My dissertation focuses on three essays. The first essay studies the effect of the 2006 compensation disclosure rules on the market for CEOs by providing additional information about CEOs’ marketability. Using unique hand-collected data on compensation peers, we find CEOs who are more frequently cited as compensation peers by other firms are more likely to leave their firms or to receive compensation increases, especially in the equity-based component of total pay. The second essay studies the dynamics of compensation peers by identifying two groups of firms: 1) Those who adjust peer groups more frequently (Active firms), and 2) Those who adjust peer groups less frequently (Non-Active firms). I find while Active firms benchmark their CEO’s pay against peer pay over time, Non-Active firms do not use their compensation peer groups for benchmarking purpose. I also find that Active firms adjust their peers both to reward CEOs for good performance, and to penalize for bad performance. On the other hand, Non-active firms adjust their peer groups only to reward CEOs. The third essay examines the role of investor relations function in the top management team. We provide evidence that firms incorporating the investor-relation function in their top management teams are more likely to have greater analyst coverage, lower analyst forecast dispersion, and to more frequently beat analysts’ estimates. These firms also exhibit lower earnings management, which suggests that firms incorporating investor relations function in their top management team are less likely to manage earnings, but instead manage analyst expectations.