Abstract:
This paper reports the results of a study investigating the effects of PCAOB inspection (Inspection) and internal quality review (IQR) salience on auditors' audit planning and reporting decisions. To investigate these judgments, 48 auditors participated in a 1 x 3 between-subjects experiment in which the salience of a post-audit review is manipulated as Inspection salient, IQR salient, or no post-audit review is salient. Manipulating post-audit reviews salience is justified using the results of Stefaniak and Houston (2009), which suggest 63 (62) percent of their audit partners can or try to anticipate the engagements that will be selected for IQR (Inspection). Using the Houston, Peters, & Pratt (2005) model, I predict that auditors will assess higher audit fees in conditions where a post-audit review is salient. Using extant accounting research on the influence of accountability (DeZoort, Harrison, & Taylor, 2006) and sanctions (Shafer, Morris, & Ketchand, 1999), I also predict that auditors will make more conservative judgments in conditions where a post-audit review is salient. While I do not find auditors were more conservative in their judgments, I do find that post-audit review salience significantly increases audit fees. Furthermore, post-audit review salience significantly increased perceived litigation risk, overall client riskiness, substantive testing efforts, and budgeted hours, as well as significantly decreased the perceived financial condition of the client. This study is important for several reasons. First, it provides initial evidence as to the impacts of IQRs on auditor planning decisions, a quality review mechanism thus far not considered in the accounting literature. Second, it provides initial evidence and understanding of whether, and how, auditors pass post-audit review costs along to their clients.
