

IT'S BAD FOR BUSINESS: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PSYCHOPATHIC
TRAITS AND IMMORAL DECISION-MAKING
IN THE WORKPLACE

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Psychology
in the Graduate School of
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2019

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ABSTRACT

Stories of corporate scandal have garnered significant media attention in recent years. Tales of embezzlement, fraud, and other immoral workplace behaviors plastered news headlines, and society demanded answers. One proposed explanation was the presence of psychopaths among businesses' employees. However, empirical support for this notion is sparse. To reduce the dearth in the literature, the present study investigated the relationship between psychopathic traits and immoral decision-making in the workplace. Approximately 100 businesspeople from the community and 15 Masters of Business Administration students were recruited to complete the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure and a brief assessment of moral disengagement. They were then presented with business-related moral scenarios and answered questions related to Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making (i.e., moral awareness, judgment, intention, and action). Triarchic domains (i.e., boldness, meanness, and disinhibition) did not predict moral awareness, judgment, intention, or action. However, Triarchic meanness predicted moral disengagement, such that individuals with higher TriPM meanness scores were more likely to morally disengage. Findings provide support for the notion that psychopathic traits are not associated with significant deficits in moral decision-making. Results also indicate employers may decrease the likelihood of immoral workplace behavior by promoting morally engaged thinking in the workplace.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

α	Chronbach's alpha coefficient (value of internal consistency)
β	Population value of regression coefficient
η^2	Measure of strength of relationship
ANOVA	Analysis of variance
CI	Confidence interval
F	Fisher's F ratio
M	Mean (arithmetic average)
N	Total number of cases
n	Number of cases
p	Probability
r	Pearson's correlation (measure of association between variables)
R^2	Multiple correlation squared (measure of strength of association)
R^2 change	Change in multiple correlation squared (measure of change in the strength of association between two statistical models)
SD	Standard deviation
t	Student's t distribution
=	Equal to (symbol)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would be remiss if I did not begin by thanking my family. I was blessed with amazing parents who provided me with endless amounts of support throughout my graduate school career. They encouraged me to achieve my goals and to pursue my passion for clinical psychology. I am also grateful for my brothers, Derek and Jacob, who, despite their constant teasing that I am a nerd, have always supported my educational pursuits.

It is integral I express my gratitude for my friends, including, but not limited to, Lindsey, CiCi, Laura, and Lauren. What their support and encouragement has meant to me cannot adequately be put into words. I was blessed with the kind of friends that might as well be family.

I am also beyond grateful for the guidance of my mentor, Jennifer Cox, PhD. This project would not have been successful without her support. She motivated me to produce my best work, and to put it simply, is everything one could ask for in a mentor.

Lastly, I would like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Ansley Gilpin, PhD, Andrea Glenn, PhD, Stephen Thoma, PhD, and Alexa Tullett, PhD, for their valuable feedback and assistance with this project. I am also grateful for the support of my lab members, Adam, Marissa, and Lauren.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, stories of corporate scandal have garnered significant media attention. Tales of embezzlement, fraud, and insider trading stole the spotlight, particularly with the 2008 collapse of the United States housing market and the subsequent global economic devastation. Answers were needed, and it was, perhaps, inevitable psychopathy would be proposed as a potential explanation (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010). While many of the wrongdoings within corporations were attributed to psychopathic traits, empirical support for the notion is relatively scarce. The present study aimed to provide scientific support for this theory with a thorough investigation of the relationship between psychopathic traits and immoral decision-making in the workplace.

Psychopathy

Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by a constellation of interpersonal and affective traits, as well as externalizing behaviors (Hare & Neumann, 2009). Interpersonally, individuals high in psychopathic traits are manipulative, deceptive, dominant, and superficial. They lie with no apparent anxiety and see others as pawns in their schemes. Affectively, they lack remorse, empathy, guilt, and an ability to form emotional bonds. People with psychopathic characteristics disregard the feelings of others and externalize blame. These interpersonal and affective traits are associated with an impulsive and irresponsible lifestyle that lacks long-term goals (Hare & Neumann, 2009).

Historically, conceptualizations of the psychopathy construct included antisocial traits. Researchers postulated individuals with psychopathic traits tend to defy social norms and engage

in violent, aggressive behavior (Hare & Neumann, 2009). However, debate emerged over the inclusion of these traits within the psychopathy construct (Skeem & Cooke, 2010), and this debate led to competing models of psychopathy in the field. Psychopathy's two-factor (Hare, 1991) and four-factor (Hare, 2003) models include antisocial traits in their conceptualization of the construct, while the three-factor (Cooke & Michie, 2001) and Triarchic (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009) models do not. Proponents of the three-factor model argued, "Criminal behavior is an epiphenomenon that is neither diagnostic of psychopathy nor specific to personality deviation" (Skeem & Cooke, 2010, p. 433).

The Triarchic model is distinct in its conceptualization of psychopathy as it posits the historically negative construct has both adaptive and maladaptive characteristics (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). The model includes personality traits such as social dominance, charm, physical fearlessness, and immunity to anxiety in its conceptualization of psychopathic personality, despite their association with healthy psychological adjustment (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). Scholars assert it is these traits, known as fearless dominance (Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003) or boldness (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009), that lend to "successful" manifestations of psychopathy, or individuals with pronounced psychopathic traits that function successfully in society (Hall & Benning, 2006).

Studies investigating psychopathic traits in non-criminal samples are increasingly relying on the three-factor or Triarchic model (Almeida et al., 2015; Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Lilienfeld, Lutzman, Watts, Smith, & Dulton, 2014; see Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010 and Ullrich, Farrington, & Coid, 2008 for exceptions). The two- and four-factor models are commonly believed to rely too heavily on antisocial, criminal behavior, and thus, are not reflective of psychopathy's manifestation in community samples (Skeem & Cooke, 2010).

The Triarchic model of psychopathy conceptualizes the disorder as having three distinct constructs: disinhibition, boldness, and meanness (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009).

Disinhibition is the propensity toward impulsivity and irresponsibility, as well as impaired affect regulation. Deficiencies in behavioral restraint and engagement in aggressive behavior are often associated with the construct (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). Boldness, a relatively understudied domain of psychopathy, encompasses tendencies to be socially dominant, venturesome, and persuasive. Individuals high in boldness remain relatively calm in threatening situations and are fairly unresponsive to punishment (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). The final construct, meanness, includes tendencies toward callousness, deceitfulness, and cold-heartedness. Meanness is associated with a lack of empathy and manipulative behavior (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009).

Corporate Psychopathy

While psychopathy is traditionally studied in criminal populations, the first clinical portrayals of psychopathy were not based on observations of forensic samples (Cleckley, 1941). In his seminal work, *The Mask of Sanity*, Cleckley (1941) studied psychopathic personality traits in non-criminal, psychiatric patients. He described psychopaths as superficially charming, insincere, and as having affective deficits. Cleckley (1941) detailed psychopathic tendencies to be unreliable, impulsive, and egotistical; criminality was not mentioned. Rather, Cleckley (1941) hypothesized individuals with psychopathic personalities existed within every facet of society stating, “There is nothing at all odd or queer about [the typical psychopath], and in every respect he tends to embody the concept of a well-adjusted happy person” (p. 354).

As psychopathy has been implicated as a potential explanation for recent corporate scandals and economic catastrophes, attention has returned to the study of successful

psychopaths, or more specifically, corporate psychopaths. Corporate psychopaths are individuals with psychopathic traits who work and operate in the corporate sector (Boddy, 2005). Babiak and Hare (2006) found 3.5% of individuals in a corporate sample fit the profile of a psychopath; this is considerably higher than the 1% typically found in the general population.

Psychopathic traits have been implicated in unfair workplace supervision (Boddy, 2011; Mathieu & Babiak, 2016) and low ratings on measures of teamwork (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010). Employees who work closely with a psychopathic individual have reported lower job satisfaction and psychological well-being (Boddy & Taplin, 2016; Mathieu & Babiak, 2016; Mathieu, Neumann, Hare, & Babiak, 2014). Boddy (2014) found that, when a corporate psychopath is among a business's employees, an average of 84.4 instances of bullying are reported per year, compared to only 13.2 in businesses without a corporate psychopath. On a larger scale, case studies suggest individuals with psychopathic traits create chaos through embezzling schemes, fraud, and insider trading (Babiak & Hare, 2006), effectively lowering the overall corporate responsibility of businesses (Boddy, 2013; Boddy, Ladyshevsky, & Galvin, 2010).

Moral Decision-Making

Despite the research suggesting an association between psychopathic traits and problematic workplace behaviors (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010; Boddy, 2011, 2014; Mathieu et al., 2014), surprisingly few studies have investigated the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision-making in the workplace.

Morality. Rest (1986) theorized morality¹ originates from human's natural social condition. Humans live in groups, and the actions of one group member can affect others in the group. Rest (1986) postulated morality functions to provide groups with rudimentary guidelines for cooperation and conflict resolution and to "optimiz[e] the mutual benefit of people living together..." (p. 1). A group's moral system is fulfilling its purpose when all group members are aware of the moral principles, appreciate the recognition of their interests by others, witness equal distribution of benefits, and seek to uphold the moral system (Rest, 1986).

Rest (1986) also posited morality stems from "the human psyche" (p. 2). Evidence suggests humans strive to view themselves as decent and moral, and behaving morally helps humans to maintain their positive self-concept (Rest, 1986). Rest's notion is consistent with

¹In both the scientific and lay communities, the terms "moral" and "ethical" are frequently interchanged. When ethics are discussed, the concept of morality arises and vice-versa. Given dictionary definitions of the terms commonly cite the other, this phenomenon is not surprising. For example, Merriam-Webster defined moral as "of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior: ethical" (Moral, n.d.) Ethics was similarly defined as "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation" (Ethical, n.d.). Although there is some distinction in how they are used, particularly by philosophers (see "Ethics vs Morals," 2017), operational definitions of morality and ethics in scientific studies do not appear to emphasize philosophical distinctions between the two terms. For example, in their study of psychopathy and ethical decision-making, Stevens, Deuling, and Armenakis (2012) operationally defined unethical decision-making as "an individual's endorsement or willingness to engage in moral- or norm-violating behavior, often in response to an ambiguous situation where there is no obvious or incorrect course of action" (p. 142). Given the frequent interchange of the terms "moral" and "ethics" in the scientific community, and given Rest's model of moral decision-making will serve as the framework for decision-making in this study, hereon the term "moral" will be used to discuss issues of right and wrong.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development (see Kohlberg 1976, 1984) and Bandura's social-cognitive perspective (see Bandura, 1986). In addition, Rest (1986) theorized human empathy promotes moral behavior. Rest (1986) asserted humans behave morally so they do not distress others, and themselves, as a result.

Moral awareness. Rest (1986) conceptualized moral decision-making as consisting of four distinct psychological processes: moral awareness, judgment, intention, and action. In the process of moral awareness, one recognizes when a situation involves moral principles. Minimally, one identifies when a decision could potentially affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of others (Rest, 1986). However, moral awareness may also include the identification of potential courses of action and the consequences to affected parties by each alternative (Rest, 1986).

Moral judgment. The process of moral judgment involves the determination of the "morally right" course of action (Rest, 1986). The emphasis is not on one's selection of the moral behavior, but on the reasoning behind their selection. One's determination is influenced by their conceptualization of the world, specifically, their schema of fairness (i.e., what is owed to them and what is owed to others; Rest, 1986). The schema resides in long-term memory and is activated to resolve moral situations and to determine the "morally right" response (Rest, 1986). Because people may have different schema, or may apply the same schema differently, variant determinations in what is the "morally correct" course of action in a given situation can arise (Rest, 1986).

Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, and Bebeau (2000) described three developmental schema of moral judgment, derived from Kohlberg's theory of moral development (see Kohlberg, 1976, 1984). The Personal Interest schema, developed in childhood, focuses on the consequences of

behavior in identifying the morally right action. One considers the benefits and consequences to themselves and to close others when determining the moral behavior; a sociocentric perspective is not adopted (Rest et al., 2000).

In the developmentally more advanced Maintaining Norms schema, the maintenance of social order defines morality (Rest et al., 2000). Authority and hierarchical role structures are obeyed, “not necessarily out of respect for the personal qualities of the authority, but out of respect for the social system” (Rest et al., 2000, p. 387). In determining the morally correct behavior, the focus is not on the consequences to oneself and close others. Rather, the morally right action is defined by social norms, rules, and law. The law is obeyed and others are expected to obey it as well (Rest et al., 2000).

In the Postconventional schema, moral behavior is “based on shared ideals, [is] fully reciprocal, and [is] open to scrutiny” (Rest et al., 2000 p. 388). Unlike in the Maintaining Norms schema, in which moral decisions are based on established practice and law, in the Postconventional schema, morality appeals to ideals and logical consistency. It is fully reciprocal and subject to debate (Rest et al., 2000). The frequency in which people employ these schema shifts throughout development, with the most complex schema more frequently used over time. (Rest et al., 2000).

Moral intention. Moral intention, the third psychological process in Rest’s model of moral decision-making, involves one’s motivation to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues, such as monetary rewards or recognition. It is one’s “degree of commitment to taking the moral course of action, valuing morals over other values, and taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes” (Rest, 1986, p. 101).

Moral action. Lastly, in the process of moral action, one transforms their moral intention into moral action and engages in the moral behavior (Rest, 1986). The process involves “figuring out the sequence of concrete actions, working around impediments and unexpected difficulties, overcoming fatigue and frustration, resisting distractions and allurements, and keeping sight of the eventual goal” (Rest, 1986 p. 15).

The relationship between moral decision-making processes. Although the four psychological processes may influence one another, the four processes have unique functions. Therefore, an individual may have sufficient skills in one process of moral decision-making, but demonstrate deficiencies in others (Rest, 1986). Furthermore, focus on one component of the moral decision-making process may detract from one’s attention to another component (Rest 1986).

Moral Disengagement

One factor proposed to play a role in moral decision-making is moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Derived from Bandura’s social-cognitive theory (see Bandura, 1986), moral disengagement is an assortment of self-regulatory processes that permit individuals to engage in immoral behavior without experiencing the guilt or psychological discomfort (i.e., cognitive dissonance) associated with engaging in behavior inconsistent with internal moral values (Bandura, 1999).

Bandura (1986) theorized individuals exert control over their thoughts and behaviors through self-regulatory processes. Internal moral standards are one such self-regulatory mechanism, encouraging behavior consistent with moral standards and deterring inconsistent behavior (Bandura, 1986). When one’s behavior is consistent with moral standards, one is internally rewarded (e.g., feels satisfaction, enhanced self-worth). Alternatively, when one’s

behavior is inconsistent with moral standards, one “self-censures,” or punishes themselves (e.g., feels disappointment, diminished self-worth). Consequently, people tend to engage in behavior consistent with their internal moral standards, because they can foresee their own positive and negative self-evaluations (Bandura, 1986).

Bandura (1999) stated the self-regulatory mechanism for moral behavior only operates if activated. Moral disengagement is the key process in the deactivation of moral self-regulation, explaining why otherwise moral people are able to engage in immoral behavior without guilt or self-censure (Bandura, 1999).

Originally proposed to be a state, largely driven by situational factors, recent research suggests moral disengagement may be better conceptualized as a trait (i.e., people differ in their propensities to morally disengage; Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2015; Martin, Kish-Gephart, & Detert, 2014; Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). For example, Moore (2008) described moral disengagement as a “cognitive orientation to the world that develops over time and is influenced by the social contexts in which one operates” (p. 131). Bandura’s concept of moral disengagement is consistent with Rest’s theory of moral decision-making. Rest (1986) postulated individuals will sometimes employ defense mechanisms to “deny or minimize feelings of moral obligation” (p. 18).

Bandura (1999) proposed four basic types of moral disengagement: cognitive restructuring of immoral behavior, distortion of one’s role in immoral behavior, reframing the consequences of immoral behavior, and reframing the role of the victim of immoral behavior.

Cognitive restructuring. Cognitive restructuring of immoral behavior occurs when a harmful act is positively framed, increasing its self-perceived morality (Bandura, 1999). Bandura (1999) specified three methods of cognitive restructuring: moral justification, euphemistic

labeling, and advantageous comparison. Moral justification cognitively reframes immoral behavior as serving the greater good (Bandura, 1999). When immoral behavior is deemed personally or socially acceptable, people can engage in the harmful behavior while preserving their positive self-image (Bandura, 1999). For example, an employee may tell himself that selectively disclosing product information to consumers is crucial in protecting the company's reputation (Moore, 2008).

The language used to describe behavior can also influence how behavior is perceived. Euphemistic labeling is used to alter the perception of immoral behavior to make it appear respectable (Bandura, 1999). For instance, intentionally lying to business competitors may be termed "strategic misrepresentation" (Dertert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008), or colluders in corrupt organizations may be referred to as "team players" (Moore, 2008).

Advantageous comparison exploits the contrasting principle (Bandura, 1999). A person's perception of a behavior is often influenced by what it is compared against. For example, minor misrepresentations on an expense report may be considered acceptable when compared to more egregious expense report infractions (Moore, 2008).

Minimization of responsibility. When one morally disengages by minimizing their role in the immoral act, he or she either displaces or diffuses responsibility (Bandura, 1999). When responsibility is displaced, responsibility for the immoral behavior is placed on an authority figure, or someone who may have explicitly or implicitly condoned the immoral act (Bandura, 1999). Because one does not perceive him or herself as personally responsible, there is no need for self-censure (Bandura, 1999). For example, an employee may justify their use of insider information by proclaiming their boss instructed him to use it.

Alternatively, if responsibility is diffused, blameworthiness for the unjust behavior is distributed across members of a group, weakening one's perceived personal responsibility. For instance, if a task force decides to use environmentally harmful methods to save on production costs, no single person on the task force feels personally responsible. As Bandura (1999) stated, "When everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible" (p.198).

Distortion of the consequences. When the consequences of immoral behavior are distorted, the effects of one's actions are positively framed, and the harm the immoral behavior caused to others is minimized or avoided (Bandura, 1999). For example, an employee at a large company may tell herself there is little harm in laundering a small amount of money from her employer, as it will not significantly affect the business's bottom line. In another scenario, a company executive may more readily introduce a controversial company policy if it will be carried out by employees lower in the chain of command. The executive's distance from the immoral act eases their ability to engage in the immoral behavior.

Reframing the role of the victim. One's self-censure for immoral behavior may depend on their perception of the victim. If one's perception of the victim is reframed, either through dehumanization or reattribution of blame, one lessens their need for self-sanction (Bandura, 1999). When a victim is dehumanized, the victim is rid of their empathy-evoking qualities (Bandura, 1999). For example, administrators at a prison may justify an inmate's mistreatment since the inmate is "just a criminal." Alternatively, one may blame the victim for the harm that befell them (Bandura, 1999). Harmful conduct may be considered justified if one was provoked by the victim, or if the victim "deserved it." For example, an employee may justify embezzlement from a company whose executives receive sizeable bonus checks despite poor performance.

Moral disengagement and the workplace. Bandura initially studied moral disengagement in the context of antisocial behavior. For example, Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996) found morally disengaged adolescents displayed higher levels of violence and engaged in more antisocial conduct (e.g., theft) than adolescents who self-sanctioned their behavior. However, Bandura (1990) also asserted individuals will morally disengage in more mundane decisions “to further their own interests or for profit” (p. 43). Consistent with Bandura’s notion, recent studies suggest a positive relationship between moral disengagement and immoral decision-making in the workplace (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Knoll, Lord, Petersen, & Weigelt, 2016; Moore et al., 2012). For example, in a sample of 307 undergraduate students enrolled in business courses, Detert, Trevino, and Sweitzer (2008) found scores on a moral disengagement scale predicted participants’ willingness to engage in immoral behavior in hypothetical vignettes. Similarly, scores on the Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale (Moore et al., 2012) predicted 213 employees’ tendencies to encourage immoral behavior in an “in-basket exercise” (i.e., experimental methodology in which participants are provided with documents containing information about a company and instructed to make managerial decisions with the available information; Knoll et al., 2016).

Psychopathy and Moral Decision-Making

Deficiencies in moral decision-making have been associated with psychopathy since the 1800s. Prichard (1837) characterized psychopathy as “moral insanity” (p. 36) and Ellis (1890) described psychopaths as “moral monsters” (p. 17). Furthermore, Cleckley (1941) described a profound lack of moral sense as a hallmark of the construct. These historic characterizations of psychopathy are consistent with present-day lay perceptions of the construct (Furnham, Daoud, & Swami, 2009; Keesler, 2014).

Despite the historic association between psychopathy and moral decision-making, no single study has investigated the entirety of Rest's moral decision-making model and moral disengagement in individuals with psychopathic traits. However, a multitude of studies have examined the association between psychopathic traits and one or more of the psychological processes outlined in Rest's model of moral decision-making.

Psychopathy and moral awareness. Rest (1986) conceptualized moral awareness as the psychological process in which one recognizes when a situation involves moral principles. Studies on the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral awareness have produced mixed results. Blair (1995, 1997) and Blair, Jones, Clark, and Smith (1995) conducted a series of studies in which both adult ($n = 20, 40$) and juvenile ($n = 32$) offenders indicated whether hypothetical actions contained moral content in the Moral-Conventional Transgressions Task (MCT: Nucci & Nucci, 1982). The MCT assesses if participants can distinguish between moral wrongs (e.g., hitting another person in the face) and violations of social convention (e.g., walking out of a classroom without permission). Participants high in psychopathic traits did not distinguish between moral and conventional wrongs and tended to rate both types of transgressions as impermissible. Blair and colleagues concluded individuals with psychopathic traits do not understand what qualifies as morally wrong and rated all transgressions as permissible to present as socially desirable (i.e., psychopathic individuals "faked good").

In contrast, Aharaoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2012, 2014) found no significant relationship between psychopathic traits and performance on a similar MCT task. For example, Aharani, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2014) presented 139 offenders with 16 scenarios depicting either a moral or conventional violation. However, unlike Blair (1995, 1997) and Blair and colleagues (1995), Aharoni and colleagues informed participants exactly one-half of the

scenarios were considered morally wrong by typical members of society. Aharaoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2014) included this information to control for social desirability and to prevent over-classification from being an effective strategy. With this change in methodology, psychopathic traits did not predict accuracy of moral and conventional transgressions. Authors concluded individuals with psychopathic traits can distinguish between right and wrong. A theoretical analysis on moral sensitivity and psychopathy similarly concluded psychopathic traits do not predict one's ability to recognize when a situation involves moral principles (Maxwell & Sage, 2009).

Psychopathy and moral judgment. Moral judgment is the psychological process in which the morally right course of action is identified (Rest, 1986). As conceptualized by Rest (1986), the emphasis is not on individuals' ultimate moral choices, but on the reasoning behind them. In a meta-analysis of studies on the relationship between psychopathy and Rest's conceptualization of moral judgment, as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974) and Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999), Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) found psychopathy was associated with lower levels of Postconventional reasoning (i.e., lower endorsement of items reflective of the Postconventional schema) and greater emphasis on personal interest concerns (i.e., higher endorsement of items reflective of the Personal Interest schema). The relationship was small to medium in magnitude.

However, limited power precluded Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) from examining relationships between specific psychopathic traits and moral reasoning. Therefore, in a subsequent study, Marshall, Watts, Frankel, and Lilienfeld (2017) examined the relationship between moral reasoning, as measured by the DIT-2, and psychopathy, as measured by the

revised version of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) and the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). PPI-R Fearless Dominance (i.e., measure of boldness and lack of anxiety that is associated with social persuasiveness and dominance; akin to the Triarchic domain boldness [Hall et al., 2014]), and LSRP Factor 1 (i.e., measure of selfish, uncaring, and manipulative behavior toward others) were negatively correlated with Postconventional moral reasoning; effect sizes were small to medium in magnitude (Marshall et al., 2017).

While not measuring moral judgment as conceptualized by Rest (1986), several studies explored the relationship between psychopathic traits and the perceived “acceptability” of hypothetical responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Sacrificial moral dilemmas, developed by Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001), assess individuals’ moral intuitions through evaluation of their utilitarian (i.e., calculative, rational decisions) considerations when responding to a moral dilemma. The dilemmas generally involve a scenario in which one course of action will cause the death of a single person but save the lives of multiple others; the alternative choice will save the life of one person but cause the deaths of multiple others. The dilemmas are categorized as either “personal” (i.e., decision entails direct physical harm) or impersonal (i.e., decision does not require direct physical harm). For example, the classic footbridge scenario is classified as a personal dilemma, as participants must decide whether to physically push a man off a bridge to prevent an oncoming train from killing five people on the upcoming tracks. In contrast, in the infamous trolley scenario, classified as an impersonal dilemma, participants must choose whether to flip a switch that would divert a train to run over one person rather than five others lying on the tracks ahead.

In both the personal and impersonal moral dilemmas, the utilitarian response would be to choose the action that would sacrifice one individual to save five others. However, a large body of research indicates individuals tend to choose the opposite response in personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2012). Scholars hypothesize the personal situations, those in which one must directly harm another individual, evoke an emotional response the impersonal situations do not (Koenigs et al., 2007). In order to engage in the utilitarian response in the personal dilemmas, one must be able to set aside their emotions. Research suggests that populations with emotional processing deficits (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions) can separate their emotions from their cognitions during moral decision-making, as evidenced by their increased tendency to endorse the utilitarian response in personal moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007). These findings led to studies examining whether psychopaths, another population theorized to have affective deficits, display the same pattern of responding.

In a study of 54 undergraduate students, Pletti, Lotto, Buodo, and Sarlo (2017) examined how individuals high in psychopathic traits differed from individuals low in psychopathic traits regarding their ratings to two types of moral dilemmas. Participants were asked to respond to sacrificial moral dilemmas, as well as everyday moral dilemmas (i.e., hypothetical scenarios in which participants must choose whether to pursue a personal advantage that harms another person [harmful situations] or poses no negative consequences for others [harmless situations]). No significant differences in moral judgment were found between individuals high and low in psychopathic traits in either the sacrificial or everyday moral dilemmas. For the sacrificial moral dilemmas, both groups perceived personal moral dilemmas as less acceptable than impersonal

moral dilemmas. Similarly, in the everyday moral dilemmas, participants rated harmful situations as less morally acceptable than harmless situations. These results are consistent with findings of other studies, suggesting psychopathic traits do not predict moral judgment (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Gay, Vitacco, Hackney, & Beussink, 2018; Lotto, Manfrinati, & Sarlo, 2014; Schiach Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Tassy, Deruelle, Mancini, Leistedt, & Wicker, 2013).

Another set of studies investigated moral judgment and psychopathy from the perspective of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Haidt and Graham (2007) identified five distinct moral domains that represent various concerns one may have when making moral decisions (harm, purity, authority, loyalty, and fairness). However, in contrast to Rest's conceptualization of moral judgment (Rest, 1986) and moral judgment as conceptualized in sacrificial moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001), the five moral domains conceptualized by Haidt and Graham (2007) do not carry moral valence (i.e., it is not clear what constitutes "deviant" responding). Rather, the focus is on preferences in moral reasoning rather than on deficits in moral reasoning (Marshall, Watts & Lilienfeld, 2016).

Overall, findings on psychopathy and moral foundations are mixed. Several studies found individuals high in psychopathic traits demonstrated diminished moral concern in harm (i.e., concerns about violence and the suffering of others) and fairness (i.e., concerns about social norms related to equality, rights, and justice) domains (Aharaoni, Antonenko, & Kiehl, 2011; Efferson, Glenn, Rempel, & Iyer, 2017; Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009). Other studies found diminished moral concern in all five moral domains (Jonason, Strosser, Kroll, Duinevel, & Baruffi, 2015). In a meta-analysis, Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) found significant, negative relationships between psychopathic traits and moral domains of harm,

fairness, purity (i.e., concerns about living in an elevated, noble, and less carnal way), and authority (i.e., concerns about obligations of group membership, such as loyalty), with the most pronounced associations for harm, fairness, and authority.

Using a sample of 374 community members, Almeida et al. (2015) completed the only known study of the Triarchic model of psychopathy and Moral Foundations Theory. Almeida et al. (2015) found negative associations between disinhibition and the moral principles of authority and purity and a positive relationship between disinhibition and the moral principle of fairness. Boldness exhibited a negative association with purity, and meanness was negatively related to harm and fairness. Effect sizes were medium to large in magnitude (Cohen's *ds* ranging from 1.11 to 5.32).

Lastly, Glenn, Koleva, Iyer, Graham, and Ditto (2010) assessed the relationship between psychopathic traits, as assessed by the LSRP, and moral identity (i.e., the degree to which individuals' self-concept is based on moral traits) among 170 community members. Individuals high in psychopathic traits were less likely to base their self-concept on moral traits; effects were large in magnitude. Both LSRP Factor 1 and LSRP Factor 2 (i.e., measure of impulsivity and self-defeating lifestyle behaviors) were negatively correlated with moral identity, although Factor 1 scores explained more overall variance.

Psychopathy and moral intention. Rest (1986) conceptualized the process of moral intention as the motivation to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues, such as monetary rewards or recognition. Studies have primarily investigated the relationship between psychopathy and moral intention by evaluating participants' degree of willingness to engage in utilitarian moral behavior in sacrificial moral dilemmas (*see Psychopathy and Moral Judgment subsection for an explanation of sacrificial moral dilemmas*). Because participants were typically

asked, “Would you engage in X behavior?,” these studies are believed to be assessing moral intention rather than moral action, as participants are neither physically engaging in the moral action nor explicitly indicating which course of action would be taken in each scenario.

As in studies on moral judgment and psychopathy, findings on moral intention and psychopathic traits are mixed. Although a multitude of studies support increased willingness to engage in utilitarian courses of action among individuals with psychopathic traits (Balash & Falkenbach, 2018; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn et al., 2010; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012; Pletti et al., 2017; Ritchie & Forth, 2016; Tassy et al., 2013), others found no such relationship (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Marshall et al., 2017). In a meta-analysis, Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) found a small to moderate association between psychopathy and utilitarian considerations in regard to sacrificial dilemmas, however, this effect was most pronounced for impersonal moral dilemmas, as compared to personal dilemmas. Pletti et al. (2017) interpreted the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral intention “as reflecting a reduced emotional reaction to the idea of harming someone, which would make the rational choice of maximizing the outcomes to emerge” (p. 361).

Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) proposed the mixed findings and the small effect sizes found in the meta-analysis may have been due to reliance on total psychopathy scores, which could have been obscuring different associations between psychopathic traits and utilitarian decision-making at the domain, or factor, level. Few studies have investigated this possibility. In a study of 191 undergraduates, Marshall et al. (2017) found a significant correlation between LSRP Factor 2 scores and endorsement of utilitarian responses on personal dilemmas.

In contrast, Ritchie and Forth (2016) found psychopathy's interpersonal and affective traits, as measured by the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale—Short Form (Paulhus, Hemphill, and Hare, 2016), uniquely accounted for 25% of the variance in moral transgressions, with those high in interpersonal and affective traits more likely to endorse engagement in utilitarian courses of action in personal sacrificial moral dilemmas. Similarly, Balash and Falkenbach (2018) found a relationship between the Triarchic domain meanness and greater endorsement of utilitarian courses of action in personal moral dilemmas.

Additionally, in a sample of 48 offenders, Koenigs et al. (2012) found that, although individuals with psychopathic traits were more likely to endorse utilitarian courses of action for impersonal moral dilemmas, this effect was most pronounced among individuals high in psychopathic traits and with low levels of anxiety, a feature of the Triarchic domain boldness.

While most studies assessed moral intention through participants willingness to engage in utilitarian courses of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas, Pletti et al. (2017) studied moral intention in everyday moral dilemmas (*see Psychopathy and Moral judgment subsection for a description of everyday moral dilemmas*). Pletti and colleagues (2017) found individuals low in psychopathy were more likely to endorse harmless courses of action than harmful courses of action, whereas individuals high in psychopathy were similarly inclined to act in both types of situations. Authors also found individuals high in psychopathic traits were more inclined to perform harmful actions, as compared to individuals low in psychopathic traits.

In their study of psychopathy and moral intention, Glenn et al. (2009) used a methodology more aligned with Rest's conceptualization of the psychological process (Rest, 1986). In a sample of 2,517 community members, Glenn et al. (2009) found psychopathic traits, as measured by the LSRP, predicted greater willingness to accept money to violate all five moral

domains, as conceptualized by Haidt and Graham (2007). The authors concluded psychopathic traits may decrease motivation to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues.

Psychopathy and moral action. Explicit studies of psychopathy and moral action (i.e., engagement in moral behavior) are essentially nonexistent. Their absence in the literature is likely due to the frequent use of hypothetical vignettes in studies of moral decision-making. While alternative methods, such as simulations and lab studies, may serve as a better measure of actual moral behavior, literature reviews indicate 25 to 55% of studies rely upon hypothetical scenarios (Lenhert, Park, & Singh, 2015; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). This is problematic as it is unclear whether studies are explaining moral intent (i.e., the individual’s motivation to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues) or moral action (i.e., the individual’s engagement in the moral behavior), as conceptualized in Rest’s model of moral decision-making (Rest, 1986).

However, a plethora of studies demonstrate the relationship between psychopathy and immoral behaviors, such as violence (Blais, Solodukhin, & Forth, 2014), criminality (Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008), and behavioral deviance (Coffey, Cox, and Kopkin, 2018). For example, Coffey, Cox, and Kopkin (2018) found the Triarchic domain disinhibition predicted seven forms of deviant behavior, including theft, vandalism, and assault, while both meanness and boldness predicted overall lifetime engagement in deviant behavior.

Psychopathy and moral disengagement. Research on moral disengagement and psychopathy is also sparse. However, available studies consistently demonstrate a significant relationship between psychopathy’s affective and interpersonal traits and moral disengagement (DeLisi et al., 2014; Egan, Hughes, & Palmer, 2015; Riser & Eckert, 2016; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, & Fagan, 2011). For example, Riser and Eckert (2016) found individuals who exhibited

unemotionality, remorselessness, and callousness (traits consistent with the Triarchic domain meanness) reported stronger morally disengaged attitudes. The authors suggested individuals low in empathy may have found it easier to disregard the negative consequences of their immoral behavior and to dehumanize victims than their counterparts with higher levels of empathy. DeLisi et al. (2014) similarly concluded, “The emotional incapacity of psychopathic personality directly relates to moral disengagement, because it prevents psychopathic individuals from emphatically relating to others. The emotional connectedness to others is required to set into motion the negative or self-conscious emotions, such as guilt or shame” (p. 297). Consistent with this notion, a multitude of studies have found a strong negative relationship between empathy and moral disengagement (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Hyde, Shaw, & Moilanen, 2009; Moore et al. 2012).

Corporate Psychopathy & Moral Decision-Making

Although there is a plethora of research on the association between psychopathy and morality, studies investigating the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision-making in the workplace are relatively scarce. Few studies have investigated whether findings on psychopathy and moral decision-making generalize to business settings.

In a study of psychopathic traits and moral awareness in the workplace, Valentine, Hanson, & Fleischman (2017) had a sample of approximately 140 businesspeople complete six items from the primary subscale of the LSRP (i.e., subscale measuring psychopathy’s interpersonal and affective traits) and indicate the degree to which a workplace scenario involved an ethical issue. Psychopathy predicted lower moral awareness ($r = -.39$), yet, the validity and generalizability of the study’s results were limited by the brief measure of psychopathy and the use of a single ethical scenario.

Heinze, Allen, Magai, and Ritzler (2010) examined the relationship between psychopathy and moral judgment among 66 students studying to obtain a Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree. The authors found psychopathic traits, as measured by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996), predicted moral judgment (adjusted $R^2 = .05$), such that students with higher total scores on the PPI tended to earn lower scores on the DIT-2, indicative of lower levels of Postconventional reasoning. The association was attributed primarily to the PPI's Machiavellian Egocentricity subscale (adjusted $R^2 = .09$), a measure of the psychopathic tendency to be aggressive and self-centered in social interactions (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).

Heinze et al. (2010) also examined the relationship between moral judgment and the two-factor model of the PPI (see Benning et al., 2003). While scores on Fearless Dominance did not significantly predict moral judgment, Self-Centered Impulsivity scores (i.e., measure of narcissism and a tendency to exploit others associated with impulsivity and antisocial behavior) significantly predicted DIT-2 scores ($R^2 = .08$).

Although Heinze and colleagues (2010) examined psychopathy's distinct domains, their study did not use business-related vignettes to measure moral judgment. Given previous findings that moral judgment is lower in business-related moral dilemmas in comparison to non-business-related moral scenarios (Weber, 1990; Weber & Wasieleski, 2001), this methodology may have limited researchers' findings.

Stevens, Deuling, and Armenakis (2012) examined the association between psychopathic traits and moral intent and disengagement in a business setting. Approximately 270 undergraduate students completed the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP-III; Palhaus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2009) and indicated the extent to which they approved or disapproved of a

prompted action in four business-related hypothetical scenarios. Participants also rated their approval of eight justifications for the prompted action in each scenario, a measure of moral disengagement. Psychopathic traits predicted lower moral intent (i.e., participants' approval of immoral actions; $r = .20$) and higher moral disengagement ($r = .22$). Moral disengagement mediated the relationship between psychopathy and moral intent. However, these results were limited by the use of an undergraduate sample and the lack of investigation into how psychopathy's three distinct domains (i.e., disinhibition, boldness, meanness) differentially affected immoral decision-making.

Watson, Teaque, & Papamarcos (2017) also investigated the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral intent using ten business-related moral scenarios. In three studies, senior business undergraduate students completed the LSRP or Sellbom's 2011 revision of the LSRP (LSRP-r; Sellbom, 2011) and indicated the likelihood they would engage in immoral behavior in response to the scenarios. Authors found psychopathy composite scores on the LSRP and LSRP-r, as well as psychopathy's interpersonal and affective traits, predicted greater endorsement of immoral behavior.

Neo, Sellbom, Smith, and Lilienfeld (2012) aggregated items (see Hall et al., 2014) on the PPI-R (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) to investigate the relationship between Triarchic domains of psychopathy and immoral decision-making in corporations. Authors presented community members with four business-related scenarios and two decisions to be made for each scenario, one moral and one immoral. For each decision, participants rated how moral they believed the decision to be, how likely they would engage in the behavior, and how likely they believed others would engage in the behavior. Although all the Triarchic domains were negatively correlated with immoral decision-making (as measured by a latent construct

consisting of participants' morality, self-engagement, and others-engagement scores), only meanness uniquely contributed to immoral decision-making ($R^2 = .58$) in regression analyses.

As in the four previous studies, Neo et al. (2012) measured moral decision-making using hypothetical vignettes, in which participants indicated their likelihood of engaging in the immoral response, as opposed to directly answering whether or not (i.e., yes or no) they would engage in the behavior.

While not directly addressing moral decision-making, Lingnau, Fuchs, and Dehne-Niemann (2017) examined the relationship between psychopathic traits, as measured by the PPI-R, and the acceptability of white-collar crime, specifically accounting fraud and insider trading. Authors found psychopathic traits explained 25% of the variance in acceptability of white-collar crime. More specifically, PPI-R Coldness (i.e., measure of decreased empathy and remorse) predicted acceptability of both types of white-collar crime, while PPI-R Machiavellian Egocentricity predicted acceptance of insider trading and PPI-R Rebellious Nonconformity (i.e., measure of risk-seeking tendencies and rule-violating behavior) predicted acceptance of accounting fraud.

The Present Study

Given the limitations of the current literature on corporate psychopathy and moral decision-making, and the harm corporate psychopaths can cause organizations and their employees, the present study investigated the relationship between psychopathic traits, moral disengagement, and moral decision-making using Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making. More specifically, this study aimed to understand the association between the Triarchic domains of psychopathy and moral awareness, judgment, intention, action, and disengagement in a business context.

In view of the theories proposed by Maxwell and Sage (2009) and the supportive findings of Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2012, 2014), it was hypothesized neither disinhibition, boldness, nor meanness would predict moral awareness (See Figure 1). The findings of Marshall et al. (2017) suggest boldness and meanness would predict moral judgment, specifically lower levels of Postconventional reasoning. However, the results of Heinze et al. (2010) suggest relationships between disinhibition and lower levels of Postconventional reasoning. Given these contradictory findings, exploratory analyses investigated the relationship between the Triarchic domains of psychopathy and moral judgment and assessed whether particular domains uniquely predict lower Postconventional reasoning (See Figure 1).

Multiple studies have established a relationship between meanness (Lingnau, Fuchs, & Dehne-Niemann, 2017; Neo et al., 2012; Watson, Teaque, & Papamarcos, 2017) and moral intention in the workplace. Given these findings, it was hypothesized meanness would predict moral intention, specifically lower Postconventional moral intention. Neither boldness nor disinhibition was expected to contribute unique variance to moral intention scores (See Figure 1).

Given the established relationship between psychopathic traits and immoral behavior, and the results of Coffey, Cox and Kopkin (2018), it was hypothesized all Triarchic domains would predict immoral action. However, exploratory analyses assessed whether any Triarchic domain uniquely contributed to variance in immoral action (See Figure 1).

Lastly, it was believed psychopathic traits would predict moral disengagement. DeLisi et al. (2014), Egan et al. (2015), and Risser and Eckert (2016) found a positive relationship between psychopathic traits and moral disengagement among youthful offenders, a community sample, and an undergraduate sample, respectively. Because Risser and Eckert (2016) reported a relationship between unemotionality, callousness, and remorselessness (traits akin to those

captured in the meanness domain of psychopathy), and moral disengagement specifically, it was hypothesized meanness would predict moral disengagement. It was not expected for either boldness or disinhibition to uniquely contribute to moral disengagement (See Figure 2).

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

Participants

Participants included 97 businesspeople recruited from the community and 15 MBA students recruited from a large southeastern public university ($N = 112$). Businesspeople were recruited through a snowball sampling technique, a recruitment methodology in which current participants recruit new participants. Specifically, acquaintances of the primary investigator that met inclusion criteria (i.e., persons 18 years or older who worked in a business-related field) were recruited via e-mail. In the e-mail solicitation, businesspeople were asked to complete the study and to forward the email solicitation to other individuals who met inclusion criteria. MBA students were recruited through an e-mail solicitation sent by faculty of the university's MBA program. Participation was voluntary, and participants who completed the study had the opportunity to enter into a raffle to win one of 15 \$50 electronic gift cards.

Due to scores on a measure of social desirability bias, the results of 11 participants were excluded from analyses (*see below*). The remaining participants had a mean age of 37.62 years ($SD = 12.97$) and included 62 males (61.4%) and 39 females (38.6%). The majority of the sample was Caucasian (92.1%), followed by relatively smaller proportions of African American (3.0%) and Asian American (3.0%) individuals. Most participants indicated their political orientation was Republican (44.6%), with another 23.8% identifying as Independent and another 13.9% identifying as Democrat. Approximately 11% of participants reported they did not identify with a political party. Additionally, most participants identified as Protestant (31.7% as Evangelical and 24.8% as Non-Evangelical), with relatively smaller proportions identifying as

Catholic (12.9%), Agnostic (5.9%), Jewish (4.0%), Muslim (1.0%), and Hindu (1.0%).

Approximately 17.8% of participants indicated they did not identify with a religious group.

The majority of participants (86.1%) indicated they were employed full-time (i.e., worked 40 or more hours per week). Approximately 9.9% of participants reported they were full-time students; the remaining 4.0% of participants reported they worked part-time (i.e., less than 40 hours per week). Participants reported they had been employed in business-related fields for an average of 15.12 years ($SD = 12.33$), and 55.4% indicated they held a supervisory role. Approximately 38% of participants reported their yearly salary was greater than \$100,000, followed by relatively smaller proportions reporting salaries between \$75,000 and \$99,999 (17.8%), \$50,000 and \$74,999 (15.8%), \$35,000 and \$49,999 (12.9%), \$20,000 and \$34,999 (5.0%), and less than \$20,000 (10.9%).

Measures

Demographic Questionnaire. A sociodemographic form contained questions addressing participants' age, gender, ethnicity, racial background, and political and religious affiliations. The questionnaire also asked about current employment (e.g., job title, salary), employment history (e.g., years in the field), and military history. See Appendix C.

Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM; Patrick, 2010). The TriPM is a self-report measure of psychopathy consisting of 58 items measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (3 = true, 2 = somewhat true, 1 = somewhat false, 0 = false). The items form three distinct scales, which measure the three phenotypic constructs delineated by the Triarchic model of psychopathy: boldness (19 items), meanness (19 items), and disinhibition (20 items). See Appendix D.

Current research suggests the TriPM generally demonstrates sufficient construct validity (Drislane, Patrick, & Arsal, 2014; Patrick, 2010; Sellbom & Philips, 2013). For example,

Drislane, Patrick, and Arsal (2014) found the TriPM demonstrated strong correlations with other self-report measures of psychopathy, including the PPI ($r = .78$) and the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III ($r = .69$; Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2009). The TriPM scales also demonstrated acceptable convergent validity (Patrick, 2010; Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013) and discriminant validity (Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013). For instance, Stanley, Wygant, and Sellbom (2013) found TriPM boldness scores were associated with theoretically related constructs, such as extraversion, fearlessness, and stress immunity. TriPM meanness scores were also associated with theoretically related constructs, including lower levels of agreeableness and empathy and deficits in perspective-taking (Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013). Lower levels of dependability and self-discipline, and higher degrees of emotional instability, were associated with TriPM disinhibition scores (Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013).

Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale. The Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale (PMDS; Moore et al., 2012) is an 8-item self-report measure of the eight forms of moral disengagement, one item for each type of moral disengagement. Items are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with one indicating strong disagreement and seven indicating strong agreement. Item scores are aggregated to form a comprehensive moral disengagement score (Moore et al. 2012). See Appendix E.

The PMDS has been used in samples of undergraduate and MBA students, as well as in samples of businesspeople from the community. Moore et al. (2012) found the eight items on the PMDS demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency ($\alpha = .80$). The scale also exhibited sufficient convergent validity with constructs associated with moral disengagement, such as Machiavellianism ($r = .44$). In addition, the PMDS demonstrated acceptable divergent validity

with constructs negatively correlated with moral disengagement, such as moral identity ($r = -.55$) and empathy ($r = -.46$; Moore et al., 2012).

Moral decision-making scenarios. Participants were presented with three business-related moral scenarios and three business-related scenarios without a moral dilemma (adapted from the “Arthur Anderson Case Studies in Business Ethics,” 2012). To establish the validity of the moral scenarios, the scenarios were pilot tested among a sample of 138 undergraduate college students. Students were first presented with the short form of the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2), a measure of moral judgment (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999; Thoma, 2006). The DIT-2 activates moral schemas and assesses their importance when responding to moral dilemmas (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). The DIT-2 has been used in a variety of populations, including working professionals (see Rest & Narvaez, 1994) and provides normative information by both gender and education level (Dong, 2009). Research indicated the DIT-2 demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency, as well as acceptable test-retest reliability (Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, 2006). The measure also exhibited sufficient convergent validity with constructs associated with moral judgment, including moral comprehension (Thoma, 2006), prosocial behaviors (Thoma, 2006), and professional decision-making (Rest & Narvaez, 1994).

Upon completion of the DIT-2, students in the pilot study were presented with five business-related scenarios containing a moral dilemma and five business-related scenarios without a moral dilemma. To assess the convergent validity of the business-related moral scenarios, postconventional reasoning scores on the DIT-2 (i.e., scores indicative of the Postconventional schema of moral judgment) were compared to Postconventional moral judgment scores (*see Preliminary Analyses subsection for a description of how Postconventional*

moral judgment scores were generated) on the five business-related scenarios with a moral dilemma. Correlations between each of the business-related scenarios and the DIT-2 moral dilemmas were significant. See Table 1. The three business-related scenarios with the highest convergent validity were selected for use in the primary study ($\alpha = .81$). The three scenarios not containing a moral dilemma that had the highest convergent validity in moral awareness scores were also selected for use in the study ($\alpha = .70$).

For each scenario containing a moral dilemma, participants were asked a series of four types of questions. Each type of question related to one of the four psychological processes involved in moral decision-making, as outlined in Rest's 1986 model. First, to assess moral action, participants were asked to choose between two courses of action, a moral action and an immoral action. Participants were also asked to identify their degree of confidence in their decision on a 3-point Likert-type scale (1 = not confident, 2 = somewhat confident, 3 = confident). Next, to measure moral awareness, participants were asked whether or not the situation contained a moral dilemma.

To assess moral judgment, participants were asked six questions about factors that may have influenced how they responded to the scenario. Two questions pertained to factors reflecting the Personal Interest schema, two questions pertained to factors reflecting the Maintaining Norms schema, and two questions pertained to factors reflecting the Postconventional schema (*see Moral Decision-Making subsection for an overview of the moral schemas*). Participants rated the importance of each factor in determining their response to the scenario on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with one indicating "no importance" and five indicating "great importance." Participants also identified the first and second factors they considered most influential to their response.

To measure moral intention, participants were provided with six issues relevant to one's decision, three reflecting moral concerns and three reflecting competing factors (e.g., monetary rewards, recognition). Participants ranked the issues in their order of importance, with "1" reflecting the most important issue and "6" reflecting the least important issue. For the three scenarios without a moral dilemma, only moral action and awareness were assessed. See Appendix F.

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16). The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16; Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015) is a 16-item instrument used to measure two constructs: self-deceptive enhancement (i.e., honest but overly positive responding) and impression management (i.e., bias toward pleasing others). It is a measure of defense, such that those who score high on either the Self-Deceptive Enhancement or Impression Management subscale are unlikely to be responding honestly on self-report measures. See Appendix G.

The BIDR-16 demonstrated acceptable internal consistency for its Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management subscales (Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015). The scale also demonstrated concurrent validity as a measure of socially desirable responding, with both the Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management subscales correlating with a 10-item short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972; r 's = .32 and .53, respectively). Additionally, the BIDR-16 exhibited sufficient convergent validity with constructs associated with self-enhancement, such as narcissism and self-esteem (Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015).

Participants rated their level of agreement with BIDR-16 items on a 7-point Likert-type scale. Extreme responses (i.e., ratings of a "6" or "7") counted as one point; all other ratings

counted as zero points. Scores on items making up the Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale ($n = 8$) and Impression Management subscale ($n = 8$) were summed to create total subscale scores. Consistent with recommended administration (Paulhus, 1998), participants whose total scores were two standard deviations above the mean on either the Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale ($M = 2.83, SD = 2.06$) or the Impression Management subscale ($M = 2.65, SD = 2.09$) were removed from analyses ($n = 11$).

Procedures

Participants completed the entirety of the study procedures on Qualtrics, an online survey platform. After providing informed consent, participants completed the TriPM, the demographics questionnaire, the PMDS, and the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI: Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2010). Although not relevant to study hypotheses, the TIPI was completed by participants to mask the study's research question and to reduce socially desirable responding. Participants were then presented with the six business-related scenarios and their associated questions. The scenarios were presented in a random sequence to control for potential order effects. Finally, participants completed the BIDR-16. Upon completion, participants were presented with a debriefing form and given the opportunity to enter into a raffle to win one of 15 \$50 electronic gift cards.

CHAPTER 3. RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM). The TriPM (Patrick, 2010) is a 58-item self-report measure of psychopathy that has three distinct scales, boldness (19 items; $\alpha = .86$), meanness, (19 items; $\alpha = .82$) and disinhibition (20 items; $\alpha = .81$; see Table 2). For bivariate correlations between TriPM scales and study variables, see Table 3.

Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale (PMDS). The PMDS (Moore et al., 2012) is an 8-item self-report measure of moral disengagement. To analyze participants' tendency to morally disengage, a PMDS score was derived by summing the instrument's eight items ($\alpha = .75$). See Table 2.

Moral decision-making scenarios. To assess participants' moral decision-making, participants were presented with three business-related moral scenarios and three business-related scenarios without a moral dilemma. For all six scenarios, participants' moral awareness was assessed through a single question; participants were asked whether or not the situation contained a moral dilemma. Responses indicating the scenario contained a moral dilemma were coded as a "1," and responses indicating the scenario did not contain a moral dilemma were coded as a "2." For the scenarios not containing a moral dilemma, items were reverse scored (i.e., responses indicating the scenario contained a moral dilemma were coded as a "2," and responses indicating the scenario did not contain a moral dilemma were coded as a "1").

Participants' responses to each of the six scenarios were summed to derive a moral awareness score, with higher scores indicative of lower moral awareness ($\alpha = .21$). See Table 2.

For each business-related moral scenario, participants' moral judgment was assessed through six questions about factors that may have influenced how they responded to the scenario. Two questions reflected the Personal Interest schema, two questions reflected the Maintaining Norms schema, and two questions reflected the Postconventional schema. To assess participants' tendency to employ the Personal Interests schema, a Personal Interest moral judgment rating score was derived by summing the six items (two from each scenario) reflective of the Personal Interest schema ($\alpha = .76$). Similarly, a Maintaining Norms moral judgment rating score was derived by summing the six items representative of the Maintaining Norms schema ($\alpha = .60$). A Postconventional moral judgment rating score was also derived by summing the six items representative of the Postconventional schema ($\alpha = .57$). For each rating score, higher scores were indicative of higher endorsement of the schema. See Table 2.

Participants were also asked to identify the first and second most important factors that influenced their decision-making. As an alternative measure of moral judgment, three moral judgment ranking scores were created from these rankings, a Personal Interest moral judgment ranking score, a Maintaining Norms moral judgment ranking score, and a Postconventional moral judgment ranking score.

Participants' ranking scores were awarded four points if an item representing the schema was ranked as the most important factor in a scenario, and two points if an item representing the schema was ranked as the second most important factor in a scenario. Ranking scores were awarded zero points if an item representing the schema was not selected as either the first or

second most important factor in the participant's decision-making. Thus, each scenario was worth six points, and ranking scores ranged from zero to 18 points (six points per scenario).

The following example illustrates the scoring scheme for participants' moral judgment ranking scores. Consider a participant that ranks an item representing the Postconventional schema as the most important factor in the first scenario. Their Postconventional moral judgment ranking score would be awarded four points. If the participant proceeded to rank an item representing the Personal Interest schema as the second most important factor in that scenario, their Personal Interest moral judgment ranking score would be awarded two points. If the participant then ranked items reflecting the Postconventional schema to be the first and second most important factors in the second scenario, their Postconventional moral judgment ranking score would be awarded an additional six points (four points for the Postconventional moral judgment item ranked as most important and two points for the Postconventional moral judgment item ranked as second most important). If the participant then selected an item representing the Maintaining Norms schema as the most important factor in the third scenario, their Maintaining Norms moral judgment ranking score would be awarded four points. The participant's Personal Interest moral judgment ranking score would be awarded an additional two points if the participant concluded by ranking an item reflecting the Personal Interest moral judgment schema as the second most important factor in the third scenario. Given the participant's aforementioned responses, the participant's Personal Interest and Maintaining Norms moral judgment ranking scores would be four, and their Postconventional moral judgment ranking score would be ten.

Ranking scores were converted to percentages by dividing the ranking scores by the total points possible and multiplying by 100. For instance, if a participant's Maintaining Norms moral

judgment ranking score was six, their percentage score would be 33.33%. For each ranking score, higher percentages were indicative of greater endorsement of the schema. See Table 2.

To assess participants' moral intention, participants were asked to rank six issues relevant to their decision-making in the business-related moral scenarios. Three issues reflected the three moral schema, and three issues reflected competing factors (e.g., monetary rewards, recognition). To assess participants' tendency to employ the Personal Interest schema during the moral intention process, a Personal Interest moral intention score was derived by summing the rankings of the three issues (one for each scenario) reflective of the Personal Interest schema ($\alpha = .20$). Similarly, a Maintaining Norms moral intention score was derived by summing the rankings of the three items representing the Maintaining Norms schema ($\alpha = .59$). A Postconventional moral intention score was derived by summing the rankings of the three items representing the Postconventional schema ($\alpha = .48$). For each moral intention score, higher scores were indicative of greater endorsement of the schema. See Table 2.

Lastly, to assess the moral action phase of Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making, participants were asked to choose between two courses of action, a moral choice and an immoral choice. Responses indicative of the moral choice were coded as a "-1," and responses indicative of the immoral choice were coded as a "1." In the moral dilemma involving taking credit for an assistant's work, 6.9% of participants indicated they would engage in the immoral behavior. In the dilemma involving the use of inside information to undercut the bid of a competitor, 50.5% of participants endorsed the immoral act, and in the scenario involving selling a used television in 'as-new' condition, 18.8% of participants selected the immoral behavior. To analyze participants' overall moral action, a moral action score was derived by summing participants'

responses to the three business-related moral dilemmas, with higher scores indicative of greater immoral behavior ($\alpha = .41$). See Table 2.

Given participants' level of confidence in their selected course of action may have influenced their decision-making, participants' subjective confidence in their decisions was measured on a 3-point Likert-type scale. Participants' confidence ratings were then controlled for by multiplying them with their choice of behavior in each scenario (participants' moral decisions were coded as a "1" if they chose to engage in the immoral behavior and as a "-1" if they chose to engage in the moral behavior). This created a moral action index ranging from -3 (extremely confident the participant would engage in moral behavior) to 3 (extremely confident the participant would engage in immoral behavior). These multiplied scores were then summed to derive a moral action index score ($\alpha = .28$), with higher scores indicative of greater confidence of engagement in the immoral behavior. See Table 2.

Although participants were asked questions pertaining to moral action in the three scenarios without a moral dilemma, the questions were included to maintain the continuity of the study's survey and to limit differentiation between the moral and non-moral dilemmas. Responses were not relevant to study hypotheses, and thus, were not included in analyses.

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16). The BIDR-16 (Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015) is a 16-item measure of response style that indicates the likelihood participants responded honestly on self-report measures. The instrument consists of two subscales: the Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale and the Impression Management subscale. A BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score was derived by summing the eight items on the Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale ($\alpha = .56$), and an Impression Management score was derived by summing the eight items on the Impression Management subscale ($\alpha =$

.59). The 11 participants whose Self-Deceptive Enhancement score ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 2.06$) and/or Impression Management score ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 2.09$) was two standard deviations above the mean were removed from analyses.

Differences between community members and MBA student samples. After excluding 11 participants with invalid data as determined by the BIDR-16, the study sample consisted of 13 MBA students and 88 businesspeople from the community. Statistical analyses were completed to determine if there were significant differences in psychopathic traits between the two groups of participants.

Boldness. To determine if there were significant differences in TriPM boldness scores between MBA students and community members, an independent-samples t-test was completed. TriPM boldness scores were normally distributed among MBA students and community members, as assessed by a Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$), and there was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances ($p = .646$). Although there were two outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot, tests run both and without the outliers produced similar results. Thus, the outliers were included in the analysis, which indicated there were no significant differences in TriPM boldness scores between MBA students ($M = 32.69$, $SD = 7.00$) and community members ($M = 35.82$, $SD = 9.19$), $M = -3.13$, 95% CI [-7.88, 1.62], $t(99) = -1.31$, $p = .19$.

Meanness. To determine if there were significant differences in TriPM meanness scores between MBA students and community members, a second independent-samples t-test was completed. There was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances ($p = .347$), and there were no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. While TriPM meanness scores were normally distributed among MBA students, as

assessed by a Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$), TriPM meanness scores were not normally distributed among community members ($p < .001$). Because t-tests are fairly robust to deviations from normality (Pallant, 2013), and the sample size was relatively large, the t-test was still completed. There were no significant differences in TriPM meanness scores between MBA students ($M = 13.85$, $SD = 5.93$) and community members ($M = 10.57$, $SD = 6.36$), $M = 3.28$, 95% CI [-.45, 7.00], $t(97) = 1.75$, $p = .08$.

Disinhibition. To determine if there were significant differences in TriPM disinhibition scores between MBA students and community members, a Welch t-test was completed. A Welch t-test was necessary considering the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances ($p = .02$). Although there was one outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot, tests run both with and without the outlier produced similar results. Thus, the outlier was included in the analysis. TriPM disinhibition scores were normally distributed among MBA students, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$), but TriPM disinhibition scores were not normally distributed among community members ($p = .001$). However, as t-tests are fairly robust to deviations from normality (Pallant, 2013), and the sample size was relatively large, the Welch t-test was still completed. The analysis indicated TriPM disinhibition scores were significantly higher in community members ($M = 13.21$, $SD = 6.99$) than in MBA students ($M = 9.77$, $SD = 4.09$), $M = -3.44$, 95% CI [-6.24, -.64], $t(24.15) = -2.53$, $p = .018$.

Control Variables To determine whether demographic variables needed to be entered as control variables in study analyses, correlational analyses assessed the association between TriPM scores and age, gender, race, political affiliation, religious affiliation, income, years of work experience, and whether or not the participant held a supervisory role at work. There was a

moderate relationship between TriPM boldness scores and gender, $r(101) = -.31, p = .002$, such that men had significantly higher TriPM boldness scores ($M = 37.39, SD = 6.94$) than women ($M = 32.28, SD = 8.84$). In addition, there was a small correlation between TriPM boldness scores and whether participants held supervisory roles at their current jobs, $r(91) = -.25, p = .019$, such that participants holding supervisory roles had higher TriPM boldness scores ($M = 37.30, SD = 7.15$) than participants who did not hold supervisory roles ($M = 33.20, SD = 9.12$). No other significant relationships between TriPM scores and demographic variables were found. Because significant relationships were found between TriPM boldness scores, gender, and whether or not the participant held a supervisory role at their job (supervisory role), gender and supervisory role were entered as control variables in all analyses. In addition, as TriPM disinhibition scores were significantly higher in community members than in MBA students, employment status was included as a control variable in all analyses.

To determine whether participants' response styles needed to be entered as control variables in study analyses, correlational analyses were completed to assess the association between TriPM scores and BIDR-16 subscale scores. There was a moderate, positive correlation between TriPM boldness scores and BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale scores, $r(95) = .43, p < .001$, and a small negative correlation between TriPM meanness scores and BIDR-16 Impression Management subscale scores, $r(94) = -.27, p = .008$. In addition, TriPM disinhibition scores were negatively correlated with BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale scores, $r(94) = -.22, p = .035$, and BIDR-16 Impression Management subscale scores, $r(95) = -.31, p = .003$. Due to these significant relationships, BIDR-16 subscale scores were controlled for in all statistical analyses.

Correlational analyses were also completed to assess the relationship between demographic variables and moral decision-making. Although prior studies found age, gender, political affiliation, religious affiliation, and work experience to be predictive of moral decision-making (Christensen, Cote, & Latham, 2016; Herington & Weaven, 2008; Ho, Yi-Hui, 2010; Tatum, Foubert, Fuqua, & Ray, 2013; Vitton & Wasonga, 2009), no such relationships were found between these variables and moral awareness, moral judgment, moral intention, or moral action. Therefore, to maintain parsimony in the regression models, age, political affiliation, religious affiliation, and work experience were not included as control variables in analyses.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Awareness

A hierarchical regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced moral awareness, as measured by participants' moral awareness scores. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations. For the hierarchical regression analysis, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score, BIDR-16 Impression Management score) were entered into the model's first block, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

The full model accounted for 10.7% ($R^2 = .107$) of the variance in participants' moral awareness scores and was not significant, $F(8, 74) = 1.11, p = .369$. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = 1.14, p = .338, R^2 \text{ change} = .041$. Consistent with hypotheses, neither TriPM boldness, meanness, nor disinhibition scores were individually predictive of moral awareness. See Table 4.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Judgment

Moral judgment ratings. To determine whether psychopathic traits influenced moral judgment, as reflected by participants' moral judgment rating scores, a series of regression analyses were performed. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations. For each hierarchical regression analysis, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score, BIDR-16 Impression Management score) were entered into the model's first block, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

First, a hierarchical regression analysis assessed whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Personal Interest schema of moral judgment. The full model accounted for 21.5% ($R^2 = .215$) of the variance in participants' Personal Interest moral judgment rating scores and was statistically significant, $F(8, 73) = 2.50, p = .018$. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 73) = .68, p = .568, R^2 \text{ change} = .022$. Although the full model was significant, the only significant predictor of Personal Interest moral judgment rating scores was BIDR-16 Impression Management scores, $t = -3.11, p = .003$, such that higher BIDR-16 Impression Management scores were associated with lower Personal Interest moral judgment rating scores, $\beta = -.41$. No TriPM score was individually predictive of the Personal Interest schema of moral judgment. See Table 5.

Next, a hierarchical regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Maintaining Norms schema of moral judgment. The full model was not significant, $F(8, 73) = 1.27, p = .275$; it accounted for 12.2% ($R^2 = .122$) of the variance in Maintaining Norms moral judgment rating scores. The addition of TriPM scores to the

original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 73) = 1.32, p = .275, R^2 \text{ change} = .048$. No TriPM score was individually predictive of the Maintaining Norms schema of moral judgment. See Table 6.

Lastly, a hierarchical regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Postconventional schema of moral judgment. The full regression model accounted for 13.9% ($R^2 = .139$) of the variance in Postconventional moral judgment rating scores and was not significant, $F(8, 73) = 1.47, p = .184$. The inclusion of TriPM scores did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 73) = 1.65, p = .185, R^2 \text{ change} = .058$. Inconsistent with the findings of Marshall, Watts, Frankel, and Lilienfeld (2017), no TriPM score was individually predictive of the Postconventional schema of moral judgment. See Table 7.

Moral judgment rankings. To determine whether psychopathic traits influenced moral judgment, as reflected by participants' moral judgment ranking scores, a second series of regression analyses was performed. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations. As in prior analyses, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score, BIDR-16 Impression Management score) were entered into the first block of each model, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

First, to assess whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Personal Interest schema of moral judgment, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed. The full model was not significant, $F(8, 74) = .81, p = .595$; it accounted for 8.1% ($R^2 = .081$) of the variance in participants' Personal Interest moral judgment ranking scores. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant

increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = .09, p = .967, R^2 \text{ change} = .003$. Consistent with analyses using rating scores, analyses utilizing ranking scores indicated TriPM scores were not predictive of the Personal Interest schema of moral judgment. See Table 8.

Next, a hierarchical regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Maintaining Norms schema of moral judgment. The full model accounted for 8.6% ($R^2 = .086$) of the variance in Maintaining Norms moral judgment ranking scores and was not significant, $F(8, 74) = .87, p = .544$. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = .51, p = .676, R^2 \text{ change} = .019$. As in prior analyses using rating scores, no TriPM score individually predicted the Maintaining Norms schema of moral judgment. See Table 9.

Lastly, to determine whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Postconventional schema of moral judgment, a hierarchical regression analysis was completed. The full regression model was not significant, $F(8, 74) = .28, p = .971$, accounting for 2.9% ($R^2 = .029$) of the variance in Postconventional moral judgment ranking scores. Incorporating TriPM scores did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = .41, p = .746, R^2 \text{ change} = .016$. Inconsistent with the findings of Marshall, Watts, Frankel, and Lilienfeld (2017), no TriPM score was individually predictive of the Postconventional schema of moral judgment. See Table 10.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Intention

A series of regression analyses were performed to determine whether psychopathic traits influenced moral intention, as reflected by participants' moral intention scores. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption

violations. For each hierarchical regression analysis, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement scores, BIDR-16 Impression Management scores) were entered into the model's first block, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

First, a hierarchical regression analysis assessed whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Personal Interest schema during the moral intention phase of moral decision-making. The full model was not significant, $F(8, 62) = .10, p = .999$; it accounted for 1.3% ($R^2 = .013$) of the variance in participants' Personal Interest moral intention scores. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 62) = .18, p = .908, R^2 \text{ change} = .009$. No TriPM score was individually predictive of participants' endorsement of the Personal Interest schema during the moral intention process of moral decision-making. See Table 11.

Next, a hierarchical regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Maintaining Norms schema during the moral intention process of moral decision-making. The full model accounted for 5.1% ($R^2 = .051$) of the variance in Maintaining Norms moral intention scores and was not significant, $F(8, 62) = .41, p = .909$. The inclusion of TriPM scores did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 62) = .81, p = .493, R^2 \text{ change} = .037$. As with the Personal Interest schema, no TriPM score was individually predictive of participants' endorsement of the Maintaining Norms schema. See Table 12.

Finally, a hierarchical regression analysis determined whether psychopathic traits influenced participants' endorsement of the Postconventional schema during the moral intention process of moral decision-making. The full model was not significant, $F(8, 62) = .631, p = .749$;

it accounted for 7.5% ($R^2 = .075$) of the variance in Postconventional moral intention scores.

The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 62) = .55, p = .652, R^2 \text{ change} = .025$.

Inconsistent with study hypotheses, no TriPM score was individually predictive of participants' endorsement of the Postconventional schema during the moral intention process of moral decision-making. See Table 13.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Action

To determine whether psychopathic traits influenced moral action, a pair of regression analyses was performed. The first regression analysis investigated whether TriPM scores influenced moral action scores. The second regression analysis determined whether TriPM scores predicted moral action index scores. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations for either procedure. For each hierarchical regression analysis, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score, BIDR-16 Impression Management score) were entered into the model's first block, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

Moral action scores. The full model was significant, $F(8, 74) = 2.14, p = .042$, accounting for 18.8% ($R^2 = .188$) of the variance in moral action scores. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = .74, p = .529, R^2 \text{ change} = .024$. Although the full model was significant, the only significant predictor of moral action scores was gender, $t = -2.39, p = .020$, such that men were significantly more likely to engage in immoral behavior than women, $\beta = -.29$. Inconsistent with hypotheses, TriPM scores were not individually predictive of moral action. See Table 14.

Moral action index scores. The full model accounted for 17.7% ($R^2 = .177$) of the variance in moral action index scores and was not significant, $F(8, 74) = 1.99, p = .059$. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = .73, p = .538, R^2 \text{ change} = .024$. Inconsistent with hypotheses, TriPM scores were not individually predictive of moral action after controlling for confidence. See Table 15.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Disengagement

A regression analysis examined whether psychopathic traits influenced moral disengagement, as measured by PMDS scores. Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations. For the hierarchical regression analysis, control variables (i.e., employment status, gender, supervisory role, BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement score, BIDR-16 Impression Management score) were entered into the model's first block, and TriPM scores were entered into the second block.

The full regression model was significant, $F(8, 74) = 4.53, p < .001$, accounting for 32.8% ($R^2 = .328$) of the variance in PMDS scores. The addition of TriPM scores to the original model, containing control variables, led to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(3, 74) = 3.15, p = .030, R^2 \text{ change} = .086$. Supportive of study hypotheses, TriPM meanness scores predicted higher levels of moral disengagement, $t = 1.93, p = .048, \beta = .22$. Also consistent with hypotheses, TriPM boldness and disinhibition scores were not individually predictive of moral disengagement. See Table 16.

Exploratory Analyses

Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making and moral disengagement. To explore the relationship between moral disengagement and the four psychological processes of outlined

in Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making, exploratory regression analyses were performed. Because preliminary analyses indicated age, gender, political affiliation, religious affiliation, and work experience were not predictive of moral decision-making, these variables were not included as control variables. There were no violations of normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumptions.

First, a linear regression analysis examined whether moral disengagement predicted moral awareness. The regression model was not significant, $F(1, 95) = .572, p = .451$; PMDS scores accounted for .6% ($R^2 = .006$) of the variance in moral awareness scores. Next, a regression analysis assessed whether moral disengagement influenced Postconventional moral judgment rating scores. PMDS scores accounted for 0% ($R^2 = .000$) of the variance in Postconventional moral judgment rating scores; moral disengagement did not significantly predict endorsement of the Postconventional schema of moral development, $F(1, 95) = .015, p = .903$.

A regression analysis assessing whether moral disengagement predicted Postconventional moral intention scores was then performed. The regression model was not significant, $F(1, 82) = 2.33, p = .131$; it accounted for 2.8% ($R^2 = .028$) of the variance in participants' endorsement of the Postconventional schema during the moral intention process of moral decision-making. Lastly, to determine whether moral disengagement predicted moral action, a fourth hierarchical regression analysis was performed. The regression model accounted for 5.9% ($R^2 = .059$) of the variance in moral action scores and was significant, $F(1, 96) = 5.99, p = .016$.

Moral disengagement and psychopathic traits. To further investigate the relationship between moral disengagement and psychopathic traits, regression analyses examined whether moral disengagement, as measured by PMDS scores, was predictive of psychopathic traits.

Preliminary analyses revealed no normality, linearity, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity assumption violations. For each hierarchical regression analysis, age, employment status, supervisory role, and work experience were entered into the model's first block as control variables. (Each variable had a significant relationship with PMDS scores.) PMDS scores were entered into the second block of each model.

First, a hierarchical regression analysis examined whether moral disengagement influenced TriPM boldness scores. The full regression model was not significant, $F(6, 68) = 1.23, p = .300$; it accounted for 9.8% ($R^2 = .098$) of the variance in TriPM boldness scores. The addition of PMDS scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(1, 68) = .004, p = .951, R^2 \text{ change} = .000$. PMDS scores were not individually predictive of TriPM boldness scores, $t = .06, p = .951, \beta = .01$.

Next, a hierarchical regression analysis assessed whether moral disengagement influenced TriPM meanness scores. The full regression model accounted for 16.9% ($R^2 = .169$) of the variance in TriPM meanness scores and was significant, $F(6, 66) = 2.24, p = .050$. The addition of PMDS scores to the original model, containing control variables, led to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(1, 66) = 8.00, p = .006, R^2 \text{ change} = .101$. PMDS scores were individually predictive of TriPM meanness scores, $t = 2.83, p = .006$, such that higher PMDS scores predicted higher TriPM meanness scores, $\beta = .35$.

Lastly, to determine whether moral disengagement predicted TriPM disinhibition scores, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed. The full regression model was not significant, $F(6, 67) = 1.93, p = .089$, accounting for 14.7% ($R^2 = .147$) of the variance in TriPM disinhibition scores. The addition of PMDS scores to the original model, containing control variables, did not lead to a significant increase in explained variance, $F(1, 67) = 2.09, p = .153$,

R^2 change = .027. PMDS scores were not individually predictive of TriPM disinhibition scores, $t = 1.44$, $p = .153$, $\beta = .18$.

Inside information moral dilemma. As there was considerably more variability in participants' moral action scores in the inside information moral dilemma, multiple one-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine if there were significant differences in psychopathic traits between participants who indicated they would engage in the moral action and participants who indicated they would engage in the immoral action in that scenario. Preliminary analyses indicated that, for each ANOVA procedure, no outliers were present, and the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variances were not violated.

In regard to TriPM boldness scores, no significant differences were observed between participants who indicated they would engage in the moral action ($M = 36.48$, $SD = 7.93$) and participants who indicated they would engage in the immoral action ($M = 34.96$, $SD = 7.89$), $F(1, 97) = .91$, $p = .342$, $\eta^2 = .009$.

Similar results were found in regard to TriPM meanness scores; no significant differences were observed between participants who indicated they would engage in the moral behavior ($M = 11.32$, $SD = 7.26$) and participants who indicated they would engage in the immoral behavior ($M = 10.68$, $SD = 5.61$), $F(1, 95) = .24$, $p = .628$, $\eta^2 = .002$.

However, in regard to TriPM disinhibition, participants who indicated they would engage in the moral action ($M = 10.55$, $SD = 4.66$) had significantly lower TriPM disinhibition scores than participants who indicated they would engage in the immoral action ($M = 14.59$, $SD = 7.71$), $F(1, 96) = 9.16$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .087$.

CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION

In 2002, Robert Hare declared, “Not all psychopaths are in prison. Some are in the boardroom” (as cited in Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010). While psychopathy was traditionally studied in criminal populations, the recent rise in corporate scandal has led to increased attention on the study of psychopathy in the workplace. Scholars theorize the distinct personality traits associated with psychopathy, such as remorselessness, irresponsibility, and egocentricity, contribute to impaired moral decision-making in the workplace, ultimately having a detrimental effect on the business’s ethical climate (Boddy, 2013, 2016a; Boddy, Ladyshevsky, & Galvin, 2010). However, scientific support for this theory is scant. The present study, and its examination of the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision-making in the workplace, provided limited support for the notion that psychopathic traits significantly contribute to immoral decision-making in a business setting.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Awareness

A wide array of studies demonstrate the relationship between psychopathy and immoral behavior. Studies illustrate the association between psychopathic traits and relatively minor transgressions, such as workplace bullying (Boddy, 2011, 2014) and behavioral deviance (Coffey, Cox, & Kopkin, 2018), as well as significant wrongdoing, such as violent and nonviolent crime (Leistico et al., 2008; Ragatz, Fremouw, & Baker, 2014). One explanation for the relationship between psychopathy and antisocial behavior is individuals with psychopathic traits do not know what behaviors society considers immoral, resulting in their heightened tendency to engage in immoral behavior (Blair, 1995, 1997). However, recent studies suggest no

relationship between psychopathic traits and the ability to identify the moral salience of a situation (Aharoni, Sinnott-Armong, & Kiehl 2012, 2014; c.f., Valentine, Hanson, & Fleischman, 2017). Consistent with the findings of Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2012, 2014) and in support of study hypotheses, psychopathic traits did not predict moral awareness in the present study. More specifically, neither TriPM boldness, meanness, nor disinhibition scores predicted participants' ability to identify whether a workplace scenario contained a moral dilemma.

The null finding may be explained by the specific characterological traits captured by the psychopathy construct. While these characteristics may explain why an individual elects to engage in immoral behavior, they may not explain the individual's inability to recognize the moral context of a situation. Consider the Triarchic domain meanness, which is characterized by cold-heartedness and a lack of empathy (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). Although these traits may contribute to an individual's propensity to consider their own needs before those of others, thus increasing their likelihood to engage in self-serving, immoral acts, these traits may not relate to their factual understanding of what behavior society constitutes as immoral. Rather, individuals with psychopathic traits may know what behaviors are moral, but elect to engage in immoral behavior anyway, prioritizing their own needs over the harm their actions may cause others. This theory garners some support from behavioral studies, which found a divergence between moral awareness and action in moral decision-making tasks (Kurzban, DeScioli, & Fein, 2012; Tassy et al., 2013). Tassy et al. (2012) also found neural disruption before exposure to a moral dilemma alters a person's moral awareness, but not their moral action. Moreover, brain imaging studies found individuals with psychopathic traits demonstrated aberrant activity in areas of the brain associated with socioemotional processing and reward and punishment when responding to moral dilemmas (Rommel & Glenn, 2015; Poepl et al., 2018).

In support of the proposition that psychopathy is unrelated to moral awareness, Maxwell and Sage (2009) asserted psychopaths do not demonstrate impairment in the psychological functions necessary to identifying moral dilemmas. The authors explained that, in order to recognize a scenario as a moral dilemma, an individual has to be able to identify the morally salient aspects of the situation and understand the potential effects their behavior may have on others. Maxwell and Sage (2009) argued individuals with psychopathic traits do not demonstrate deficiencies in either ability, discussing the null relationship between psychopathy and performance on moral/conventional transgressions tasks and their lack of impairment in perspective-taking abilities. The authors concluded, “Psychopaths, rather than showing evidence of impaired moral-sensitivity, are morally sensitive in the operative sense of being able to perceive a situation’s morally salient aspects, recognize moral dilemmas, and gain insight into the effects that actions can have on human welfare” (Maxwell & Sage, 2009, p. 82).

However, the present study’s null findings may also relate to the use of moral dilemmas specific to the workplace. Studies have found that organizational factors, such as a business’s ethical climate and emphasis on reward and punishment, can contribute to ethical decision-making (Lehnert, Park, & Singh, 2015; Peterson, 2002; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). For example, if a business has a low emphasis on ethical conduct and a high emphasis on performance, employees may perceive behavior - typically viewed by society as immoral – as acceptable, as long as it contributes to positive work performance.

Consider the Wells Fargo scandal of 2016, in which the banking company opened an estimated 3.5 million banking and credit card accounts without client authorization (Egan, 2018; McLean, 2017). Over 5,300 employees were implicated in the scandal, and many attributed the widespread fraudulence to the company’s strict sales quotas. Employees indicated they had to

engage in fraudulent behavior to meet increasingly higher quotas, and if not, risk getting fired (Egan, 2018; McLean, 2017). According to one employee, “It was normal business practices to use false identification on accounts and to change customers’ names and open new accounts” (McLean, 2017, para. 29). The employee further stated, “Management made it clear that no employee was allowed to complain about the unethical practices that were going on within the branch” (McLean, 2017, para. 29).

Thus, it is possible moral awareness is largely influenced by the context (i.e., behavioral norms of the setting) of the moral dilemma. To better understand the relationship between psychopathy and moral awareness, both generally and specifically in relation to the workplace, future studies should examine whether moral awareness differs depending on the context of the scenario.

Yet, the non-significant relationship between psychopathy and moral awareness must be viewed with caution, as moral awareness scores exhibited limited variability ($SD = .75$), which may have precluded significant relationships from emerging. In addition, the items assessing moral awareness demonstrated low internal consistency ($\alpha = .21$). The poor internal consistency may be related to a variety of factors, including poor measurement of the construct, the length of the scale ($n = 3$), or the complexity of the moral awareness construct (*see Limitations and Future Directions subsection*). Replication of the study’s findings will be necessary to further validate the null relationship between psychopathy and moral awareness in the workplace.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Judgment

The present study’s exploratory analyses were not indicative of a relationship between psychopathic traits and moral judgment. As with moral action, neither TriPM boldness, meanness, nor disinhibition scores were related to moral judgment scores. These results suggest

higher levels of psychopathic traits are not associated with impairments in moral judgment (i.e., greater endorsement of the Personal Interest schema of moral development and/or lower endorsement of the Postconventional schema of moral development).

These results are incongruent with the theory that the distinctive characterological traits associated with psychopathy (e.g., egocentricity, irresponsibility, lack of empathy and remorse) are related to lower levels of moral development (Campbell et al., 2009; O'Kane, Fawcett, & Blackburn, 1996). Campbell et al. (2009) hypothesized that, due to their pronounced self-interest, individuals with psychopathic traits will not prioritize abstract moral principles, such as the need to consider the impact of their behavior on society, when making moral decisions. In support of their hypothesis, Campbell and colleagues (2009) found psychopathic traits were associated with higher Personal Interest moral judgment scores and lower Postconventional moral judgment scores.

Rather, the present study's null findings are consistent with the findings of a recent meta-analysis of 23 studies on the relationship between psychopathy and moral judgment. Marshall, Watts, and Lilienfeld (2016) found psychopathy demonstrated a significant, albeit small, negative association with the Postconventional schema of moral development and a positive relationship with the Personal Interest schema of moral development. Due to the small effect sizes, the authors concluded their results "provided evidence against the view that psychopathic individuals possess a pronounced and overarching deficit [in moral judgment]," and "...the null hypothesis that psychopathic individuals do not possess a pervasive deficit in moral decision making is at present difficult to exclude" (Marshall, Watts, & Lilienfeld, 2016, p. 8).

Due to concerns about assessing psychopathy as a unitary construct, other studies examined whether the different factors, or domains, of psychopathy had distinct relationships

with moral judgment. The findings of Marshall et al. (2017) indicated boldness and meanness were negatively correlated with the Postconventional schema of moral development, while the results of Heinze et al. (2010) suggested a relationship between disinhibition and lower endorsement of the Postconventional schema of moral development. However, due to small to medium effect sizes, Marshall et al. (2017) stated their findings “call into question the view that psychopathy is linked to profound moral reasoning deficits” (p. 243).

Consistent with the assertion of Marshall and colleagues (2017), the present study’s exploratory analyses suggest psychopathy may not be associated with impairments in moral development, but a failure to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues. In other words, deficits are in moral intention rather than in moral judgment. This notion is congruent with the theory that moral decision-making is influenced by both cognitive and emotional processes (Haidt, 2001). While the emotional aspects of moral decision-making (i.e., those that evoke an appreciation for others’ feelings and guide behavior) may be impaired, the cognitive component, which guides the understanding of the world and its social schema, may remain intact.

The present study’s null findings may also be explained by the use of workplace moral dilemmas. Unlike in prior studies on moral judgment, the current study exposed businesspeople to moral dilemmas they are likely to face at some point in their careers. Previous studies relied on extreme situations, such as the classic dilemma in which an individual must decide whether to steal food to feed his family, which did not pertain to moral decision-making in the workplace. The use of workplace moral dilemmas may have permitted a more valid examination of the relationship between psychopathy and moral judgment in a business setting.

Relatedly, it is also possible the absence of a relationship between psychopathic traits and moral judgment is due to organizational factors. As discussed in regard to moral awareness, a

business' ethical climate may influence how individuals assess moral situations (Lehnert, Park, & Singh, 2015; Peterson, 2002; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). For instance, if a business tends to reward employees who have the largest sales commissions, employees may become more focused on concerns pertaining to the Personal Interests schema of moral decision-making, with its emphasis on personal reward and punishment. Future studies should assess whether contextual factors significantly contribute to businesspeople's moral judgment and whether psychopathic traits mediate and/or moderate this relationship.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Intention

A multitude of studies found psychopathy, specifically meanness, predicted participants' willingness to engage in immoral behavior in the workplace (Lingnau, Fuchs, & Dehne-Niemann, 2017; Neo et al., 2012; Watson, Teaque, & Papamarcos, 2017). However, the studies' conceptualizations of moral intention were not congruent with moral intention as defined in Rest's moral decision-making model. Rest (1986) conceptualized moral intention as the process in which individuals prioritize moral values over competing factors, such as money or recognition. The aforementioned studies did not examine whether competing factors influenced participants' willingness to engage in immoral behavior. In the only known study of the relationship between psychopathy and moral intention as theorized by Rest, Glenn et al. (2009) found psychopathic traits predicted a person's willingness to accept money to violate their moral values.

Contrary to hypotheses and inconsistent with the findings of Glenn et al. (2009), the present data suggest no relationship between psychopathy and moral intention in the workplace. Moral intention was not predicted by TriPM boldness, meanness, or disinhibition scores. These findings are inconsistent with theories that predict a relationship between moral intention and

psychopathy. For example, Maxwell and Sage (2009) asserted individuals with psychopathic traits may prioritize their needs over those of others, causing them to disregard moral values in favor of more selfish considerations. Consistent with this notion, Glenn et al. (2009) proposed weakened moral intention in individuals with psychopathic traits may be due to an increased sensitivity to reward (i.e., competing factors such as money or recognition) and reduced sensitivity to punishment (i.e., consequences of immoral behavior).

Inconsistent findings may be due to the current study's low internal consistency for the items operationalizing moral intention (Personal Interest moral intention score $\alpha = .20$; Maintaining Norm moral intention score $\alpha = .59$; Postconventional moral intention score $\alpha = .48$). Similar to the scale assessing moral awareness, the poor reliability of the moral intention scales may be related to the scale's validity, the scale's length ($n = 3$), or to the complexity of the moral intention construct (*see Limitations and Future Directions subsection*). Regardless of the cause, the inadequate reliability may have disguised relationships between psychopathic traits and moral intention.

However, it is also possible psychopathy is unrelated to moral intention in the workplace. As previously discussed, organizational factors, such a business's ethical climate and emphasis on reward and punishment, can significantly contribute to ethical decision-making (Lehnert, Park, & Singh, 2015; Peterson, 2002; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). As these factors were unexamined in the current study, it is possible they explain a significant proportion of the variance in moral intention. Yet, previous studies on moral decision-making in the workplace demonstrated significant relationships between psychopathy and moral intention (Lingnau, Fuchs, & Dehne-Niemann, 2017; Neo et al., 2012; Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2012; Watson, Teaque, & Papamarcos, 2017). Replication of the present study's findings will be

necessary to better understanding the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral intention in a business setting.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Action

An ample amount of research demonstrates the association between psychopathy and immoral behavior. For example, studies demonstrate the association between psychopathic traits and violence (Blais, Solodukhin, & Forth, 2014), criminality (Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008), and behavioral deviance (Coffey, Cox, and Kopkin, 2018). Research also indicates psychopathy is associated with immoral behavior specific to business settings, such as workplace bullying (Boddy, 2014) and unfair workplace supervision (Boddy, 2011; Mathieu & Babiak, 2016). In addition, case studies link psychopathic traits with white-collar crime, such as fraud, embezzlement, and insider trading (Babiak & Hare, 2006; Boddy, 2015, 2016b). Scholars theorize psychopaths' antisocial tendencies are due to deficits in empathy, decreased sensitivity to punishment, and increased sensitivity to immediate gratification (Venables, Hall, & Patrick, 2014).

However, inconsistent with previous research and study hypotheses, the current study did not find an association between psychopathic traits and moral action. Neither TriPM boldness, meanness, nor disinhibition scores predicted moral action, as measured by both moral action scores and moral action index scores. In other words, higher levels of psychopathic traits were not related to an increased likelihood to engage in immoral behavior. These incongruent findings may be due to low internal consistency among items reflecting moral action (moral action score $\alpha = .41$; moral action index score $\alpha = .28$). Similar to moral awareness and intention, the poor reliability may have precluded a relationship between psychopathy and moral action from being observed (*see Limitations and Future Directions subsection*).

It is also plausible the study's method of operationalizing moral action contributed to the null results. Although participants explicitly indicated whether they would engage in the immoral action presented in the vignette, they were not directly exposed to the moral dilemma or given the opportunity to engage in the moral or immoral behavior. Because it is possible the impulsivity and emotional deficits associated with psychopathy are most discernable when there is a pressure to respond quickly (Kiehl, 2007), individuals with psychopathic traits may have responded similarly to those without psychopathic traits in the current study.

It is also possible the incongruent findings are due to the growing prevalence of immoral behavior in the workplace (Verschoor, 2012). According to a national survey of business ethics, 45% of employees have observed misconduct in the workplace, and 13% have perceived pressure to violate their company's ethical standards or to break the law (Ethics Resource Center, 2011). In addition, 42% of employees reported their companies have a weak ethical culture (Ethics Resource Center, 2011). Consistent with these findings, over 50% of participants in the current study indicated they would use inside information to undercut the bid of a competitor. Given the increased prevalence of immoral workplace behavior, and the significant influence organizational factors can have on workplace moral decision-making (Peterson, 2002), immoral workplace behavior may largely be due to contextual, rather than individual, factors. However, additional research on the influence of organizational factors on moral decision-making, and whether psychopathic traits contribute to this relationship, is necessary to test this hypothesis.

Another explanation for the present findings is related to the relationship between moral disengagement and immoral behavior in the workplace. Previous studies found moral disengagement predicted immoral workplace behavior (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Knoll et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2012). Furthermore, Moore et al. (2012) demonstrated the predictive

validity of moral disengagement beyond the explanatory power of other individual factors, such as Machiavellianism, moral identity, and empathy. Consistent with prior research, the current study found moral disengagement predicted immoral action. Therefore, it is possible moral disengagement, rather than psychopathic traits, accounts for a significant proportion of the variance in moral action. Additional research is necessary to assess this possibility.

Psychopathic Traits and Moral Disengagement

While research on the relationship between psychopathy and moral disengagement is limited, multiple studies indicated psychopathy's affective traits (e.g., lack of empathy, remorselessness) are positively related to moral disengagement (DeLisi et al., 2014; Egan, Hughes, & Palmer, 2015; Risser & Eckert, 2016; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, & Fagan, 2011). Consistent with study hypotheses and previous findings, TriPM meanness predicted moral disengagement in the present study. Specifically, individuals with higher TriPM meanness scores were more likely to score high on the PMDS, a measure of a person's tendency to morally disengage.

While the effect size was small in magnitude, the present findings are congruent with research on the relationship between empathy, a personality trait captured within the Triarchic domain meanness, and moral disengagement. Multiple studies found empathy is negatively related to moral disengagement (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Hyde, Shaw, & Moilanen, 2009; Moore et al. 2012). Empathy is the degree to which a person acknowledges, understands, and cares about the feelings, thoughts, and experiences of others (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Detert, Trevino, and Sweitzer (2008) proposed empathy is negatively related to moral disengagement as "individuals high on empathy are more likely to vicariously experience the feelings of others and to be concerned about those other's needs" (p. 376). The

authors indicated this concern for others makes it difficult to dehumanize the victims of immoral behavior (i.e., reframing the role of the victim) and to minimize the harm their immoral acts causes others (i.e., reframing the consequences of one's immoral behavior; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008).

The role of empathy in morality is congruent with Rest's 1986 model of moral decision-making. Rest (1986) stressed the importance of empathy, stating it motivates people to engage in moral behavior so they do not cause others, and themselves, distress. Similarly, Bok (1998) concluded empathy forms the "very basis of morality... Without some rudimentary perception of the needs and feelings of others, there can be no beginnings of felt responsibility toward them" (p. 70). Consistent with Bok's assertion, Stevens, Deuling, and Armenakis (2012) found moral disengagement mediated the relationship between psychopathic traits and unethical behavior in the workplace. However, as TriPM meanness scores did not directly predict moral action in the present study, future research needs to further examine the nature of the relationship between TriPM meanness, moral disengagement, and immoral behavior. In addition, the direction of the relationship between TriPM meanness and moral disengagement needs to be clarified, as exploratory analyses found each variable predicted the other.

Implications

The present study was the first to examine the association between psychopathic traits and the entirety of Rest's 1986 moral decision-making model. While a multitude of studies examined the relationship between psychopathy and a single psychological process associated with moral decision-making (e.g., moral awareness, moral judgment, utilitarian decision-making), the current study simultaneously assessed the relationship between psychopathic traits and five moral decision-making processes. The extensive investigation brought clarity to the

existing literature's varying findings on the association between psychopathy and morality. First, it provided further support for the notion that psychopathic traits are not associated with significant deficits in moral decision-making (Cima, 2010). The null findings, particularly in regard to moral awareness and judgment, suggest individuals with psychopathic traits may not be as morally compromised as has been assumed by laypersons and mental health professionals (Furnham, Daoud, & Swami, 2009). While higher levels of psychopathic traits may relate to a failure to prioritize moral concerns over competing issues, such as monetary reward and recognition, higher levels of psychopathy may not affect a person's ability to recognize the moral salience of a situation. However, the study's incongruent findings with the literature on psychopathy and moral intention and action suggest further research is necessary in those domains.

The present study's null findings also suggest moral decision-making in the workplace may be largely influenced by contextual, rather than individual, factors. While the most widely requested direction for future research in business ethics is the role of individual factors (Craft, 2013), the present study indicates these factors, specifically personality traits, may not be as integral to workplace moral decision-making as factors related to the business setting. Consistent with this notion, a plethora of research found workplace moral decision-making is significantly influenced by organizational factors, such as a business's ethical climate and its emphasis on reward and punishment (Lehnert, Park, & Singh, 2015; Peterson, 2002; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).

In addition, the present study further established the relationship between psychopathy and moral disengagement. Studies on the relationship between psychopathy and moral disengagement are scarce and have primarily investigated the role of moral disengagement as it

related to antisocial behavior (DeLisi et al., 2014; Risser & Eckert, 2016; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, & Fagan, 2011). Only one known study has investigated the relationship between psychopathy and moral disengagement in a workplace setting, finding that psychopathic traits significantly predict moral disengagement, and moral disengagement mediated the relationship between psychopathic traits and unethical behavior (Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2012). In the current study, psychopathic traits, specifically the Triarchic domain meanness, predicted moral disengagement, and moral disengagement predicted immoral behavior. Although the effects were small in magnitude, these findings provide further validity for the detrimental effect of psychopathy's affective traits in the workplace.

In regard to practical implications, a significant relationship emerged between moral disengagement and immoral workplace behavior in the present study. As this finding is consistent with prior research (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Knoll et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2012), it may be beneficial for companies to regularly provide mandatory ethics trainings to promote moral behavior in the workplace. More specifically, it may be worthwhile for organizations to investigate whether morally disengaged thinking can be mitigated through workplace trainings, and if so, provide those trainings to employees. The only known longitudinal study of moral disengagement found moral disengagement can be influenced by external factors over time (Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008), suggesting employees' tendencies to morally disengage, and any associated unethical behavior, may be lessened through these initiatives.

It may also be helpful for organizations to actively promote morally engaged thinking in the workplace. If an ethical climate is actively promoted, moral disengagement in the workplace may be less likely to go unchecked by coworkers and employers. For example, supervisors could

increase individual accountability, making the displacement or diffusion of responsibility a less valid justification for immoral behavior (Moore et al., 2012). Employers could also limit their use of positive euphemisms for immoral behavior and strengthen the relationship employees have with their coworkers, company stakeholders, and the general public to decrease the dehumanization of victims of immoral behavior (Moore et al., 2012). However, research on the effectiveness of these tactics is necessary to determine whether they would be effective in reducing moral disengagement and immoral behavior in the workplace.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although this study presents a number of important findings, these results should be considered in the context of the study's limitations. The most notable limitation lies in the low internal consistency (α 's ranging from .20 to .59) among items that operationalized three of the study's dependent variables: moral awareness, moral intention, and moral action. Measures of internal consistency assess the extent to which participants responded similarly to scale items, and a scale with poor internal consistency may not be a reliable measure of the construct it is purporting to measure (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Therefore, it is possible the poor reliability of the study's moral awareness, intention, and action scales indicates the scales were not valid measures of their respective constructs (i.e., Rest's 1986 conceptualization of moral awareness, intention, and action). However, a scale's length can influence its reliability (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011), making it plausible the scales' brevity ($n = 3$) negatively impacted their internal consistency. It is also possible the complexity of the constructs precluded scale reliability. The psychological processes of moral decision-making may be influenced by a wide array of factors that need to be identified, and controlled for, in the moral dilemmas (and related items) that comprise a scale. No matter their cause, the poor reliability estimates may have precluded a

relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision-making processes from being observed. Thus, future research should take appropriate steps to further develop and validate measures of moral decision-making in the workplace.

In addition, research should address whether the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision-making in the workplace is moderated by the context of the moral scenario. Numerous studies demonstrate the influence of contextual factors on moral behavior in the workplace (Lehnert, Park, & Singh, 2015; Peterson, 2002; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), and it is plausible the poor internal reliability of three of the study's scales was due to the multidimensionality of the scenarios. For example, it may be that the association between psychopathy and immoral workplace behavior depends on whether the scenario involves direct or indirect harm. While a person may be willing to indirectly harm customers by exaggerating a supplement's beneficial effects in an advertisement, that person may not be willing to sabotage a coworker's presentation. Consistent with this notion, a plethora of research indicates moral reasoning is influenced by a person's degree of involvement in the harm caused (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2012).

The relationship between psychopathy and moral decision-making may also depend on whether the victim of the immoral act is a friend/acquaintance, an unknown individual, or an entity (i.e., business). According to kin selection theory, people are more likely to engage in altruistic behavior when the receiver is a relative (Hamilton, 1964). For example, Rachlin and Jones (2008) examined the amount of money participants were willing to forgo in order to give \$75 to people at various social distances from them. The authors found participants' willingness to forgo a monetary reward increased as their relationship to the other individuals became

stronger. Similarly, in the current study, participants' willingness to engage in immoral behavior decreased as their relationship to the victim became closer. Specifically, 50.5% of participants indicated they would engage in an immoral act that would harm a competing business, while only 18.8% of participants stated they would engage in behavior that would harm a customer. Only 6.9% indicated they would engage in immoral behavior that would harm their assistant. Future research should address whether the degree of harm, the victim, and other contextual factors, such as the ethical climate of the workplace, moderate the association between psychopathy and moral decision-making.

Another notable limitation of the present study was the operational definition of moral action. Participants were asked to indicate whether (i.e., yes or no) they would engage in the immoral behavior presented in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were not directly exposed to moral dilemmas where they had to make moral decisions. While this methodology improved upon prior studies by differentiating between moral intention and moral action, the use of hypothetical vignettes limited the generalizability of the findings (Weber, 1992). Future research should either incorporate a questionnaire pertaining to participants' past unethical workplace behavior, utilize an experimental design, or use a more realistic simulation, such as an in-basket exercise (see Barton & Martin, 1990; Knoll et al., 2016) to bolster the external validity of the findings. The use of methodology other than self-report may also limit monomethod bias.

Another avenue for future research pertains to the relationship between psychopathic traits, moral disengagement, and the four psychological processes associated with Rest's 1986 moral decision-making model. While the current study assessed the relationship between psychopathic traits and each psychological process individually, null results precluded the performance of mediation analyses. Future research should examine whether moral

disengagement mediates the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral awareness, judgment, intention, and action. In addition, given the varying relationships between psychopathic traits and the five processes of moral decision-making examined in this study, research should examine whether the relationships between psychopathic traits and these processes are interrelated.

Conclusion

Recent estimates indicate white-collar crime costs the United States at least \$1 trillion dollars per year (Friedrichers, 2007). However, the cost of corporate maleficence is not purely financial. Immoral workplace behavior is believed to be detrimental to the ethical climate of business entities and to the public's trust in institutions and society as a whole (Ashford & Anand, 2003). As psychopathy has been implicated as a potential risk factor for immoral workplace behavior (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010; Boddy, 2011), it is not surprising that the most widely requested direction for future research in business ethics is the role of individual factors in unethical workplace behavior (Craft, 2013). The present study not only lessened the paucity of research in this area, but helped to clarify the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision-making. While the present research indicated the magnitude of the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision-making in the workplace may be smaller than originally theorized, the findings on psychopathy and moral disengagement suggest psychopaths can still be bad for business.

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Appendix A

Tables

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and DIT-2 Correlations for Piloted Moral Scenarios

Moral Scenario	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>r^a</i>
1	3.23	.93	.25**
2	3.23	.93	.25**
3	3.57	.85	.36**
4	3.63	.91	.25**
5	3.57	.84	.22**

Note. ^aCorrelations between Postconventional Moral Judgment Scores and DIT-2 Postconventional Reasoning Scores.

***p* < .01

Table 2

Psychometric Properties of Study Variables

Variable	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Range	Minimum	Maximum
TriPM						
Boldness	101	35.42	8.08	38	13	51
Meanness	99	11.00	6.37	26	1	27
Disinhibition	100	12.76	6.77	32	2	34
PMDS	101	16.20	5.33	23	8	31
Moral Awareness	97	6.54	.75	3	6	9
Moral Judgment						
Personal Interest Rating	97	17.36	4.12	21	6	27
Maintaining Norms Rating	97	18.42	3.85	21	6	27
Postconventional Rating	97	19.00	4.20	23	6	29
Personal Interest Ranking	101	25.52	17.32	89	0	89
Maintaining Norms Ranking	101	37.84	18.93	78	0	78
Postconventional Ranking	101	33.99	17.77	100	0	100
Moral Intention						
Personal Interest	84	7.52	2.15	11	4	15
Maintaining Norms	84	8.52	3.16	14	3	17
Postconventional	84	7.96	3.57	14	3	17
Moral Action						
Moral Action	98	-1.45	1.61	6	-3	3
Moral Action Index	98	-4.65	3.98	17	-9	8

Table 3

Correlations between TriPM Scales and Study Variables

Variable	Boldness	Meanness	Disinhibition
PMDS	-.15	.39**	.24*
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.43**	.09	-.22*
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.16	-.27**	-.31**
Moral Awareness	.16	-.20*	.06
Moral Judgment			
Personal Interest Rating	-.12	-.03	-.08
Maintaining Norms Rating	-.01	-.19	-.14
Postconventional Rating	.17	-.14	-.18
Personal Interest Ranking	-.01	-.07	.07
Maintaining Norms Ranking	.16	.05	.00
Postconventional Ranking	.01	.06	-.11
Moral Intention			
Personal Interest	.02	.03	-.03
Maintaining Norms	.15	.07	-.08
Postconventional	-.06	-.01	.03
Moral Action			
Moral Action	-.10	-.02	.19
Moral Action Index	-.13	-.03	.20

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on Moral Awareness

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.10	.88	.383
Gender	-.12	-1.01	.317
Supervisory Role	-.07	-.56	.576
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.04	-.31	.756
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.11	.91	.367
Model 2			
MBA Program	.08	.67	.507
Gender	-.14	-1.08	.284
Supervisory Role	-.06	-.47	.639
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.02	.17	.864
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.06	.46	.647
TriPM Boldness	.04	.26	.793
TriPM Meanness	-.21	-1.62	.110
TriPM Disinhibition	.15	1.21	.228

Table 5

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Personal Interest Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment ratings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.10	-.91	.365
Gender	.18	1.60	.114
Supervisory Role	.04	.35	.727
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.06	.56	.580
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.33	-2.79	.007**
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.09	-.79	.430
Gender	.13	1.04	.302
Supervisory Role	.05	.39	.697
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.10	.75	.455
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.41	-3.11	.003**
TriPM Boldness	-.02	-.13	.898
TriPM Meanness	-.13	-1.04	.302
TriPM Disinhibition	-.07	-.60	.553

** $p < .01$.

Table 6

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Maintaining Norms Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment ratings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.01	-.09	.930
Gender	.19	1.56	.122
Supervisory Role	.10	.79	.430
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.15	1.22	.228
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.02	.17	.869
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.01	-.12	.909
Gender	.12	.94	.352
Supervisory Role	.12	.91	.365
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.22	1.53	.131
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.08	-.60	.554
TriPM Boldness	.01	.04	.965
TriPM Meanness	-.26	-1.94	.057
TriPM Disinhibition	.02	.14	.892

Table 7

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Postconventional Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment ratings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.11	-1.00	.319
Gender	.13	1.09	.280
Supervisory Role	.04	.32	.750
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.15	1.24	.221
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.13	1.04	.300
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.13	-1.16	.251
Gender	.12	.92	.360
Supervisory Role	.11	.88	.381
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.12	.87	.390
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.07	.47	.637
TriPM Boldness	.20	1.46	.148
TriPM Meanness	-.24	-1.82	.073
TriPM Disinhibition	.08	.60	.549

Table 8

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Personal Interest Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment rankings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.08	.69	.495
Gender	.03	.27	.786
Supervisory Role	.01	.04	.969
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.20	-1.67	.098
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.12	-.96	.342
Model 2			
MBA Program	.08	.71	.480
Gender	.01	.08	.934
Supervisory Role	-.01	-.05	.964
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.17	-1.18	.243
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.14	-.97	.336
TriPM Boldness	-.05	-.38	.708
TriPM Meanness	-.02	-.13	.898
TriPM Disinhibition	-.03	-.20	.842

Table 9

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Maintaining Norms Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment rankings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.12	-1.03	.309
Gender	.07	.57	.573
Supervisory Role	-.08	-.67	.506
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.16	1.34	.183
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.10	.77	.445
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.13	-1.08	.283
Gender	.12	.95	.344
Supervisory Role	-.06	-.46	.650
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.08	.59	.557
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.15	1.04	.300
TriPM Boldness	.12	.83	.409
TriPM Meanness	.08	.59	.559
TriPM Disinhibition	.04	.32	.748

Table 10

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Postconventional Schema of Moral Judgment (as assessed by moral judgment rankings)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.04	.33	.742
Gender	-.06	-.50	.620
Supervisory Role	-.03	-.23	.822
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.07	.58	.566
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.01	-.04	.967
Model 2			
MBA Program	.05	.42	.678
Gender	-.09	-.69	.491
Supervisory Role	-.06	-.48	.636
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.12	.84	.406
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.01	-.06	.951
TriPM Boldness	-.14	-.99	.327
TriPM Meanness	.04	.26	.796
TriPM Disinhibition	-.05	-.37	.712

Table 11

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Personal Interest Schema of Moral Intention

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.02	.13	.894
Gender	.04	.26	.794
Supervisory Role	.00	-.01	.995
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.02	-.14	.893
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.06	.42	.675
Model 2			
MBA Program	.02	.18	.857
Gender	.05	.31	.757
Supervisory Role	.03	.17	.864
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.07	-.46	.649
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.05	.31	.759
TriPM Boldness	.10	.60	.552
TriPM Meanness	.01	.08	.937
TriPM Disinhibition	-.07	-.48	.635

Table 12

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Maintaining Norms Schema of Moral Intention

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.03	.26	.793
Gender	.09	.64	.524
Supervisory Role	.06	.45	.656
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.02	.17	.866
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.03	.21	.832
Model 2			
MBA Program	.03	.23	.820
Gender	.15	1.04	.303
Supervisory Role	.11	.77	.445
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.12	-.72	.472
BIDR-16 Impression Management	.07	.46	.644
TriPM Boldness	.22	1.38	.174
TriPM Meanness	.09	.56	.576
TriPM Disinhibition	-.04	-.27	.786

Table 13

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on the Postconventional Schema of Moral Intention

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	.16	1.27	.210
Gender	-.10	-.75	.457
Supervisory Role	.06	.42	.679
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.03	-.24	.810
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.11	-.80	.425
Model 2			
MBA Program	.18	1.40	.166
Gender	-.15	-1.08	.284
Supervisory Role	.02	.15	.879
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.03	.20	.840
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.15	-.98	.332
TriPM Boldness	-.14	-.88	.385
TriPM Meanness	.00	-.02	.984
TriPM Disinhibition	-.11	-.80	.427

Table 14

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on Moral Action (as assessed by moral action scores)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.19	-1.76	.083
Gender	-.28	-2.47	.016*
Supervisory Role	.12	1.01	.318
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.23	-2.06	.043*
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.15	-1.31	.195
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.21	-1.89	.062
Gender	-.29	-2.39	.020*
Supervisory Role	.08	.62	.541
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.14	-1.01	.316
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.15	-1.16	.252
TriPM Boldness	-.12	-.88	.384
TriPM Meanness	-.07	-.57	.568
TriPM Disinhibition	.15	1.25	.216

* $p < .05$.

Table 15

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on Moral Action (as assessed by moral action index scores)

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.16	-1.49	.141
Gender	-.24	-2.10	.039
Supervisory Role	.12	1.06	.290
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.24	-2.16	.034*
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.15	-1.28	.205
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.18	-1.60	.114
Gender	-.24	-1.93	.057
Supervisory Role	.07	.58	.563
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.16	-1.19	.239
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.12	-.90	.374
TriPM Boldness	-.15	-1.08	.284
TriPM Meanness	.01	.09	.928
TriPM Disinhibition	.13	1.12	.266

* $p < .05$.

Table 16

Influence of Psychopathic Traits on Moral Disengagement

Predictor	β	t	p
Model 1			
MBA Program	-.22	-2.13	.037*
Gender	-.19	-1.72	.090
Supervisory Role	.14	1.30	.196
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.19	1.82	.073
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.39	-3.47	.001**
Model 2			
MBA Program	-.24	-2.38	.020*
Gender	-.13	-1.13	.260
Supervisory Role	.06	.54	.588
BIDR-16 Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.25	2.00	.050*
BIDR-16 Impression Management	-.26	-2.16	.034
TriPM Boldness	-.20	-1.62	.110
TriPM Meanness	.22	1.93	.048*
TriPM Disinhibition	.18	1.63	.107

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Appendix B

Figures

Figure 1. Hypotheses on Psychopathic Traits and Moral Decision-Making





Figure 2. Hypotheses on Psychopathic Traits and Moral Disengagement



Appendix C

Demographics Questionnaire

- **What is your current age?**
 - *FREE RESPONSE*
- **To which gender identity do you most identify?**
 - Male
 - Female
 - Transgender
 - Gender Nonbinary
 - Other
- **Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?**
 - Yes
 - No
- **What is your racial background?**
 - White/Caucasian
 - Black/African American
 - Asian/Asian American
 - Native American/Alaska Native
 - Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander
 - Biracial/Multiracial
 - Other (*WITH FREE RESPONSE*)
- **What is your political affiliation (*if any*)?**
 - Democrat
 - Republican
 - Independent
 - Libertarian
 - Green Party
 - None
 - Other (*WITH FREE RESPONSE*)

- **What is your religious affiliation (if any)?**
 - Protestant (Non-Evangelical)
 - Protestant (Evangelical)
 - Catholic
 - Jewish
 - Muslim
 - Hindu
 - Agnostic
 - None
 - Other (*WITH FREE RESPONSE*)
- **Do you currently serve, or have you ever served, in a branch of the United States military?**
 - Yes
 - No
- **What is your current employment status?**
 - Employed Full-Time (40 or more hours/week)
 - Employed Part-Time (Less than 40 hours/week)
 - Full-Time Student
- (*if selected employed full-time or part-time employment status*)
 - **What is your current title?**
 - Associate
 - Manager
 - Director
 - Vice-President
 - President
 - Other (*WITH FREE RESPONSE*)
 - **Do you currently hold a supervisory role?**
 - Yes
 - No
- **What is your current personal income?**
 - Less than \$20,000

- \$20,000 to \$34,999
 - \$35,000 to \$49,999
 - \$50,000 to \$74,999
 - \$75,000 to \$99,999
 - Over \$100,000
- **How many years have you worked in a business-related field or setting?**
 - FREE RESPONSE*
- **What area of business do you currently work in or plan to work in? Select all that apply.**
 - Human Resources
 - Marketing/Promotion
 - Customer Service
 - Sales
 - Accounting/Finance
 - Distribution
 - Research and Development
 - Administrative/Management
 - Production
 - Operations
 - IT Support
 - Purchasing
 - Legal Department
 - Other (*WITH FREE RESPONSE*)
- **How many times have you been fired by an employer?**
 - FREE RESPONSE*
- **How many times have you quit a job without giving your employer proper notice?**
 - FREE RESPONSE*

Appendix D

Triarchic Psychopathy Measure

Instructions: This questionnaire contains statements that different people might use to describe themselves. Each statement is followed by four options: True, Somewhat True, Somewhat False, False. There are no right or wrong answers; just choose the option that best describes you.

1. I'm optimistic more often than not.
2. How other people feel is important to me.
3. I often act on immediate needs.
4. I have no strong desire to parachute out of an airplane.
5. I've often missed things I promised to attend.
6. I would enjoy being in a high-speed chase.
7. I am well-equipped to deal with stress.
8. I don't mind if someone I dislike gets hurt.
9. My impulsive decisions have caused problems with loved ones.
10. I get scared easily.
11. I sympathize with others' problems.
12. I have missed work without bothering to call in.
13. I'm a born leader.
14. I enjoy a good physical fight.
15. I jump into things without thinking.
16. I have a hard time making things turn out the way I want.
17. I return insults.
18. I've gotten in trouble because I missed too much school.
19. I have a knack for influencing people.
20. It doesn't bother me to see someone else in pain.
21. I have good control over myself.
22. I function well in new situations, even when unprepared.
23. I enjoy pushing people around sometimes.
24. I have taken money from someone's purse or wallet without asking.

25. I don't think of myself as talented.
26. I taunt people just to stir things up.
27. People often abuse my trust.
28. I'm afraid of far fewer things than most people.
29. I don't see any point in worrying if what I do hurts someone else.
30. I keep appointments I make.
31. I often get bored quickly and lose interest.
32. I can get over things that would traumatize others.
33. I am sensitive to the feelings of others.
34. I have conned people to get money from them.
35. It worries me to go into an unfamiliar situation without knowing all the details.
36. I don't have much sympathy for people.
37. I get in trouble for not considering the consequences of my actions.
38. I can convince people to do what I want.
39. For me, honesty really is the best policy.
40. I've injured people to see them in pain.
41. I don't like to take the lead in groups.
42. I sometimes insult people on purpose to get a reaction from them.
43. I have taken items from a store without paying for them.
44. It's easy to embarrass me.
45. Things are more fun if a little danger is involved.
46. I have a hard time waiting patiently for things I want.
47. I stay away from physical danger as much as I can.
48. I don't care much if what I do hurts others.
49. I have lost a friend because of irresponsible things I've done.
50. I don't stack up well against most others.
51. Others have told me they are concerned about my lack of self-control.
52. It's easy for me to relate to other people's emotions.
53. I have robbed someone.
54. I never worry about making a fool of myself with others.
55. It doesn't bother me when people around me are hurting.

56. I have had problems at work because I was irresponsible.

57. I'm not very good at influencing people.

58. I have stolen something out of a vehicle.

Appendix E

Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale

Instructions: Please use the following scale to indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree; Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree.

1. It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about.
2. Taking something without the owner's permission is okay as long as you're just borrowing it.
3. Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate your own credentials a bit.
4. People shouldn't be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing what an authority figure told them to do.
5. People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.
6. Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal.
7. Some people have to be treated roughly, because they lack feelings that can be hurt.
8. People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves.

Appendix F

Moral Decision-Making Scenarios

You are an executive in charge of research and development. Three weeks ago, your boss asked you to design a computer program to improve efficiency within your company. However, other work pressures kept you from setting aside sufficient time to complete the assignment. Meanwhile, your assistant, Taylor, shares with you a software package he developed that will address many of your boss's concerns about the company's efficiency. With several edits, Taylor's program could satisfy the objective of your own assignment. You consider making the revisions and presenting the software package as your own design to your boss.

- Do you make the revisions to Taylor's program and present the project as your own to your boss?
 - YES NO
- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO
- Rate the following in terms of importance (1 = great, 2 = much, 3 = some, 4 = little, 5 = no).
 - A) Would you be breaking the law by presenting Taylor's program as your own to your boss?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - B) Do other executives in the company present their assistants' work as their own?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - C) Will the company be negatively affected if you take credit for Taylor's work?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - D) How will your reputation in the company be affected if your boss discovers the program was Taylor's work and not your own?
 - 1 2 3 4 5

- E) Would presenting Taylor’s program as your own to your boss help you to secure the promotion you have been vying for?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
- F) If the program was developed on company time, to whom does the program belong?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
- Which of these 6 issues is the 1st most important?
 - A B C D E F
- Which of these issues is the 2nd most important?
 - A B C D E F
- Rank the following in order of importance, from most important (1) to least important (6).
 - _____Securing bargaining power for a raise
 - _____Earning a promotion
 - _____Adhering to company policy
 - _____Impressing your boss
 - _____Employees’ rights to receive credit for their work
 - _____Maintaining a positive working relationship with Taylor

You have recently joined the sales team for RHK Materials, a manufacturer of wooden construction materials. When contractors issue requests for bids for a bill of the materials required to complete a construction project, it is your job to develop RHK Material’s bid. Upon completion of a bid for Grissom Construction, a large contractor, your supervisor comes into your office and hands you two brown envelopes. Your supervisor tells you the envelopes contain bids from two of RHK Material’s main competitors; he has just received them from their “inside man” at Grissom Construction. He instructs you to underbid the competitors and remarks, “This is the way things are done in the construction industry.”

- Do you use the information provided in the envelopes to underbid RHK’s competitors and secure the sale?
 - YES NO

- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO
- Rate the following in terms of importance (1 = great, 2 = much, 3 = some, 4 = little, 5 = no).
 - A) Will you get fired if you don't use the insider information and lose the contract with Grissom Construction?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - B) Will following your supervisor's instructions show you are team player?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - C) Is it against the law to use the information about your competitors' bids?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - D) Is it fair for companies in the construction industry to use insider information during the bidding process?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - E) Do other salespeople in the company use inside information to develop their bids?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - F) How is the construction industry affected by RHK Material's use of insider information?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
- Which of these 6 issues is the 1st most important?
 - A B C D E F
- Which of these issues is the 2nd most important?
 - A B C D E F
- Rank the following in order of importance, from most important (1) to least important (6).
 - ____ Adhering to standard practices in the company
 - ____ Making a good first impression with your supervisor
 - ____ Proving your skills as a salesperson
 - ____ Earning a sizable commission check
 - ____ Fairness in the construction industry

- _____Winning the bid

You are a salesman at an electronics store, and a customer is interested in buying a new television. He wants it as soon as possible since his old television just died. The customer expresses interest in a model that is out of stock and will not be available for another week. The customer is clearly disgruntled when he hears of the model’s unavailability. In fear of losing the sale, you speak to your manager about potentially expediting shipping for the customer. Your manager states this is not feasible, but suggests telling the customer they can arrange to get the model he desires in 24 hours and to sell him the demonstration model as though it’s a new television. Your manager expresses the model is in “as-new” condition, and the customer wouldn’t know the difference.

- Do you tell the customer you can arrange for the television to arrive within 24 hours and sell him the demonstration model?
 - YES NO
- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO
- Rate the following in terms of importance (1 = great, 2 = much, 3 = some, 4 = little, 5 = no).
 - A) Who would be more negatively affected by the sale, your employer or the customer?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - B) Would other salespeople sell the customer the demonstration model in order to make the sale?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - C) Is it okay to mislead the customer since you know the demonstration model is in “as-new” condition?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
 - D) Will making the sale improve your chances of earning a promotion within the next year?
 - 1 2 3 4 5

- E) Is it against company policy to sell a demonstration model to a customer without him/her knowing it is a demonstration model?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
- F) Will you lose the sale, and the accompanying commission check, if you don't sell the customer the demonstration model?
 - 1 2 3 4 5
- Which of these 6 issues is the 1st most important?
 - 1 2 3 4 5 6
- Which of these issues is the 2nd most important?
 - 1 2 3 4 5 6
- Rank the following in order of importance, from most important (1) to least important (6).
 - ____ Forming an honest relationship with customers
 - ____ Making the Sale
 - ____ Impressing your manager
 - ____ Following the direction of superiors
 - ____ Earning a sizeable commission check
 - ____ Consumers' Rights

You are an investment banker, and you recently interviewed for an open position at Clemens Financial Group. Several days after the interview, you receive a call from Clemens Financial's investment director, and are offered the position. You are very interested, particularly as the position offers avenues for advancement not available at your current firm. Although the investment director offers you a starting salary significantly higher than what you are earning at your current company, you consider negotiating for a higher salary.

- Do you negotiate a higher salary with the investment director at Clemens Financial?
 - YES NO
- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO

You have recently been promoted to the position of regional branch manager at D & D Banking. Eager to make a good impression at your first meeting with your supervisors, you arrive 30 minutes early. As you take your place in the conference room and pull out your tablet to review your notes, you realize its battery is nearly dead, 10% of its total charge. The battery will not sustain its charge for the entirety of the meeting, and your charger is at home. Because you only live 10 minutes away from D & D Banking's headquarters, you consider driving home to retrieve your charger.

- Do you drive home to retrieve your charger?
 - YES NO
- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO

You are a salesperson at Harper Office Supply, and your sales manager assigned you a new lead, Williams and Sons Law Firm. The law firm is one of the largest in the area with over 75 attorneys on staff. If you close the deal, Harper Office Supply would earn a significant profit, and you would receive a sizeable commission. During your sales meeting with Williams and Sons, you close the deal, securing a three-year contract with the firm. You are eager to share the news, and on your lunch break, you spot your sales manager across the breakroom.

- Do you approach your sales manager and inform him you closed the deal with Williams and Sons Law Firm?
 - YES NO
- Would you consider this to be an issue of right and wrong (i.e., good or bad behavior)?
 - YES NO

Appendix G

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form

Instructions: Please use the following scale to indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree; Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree.

1. I have not always been honest with myself.
2. I always know why I like things.
3. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
4. I never regret my decisions.
5. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
6. I am a completely rational person.
7. I am very confident of my judgments
8. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
9. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
10. I never cover up my mistakes.
11. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
12. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
13. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.
14. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
15. I never take things that don't belong to me.
16. I don't gossip about other people's business.

Appendix H
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Certification

February 20, 2018

Megan Kopkin, M.A.
Department of Psychology
College of Arts & Sciences
The University of Alabama
Box 870348

Re: IRB # 18-OR-072 "Decision Making in Workplace Scenarios"

Dear Ms. Kopkin:

The University of Alabama Institutional Review Board has granted approval for your proposed research. Your application has been given expedited approval according to 45 CFR part 46. You have also been granted the requested waiver of documentation of informed consent. Approval has been given under expedited review category 7 as outlined below:

(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

Your application will expire on February 19, 2019. If your research will continue beyond this date, complete the relevant portions of Continuing Review and Closure Form. If you wish to modify the application, complete the Modification of an Approved Protocol Form. When the study closes, complete the appropriate portions of FORM: Continuing Review and Closure.

Please use reproductions of the IRB approved informed stamped consent form to obtain consent from your participants.

Should you need to submit any further correspondence regarding this proposal, please include the above application number.

Good luck with your research.

Sincerely,


Carpantato T. Myles, MSM, CIM, CIP
Director & Research Compliance Officer
Office for Research Compliance