The dynamic created in the USAF between technological advances and strategic bombardment doctrine dates from the earliest systematic attempts to codify air doctrine after World War I. These ideas seemed to be validated by the advent of atomic weapons and long range bombers during World War II. By the 1950s, strategic bombardment and technologically advanced aircraft had become the lens through which airmen viewed modern warfare. Airmen were generally persuaded that war was total, and would be fought with nuclear weapons, despite a growing body of evidence that the geostrategic environment had changed since World War II. This dissertation uses the F-111A as a case study to demonstrate the consistency of USAF thinking concerning doctrine and technology, which ultimately affected procurement decisions. As envisioned in 1959, the F-111A was the product of not only the latest aircraft technology available, but also a persistent preference for strategic bombardment doctrine within the USAF. Acquired as a long-range high-speed tactical nuclear fighter-bomber to counter the Soviet nuclear threat in a general war, the F-111A was sent to Southeast Asia in 1968, and again in 1972, to face an insurgent threat in a limited war. Enamored with technology, airmen believed that the F-111A, with its advanced systems, could solve the tactical problems encountered in Southeast Asia that were unforeseen in institutional doctrine. The complicated history of the F-111A serves to illustrate the pitfalls of static doctrine in an ever-changing strategic environment. This study addresses why the USAF arrived in Southeast Asia equipped for a general war in Europe, and illuminates the continuing challenge of matching technology and doctrine.