Three essays in corporate finance

dc.contributorLee, Junsoo
dc.contributorLigon, James A.
dc.contributorStone, Mary S.
dc.contributorUnderwood, Shane E.
dc.contributor.advisorAgrawal, Anup
dc.contributor.authorNasser, Tareque
dc.contributor.otherUniversity of Alabama Tuscaloosa
dc.descriptionElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation contains three distinct essays in the broad area of corporate finance. The first two essays examine the role of an independent director who is also a blockholder (IDB), a potent governance mechanism, on executive compensation, and corporate financial and investment policies, respectively. The last essay examines insider trading in takeover targets. The first essay examines three issues. First, we investigate the determinants of an IDB's presence in a firm. Second, we examine the relations between IDB presence and (1) the level and structure of CEO compensation, and (2) CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Third, we analyze if IDB presence is related to firm valuation. Our findings suggest that the presence of an independent blockholder on the board promotes better incentives and monitoring of the CEO, and consequently leads to higher firm valuation. In the second essay, we examine how the presence of an IDB affects: (1) four key financial and investment policy choices of a firm: the levels of cash holdings, dividends, investments and financial leverage, and (2) firm risk. We also examine how the market values IDB presence and changes in various policy choices associated with IDB presence in a firm. We find that firms with IDBs have significantly lower levels of cash holdings, dividend yields, repurchases, and total payout, but higher levels of capital expenditures. We also find that firms with IDBs have lower risk. Overall, IDB presence appears to reduce agency problems between managers and shareholders. The third essay brings large-sample evidence on whether the level and pattern of profitable insider trading before takeover announcements is abnormal for a broad cross-section of targets of takeovers during modern times. We find an interesting and subtle pattern in the average pre-takeover trading behavior of target insiders. While insiders reduce both their purchases and sales below normal levels, their sales reduce more than purchases, leading to an increase in net purchases. This pattern of `passive' insider trading is confined to the six-month period before takeover announcement, holds for each insider group, for all measures of net purchases examined, and in certain sub-samples with less uncertainty about takeover completion.en_US
dc.format.extent216 p.
dc.publisherUniversity of Alabama Libraries
dc.relation.hasversionborn digital
dc.relation.ispartofThe University of Alabama Electronic Theses and Dissertations
dc.relation.ispartofThe University of Alabama Libraries Digital Collections
dc.rightsAll rights reserved by the author unless otherwise indicated.en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Finance
dc.titleThree essays in corporate financeen_US
dc.typetext of Alabama. Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies University of Alabama
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