This dissertation examines sixty years of fishing activity and more than twenty years of direct regulatory management in the Gulf red snapper fishery in order to assess the consequences of regulatory intervention in the fishery. The analysis traces the evolution of regulatory response to a commons problem, beginning with command and control regulations that successfully capped fishing output but unintentionally exacerbated overcapitalization concerns, segueing to the subsequent adjustments of the aforementioned policies applied to ameliorate the unintended consequences of regulation, and ending with a rights-based approach intended to align individuals' incentives with the fishery's. After outlining and discussing the various regulatory strategies used to manage the fishery, the analysis then replicates two previous econometric models of Gulf red snapper price in order to consider the determinants of price, including regulatory decisions. The work concludes with another pair of econometric models used to investigate the relationship between regulation and price volatility. The results provide feedback to regulators regarding the implications of fishery management policy.