

MANY GENDER GAPS: INTERSECTIONALITY AND
CROSS-GROUP DIFFERENCES IN GENDER'S
EFFECT ON POLITICAL BELIEFS

by

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I set out to debunk the notion that the gender gap in political ideology is homogeneous across subpopulations. This idea is implicit in most of the otherwise exhaustive gender gap literature. Building on intersectionality theory I explore the many ways people are influenced by their other identities and group memberships in expressing their gender. I focus on three core theories of the gender gap: compassionate communitarianism, Group Positions Theory, and financial precarity. Applying these theories to intersectional identities I demonstrate that the gender gap is not homogenous, and that the applicable driver or theory varies from one group to another. In particular, I argue that the intersectional class-gender gap is best explained by group positions theory, as is the religion-gender gap. However, I find compelling evidence that the generation-gender gap is better explained by precarity theory.

DEDICATION

To Ciara and Caitriona

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1. INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A SINGLE GENDER GAP?

The American dream is built on the powerful idea that all men are created equal, and that through hard work and sheer determination every opportunity is open to the American man. The only constraint on a man's potential is his willingness to put in the effort. On the other hand, plenty of American's face very real constraints. Women and people of color routinely face constraints that white American men, and particularly middle or upper-class men do not face. Furthermore, women of color face a double bind, as has been recognized by the rich theoretical tradition of intersectionality (Carbado et al. 2013). A particularly visible example from race-gender intersectionality is the criticism of Anita Hill as a "race traitor" guilty of "high-tech lynching" for attempting to exercise a right to tolerable work conditions instead of towing the line for advancement of an African American colleague (Carbado et al. 2013; Harris 2013). This dissertation explores the ways in which additional identities—beyond race—intersect with gender to place American women into a position to question the idea that all possibilities are open to them. These identities—religion, class, and generation—are more likely to be voluntary or impermanent than race, but they do create consciously or unconsciously accepted constraints on the acceptable worldviews and political ideas an individual will adopt. Membership in these groups necessitates commitments to ideas which may benefit the group while requiring personal sacrifice, including taking policy positions which appear to work against the individual's self-interest.

Americans have been bombarded by right wing criticism that the media is getting real people and voters wrong, along with assertions that journalists are ignoring facts of all sorts. While many of these critiques conveniently point to ways that the media is treating right-wing politicians unfairly, there is at least one area of legitimate critique. For decades, the media has pointed to liberal women as the saving grace of the Democratic party. Even more importantly, there is a sense of urgency to attract female swing voters. While getting out the female vote is certainly admirable, a group which makes up a solid majority of the electorate might not be accurately considered as a bloc of swing voters. The media has painted female voters as a homogeneous special interest group, all of whom should be “swingable” when either traditional women’s issues or mother’s issues are at play. This is a patently ridiculous premise, but one with plenty of apparent basis in fact if one looks to the way that political scientists have discussed female voters and the gender gap. As a discipline we have focused on the degree of difference between men and women in voting, or ideology, and have tried to explain that simple gap. Because each woman brings her own set of additional identities to bear on her political decisions, I have started this dissertation by examining how intersecting identities encourage women to see their roles, values, and interests differently from one another. I have examined the ways in which women across class and religious groups are an ideologically heterogeneous group rather than a single voting bloc defined in mirror to men. Women, in fact, are complex and uniquely thinking voters, not replicable entities at odds with men.

The media’s depiction of women voters is consistent with a large literature in political science, which has identified a significant gender gap in partisanship. Many studies have documented the fact that women are consistently more likely than men to identify as liberal and Democratic (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004; Brady et al. 2009, Chaney et al. 1998, Howell &

Day 2000, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999, Kaufmann 2008, Manza & Brooks 1998). For the most part, both scholars as well as political commentators have treated this gender effect as homogenous (Cassese and Barnes 2018), and thus relatively uniform across the entire population of American women and men. The most recent example of this assumption in the popular media concerned the voting behavior of women in the 2016 election and the prediction that then presidential candidate Donald Trump would lose conservative female support en masse for his offensive rhetoric. However, long before this special case pundits and scholars alike have claimed that women in conservative communities would vote in marginally more liberal ways—because they were empathetic soccer moms, or compassionately devout, for example. The cause and existence of the gender gap in partisanship has been the subject of truly prolific scholarship but has rarely addressed what would seem to be an essential question. Is the gender gap the same across all American communities and identity groups?

In this dissertation, I bring together the gender gap and intersectionality literatures to explore this question. The forces of intersectional oppression had long been a rarely noticed undercurrent of control in the lives and ideologies of many Americans, but today attention to the effects and presence of intersectional identities bring purposeful effort to the mobilization and representation of many subgroups, so that a complete understanding is all the more important (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013). I examine how the gender effect on ideology and the gender gap in partisanship varies as a function of overlapping group identities in terms of class and religion. It is important here to once again point out that examining class-gender or religion-gender intersections are just additional steps in the project of understanding the many potential interlocking identities that uniquely shape women's political behavior. While race has been left out due to the necessity of limiting this dissertation's scope and following appropriate analytical

techniques, intersectionality is incomplete when it disregards race (Carbado et al. 2013), and expansions on this project will need to bring race back into the analysis through more complex methods and additional data. In taking this first step, I will explore the utility of three theoretical approaches to understanding the heterogeneity of the gender gap in American politics.

The quintessential American ideal of individualism is tied to conservatism, and especially to the ideas of small government and self-sufficiency. In contrast, communitarianism leads to a liberal bent towards group identity, charity, and other centeredness. A communitarianism hypothesis argues that American women are socialized into communitarian ways of thinking, whereas men are socialized towards individualism. A second theory aligns with Group Position Theory and argues that partisanship will be related to one's position in the social group hierarchy. Men score higher on social dominance orientation and are more likely to support social structures that perpetuate inequality from which they are more likely to benefit personally. Progressive politics has long aligned with egalitarian values which tend to run counter to social dominance. Conservatism has also traditionally lined up along this spectrum but has carried the mantle for greater hierarchy and the norms of traditional power relations. However, intersectionality theory has emphasized that compounding factors of social control come to exist through many mechanisms. Jackman's (1994) ideas of self-enforcing patriarchy and the various group positions and social dominance theories support the idea of socially enforced hierarchy (Bobo 1999; Jost et al. 2004, Pratto et al. 1994, Sidanius et al. 1994). Intersectionality is first and foremost a theory concerned with compounding factors of oppression and power over. It is especially important to consider the mechanisms behind this control as I evaluate overlapping identities through the frame of intersectionality. Seminal works focus on racism, patriarchy, and

later classism or other forms of economic oppression and exploitation, but this list need not be seen as exhaustive.

Third, an economic precarity theory argues that, for a host of reasons, women are consistently less stable in their class position. Higher economic risk and caretaking responsibilities are tied to greater liberalism (Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy et al. 2009, Edlund & Pande 2002, Welch & Hibbing 1992). This can be seen most easily as impacting pocket-book voting. Further, the government reinforces hierarchical social control through policing and welfare policies. Because women are more likely to seek government assistance, and increasingly likely to be incarcerated, the economic precarity which disproportionately and increasingly leads them to government programs is more likely to impose social control in their lives than in the lives of men (Crenshaw 2012; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011).

Implications for Understanding Variation in the Gender Gap

The importance of communitarianism, group position and economic precarity in the formation of political values suggests that the gender gap should vary in predictable ways across several politically relevant demographic subgroups of the electorate. I summarize the logic of these intersectional hypotheses below.

Religion

First, I expect that the gender gap will vary across the major religious identities. A review of the teachings of major American faith traditions will be used to address differences in communitarian-individualist teachings and gender role teachings. The doctrines common to different religions prescribe beliefs which are more or less friendly to a wide range of politics (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). In addition, group position theory comes into play because of

different religions' support or opposition to racial and gender equality. ANES data establishes the importance of these interactions, with more communitarian faith traditions supporting more communitarian politics, and benevolent sexism driving political beliefs amongst women whose faith traditions are committed to traditional gender roles. Data limitations also necessitate qualitative work to elaborate the mechanism behind gender-religion effects, and a mix of political science and religious studies sources are used to validate my classification of denominations.

Marital Status

Additionally, I expect that the gender gap will vary by family structure and especially by marital status. Indeed, one of the largest demographic voting gaps in the United States exists between married and unmarried women (Kingston and Finkel 1987, Plutzer and McBurnett 1991, Weisberg 1987). This is relevant to any study of gender and religion because scholars have found a reciprocal relationship between religiosity and marital status. While the most religious are more likely to marry, religious individuals who choose to enter into cohabitating relationships instead of marrying will decline in participation and expressed importance of religion (Thornton et al 2004). Edlund and Pande (2002) point to the rise in divorce and single parenthood and the subsequent decline in women's financial security as a cause for women's increasingly liberal political attitudes. With unfavorable economic circumstances fewer individuals marry (Carbone and Cahn 2014). Today's more mobile married couples also tend to reside where their financial opportunities are most positive—advancing social and political echo chambers in the process (Hawley 2012). The declining importance of religion amongst Americans and rising economic inequality is inextricably tied to lower marriage rates, and by extension to the increase in the gender gap in voting—as unmarried women grow in number and

tend to vote more often for liberal policies and politicians than their married peers. This dissertation must account for the shifting landscape of religion, economics, and family structure since the gender gap's inception in 1973 if it is to address the role of religion-gender intersectionality.

Social Class

Theories of communitarianism, group position and economic precarity lead me to expect that the gender gap will also vary by social class. The American middle class is highly mobile, and therefore less moored to traditional community and family networks, allowing middle class individuals to think in more individualist terms than working class and poor Americans on average (Lareau 2003). Insofar as partisanship aligns with communitarian-individualist ideals, class and gender serve as reinforcing political identities for middle class men and competing or conflictual identities for other class-gender groups. Group Position Theory is also likely to come into play as gender and class each determine social power or prestige. Middle class men will have reinforcing political identities, while middle class women and members of the working class will not view themselves as dominant and will favor political positions which oppose the status quo. An interesting caveat here is that women who are traditionalist in their gender ideals may feel they occupy their rightful position in society, and therefore align with middle class men in preferring status quo reinforcing positions. These traditionalist women will tend to hold conservative social values, and be especially likely to favor benevolent sexist attitudes, as well as hostile sexist attitudes in some cases.

The economic precarity theory is important to understanding how class may operate differently for women than for men. Middle class women may not wholly align with middle class

political interests because they are not sure that they will stay middle class. There is an ongoing debate about what drives the economic caution of women in their political decisions. Theories include a biologically determined pessimism, a socialized drive to care for others—including strangers, and a higher likelihood of benefitting personally from safety net programs (Beutel & Marini 1995, Chaney et al. 1998, Conover 1988, Edlund & Pande 2002, Erie & Rein 1988, Gilens 1988, Gilligan 1982, Huddy et al. 2009, Kaufmann 2002, Manza & Brooks 1998, May and Stephenson 1994, Piven 1985, Sanbonmatsu 2010, Seltzer et al. 1997, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986, Welch & Hibbing 1992). In this dissertation I have attempted to control for how much personal risk men and women are facing. I believe it is possible in this way to see whether precarity is the driving force behind policy decisions, or whether other factors drive the same ideological differences when precarity is taken away as a possible explanation. In other words, this determines whether gender-class roles are internalized identities or simply reflect material conditions of a given individual.

Upward economic mobility is rare, but not impossible in the United States.

Unfortunately, downward mobility is quite common. While downward mobility is a more likely experience for women than for men, America's limited safety net means that no one is immune from dramatic changes in their financial circumstances over time. If class at birth does not mean that you can perfectly predict your current circumstances, which matters? As I will demonstrate later in the dissertation, both long term identity and passing economic circumstances matter a great deal, and both matter in different ways for women than for men. Study of religion calls up the need to address the entanglement of religion, family formation, and economics. These complicated questions arise once again when we consider gender, class, and precarity. The 1970s fight over America's morality politics is remembered for efforts to increase the rights of women

in the workplace and for expanding divorce rights. What is all but forgotten is that financial deregulation was gearing up and started with policies that touched at the heart of many American family's financial decision-making and ultimate security. I point to the rapid changes of this era—from loosening divorce laws to lax usury and financial regulation—to explain how many American women found themselves in a uniquely unsettled financial position. I am able to conclude that American women respond more significantly to financial upheaval than do American men. In this way we see that as the gender gap was first noticed in the 1970s was already marked by major differences of degree between different groups of women.

Generational Identities

Finally, I explore one sizeable exception that exist to arguments of a communitarian-individualism explanation. While dominant groups in America have long relied on individualism as a driving ethic for American values, millennials have been less financially independent than previous generations. Out of necessity in the post-recession economy millennials were more likely to move back home, and more willing to demand larger safety nets from government. Extending the economic exception to individualism, we see that a lot of non-individualist beliefs stem from a clear need for financial support and security. This case is especially interesting because it has the potential to change previous relationships around class and religion. Typically, young adults have left the nest at eighteen if they were to attend college, and returned only periodically, driven by a search for higher paying and more specialized professional jobs. Today's heavy student loan burden has provided a disincentive for this behavior. If we see the college educated middle class more likely to move home and stay with family, a longstanding justification for middle class individualism may come unwound for this generation. Furthermore,

the prestige of a college degree still exists and perhaps has increased. The return on investment in terms of high income as a result of high education has also increased. However, we see that middle class millennials with college degrees, heavy debt, and limited savings may not experience the sense of security we have often equated with the American middle class. Today's American young adults are increasingly equalitarian, and they experience higher community or family reliance paired with higher levels of precarity in their personal finances.

A Caveat on Race

As mentioned above, this dissertation has focused on variation within, rather than across racial groups. Although similar relationships occur within each racial group which I am able to study, there is not adequate survey data for many years to be able to provide rich understandings of the ideological positions of non-white women. Yet another problem with the common narrative regarding female voters is the implicit, but rarely stated assumption that when commentators discuss female voters, they mean white women. Although I have attempted to note where I am aware that relationships differ for non-white racial groups, my analysis usually centers on white voters. There is such little ideological or party variation amongst African American voters that the gender gap can disappear, or other effects can be hard to detect due simply to their miniscule size. More frustrating, the major survey data does not have ideal sample sizes for African American voters and has unreasonably small sample sizes for other groups. Mixed with interaction based independent variables, the sample size necessary for statistical significance is often too large for the available surveys. It is not the case that male and female minority voters are indistinguishable, nor is it the case that race and gender operate in complete isolation. In fact, the premise of this dissertation is that intersectionality—the

multifaceted identities that an individual lives with—are of utmost importance. I am explicitly focused on white women because to transpose the theories I am interested in onto other groups of women would be theoretically and analytically lazy. I make no assertion that my relatively simple analyses should be taken as guiding theory when extensive existing research argues for a different fact pattern with regards to race-gender intersectionality. As the field progresses some of these theories will be elaborated. For example, Lizotte and Cary (2021) have demonstrated that a precarity theory drives the higher levels of liberalism amongst black women relative to black men. In this article the authors are able to conclude that economic precarity drives black women's social welfare policy preferences.

In conclusion, I believe that application of the findings presented here to race are inappropriate for two key reasons. Firstly, I do not have the data or analytical capacity to draw meaningful between race comparisons. I would expect numerous false null results when looking at the smaller sample sizes by race in the ANES, and typical workarounds (such as weighted samples) raise serious concerns for looking at small subgroups. Secondly, the work on race-gender does not suffer from the same degree of disregard as other differences have. The seminal works in Intersectionality may well be read to imply that a gender effect should differ by race. Additionally, Black Feminism scholars have produced compelling work on the specific causalities behind this variation. I believe that this work deserves further attention, and in particular that additional research is needed to examine the role of gender across other racial and ethnic groups, especially amongst groups that are heterogeneous and may not be appropriately studied as a single group in the first place.

Finally, I adopt the view of Carbado (2013) and others that intersectionality ought not be relegated to the sphere of hyper-specialization and should be considered as a paradigm in its own

right (Hancock 2007). Kimberlé Crenshaw used intersectionality as a tool to explain the need for more nuanced legal protections and her predecessors fought to bring awareness of gaps to practitioners. However, in addition to this very concrete contribution, these scholars were building on the work of numerous others to elaborate the various systems and forces of oppression which operate on a single individual. In the case of race-gender intersectionality earlier thinkers had expressed and fought the “double handicap” (Terrell 1940), women as scapegoats or as a “slave of a slave” (Beale 1970), “Jane Crow” (Murray 1987), and “multiple jeopardy” (King 1986). Crenshaw developed these ideas to talk about multiplicative effects as suggested by King (1986), but she also emphasized the importance of the forces that empowered those effects, racism and patriarchy. Nash (2008) went on to specifically incorporate class and to elaborate the multifaceted contributions of intersectionality.

In each case it is the system justifying beliefs that work to alter individual life experiences, or to restrict life chances. I have chosen to rely on intersectionality in explaining the identity-based life circumstances of respondents with a belief that the options open to individuals are filtered through each closely held identity. While race-gender is rightfully the most fundamental intersection and takes a place of primacy in all discussion of intersectionality, I do believe that the theoretical work done by intersectionality scholars sets the stage for exploration of many social systems that drive individuals’ beliefs. Critiques of “equivalency” in claims of oppression are well founded (Collins 1998), and it is important to note that I do not think the social controls inherent in generation, religion, or even class in the American context compares to those of race and gender. I still believe these secondary cases of control enforced through norms and social systems are interesting and noteworthy. I also expect that some of the

mechanisms elaborated in this dissertation will prove useful in looping back around to explore the race-gender intersections from even more angles than existing work has so far managed.

Next Steps

The dissertation that follows will elaborate where more complex intersectionality analysis is necessary to meaningfully understand the gender gap in political ideology. Controversy exists within the field about which intersectional identities are worth study, and whether intersectionality can be used to study dominant groups (Davis 2008). I have taken the approach that we can comparatively study all groups with an intersectional framework, although the appropriate methodology for each intersection may vary. While not all identities serve to oppress individuals all of the identities discussed here have been levers for disadvantaging certain groups of women. In so far as set of beliefs allows the privileged members of a group to command or direct the other members, this group is actually an identity with a built-in system of oppression.

To start, I present a chapter reviewing the literature on the gender gap, and the theories most commonly used to understand the simple gender gap (male-female non-intersectional gap). Next, I delve deeper into positing a theory of the intersectional gender gaps. Using an individualism-communitarianism distinction we can explain a great deal of the interactive effects of gender and class as well as gender and religion. I explore why this is the case, and how this fits into existing work on the gender gap as well as intersectionality. Next, I approach each of these intersections in turn, dedicating one chapter to the gender-religion gap, one to the gender-class gap as well as gender-precarity effects. In particular, I emphasize the surprising way that economic precarity effects individuals intersectionally and conclude the class-gender chapter with a synthesis of the findings on economic and communitarian-individualist explanations of

the gender gap. Lastly, I present a look at the intersection of gender and generation. Millennials' changing attitudes towards individualism may signal a subtle shift in American politics which will expand as generational replacement occurs, and which will have enormous implications for the future of the American gender gap in voter preferences. More concretely, the exceptional economic risks faced by millennials explain a great deal of generational differences in the gender gap.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is consensus that female voters break towards the Democrats (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004, Brady et al. 2009, Chaney et al. 1998, Kaufmann 2008, Manza & Brooks 1998). Beyond this consensus the gender gap literature has looked to the exceptions to prove the rule. This has resulted in a robust literature which finds that the gender gap in ideology is reversed, class dependent, or nonexistent across issue areas and even specific policies aimed at the same goals (Conover and Sapiro 1993, Eagly et al. 2004, Eichenberg 2003, Haider-Markel & Vieux 2008, Halim & Stiles 2001, Howell & Day 2000, Huddy et al. 2005, Huddy et al. 2009, Hughes & Tuch 2003, Hurwitz & Smithey 1998, Lerner et al. 2003, Schlesinger & Heldman 2001, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986, Smith 1984, Stack 2000, Wolpert & Gimpel 1998). Some issue areas where a “standard” political gender gap is found are concretely gendered and women align more often with the liberal stance (Huddy et al. 2009, Hurwitz & Smithey 1998, Schaffner and Senic. 2006). On the other hand, most women’s issues—those things seen as disproportionately affecting women—do not present a gender gap in opinions (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004, Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy et al. 2009, Sears & Huddy 1990, Sears 2003, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986).

Why is the gender gap heterogeneous?

As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, the study of American politics has presented a well-documented gender gap whereby American women tend to vote and think in slightly more liberal or Democratic ways than American men. Often this is accompanied by an implicit assumption that women across the American population will vote slightly more liberally

than their male peers within communities and even households. The gender gap itself is explained by gender differences in belief in compassion politics, equalitarianism, economics, and more rarely a given personality trait. Taken as a whole, the most prevalent theories center on a concern with the wellbeing of others and a desire to live in a society with shared regard for other community members. In particular, these theories center government efforts to care for community members and ensure a base level of security for those members. In other words, women are more strongly committed to communitarian ideals than are men, and conversely men are more strongly committed to individualist ideals than are women. Part of this variation is endogenous with equalitarian beliefs, which also vary by gender. Women tend to believe in equalitarian principles more strongly, while men are more likely to be committed to hierarchies. Finally, women are more likely to experience economic precarity or to be attuned to its impact on others. Women are likely to be more economically liberal, while men are likely to be more economically conservative.

As I will argue in this dissertation, gender is not the only determinant of commitment to communitarian or individualist ideals, to belief in equalitarianism or hierarchy, or to concern for economic precarity. This dissertation elaborates a handful of cases where intersectional identity drives differences in the magnitude of the gender gap across different groups within the American electorate. In particular I point out that the average member of certain groups maintains strong commitment to communitarian ideals regardless of their gender, and that the average member of other groups maintains strong commitment to individualist ideals—again regardless of gender identity. The average member of some groups is highly equalitarian while the average member of other groups is highly hierarchical in their values, regardless of gender. Finally, the average member of some groups is very worried about the economy and finances,

while the average member of other groups is markedly less concerned, regardless of gender. This means in effect that the gender gap is concentrated amongst certain subgroups. Similarly, political pundits are endlessly fascinated with the possibility of shifting female voters based alternatively on their surprisingly liberal ideals (given their other identities) or what is presumed to be a natural tendency toward conservatism, on the part of certain women, if one could only overcome their gender proclivities. This dissertation will elaborate the ways in which women from various communities and identity groups are thoughtful voters with complex commitments. I will demonstrate that many of the exceptions to the gender gap are rather predictable, and that the most extreme instances of the gender gap are also easily understood when framed in terms of the gender gap theories. On average, American women are more liberal than American men because they are more likely to hold communitarian than individualist ideals, adhere to equalitarianism, and worry about the economic wellbeing of their family and fellow Americans. When a group leans heavily towards communitarianism or individualism, equalitarianism, or economic precarity regardless of gender there will not be an evident gender gap.

Theories of the Contemporary Gender Gap in U.S. Politics

The gender gap originally referred to one of two things. Firstly, directly after earning the right to vote, women did not vote at the same levels as men. Secondly, there was a gender gap in ideology formed by greater religious and social conservatism amongst women. Today women vote more often than men, and the direction of the ideological gender gap has flipped, with women now more likely to identify as liberal compared to men. Despite commentators' heightened concern over an all-encompassing religiously based culture war it seems that religion has lost its place as the central and clear-cut driver of the gender gap in ideology. Women still

exhibit a higher degree of religiosity in terms of religious belonging and worship attendance. However, men have turned towards the Republican party and women have turned towards the Democrats (Campbell 1967, Kaufmann 2002, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999, Kenski 1988, Sanbonmatsu 2010, Wirls 1986) – flipping the gender gap, and appearing to diminish the role of religion in the process.

However, there has been a great deal of debate over the primary driver(s) of the modern gender gap in ideology and by extension vote choice. The literature has generally focused on four potential mechanisms: predispositions to compassion or care-based issues and communitarianism, biologically inherent predisposition to equalitarianism, inherent personality differences, and economic position. Missing from some of this work is a discussion of how interlinked each theory really is. I believe there is an overarching theme of communitarianism—or other-centeredness—across the various theories and will discuss this idea in depth in future chapters. For now, I will set forth the existing theories, so as to center my work in the robust literature that exists to date. Even if one is uncomfortable with thinking of these theories as intrinsically interrelated, each individually identified theory represents a causal mechanism which varies in magnitude and variation from one group to the next. Each of the dominant theories aligns with and supports this dissertation’s overarching argument that the gender gap is not homogeneous, and that it should be expected to vary based on intersectional identities. This conclusion flows naturally from an understanding that gender is an identity which has impacts of various strengths within as well as between genders (Gidengil & Stolle 2021).

Modern Gender Gap Theories: Equalitarian Identity

Scholars and observers of American politics have rightfully focused on variation in the levels of support for equality in terms of race, class, and now gender and sexuality. The earliest

studies considered prejudice against each group individually and treated such beliefs as issue positions rather than ideology. Early in the gender gap literature there was an assumption that women would by and large turn to liberal politicians for support with the growing feminist and gender equality movements as women's social consciousness rose, and they aligned their politics with these movements. Out of a core literature on equalitarian beliefs numerous ideology-based conceptions of anti-equalitarian beliefs have flourished. Many scholars have now focused on theorizing the alternative belief systems which we interpret as directly opposing equalitarian beliefs. As I will discuss later, the belief systems are not found to be equally distributed between genders.

In their review of the literature on some of these belief systems, Sibley and Duckitt (2008) perform an extensive metanalysis to connect Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and the big five personality traits. In their analysis it is abundantly clear that the complex multidimensional nature of personality makes discussion difficult as a relatively simple design yields numerous substantive findings with varying theoretical relevance. Ultimately, this study demonstrates a wide range of applications for well-constructed personality measures, and the authors are able to showcase a lack of publication bias, as well as a tendency for more widely studied dimensions (in this case RWA and SDO) to operate through personality.

Contrary to the common belief that whiteness is an apolitical default identity, increased attention to immigration, racial tension, and the election of America's first black president aligned to create a high salience of white identity and ideological movements claiming to defend these interests (Jardina 2019). An experimental study found that pointing out a "rags-to-riches" explanation was able to reduce moral outrage about unequal outcomes, and to reduce support for redistributive policies. High status individuals were especially receptive to this narrative

(Wakslak et al. 2007). Presumably, reinforcement of the idea that good fortune is earned is reassuring for those who have it. Another study found that immigration was more strongly opposed as a source of threat to national culture than as an economic threat (Sniderman et al. 2004), in this case we can see that identity is activated more effectively than concrete financial impacts, at least in certain circumstances.

The works that Sibley and Duckitt (2008) analyze on Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as well as those on Group Position Theory (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999), paternalism (Jackman 1996), and recently white identity (Jardina 2019) at times delve into the details of anti-equalitarian beliefs, but they also often address the system-justifying beliefs that are essential to adopting such worldviews. The latter is necessary as equality has long been held as a core value of American political culture, although survey data demonstrates that it is far from a universally held belief.

Although deep inequality is an uncomfortable reality for many, conservatives successfully adopt system-justifying beliefs to support the status quo, while left-leaning individuals confronted with deep inequality are more likely to believe that the system has failed or disapprove of existing institutions (Anderson & Singer 2008). System-justifying beliefs can increase psychological well-being and reduce “anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty (Jost & Hunyady 2002).” Conservative ideologies also seem more natural for individuals who prefer certainty and order, and threatening situations or situations which introduce higher instability elicit more conservative preferences (Jost et al. 2003). Human beings dislike risk and the unknown. At the extremes even positive change is frightening in its ability to unsettle the status quo and introduce unknowns.

Women tend to be more equalitarian and are more likely to see a structural rather than personal cause for inequality which negatively impacts others (Barnes & Cassese 2017). For example, women are more likely to believe that something about the economy or the law is at least partially to blame, and the person who is down on their luck should not be fully to blame for finding themselves in unfortunate circumstances. At its core, equalitarianism is the set of beliefs that says all people are inherently worthy, and that their value derives from their universal humanity. Equalitarianism recognizes varied identities, individual and group differences, but does not attribute worth based on these differences. Rather than abiding by system-justifying beliefs equalitarians, who are on average slightly more likely to be women, believe that the system is fundamentally flawed if people are living in substantially unequal conditions. This belief can be a driving force for one's beliefs about government and society.

Support for both liberal social welfare and liberal racial justice policies are connected to low Social Dominance Orientation. This measure of desire to maintain or increase power over outgroups, as opposed to promoting equality, is higher on average amongst men, regardless of other identities and environmental factors (Sidanius et al. 1994). To fully unpack SDO's impact on gender relations is complex because the idea focuses on a commitment to supporting or undermining the status quo as a whole, as well as the roles of groups within the existing hierarchy. Because SDO does not involve thinking in terms of person-to-person contact, placing gender into an SDO framework is awkward. The very meaning of masculinity and femininity is built and acted out day by day as highly personal identities even within one's home. In fact, while social dominance orientation refers to an individual level proclivity for power and hierarchical structure, this is only one aspect of Social Dominance Theory. The complete theory explains how institutional bias is built around dominant group interests, so that to fully

understand these disparities in resources and prestige you must look at history as well as the ideologies that come out of SDO-based beliefs (Sidanius 2004). The systems and customs of society were set up to support the dominant group's desired outcomes. With no intentional effort to maintain inequality or subordination we do so as we carry out the day-to-day duties of our roles in society, and the dominant group's hold on power is thereby self-perpetuating and nearly accidental.

Social dominance theory predicts that all forms of prejudice extend from social dominance orientation, so that hierarchy or prejudice based on race, gender, and class would all originate in part from the same preference for an ingroup (Sidanius 2004). For women who do hold stronger SDO this would mean that there is an intrinsic preference for men in higher levels of power, as this would uphold the existing social hierarchy. We might assume that high SDO women would want to be dominant in their own heterosexual relationships, but by supporting the continued societal power of their husbands and fathers they are also maintaining their relative power over other women.

Jackman (1996) argues that paternalism allows dominant groups to forge goodwill through benevolence, such that subordinate groups are intimately committed to the individuals who make up that group, and thus wind up ardently defending the institutions that lead to their own lower position. Threats to a dominant group's position can elicit stronger political responses, so that even an apparently low-salience identity group like whites can maintain an identity which can be a source of political beliefs when the group feels at risk (Jardina 2014). Further, these longstanding and recreated relationships can become so entrenched that according to system justification theory members of subordinate groups will internalize feelings of inferiority, and sometimes be the staunchest defenders of hierarchies (Jost et al. 2004).

Blumer (1958) introduced Group Position Theory or the idea that racism was not only an aversive feeling, but rather an intentional preferencing of one's in group over another. Group Position Theory is similar to Social Dominance Theory in its commitment to understanding the interplay of personal commitment to hierarchical societies with the structures, ideas, and histories that create and recreate them. However, where Social Dominance Theory focuses on a desired hierarchy, Group Position Theory points to hierarchies that groups within the system define as normatively right. Group Position Theory suggests that racism and prejudice stem from a sense of race based on in group and out group identification, but not primarily on the feelings of one individual towards another (Blumer 1958). It also emphasizes a need for strictly defined group boundaries, where a group might rather define itself exclusively than win more members. In this way there is a preference for prestige rather than majority. On the other hand, Group Position Theory explains that conflicts of group values and concrete group interests will shift the normative story for hierarchy, and therefore the hierarchy itself. Social Dominance Theory elaborates only an explanation of why the world is how it is today, whereas GPT allows that in group members might adapt or at least acquiesce to change that is in their best interest (Bobo 1999).

Right wing authoritarianism features preferences for “conventionalism, moral absolutism, obedience to authority, and cynicism” (Napier & Jost 2008 p. 595) and has long been associated with the working class. As a driver of ideology, the first two features were associated with economic conservatism, but not with SES. The latter two features were associated with cultural conservatism. Obedience to authority and cynicism were associated with both lower educational attainment and intolerance, so that it appears that individuals who are less educated are

sometimes conservative because of a commitment to the traditionalist beliefs of authoritarianism, rather than for economic reasons (Napier & Jost 2008).

People with higher levels of education are more liberal on racial policies and less anti-communist (Davis 1982), but also tend to take some more libertarian stances such that they are unlikely to call for government enforcement of policies, including those with equalitarian aims (McCall & Manza 2011). Overall, education has a non-linear effect on ideology with high school graduates and postgraduates being more liberal than those holding a bachelor's (McCall & Manza 2011). Received knowledge and conservative pundits argue that the material presented in certain college curriculums may skew towards liberal ideologies—whether that be gender studies or environmental science. In particular, the inclusion of non-creationist theories in science classes and the inclusion of material on the civil rights and feminist movements have been seen as direct challenges to conservative Christian views. Recently controversial invited speakers on college campuses have also created a highly visible effort by the left to prohibit those speakers deemed dangerous, and a visible backlash on the right in the name of free speech (Haidt and Lukianoff 2018).

What has been shown empirically is that education increases tolerance. Through exposure to more points of view, critical thinking across disciplines, and diverse student bodies, individuals who attend college become more open and ultimately less supportive of ideologies based on prejudice or intolerance (Napier and Jost 2008). This aligns with previous work that found a connection between liberal positions on racial policies and education. Racism is only one type of anti-equalitarian belief, but it is often the most dominant form in American politics. To know that education reduces racial conservatism is to connect education to equalitarianism more broadly. Of key importance to this dissertation is the fact that while women were once excluded

from formal higher education, American women now consistently outperform American men in terms of college enrollment and degree completion. Furthermore, the gender gap is larger amongst college educated Americans (Gillion, Ladd, and Merideth 2020). However, education cannot be the sole explanation for a gender gap that began when the educational gender balance was reversed. It is worth noting that we can expect that higher female education rates may create a compounding effect for other gender gaps.

Beginning from the premise that women are more equalitarian, and that equalitarianism aligns with the Democratic party and liberal ideologies, we should expect women to be more liberal on average. Many of these theories explicitly argue that men are more likely to hold beliefs—SDO, dominant group position, or beneficiary of the hierarchy—that will make them more anti-equalitarian (Pratto et al. 1994). This body of research predicts a gender gap between the average female and male voter. However, many of these theories also posit that additional identities can be important to determining the feelings of dominance or benefit that drives anti-equalitarian beliefs. If we read fully into these theories, we should expect the widely recognized gender gap between the average American man and the average American woman. However, we also can anticipate that the gap will not be homogenously distributed across society. Jackman (1994) argues that the women who benefit from inequality value it. SDO and GPT both suggest that people who are outside of the dominant groups can oppose inequality regardless of their gender.

Group Position Theory as determinant of the heterogeneous gender gap

Group Position Theory is specific and detailed in arguing that those who benefit most from the status quo support conservative policies and embed those ideas in the structures and norms of institutions (Bobo 1999). Social Dominance Theory argues for a similar framework but

adds a dynamic time dimension by which the hierarchy of society and power changes due to shocks and disequilibrium (Jost et al. 2004). Social Dominance Theory also emphasizes an inherent individual level predisposition to support hierarchical social structures, which is referred to as Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) by the theory's authors. This predisposition, SDO, is consistently higher amongst men than women, even after controlling for numerous other demographic characteristics (Pratto et al. 1994, Sidanius et al. 1994).

Social Dominance Theory points out that many women will be likely to believe in and support their subordination, at least subconsciously in service to fulfilling caring roles or supporting family members (Sidanius 2004). Jackman (1996) argues that paternalism allows dominant groups to forge goodwill through benevolence. SDT and GPT, on the other hand, both argue that dominance is forged through force and power. Even in cases where violence and economic coercion are not explicit there may be male dominance.

According to paternalism theory, this quieter power dynamic is possible at times because subordinate groups are intimately committed to the individuals who make up the benevolent dominate group, and thus ardently defend the institutions that help their husbands or fathers, even as the same institutions lead to the women's subordination. Women take on this secondary position as a means to demonstrate love and loyalty and to fulfill their roles well. They understand their supporting roles as positive if inferior to the roles of men in their lives. The expectation of this theory is still that the institutions of daily life will recreate inequality in society (Jackman 1996). For reasons of personal loyalty as much as for material benefit, the gains of white men have traditionally felt like gains for the white women who were their spouses. Social structuring is more likely to be performed by gentle coercion and personal commitments or benevolence than by force (Bobo 1999, Jackman 1996). Jackman's argument in

the case of gender demonstrates that some women may be active in supporting and recreating patriarchal structures.

Expanding to other dimensions of identity the same theory may apply. Disadvantaged race and class groups are not able to be violently controlled through formal legal means, although we know that the legal and welfare systems do operate informally to place controls on such groups. Working class employees may put up with mistreatment by management because fighting back would mean risking promotions or raises and provide only a small chance of improved conditions.

Women are more likely to have strong egalitarian beliefs on average and therefore a general preference for equality. However, for most people observing deep inequality can be uncomfortable, and the suffering of those at the low end of hierarchy can create a moral imperative for change. Although wealthy white men are predisposed to support the status quo, they still have a psychological need to justify aspects of the status quo which are unfair or harmful to other members of society. Conservatives successfully adopt system-justifying beliefs to support their own group's emotional well-being (Anderson & Singer 2008). System justifying beliefs can increase psychological well-being and reduce "anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty (Jost & Hunyady 2003)." An experimental study found that pointing out a "rags-to-riches" explanation of success was able to reduce moral outrage about unequal outcomes, and to reduce support for redistributive policies. High status individuals who could be most challenged by inequality were especially receptive to this narrative (Wakslak et al. 2007).

This set of theories come together to argue that the most privileged and powerful will be the most conservative. Between direct gains and deeply rooted socialization, men are committed to ideals of American Individualism. These ideas fit their lived experience, add to their

psychological comfort, and justify their dominance from the domestic sphere to their political wishes. However, the same set of theories also give room to explain the complexities of how myriad personal identities and one's intersecting group positions lead individuals to a wide array of political positions which are sometimes unexpected. These positions may seem counterintuitive if we consider only one dimension of a person's identity, but adequately represent the person's politics and interests in another way. Women on average are more liberal than men in American politics. They are more likely to see structural problems in society and policy, and to find value in subscribing to compassionate communitarian ideals. The individualism of American men gives a single coherent, if aspirational, understanding of the world. The communitarianism of American women relies on varied understandings of who the community or collective is. Even aligning with the individualist politics of one's supportive male relatives can be a way of protecting one's understanding of "us." Simply put, American women can subscribe to a startling wide variety of politics without breaking this mold of communitarian thinking while American men are more reigned in when it comes to maintaining their commitment to individualism. When American women do break from compassionate communitarianism is it easy to find that they are aligned with an identity group that also holds strictly individualistic beliefs.

On the other hand, members of subordinate groups may internalize feelings of inferiority, and sometimes will be the staunchest defenders of hierarchies by which they are tangibly harmed and from which they stand to benefit only in symbolic terms (Jost et al. 2004). When we discover that groups of women are staunchly at odds with egalitarian beliefs, we tend to see that they also hold beliefs that justify their own inferior roles in society.

Furthermore, gendered political preferences may be subverted in favor of politics of race (Simien 2004). For white women gender subordination can be paired with feelings of racial dominance. White women may commit to especially conservative and hierarchical politics to maintain this racial dominance while being heavily committed to the subordinate role of women, themselves included (Barnes and Cassese 2018). We must remember that intersectional identity can mean an individual supports a policy from which they receive direct harm, and which also benefits their group. However, as a generalization conservative politics benefit the dominant group within the status quo. For example, wealthy white men will typically support unequal structures, at least implicitly, because they benefit most from them. Other groups will oppose components of the status quo which harm their in-group members, although they may not wage a battle against the system as a whole (Bobo 1999, Jost et al. 2004). There was a belief that gender solidarity would eventually equate equalitarian beliefs or compassion politics with feminist ideology. For women who do take up feminist equalitarian ideals there is a clear interest in promoting left-leaning politicians who will defend gender equality and work on concrete “women’s issues.” On the other hand, both internalized commitments to subordination in the form of traditional gender roles, and men’s higher standing in the societal hierarchy promote higher conservatism because either can create a feeling that the hierarchy is justified or morally right (Austin and Jackson 2019, Jost and Banaji 1994). Recent work on the 2016 presidential election attributes commitment to the “white heteropatriarchy” with promoting votes for Donald Trump. Sexism was a significant driver of pro-Trump vote choice for white women, but was less important for white men, and even less significant for African Americans (Bracic et al. 2018, Frasure-Yokley 2018). White women who subscribed to negative stereotypes were surprisingly numerous, and they voted for then candidate Donald Trump.

Modern Gender Gap Theories: Compassion

Most arguments of the inherent ideological difference of women do not fully articulate a single cause for the difference. Instead, it is common to group together policy orientations which can be explained by commonly accepted feminine traits and social roles, and then to label these as “compassion.” These explanations have a bent towards utilitarianism at the expense of conceptual clarity. While they provide statistically powerful explanations, there is a tendency across the literature for authors to add and drop measures while still claiming the term compassion as the mechanism. Just as confusing, many of the compassion issues are also frequently given new labels—compassion, caretaking, nurturance, and maternal values to name a few.

Compassion, protectiveness, and caretaking roles are connected to safety net programs, but also to policies relating to personal safety and national defense (Barnes & Cassese 2017, Eagly et al. 2004, Hutchings et al. 2004, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). All of these ideas boil down to an expectation that women’s interests are the interests of those they care about. Compassion politics addresses the idea that voters do not want to see anyone hurt or suffering. In particular, research shows that these issues appeal to women who respond in especially favorable ways to politics that aspires to help others—whether that be the voters’ own children, neighbors, or fellow people around the world who are in need. These ideals usually come with a charitable tone. The logic goes that starving children around the world may not in fact be as important to voters as their own children are, but if we can help those far off starving children we still ought to do so. Inherent in compassion politics is that pride, dignity, and self-determination is not as front of mind as a target population’s well-being. In addition to a discussion of equalitarian beliefs based on shared humanity, it is important to address the sympathy-based arguments for

other-centered compassion politics. To elaborate this difference, equalitarianism would argue that no one's needs ought to supersede another's. Compassion politics would argue that one should put other's needs first. Taken to the extreme, this means that compassion voters would respond favorably to policies they see as helping others, including their own children, but that policies aimed at their individual wellbeing or bottom line would be relatively unappealing. Compassion voters are not necessarily swayed as much by appeals to their own bottom line.

Earlier work pointed to the extreme gender gap on issues of safety and national defense which dwarfed even the typical compassion policy issues (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), but later work brought public safety and defense into the compassion issue fold because of the relevance of these issues to women's maternal and caretaking interests (Stack 2000; Lerner et al. 2003; Hurwitz and Smithey 1998; Haider-Merkel and Vieux 2008). If criminals have guns, they could hurt our babies, if terrorists have bombs, they could hurt our towns, but if we put boots on the ground our adult children are in danger. Diplomacy and law and order are both ways that we can protect loved ones from danger. Compassion arguments foreground gender roles and provide an argument that it is the caretaking roles of women that matter. In comparison, many gender gap theories focus on the status differential of men and women, despite the fact that women and all other less powerful groups do not share political values distinct from men (Eagly et al. 2004). Compassion-based gender gaps are interesting because they play out as exceptions to the rules of party ideology and elite-driven policy preferences. When comparing Republican men and women, a gender gap in support for gun control is apparent and just as pronounced as the same gap amongst Democrats (Barnes & Cassese 2017). Regardless of commitment to typical party stances, women will respond more negatively than men to the racializing of an issue (Hutchings et al. 2004).

These arguments are straightforward and have broad appeal but run up against various criticisms (Blinder & Rolfe 2017). Many of the issue positions labeled as compassion or caretaking issues in this strain of the literature are typified by race and gender issues of equalitarianism by the same authors or lumped in with “women’s issues” of employment rights and subsidized childcare by others (Conover 1988, Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Howell and Day 2000).

In addition to the tendency for women, on average, to have stronger support for policies that help the disadvantaged, feminist women are more likely to commit to these values (Conover 1988). Compassion issues can take the form of opposition to mistreatment of specific groups, namely a stronger emphasis on gay rights issues amongst women than amongst men (Kaufman 2002). Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) are amongst the authors who separate public safety and compassion issues. In their analysis, public safety issues are more predictive than compassion issues; however, they point out that overall policy is growing in importance for women versus men.

Despite face validity, there are limits to how much these authors manage to provide concrete justification for a compassion mechanism, and in a few cases circuitous arguments seem to point to issue positions as proof of compassion, as arguing for their combined significance due to being caused by compassion. From an analytical standpoint, it is true that so called compassion issues align well in statistically significant scales. In defense of the notion that these scales represent meaningful and inherent ideological differences is an argument that recent polarization has enabled enhanced issue-based sorting. As the policy ideals of the parties crystalized, the existing gap in policy preferences amongst men and women led directly to a gender gap in partisanship (Gillion et al 2017). As such, it seems that the flaws in the

compassion argument amount to inconsistency between authors stemming from a convergence on the idea instead of an explicit outgrowth from one authoritative paper. This inconsistency is remedied by relying on the scales of the earliest authors, except where these are not reproducible across the desirable time horizon, or where explicit improvements have been made by later works.

Compassionate communitarianism and American individualism as drivers of the heterogenous gender gap

A core tenant of American political culture is an emphasis on classical liberalism in the form of individualistic ideals (de Tocqueville 1835, Feldman 1983, Hartz 1955, Lipset 1979; Williams 1956, and Zaller et al. 1983). This tradition manifests in the American dream's paramount belief in being self-made. It is also typified by personal responsibility frames. These can mean seeing the provisions of aid programs as rewards for personal failings, laziness, or other bad behavior. Another common argument of individualist liberalism is that structural economic challenges, structural racism, and structural sexism are non-existent. Furthermore, prejudice and inequality are both thought by individualists to be unfortunate realities which can be better overcome by individual effort than by government intervention. Fundamentally, American political discourse centers on the rights of individuals.

The individualistic perspective is at odds with a communitarian world view—sometimes derided as a collectivism. The latter places importance on the wellbeing of one's entire community. Group based social justice movements have centered shared consciousness and socialization of conflict. In order to build a movement, there are explicit appeals to potential movement members that the challenges an individual faces as result of the prejudice or discrimination they face are not due to personal circumstances but directly connected to the shared experience of structural prejudice. Furthermore, many movements have built bridges that

point to the need for liberation for all groups to facilitate the liberation of any group. While individualists would point to the rising tide of business successes granting more individuals opportunity, communitarians would suggest that rising up the whole community is essential to one person's ultimate level of success or even wellbeing.

Thus, collectivism or communitarianism is compatible with social justice causes such as gender, racial, and economic equality. Gilens (1995) points to a range of scholarship which identifies individualism as a cause of opposition to welfare policies (Feagin 1975, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Kleugel and Smith 1986, Williamson 1974), but demonstrates that racial attitudes are a more significant predictor of such stances. This speaks to my earlier argument that the theories of gender gap theories are in ways interconnected. However, the significance of racial resentment should also not be taken only as intergroup conflict at odds with individualism's significance; because racial resentment's content is based on stereotypes that blacks are not attaining independence in the way that American political culture supposes they ought to. Communitarianism also means that when evaluating benefit of policies an individual can place value on a policy based on the ability to indirectly gain personal satisfaction from a policy which they expect to benefit their community or fellow citizens directly. When we take individualism as the antithesis of communitarianism it follows that racial resentment and welfare opposition are both policies supporting outgroups and therefore directly harming the primacy of the individual.

Many studies have concluded that there are important gender differences in orientations toward individualism and communitarianism. Men are expected to be individualistic, while women are more likely than men to approach both life and politics from a communitarian perspective. These differences appear to be rooted in socialization. Women are socialized to be maternal or helping figures who are empathetic and concerned with those around them. In other

words, women are taught to be communitarian in their world view in order to fulfill their gendered roles. While men and boys are congratulated for personal achievement, women and girls are rewarded for being a team player or helper at home as well as in professional roles. Female employees can be counted on to take on training, office logistics, and management of office politics or different colleagues. When they point out they were not technically hired for such tasks they are punished for being uncooperative. Men are more likely to be seen as focused or driven for drawing the same lines. The female worker's supportive perspective expands to communitarian worldviews while the male achievement orientation leads to the belief that one must get ahead on one's own – a core tenet of individualism.

Because women are more likely than men to embrace a communitarian world view, they also tend to find more value in equalitarianism. For example, women are more likely to attribute inequality to structural causes rather than personal failures (Barnes & Cassese 2017). A political perspective or policy package which helps a woman's children, her neighbors, or even a stranger in need can therefore appeal more to women even if it does not directly advance her personal well-being or success. Compassion, protectiveness, and caretaking roles are connected to safety net programs, which may be an essential source of assistance in financially supporting those family members and friends that women are expected to extend compassion to or take responsibility for. In addition, policies relating to public safety and national defense serve some of the same compassion-based goals and are thought to represent extensions of protective mothering (Barnes & Cassese 2017, Eagly et al. 2004, Hutchings et al. 2004, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). As the policy ideals of the parties crystalized around the dimensions of individualism and communitarianism, the existing gap in policy preferences and ideology amongst men and women led in turn to a gender gap in partisanship (Gillion et al 2018).

As an aside, individuals who are high in humanitarianism believe in helping those in need, but this operates through their wider ideology of valuing human life and worth to encourage a wide variety of policies and private reactions (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). A high degree of humanitarianism leads to stronger communitarian policy preferences for liberals. The same high degree of humanitarianism may lead to private charity without a desire for governmental action for individualist conservatives. Individualism is ideologically at odds with understandings of inequality as stemming from unfair systems, and thus favors explanations of inequality based in personal responsibility, and conversely personal failings. In this way, a person who believes in the inherent worth of all humans, and the values of helping other human beings may still oppose political intervention aimed at providing public aid to their fellow countrymen.

Modern Gender Gap Theories: Economics

A compelling argument exists that the gender gap is best explained by contrasting material needs of women before and after the proliferation of more open divorce laws and single motherhood (Edlund & Pande 2002). This discussion centers on the relative economic dependence of women. Because women are more likely to be financially harmed by divorce, and must support children without a male breadwinner, theory proposes that economic needs or anxieties drive women towards support of safety net programs, and therefore a more general liberal ideology (Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy et al. 2009, Welch & Hibbing 1992). While men are relatively responsive to pocketbook or self-interested needs, women's views change more with the national economy (Welch & Hibbing 1992, Chaney et al. 1998). Because women are pessimistic about the national economy and weight the economy heavily rather than worrying only about their own finances, their anti-incumbent bias is higher than men's during bad economic times (Chaney et al. 1998).

A consensus does exist that women are economically cautious (Chaney et al. 1998, Welch & Hibbing 1992). This caution is not exclusive to economic policy preferences. When it comes to policy, we can see a difference in beliefs in part attributable to personal need and perspective. In addition, women are likely to put off personal responsibility for financial decisions and to be financially conservative in disadvantageous ways. High income women are less likely than their male peers to take an active role in managing investments and retirement planning. In general women feel a greater need to enlist the help of experts or to accept other (non-expert) individual's opinions. Although they are ultimately likely to live longer past the retirement age, women are likely to defer to the opinions and preferences of their husbands when it comes to finances. When women do make independent financial decisions, they are more likely to value low risk and low yield accounts even if doing so ultimately costs them dearly in lost interest earnings. Men are more likely than women to invest heavily in high yield stock only portfolios. In other words, when men make questionable decisions about their finances, they reflect over-confidence and excessive risk taking. These types of mistakes can certainly be more harmful, but they also tend to be more profitable than leaning too far in the opposite direction.

While the overly risky and the overly cautious strategies are considered unwise, women express caution quite widely, and this reflects a widespread fear of negative outcomes. Women are more willing to pay for more insurance, hold higher cash reserves, and ultimately choose both their own financial products and economic policy based on a minimax regret strategy. While the worst-case scenario may be unlikely, women do not want to be left out in the cold if it occurs. The opinions of financial experts would be that such scenarios are too rare to plan or prepare for, but women in particular lose out on certain opportunities to account for them.

Similarly, support for social welfare programs or safety net issues is higher amongst women in part because of a perception that they will be more likely to see a personal benefit (Beutal & Marini 1995, Conover 1988, Erie & Rein 1988, Gilens 1988, Gilligan 1982, Kaufmann 2002, Manza & Brooks 1998, May and Stephenson 1994, Piven 1995, Sanbonmatsu 2010, Seltzer et al. 1997, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). Women do draw on these programs more often because they are more likely to fall into poverty. In contrast, white men associate government provision with support of outgroups, and oppose it because it threatens their own social dominance (Kaufmann 2002). It seems the thought of safety nets as insurance on their own wellbeing is irrelevant to these men. This variation appears even more significant than the literature would suggest as we parse the data.

Besides the difference between men and women in opinions on financial safety net programs overall, there is a peculiarity in the definition of most of these programs which may predispose women to support them. The most popular safety net programs—those targeted the elderly provide long term and reliable income supports, such that their effect is to permanently lower the poverty rate. On the other hand, most safety net programs are heavily restricted and cash benefits are subject to time limits. This means that the primary beneficiaries are those who are able to see these programs as short-term bridges rather than counting on long-term program availability. Thus, most safety net programs are set up in a way that makes constituency building nearly impossible. As such we might assume that their appeal is universally low. After all, some people face lifelong poverty and are displeased with the time limited programs, and others never face poverty so that the programs never seem like something that they can benefit from personally. We know from the average woman's attitudes towards personal finance and the realities of American women's economic precarity that these programs provide a very real

benefit. Seeing these programs as insurance against the deepest strains of economic uncertainty allows us to understand why American women may find them more appealing than American men do. This dissertation will address that American women are more likely than American men to face numerous situations that can precipitate a slide into poverty. Divorce, caretaking, unstable hours, and pregnancy often create temporary hardships or adjustment periods. Each of these circumstances is more common or more harmful for American women, and it seems that women are aware of these risks and their related precarity. What makes these safety net programs politically appealing is that they can be a form of insurance for those in precarious financial positions.

Support for safety net policies is also often tied to a general belief in equality. One area of exploration around this theory is the interplay between feminist consciousness, workforce participation, and support for safety net programs. Knowing that workforce participation was associated with increased feminist consciousness at the individual level, it is possible that it simultaneously increased support for safety net programs. The stressors and surprising precarity of the workplace are likely not thought of much by those who do not participate; however, as women joined the workforce and experiences these risks firsthand, they may have come to understand the private labor market as a dangerous place worth protecting against rather than relying upon blindly. Alternatively, it is possible a selection effect drove those who already supported safety net programs into a workplace that increased their support for feminism. These women may have been more financially at risk and entered the workforce out of need that had previously aligned them with political groups who supported safety nets. Once in the workforce these women were witness to sexism and discrimination at the hands of men who did not share the personal level of regard for them that their loved ones may typically express. The open

disrespect for women outside of one's family which was on full display in the workforce may well have driven working women towards feminism. Finally, it is possible that those who already supported feminism entered the workplace with an understanding of their work as part of a drive for gender equality, and their workforce participation drove an increase in support for safety net programs which was unrelated to their original feminist beliefs (Manza and Brooks 1998).

The groups most likely to benefit from safety net programs are the same groups that face high rates of transition in and out of poverty. Women across the board face these transitions. In addition, working class individuals or those without college degrees are more likely to work in the types of low income and non-salaried jobs that face frequent downsizing and cutbacks. Similarly, millennials are frequently identified as remarkably financially insecure. Over time Americans experience engaging in widely varying degrees of savings and debt financing. Thus, precarity as a theory of the gender gap also would not suggest that all women are simply one degree more liberal than men.

Modern Gender Gap Theories: Personality and Other Less Dominant Explanations for the Gender Gap

A final primary emphasis of theory is that women have something inherently more liberal in their value systems. This is alternatively explained as a product of genetics or socialization arguments. Perhaps women are not just a member of groups that believe in certain things, but rather they have an inherent feminine need to believe in something that aligns them with liberals and the Democratic Party, or so the logic goes. Ironically, this inherent difference set of theories can be summed up as the homogeneous gender gap theory. If being a woman makes you, say, four percent more liberal then we ought not to see much difference in the gender gap between groups. Women, or rather any woman, are more liberal. Period. This inherent difference idea

pops up in numerous works of varying credibility. Some present useful contributions, and some are not fully fleshed out, but each of these theories has so far failed to find a foothold in the literature through replication and buy-in from other scholars. These findings are worth being aware of, and some even add nuance to the larger debates of the gender gap literature. However, I think that in this dissertation the wide range of intrinsic difference gender gap theories will ultimately serve only to demonstrate that the heterogeneous gender gap is the most supportable conclusion, and that a simple gender effect argument cannot hold up.

Some tie political values to broader inherent characteristics such as gender differences in typical personalities which are also correlated with economic standing (Morton et al. 2016). Women with less “agentic” personalities tend to accept traditional gender roles and were more likely to vote for Donald Trump in 2016 (Bock et al. 2017). Agentic personality primarily refers to a self-regard that includes feelings of efficacy, and it is more commonly found in men.

It is certainly noteworthy that controlling for gendered differences in pay, there is still a significant pay gap amongst people with the personality traits of neuroticism and agreeableness, and that women on average score higher on tests for these characteristics (Morton et al 2016). Once again, we see that the lines of gender gap theories need not to be set in stone. Women have typically feminine personality traits, feminine personality traits reduce financial gain, and this may increase risk or economic precarity. Criticisms of personality-based research argue that personality is not the concrete and lifelong characteristics that its advocates claim. In fact, it is not uncommon for popular authors on the topic of personality to start out by couching their advice or conclusions as based on scales whose scientific accuracy they will make no claims on (Cron and Stabile 2016). Much of the work on personality is in psychology or even self-help and personal development. While the former is a rigorous academic subject with frequent interplay in

the political science literature, there is also a meaningful difference in the way that psychologists and political scientists assign credibility to studies based on statistical significance. The very definition of personality assumes that humans have thoughts, beliefs, and tendencies they carry throughout life regardless of circumstance or even age. In reality, almost all personality tests demonstrate an ever-changing human psyche. People who retake a personality test over time often find that their personality has changed, even if they do not think they have felt any such change. Are people undergoing life events that shatter their world view and direct them to respond to their situation in a drastically different way and unravel their subconscious? Sometimes, but more often they are answering questionnaires in a way that expresses minor shifts in their mood or mindset—like being hungry or cranky about a traffic jam on the way into a psychology lab.

With that caveat, quite a bit of solid social science research has demonstrated that certain characteristics stand up to rigorous testing, especially in the aggregate of large populations. Coming back to social dominance orientation, there does appear to be a deeply ingrained and typically lifelong characteristic which varies mostly in terms of predictable and theoretically justified situationally dependent activation. Gender differences in the tendency towards social dominance orientation are consistently present across other demographic categories, but there are also group-level variations in magnitude. The members of high-status groups in society have particularly high social dominance orientation. For example, the average wealthy white man is situated at an apex of compounding societal dominance and would be expected on average to have a higher level of SDO than a man who was only white or only wealthy (Sidanius et al. 1994). SDO's compounding effects are particularly interesting for this dissertation as they represent the flipside of the common intersectional disadvantages that social scientists have

tended to focus on. By virtue of compounding, we once again expect the gender gap (which represents a single dimension of variation in dominance) would operate intersectionally. For example, we would expect that black women and black men would display a smaller gender gap than white women and white men (who have two layers of potential dominance compounding). Similar cases can be made for the differences in gender gaps amongst working class versus middle- or upper-class voters. If membership in a certain religion conveys societal benefits, we would expect that same to be true for non-members and members of that religion.

The Gender Gap and Intersectionality: The Big Picture

The gender gap literature has emphasized a common sense of feminine identity, but this dissertation will endeavor to demonstrate the importance of rich intersectional identities and self-conceptions in understanding the gender gap. In addition to gender, individuals bring racial, class, religious, and generational identities into the political world. Intersectionality theory has demonstrated that identities may not have simple additive effects. Each person learns how to play the role of their identities within the context of their other group affiliations (Crenshaw 1989, Crenshaw 1991). Some of this is practical learning of the proper and expected behaviors for particular settings or the values and morals to aspire to in order to receive positive recognition. Some of this learning is direct communication of the beliefs and behaviors expected for members of your identity group. In turn, one's particular group setting determines how would-be voters should translate their experiences into political beliefs or actions. What it means to be a man or woman is different whether you are working or middle class, whether you are black or white, whether you are a millennial or a member of the greatest generation, whether you and your community are deeply religious or largely secular, and within religious communities based on the content of your faith beliefs. A single gender gap is unrealistic. As this dissertation

argues, gender difference in politics is not additive, but rather reflects compounding and conflicting intersectional gender identities.

There are many ways that identity translates to belief and political action. Factors as simple as well-targeted media appeals can pull the ideological average for a group in one direction or another and can allow for variation across time (Zaller 1992). The primary drivers of the gender gap discussed above exhibit varying usefulness in explaining the difference across gender, but also across class, religion, generation, and other identities. They have even been activated—intentionally or not—for an election or two and then left be.

Continuing to discuss the gender gap as an invariant difference of ideology between men and women—a single simple difference between any given man and any given woman, all else being equal, would be reasonable only if the magnitude of the gender gap was consistent across subgroups of the population. The current literature acts as if a “woman effect” is uniformly distributed across the population. However, I will demonstrate that the gender gap is systematically different across denominational groups, systematically different between generations, systematically different across subjective class identities, and systematically different depending on how individuals perceive their own financial circumstances.

In this chapter I reviewed some of the drivers of the gender gap in ideology that have been suggested by the political science literature. While theories abound, a few have risen to the top. In particular, extensive scholarship has worked on elaborating and refining a theory of compassion politics. This theory incorporates communitarian ideals of concern for others and addressing the policy needs associated with American women’s high caretaking burdens. Next comes a series of theories which point to the attraction of ideology based on differences in group identity and position. Finally, I emphasized theories of the gender gap which focus on the

personal needs that arise for the many American women who face serious economic precarity as they navigate caretaking, wage and wealth inequality, and financial instability arising from divorce.

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Analysis

Overview

The primary aim of this dissertation is to add nuance to the sweeping literature of the gender gap in American politics. In truth, this means that I am aiming to reframe the way that we look at over half of the electorate and hoping to provide a far-reaching overview of the ways that an intersectional approach can help us see the true role of gender in American politics. Each substantive chapter in this dissertation touches on numerous communities, beliefs, and ways of being. All of these have been the subject of many volumes, and yet deserve further attention from the intersectional perspectives I point to here.

To explore these relationships as broadly as possible within this dissertation I will be reliant on large-n statistical analysis. Thanks to extensive survey data many of the theories and relationships I explore can be seen and replicated in detail without additional data collection. There are many places where this falls down, but I believe that my chosen analyses and ways of studying the question at hand best fulfill the goals of this dissertation and provides for a delimited scope that is essential for a study which touches on so many facets of American society and ideological life. Furthermore, I think that laying bare both the complexity and the repeating trends or common threads of gender and intersectionality in the American electorate is a valuable and needed contribution to a gaping hole in the gender gap literature.

I believe that this far-reaching approach will offer up a valuable scaffolding for connecting many other studies in American Politics. Phenomenal work proliferates in the areas of identity and politics which does not always receive the attention and credibility it deserves. To confirm, document, and understand the complex lived experience of an identity group rich qualitative work is necessary. What I am attempting to do here is not to supersede these studies by offering one relatively simplistic explanation of how all identities operate. Instead, I hope that my simple answers will provide another way in which complementary studies in different areas are able to be woven together. I hope that in this dissertation I have demonstrated a certain degree of commonality between many of the groups in question, and that by providing this sense of commonality I am able to give other scholars a launching point for detailed discussions of the mechanisms of difference and to promote debate around the broad commonality I have suggested.

The clear theoretical assertions of the gender gap literature explain much of the heterogeneity in the magnitude of the gender gap across subpopulations, although these effects have not previously been asserted or appreciated. Much of what I have done in this dissertation is simply apply, explain, and catalog the theoretically predictable variations. However, I have attempted to do this on such a wide scale that it is imperative to be able to defend my findings with representative national samples. Much of the theoretical literature works to describe in depth the experiences and day-to-day significance of the gender gap theories I address. I weave throughout this dissertation's theory the qualitative works of experts on specific subpopulations and their politics. I make every effort to include the lessons and the stories of individuals and communities. It would be both presumptuous and terribly unrealistic to think that I have the capacity to make significant contributions to such rich literatures and personal stories for a given

group when I am also trying to touch on such a wide range of groups. Each community that I mention in this dissertation deserves the kind of in-depth culturally and historically sensitive research that qualitative study allows. I do not believe that anything I could offer in that regard within the scope of this dissertation would be able to add meaningfully to the conversation.

In the same way that qualitative study considers nuance and uniqueness, large-n quantitative works treat each and every person in a coldly calculated and uniform manner. For many research questions this ultimately means that you are catching cultural and attitudinal differences as a result of question interpretation rather than meaningful difference on substantive variables. In the case of this dissertation, I am actually interested in those secondary differences. I genuinely believe that identifying concrete and objective, if oversimplified, differences between the groups on the exact same measures will be an ideal way to catalogue differences. Where most research on the gender gap looks at a universal gender gap with complete disregard for variation, and some considers the unique meaning of gender to a subpopulation, I endeavor here to see where there is commonality between the drivers of differences.

Data

American National Election Studies

The statistical analysis for this dissertation will be completed with the American National Elections Studies (ANES) cumulative data file. This study was performed biennially starting in 1948, and every four years as of 2004. This is pooled data with individual level responses. The later waves incorporated greater sample sizes than early waves. This study is completed by Stanford University and the University of Michigan. It is funded by the National Science

Foundation and is the most widely recognized and heavily utilized survey of American residents amongst political scientists.

In addition to a large sample size, the ANES includes the most important variables for the dissertation. The subjective social class question is an inclusive 7-point scale. There are both religious belonging and religious belief questions. The study also includes numerous policy and political behavior questions. Findings based in the ANES are easy to relate to previous research due to the survey's ubiquity and the frequency with which I will be referencing the same data as the authors whose work I have aimed to build upon. Finally, the gender gap literature has been preoccupied with the timing of the gender gap's emersion. Most scholars place this during the civil rights era or coinciding with the rise of women's workforce participation. The ANES is the only major comprehensive survey which reaches back far enough to capture these dynamics. When a variable of interest is present in the 2016 survey it was more likely than not also asked in 1964 and direct comparisons can be made between the current gender gap, the early days when the gender gap was first forming, and the days before it had begun to form, much less ever been considered by scholars. For the remainder of this dissertation, I will be referring to variables and data from the ANES cumulative file, unless otherwise noted.

General Social Survey

The General Social Survey (GSS) may be useful later on for replicating results. Most of the questions included in the ANES are also available on the GSS. There are slightly larger sample sizes in each wave of the GSS than in the ANES. However, the survey began later than the ANES. The period of 1972-1984 is of enough political significance that excluding it may prevent a complete understanding. For the more recent years of study, this data will be useful to

this dissertation. In particular, the GSS has additional religion questions which could be interesting for the religion chapter. The GSS is housed at the University of Chicago and funded by the National Science Foundation.

Cooperative Congressional Election Study

The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) has amassed an amazing sample size in only slightly over a decade. This allows for comprehensive analysis of trends in each wave year. The CCES is created and administered by a consortium of universities under Harvard University and receives National Science Foundation funding.

However, the CCES presents two downsides. First, although a cumulative datafile is available it excludes many of the study’s most interesting questions. Of course, it is possible to merge the single year files, but many variable coding’s vary significantly from year to year. Additional analyses will make every effort to recode these variables and merge data where appropriate, but this data does not make up the bulk of analysis for the dissertation. A second problem specific to this dissertation is that the CCES does not include a subjective class question and features a limited set of religion and religiosity questions.

Data Selection:

	Religion	Class	Income	Ideology	Party	N	Years	Frequency
ANES	Biblical literalism, major	Yes (7)	Percentile	Yes	Yes	59,944	1948-2016	Biannual or every 4 years
GSS	Biblical literalism, major, born again	Yes (4)	Inflation Adjusted	Yes	Yes	62,466	1972-2016	Annual or biannual
CCES	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	Bands	Yes	Yes	392,755	2006-2017	Annual

CCES 2016	Major, born again	<i>No</i>	Bands	Yes	Yes	64,600	2016	Single
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Variables:

Class

The primary analysis for this chapter will center on American National Election Study thanks to a self-reported class identity. For larger samples I will also use the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The latter will demand the use of education and income measures in place of self-reported class identity. Using all three measures ameliorates concerns of bias inherent in a self-reported class identity variable. The multiple measures of class will allow us to overcome some of this lack of clarity, and it will also be useful to determine the degree to which American’s self-placement within a class identity is endogenous with partisanship. For example, those who do not believe in structural economic differences are both less likely to see dividing lines between economic groups and less likely to support policies which would encourage economic restructuring. Finally, I would not be surprised if class identity varies from year to year based on real economic conditions and on attitudes toward each class group during differing political times.

To understand American social classes, we can examine the various measures commonly used by researchers. Income is a straightforward measure but is unreliable both for work in American Politics and Comparative Politics. People do not always think of their income in the same terms—some will know their annual salaries, but others would have to do complicated math to convert hourly rates and are unlikely to manage much accuracy on such a question during a long survey. Even if they know the exact number, a lot of people will not report honestly. For the purposes of this study, it is particularly important to consider whether women’s

class identity is driven consistently by individual or household income, as well as how that is impacted by being unmarried, or differs across important social lines. More reliable measures can be created for wealth (Cordova 2008), but those do not ease all the gender-based concerns. Income and wealth also fail to provide clear endpoints for specific class categories. Occupational status was favored as an explainer of class identification in the past, but it does not necessarily line up with pay. An individual earning the national median income could likely manage a rather comfortable lifestyle in the deep south or the Dakotas but would struggle to make ends meet in Manhattan.

Education is another common proxy variable for class. This is not a perfect match given the huge disparities in actual lifestyle that different jobs and geographic or social settings can provide for people with the same level of educational attainment. Particularly compelling arguments to avoid this measure is the fact that education levels do not translate to class or quality of life in comparable ways across racial groups (Nunlee 2017). Again, the issue of whether women will define their class identity from their own educational attainment or that of their husband comes up. There is also the matter of whether an individual's educational attainment changes ideology via class identification or through exposure to specific fields of thought and predominantly middle-class peers.

Yet, education is far easier to measure in a widely acceptable manner than class identification. Survey data around the 2016 and 2020 elections have made clear that education is in and of itself a meaningful category. I maintain that education is deeply intertwined with class, and analysis later in this dissertation will largely demonstrate that the two can be used interchangeably in many circumstances. The use of education as a potential proxy for class is useful because it aligns with other research. Where my findings are the same across models with

class variables and education proxies, I am reassured that findings are not only an artifact of my preferred specification. Self-reported class identity is the most appropriate measure for the aim of testing intersectional identity. Education provides for better communication between this dissertation and the works of other scholars. Where the two models match—which I find they consistently do—this dissertation is best able to answer the questions posed while connecting to the literature.

Finally, and most interestingly in the context of a changing gender gap is that the meaning of education is shifting in social, economic, and political terms simultaneously. It was long desirable for a wealthy or professionally ambitious man to marry a less educated and lower earning woman. They would form a 1950s style traditional home, with the man gaining status as a breadwinner, and benefitting from the emotional and logistical support from a stay-at-home wife, or at least a wife who worked for the sake of interest rather than need. In the current times it seems that the most ambitious men marry the most ambitious women. Individuals pair off by education, and earning potential, to form exceptionally high earning households with exceptionally privileged children who will almost certainly go on to also be highly educated. At the same time that education is gaining attention as a predictor of vote choice, there is a growing conversation about the developing tendency for young women to outperform their male peers in educational attainment. This is leading some scholars to wonder about whether women will outpace men as breadwinners (Mundy 2012). It seems prescient to me to also consider that the feminization of careers which require higher academic credentials may lead to these jobs becoming less lucrative. The dynamics of class, education, and gender are going to simultaneously undergo profound changes over the next decades, one way or another. Education itself may be further politicized in the process.

While a high school diploma was long seen (mostly accurately) as a ticket to a solid job, the financial benefit of a high school diploma has been gradually and consistently eroding. High school graduates earned 37% more than their non-graduate peers in 2000 and only 24% more in 2019. Meanwhile, the college graduates earned 63% more in 2000 than their high school graduate peers and 71% more in 2019 (BLS 2021). A four-year degree or a postgraduate degree is still a good investment for most who finish such programs, but the benefits do not accrue equally. As will be discussed later in this dissertation, such educational tickets to the middle class are likely only a reasonable financial proposition for those who were born in the middle class. There was a time when the debate around college affordability included complaints that there was no help for middle class kids because Pell Grants went to lower income students. Today, federally provided grants cover such a negligible portion of the cost of college that what remains of this debate is fighting over crumbs.

Most of the federal assistance when it comes to college affordability is in the form of loans. Subsidized loans and loan forgiveness programs make a meaningful difference to borrowers. Neither policy can be considered without the all too obvious reality that student loans often plunge students into financial despair rather than catapulting them into a high-class identity. Particularly worrisome is that the loan burden is highest amongst first generation students and students of color. The meaning of an education for class identity is not so simple when a respondent's class of origin determines that they are unable to gain the immediate financial returns of a college degree. It is also problematic when so many high school graduates take on huge student loans only to drop out of college. That student loans may undo the financial advantages of some individuals' degrees and may damage a graduate's ability to afford the trappings of a middle-class lifestyle are worth considering and make education something we

should consider with a grain of salt. Having accounted for all the above there is still the matter of a growing education divide in the electorate. Debates may rage on about whether this does or does not constitute a class divide, but education has been an increasingly important force for the last few elections and therefore must at the very least be incorporated into my models.

We tend to believe that a great deal can be predicted about vote choice from someone's income and educational attainment and have numerous explanations of why this is the case (Davis 1982, McCall and Manza 2011, Napier and Jost 2008). This can be taken as further encouragement that class matters, but we should test class directly if we are to draw strong conclusions. Relying on self-identification of class is the closest we can come to excluding the numerous alternative explanations of how these two variables operate. Doing so allows us to focus in on the effects of class *identity*. As I evaluate how much a classXgender identity drives political views, it is imperative to have a sense of whether there is an identity present in the first place. Furthermore, class consciousness, or the active engagement of political behavior on the behalf of a class group, would require a recognized sense of class identity. Measuring proxies for class is likely to measure material factors that are associated with the proxies to at least as great an extent as they would capture the salience of an identity. Despite the higher reliability of measures of education, I maintain that the measures of self-reported class identification are at least as important to the questions I ask in this chapter.

Race-Ethnicity

Studies of race in the United States are dependent upon the slowly evolving conceptualization and measurement of race. The earliest questions on race presume a black-white dichotomy, in line with traditional American beliefs about race and very small minority

population sizes. In some cases, there is both a question on race and a question on ethnicity. Finally, the most common categorization now is a race-ethnicity question which breaks down white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other or multiracial. Recent waves of the major studies include good sample sizes of each of the three largest groups (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic and Hispanic). However, to evaluate based on the more comprehensive classification does mean losing earlier observations. Some scholars rely on a white-non-white dichotomous variable, or only study white and black respondents. In studies where the primary interest is on white respondents the white-non-white dichotomous variable can be useful. In nearly all other cases this conceptualization is highly problematic, and of limited use. The non-white population is far too heterogenous to fit into a useful categorization. The black national election study and the Latino Immigrant National Election Study can be useful to elaborate on within group effects. Because of limited samples sizes and the scope of this dissertation I use race and ethnicity only as control variables for the purpose of this dissertation. I use the race-ethnicity variable where available and at times default to a white/non-white/other classification when necessary.

Religion

Biblical literalism (biblicalism) is a widely used measure of believing. This varies markedly amongst Christian denominations. This is coded 0 for the bible is the word of man or is myth and legends, 1 for the bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally in every case, and 2 for the bible is the literal word of God. While 0 is commonly reflective of non-Christian belief, responses of 1 tend to be common amongst mainline protestants and Catholics, 2 tends to reflect evangelical belief. The inclusion of a self-reported evangelicalism measure is

surprisingly rare but would have been a preferable measure. I chose to rely on Biblical Literalism for the religion chapter despite some misgivings for a handful of reasons. Firstly, this lumps “Christian conservatives” and “Christian progressives” into separate groups fairly effectively. Secondly, while a surging population of Americans (especially younger Americans) do not self-affiliate with a specific denomination, this measure captures those who still believe in a set of doctrinal belief. Surprisingly, the strong affirmative response to the biblical literalism question is not specific to those who practice within a given denomination, or denominational group. I believe in particular, that capturing the religiously disaffected is important because these individuals may also be disaffected from other forms of traditional societal participation, including political parties.

In the generations chapters I have coded religion by denomination with Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish dummy variables. Each of these groups are compared to the growing group of non-religiously affiliated people and smaller denominations in a combined other and none category. With the wide range of religion and religiosity variables across available surveys there is no one correct variable that can be used across all my analyses. The religious landscape has changed in dramatic ways since the inception of the ANES, for example, and the questions we care about today are not the same as the questions that were deemed important at the survey’s inception.

Gender

Measuring gender is simple, but not without potential downfalls or well-deserved critique. I have utilized the ANES and CCES gender variables coded dichotomously with 1 for female and 0 for male. There are remarkably few missing or other responses for this variable, so

that any analysis of those responses would not be able to generate statistically meaningful results. Gender identity accounts for how one presents to the world, how one is likely to be treated, and the values and behaviors that are deemed by society to be most acceptable for an individual. On the other hand, biological sex does not match every individual's gender and is far from matching every individual's gender role. However, for the GSS sex is the only option, and this question receives exceptionally high response rates as well. I feel comfortable using this as the GSS will only provide a replication, and for many individuals throughout the survey's time horizon gender and sex were synonymous as well as being indistinguishable in meaning.

Compassionate Communitarianism

When testing the compassionate communitarianism theory, I utilize a scale constructed from a variety of compassion issue policy positions. The Cronbach's alpha value for this scale is greater than the requisite 0.7 at 0.7045. The variables included in this scale are whether the government should help minority groups or minority groups/blacks should help themselves, whether government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living, whether federal spending on childcare should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on financial aid for college students should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on the environment should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on public schools should increase, decrease or remain the same, whether federal spending on the poor should increase, decrease, or remain the same, and whether federal spending on welfare should increase, decrease, or remain the same. Compassion policies reflect a concern for a variety of others in the local or national community which extends above

and beyond the pocketbook voting in favor of personally beneficial policies of an economic precarity theory. Please see appendix for detailed question wording.

Ideology

Throughout this dissertation I have utilized ideology as my primary dependent variable. This decision is not without drawbacks. I situate this dissertation in the gender gap literature, which tends to emphasize vote choice, and the intersectionality literature which most often focuses on policy regimes. I choose to focus on ideology for a handful of reasons. Firstly, it is one of the most widely answered questions, included on every wave of the ANES. Secondly, it is a simply understood question, but still holds enough complexity to demonstrate meaningful fluctuation across time and subject. To truly see the value of this measure I compared it to a handful of alternatives. Most obviously, I could have used vote choice. It would have been simple enough logistically to code for presidential vote choice in each wave, but this would have presented a troublesome amount of noise. While partisanship is rather steady, individual candidate perceptions can vary widely. A vote for either President Bush probably does not mean exactly the same as a vote for President Trump, but each would take exactly the same value. I also am specifically interested in variables which are deeply entangled with turnout. As we look at the online activism and protests of young voters, working class voters, and voters from religious groups who have not always embraced mainstream politics, I am compelled to conceptualize engagement and belief in as broad a way as possible. Similarly, while those who show up to vote are likely to have partisan leanings even if they do not fully embrace a party affiliation, I fully expect that the strength or likelihood of partisan affiliation will differ across generations and class or educational attainment. I am not interested only in the end results of vote choice and partisanship because I am looking specifically at groups whose political

participation or engagement may not be fully captured by these variables. Through the use of ideology, I hope to capture the most general attitudes around politics. For this study I do not have rich qualitative data on all the ways that would be voters think about politics, or even all the ways they may act out their beliefs, but I have reason to believe that both vote choice and partisanship would systematically bias my results, and most likely understate the effects I find. Ideology is coded as a 7-pt Likert scale with 7 being most conservative and 1 being most liberal.

Variable Scales and Distribution:

Variable	Median	Standard Deviation	Range
Class	2	1.103	(1, 4)
Education	3	1.812	(1, 7)
Partisanship	3	2.079	(1, 7)
Age	45	17.218	(17, 99)
Ideology	4	1.417	(1, 7)
Biblical Literalism	1	0.710	(0, 2)
Foreign Aid Support	0	0.646	(0, 2)
Environmental Spending Support	2	0.657	(0, 2)
Equalitarianism	0	0.199	(-0.458, 0.417)
Ethnocentrism	0.003	0.167	(-0.333, 0.37)
Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation	1	0.656	(0, 2)

Models

For each test of my hypotheses on class and religion I have created a multilevel ordinary least squares model. My primary causal variables are gender and class in the former chapter and gender and religion in the latter. These models include an interaction term for class and gender or class and biblical literalism respectively. My dependent variable in each model is self-reported ideology. This is measured using the standard seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). I control for several variables which have been found in

the literature to affect ideology and may also be correlated with class and gender. Religiosity measures were included in the class models for religious affiliation. Family structure was controlled for with a categorical variable for marital status (0 for married, 1 for never married, 2 for divorced, 3 for separated, 4 for widowed, and 5 for domestic partners; not married). There is a control for region. Age is controlled for with a variable for birth year. Race and ethnicity are controlled for with a categorical variable derived from the ANES 7-category race-ethnicity variable. Finally, the first level in each of these models accounts for time effects with a variable for survey year. This is intended to capture time effects, whether that be political effects or cultural and economic changes in the significance of class and gender, and to correct for the challenges of a pooled dataset.

The models in the generations chapter are similar, with the exception that they are not multilevel models. This was necessary primarily because the later generations have few to no observations across the earlier survey years. This creates many empty cells in the grid of year and generation, and pooling the data allows for a complete picture of the various generations across their life spans (so far).

4. AMERICA'S INDIVIDUALISTIC MIDDLE CLASS AND THE GENDER GAP

Introduction

This chapter explores the role of class identity in driving variation of the gender gap in political ideology. As the previous chapter laid out, there are a handful of theories which predict and explain variations in the gender gap. The gender gap is dependent on degree of economic precarity, differences in equalitarian belief, and compassionate communitarianism. Women are on average higher in each of these. Despite this average difference, there is significant variation across the population of American male and female voters for each measure. This variation too is non-random. In this chapter, I examine how each determinant of the gender gap is related to social class.

One would expect that working class people face more economic precarity than middle class people. The middle class, or those with a college education, are dramatically less likely to face unemployment, and are more likely to have high credit scores and other precursors of financial flexibility. A consensus does exist that women are economically cautious (Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy & Cassese 2009, Welch & Hibbing 1992), and that support for social welfare programs or “compassion” issues is higher amongst women (Beutal & Marini 1995, Conover 1988, Erie & Rein 1988, Gilens 1988, Gilligan 1982, Huddy & Cassese 2009, Kaufmann 2002, Manza & Brooks 1998, May and Stephenson 1994, Piven 1995, Sanbonmatsu 2010, Seltzer et al. 1997, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). White men align government provision with support of

outgroups and oppose it on average because it threatens their own social dominance (Kauffman 2002). Social welfare support amongst women is also attributed to higher expectations of personal gain from such programs owing from lower wages and higher rates of single parenthood, although this is debatable (Edlund & Pande 2002, Gidengil et al. 2003).

Alternatively, support for both liberal social welfare and liberal racial policies are connected to Social Dominance Orientation. This measure of desire to maintain or increase power over outgroups, as opposed to promoting equality, is higher on average amongst men, regardless of other identities and environmental factors (Sidanius et al. 1994).

For equalitarian beliefs there is a two-pronged consideration. First, members of the middle and working class may see their own class position as one of dominance or subordination. The hierarchy one seeks to defend or abolish could hinge on these relations. Second, we have a rise in scholarship and popular news on the topic of class as a driver of racial animus. Scholars point to members of the working class who hope to defend racist policy (implicitly or explicitly) in hopes of maintaining racial dominance as a counter to their economic subordination. We also have extensive research on the racialization of poverty. While a working-class person could be especially likely to directly benefit from safety net programs, they may see these programs as giving away money to members of a racial outgroup at the expense of people more like themselves.

Finally, in case of the communitarian compassion theory we see that working class Americans are more likely to abide by communitarian ideals in their own lives. Modern American society encourages the unmooring of America's middle class from communities of origin in favor of highly specialized careers in other towns or states. In contrast America's good working-class jobs are more likely to encourage long tenure and interpersonal connections. This

can be seen in the difference between an old boss calling his friend to recommend your work ethic or talents as a craftsman versus an employer who wants to see you are a CPA with tech sector experience. Michael Dawson (1994) demonstrated that social norms of communitarianism in the black community created political values of communitarianism. I will address whether the same can be said of the working class. As a corollary, the American dream, a middle-class life, and the ideals of individualism are all inextricably intertwined and, in this chapter, I will examine whether this is a predictive relationship or predominantly an imagined one. The variation across all three theories is between classes, but the impact of this variation predicts the degree of difference between men and women within those classes.

Theorizing a Gendered Class Identity

It is difficult to establish an understanding of class division in the United States. We have extensive study on the dividing lines between other identity groups, but none quite fit the pattern of modern-day class relations. The role restrictions imparted by America's class system are rarely explicit or dichotomous in the way they are for gender (Jackman 1996). On the other hand, the physical separation which forms between socioeconomic groups in the United States can be stark. Today, the desirability and characteristics of neighborhoods can drive wildly different affordability levels. For decades Americans of varying means lived in close proximity because they worked for the same organizations, or for one another. Before two car households the janitor and the CEO might both want to live within walking distance of one another, and the housing options available would have made this possible. Today's degree of class separation in schools, workplaces, and residential settings is unprecedented, and not reflected in distant history.

Even as income inequality and geographic polarization increase, the insidious physical separation that is part of America's racial experience is not possible for class because of the many gradations in class group membership (ibid.). Class groups are distant, but not subject to the historic and structural isolation of racial groups.

Even religion's institutionalized sharing of norms is not possible for class because the many ways that Americans identify class do not align with central organizations and institutions. At one-point unions offered some class solidarity, but this was specific to the economies or communities where they held the most power and the language of such organizing was around workers not necessarily a given class identity. As such, these pockets of class consciousness are predictably minimal in large nationally representative samples. The sharing of ideas between and within classes is unlike those of the other identities we commonly study.

Class-Gender and Economic Precarity

Despite this difficulty in finding a corollary to American class socialization, there are certain differences between working-class and middle-class experiences in America that are socially and politically significant. Firstly, working class individuals who have lower skills are more likely than their middle-class peers to experience involuntary employment interruptions (Bonoli 2005), and unemployment amongst working-class men has been especially concerning in recent years (Legerski and Cornwall 2010). Just as women are more likely than men to experience economic precarity, the financial situation of working-class families is less certain than that of middle-class families. Again, financial insecurity can lead to pocketbook voting for more liberal safety net programs. As discussed above individuals are also more likely to come in contact with people of their own class or adjacent class members. This means that an upper

middle-class person may have little to no personal interaction with people in poverty, while working class people are much more likely to have personal relationships with people in poverty (Jackman 1996). Whether through personal experiences or the experiences of close acquaintances, friends, or family members, working class people may more frequently witness direct benefits of safety net programs, while often upper-middle and upper-class people do not have personal relationships with individuals who directly benefit from these programs, and may be more likely to fall back on stereotypes.

The gender gap is sometimes explained by contrasting material needs of women before and after the proliferation of more open divorce laws and single motherhood (Edlund & Pande 2002). This discussion centers on the relative economic dependence of women. Because women are more likely to be financially harmed by divorce, and must support families without a male breadwinner, theory proposes that economic needs or anxieties drive women towards support of safety net programs, and therefore a more general liberal ideology (Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy & Cassese 2009, Welch & Hibbing 1992). If ideology is derived from economic security, we would expect that the working class would also be more liberal. This also fits my ultimate findings regarding the general tendencies of ideology in which working-class men and women, as well as middle class women, are more liberal than middle class men. However, these theories would create the presumption that working-class women would be exceptionally liberal in comparison to either working-class men or middle-class women. Not only is this not born out in the data, but working-class women become substantially more liberal than their male peers when their economic optimism is higher. This tendency is at odds with a theory of economic fear as a driver of liberalism. Although these explanations carry weight under certain circumstances, they do not appear to provide a comprehensive understanding. Class identity is not a stagnant part of one's

politics, but part of a complex dynamic evaluation of financial circumstances and economic policy.

Class-Gender and Compassionate Communitarianism

Secondly, the American middle class is more mobile than the American working class (Lareau 2003). Previously Americans across the board moved frequently between counties and even states. This allowed for the easy flow of workers to tight labor markets and was integral to the American political culture of boundless opportunity and individualism. Over time this tendency has fallen off dramatically. It is easier for middle class people to move because they are more able to bear the costs associated with moving, but it also may be more necessary when looking for jobs that take advantage of more specialized job training. This mobility means that middle-class Americans tend to live further from their extended family. Working-class American families are more likely to be heavily involved in the lives of their familial networks (ibid.). Middle-class Americans today may see individualism as more compelling because they are accustomed to having more limited family responsibilities and to hiring professional help for domestic needs rather than relying on kin networks for caretaking. If you are surrounded by extended family who help and support each other with day-to-day challenges, safety net programs can once again provide visible and concrete benefits even as your own life stage does not allow you to receive their direct benefits. When your sister-in-law has access to a good publicly funded pre-school, she may not spend time her time with you preoccupied about her children's future or need to borrow money to pay for childcare. If you live amidst other successful middle-class professionals around your age and do not see your family too often it can be easier to see safety net programs as only having benefits far removed from your own life.

Class-Gender and Group Positions Theory

Finally, the discomfort of inequality is higher for the well-off unless they can find a justification for these differences (Jost and Hunyady 2002, Wakslak et al. 2004). People with left leaning beliefs will experience lower faith in government when inequality is higher as they see this inequality as a failing of a system that ought to fix the problem (Anderson and Singer 2008). System justifying myths ameliorate discomfort and increase satisfaction while providing an explanation, which in the American case tends to rely heavily on individualism and personal responsibility (Wakslak et al. 2004). This motivated cognition amounts to a need for the middle class to fit their ideologies into explanations of their good fortunes which means adopting more conservative beliefs. These system justifying beliefs could include the idea that success is earned, rather than based on luck and fortune. All of this is to say that while rational choice economic voting can push men and women with more money towards more conservative positions, and lower income men and women away from conservative ideals, this happens through a complex internal process. As individuals assess their own interests, there may be gender-based differences in the ideological solutions which are more appealing. Personal finances alone may not explain the difference between male and female perceptions of economic policies.

Is the Gender Gap Homogeneous Across Class?

At the outset of my analysis for this chapter, I will demonstrate the existence of a gender effect conditional on class identity in ideological self-identification. The traditional gender gap literature does not address the fact that the gender gap is largely concentrated amongst the

middle class, but the data makes this reality quite clear. I demonstrate in this chapter that the gender gap in ideological self-identification is almost null for people who claim to be working class, and significantly higher than the average for those who identify as middle class. Some of the gender gap literature has pointed to variations in the gender gap that arise as a result of concentrations of liberalism amongst certain groups of women—African Americans and the highly educated for example. However, when looking through a class prism it seems that middle class men may be the ideological outlier as they are markedly more conservative than middle class women or working-class individuals of either gender.

Examining the gender gap in terms of class-gender interaction-based difference in ideology I find that the interaction term is consistently a significant predictor in survey data over time and across a handful of nationally representative samples. This class-gender term works through ideology to also predict party affiliation.

Amongst the most commonly used proxies for American social class is education. As a proxy we should remember that there is a significant endogeneity problem when it comes to this research design. People with higher rates of education are on average more liberal (Davis 1982, McCall & Manza 2011), and women are now more likely than men to complete high school and college. There is a tendency for women with less traditional expectations for women's roles to be more interested in pursuing higher education, so that those women who complete a degree will be doubly likely to have higher degrees of liberal belief—they self-selected as individuals desiring a career that may be inherently socially liberal and then were trained in environments, we associate with increasing liberal ideology amongst young people.

Even if I were to avoid educational class proxies completely this would still be of significant concern. Because we often conflate class and educational attainment, one might

assume that middle class women are significantly more liberal than working-class women. This assumption would then lead us to expect no particular difference between working class men and middle-class men, but also to expect that middle class women would be more liberal than either group. As we see in the data, this does not seem to be the case. I take this as reassurance that education effects could not account for all of the variation in ideology around class-gender intersections.

When we consider gendered differences in politics between social classes it is worth revisiting the reasons that we believe gender can drive ideology at all. We think that men and women see their roles in the world, and in their families, as being substantially different from one another. We are comfortable with the idea that people working in different fields or living in different types of residential communities have different political values related to the values and needs that drive their life and self-conception. When it comes to studies of class, we even foreground these occupational differences. If women see themselves as serving roles as homemakers or mothers instead of identifying with traditionally male professional roles this should be considered a meaningful source of their individual political desires. Even if women see themselves as filling both roles and feel that neither is particularly gendered, so that they lack a “gender consciousness” we should assume that the domestic or personal roles and the professional roles are both potentially relevant to their political opinions. Finally, when and if we see men viewing themselves as serving different roles than women, their unique self-conception should also be expected to drive their political opinions. Again, even if men do not notice that their specific roles are different from their female peers or identify their roles as gendered, the differences can matter.

The relationship between class and gender comes into play when evaluating how individuals self-identify with gender roles because regardless of employment status married working-class couples maintain a commitment to performing and identifying with traditional gender roles (Legerski & Cornwall 2010). Working-class women will work to maintain the dominance of their feminine identities as wife and mother, even if they are also the sole breadwinner. Amongst middle-class working women their profession defines their identity regardless of their spouse's working status. Men and women of higher-class standing think of women's identities as less gendered. Men and women who are in working-class couples are both united in reinforcing traditional gender norms. While they view their own roles as more disparate from one another, they also share an ideal point in terms of values and their places in life. Middle class husbands and wives each dedicate themselves to the idea of their identity being driven by their professional roles, but do not address who will be responsible for domestic tasks. Middle class men will express support of equality but will not actually perform equal amounts of housework or childcare. Working-class couples will express disparate importance of the husband's and wife's paid work, while working-class women will express great pride in domestic work and family responsibilities, as well as distress or regret when their focus has to turn from domestic roles to paid work. Even focusing only on the day-to-day roles of men and women, it appears that working class women with full time jobs perform their domestic roles diligently to avoid emasculating out of work men, and men reciprocate by not stepping into domestic roles when they have the added time at home (Legerski & Cornwall 2010). Middle class husbands will pick up more domestic duties when their wives work more hours, but never approach parity, and this creates tension between women who would like their male partners to

take on more equalitarian domestic workloads, and men who tend to think they are already taking the initiative to do their fair share.

All this is to say that working-class men and women share a closely aligned ideology around gender. The same cannot be said for middle class men and women. As such, we might expect to see that working-class men and women are more politically aligned with one another than middle class men and women will be.

These class differences hinge on the idea that classes do exist in our society and that they have substantive meaning across individuals with at least a modest consensus of understanding. Arguments that America is a classless society, or one devoid of class politics are abundant (Bell 1960, Hartz 1955, McCall & Manza 2011, Lipset & Marks 2000). However, we have many of the markers of class which are seen in societies recognized as having rigid class structures. Our class mobility rates (or economic mobility rates) are quite similar to the most rigid systems, with economic position at birth being one of the most important predictors of economic position later in life (Nunlee 2017). The economic policies which researchers presume ought to drive working-class voters' politics rarely do (Bartels 2008, McCall & Manza 2011, Page & Jacobs 2009, Svallfors 2006, Ura & Ellis 2008, Wright 1997), but social class as measured through the various accepted means—income, identity, and education—matters for elections (Bartels 2008, McCall & Manza 2011, McCarty et al. 2006, Stonecash & Brewer 2006). When presented with options for class affiliation Americans can in fact place themselves in a category. This self-reported class is deeply entangled with opinion and political action (Campbell et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, Walsh et al. 2004), but allows for the attempt to capture identity. There is a critique that American poll respondents decline to answer self-placement questions on social class. In the

prominent political science dataset this problem seems to be minimal, and alternative measures confirm that missing data is not a substantive concern for this dissertation.

We know that a great deal can be predicted about vote choice from someone's income and educational attainment and we, as scholars, have numerous explanations of why this is the case. This can be taken as encouragement that class matters, but we should test class directly if we are to draw conclusions. Relying on self-identification of class is the closest we can come to excluding the numerous alternative explanations of how these two variables operate and focus in on the particular effects of class identity. Concerns about whether the income and education of a woman, her husband, her partner, her ex-husband, or her father matters most for class belonging are avoided when we simply ask what class she belongs to.

Having established a class-gender variation in ideology this analysis is also attempting to see how the three theories of the gender gap drive variations in the effect of a class and gender interaction term on ideology. Ideology does not perfectly align with preferences or political behavior, but it is meaningfully connected to each. It has also been demonstrated that ideology stems from group affiliation and affinity (Jost et al. 2009, Bobo 1999, Campbell et al. 1960/65, Sniderman et al. 2004). However, this ideology can be based on either mental reinforcements that tie beliefs to the group through shared interests, or through beliefs that amount to justifications about how the world works and why one's ideology is representative of how it ought to work (Anderson & Singer 2008, Jost & Hunyady 2002, Jost et al. 2003, Jost et al. 2009, Kleugel & Smith 1986, Napier & Jost 2008, Lerner 1980, Wakslak et al. 2007).

For women, the draw of gender-based ideology is filtered through many additional factors. There is no overarching women's voting bloc, but the partisan gap between men and women has fascinated researchers who look for an account of what it means to be a female voter.

There is consensus that female voters break towards the democrats (Box-Steffenmeier 2004, Brady et al. 2009, Chaney et al. 1998, Kaufmann 2008, Manza & Brooks 1998), but the gap is class dependent, reversed, or nonexistent across issue areas and even specific policies with shared aims (Conover and Sapiro 1993, Eagly et al. 2004, Eichenberg 2003, Haider-Markel & Vieux 2008, Halim & Stiles 2001, Howell & Day 2000, Huddy & Cassese 2009, Huddy et al. 2005, Huddy et al. 2009, Hughes & Tuch 2003, Hurwitz & Smithey 1998, Lerner et al. 2003, Schlesinger & Heldman 2001, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986, Smith 1984, Stack 2000, Wolpert & Gimpel 1998). Some of these gender gap differences are framed by concrete gender-based concerns (Huddy & Cassese 2009, Hurwitz & Smithey 1998, Schafer et al. 2006), but most women's issues—those things seen as disproportionately effecting women—do not present any gender gap in opinions (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004, Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy & Cassese 2009, Sears & Huddy 1990, Sapiro 2003, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986).

Establishing Class-Gender Effects

I have created a multilevel ordinary least squares model. My primary causal variables are gender and class. The model includes an interaction term for class and gender. My dependent variable is self-reported ideology. This is measured using the standard seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). I control for several variables which have been found in the literature to affect ideology and may also be correlated with class and gender. Religiosity measures were included for church attendance, importance of religion, and belief that the bible is the word of God. Family structure controls were for number of children (0, 1, 2, or 3+) and a categorical variable for marital status (0 for married, 1 for never married, 2 for divorced, 3 for separated, 4 for widowed, and 5 for domestic partners; not married). There is a

control for whether respondents were from the south. Age is controlled for with a variable for birth year. Finally, I include dummy variable controls for survey year in all the models that utilize pooled datasets. This is intended to capture time effects, whether that be political effects or cultural and economic changes in the significance of class and gender.

Besides beginning to evaluate the place of a class-gender effect in existing scholarship, this chapter is primarily concerned with demonstrating that such an effect exists. The effect has been modeled as an interaction between gender and self-reported class or income. Both operationalizations produce significant class-gender effects. Self-reported class is useful because it demonstrates class as a meaningful personal identity which is recognized by the respondent and might therefore be subject to mobilization (Brewer 2001). Operationalizing class as household income is useful because it may be considered a more objective and widely understood measurement. Education is used as a control with both measures but is particularly important for the income model. Education and income are correlated, and education effects on income are widely recognized, as are education effects on ideology.

In addition to utilizing both measurements, I have examined the presence of the class-gender effect across samples. The effect is significant in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, the General Social Study, and the American National Election Study. Class-Gender effects are significant for at least the last fifty years, when adequate sample sizes are available, and is still present through the 2016 surveys.

Finally, it was important to understand the mechanism through which this effect is operating. It might be unsurprising if elite discourse meant that sizeable proportions of respondents aligned with a party that seemed to speak to groups, they belong to without agreeing all that strongly with the beliefs of that party. On the contrary, the class-gender effect on

ideology is quite strong. The class-gender effect also can predict partisanship, but this effect becomes insignificant when controlling for ideology. Because the reverse is not true, it seems that class-gender is working through ideology on partisanship. This finding is especially interesting. Many theories of class and politics would suppose that social institutions and labor organizations are essential to mobilizing would be voters. This would mean that partisanship was a primary driver of reported ideology, and an essential heuristic for voters. Instead, we see that there are significant differences in beliefs between class-gender groups. It seems in this case that partisanship falls in line with one's values rather than the other way around. Importantly, working-class voters are more likely to register as independent voters and are expected to have less stable political beliefs. That both ideology and partisanship are expected to vary extensively makes the actual variation and contingency especially important.

Although ideology is a highly significant predictor of policy and issue positions, the class-gender effect is rarely a significant predictor of specific issue positions. This can be partially explained by the limited sample size for many issue position questions and may also be caused by differing importance of class or gender for nuanced differences in issue framing. However, further examination of this is necessary.

H1: The gender gap will be larger amongst members of the middle class than amongst members of the working class, all else equals.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Class} + \beta\text{Race} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Marital Status} + \beta\text{Biblical Literalism} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.1 Gender-Class Effect on Ideology

Model – Multilevel	Gender-Class
Female	-0.128* (0.054)
Class	0.071***

	(0.015)
Female X Class	-0.066**
	(0.021)
Education	-0.019*
	(0.008)
Black	-0.758***
	(0.038)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.125
	(0.085)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.346*
	(0.15)
Hispanic	-0.388***
	(0.038)
Other or Multiple Races	0.12*
	(0.079)
Missing Race	-0.213
	(0.175)
Never Married	-0.35***
	(0.033)
Divorced	-0.276***
	(0.036)
Separated	-0.234**
	(0.074)
Widowed	-0.196***
	(0.046)
Partners; not married	-0.417***
	(0.052)
Age	0.005***
	(0.001)
North Central Region	0.083*
	(0.037)
South Region	0.183***
	(0.034)
West Region	0.022
	(0.037)
Biblical Literalism	0.693***
	(0.017)
Constant	3.47***
	(0.077)
Year Random-Effects Constant	0.005
	(0.003)
Residual	1.804
	(0.022)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	13,895

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
 Table 4.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Figure 4.1 Gender Gap by Social Classⁱ




Figure 4.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Throughout this dissertation I attempt wherever appropriate to include a secondary model with education as a proxy for class, as addressed above. This serves two purposes. Firstly, at the time of this writing there is a debate over whether Donald Trump concentrated a dormant working-class vote, or simply exacerbated a developing gap in voting behavior by education. This debate has complexities beyond the scope of this dissertation but necessitates addressing education. Secondly, while class can present substantial measurement challenges, education is a

relatively reliable variable. In most cases education is actually a good proxy for class, and so including it serves as a quick replication of my findings. In both the class self-identification and the education proxy models I fail to reject the null. These models both lend support to my assertion that the gender gap is concentrated amongst middle class Americans.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Race} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Marital Status} + \beta\text{Biblical Literalism} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.2 Gender-Class Effect on Ideology with Education as a Proxy Variable

Multilevel Model	Gender-Class with Education Proxy
Female	0.003 (0.063)
Education	0.027** (0.009)
Female X Education	-0.064*** (0.013)
Black	-0.738*** (0.035)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.178* (0.079)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.329* (0.129)
Hispanic	-0.365*** (0.034)
Other or Multiple Races	-0.23** (0.076)
Missing Race	-0.185 (0.145)
Never Married	-0.358*** (0.03)
Divorced	-0.26*** (0.032)
Separated	-0.302*** (0.067)
Widowed	-0.174*** (0.041)
Partners; not married	-0.419*** (0.049)
Age	0.005***

	(0.001)
North Central Region	0.062 (0.033)
South Region	0.155*** (0.031)
West Region	0.005 (0.034)
Biblical Literalism	0.676*** (0.016)
Constant	3.454*** (0.071)
Year: Random-effects Constant	0.004 (0.002)
Residual	1.793 (0.02)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	16,909

Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.2 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Applying the Theories of the Gender Gap as Explanations of the Class-Gender Gap

A primary emphasis of theory is that women have something inherently more liberal in their ideology. This is alternatively explained as a product of genetics or socialization, and often the specific origins are set aside. The theories behind this argument are numerous. Some tie political values to broader inherent characteristics such as gender differences in typical personalities (Morton et al. 2016), or in the tendency towards social dominance orientation (Sidanius et al. 1994). These personality traits are also correlated with economic standing (Morton et al. 2016), while SDO presents a gender gap which is consistent across social classes. Furthermore, gendered personality differences arise mostly in rich developed countries, and men participating in more traditional economies are less distinctive from female peers. While subnational comparisons are not available, it is possible that aggregate differences in very wealthy countries are covering up variations in degree of gender difference between the classes.

It is certainly noteworthy that controlling for gendered differences in pay, there is still a noteworthy pay gap amongst people with the typically feminine personality traits of neuroticism and agreeableness (Morton et al 2016).

Testing the Communitarianism Theory

The inherent differences theories are difficult to test definitively because they are quite varied. These can be thought of in two broad categories. Firstly, there are studies which evaluate the importance of genetically determined traits, or those which are emphasized and generationally recreated through gendered socialization (Brewer 2001). Studies which have the appropriate data to uncover differential personality traits have demonstrated related effects of economic position (Morton et al. 2016). Other studies look at pathways of ideology and issue importance through characteristics such as compassion (Blinder & Rolfe 2017). These are outside of the scope of this dissertation, given the data demands of evaluating abstract values and personality, which can be difficult to discern from standard survey data. On the other hand, many studies with similar theories rely on a set of issues which can be connected to these feminine ideals. This chapter evaluates the importance of communitarian compassion policies on the ideology of gender-class interactions.

Most arguments of the inherent ideological difference of women do not utilize a coherent ideological precursor measure, however. Instead, it is common to group together policy orientations which can be explained by commonly accepted feminine traits and social roles. Compassion, protectiveness, and caretaking roles are connected to safety net programs as in the material benefits theories, but also to policies as disparate as foreign aid and environmental protections. These arguments have a straightforwardness and broad appeal to them but run up against various criticisms (Blinder & Rolfe 2017). In defense of the inherent ideological

differences causing a more recent gender gap is an argument that recent polarization has enabled enhanced issue-based sorting (Gillion et al 2017). Understanding how membership in a working-class community influences the importance of compassionate communitarianism issues demands further study. While we expect that middle class individualism will lead to low support for such policies.

To demonstrate that this communitarianism is truly present where I expect it, and that it drives ideology, I will begin with a simple multilevel model to demonstrate the variation in the gender effect (gender gap) across class groups by compassionate communitarianism within the ANES's large-n data. Most of the compassionate communitarianism issues are also economic in nature, so that it is not immediately apparent whether the gender gap is associated with compassion and concern for others, or with the personal economic insecurity addressed in the theories discussed above. However, two issue areas, the environment and foreign aid are commonly associated with this female concern for others but seem further removed from personal needs.

For both of these policy issue positions, the class-gender effect is significant. This simplistic test serves as tentative support for a class dependent effect of gender which is in line with the common studies of the gender gap. In the case of support for foreign aid, a highly significant gender effect is overshadowed by including the class-gender effect in the model. This is true in the class self-identification model as well as the education proxy model.

H2: When controlling for foreign aid support there will be no class-gender gap in ideology, all else equal.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Class} * \beta\text{Foreign Aid Support} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.3 Multilevel Model with Foreign Aid Support on Self-Reported Ideology

Variable	Foreign Aid Support
Female	-0.03 (0.115)
Class	0.145*** (0.032)
FemaleXClass	-0.119** (0.042)
Foreign Aid Support	-0.287*** (0.051)
Female X Foreign Aid Support	0.106 (0.07)
Education	-0.023 (0.016)
Age	0.005** (0.001)
Black	-0.567*** (0.076)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.073 (0.172)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.257 (0.267)
Hispanic	-0.299*** (0.072)
Other or Multiple Race	0.08 (0.199)
Missing Race	-0.413 (0.32)
Biblical Literalism	0.618*** (0.036)
Never Married	-0.348*** (0.067)
Divorced	-0.310*** (0.071)
Separated	-0.115 (0.129)
Widowed	-0.21** (0.077)
Partners; not married	-0.432** (0.163)
North Central Region	0.121

	(0.078)
Southern Region	0.240**
	(0.071)
Western Region	0.024
	(0.075)
Constant	3.455
	(0.155)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.006
	(0.006)
Residual	1.806
	(0.044)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	3,430

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.3 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Education} * \beta\text{Foreign Aid Support} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.4 Multilevel Model with Foreign Aid Support on Self-Reported Ideology

Variable	Foreign Aid Support – Education Proxy
Female	-0.054
	(0.119)
Education	0.032
	(0.017)
Female X Education	-0.065**
	(0.024)
Foreign Aid Support	-0.272***
	(0.043)
Female X Foreign Aid Support	0.103
	(0.059)
Age	0.006***
	(0.001)
Black	-0.556*
	(0.064)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.138
	(0.149)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.091
	(0.225)
Hispanic	-0.261***
	(0.063)
Other or Multiple Race	0.033

	(0.19)
Missing Race	-0.609*
	(0.264)
Biblical Literalism	0.606***
	(0.03)
Never Married	-0.342***
	(0.055)
Divorced	-0.267***
	(0.059)
Separated	-0.262*
	(0.111)
Widowed	-0.166*
	(0.065)
Partners; not married	-0.400**
	(0.145)
North Central Region	0.072
	(0.064)
Southern Region	0.193**
	(0.059)
Western Region	-0.024
	(0.062)
Constant	3.550
	(0.131)
Year: Random-effects Parameters	0.003
	(0.004)
Residual	1.791
	(0.036)
	(0.107)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	4,931

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.4 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

H3: When controlling for environmental spending support their will be no class-gender gap in ideology, all else equal.

Ideology = $\alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Class}} * \beta_{\text{Environmental Spending Support}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} +$

$\beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} || \text{year}$

Table 4.5 Multilevel Model with Environmental Spending Support on Self-Reported Ideology

Multilevel Model	Environmental Spending Support
Female	-0.154*

	(0.071)
Class	0.044**
	(0.015)
FemaleXClass	-0.044*
	(0.02)
Environment Spending	-0.643***
	(0.023)
Female X Environment	0.03
	(0.032)
Black	-0.605***
	(0.038)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.066
	(0.083)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.332*
	(0.153)
Hispanic	0.242***
	(0.037)
Other or Multiple Races	-0.16*
	(0.077)
Missing Race	-0.055
	(0.175)
Education	-0.022**
	(0.008)
Age	0.002**
	(0.001)
Never Married	-0.279***
	(0.033)
Divorced	-0.224***
	(0.036)
Separated	-0.144*
	(0.073)
Widowed	-0.13***
	(0.045)
Partners; not married	-0.345***
	(0.05)
North Central Region	0.038
	(0.036)
Southern Region	0.142***
	(0.034)
Western Region	-0.030
	(0.036)
Biblical Literal	0.593***
	(0.017)
Constant	4.608
	(0.083)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.002

	(0.002)
Residual	1.633
	(0.02)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	12,980

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.5 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Education} * \beta\text{Environmental Spending Support} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.6 Multilevel Model with Environmental Spending Support on Self-Reported Ideology with an Education Proxy

Multilevel Model	Environmental Spending Support – Education Proxy
Female	-0.062 (0.077)
Education	0.008 (0.01)
Female X Education	-0.043** (0.013)
Environment Spending	-0.632*** (0.021)
Female X Environment	0.019 (0.03)
Black	-0.595*** (0.035)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.10 (0.079)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.303* (0.138)
Hispanic	-0.23*** (0.035)
Other or Multiple Races	-0.187 (0.074)
Missing Race	-0.12 (0.152)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)
Never Married	-0.285*** (0.03)
Divorced	-0.212***

	(0.033)
Separated	-0.206**
	(0.068)
Widowed	-0.116**
	(0.041)
Partners; not married	-0.352***
	(0.048)
North Central Region	0.026
	(0.034)
Southern Region	0.123***
	(0.032)
Western Region	-0.031
	(0.034)
Biblical Literal	-0.583***
	(0.016)
Constant	4.562
	(0.08)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.002
	(0.002)
Residual	1.635
	(0.107)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	14,946

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.6 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

For both of the above issue area hypothesis we see mixed results. On one hand, accounting for these issue areas removed the statistically significant simple gender gap. On the other hand, the class-gender intersectional gender gap remains, regardless of which specification of class is used.

Estimation: Group Positions Theory

Equalitarianism

The ANES includes a generalized equalitarianism scale. This includes six questions on general equalitarian attitudes. There is also a single question Likert scale on gender role equality. Each question allows five responses ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly. These questions

include whether society should “ensure equal opportunity to succeed,” whether “we have gone too far pushing equal rights,” whether it is a “big problem that not everyone has equal chance,” whether it is “not big problem if some have more chance in life,” whether we “should worry less about how equal people are,” and whether the U.S. would have fewer problems if everyone was treated equally. The GSS equalitarianism scale has eight questions and emphasizes economic equality. There are also two questions on racial equality and one on gender equality.

To test for the effect of equalitarianism I have started by determining the degree to which men and women of each class differ on the ANES equalitarianism scales. I will attempt to test whether gender and class determine equalitarianism or whether there are differences in how gender and class identity translate equalitarianism values into ideology. Provisional data analysis points to an effect whereby the difference in ideology between high equalitarians and low equalitarians widens amongst the middle class compared to the working class. In other words, high equalitarians are more liberal if they identify as middle class than if they identified as working class, but low equalitarians are more conservative if they identify as middle class than if they identified as working class. Two explanations are likely. Firstly, higher education or political sophistication amongst the middle class might create a larger tendency towards aligning one’s abstract values with ideology or partisanship. Secondly, it is possible that high equalitarians in the middle class feel a sense of cognitive dissidence over benefiting from an unequal society and become more liberal, while low equalitarians feel things are as they should be and want to preserve the status quo through conservative politics. This is another instance of system justifying beliefs being an essential drive in the meaning of inequality and equalitarianism promoting policies.

Depending on the measure of equalitarianism that is employed, controls for equalitarianism and interactions of classXgender with equalitarianism in simple models largely erase the classXgender gap. This may be explained simply by the fact that so much of the straight gender gap is caused by equalitarianism. Of course, we cannot explore the class dependence of a gender gap which we have controlled out of the model. In similar form, much of the American partisan divide is explained as differences on beliefs about the appropriate amount of federal intervention in promoting equality, or even in the feasibility of widespread national equality of outcomes (Barnes and Cassese 2017). As can be seen in many of these models, ideology and partisanship do not align perfectly, especially over the long-time horizon covered by ANES data. However, if equalitarianism explains away most partisanship, and partisanship explains away most ideological variation, we may be eating up statistically significant variation in our dependent variable. If equalitarianism is a vital predictor of the relationship between class and gender in explaining ideology it will be vital to any meaningful theory of the classXgender gap. If equalitarianism does not explain this relationship, but does explain most variation in ideology, including it in models will prevent our ability to understand underlying effects of classXgender.

Finally, equality is often put at odds with competition. For women socialized to be kind and cooperative, group-based competition may be uncomfortable and feel like a form of disagreeableness. While men can selectively take on a team-based mentality, women might consider the very act of supporting equalitarian politics to represent efforts at the kind of bridgebuilding and caretaking roles which are expected of them. In other words, for women to vote for everyone to be okay is an act of conformity, but the same vote for men would be an act

of resignation or a sign of personal weakness. At the extremes, a man accepting equality is being forced to come to terms with not excelling above others.

Testing the Group Positions Theory: Equalitarianism

Equalitarianism is one of the values which women are thought to place higher emphasis on than men would. This value has been demonstrated to explain a great deal of the difference in female partisanship, and levels of equalitarianism are connected to class as well (Blinder & Rolfe 2017). Simply tying higher equalitarianism to more liberal viewpoints overall, however, does not explain away the gendered effect of this value. I utilize a multilevel model to determine whether some of the variance in the gender effect’s magnitude (gender gap) across social classes is explained by differences in equalitarianism.

Using the American National Election Study questions on equalitarianism to create a scale from 0 to 4, respondents close to the median (47th percentile and a scale score of 2) display a class dependent gender gap in ideology, while the least equalitarian maintain a class dependent ideology with a small gender gap.

H4: When controlling for equalitarianism there will be no class-gender gap in ideology, all else being equal.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Class} + \beta\text{Equalitarianism} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.7 Multilevel Model Predicting the Effects of Equalitarian Belief on the Gender Gap in Ideology Across Social Classes

Multilevel Model	Equalitarian Belief
Female	-0.007 (0.058)
Class	0.062*** (0.017)
FemaleXClass	-0.072**

	(0.022)
Equalitarianism	-2.675***
	(0.086)
Female x Equalitarianism	0.186
	(0.119)
Education	0.005
	(0.008)
Region – North Central	0.056
	(0.039)
Region – South	0.069
	(0.037)
Region – West	-0.017
	(0.04)
Age	0.004***
	(0.001)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.238***
	(0.036)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.218***
	(0.039)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.213**
	(0.077)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.164**
	(0.048)
Marital Status – Partners	-0.344***
	(0.001)
Biblical Literalism	0.519***
	(0.019)
Constant	3.569
	(0.082)
Year: Random-effects Parameters	0.003
	(0.003)
Residual	1.532
	(0.021)
N	11,968
Prob > chi2	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.7 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

In this model there is still a class-gender gap. This model suggests that the class effect runs through equalitarianism. Rather than explaining the intersectional effect, equalitarianism eliminates works against the class dependence of the gender gap, and effectively absorbs

variation on the model. Because this is also negating the significance of the gender gap it appears that equalitarianism is central to understanding the class-gender intersectionality.

Figure 4.2 Equalitarianism and the Class-Gender Ideology Gapⁱⁱ




Figure 4.2 Source : Anes 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Equalitarianism} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.8 Multilevel Model Predicting the Effects of Equalitarian Belief on the Gender Gap in Ideology Across Social Classes with an Education Proxy Variable for Class

Multilevel Model	Equalitarian Belief – Education Proxy
Female	0.001 (0.068)
Education	0.038*** (0.01)
Female x Education	-0.044**

	(0.014)
Equalitarianism	-2.691*** (0.08)
Female x Equalitarianism	0.251* (0.11)
Region – North Central	0.039 (0.037)
Region – South	0.055 (0.034)
Region – West	-0.015 (0.037)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.244*** (0.033)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.197*** (0.036)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.27*** (0.072)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.138** (0.044)
Marital Status – Partners	-0.35*** (0.067)
Biblical Literalism	0.511*** (0.018)
Constant	3.571*** (0.078)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.004 (0.003)
Residual	1.539 (0.02)
N	12,003
Prob > chi2	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.8 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

With the education proxy we see similar results, although the class-gender gap is smaller.

Testing the Group Positions Theory: In-group Favoritism and Out-group Animosity

Studying group positions theory requires first establishing the in-group that would be salient for classXgender effects. As a starting point, establishing differences in levels of outgroup

animosity between class/gender groups would help to establish whether any of these groups experience a particularly high sense of differentiation between their in and out-group feelings. Middle class men may have particularly high in-group feelings related to SDO, and conscious or unconscious attempts to justify dominant positions which align with conservative ideology (Jardina 2014, Jost et al. 2004 Sidanius et al. 1994, Sidanius 2004).

Gender consciousness amongst women may also be a driving force. The latter could be mediated by class-based and education-based socialization. Therefore, the large gender gap amongst the middle class could be caused by a greater sense of gender consciousness, rather than by differences in in-group favorability or out group animosity amongst working class and middle-class women. I would expect this consciousness to stem from higher levels of education and political sophistication. To measure gender consciousness, we can also take advantage of the ANES women's equality scale. This taps into gender equality and feminist ideals but does not rely on the label of feminism. At this point, feminism is so politically polarizing that conservatives and Republican partisans who are sympathetic to ideals of gender equality may still respond with animosity pointed more towards their partisan out-group. Using a measure of gender consciousness seems counterintuitive for evaluating classXgender identity, but in reality, we must establish whether the identity or its politics are particular to class groups, and whether middle- and working-class men are equally likely to express out-group animosity.

Finally, working-class men whose politics do not diverge that far from their female peers may define their ingroup as much by family or community affiliation as by gender affiliation. This would probably lead to middle of the road or inconsistent in-group and out-group appraisals. In other words, for Group Position Theory to explain smaller gender gaps amongst the working class, working-class men could not feel significantly more favorable towards men

than working-class women do, nor could they exhibit substantially higher animosity towards women when compared to working-class women. They would be supportive of or ambivalent towards women's rights and gender equality rather than espousing male dominance and pro-patriarchy beliefs.

An alternative hypothesis here would be that the smaller difference between working-class men and women reflects a great deal of statistical noise because there is not a prototypical working-class vote. College education and professional work environments create a stronger sense of gender inequality for women (Manza and Brooks 1998), and perhaps a sense of threat for men. A much lower rate of participation in higher education and professionalized work environments amongst the working class could mean that their gender role socialization is subconsciously or uncritically taken on board without including gender consciousness or resentment of inequality. For men this may mean not systematically considering feminist issues or thinking of them as an issue area outside of their immediate life experience. The expectations of performing gender might not extend to the formation of political beliefs because the typical partisanship of your family or community is an adequate heuristic, and there is no need to find a gender-based cue as to how to vote your interests. Some work argues that men and women in some cases are likely to be committed to traditional gender roles, or willing to accept gender inequality while working for shared interests, so women are not a competing out-group, but rather align with the same values as their male peers (Jackman 1996, Simien 2004).

For a gender-based substantive measure of the equalitarianism theory I used the feeling thermometer for feminists. This ranges 0-100.

In-group Favoritism, Out-group Animosity and Ethnocentrism

For a race-based substantive measure of the group positions theory I constructed an ethnocentrism scale. This is simply 300 – a respondent’s 0-100 group thermometer rating of blacks, Jews, and Hispanics or Latinos. Ethnocentrism scales are widely used and capture animosity towards minority groups (Jost et al. 2004). This measure also captures in-group animosity for each group whose thermometer rating is a component of the scale. This seems odd and commonsense might assume that in-group animosity would be very consistently low. While it is lower than out-group animosity these values still feature surprising variance (ibid). Scholars have attempted to connect in-group animosity to support for the status quo or systems support.

I utilize a multilevel model with study year as the first level to determine whether some of the variance in the gender effect’s magnitude (gender gap) across social classes is explained by differences in ethnocentrism.

H5: When controlling for ethnocentrism there will be no class-gender gap in ideology, all else being equal.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Class} + \beta\text{Ethnocentrism} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.9 Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Ethnocentrism on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Across Social Classes

Multilevel Model	Ethnocentrism
Female	-0.13 (0.079)
Class	0.075** (0.023)
Female X Class	-0.067 (0.03)
Ethnocentrism	-0.025* (0.012)
Female X Ethnocentrism	-0.126 (0.21)
Education	-0.025* (0.0122)

Region – North Central	0.083 (0.055)
Region – South	0.235*** (0.051)
Region – West	0.034 (0.05)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)
Black, Non-Hispanic	-0.68*** (0.061)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.214 (0.117)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.208 (0.234)
Hispanic	-0.282 (0.059)
Other or Multiple Race	-0.111 (0.118)
Missing Race	-0.438 (0.296)
Never Married	-0.341*** (0.049)
Divorced	-0.225*** (0.053)
Separated	-0.111 (0.064)
Widowed	-0.224*** (0.064)
Partners; never married	-0.383*** (0.082)
Biblical Literalism	0.752*** (0.026)
Constant	3.288*** (0.026)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.003 (0.003)
Residual	1.828 (0.032)
N	6,467
Prob > chi2	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.9 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Because equalitarianism and ethnocentrism are similar and related concepts—you cannot think less of a group if you also believe they are inherently equal—it may be expected that the results would be nearly identical. In fact, it appears that the more concrete feelings about specific groups is important to the classXgender effect. In the above model we see that controlling for ethnocentrism makes the effects of classXgender, and gender insignificant.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Ethnocentrism} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.10 Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Ethnocentrism on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Across Social Classes with an Education Proxy Variable for Class

Multilevel Model	Ethnocentrism – Education Proxy
Female	0.196 (0.131)
Education	0.034* (0.015)
Female X Education	-0.092*** (0.021)
Ethnocentrism	0.003*** (0.001)
Female X Ethnocentrism	-0.001 (0.001)
Region – North Central	0.062 (0.053)
Region – South	0.221*** (0.05)
Region – West	0.02 (0.053)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)
Black, Non-Hispanic	-0.691*** (0.059)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.272* (0.116)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.177 (0.219)
Hispanic	-0.259*** (0.057)
Other or Multiple Race	-0.128

	(0.115)
Missing Race	-0.464
	(0.29)
Never Married	-0.348***
	(0.048)
Divorced	-0.229***
	(0.051)
Separated	-0.16
	(0.11)
Widowed	-0.198**
	(0.062)
Partners; never married	-0.404***
	(0.08)
Biblical Literalism	0.743***
	(0.025)
Constant	0.743***
	(0.025)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.003
	(0.003)
Residuals	1.838
	(0.031)
N	6,824
Prob > chi2	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.10 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

As with the earlier models there is no longer a statistically significant gender gap. However, the education-gender effect is highly significant. Firstly, education may teach norms that lead highly educated respondents to mask their true beliefs. Alternatively it is possible that where class identity and educational identity are mismatched there is more opportunity for racial resentment. Perhaps high earning high school graduates who do not feel they receive respect commensurate with their station, or low earning people with graduate educations have a sense of discontent that comes out in the form of ethnocentrism.

Testing the Economic Precarity Theory

Women are often assumed to be more economically insecure due to childrearing responsibilities, wage gaps, wealth gaps, and relative financial loss after divorce from male partners (Edlund & Pande 2002). Class is also tied to wage and wealth differences, differences in job security and other differences in economic position or security. It is intuitive that all of these factors would influence the impact that economic factors have on ideology. To test this theory, I have utilized the ANES question on prospective personal financial evaluation. This asks how the respondent expects their finances to change over the next year (get worse, stay the same, or improve). From the gender gap literature, we would expect that women are more fearful of their future financial position. They may feel less in control of their own financial fate and are more likely to expect that they will need government assistance and as such we would expect women who worry about this insecurity to be more liberal (Edlund & Pande 2002).

To capture precarity I utilize a prospective evaluation of the respondent's personal financial situation in the ANES models. This variable is coded 0 if they expect their situation to get worse, 1 if they expect it to stay the same, or 2 if they expect it to get better. It is necessary to capture feelings about an individual's personal situation because precarity refers to personal circumstances. Additionally, future conditions raise direct needs for safety net programs and politicians that will support them. Retrospective economic evaluations should be predictive only because past situations are correlated with future conditions. Unfortunately, the other surveys do not include questions about personal prospective financial evaluation. I have also evaluated the impacts of prospective sociotropic economic evaluations. This variable is coded 0 if they expect the economic situation of others to get worse, 1 if they expect it to stay the same, or 2 if they expect it to get better. This is meaningful when considering communitarianism and compassion politics because women are thought to be more impacted by the financial circumstances of others

than men are. With this reality women may feel bad about their own economic position if their peers are struggling and may see this as causing them concrete difficulties as they aim to take care of those around them.

When it comes to class-gender effects we can consider that economic theories of the gender gap tie female liberalism to realistic and rational fears. As such, women who are working-class—and therefore have less financial security to begin with—ought to be more liberal if their economic fears are heightened. In fact, it seems that the opposite is true. Working-class women who are optimistic about their finances over the next year are more liberal than their less optimistic peers. Financially optimistic women have a gender gap that separates them from their male peers at all levels of class identity, but the size of this gap does not seem to be class dependent. Furthermore, financial optimism does not seem to impact men or middle-class women and is not significant in the full model. Although including it in the model increases the coefficient for class-gender effects, it does not appear that the financial worry or precarity theory is the most useful explanation.

H6: When controlling for prospective personal financial evaluation there will be no class-gender gap in ideology, all else being equal.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Class} + \beta\text{Economic Evaluations} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} + \beta\text{Religion} + \beta\text{Religious Service Attendance} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 4.11 Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation and the Class-Gender Effect on Ideology

Multilevel Model	Prospective Financial Evaluation
Female	-0.134 (0.07)
Class	0.071*** (0.016)

Female X Class	-0.06** (0.021)
Financial Evaluation	-0.127*** (0.025)
Female X Financial Evaluation	-0.012 (0.035)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)
Education	-0.015 (0.008)
Region – North Central	0.094* (0.037)
Region – South	0.201*** (0.035)
Region – West	0.035 (0.037)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.345*** (0.034)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.261*** (0.037)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.241** (0.075)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.173*** (0.046)
Marital Status - Partners	-0.401*** (0.001)
Black, Non-Hispanic	-0.729*** (0.039)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.131 (0.085)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.328* (0.150)
Hispanic	-0.373*** (0.038)
Other or Multiple Race	-0.188* (0.08)
Missing Race	-0.208 (0.176)
Biblical Literalism	0.694*** (0.018)
Constant	3.648*** (0.018)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.006 (0.003)
Residual	1.796 (0.022)

Prob > chi2	0.000
N	13,621

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.11 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Figure 4.3 Precarity and the Class-Gender Ideology Gapⁱⁱⁱ




Figure 4.3 Source : ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Economic Evaluations} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} + \beta\text{Religion} + \beta\text{Religious Service Attendance} || \text{year}$$

Table 4.12 Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation and the Class-Gender Effect on Ideology with an Education Proxy Variable for Class

Multilevel Model	Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation – Education Proxy
Female	0.035 (0.075)
Education	0.03**

	(0.009)
Female x Education	-0.063***
	(0.013)
Financial Evaluation	-0.104***
	(0.023)
Female x Financial Evaluation	-0.032
	(0.032)
Age	0.004***
	(0.001)
Region – North Central	0.072*
	(0.034)
Region – South	0.171***
	(0.031)
Region – West	0.018
	(0.034)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.355***
	(0.03)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.246***
	(0.033)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.31***
	(0.067)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.161***
	(0.042)
Marital Status - Partners	-0.407***
	(0.049)
Biblical Literalism	0.674***
	(0.016)
Black, Non-Hispanic	-0.714***
	(0.035)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.192*
	(0.116)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.31*
	(0.129)
Hispanic	-0.354***
	(0.035)
Other or Multiple Race	-0.221**
	(0.077)
Missing Race	-0.148
	(0.147)
Constant	3.613***
	(0.08)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.005
	(0.003)
Residual	1.786
	(0.02)
Prob > chi2	0.000

N	16,550
Standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05	

Table 4.12 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Here we see that using an education proxy does not substantively change the model or the inferences we can draw.

Conclusion

This study has attempted to demonstrate an intersectional effect of class and gender on ideology. As with the study of the gender gap, it is difficult and perhaps an unreasonable objective to find the singular explanation of gender-class gaps. For each major explanation of the gender gap, there is a reasonable explanation of how class ideology gaps could be driven by the same determinants. In this chapter, I believe I have presented evidence to suggest that Group Positions Theory and related theories are the most promising avenue for further research on a class-gender intersectionality. It seems apparent that equalitarian ideals drive the effect of class and education on ideology, and by extension that the class-gender intersectional effect is driven by or manifested in varying degrees of ethnocentrism. However, while class and education operate very similarly in most of my models, that was not the case for the ethnocentrism models. This unique result demands further study. While it does not negate the importance of ethnocentrism, it is worth noting that more educated individuals may be effectively managing their ethnocentric beliefs to align with social norms, but we also must consider that other alternatives may exist. For example, the overlap of class and education is partially determined by income and partially determined by race. It may be that a second important intersectionality

exists along one of these axis, or even that a mismatch between class and education is the politically significant condition.

Both in the data from survey research and in cursory applications of the major existing gender gap theories, there is compelling evidence that the class-gender interaction is substantively important and present across a broad set of potential domains for study. Please see the appendix to review the primary findings replicated with partisanship as the dependent variable instead of ideology.^{iv}

In proceeding with this study, it might be valuable to utilize other methodologies. Experimental settings might allow for activation of values which are deeply rooted through socialization and of economic anxieties. ANES data suggests that differences in application of values might be a particularly promising route of exploration for class-gender effects. This chapter has briefly looked at equalitarianism, which could be studied more thoroughly with a larger scale measure, or in an experimental setting. However, the differing personality traits which have been studied elsewhere, and connected to both class and gender separately, could be valuable in finding the root of the interactive effect.

Ultimately, the class-gender effect can be recognized with a great deal of confidence. Its origins are more elusive. We should expect a variety of minor causes but uncovering conclusively that certain values or characteristics determine class and gender effects would be hugely significant. Such a finding could provide a great deal of insight for studying elections, issue mobilization, and political activism.

In the above analysis I attempted to weigh the importance of prominent theories of the gender gap in predicting class-gender effects. Economic precarity seems to be promising, but I believe that Group Positions Theory is currently the strongest explanation of the class-gender

effect. We may have guessed the former because of the close intertwining of income and class identity in the United States. Having seen that the same results are present when using education as a proxy for class, I believe that this is a meaningful theoretical finding. Perhaps there is a significant impact of class identity upon financial security or vice versa. When it comes to Group Positions Theory those studying hierarchy should be particularly interested in the latter finding. I believe that untangling the differences between egalitarian and ethnocentric belief for the class-gender intersection could be important to other work.

5. INDIVIDUALISTIC AND COMMUNITARIAN DOCTRINE AND THE GENDER GAP

Introduction

How do religious beliefs affect the gender gap? Here, I define the gender gap in terms of partisan identification. I argue that the doctrines of American religious denominations vary considerably regarding individualism and communitarianism. This variation, I contend, affects the gender gap present between these religious doctrinal groups, and therefore the gender gap amongst these denominations' members will also differ. I focus on the how the three theories of the gender gap discussed earlier relate to religious belief, belonging, and behaving. First, I identify explicit differences in various denominations' doctrines which endorse and encourage either individualism or communitarianism.

The communitarian and individualist values which drive the explanations of the gender gap and explain women's greater liberalism are not evenly distributed across religious denominations. Communitarian values lend themselves to interpretations of religion which emphasize social responsibility, such as aid to the poor. Individualist values are in line with religions which emphasize personal piety (Sargeant 2000, Wilcox and Robinson 2011), or individual responsibility. This encourages practices like commitment to prayer, study, and focus on individual sin. These values are not perfectly aligned by denomination, but Catholics are twice as likely as protestants to be communitarian (ANES 2018). Qualitative work has identified similar denominational dichotomies within other religions (Campbell and Putnam 2010).

Next, I examine how difference in levels of in group favoritism, out group animosity, and egalitarianism between these religious groups drive political variation in line with Group Positions Theory, and how this variation within doctrinal groups can explain the differences in gender gap between doctrinal groups. For many people religion provides a sense of what it means to be a good person, a good leader, or even a good citizen. For example, the denominationally specific values of fulfilling a given gender role are deeply embedded in Americans' practices of performing gender. Even as we discuss class, and especially race, we find complicated histories around who the church has deemed worthy.

Finally, I examine whether the precarity theory sheds light on variation in the gender gap across denominations. For a variety of reasons religion and economic circumstances are intertwined in America, so that it is possible for some denominations on average to be more in favor of or positively impacted by a given economic policy.

The Gender Gap and Religious Affiliation

America's modern day religious landscape originated with the self-sufficiency values of Puritan and other Protestant denominations (Williams 2010). New immigrant groups over time added denominational diversity and the previously small Catholic population grew through immigration and above average birth rates. The gradually improving status of African Americans and the strivings of the civil rights and black liberation movements resulted in the Black church as an important institution politically and spiritually. Each of these developments added some political pluralism to the ranks of America's faithful, but none unseated the political supremacy of the Protestant ethic of self-sufficiency in America's civil religious traditions. With the explosion of Evangelical churches and non-denominational Christian churches, American individualism found full fruition (Sargeant 2000).

Evangelical leaders and others on the Religious Right dominate the public discourse on religiously motivated politics (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). Originally, evangelicals were tentative to engage in politics which they saw as inherently dirty business, but practitioners and leaders alike eventually came to see politics as an essential sphere to fight for adherence to their world view. Once evangelical leadership took on these political efforts, there was a concerted and overwhelmingly successful effort to create a connection between conservative movements and the beliefs and institutions of evangelical churches (Williams 2010).

While Evangelicals are far from being a majority group—or even a majority of American Christians—their voices are consistently amongst the loudest when it comes to the politics of religion. This status stems in part from a now passed era where powerful public pastors served as “kingmakers” when it came to Republican presidential nominations. Today a less organized but still powerful evangelical base supports the Republican party, and these voters are largely credited with the success or failure of Republican party nominees. As such, it is worth understanding the essentials of Evangelical doctrine as it pertains to politics. I point out here the degree to which evangelical teachings emphasize self-sufficiency rather than collective action. This is one area where most denominational groups have a gap in beliefs between men and women. Because this is such an essential belief for Evangelicals little variation exists, and the gap is non-existent. There is not only a relationship between the politics of congregants and the manifestation of those values in their understandings of faith teachings. The very nature of Evangelical and Protestant denominations is supportive of individualistic ideals. Furthermore, an emphasis on stewardship and personal responsibility supports beliefs that the needy are often undeserving (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). Finally, distrust of interventionist government is in

line with a tradition averse to centralized authority in the church as well as government (Williams 2010).

In addition to Mainline Protestants and Evangelicals, the third sizeable group in America's historic religious landscape are Catholics. There have been Catholic groups which mobilize around progressive social provision even where they maintain social conservatism. For quite a while, Catholics made up a voting block at odds with Mainstream and Protestant American politics (Newport 2012). At the same time, early American Catholics were mostly working class or poor, and their political participation was facilitated by heavy mobilization efforts on the part of existing parties. This classically took the form of unions and civic organizations loyal to the Democratic Party. The differences between Protestant and Catholic voters extended well beyond doctrinal belief. American Catholics tended to break with American individualism—and the Protestant majority—in visible ways (Putnam and Campbell 2012).

Members of all three American Christian traditions are more politically conservative than the average non-religious or non-Christian American. All three denominational groups present a hierarchical approach to personal relationships and religious leadership which support conservative ideas, and unequal societal outcomes. However, believers within the various traditions see different acceptable political positions open to them. Protestant doctrine's complementary support for individual responsibility and social conservatism does not leave much room for a partisan gender gap. In contrast, Catholicism's mix of social conservatism and traditional belief in social justice and economic justice presents political cross pressures that make a wider range of party positions acceptable. After Vatican II many Catholic Church leaders took a hands off, behind the scenes, or localized approach to politics. All told, the politics of Catholics is markedly more heterogeneous than that of many other denominations, and this

variability is visible in sizeable gender differences. Men, who tend to be more conservative overall, can find normative support for conservatism within Catholic doctrine. Women, who tend to be more liberal overall, can also find normative support for liberal political stances. In this way the partisan gender gap is slightly larger amongst Catholics than amongst Protestants.

Variations of magnitude in the gender gap between Christian denominations pale in comparison to the gender gap seen amongst those who do not hold Christian beliefs. Amongst the most powerful measures of variation in religious belief amongst Americans is the question of adherence to biblical literalism. “Bible believing Christians” can vary widely in the literalism they apply to the bible, or the beliefs they bring to their reading of Christian scriptures. This term itself is loaded with varied meaning depending on who you speak with. All these differences are nuance when compared with non-Biblical literalists. This diverse group of Americans can include people who are completely uninhibited by commitments to any particular doctrine, those who are culturally but not religiously Christian, and those who profess non-Christian faith. Within this large bucket of “others” the effect of gender is not hampered by any single commitment, so the gender gap is maximized. I hypothesize that:

H1: The Gender gap in partisanship will be largest amongst respondents who are not biblical literalists.

H1a: The Gender gap in partisanship will be smallest amongst biblical literalists

Data and Methods

I rely on the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative data file released in 2016 to test my hypotheses. These data provide a nationally representative sample with highly reliable survey techniques. Furthermore, the ANES is especially strong in terms of its political,

ideological, and policy questions. It also provides a reasonable breadth of religion variables and is one of the few studies which includes large enough sample sizes across religious doctrinal groups to test my hypotheses. I utilize data from the American National Election Study times series cumulative data file for the years 1992 to 2016. I test my hypotheses using ordinary least squares regression models and multilevel models of the effect of gender and biblical literalism interactions on political partisanship. Where appropriate I also compare group means of policy positions and family structure.

Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable is partisanship. The variable used was a 7-point Likert scale. Higher values are more Republican, so that 1 is strong Democrat, 2 weak Democrat, 3 Democrat leaning Independent, 4 Independent, 5 Republican leaning Independent, 6 weak Republican, and 7 strong Republican.

Independent Variables

The two primary independent variables are gender and religious tradition. Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable where 0 is male and 1 is female. Religious tradition is a simple categorical variable for beliefs about the bible, which I refer to as a Biblical Literalism. For this variable, 0 means that a respondent selected “The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God”, 1 means that a respondent selected “The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”, and 2 means that a respondent selected “The Bible is the Actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.” This question allows me to include non-Christian and non-religious respondents, but also creates a bar for measuring someone’s religion that measures beliefs rather than behaviors. The most literal interpretation is more common to Mainline and Evangelical Protestants, while a moderate

literalist stance is more common to Catholics. The gender gap variation between religious traditions is always measured in this study as an interaction between Gender and Biblical Literalism.

Each model includes a control for study year, and for respondent age. I also have included a dichotomous control for marital status. This is coded 1 for married, and 0 for all other responses including widowed, separated, divorced, in a domestic partnership, and missing values. Such a control is controversial amongst political scientists. A widow and someone who has chosen to never marry may have very different beliefs and life experiences. Because this is not my variable of interest, I am comfortable enough that a lot of the noise of this variable will wash out in the model, and I test my hypothesis with alternative specifications and do not return substantively different results. A control for census region is coded 1 for Northeast, 2 for North Central, 3 for South, and 4 for West. A control for education is coded based on number of years of formal education. Finally, a control is included based on the ANES race-ethnicity summary variable. For this variable, 1 is White non-Hispanic, 2 is Black non-Hispanic, 3 is Asian or pacific-islander non-Hispanic, 4 is American Indian or Alaskan Native non-Hispanic, 5 is Hispanic, 6 is other or multiple races non-Hispanic, and 9 is missing.

Variable Scales and Distribution:

Variable	Median	Standard Deviation	Range
Class	2	1.103	(1, 4)
Education	3	1.812	(1, 7)
Partisanship	3	2.079	(1, 7)
Age	45	17.218	(17, 99)
Ideology	4	1.417	(1, 7)
Biblical Literalism	1	0.710	(0, 2)
Foreign Aid Support	0	0.646	(0, 2)
Environmental Spending Support	2	0.657	(0, 2)
Equalitarianism	0	0.199	(-0.458, 0.417)

Ethnocentrism	0.003	0.167	(-0.333, 0.37)
Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation	1	0.656	(0, 2)
Feminist Thermometer	0	0.232	(-0.5, 0.47)

Denominational Differences in The Gender Gap As displayed in table 5.1, women are 0.317 points less conservative on a 7-point Likert scale, amongst those who are not biblical literalists. Amongst moderate biblical literalists women are 0.157 points less conservative than moderate biblical literalist men. Amongst strict biblical literalists women are only 0.021 points less conservative than men. For hypotheses 1 and 1a I fail to reject the null, and both hypotheses stand. These results are all significant. This finding is interesting but does not account fully for the significant gender gaps we find in other populations, or fully capture the variation in gender gaps by religion.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Biblical Literalism}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Race}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 5.1 Religion-Gender Effect on Ideology

Multilevel Model	Religion-Gender
Female	-0.317*** (0.04)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)
Partisanship	0.366***

	(0.004)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215***
	(0.025)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162***
	(0.027)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152**
	(0.007)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094**
	(0.035)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261***
	(0.042)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096**
	(0.031)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026
	(0.066)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101
	(0.109)
Hispanic	0.022
	(0.029)
Other or multiple races	-0.003
	(0.064)
Missing race	-0.08
	(0.123)
North Central Resident	0.037
	(0.028)
South Resident	0.06*
	(0.026)
West Resident	-0.04
	(0.028)
Constant	2.353***
	(0.06)
Year: Random-effects Parameters	0.003
	(0.002)
Residual	1.277
	(0.014)
Prob > chi2	0.000
N	16,853

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Figure 5.1 Multilevel Models Predicting the Marginal Gender Gap in Partisanship Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates^v




Figure 5.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Theory: Explaining the Denominational Differences in the Gender Gap

Group Positions: In Group Favoritism and Out Group Animosity

Within some communities, religion also operates as an important ingroup. Beyond heated disagreement on theological grounds, scholars have demonstrated that churches with more stringent membership requirements actually manage to maintain higher levels of committed membership and participation (Wilcox and Robinson 2010, Williams 2010). Just as stricter ingroup-outgroup delineations help to define group association and can stoke outgroup antipathy

(Riek et al. 2006), religion's explicit membership requirements and peer-to-peer reinforcement of norms can be a mechanism for strict group definitions.

Outgroup sanctions have come in many forms over the years. Protestant majorities' anticatholic feelings defined Catholics and immigrants as unamerican, and undeserving of certain jobs, housing, and political positions. Evangelical discomfort with fundamentalist extremism led to deep sanctions against a religious group that had at times appeared to be on the same political team (Williams 2010). Today's antipathy towards Muslims is strongest amongst the most religious Americans and is especially high amongst the most highly religious Christians (Johnson et al. 2011). The policy of many white churches' to explicitly prohibit black congregants and interracial relationships encouraged Sunday mornings to be "the most segregated hour in America," according to Dr. Martin Luther King.

Group positions: Equalitarianism

An equalitarianism theory arises from the differences in equalitarian belief across gender as well as across denominations. Individualism serves as a legitimizing myth for inequality. If we are all given an equal start and fight or work for what we come out with, anyone can reach the highest levels. Thus, equality is not a desirable collective goal because each individual could achieve a higher circumstance on their own. While communitarian denominations appeal directly to equalitarian beliefs. Deep inequality can be uncomfortable for many. Conservatives successfully adopt system justifying beliefs to support their own group's well-being (Anderson & Singer 2008). System justifying beliefs can increase psychological well-being and reduce "anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty (Jost & Hunyady 2003)." An experimental study found that pointing out a "rags-to-riches" explanation was able to reduce

moral outrage about unequal outcomes, and to reduce support for redistributive policies. High status individuals were especially receptive to this narrative (Wakslak et al. 2007). Members of subordinate groups may internalize feelings of inferiority, and sometimes will be the staunchest defenders of hierarchies (Jost et al. 2004). Social Dominance Theory points out that women will be likely to believe in and support their subordination, at least subconsciously (Sidanius 2004). Jackman (1996) argues that paternalism allows dominant groups to forge goodwill through benevolence. Subordinate groups are intimately committed to the individuals who make up that group, and thus ardently defend the institutions that lead to their subordination. Jackman's argument in the case of gender demonstrates that women may be active in supporting and recreating patriarchal structures. For women who take up feminist equalitarian ideals there is a clear interest in promoting left leaning politicians who will defend gender equality and work on concrete "women's issues."

As religious groups struggle to define their identities and place in the wider society, the role of women has played a particularly important part in differentiating religious conservatives from worldly society. Women in conservative and traditionalist denominations take traditional gender roles to heart as a demonstration of their faith, and in doing so define themselves as ever more committed to the religion and its' values (DeRogatis 2014). It is a commonly stated puzzle that while religiosity on average increases conservatism, women are both more liberal and more religious (Kaufmann 2004, Newport 2012). To assume that the gender, religiosity, and ideology are correlated in a set of simple linear relationships does not fit the data. On the other hand, the most extreme expectations for gender roles can create backlash. Religious beliefs which outsiders see as supporting the mistreatment or demeaning of women have served to galvanize ingroup members around feelings of persecution and being misunderstood, while enabling

outgroup members to define their own associations in opposition to these actions and beliefs (DeRogatis 2014, Steiner 2006, Williams 2010).

Traditions which are most committed to individualism are ideologically at odds with understandings of inequality as stemming from unfair systems, and thus favor explanations of inequality based in personal responsibility, and conversely personal failings. Women tend to be more equalitarian and are more likely to see a structural rather than personal cause for inequality which negatively impacts others (Barnes & Cassese 2017).

As such, I test the following hypotheses:

H2: There is a difference in equalitarian beliefs between religious doctrinal groups.

H2a: There will be no difference in the size of the partisan gender gap amongst doctrinal groups when controlling for support for feminism.

H2b: There will be no difference in the size of the partisan gender gap amongst doctrinal groups when controlling for ethnocentric beliefs.

H2c: There will be no difference in the size of the partisan gender gap amongst doctrinal groups when controlling for individual scores on the equalitarianism scale.

Compassion

A compassion-based theory argues that women are socialized to be maternal or helping figures who are empathetic and concerned with those around them. Compassion, protectiveness, and caretaking roles are connected to safety net programs, but also to policies relating to personal safety and national defense (Barnes & Cassese 2017, Eagly et al. 2004, Hutchings et al. 2004, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). As the policy ideals of the parties crystalized, the existing gap in policy preferences amongst men and women led directly to a gender gap in partisanship (Gillion et al 2018). The connection of this theory to religion is more tenuous. Greater ambivalence

towards the traditional role of women amongst non-biblical literalists, and stronger commitments amongst the strict biblical literalists may exist. However, because strict biblical literalists are the most conservative, we would expect that both men and women are unwilling to support compassion issues. For compassion issues to explain the larger gender gap amongst non-biblical literalists there should be a high support of compassion issues which drive women's politics, but not men's. Moderate biblical literalists would fall in the middle, and strict biblical literalists would demonstrate the lowest support for compassion issues. I test first whether the relationship between support for compassion issues and denominations as expected.

H3: There is a difference in compassion (in the form of social justice and social responsibility beliefs) between religious doctrinal groups.

H3a: As biblical literalism increases, support for compassion issues will decrease.

Economic Insecurity

An economic insecurity theory proposes that economic needs or anxieties drive women towards support of safety net programs, and therefore a generally more liberal political position (Chaney et al. 1998, Huddy et al. 2009, Welch & Hibbing 1992). A compelling argument exists that the gender gap is best explained by contrasting material needs of women before and after the proliferation of more open divorce laws and single motherhood (Edlund & Pande 2002). Women are also generally more economically cautious (Chaney et al. 1998, Welch & Hibbing 1992). Women do not embrace conservative ideas as readily because they are more likely to benefit from government support due to lower earnings, more caretaking responsibilities, and a greater personal harm from divorce than men (Edlund and Pande 2002). The economic background,

number of children, and divorce risk across denominations may vary in such a way that women across denominations face different economic risks. As such I test the following hypotheses:

H4: There is a difference in economic security of women among doctrinal belief groups.

H4a: Women in doctrinal belief groups with larger partisan gender gap effects will experience higher rates of single parenthood.

H4b: The gender gap in partisanship will not vary amongst doctrinal beliefs, holding prospective economic evaluations constant.

Measuring Explanations of the Denominational Gender Gap

Using the same ANES data and variables, and similar multilevel models I expand my analysis to test which of the above theories best explains the denominational gender gap. When testing the equalitarianism-based theory, I employ a scale composed of the ANES' six question equalitarianism battery. Each question allows five responses ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly. These questions include whether society should "ensure equal opportunity to succeed," whether "we have gone too far pushing equal rights," whether it is a "big problem that not everyone has equal chance," whether it is "not big problem if some have more chance in life," whether we "should worry less about how equal people are," and whether the U.S. would have fewer problems if everyone was treated equally. For a race-based substantive measure of the equalitarianism theory I constructed an ethnocentrism scale. This is simply 300 – a respondent's 0-100 group thermometer rating of blacks, Jews, and Hispanics or Latinos. For a gender-based substantive measure of the equalitarianism theory I used the feeling thermometer for feminists. This also ranges 0-100.

When testing the compassion issues-based theory I construct a scale with a variety of compassion issue policy positions, and an acceptable Cronbach's alpha greater than 0.7. The variables included in this scale are whether the government should help minority groups or minority groups/blacks should help themselves, whether government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living, whether federal spending on childcare should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on financial aid for college students should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on the environment should increase, decrease, or remain the same, whether federal spending on public schools should increase, decrease or remain the same, whether federal spending on the poor should increase, decrease, or remain the same, and whether federal spending on welfare should increase, decrease, or remain the same.

When testing the economic precarity theory I utilize a prospective evaluation of the respondent's personal financial situation. This variable is coded 0 if their situation is expected to get worse, 1 if it is expected to stay the same, or 2 if it is expected to get better. Finally, I constructed a variable for whether respondents were single parents. This is coded 1 if they are single parents, and 0 if they are not. Zeroes include both childless respondents and married respondents with children. The goal of this measure was to determine whether respondents were likely to experience the unique financial challenges of single parenthood.

What Theory Best Explains the Denominational Gender Gap?

As demonstrated in Table 5.2, the more communitarian denominations (biblically moderate) do not have a larger gender gap than the individualist denominations (strict biblical literalists) when controlling for support for feminism. Men in the communitarian denominations were 0.157 pts more conservative than women in these denominations, when not controlling for

the feminist thermometer. By contrast, men in individualist denominations were 0.021 pts more conservative, when not controlling for the feminist thermometer. When controlling for the feminist thermometer, men in communitarian denominations were 0.064 pts more conservative than women in communitarian denominations while men in individualist denominations were 0.018 pts less conservative than women in individualist denominations. Comparing the gender gaps in the standard model establishes a difference of 0.124 pts between communitarians and individualists, with the latter having a smaller (and flipped) gender gap. When controlling for the feminist feeling thermometer the gender gap is only 0.097 pts different between communitarians and individualists, again with individualists having a smaller flipped gender gap. This does not account for all variation but serves as an interesting preliminary finding that gender roles are closely related to the way women of faith define their political beliefs.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Biblical Literalism}} + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Feminist Thermometer}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} || \text{year}$$

Table 5.2 Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Gender-Based Equalitarianism on the Gender Gap in Ideology Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

Multilevel Models	Standard Model	Feminist Thermometer Model
Female	-0.317*** (0.04)	-0.229*** (0.045)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)	0.391*** (0.036)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)	0.671*** (0.042)
Female X Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)	0.158** (0.053)
Female X Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)	0.261*** (0.059)
Feminist Thermometer		-1.15*** (0.001)

Female X Feminist Thermometer		0.099 (0.001)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
Partisanship	0.366*** (0.004)	0.352*** (0.006)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215*** (0.025)	-0.163*** (0.03)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162*** (0.027)	-0.121*** (0.032)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152** (0.007)	-0.139* (0.069)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094** (0.035)	-0.084* (0.04)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261*** (0.042)	-0.222*** (0.044)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096** (0.031)	0.172*** (0.036)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026 (0.066)	0.009 (0.075)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101 (0.109)	-0.09 (0.134)
Hispanic	0.022 (0.029)	0.073* (0.033)
Other or multiple races	-0.003 (0.064)	0.013 (0.063)
Missing race	-0.08 (0.123)	-0.132 (0.194)
North Central Resident	0.037 (0.028)	0.019 (0.033)
South Resident	0.06* (0.026)	0.033 (0.031)
West Resident	-0.04 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.033)
Constant	2.353	2.319*** (0.067)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)
Residual	1.277 (0.014)	1.196 (0.016)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
N	16,853	11,603

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
 Table 5.2 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Furthermore, the more communitarian denomination does not have a larger gender gap than the individualist denomination when controlling for ethnocentrism, as demonstrated in Table 5.3. Men in the communitarian denominations were 0.151 pts more conservative than women in these denominations, when controlling for ethnocentrism. By contrast, men in individualist denominations were only 0.011 pts more conservative, when controlling for ethnocentrism. When not controlling for ethnocentrism, men in communitarian denominations were 0.141 pts more conservative while men in individualist denominations were 0.017 pts less conservative. In the standard model, being female results in 0.124 pts more liberalism amongst the communitarian denominations than amongst the individualist denominations. When controlling for ethnocentrism the gender gap is 0.14 larger amongst the communitarian denominations than amongst the individualist denominations. Based on these models it seems that ethnocentric beliefs are not the driving force behind the religious differences in the gender gap. Importantly, the feminist thermometer findings support a Group Positions Theory reading of the gender gap by religion. If we are to trust this measure of ethnocentrism, which is widely used, we cannot attribute gender differences in ideology across religions to a succinct group positions and equalitarianism theory as defined in the gender gap literature.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Biblical Literalism} + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Ethnocentrism} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 5.3 Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Ethnocentrism on the Gender Gap in Ideology Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

Multilevel Model	Standard Model	Ethnocentrism Model
Female	-0.317*** (0.04)	-0.35*** (0.061)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)	0.417*** (0.05)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)	0.751*** (0.058)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)	0.181* (0.072)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)	0.341*** (0.079)
Ethnocentrism		0.414** (0.127)
Female x Ethnocentrism		-0.192 (0.172)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
Partisanship	0.366*** (0.004)	0.382*** (0.007)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.009)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215*** (0.025)	-0.211*** (0.04)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162*** (0.027)	-0.161*** (0.043)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152** (0.007)	-0.048 (0.092)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094** (0.035)	-0.072 (0.051)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261*** (0.042)	-0.27*** (0.066)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096** (0.031)	0.143** (0.052)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026 (0.066)	-0.112 (0.097)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101 (0.109)	0.096 (0.183)
Hispanic	0.022 (0.029)	0.082 (0.048)
Other or multiple races	-0.003 (0.064)	0.002 (0.096)
Missing race	-0.08	-0.44

	(0.123)	(0.248)
North Central Resident	0.037	0.027
	(0.028)	(0.045)
South Resident	0.06*	0.065
	(0.026)	(0.042)
West Resident	-0.04	-0.041
	(0.028)	(0.044)
Constant	2.353	2.219***
	(0.06)	(0.09)
Year: Random-effects Parameter	0.003	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.000)
Residual	1.277	1.283
	(0.014)	(0.022)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
N	16,853	6,800

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.3 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Men in the communitarian denominations were 0.169 pts more conservative than women in these denominations, when controlling for equalitarianism. By contrast, men in individualist denominations were only 0.01 pts more conservative, when controlling for equalitarianism. When not controlling for equalitarianism, men in communitarian denominations were 0.069 pts less conservative while men in individualist denominations were 0.019 pts less conservative. In the standard model, being female results in 0.174 pts more liberalism amongst the communitarian denominations than amongst the individualist denominations. When controlling for ethnocentrism the gender gap is still 0.05 pts larger amongst the communitarian denominations than amongst the individualist denominations

This confirms that for the substantively equalitarian idea of feminism as well as for general equalitarianism, equalitarian belief drives the differences in ideology. It is possible that the ethnocentrism model activates a greater degree of social desirability bias, and that as such it is marked by a unique degree of measurement error. While equalitarianism is not telling the whole story, for two of the three hypothesis I have failed to reject the null and believe that the

religion-gender gaps are partially explained by average differences equalitarianism. In other words, for these gender gaps group positions theory has significant bearing.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Biblical Literalism} + \beta\text{Gender} * \beta\text{Equalitarianism} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 5.4 Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Equalitarianism on the Gender Gap in Ideology Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

Multilevel Model	Standard Model	Equalitarianism Model
Female	-0.317*** (0.04)	-0.282*** (0.049)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)	0.349*** (0.038)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)	0.631*** (0.043)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)	0.128* (0.057)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)	0.284*** (0.061)
Equalitarianism		-1.634*** (0.075)
Female x Equalitarianism		0.382*** (0.099)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Partisanship	0.366*** (0.004)	0.304*** (0.006)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.007)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215*** (0.025)	-0.165*** (0.03)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162*** (0.027)	-0.127*** (0.032)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152** (0.007)	-0.16* (0.065)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094** (0.035)	-0.088* (0.039)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261*** (0.042)	-0.233*** (0.051)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096**	0.229***

	(0.031)	(0.036)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026	-0.027
	(0.066)	(0.084)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101	0.041
	(0.109)	(0.124)
Hispanic	0.022	0.038
	(0.029)	(0.034)
Other or multiple races	-0.003	0.025
	(0.064)	(0.078)
Missing race	-0.08	-0.038
	(0.123)	(0.142)
North Central Resident	0.037	0.029
	(0.028)	(0.033)
South Resident	0.06*	0.028
	(0.026)	(0.031)
West Resident	-0.04	-0.043
	(0.028)	(0.033)
Constant	2.353	2.627***
	(0.06)	(0.069)
Year: Random-effects Parameters	0.003	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Residual	1.277	1.235
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
N	16,853	11,968

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.4 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Moving on to see whether the other theories of the gender gap could explain these differences just as well, I have examined the rates of compassion issue scores between denominations. It appears that biblical literalists hold more liberal beliefs on compassion issues than individuals with moderate biblical literalism. The average compassion score for each group is listed in Table 5.5. Given this, it would not be possible for a compassion issue driven partisan gender gap to be larger amongst biblical moderates.

Table 5.5 Compassion Scale Scores by Biblical Beliefs

Biblical Literalism	Mean Compassion Scale Score	95% Confidence Interval
“The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God”	1.523	(1.498, 1.549)
“The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”	1.347	(1.333, 1.361)
“The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”	1.419	(1.402, 1.437)

Table 5.5 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Finally, I examine the theory that economic precarity or insecurity amongst women drives the gender gap. The single parenthood based economic security hypothesis was not supported. This hypothesis expected that those religious traditions with more conservative politics experience less need for liberal social welfare policies because they are less likely to experience single parenthood. In fact, it seems that the more politically and biblically conservative groups experience more single parenthood, as shown in Table 5.6. The differences between biblical literalists and biblical moderates are statistically insignificant. The higher rates of single parenthood amongst biblical literalists may be partially accounted for by higher birthrates within these groups, or by other demographic factors, but the essential finding is that they are not immune from the economic challenges that the general population of Americans face.

Table 5.6 Rates of Single Parenthood by Biblical Belief

Biblical Literalism	Rate of Single Parenthood	95% Confidence Interval
“The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God”	0.020	(0.014, 0.026)
“The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”	0.028	(0.024, 0.033)
“The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”	0.045	(0.039, 0.051)

Table 5.6 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

As demonstrated in Table 5.7, the prospective economic evaluation based economic security hypothesis was not supported as demonstrated by no significant change in the gender difference between biblical literalists and those with a moderate interpretation of the bible. Looking at the point estimates the standard model exhibits a 0.136 pt. change in the gender gap from moderate biblical literalists to strict biblical literalists. For the precarity model this difference is 0.13 pt. Differences in perceived economic need or security cannot fully explain doctrinal differences in the partisan gender gap.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Biblical Literalism}} + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Personal Economic Evaluation}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}}$$

Table 5.7 Regression Models Predicting the Effects of Prospective Economic Evaluations on the Gender Gap in Ideology Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

Multilevel Models	Standard Model	Precarity Model
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Female	-0.317*** (0.04)	-0.306*** (0.053)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)	0.437*** (0.032)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)	0.75*** (0.037)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)	0.155** (0.047)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)	0.285*** (0.051)
Prospective Economic Evaluation		-0.043* (0.019)
Female x Prospective Economic Evaluation		-0.004 (0.027)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Partisanship	0.366*** (0.004)	0.366*** (0.005)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)	-0.040*** (0.006)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215*** (0.025)	-0.215*** (0.026)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162*** (0.027)	-0.156*** (0.028)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152** (0.007)	-0.173** (0.057)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094** (0.035)	-0.085* (0.035)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261*** (0.042)	-0.256*** (0.042)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096** (0.031)	0.103** (0.031)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026 (0.066)	-0.04 (0.067)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101 (0.109)	-0.092 (0.109)
Hispanic	0.022 (0.029)	0.029 (0.03)
Other or multiple races	-0.003 (0.064)	-0.003 (0.065)
Missing race	-0.08 (0.123)	-0.059 (0.125)
North Central Resident	0.037 (0.028)	0.045 (0.028)
South Resident	0.06* (0.026)	0.074** (0.027)

West Resident	-0.04 (0.028)	-0.033 (0.029)
Constant	2.353 (0.06)	2.413*** (0.067)
Year: Random-Effects Parameters	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Residual	1.277 (0.014)	1.273 (0.014)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
N	16,853	16,497

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.7 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

While most of the gender gap theories emphasize a type of pocketbook voting and concrete personal challenges, there is an understanding that women are more other-oriented. This leads women to take a sociotropic approach to economic evaluation. In other words, they emphasize the economic wellbeing of others more than men might. To cover the possibility that women evaluate personal precarity with a sociotropic lens I have included an additional analysis with a sociotropic economic evaluation causal variable. As demonstrated in Table 5.8, the prospective sociotropic economic evaluation based economic security hypothesis was not supported as demonstrated by no significant change in the gender difference between biblical literalists and those with a moderate interpretation of the bible. Looking at the point estimates the standard model exhibits a 0.136 pt. change in the gender gap from moderate biblical literalists to strict biblical literalists. For the precarity model this difference is 0.127 pt. Differences in perceived economic need or security cannot fully explain doctrinal differences in the partisan gender gap.

$$\text{Ideology} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Biblical Literalism}} + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Sociotropic Economic Evaluation}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} \parallel \text{year}$$

Table 5.8 Regression Models Predicting the Effects of Sociotropic Prospective Economic Evaluations on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

	Standard Model	Prearity Model
Female	-0.317*** (0.04)	-0.289*** (0.046)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.436*** (0.032)	0.425*** (0.032)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.748*** (0.036)	0.736*** (0.037)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.16** (0.047)	0.147** (0.047)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.296*** (0.051)	0.274*** (0.051)
Prospective Sociotropic Economic Evaluation		-0.128*** (0.016)
Female x Prospective Economic Evaluation		-0.03 (0.022)
Age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Partisanship	0.366*** (0.004)	0.355*** (0.005)
Education	-0.041*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.006)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.215*** (0.025)	-0.214*** (0.025)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162*** (0.027)	-0.167*** (0.027)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152** (0.007)	-0.159** (0.056)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.094** (0.035)	-0.096** (0.035)
Marital Status – Other	-0.261*** (0.042)	-0.26*** (0.041)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.096** (0.031)	0.116*** (0.031)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.026 (0.066)	-0.02 (0.066)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.101 (0.109)	-0.102 (0.109)
Hispanic	0.022 (0.029)	0.029 (0.029)
Other or multiple races	-0.003 (0.064)	0.002 (0.064)
Missing race	-0.08	-0.06

	(0.123)	(0.124)
North Central Resident	0.037	0.044
	(0.028)	(0.028)
South Resident	0.06*	0.062*
	(0.026)	(0.026)
West Resident	-0.04	-0.034
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	2.353	2.486***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Year: Random-effects	0.003	0.012
Parameter	(0.002)	(0.006)
Residual	1.277	1.265
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
N	16,853	16,790

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.8 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Conclusion

America was founded on individualist religious denominations and has maintained a deep intermingling of religion and politics which allows this ideology to persist both in politics and religion. This religious tradition has enveloped the basic tenants of American values, particularly individualism and self-sufficiency since colonial times. America's dominant religious traditions have maintained those values and carried them into the modern day.

In this chapter, I examined the role of religious denominations on the gender gap, measured as partisan affiliation. I was specifically interested in examining the gendered effects of the communitarian doctrines common to Catholicism, and the individualist doctrines common to protestants, and especially common to evangelicals. I was curious about communitarianism's inherent interest in social justice would contrast with individualism's belief in personal achievement and individual responsibility. Because these values interact with how men and

women view their own roles differently, I wanted to see whether the gender gap in political partisanship would also differ between individuals with these beliefs.

My primary analyses suggested that denominational differences in equalitarianism do account for the smaller gender gap in ideology amongst biblical literalists (individualist protestants) than amongst biblical moderates (communitarian Catholics). Please see the appendix to review similar results for the effects of biblical literalism and gender on partisanship.^{vi}

In addition, I tested several alternative hypotheses regarding the gender gap, namely denominational differences in support for compassion issues and economic security. Interestingly, my results showed that the compassion issues theory was not supported, and that conservatism amongst biblical literalists cannot be explained by less support for these issues. I also did not find support for a theory that denominational differences in economic security account for the denominational difference in gender gaps. Subjective evaluations of economic wellbeing did not support the idea that biblical literalists or biblical moderates held different politics because they felt more economically secure, nor did differences in their family structures account for the difference.

This research is simply one part of a larger line of questions, and I acknowledge important limitations in this work. For example, I did not examine non-Christians, or the non-Religious. Looking at these groups would improve generalizability, and perhaps help to define the lines between doctrine and ideology more sharply. Due to data limitations, I was not able to directly test socialization and personality theories such as Group Position Theory (Bobo 1999), Paternalism Theory (Jackman 1996), or Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius 2004). Denominational differences may or may not be accounted for more thoroughly with these more

complete ideas, and differences in equalitarianism could fit into any of their structures. These are avenues of future research I plan to pursue.

6. MILLENNIALS, COMMUNITARIAN RELIANCE, AND THE SHRINKING GENDER GAP

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the mechanisms behind variances in the gender gap across generations the most recent generations of Americans. I argue that millennials and generation z experience widespread economic precarity. This contrasts meaningfully with earlier generations where men typically felt economically secure and self-sufficient, while the average woman would still have felt economically at risk. This lack of self-sufficiency in the realm of economics is relevant to the gender gap where economic precarity drove liberalism only amongst women, but now drives more liberalism amongst both genders when compared to earlier generations. This is in line with research that anticipates generational effects of economic and policy regime on ideology (Shorrocks and Grasso 2020). Finally, this economic precarity has socialized into a shared grievance. Millennials and Generation Z have not succeeded in living out the American ideal of individualism and are more likely than older generations to believe in communitarian politics and a strong safety net.

America's individualistic values have long manifested in the goals of America's youth and the American perception of what it means to grow up. Today's youth and young adults are extensively berated for their inability or unwillingness to "leave the nest," but such criticisms are no longer a matter of opinion piece fluff and griping elders. Millennials and Gen Z have not only been more likely to rely on relatives in every way; their pathways into adulthood have been

marked by an ambling inability to achieve the benchmarks researchers have set as signifiers of adulthood. Traditionally, Americans have been considered to have reached maturity when they leave home, finish school, get married, gain financial independence, and have their first child. As it turns out these quintessential rites of passage are no longer a given in the lives of America's youth. Each of the five benchmarks are now harder to achieve, less common, and more likely to occur later in life.

We are surrounded also by a sense that millennials are constantly in need of reassurance. It is argued that this generation lacks self-direction. The proliferation of trigger warnings and the critique of the same has done nothing to counter the fact that millennials suffer from exceptionally poor mental health when compared to previous generations. This phenomenon has been given numerous explanations and is likely best addressed by mental health professionals. However, acknowledging this reality and looking to the defining moments of the generation allows us to see a generation whose formative years have been defined by uncertainty. As I will discuss below this has led to a uniquely powerful effect of economic anxiety on the generation.

The Generations

The theory of generational effects is that each generation experiences a different set of profoundly impactful events at formative points in their lives. Living through these shared experiences at similar times in their lives means that for an entire generation there is, on average, a common shift towards certain beliefs, preferences, or fears. This is not to say that there is hegemony amongst members of a generation, or that there is no overlap between generations. Rather, generational effects amount to marked and measurable variations between generational groups (Abramson 1979, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Schuman and Corning 2012).

As Americans move through the life stages, they take on identities centered on age, but at various points we have seen proof that these identities are complicated by a resistant to being seen as growing up to become their parents. Just as adolescents try to psychologically separate themselves from their parents, each new life stage brings an opportunity to define oneself in terms of building on or correcting the actions of one's elders (Scott 2016). It is not enough to understand that elderly retirees vote for Medicare and social security while young parents vote for good schools. Each generation comes into each life stage with a shared national history. The circumstances contemporary to one's development drive policy preferences. As we can see here with the financial precarity model the impact of economic circumstances while one is coming of age can drive lifelong feelings of economic insecurity across the generation.

The cut points for generations can be meaningless or can be defined in a way that carefully accounts for the exact timing of meaningful events and societal transitions. The ANES cumulative data file captures the greatest generation, the silent generation, the baby boomers, generation x, millennials, and generation z. The greatest generation and silent generation were defined by the participation in the world wars and the nation's postwar economic boom. These older adults came of age in the time in America that future generations mythologized either for its economic security or its flourishing traditional values (Kamenetz 2006). They lived through the societal changes of civil rights, the women's movement, and the sexual revolution. Oftentimes this put them at odds with the demands of the next generation(s).

America's Baby Boomers have been immensely influential when it comes to politics and societal values. Their early lives were marked by a drive for more emancipative values on the part of their peers. This took the form of promoting equalitarian values and cultural openness, and this opening can be credited with liberalizing laws around sex and marriage (Coole 2012).

These new values were a double-edged sword for women. While single mothers and working women faced dramatically less stigma there were also financial tolls. Women, who were more likely than men to be harmed by divorce, did not suddenly receive a better shake in such proceedings when divorce became more common. In fact, while baby boomer women and generation x continued to form mostly traditional families, they faced rapidly escalating divorce rates with the spread of no-fault divorce (Edlund and Pande 2002).

On the other hand, both generations lived through the rise of neoliberalism and Reaganomics. The individualist ideals of making it on your own through sheer grit and determination moved from the stuff of folklore to the stuff of obligation. Earlier generations viewed a decline in work towards the end of one's life either as a reward for years of dedicated work or as a necessity brought on by the inevitable aging of the human body. Today the urge to maintain youth and vitality has transformed into a public desire to decrease elderly dependence on family, society, and the government (Coole 2012). America's booming elderly population might stave off some of their eldercare needs and medical bills by working much later into their life than previous generations, but these changes can occur only around the margins when we consider the size and probable longevity of this generation. Due to a wobbling "three-legged stool," and thanks in part to the expectation that older Americans can keep working, the elderly population is now simply another part of America's potential labor force (Bruder 2018).

It is unclear whether baby boomers stand to compete for power as a major voting bloc or fragment into self-interested factions within the market and electorate. In addition to the obvious safety net program preferences, America's unprecedented elderly population will demand different types of housing (smaller and more accessible) and community resources than the smaller cohorts before them (Nelson 2009). This may be compounded by the burgeoning demand

for starter homes amongst the large millennial population, and the lower-than-expected demand for large family homes as the birthrate dips.

Economic precarity

Research has established that the availability of a stronger safety net for residents of a given country may minimize the gender gap within that country, and that this effect is driven by the availability of programs throughout an individual's life, rather than only at the time they are surveyed (Shorrocks and Grasso 2020). Considering the particularly low levels of safety net provision in the United States this opens the possibility for significant gender gap expansion, but societal and cultural factors must also be accounted for.

When lucky enough to have supportive and stable families, millennials have turned to them for assistance in times of need, but even this resource introduces new fears, uncertainties, and insecurities. In many countries young people have continued to live with their parents even as they grow and mature in their educations and careers. The same has not traditionally been true for America's young adults. While many European students attend the college closest to their childhood home, America's academically ambitious youth might aim for a capstone state school or even an out of state school that would draw them far from home. Today we think of community colleges as the most widely accessible form of higher education, but even the idea of a junior college or community college close to home is a relatively new phenomenon. For most individuals who wanted to pursue higher education, leaving a childhood home was simply part of the process for many generations. With the advent of the G.I. Bill, it became a goal to give all students the opportunity to commute to a local school, and ideally to an affordable community

college. Today's students and former students return home for less intentional reasons (Jay 2012, Kamenetz 2006).

While college enrollment has risen, so has the dropout rate. Students trying college out for themselves, taking a few enriching courses, and ultimately deciding that college was not the path they wanted to take has not always been a catastrophic outcome. The repercussions of this in the current system are that once hopeful students are derailed and put in profound debt without much hope of a commensurate financial gain. Even for students who persevere and complete a degree the burden of student loans can be so profound that academic and career success does not necessarily make the costs manageable. The most financially fortunate students are supported by family through school. This is certainly something to be grateful for, even if it does not facilitate the student's immediate launch into financial independence. Much more sinister, minority students and students from lower income households are, on average, the heaviest student loan borrowers. These students are not dependent on their parents to bail them out of college costs and student loan burdens; however, they often graduate with so much debt that they cannot afford the lifestyle we once expected college educated Americans to earn (Kamenetz 2006).

Like students pursuing higher education, Americans looking to enter the workforce have a tradition of traveling far and wide across the country for economic opportunity. In the earliest days the idea of an open horizon lured colonists, and then pioneers. This idea of forging new paths is a quintessentially American idea that has been brought forward over the generations. The very notion of the American dream is that opportunity abounds for those willing to seek it out. This belief has been immortalized in literature, film, and music. From the hobos of the great depression who traveled out of necessity to the beatniks and hippies of the 1960s who traveled on personal and cultural pilgrimages the idea of hitting the road is an essential part of the

American story. It has been noted by researchers that Americans tended to move more often overall in early decades than they do these days. Americans today are far more likely to stay in the state, county, and even municipality that they were born than their grandparents would have been (Frey 2019).

As time passes it seems that Americans are less mobile than they used to be. Some of this may simply be a change of culture away from an infatuation with wanderlust. However, a lot of the shift is attributed to the increasingly insurmountable obstacles for most people to move. It may seem that if the truly impoverished and indigent of the great depression could manage a move then today's Americans would be able to swing it, but this dismisses the immense financial costs of moving. There are the obvious costs—paying for travel expenses, packing expenses, and lost wages during a transition. There are also costs that might not be as immediately apparent. Today, your debts can follow you seamlessly from one state to another. There were days when if you skipped town your landlord would be hard pressed to track down any further payment. In the modern system credit dings and collection calls can follow you demanding payment for months of lease payments on a home you no longer need. Similarly, if you left behind debts to a few old friends, you would only be obliged to them if you returned to your old neighborhood. Instead, the millions of Americans with consumer debt know that they will still be in touch with their creditor no matter how far their fresh start takes them physically.

Dependency and Communitarianism

Commentators have argued that millennials were raised by helicopter parents, that they were told too often that they were special, that they were given too many participation trophies, and generally speaking that they were not raised to take on life's challenges head-on in the way that American individualism would demand (Haidt 2018, Kamenetz 2006, Sternberg 2019). All

of this may be true, but none of these explanations fully account for the rapid decline in individualism amongst America's young adults. Millennials were cast as irresponsible and self-centered. It turns out that they desire to take on the roles and responsibilities of traditional American adulthood. They are falling behind these markers by no choice of their own. While millennials (and Gen X) have had relatively few children, they have consistently expressed a desire for more children than they are having when asked by researchers. Surveys also demonstrate that financial instability is among the top reasons for not having a child or having another child. Although more Americans choose to cohabitate than was once the case, millennials are also reporting putting off marriage for financial reasons. The traditional vision of marriage is a nice engagement ring, a place of your own, and a commitment to providing security and stability whenever possible. Of course, most people vow fidelity for richer or for poorer, but the meaning of this is twisted a bit when would-be newlyweds come into a partnership with decades of debt repayment and bleak career prospects lined up before them (Jay 2012).

All of this sums up to the simple reality that millennials, and now Gen Zers are by and large stuck in a state of semi-adolescence. Independence is no longer the default for America's youth. It may not even be a feasible option for many. These truths seemed like nothing more than editorial fodder for quite some time, and some of the explanations and "back in my day" stories are of little use. On the other hand, America's young people are genuinely staring down a future that will include challenges earlier generations did not have to face. These realities include staggering debt, a financial need to live at home, and such a high degree of financial pessimism that many young people have given up dreams of starting a family or purchasing a home.

So, if individualism is impossible, what happens to individualistic American values? The truth is that American individualism is falling by the wayside. We all know that younger

Americans tend to be more liberal. Perhaps, the gap between male and female voters could narrow as the professional and domestic roles of men and women edge closer together. This would be a sort of full circle effect when we consider that the growth of feminist values and female workforce participation coincided with the modern gender gap's emergence (Inglehart and Norris 2000). As I discuss below these changes do not fully account for generational differences.

Economic and Societal Fears

It is often noted that millennials have experienced a disproportional number of hundred-year tragedies. These tragedies are often listed off in online litanies. The September 11th attacks and ensuing war on terrorism put a terrifying lack of physical security on display for millennials at a very young age. Gen Zers were born into an America that had already been at war for a few years and grew up with the normality of these casualty reports. Friends and family went off to this generations' war as they have throughout history. Then increasingly frequent natural disasters and extreme weather of unusual intensity came into the public awareness.

The first of these events, Hurricane Katrina, put government ineptitude on display. The sense that government could be capable of protecting us from nature, but not manage to (or bother to) do so jarred many Americans. As the days of tragedy unfolded news reports centered on the evil of everyday human beings as well. In the midst of winds and rain and flooding taking people's homes many of the stories coming out of New Orleans were about people robbed or physically victimized by neighbors and fellow community members. Awakening to climate change was a slow and lopsided process for Americans. As more Americans were impacted directly, they came to see the sheer size of the problem. Going back to the 1970s there were

individualist proclamations about the right things to do for our planet. Turn off the lights. Take shorter showers. Carpool or ride your bike. Plant a tree. Each of these aligned with the individualistic ethos of doing your part, but over time it became clear that not everyone else was doing theirs. It would be nearly a decade before sweeping national action on climate change became a feasible reality.

In the meantime, the great recession and the jobless recovery took over the public psyche. The enormity of the recession, the later debt crises, and a twenty-first century rise in policies which promote inequality has been well chronicled by academics and the popular press alike (Case and Deaton 2020, Desmond 2016, Enrich 2020, Lowry 2017, Macy 2018, Morris 2008, Sternberg 2019). Some of the hardest hit Americans were those young people who were just starting careers. Because a first job and starting salary act as the launching pad for each subsequent raise or promotion having a faulty start is much more damaging than a mid-career quaver. For graduates of high school or college first entering the workforce in 2009-2011 a subpar first job was not the worst-case scenario. With soaring youth unemployment rates many young people became “detached.” This term was coined by economists to describe individuals who are neither working nor in school, and who have no formal source of income (Kamenetz 2006). While a gap in one’s resume is problematic in a job hunt, a long absence from any form of work or education at the beginning of an individual’s career can be even more problematic. Unfortunately, many millennials fell into this trap, and it appears that for some of them there has been lasting damage. Yet again, the economics of the recession meant that young adults continued to live with their parents, were alienated from socially defined benchmarks of growing up, and ultimately suffered permanent harm to their earning potential. For those who were slightly more fortunate, a graduate degree beckoned.

Overeducation and Social Instability

Graduate and professional degrees are thought of by most as a sure-fire way to increase earning potential and improve job security. The numbers on this are mostly affirming. The most educated Americans suffer only a 2% unemployment rate even in times when the average unemployment rate hovers around 10%. In contrast there is a great deal of research emerging on the problem of over education. In areas where there is a mismatch in the labor market between the degrees people hold and the jobs open or the specialization employers need, the effects on job satisfaction and subjective wellbeing can be significant. There is a woeful lack of research into overeducation, or overqualification as it has traditionally been described, in the social sciences. However, the most recent major sociology study on overqualification concludes that in the American context overqualification for one's position is correlated with increased liberalism and lower levels of belief in the American Dream (Vaisey 2006).

Generally speaking, it makes sense that overqualified young professionals can feel disappointed with their work lives. They are not falling into the roles they desired, or even the rightful roles that the broader society expects of them. In fact, this misalignment between human capital and demands on the labor market represents a large investment on the part of families, communities, and government. The reality that social and economic resources have been expended to prepare young people for jobs that may not exist is problematic on many levels. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is most concerning that after the effort, time, and savings are exhausted, the young person is not able to go out into the labor force and gain the high earning career they may have planned on to support the pay down of heavy student loan burdens. Furthermore, we might expect that a glut of qualified professionals in a given area can drive

down wages in professions that are expected to be high paying. Ultimately the person who fills a role may be the person willing to settle for this new lower wage, and not the most qualified or most competent person originally drawn to a profession—a result that has been described as “bunching” (Brynin 2002). In this case a formerly distinguishing qualification is so widespread that it becomes less useful in signifying which candidates are actually most competent. Research has also documented that employees who are overqualified face wage penalties for the positions they occupy

At the most extreme ends societies that educate their young people well but fail to find them suitable jobs experience brain drain. This phenomenon has been observed everywhere from Greece (Labrianidis and Voiatzis 2012) to the rural United States (Petrin, et al. 2014). If no one needs your Greek University MBA at home, you find well paid consulting work abroad. If you take out loans to complete a bachelor’s at a flagship state school in the deep south the wage premium of a city in the Northeast or Midwest makes staying home seem irresponsible.

But if we are interested in the long run effects of this, we need to consider that high earning family members are often a lifeline or a guidepost for relatives in harder economic positions. Millennials are now at an age where we expect them to take on greater familial responsibilities, especially in terms of caretaking roles. The willingness of some young people to move for work certainly can provide them the opportunity discussed above to branch out on their own and live a life separate from their family of origin, without dependence on family or even hometown ties. The problem with this conception is that growing up has not traditionally meant only being responsible for oneself, but also stepping up to be responsible for others. I have discussed already that young people are choosing to have fewer children, or delaying childrearing indefinitely, because they do not feel comfortable with their financial circumstances.

More simply, children who move further from their parents are less likely to take on a primary role in caring for aging parents and other relatives. The children who stay home may face a high caretaking burden, and we know they are more likely to be the siblings and cousins who were least equipped financially for these roles in the first place. All of this puts greater pressures on families and exacerbates the escalating need for paid elder care and government support (Haidt 2018, Kamenetz 2006).

Theory

America's young adults—millennials and gen Zers—are significantly more liberal, on average, than members of other generations. We have seen in other intersectional relationships that ideologically polarized groups present smaller gender gaps. If the average ideology of a group falls far to one side or the other, it would be more unlikely that an individual's beliefs cross the distance into a wildly different belief system. If everyone is liberal the difference between being liberal and extremely liberal does not mean as much, and the space between men and women is minimized by virtue of an entire population tending to span a smaller portion of the ideological spectrum.

In the case of America's young people, we see that the ideals of individualism and self-reliance have moved out of the realm of realistic goals for many. These generations have come to fully expect reliance on family and at times government. These changes arise from a genuine need for support to make ends meet. At an individual level the need to accept help removes some of the stigma that previous generations experienced when it came to giving and receiving assistance. If everyone you know is struggling or accepting much needed parental support and hoping for student loan forgiveness or Medicaid expansion for their own benefit, individualism

cannot stand as a norm. It is my assertion that many of today's young people are identifying their individual economic problems as shared social concerns. A long line of American thinkers has advocated a belief in the self-made man and the American dream of making it on your own and improving upon what you came from. For many of America's young people it seems that these things are nothing but aspirations. Given that individualism is something they do not believe they can live up to, and that interdependent reliance is a given, it should come as little surprise that so many young Americans are turning towards communitarian ideals. With this sizeable shift the values of men and women are more similar amongst millennials and generation z than they are amongst past generations because there is an unusually high degree of consensus amongst these generations' members.

With the vast majority of Americans living paycheck to paycheck to lose a job is to lose a livelihood. An inability to pay for a \$400 emergency without debt is the norm. For the average American savings rates are low, and there is nothing left over after bills are paid each month (Glink and Tamkin 2020). Staggering debt and ever-increasing costs of living mean that each job loss can be the start of homelessness, defaults, and repossessions. When these things occur families disintegrate, addictions surge, mental and physical health falters and abuse runs rampant (Snyder 2019). For millennials these realities were lived out as children and as young working adults. The great recession and jobless recovery taught numerous Americans that to lose a job meant that your life would also be irrevocably damaged. For millennials this lesson was taught in a rush during their formative years.

Hypotheses

I begin here by checking for the presence of a higher degree of communitarian values amongst millennials and gen Zers than amongst members of older generations. It is important to note that I am comparing these generations only within the present-day political sphere. The policy and economic sphere over time fluctuates naturally in and out of considering communitarian and individualistic values. Elder millennials have been able to vote since at least the 2000 presidential election. This is a short time horizon relative to the sixty or more years we are able to review in many analyses of American political thought. Even shorter is the total of seven years for which the oldest members of Generation Z have been eligible to vote at the time of this writing. Still, it is essential that we delimit this analysis to apples-to-apples comparisons. I am attempting to demonstrate that generations are prone to respond differently to the same or similar situations. Seeing that the generations respond differently to the same situations tells us more about how similar or different they will be in the future than does a comparison of millennials and non-millennials over the course of their life span. Furthermore, a comparison only on age would be questionable given that a twenty-five-year-old from the greatest generation could have been seven years into their career with a couple kids at home, while a twenty-five-year-old millennial is more likely to be just considering their first marriage, and still be facing a number of crossroads when it comes to their professional futures.

First, I set out to demonstrate the relatively small gender gap visible between gen z and millennial men and women.

H1: There will be a smaller significant gender gap amongst millennials and generation z than amongst earlier generations, all else being equal.

H1a: There will be no difference in the significant gender gap amongst generations, all else being equal.

H2: Average compassion scores will be different between generations, all else being equal.

H2a: There will be no statistically significant difference between generations on average compassion scores, all else being equal

I have studied an economic precarity theory of the ideological gender gap in the last two chapters. In this chapter I am particularly interested in this theory; because I believe that communitarianism and economic precarity are intertwined amongst millennials and generation z. I expect that feelings of economic precarity are more widespread amongst millennials and generation z than amongst earlier generations. In particular, I expect millennial and generation z men to have stronger feelings of economic precarity than do their male counterparts in earlier generations.

H3: The average reported economic precarity will be stronger amongst millennials and generation z than amongst earlier generations, all else being equal.

H3a: The average reported economic precarity will be equal or lower amongst millennials and generation z than amongst earlier generations, all else being equal.

H4: Millennial and Generation Z men will report higher feelings of economic precarity than do men in earlier generations, all else being equal.

H4a: Millennial and Generation Z men will report equal or lower feelings of economic precarity than do men in earlier generations, all else being equal.

Finally, I test whether the generational differences in the gender gap can be explained away with the inclusion of a communitarianism control, or an economic precarity control.

Having completed this analysis I am confident that the differences in the size of the gender gap between generations can be explained by differences in degree of economic precarity.

H5: The gender gap X generation effects will be statistically insignificant when controlling for economic precarity, all else being equal.

Analysis

Variable Scales and Distribution:

Variable	Median	Standard Deviation	Range
Education	3	1.812	(1, 7)
Partisanship	3	2.079	(1, 7)
Age	45	17.218	(17, 99)
Ideology	4	1.417	(1, 7)
Biblical Literalism	1	0.710	(0, 2)
Job Loss Worry	5	1.234	(1, 5)

The gender gap emerged in the 1970s, so we can expect that those Americans who came of age and started voting at this time—the boomers and greatest generation would be the first to exhibit a gender gap in political ideology. Looking at the gender gap in ideology this is confirmed. The gender gap expands with each new generation, but amongst millennials the confidence intervals are markedly wider than they had been for previous generations. In fact, millennials do not exhibit a statistically significant gender gap. This may be expected as younger voters are more likely to have “noisy” or unstable political beliefs. Most surprisingly, this seems simply to be a mark of transition in the reality that generation Z does not exhibit a gender gap.

Figure 6.1 Ideological Gender Gap by Generation




Figure 6.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Partisanship} = \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Generation}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Race}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Religion}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + C$$

Table 6.1 OLS Regression Models Predicting the Effects of the Gender Gap in Ideology between Generations

Multilevel Models	Standard Model
Female	0.041 (0.03)
Silent Generation	0.119** (0.036)
Boomer	0.286*** (0.037)
Generation X	0.573*** (0.052)
Millennial	0.65***

	(0.109)
Generation Z	0.227 (0.209)
Female x Silent Generation	-0.148** (0.046)
Female x Boomer	-0.309*** (0.043)
Female x Generation X	-0.487*** (0.061)
Female x Millennial	-0.49*** (0.139)
Female x Generation Z	0.047 (0.261)
Education	0.13*** (0.005)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.219*** (0.027)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.197*** (0.031)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.207*** (0.052)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.057 (0.031)
Marital Status – Other	-0.394*** (0.062)
Black Non-Hispanic	-1.688*** (0.028)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.111 (0.097)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.496*** (0.112)
Hispanic	-0.504*** (0.038)
Other or multiple races	-0.59*** (0.102)
Non-white and Non-black	-0.324 (0.29)
Missing race	-0.408** (0.139)
North Central Resident	-0.152*** (0.026)
South Resident	-0.447*** (0.025)
West Resident	-0.257*** (0.028)
Protestant	0.305**

	(0.099)
Catholic	-0.419*** (0.100)
Jewish	-1.315*** (0.114)
Other/No Religion	-0.30** (0.102)
1956	0.145* (0.071)
1958	-0.113 (0.075)
1960	0.043 (0.079)
1962	-0.007 (0.077)
1964	-0.221** (0.073)
1966	0.011 (0.077)
1968	-0.048 (0.074)
1970	0.004 (0.074)
1972	0.123 (0.067)
1974	0.03 (0.074)
1976	0.121 (0.069)
1978	0.026 (0.069)
1980	0.079 (0.074)
1982	-0.065 (0.076)
1984	0.308*** (0.07)
1986	0.201** (0.071)
1988	0.385* (0.072)
1990	0.171* (0.072)
1992	0.225** (0.07)
1994	0.414***

	(0.074)
1996	0.161* (0.075)
1998	0.182* (0.080)
2000	0.201** (0.075)
2004	0.376*** (0.082)
2008	0.076 (0.074)
2012	0.139* (0.066)
Constant	3.434*** (0.001)
r2	0.125
N	52,055

Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 6.1 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Table 6.2 Mean Compassion Score by Generation

Generation	Mean Compassion	Standard Deviation
Silent Generation	1.404	1.040
Greatest Generation	1.458	0.942
Boomers	1.534	0.752
Generation X	1.475	0.573
Millennials	1.511	0.544
Generation Z	1.495	0.893

Table 6.2 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Next, I apply the three core theories of the gender gap to the ideological gender gap amongst each generation. I ran ordinary least squares models with the intersectional effects of gender and generation as independent variables and ideology as the dependent variable. I used the earlier base model to establish variation in the effects on ideological gender gap by generation. In the theory models I add controls one at a time which capture compassion politics, group position effects, and finally economic precarity.

Minor variations amongst the various gender-generation groups could be evaluated endlessly for unique once off effects. However, what I find most compelling is that the variation amongst generations evaporates when controlling for economic precarity. It appears that the millennial and generation Z gender gap was insignificant because there was so much less variation amongst these generations' members when it comes to economic precarity. The standard model represented in Figure 6.1 exhibits significant gender gaps amongst each generation studied prior to generation X, and no significant gender gap amongst members of generation Z or millennials. Furthermore, the generational gender gaps do not absorb all variation in the overall gender gap. However, when we compare these results to the precarity model in table 6.3 below we see that the overall gender gap is no longer significant. To understand the substantive meaning of this we can look at figure 6.1's visual representation of these effects. When considering confidence intervals, the gender gap largely disappears for all generations when precarity is controlled for. The longstanding gender gap theory of economic precarity is such that men, on average, feel economically secure. Their financial responsibilities have been in line with their own ability to go out and earn income. As I have discussed at previous points in this dissertation, the earning potential of American women has often not aligned with their financial responsibilities, especially when one accounts for higher rates of caretaking. Unrelated to political ideology there has long been a hope that women's advancement in education and the workplace would create a financial leveling amongst the genders. Ironically, it appears now that without this leveling taking place we have reached a point where both genders feel the precarity once common only to female voters. Amongst millennial and generation Z men there is no longer a sense that opportunity is readily available. As many have pointed out it seems that the system is rigged.

So, what does it mean if the thing that makes female voters unique is no longer specific to women? We see that the gap between male and female voters is dwindling through generational replacement with younger voters who have a sense of the world that is more economically precarious than their elders believe. Of course, this generational difference could be attributed to any number of things. More noteworthy is that when comparing only those who express a concrete financial fear—losing one’s job—the gender gap largely evaporates for earlier generations as well.

Figure 6.2 Ideological Gender Gap by Generation: High Fear of Job Loss




Figure 6.2 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

$$\text{Ideology} = \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Generation}} + \beta_{\text{Gender}} * \beta_{\text{Job Worry}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Race}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Religion}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} + C$$

Table 6.3 OLS Regression Models Predicting the Effects of Precarity on the Gender Gap in Ideology Between the Generations

Multilevel Models	Standard Model	Precarity Model
Female	0.041 (0.03)	0.037 (0.104)
Silent Generation	0.119** (0.036)	0.131* (0.058)
Boomer	0.286*** (0.037)	-0.005 (0.054)
Generation X	0.573*** (0.052)	-0.009 (0.067)
Millennial	0.65*** (0.109)	-0.147 (0.203)
Generation Z	0.227 (0.209)	-0.314 (0.347)
Female x Silent Generation	-0.148** (0.046)	-0.101 (0.078)
Female x Boomer	-0.309*** (0.043)	-0.113 (0.071)
Female x Generation X	-0.487*** (0.061)	-0.266** (0.086)
Female x Millennial	-0.49*** (0.139)	-0.04 (0.280)
Female x Generation Z	0.047 (0.261)	0.251 (0.429)
Worried A Lot About Finding/Losing Job		0.004 (0.071)
Somewhat Worried About Finding/Losing Job		0.142 (0.061)
Female x Worried a Lot About Finding/Losing Job		-0.128 (0.103)
Female x Somewhat Worried About Finding/Losing Job		-0.162 (0.086)
Education	0.13*** (0.005)	-0.033*** (0.007)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.219*** (0.027)	-0.356*** (0.034)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.197*** (0.031)	-0.27*** (0.037)

Marital Status – Separated	-0.207*** (0.052)	-0.258*** (0.069)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.057 (0.031)	-0.124** (0.046)
Marital Status – Other	-0.394*** (0.062)	-0.391*** (0.077)
Black Non-Hispanic	-1.688*** (0.028)	-0.528*** (0.039)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.111 (0.097)	-0.148 (0.105)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.496*** (0.112)	-0.194 (0.115)
Hispanic	-0.504*** (0.038)	-0.113* (0.044)
Other or multiple races	-0.59*** (0.102)	-0.328 (0.22)
Non-white and Non-black	-0.324 (0.29)	
Missing race	-0.408** (0.139)	-0.161 (0.143)
North Central Resident	-0.152*** (0.026)	0.111** (0.034)
South Resident	-0.447*** (0.025)	0.171*** (0.035)
West Resident	-0.257*** (0.028)	-0.002 (0.037)
Protestant	0.305** (0.099)	0.43** (0.141)
Catholic	-0.419*** (0.100)	0.155 (0.142)
Jewish	-1.315*** (0.114)	-0.567*** (0.159)
Other/No Religion	-0.30** (0.102)	-0.312* (0.143)
1956	0.145* (0.071)	
1958	-0.113 (0.075)	
1960	0.043 (0.079)	
1962	-0.007 (0.077)	
1964	-0.221** (0.073)	
1966	0.011 (0.077)	

1968	-0.048 (0.074)	
1970	0.004 (0.074)	
1972	0.123 (0.067)	
1974	0.03 (0.074)	
1976	0.121 (0.069)	
1978	0.026 (0.069)	
1980	0.079 (0.074)	
1982	-0.065 (0.076)	
1984	0.308*** (0.07)	
1986	0.201** (0.071)	0.03 (0.048)
1988	0.385* (0.072)	0.137* (0.005)
1990	0.171* (0.072)	0.009 (0.05)
1992	0.225** (0.07)	0.03 (0.048)
1994	0.414*** (0.074)	0.286*** (0.05)
1996	0.161* (0.075)	0.161** (0.05)
1998	0.182* (0.080)	0.1 (0.054)
2000	0.201** (0.075)	
2004	0.376*** (0.082)	0.193** (0.057)
2008	0.076 (0.074)	0.108* (0.051)
2012	0.139* (0.066)	
Constant	3.434*** (0.001)	4.167*** (0.163)
r2	0.125	0.096
N	52,055	13,589

Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Table 6.3 Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

Conclusion

Some of the best political science work on generations has been qualitative, but I believe these simple analyses demonstrate a need for expansion of quantitative work on generational identities and politics. For the previous two chapters I provided a replication on partisanship in the appendix. For generations I have completed a similar secondary analysis which can also be reviewed in the appendix,^{vii} but as expected generations vary widely in their results on partisanship. It may be too soon to see if this is a quirk in the way different age groups will translate ideology to partisanship, or an effect with broad implications for participation amongst rising generations.

When we consider the gender gap it is remarkable that economic precarity could have changed so dramatically across generations. Women have faced financial precarity as a constant as the world changed dramatically around them. With the vast majority of white women not working outside the home and staying married there was financial precarity. When society experienced smaller families, higher female education rates, and soaring divorce rates women felt financial precarity. It has seemed throughout these times that women took on financial risks which were fundamental and specific to their gendered roles, and that perhaps their financial fears could be ingrained in their very biology. Women choose to take on many of these risks, by wanting children, by standing by elderly parents, and entering into partnerships without promised ends. Still, each of these risks fundamentally a result of a social and political environment which makes such choices risky. What is heartbreaking today is that for the first time we have data that America's young men are also by and large feeling the worries of economic precarity. Rather

than resolving the risks common to American women, we have simply expanded these risks and their requisite fears across the population.

It seems most likely that this fear is an unfortunate side effect of seeing a world that was inhospitable to overcoming the challenges of early adulthood. The disasters, debt, and instability of millennials' and generation z's early years could be expected to unsettle anyone's nerves. However, an unlikely optimistic note may be warranted. As men and women come into parallel on their feelings about the economy the gender gap may give way to a less divided sense of the world. Men may be more likely to vote in support of women's issues and female preferences if they are more able to empathize with the feelings of precarity that women have long expressed. For those Americans who will never escape precarity there may be more bridges open to the millennials and member of generation z who lived through brief precarity before establishing stable financial lives.

7. CONCLUSION

The Heterogeneity of the Gender Gap

It is my hope that this dissertation has corrected the tendency to ignore the multifaceted nature of the gender gap. The preliminary analysis presented here confirms that the gender gap varies on a couple of meaningful dimensions, and we can presume that it will also vary on many more. By examining the series of theories that have been put forth to explain the ideological gender gap I have been able to compare their efficacy in the context of intersectional identities. Previous studies have been unnecessarily blunt in their evaluations. I hope that by moving beyond comparing the genders as homogenous groups I have been able to enumerate the conditionality of gender gap theories. I have found that class-gender effects can be best explained with Group Positions Theory, religion-gender effects are attributable to a more abstract sense of belief or opposition to equalitarianism, and the generation-gender effect is most closely related to economic precarity.

Findings on Class and Gender

In evaluating the class-gender effect I found that Group Positions Theory is the most promising theory for predicting class-based variation in the gender gap. Broad equalitarian beliefs, as well as ethnocentrism and beliefs around gender equality are all useful in these analyses, albeit to varying degrees. In being attentive to class divisions I hope to improve the

nuance we apply to an identity which has often been oversimplified if not neglected through the use of inappropriate proxies. Even if simplistic proxies remain the only measure of class, we have the opportunity to move away from completely ignoring self-identification. There are many legitimate critiques around the stability of self-reported class, especially when it comes to using this measure to determine concrete quality of life and security. As I have argued, there is still value in this measure to pick up how one may self-affiliate. In the models throughout this dissertation, I have found that education serves as an effective proxy in many cases, but in select circumstances education proxies would lead to inaccurately accepting substantively difference results. Careful attentiveness to measurement of social class will be helpful in guiding future work and in delimiting my results. Measurement of social class with attention to gender is even more important given the historic difference in how men and women have come by their class identities. Given that class may be an identity applied based on household either by collective status or status of the breadwinner social scientists need to be careful in interpreting individual level measurements. I maintain suspicions that regional and local culture can determine whether married women find their class identity in their own occupation or in the work and wealth of their male relatives.

Considering the intersection of class and gender is especially interesting because I expected that where political appeals are directed based on social class, they will often be implicitly gendered. How could an appeal based on a group of all gender identities across all life stages be gendered? The image of the working class in American politics is largely that of a male factory worker or miner. This is despite the long-term decline in American manufacturing and coal industries. More importantly for my purposes, it ignores the longstanding existence of pink-collar industries, and the many roles that working-class women within the electorate fill.

Working class women are treated by politicians as extensions and supporters of their men. This may be wise given the tendency for working class wives to act out their domestic roles explicitly and intentionally in support of male breadwinner roles. However, it does not reflect the economic importance of working-class women's paid labor, and by default presumes that these women will align themselves based on their roles in the private sphere despite this disregard politicians have shown for women's vital economic contributions. Furthermore, there is a statistical truth that women are more likely than men to live in poverty. This may be over accounted for in American politics. Criminalization of poor men by the U.S. government is in essence a terrifying case of failing to substantively represent these men. Women are being added to the American prison population at an alarming rate but are still highly underrepresented. Instead, poor American women are likely to wind up dependent on safety net programs. Given the punitive policies and stigma attached to many of these programs, this is a mixed blessing.

For groups that are so frequently and meaningfully in contact with public programs it makes sense that political advocacy would be essential. If the sexes are in contact with drastically different programs and public sector staffs we should once again expect a meaningful difference in their policy preferences and political priorities. Regardless, it is worth pinning down how much the differences of poor women and men do or do not influence their politics. Doing so may improve understandings of whether representation for the unified interests of "the poor" is a valuable goal, or whether the political needs of poor men and poor women differ.

Additional Study – Class

To examine the impact of communitarianism, I would like to complete long form interviews and analysis of memoirs focused on experiences of class and gender. These could be

useful for understanding classXgender effects on identity, as well as establishing patterns as to how this is seen to effect personal values. I think this would be particularly beneficial given the data limitations in measuring communitarianism but would be useful regardless of the ultimate causal mechanism. This is particularly useful in understanding identity. Where possible, I would replicate the findings of interviews with large-n surveys.

I would like to use a mix of semi-structured interviews and memoirs to expand on the quantitative findings. To better connect these findings to results based on large survey data, I will have interview participants respond to a brief set of survey questions which will match useful questions in the large surveys. Almost anyone could talk about the significance of their class and gender on their political beliefs. Because there is no natural specific set of subjects for interviews on these very broad topics, a review of memoirs focused on class would allow for a lot of material, but also focus on the most carefully considered and thought through understandings of class identity. Discussions of politics and gender within these works may be of particular usefulness.

Findings on Religion and Gender

I was able to conclude that ideas around equalitarianism and belief in hierarchy account for much of the religion-gender gap variations. It is also fascinating that the analyses presented here do not support hypotheses that family structure and socioeconomic differences between religious groups drive variations in the gender gap. Further work on the religious variation within the gender gap will elucidate the way that known gender differences in religious belief and behavior impact political belief and behavior. Religious mobilization has relied on a handful of well-known religious interest groups and denominations. The leadership and faces of these

organizations are disproportionately male, while religious practitioners are disproportionately female (Newport 2012). Many denominations maintain formal theological requirements that clergy be all male, but there are also tendencies to promote men in lay positions, and for denominations that permit women to serve in clergy the roles they are encouraged to take on may be limited to women's and children's ministries. This is especially striking when you take note of the share of active church members in the pews who are female, and the proportion of volunteers who are women.

In some cases, it seems that religious men and women actually share very similar political beliefs, and perhaps in these cases male leadership provides adequate substantive representation. In fact, for women who abide by doctrines prohibiting female clergy it would be wholly unacceptable to follow a female priest, pastors, reverend, or rabi. For women who believe in complementarianism and other doctrines defining traditional roles for women it would presumably be impossible to find a female leader who represented their views. To find a leader with their husband's beliefs might be to find a leader with their own beliefs. On the other hand, within some groups of religious believers, gender accounts for meaningful differences in beliefs. These differences are interesting in their own right. They also provide us a way to evaluate how well religious interest groups represent their full range of supporters. Given the influence of these groups this is an important goal (Williams 2010, Wilcox and Robinson 2011).

As the methods of political operatives change the value of this type of research may also increase. The ability to target more specific constituencies gives more significance to our ability to understand each smaller group. The real-world application of this dissertation may be to move away from emphasis on a nonexistent women's vote, or a series of characters imagined by pundits (Carroll 1999). If America's soccer moms do not identify themselves by their suburban

motherhood, but rather by their class, religious, or financial perspectives we may want to consider new ways to reach out to these voters. Furthermore, pundits and political campaigns alike seem fascinated with the possibility of picking off female voters from their communities. I have discussed at length that this way of thinking is absurd. What I think is worth noting is that “solid” voting blocs may be the result of male or female voters anchoring the average for a group. If we can find cases where men or women are fluid in their beliefs, we should consider how to appeal to this half of apparently stubborn voter groups.

Further Study – religion

I think that performing analysis of elite doctrinal standpoints within different religious denominations would provide an interesting and substantively valuable understanding of how gender effects can be more highly activated or deemphasized in an individual’s ideology based on religion. Here I would incorporate previous work on the denominational dependence of the gender gap. American society was founded on protestant traditions which emphasized individualism. Today the national diversity of religious faith has expanded, but some of the original liberal individualist denominations remain deeply engrained in our national character and have bred younger religious traditions which also emphasize individualism and interpret morality in terms of personal piety. In the midst of this transformation, and afterwards, other traditions have emphasized communitarian values in the form of social justice or charity work. In some modern cases, the efforts of this other oriented work have been at the expense of emphases on personal piety. Thanks to theology writings, congregation level data, and the explosion of religious writing for popular audiences, I expect to be able to tackle this question from many angles. I think that a clear connection will be visible between elite opinion, institutionalized

culture, and popular opinion in the form of the religious mass media. Most importantly, these alternative methods would support alternative specifications for a communitarian versus individualist religious ideology.

Findings on Generations and Gender

One of the most surprising findings has been the shrinking and closing of the gender gap amongst the two most recent generations. Gender gap scholars have both explicitly and implicitly sought to answer the question of what would close the gender gap. Many of these theories have optimistically looked at an increase in gender equality as an opportunity for the gap to close. Alternatively, it seemed likely that increasing gender consciousness amongst women would expand the gender gap. This would have resulted in a heightened difference between female and male voters but was also seen as an opportunity for women to more accurately vote in their own best interest.

What seems to actually have been the answer was not a leveling through the advancement of women, but through a heightened sense of economic precarity across the population. The economic risks that were once dramatically more common amongst women are now common to all of America's young people.

The very existence of study on the generations is dependent on "generational effects" stemming from shared experiences of an age cohort. For some generations it can be difficult to pinpoint an experience which was universal and meaningful to the entire generation. In the case of millennials and generation Z it is remarkable both that the shared experience of the recession is so salient, and how closely the events can be tied to politically salient risks.

Moving Forward: What This Means for Activists and Political Actors

For those involved in political mobilization and campaigning the ideas of Group Positions Theory and inegalitarianism being effective mobilizers can present a great deal of confusion. For conservatives who have always wanted to encourage traditional social norms without offending moderate voters this idea may present encouragement, but probably does little to concretely explain how this is practically possible. For anyone who does not support these values it can be demoralizing. It seems like an inconvenient unavoidable fact. What this response ignores is that Group Positions Theory operationalizes a broad range of beliefs driven by values as well as individual psychology. Inherent in this belief system is a desire to defend the status quo, and to protect the individual's way of life by protecting their in group. This suggests that race or gender need not be the only in group. Few Americans are excited for more political polarization, but it is worth understanding that people can be activated to support their party ingroup just as they would be activated for a more harmful ingroup. Furthermore, additional policy based ingroups may be possible. If a policy—labor rights, public safety, public education, etc. was framed as an essential component of a group's way of life activists may be able to draw intense support. For those groups who have felt left out of politics and disaffected from government, this sense of team or group contribution may be an effective motivator to reengagement.

Moving Forward: What This Means for the Political Economy

A strong middle class is seen by many as a precursor for democratic consolidation and stability. Flagging economics conditions can both social movements and political instability. Economic precarity amongst women has motivated numerous activists and fueled the rise of

women in higher education and the workplace. Young men are often thought to be more likely to act out their political frustrations through violence or contentious politics. As we see the rise of economic precarity amongst young men we must anticipate two possibilities, which are likely to occur in tandem. On one hand, the shared experiences of the youngest American men (and women) could spark meaningful political discourse and powerful political action. Having a clearly defined cause could be the centralizing force in renewed youth movements, and in this case political activism on economic issues. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, young men who fail to attach to meaningful work, civic society, and family relationships have historically created undesirable societal outcomes. For the undereducated low-skilled young men of the future, who find their female peers have outpaced them in achievements and financial stability, and for those with high debt and little to show for it, starting a career or a family could look very unlikely. Some of these young men could face the kinds of lives that nineteenth and twentieth century social commentators would have warned of—crime, transience, unstable employment, and fragile family structures. Others may adopt lifelong commitment to the ideologies that we expect largely from extremists and uninitiated young people today. The potential outcomes of this can already be seen in some instances of political violence and perhaps at the furthest extremes in school the manifestos of mass shooters.

We should anticipate a future in which the theories of the gender gap are similarly useful, but the substance of the gender gap may be wildly different based on how the coming years unfurl. If we are to assume that we are now entering a world where America's youth will face widespread precarity and economic disaffection, it would stand to reason that the gender gap will shrink with generational replacement. On the other hand, we will have to wait and see whether this occurs. We also cannot predict how politics of hierarchy will change over the coming years.

If race and gender norms are used as dividing lines, we may see surging gender-based divisions, but if these issues fade away with a growing population of equalitarian young people (as has often been anticipated) there will be one more cause for a dissipating gender gap.

Moving Forward: What We Can Understand About Female Trump Voters and What We Can Expect

Political Science is sometimes critiqued for its design mostly to look backwards. All disciplines are careful to point out that good scientists let you estimate the likelihood of outcomes but will never let us predict the future. When it comes to the social sciences this is doubly true, as we know that whether or not you fall on the side of theory that presumes rational actors, people make for particularly messy subjects. Trying to predict what people or systems will do is especially dangerous when we remember that our subjects are individuals with free will, and in some cases powerful actors or groups with the ability to choose a different outcome than the one we might predict. Finally, demographic shifts can seem like a Titanic size trendline to be steered in any direction. Yet, many intelligent predictions throughout history have been made to look quite silly by a surprising election outcome, an unthinkable invention, an unpredictable natural disaster, or even a public health catastrophe. The significance of various identity groups in future election results are outside of the scope of this dissertation, but we can point to some surprising points in retrospect.

After 2016 there was an overwhelming effort to determine whether white voters, and especially white women had voter for Trump for class or race reasons. This emerging cleavage was alternatively cast as a working-class populism, an education divide, or a rising racism. The data presented here make a case for all three being part of the story. Group Positions Theory

drives the class divide, and we can extrapolate that this represents a class-based desire to emphasize status quo or outmoded beliefs about race and other conservative social values. Additionally, this was the only model where education did not proxy effectively for self-reported class identity. I take this to mean that education encourages respondents to more effectively self-monitor for social desirability of their responses. The fact that this education effect came out in truly anonymous voting may actually mean that the variation is not a social desirability bias, but an effectively internalized preference for socially desirable positions on race. In sum it seems that education overrides class-based beliefs, and that class-based beliefs are motivated by racial conservatism. The class versus racism debate is overly simplistic, but it also presents a false dichotomy. Finally, it is important to remember that these analyses are structured to present nuance. I am not arguing that all working-class voters are racist, or that race was the only motivator for working-class voters. However, where the gender gap closed (where white women who may otherwise have been moderate or liberal voter for Trump) this seems to be attributable to race based issues.

The next relevant discussion point from the 2016 and 2020 elections was whether Candidate and President Donald Trump's intolerant rhetoric was unique to his campaigns and governance, or whether this is a new normal. Once again, it seems that (perhaps unsurprisingly) the debate has been framed incorrectly. The significance of racial conservatism and traditional values around gender, hierarchy and other forms of equalitarianism are not newly important. What is alarming is how powerful these beliefs can be in driving ideology and activating different voting groups.

We can expect continued attention and mobilization around hot rod racial issues. This dissertation presents two traditionally low mobilization groups as being particularly influenced

by Group Positions Theory—the working class and Christian conservatives. The mixed record of these groups in effecting policy change may create a peculiar environment where symbolic victories are plentiful, but substantive representation is not effectively garnered. In other words, when it comes to spending, legal regimes, and practical governance there may be limited action. When it comes to discourse and gestures, we can anticipate that the showcase of defense for Confederate statues and debate against Critical Race Theory may be just the beginning of a parade of issues meant to assuage racially conservative low-participation constituents. On the other hand, policies which seem to be on precarious footing may be especially at risk. The chipping away of affirmative action may be only a precursor now that mainstream politicians are so thoroughly aware of their constituents’ racial conservatism. The intense feelings around issues such as this may ignite if norms continue to shift against progressive equalitarianism.

The Big Picture: Nuance not Randomness

The lived experiences of women are not universal, and we should not expect that their politics would be invariant. The false assumption of a homogeneous gender gap excuses the failure of politicians to substantively represent the many diverse groups of women that make up their sub constituencies. There is no one “women vote,” “female vote,” or even “mother vote.” Efforts to appeal to a female voting block have repeatedly failed for good reason. Women are not homogenous, men are not homogeneous, and the ideological difference between the two should not be expected to be homogeneous. Within the American population are numerous groups who have been the subject of heavy political organizing and repeated political appeals based on their myriad identities. Male and female members of each such group have also been appealed to in different terms as well and have taken undesignated political messages differently because of

their various personal and socialized values. Disaggregating these groups is the first step in acknowledging that they may hold a wide variety of beliefs. Appealing to a token or imagined female voter does not amount to adequate representation of this diversity of opinions.

Women have been treated as acting against their self-interest for failing to vote in the way experts expect. This failure is interpreted as irrational voting but is actually reflective of complexity and nuance rather than the presumed random chance. Contributing to the appearance of randomness or ignorance is the ability for female voters to shift stances from one election to the next. Ironically, political scientists sometimes critique American voters for mindlessly following the whims of the party and blindly standing by this heuristic instead of adjusting their vote choices based on ideological shifts and policy proposals. It is true that American survey respondents have been known to throw out ideas with no backing or stability. Perhaps women are just making random choices more often than men because they do not understand, and they do not care about the variation between politicians. This theory has gained wide regard because the data makes sense so far as we have seriously considered it. We are missing one key point, however. The difference in political beliefs amongst women from one election to the next is far from random. As I have discussed in this dissertation, women respond to slightly different political stimuli than men, on average. Some of these important stimuli for female voters are more variable from one election to the next than the primary stimuli of male voters. In particular, the drivers of the gender gap are really the drivers of the American women's vote variation from one election to the next. Women are often compassion politics voters. It has been demonstrated that compassion politics can be dialed up and down to such a degree that the same politician may successfully appeal to these voters even if they have previously failed to garner such success. Novel to this dissertation is a clear fluidity in the economic desires and judgements of female

voters. All voters evaluate the economy and the role of politicians in complex and controversial terms. We also know; however, that women do not apply one of these methods of evaluation, step back, and blindly follow their initial conclusions. So, what happens when women change their politics based on a constantly changing or fluctuating belief?

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APPENDIX: ANES ITEM CODING

EGAL_EGALINTRO SECTION: 155 ITEM: 1 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION
ITEM LABEL: INTRO - EGALITARIANISM
Please turn to page [^postpg_k / ^postpg_m] of the booklet.
I am going to read several more statements.
After each one, I would like you to tell me how strongly you agree or disagree.
The first statement is:
WEB SPEC: Online, omit the reference to the respondent booklet.
Render question text as follows:
'Now we will show several more statements. After each one, we would
64
like you to tell us how strongly you agree or disagree. The first
statement is:
RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options
ENTRY TYPE: Display only

EGAL_DONECESS SECTION: 155 ITEM: 2 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION
ITEM LABEL: Society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity
'Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that
everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.'
Looking at page [^postpg_k / ^postpg_m] in the booklet.
Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree,
disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly,
disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat,
or agree strongly] with this statement?
1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly
WEB SPEC: Online, omit the reference to the respondent booklet.
Bank with EGAL_EGALINTRO.
RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: Forward/Reverse order
ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

EGAL_WORRYLESS SECTION: 155 ITEM: 5 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION
ITEM LABEL: We'd be better off if worried less about equality
(Still looking at page [^postpg_k / ^postpg_m] in the booklet.)

'This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.'

(Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree strongly] with this statement?)

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

WEB SPEC: Online, omit the reference to the respondent booklet.

RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: Forward/Reverse order

ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

EGAL_NOTBIGPROB SECTION: 155 ITEM: 6

KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION

ITEM LABEL: Not a big problem if some have more chance in life

(Still looking at page [^postpg_k / ^postpg_m] in the booklet.)

'It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.'

(Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree strongly] with this statement?)

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

WEB SPEC: Online, omit the reference to the respondent booklet.

RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: Forward/Reverse order

ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

EGAL_FEWERPROBS SECTION: 155 ITEM: 7

KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION

ITEM LABEL: If people were treated more fairly would be fewer probs

(Still looking at page [^postpg_k / ^postpg_m] in the booklet.)

'If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.'

(Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat or agree strongly] with this statement?)

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat

3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
WEB SPEC: Online, omit the reference to the respondent booklet.
RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: Forward/Reverse order
ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

THERMGR_THGRFEM SECTION: 126 ITEM: 5 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-
ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Feeling thermometer: FEMINISTS ITEM RANDOM: Order of group thermometers (Still looking at page ^postpg_c of the booklet.) (How would you rate:) 23 Feminists {Probe for don't know response: when you say don't know, do you mean that you don't know who this is or do you have something else in mind? ENTER number 0-100 ENTER '998' for 'Don't know where to rate' ENTER '999' for 'Don't recognize' .} 998. Don't know ('don't know where to rate') 999. Don't recognize ('don't know who this is') WEB SPEC: Online: omit the reference to the respondent booklet. Display feeling thermometer graphic on screen. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLO WED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

THERMGR_THGRINTRO SECTION: 126 ITEM: 1 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: INTRO POST-
ELECTION GROUP THERMOMETERS Still using the thermometer, how would you rate the following groups: WEB SPEC: Online use this text: 'Still using the thermometer, we would like you to rate some groups. Please click next to continue.' Do not show the feeling thermometer graphic on this screen. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options ENTRY TYPE: Display only

DEMPO_CLASS SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 46 KEEP STATUS: 4a F
TF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-
ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Think of self as belonging to class ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-
QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: Next, there's been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? 1. Yes 2. No RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEMPO
_WHICHCLASS SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 47 KEEP STATUS: 4a FT
F CAPI AND INTERNET POST-
ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social Class: working or middle ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-
QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: IF R THINKS OF SELF AS MEMBER OF EITHER MIDDLE OR WORKING CLASS: Which one? 0. Lower class or poor {VOL} 1. Middle class 2. Working class 3. Both {VOL} 4. Upper class {VOL} 5. Other

{SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. Bank with previous question, CLASS. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch DEMPO_CHCLASS SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 48 KEEP STATUS: 4a F

FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-

ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social Class: had to choose working middle ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-

QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: IF R DOESN'T THINK/DK IF THINKS OF SELF AS MIDDLE OR WORKING CLASS: Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? 0. Upper class {VOL} 1. Middle class 2. Working class 3. Neither {VOL} 4. Lower class or poor {VOL} 5. Other {SPECIFY}

WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch DEMPO_AVGCLASS SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 49

KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-

ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social class: average or upper working middle class ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-

QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: IF R THINKS OF SELF AS MIDDLE CLASS / IF R THINKS OF SELF AS WORKING CLASS: 33

Would you say that you are about average [middle/working] class or that you are in the upper part of the [middle/working] class?] 0. Lower class or poor {VOL} 1. Average [middle/working] class 2. Upper [middle/working] class 3. Lower [middle/working class] {VOL} 4. Upper class {VOL} 5. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch DEMPO_CLASSREV

SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 49.3 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-

ELECTION ITEM LABEL: EGSS social class ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 2-

QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class? 1. Lower class 2. Working class 3. Middle class 4. Upper class RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch DEMPO_MIDDLECLASS SECTION: 127.5 ITEM: 49.4 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-

ELECTION ITEM LABEL: EGSS social class if middle class ITEM RANDOM: Assignment to CLASSA (randint_class=1) or CLASSB (randint_class=2) set of social class questions IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 2-

QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE POST: IF R HAS INDICATED SOCIAL CLASS AS MIDDLE CLASS: Are you in the lower middle class, the middle class, or the upper middle class? 1. Lower middle class 2. Middle class 3. Upper middle class RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

LIBCPO_LIBCPOINTRO SECTION: 135 ITEM: 1 KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-

ELECTION ITEM LABEL: INTRO - LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE PLACEMENT Please tu

rn to page ^postpg_n of the booklet. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. WEB SPEC: Online: omit the reference to the respondent booklet RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options ENTRY TYPE: Display only
43 LIBCPO_LIBCPOSELF SECTION: 135 ITEM: 2 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CAPI AND INTERNET POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: 7pt scale liberal-Conservate: self placement Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? {INTERVIEWER: DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW} 1. Extremely liberal 2. Liberal 3. Slightly liberal 4. Moderate; middle of the road 5. Slightly conservative 6. Conservative 7. Extremely conservative 99. Haven't thought much {DO NOT PROBE} WEB SPEC: Online, bank with previous item, LIBCPO_LIBCPOINTRO. Underneath scale options should be an option for 'Haven't thought much about this', omitting '{DO NOT PROBE}' RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

THCASI_THGRASIAN SECTION: 161.82 ITEM: 1 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CASI AND WEB POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI - POST: Feeling thermometer: ASIAN-AMERICANS ITEM RANDOM: Order of CASI group thermometers IF FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING / IF NOT FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING: [Using the same thermometer scale which you used earlier in the interview, how would you rate: Asian-Americans Please enter the rating number in the number box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. / How would you rate: Asian-Americans] TYPE THE NUMBER. WEB SPEC: Display the feeling thermometer graphic for each item in this section. Display group names in boldface type. For the FIRST item displayed in this series, display the text as follows: 83
'Using the same thermometer scale you used earlier in the survey, how would you rate Asian-Americans?' 'Please enter the rating number in the number box. 'Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.' For SUBSEQUENT items displayed in this series, display the same feeling thermometer graphic and display text as follows (example): 'How would you rate Asian-Americans?' RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

THCASI_THGRHISP SECTION: 161.82 ITEM: 2 KEEP STATUS: 4a
FTF CASI AND WEB POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI - POST: Feeling thermometer: HISPANICS ITEM RANDOM: Order of CASI group thermometers IF FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING / IF NOT FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING: [Using the same thermometer scale which you use

d earlier in the interview, how would you rate: Hispanics Please enter the rating number in the number box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. / How would you rate: Hispanics] TYPE THE NUMBER. WEB SPEC: See THCASI_THGRASIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

THCASI_THGRBLACK SECTION: 161.82 ITEM: 22 KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CASI AND WEB POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI - POST: Feeling thermometer: BLACKS ITEM RANDOM: Order of CASI group thermometers IF FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING / IF NOT FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING: [Using the same thermometer scale which you used earlier in the

interview, how would you rate: Blacks Please enter the rating number in the number box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. / How would you rate: Blacks] TYPE THE NUMBER. 84

WEB SPEC: See THCASI_THGRASIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

THCASI_THGRILLEG SECTION: 161.82 ITEM: 24 KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CASI AND WEB POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI - POST: Feeling thermometer: ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ITEM RANDOM: Order of CASI group thermometers IF FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING / IF NOT FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING: [Using the same thermometer scale which you used earlier in the

interview, how would you rate: Illegal immigrants Please enter the rating number in the number box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. / How would you rate: Illegal immigrants] TYPE THE NUMBER. WEB SPEC: See THCASI_THGRASIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

THCASI_THGRWHITE SECTION: 161.82 ITEM: 26 KEEP STATUS: 4a

FTF CASI AND WEB POST-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI - POST: Feeling thermometer: WHITES ITEM RANDOM: Order of CASI group thermometers IF FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING / IF NOT FIRST CASI THERMOMETER RATING: [Using the same thermometer scale which you used ea

...rlier in the interview, how would you rate: Whites Please enter the rating number in the number box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. / How would you rate: Whites] TYPE THE NUMBER. WEB SPEC: See THCASE_THGRASIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 0-100 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry

ITEM LABEL: FTF ONLY: INTERVIEWER : Is R male or female (Observation) IF MODE OF IW IS FACE-TO-FACE: IS THE RESPONDENT MALE OR FEMALE? IF UNSURE, CODE DK. 1. Male 2. Female RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed NO CAPI RF ALLOWED ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

FINANCE_FINPROSP SECTION: 30 ITEM: 7 KEEP STATUS: 4aR FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: R how much better worse off next year IF R IS NOT LIVING AT HOME WITH FAMILY MEMBERS / IF R IS LIVING AT HOME WITH 1 OR MORE FAMILY MEMBERS: Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now [you /you and your family living here] will be [much better off financially, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off, or much worse off / much worse off financially, somewhat worse off, about the same, somewhat better off, or much better off] than now? 1. Much better off 2. Somewhat better off 3. About the same, 4. Somewhat worse off 5. Much worse off RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: Forward/Reverse order ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

LIBCPRE_LCINT SECTION: 32 ITEM: 1 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: INTRO LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SELF-RATING Please look at page ^prepg_d of the booklet. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. WEB SPEC: Online, omit the text, 'Please look at page [preload: prepg_d] of the booklet.' RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options ENTRY TYPE: Display only

LIBCPRE_LCSELF SECTION: 32 ITEM: 2 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: 7pt scale Liberal conservative self-placement Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? {DO NOT PROBE} 1. Extremely liberal 2. Liberal 3. Slightly liberal 4. Moderate; middle of the road 5. Slightly conservative 6. Conservative 7. Extremely conservative 99. Haven't thought much about this {DO NOT PROBE} WEB SPEC: Online, bank with previous item, LCINT. Add onscreen: 'Click below to make your choice'. Include response options on a scale under the question text. Show numbers on all seven scale points in the response options. Underneath scale options should be an option for Haven't thought much about this, omitting '{DO NOT PROBE}' RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

ECON_ECNEXT SECTION: 35 ITEM: 4 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Economy better or worse in next 12 months What about the

next 12 months? Do you expect the economy, in the country as a whole, to get better, stay about the same, or get worse? 1. Get better 2. Stay about the same 3. Get worse RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_BIRTHYR SECTION: 62 ITEM: 1.3 KEEP STATUS: 4f FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Birthdate: year of birth YEAR: RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: No categorical response options NUMERIC HARD RANGE: 1904-1998 ENTRY TYPE: Numeric entry DEM_MARITAL SECTION: 62 ITEM: 6 KEEP STATUS: 4f FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Marital status Are you now married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married? 71 {IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS 'MARRIED' WITHOUT MENTIONING THAT SPOUSE IS ABSENT, CODE 1. IF R INDICATES UNMARRIED PARTNER, REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN THE QUESTION TEXT} 1. Married: spouse present 2. Married: spouse absent {VOL} 3. Widowed 4. Divorced 5. Separated 6. Never married WEB SPEC: Online, omit response option 2 and make response option 1 'Married'. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_EDUCR SECTION: 62 ITEM: 7.1 KEEP STATUS: 4f FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Highest level of Education What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? 01. Less than 1st grade 02. 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th grade 03. 5th or 6th grade 04. 7th or 8th grade 05. 9th grade 06. 10th grade 07. 11th grade 08. 12th grade no diploma 09. High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (for example: GED) 10. Some college but no degree 11. Associate degree in college - Occupational/vocational program 12. Associate degree in college -- Academic program 13. Bachelor's degree (For example: BA, AB, BS) 14. Master's degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 15. Professional School Degree (For example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 16. Doctorate degree (For example: PhD, EdD) 95. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, include a small text box in place of 'SPECIFY' RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_CLASS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 46 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Think of self as belonging to class IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: There's been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? 1. Yes 2. No RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch 79

DEM_WHICHCLASS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 47 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social Class: working or middle IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: IF R THINKS OF SELF AS MEMBER OF EITHER MIDDLE OR WORKING CLASS: Which one? 0. Lower class or poor {VOL} 1. Middle class 2. Working class 3. Both {VOL} 4. Upper class {VOL} 5. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. Bank with previous question, CLASS. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_CHCLASS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 48 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social Class: had to choose working middle IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: IF R DOESN'T THINK/ DK IF THINKS OF SELF AS MIDDLE OR WORKING CLASS: Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? 0. Upper class {VOL} 1. Middle class 2. Working class 3. Neither {VOL} 4. Lower class or poor {VOL} 5. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. Ask if DEM_CLASS=2 or if DEM_CLASS asked (randint_class=1) but not answered (skipped) RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_AVGCLASS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 49 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Social class: average or upper working middle class IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 4-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: IF R THINKS OF SELF AS MIDDLE CLASS / IF R THINKS OF SELF AS WORKING CLASS: Would you say that you are about average [middle/working] class or that you are in the upper part of the [middle/working] class?] 0. Lower class or poor {VOL} 1. Average [middle/working] class 2. Upper [middle/working] class 3. Lower [middle/working class] {VOL} 4. Upper class {VOL} 5. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, display only response options 1 and 2. RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_CLASSREV SECTION: 62 ITEM: 49.3 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: EGSS social class IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 2-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class? 1. Lower class 2. Working class 3. Middle class 4. Upper class RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch 80

DEM_MIDDLECLASS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 49.4 KEEP STATUS: 4a FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: EGSS social class if middle class IF R IS SELECTED FOR THE 2-QUESTION SET OF SOCIAL CLASS QUESTIONS IN THE PRE: IF R HAS INDICATED SOCIAL CLASS AS MIDDLE CLASS: Are you in the lower middle class, the middle class, or the upper middle class? 1. Lower middle class 2. Middle class 3. Upper middle class RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_HISP SECTION: 62 ITEM: 50.5 KEEP STATUS: 4f FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: R: Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino? 1. Yes 2. No RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

DEM_RACECPS SECTION: 62 ITEM: 52.5 KEEP STATUS: 4f FTF CAPI AND INTERNET PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: Race of Respondent I am going to read you a list of five race categories. Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be: - white; - black or African-American; - American Indian or Alaska Native; - Asian; or - Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander? {PROBE FOR RACE IF R SAYS HISPANIC OR A HISPANIC ORIGIN} {ENTER ALL THAT APPLY} 01. White 02. Black or African-American 03. American Indian or Alaska Native 04. Asian 05. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 95. Other {SPECIFY} WEB SPEC: Online, in the stem display only 'Please choose one or more races that you consider

yourself to be' followed by the line (Mark all that apply:)', For response option 95, display 'Other (please specify)' with a small text box RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed ENTRY TYPE: Multipunch

SELFGEND_GENDTYP SECTION: 63.1 ITEM: 1.5 KEEP STATUS: 4aR FTF CASI AND WEB PRE-ELECTION ITEM LABEL: CASI: are you (R) male or female REVISED What is your gender? 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other RESPONSE OPTIONS ORDER: As listed NO CAPI DK ALLOWED NO CAPI RF ALLOWED ENTRY TYPE: Single punch

FOOTNOTES: SIMPLIFIED OLS MODELS USED TO CREATE FIGURES AND
PARTISANSHIP REPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY MODELS

$$i \text{ Ideology} = \alpha + \beta \text{Gender} * \beta \text{Class} + \beta \text{Education} + \beta \text{Partisanship} + \beta \text{Region} + \beta \text{Age} + \beta \text{Year} + \beta \text{Marital Status} + \beta \text{Biblical Literalism}$$

Table 4.1a Gender-Class Effect on Ideology

Variable	Coefficient	P > t
Female	-0.14	0.009
Class	0.058	0.000
Female x Class	-0.058	0.005
Year	0.001	0.621
Black	-0.759	0.005
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.144	0.089
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.309	0.039
Hispanic	-0.377	0.000
Other or Multiple Races	-0.194	0.014
Missing Race	-0.167	0.330
Never Married	-0.343	0.000
Divorced	-0.275	0.000
Separated	-0.212	0.000
Widowed	-0.194	0.000
Partners; not married	-0.401	0.000
Age	0.005	0.000

North Central Region	0.092	0.012
South Region	0.184	0.000
West Region	0.022	0.549
Biblical Literalism	0.699	0.000
Constant	2.081	0.429
R-Squared	0.167	
N	14,054	

Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Table 4.1a Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

ⁱⁱ Ideology = $\alpha + \beta\text{Gender} + \beta\text{Class} + \beta\text{Equalitarianism} + \beta\text{Education} + \beta\text{Partisanship} + \beta\text{Region} + \beta\text{Age} + \beta\text{Year} + \beta\text{Marital Status}$

Table 4.7a OLS Regression Models Predicting the Effects of Equalitarian Belief on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Across Social Classes

Variable	Coefficient	P> t
Female	0.098	0.047
Class	-0.000	0.014
Female x Class	-0.057	0.018
Equalitarianism	-0.125	0.005
Education	-0.05	0.007
Partisanship	0.291	0.005
Region – North Central	0.109	0.032

Region – South	0.185	0.03
Region – West	-0.038	0.032
Age	0.006	0.001
Year	-0.001	0.001
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.195	0.03
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.15	0.032
Marital Status – Separated	-0.067	0.063
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.129	0.04
Marital Status – Partners	-0.316	0.052
Constant	4.833	1.987
N	13,086	
R²	0.341	

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.7a Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

ⁱⁱⁱ Ideology = $\alpha + \beta_{\text{Gender}} + \beta_{\text{Class}} + \beta_{\text{Economic Evaluations}} + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Partisanship}} + \beta_{\text{Region}} + \beta_{\text{Age}} + \beta_{\text{Year}} + \beta_{\text{Marital Status}} + \beta_{\text{Religion}} + \beta_{\text{Religious Service Attendance}}$

Table 4.11a Prospective Personal Financial Evaluation and the Class-Gender Effect on Ideology

Variable	Coefficient	P> t
Female	0.037	0.032
Class	0.003	0.007

Female x Class	-0.032	0.009
Financial Evaluation	0.025	0.012
Age	0.007	0.001
Year	-0.001	0.001
Partisanship	0.340	0.004
Education	-0.069	0.005
Region – North Central	0.145	0.024
Region – South	0.282	0.023
Region – West	0.039	0.025
Marital Status – Never	-0.269	0.024
Married		
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.206	0.026
Marital Status – Separated	-0.137	0.049
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.132	0.031
Marital Status - Partners	-0.39	0.042
Constant	4.937	1.119
R Squared	0.290	
N	23,741	

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.11a Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

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Table 4.1b Multilevel Models Comparing the Effects of Ethnocentrism and Equalitarianism on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Across Social Classes

Multilevel Model	Base Model	Equalitarianism	Ethnocentrism
Female	-0.262*** (0.065)	-0.171* (0.071)	-0.191* (0.092)
Class	0.137*** (0.02)	0.128*** (0.022)	0.159*** (0.028)
Female X Class	-0.046 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.077* (0.037)
Education	0.067*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.011)	0.067*** (0.014)
Ethnocentrism			1.043*** (0.187)
Female X Ethnocentrism			0.202 (0.249)
Equalitarianism		-3.321*** (0.156)	
Female X Equalitarianism		-0.088 (0.156)	
Region – North Central	0.101* (0.046)	0.045 (0.051)	0.056 (0.066)
Region – South	0.254*** (0.043)	0.082 (0.047)	0.311*** (0.062)
Region – West	0.166*** (0.047)	0.086 (0.052)	0.146* (0.067)
Age	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Black, Non-Hispanic	-2.142*** (0.045)	-1.504*** (0.05)	-2.069*** (0.067)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.337** (0.108)	-0.307* (0.133)	-0.362* (0.148)
American Indian or Alaskan Native	-0.716*** (0.18)	-0.393* (0.189)	-0.927*** (0.271)
Hispanic	-1.042*** (0.046)	-0.773*** (0.051)	-0.927*** (0.07)
Other or Multiple Race	-0.605*** (0.099)	-0.463*** (0.116)	-0.484** (0.141)
Missing Race	-0.512* (0.206)	-0.518* (0.217)	-0.465 (0.343)
Never Married	-0.359*** (0.041)	-0.25*** (0.045)	-0.302*** (0.059)
Divorced	-0.252*** (0.045)	-0.219*** (0.05)	-0.195*** (0.064)
Separated	-0.366*** (0.087)	-0.293** (0.092)	-0.275* (0.126)
Widowed	-0.204*** (0.055)	-0.127* (0.059)	-0.262** (0.076)
Partners; never married	-0.406***	-0.369***	-0.327**

	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.099)
Biblical Literalism	0.561***	0.375***	0.622***
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Constant	3.449***	3.668***	3.242***
	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.142)
Year: Random-effects	0.009	0.009	0.017
Parameter	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Residuals	3.654	3.209	3.621
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.055)
N	18,047	13,304	8,797
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4.1b Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

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Table 5.1a OLS Regression Models Predicting the Gender Gap in Ideology Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

	Standard Model
Female	-0.319 (0.04*)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.434 (0.032*)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.746 (0.037*)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.164 (0.047*)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.3 (0.051)
Year	-0.002 (0.047*)
Age	-0.007 (0.051)
Education	-0.041 (0.006**)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.211 (0.025*)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.162 (0.027*)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.152

	(0.056)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.099 (0.035*)
Marital Status – Other	-0.404 (0.049*)
Black Non-Hispanic	0.1 (0.031*)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.029 (0.067)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.100 (0.109)
Hispanic	0.027 (0.029*)
Other or multiple races	-0.002 (0.064)
Missing race	-0.055 (0.123)
North Central Resident	0.039 (0.028*)
South Resident	0.063 (0.026*)
West Resident	-0.037 (0.028*)
Constant	6.195 (2.038)
r²	0.4035
N	16,853

Source: 2016 ANES Cumulative Data File

^{vi} Table 5.1b Multilevel Models Predicting the Effects of Equalitarianism and Ethnocentrism on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Between Biblical Literalists and Biblical Moderates

Multilevel Model	Standard Model	Ethnocentrism Model	Equalitarianism Model
Female	-0.708*** (0.061)	-0.629*** (0.093)	-0.469*** (0.072)
Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.639*** (0.049)	0.699*** (0.075)	0.431*** (0.056)
Strict Biblical Literalism	0.951*** (0.054)	1.124*** (0.084)	0.664*** (0.062)
Female x Moderate Biblical Literalism	0.384*** (0.072)	0.336** (0.109)	0.277** (0.084)
Female x Strict Biblical Literalism	0.416***	0.291*	0.255**

	(0.075)	(0.115)	(0.087)
Equalitarianism			-3.387***
			(0.107)
Female x Equalitarianism			0.024
			(0.144)
Ethnocentrism		0.991***	
		(0.182)	
Female x Ethnocentrism		0.201	
		(0.242)	
Age	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.095***	0.092***	0.129***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.339***	-0.322***	-0.246***
	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.042)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.244***	-0.229***	-0.227***
	(0.04)	(0.062)	(0.046)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.327***	-0.257*	-0.272**
	(0.077)	(0.12)	(0.085)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.208***	-0.275***	-0.125*
	(0.049)	(0.075)	(0.054)
Marital Status – Other	-0.386***	-0.337***	-0.363***
	(0.061)	(0.096)	(0.073)
Black Non-Hispanic	-2.131***	-2.07***	-0.246***
	(0.04)	(0.065)	(0.042)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.318**	-0.364*	-0.227***
	(0.098)	(0.145)	(0.046)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.671***	-0.724**	-0.272**
	(0.153)	(0.254)	(0.085)
Hispanic	-1.049***	-0.9***	-0.125*
	(0.042)	(0.068)	(0.054)
Other or multiple races	-0.652***	-0.497***	-0.363
	(0.091)	(0.134)	(0.073)
Missing race	-0.408*	-0.365	
	(0.17)	(0.337)	
North Central Resident	0.08	0.037	0.021
	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.047)
South Resident	0.259***	0.326***	0.076
	(0.039)	(0.06)	(0.044)
West Resident	0.182***	0.172**	0.1*
	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.048)
Constant	3.571	3.425***	3.741***
	(0.087)	(0.139)	(0.104)
Year: Random-effects Parameters	0.01	0.018	0.019
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Residual	3.639	3.607	3.213

	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.036)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	22,390	9,319	15,602

Standard errors in parenthesis
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 5.1b Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File

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Table 6.1a OLS Regression Models Predicting the Effects of Precarity on the Gender Gap in Partisanship Between the Generations

Multilevel Models	Standard Model	Precarity Model
Female	0.052 (0.03)	0.182 (0.124)
Silent Generation	0.289*** (0.044)	0.355*** (0.073)
Boomer	0.581*** (0.056)	0.525*** (0.067)
Generation X	1.006*** (0.081)	0.859*** (0.084)
Millennial	1.209*** (0.135)	0.941*** (0.244)
Generation Z		0.209 (0.412)
Female x Silent Generation	-0.152** (0.046)	-0.304** (0.095)
Female x Boomer	-0.316*** (0.043)	-0.364*** (0.086)
Female x Generation X	-0.498*** (0.061)	-0.574*** (0.105)
Female x Millennial	-0.504*** (0.139)	-0.181 (0.324)
Female x Generation Z		-0.023 (0.502)
Worried A Lot About Finding/Losing Job		0.174* (0.088)
Somewhat Worried About Finding/Losing Job		0.357*** (0.074)
Female x Worried a Lot About Finding/Losing Job		-0.199 (0.124)

Female x Somewhat Worried About Finding/Losing Job		-0.152 (0.102)
Education	0.134*** (0.005)	0.091*** (0.009)
Marital Status – Never Married	-0.21*** (0.027)	-0.22*** (0.042)
Marital Status – Divorced	-0.206*** (0.031)	-0.168*** (0.045)
Marital Status – Separated	-0.208*** (0.052)	-0.136 (0.078)
Marital Status – Widowed	-0.115*** (0.062)	-0.198*** (0.054)
Marital Status – Other	-0.383*** (0.062)	-0.202* (0.094)
Black Non-Hispanic	-1.678*** (0.028)	-1.813*** (0.045)
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.109 (0.097)	0.056 (0.135)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.493*** (0.112)	-0.703*** (0.136)
Hispanic	-0.494*** (0.038)	-0.604*** (0.052)
Other or multiple races	-0.571*** (0.103)	-0.924** (0.266)
Non-white and Non-black	-0.284 (0.29)	-0.924** (0.266)
Missing race	-0.398** (0.139)	-0.297 (0.175)
North Central Resident	-0.15*** (0.026)	0.041 (0.045)
South Resident	-0.442*** (0.025)	-0.044 (0.043)
West Resident	-0.254*** (0.029)	0.019 (0.048)
Protestant	0.310** (0.10)	0.22 (0.175)
Catholic	-0.409*** (0.102)	-0.306 (0.176)
Jewish	-1.312*** (0.115)	-1.392*** (0.203)
Other/No Religion	-0.29** (0.103)	-0.34 (0.178)
1956	0.131 (0.072)	
1958	-0.15* (0.075)	

1960	-0.008 (0.08)	
1962	-0.061 (0.078)	
1964	-0.28*** (0.078)	
1966	0.053 (0.078)	
1968	-0.132 (0.075)	
1970	-0.095 (0.076)	
1972	0.017 (0.069)	
1974	-0.101 (0.077)	
1976	-0.015 (0.072)	
1978	-0.118 (0.073)	
1980	-0.077 (0.078)	
1982	-0.236** (0.081)	
1984	0.131 (0.075)	
1986	0.01** (0.077)	-0.14* (0.058)
1988	0.176* (0.078)	0.049 (0.059)
1990	-0.052 (0.079)	-0.169 (0.06)
1992	-0.011 (0.078)	-0.107 (0.058)
1994	0.162 (0.083)	0.063 (0.062)
1996	-0.106 (0.084)	-0.185** (0.062)
1998	-0.092 (0.09)	-0.193** (0.068)
2000	-0.098 (0.086)	
2002	0.03 (0.09)	
2004	0.052 (0.094)	0.028 (0.071)

2008	-0.273** (0.09)	-0.287*** (0.062)
2012	-0.25** (0.087)	
Constant	3.003*** (0.087)	3.237*** (0.202)
r2	0.125	0.139
N	51,811	18,431

Standard errors in parenthesis

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 6.1a Source: ANES 2016 Cumulative Data File