Three essays on investments and corporate finance

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dc.contributor Parsons, Linda M.
dc.contributor Mobbs, Houston Shawn
dc.contributor Lee, Junsoo
dc.contributor Agrawal, Anup
dc.contributor.advisor Cook, Douglas O.
dc.contributor.author Via, Marc Antony
dc.date.accessioned 2017-03-01T17:09:33Z
dc.date.available 2017-03-01T17:09:33Z
dc.date.issued 2014
dc.identifier.other u0015_0000001_0001637
dc.identifier.other Via_alatus_0004D_12062
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.ua.edu/handle/123456789/2091
dc.description Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
dc.description.abstract This dissertation consists of three essays on investments and corporate finance. The first essay is an investment article focused on factors affecting market makers in the trading of securities, the second essay is a corporate finance article which empirically tests theories of what factors motivate executives to innovate, while the third essay is a corporate finance article which empirically tests theories of why returns are higher in firms with high organization capital investments. For the first essay, I evaluate the shift in the duration of legal insider trading and asymmetric information after Sarbanes Oxley, and find that market makers can identify asymmetric trading via the PIN measure and abnormal volumes and adjust spreads accordingly. This study is the first to consider the duration and accuracy of asymmetric trading and their effects on bid ask spreads. The second essay considers executive incentives to innovate based on firm governance and compensation policies. Basically it seeks to empirically test the theoretical predictions of Manso (2011). Manso theorizes that the individual choice of management to innovate is motivated by a firm tolerance for early failure, as innovations often struggle along their development paths. Ultimately, I find empirical support for many of the predictions of Manso. The third essay addresses how the threat of talented employee departure from firms affects firm risk. Eisfeldt and Papanikoloau (2013) introduced the idea that the threat of the loss of key talent may increase risk for firms with high levels of organization capital. However, they do not provide direct evidence that this risk increase is due to this employment threat, and other literature has suggested that SG&A risk is from management inability or unwillingness to reduce costs. I add to this debate by testing the movement of inventors between firms, and find strong support for the theories of Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013).
dc.format.extent 207 p.
dc.format.medium electronic
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language English
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher University of Alabama Libraries
dc.relation.ispartof The University of Alabama Electronic Theses and Dissertations
dc.relation.ispartof The University of Alabama Libraries Digital Collections
dc.relation.hasversion born digital
dc.rights All rights reserved by the author unless otherwise indicated.
dc.subject.other Finance
dc.title Three essays on investments and corporate finance
dc.type thesis
dc.type text
etdms.degree.department University of Alabama. Dept. of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies
etdms.degree.discipline Finance
etdms.degree.grantor The University of Alabama
etdms.degree.level doctoral
etdms.degree.name Ph.D.


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