Do Managers Manipulate Employee Labor Costs to Meet Firm- and Executive-Level Targets?

dc.contributorMobbs, Shawn
dc.contributorPollard, Troy
dc.contributorStinson, Shane
dc.contributorSwanquist, Quinn
dc.contributor.advisorLopez, Thomas J
dc.contributor.authorDavis, Robert Tucker
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-30T15:21:27Z
dc.date.available2023-11-30T15:21:27Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.descriptionElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US
dc.description.abstractFair and equitable employee compensation within firms has received considerable attention by regulators, the media, and academic researchers. For example, many prominent CEOs have made explicit commitments to compensate employees fairly (Business Roundtable, 2019). The objective of this study is to provide evidence on this ongoing controversy by investigating whether managers manipulate non-executive labor costs to meet performance benchmarks. First, I predict and find that managers manipulate labor costs to meet analysts' earnings forecasts. Having established that managers manipulate labor costs to meet firm-level performance benchmarks, I next explore the extent to which managers manipulate non-executive employee labor costs to meet executive-level bonus targets. I find no consistent evidence that managers manipulate labor costs to meet or exceed their individual bonus targets. Collectively, this evidence indicates that managers are more focused on meeting firm-level benchmarks rather than individual level targets, suggesting that managers are, on average, not as self-serving as they are sometimes portrayed.en_US
dc.format.mediumelectronic
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.otherhttp://purl.lib.ua.edu/188269
dc.identifier.otheru0015_0000001_0004788
dc.identifier.otherDavis_alatus_0004D_15328
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.ua.edu/handle/123456789/12775
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Alabama Libraries
dc.relation.hasversionborn digital
dc.relation.ispartofThe University of Alabama Electronic Theses and Dissertations
dc.relation.ispartofThe University of Alabama Libraries Digital Collections
dc.rightsAll rights reserved by the author unless otherwise indicated.en_US
dc.subjectExecutive Bonus
dc.subjectLabor Costs
dc.subjectReal Activities Management
dc.titleDo Managers Manipulate Employee Labor Costs to Meet Firm- and Executive-Level Targets?en_us
dc.typethesis
dc.typetext
etdms.degree.departmentCulverhouse School of Accountancy
etdms.degree.disciplineAccounting
etdms.degree.grantorThe University of Alabama
etdms.degree.leveldoctoral
etdms.degree.namePh.D.
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