TROY UNIVERSITY BRANCH EXPANSION, 
1964-2005, KUDZU U.

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ABSTRACT

This is an institutional history for the period between 1964-2005 examining the branch expansion of Troy University. Troy University, which began as Troy Normal School in 1887 evolved a great deal during the 20th century. Much of this evolution took place in the latter half of the century, as the institution grew from a single campus institution, to a university with more than 60 teaching locations located throughout the world. For the majority of this study, the entity operated under the name Troy State University. Many circumstances lead to the off-campus growth of this institution but the entrepreneurial personalities of the chief executive officers and various external factors were most responsible. For nearly twenty years of this time period, Troy operated with three separately accredited institutions, with locations in Montgomery and Dothan gaining independent status from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The merger of all three institutions under one institution, strategically called One Great University (OGU), took place in 2005. This merger also resulted in one final name change to Troy University. This study examines the growth of an institution through off-campus expansion, focusing on the challenges and opportunities which accompanied this endeavor.
DEDICATION

To my family: Beth and Camden. You have been my driving force behind this endeavor since day one. Beth, you supported me, pushed me and encouraged me throughout this entire process. It was a long road, but you never lost faith and always let me know that you believed in me. You sacrificed so much for me to be able to achieve this goal, and for that I am eternally grateful. Camden, you mean more to me than you will ever know. My hope is that my completion of this degree shows you that anything is possible through dedication and hard work. It will not always be easy, but with support, which you will always have, you will achieve all of your dreams. Mom, thank you for your unwavering support. Not only during through this process, but throughout my entire life. You have been an inspiration and always there to provide encouragement when I most needed it.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Kudzu U. It is by this name that John Porter, the Director of the Alabama Commission on Higher Education (ACHE), once recognized Troy University (Visser, 1988). Kudzu, which was declared a weed by the USDA in 1972, is often found in the Southeast portion of the United States and covers over seven million acres in the South. It is known for its insatiable desire for expansion and can grow as much as a foot per day in the summer months (Shores, 2013). Is this description of an institution a term of endearment? This is debatable depending largely on to whom the question is posed. What is not debatable is the fact that between the years of 1964 and 2005 Troy University grew from a modest teacher’s college situated in sleepy Pike County, Alabama, to an international comprehensive university delivering higher education to students spread across over 60 different teaching locations, in over 20 countries and on 3 continents. This type of growth required a concerted effort of people, conditions, and resources. Such a combination existed during this time period, and all of these factors must be examined to gain a greater understanding of this higher education growth phenomenon.

History of Troy- the Institution

Under Alabama House Bill 166, Troy University was founded in 1887 as a normal school (English, 1988). The bill allowed for the creation of a normal school in Pike County, Alabama, for the education of white male and female teachers. Normal schools, or teachers colleges as they would soon be known, were created in an effort to train teachers (Hawkins, 2013). The student in a normal school would complete the final two years of secondary school and then move into two years of post-secondary education (English, 1988). According to the language of the Act, the
school would be governed under a Board of Directors, made up of individuals local to the Pike County area, with the Superintendent of Education for the State of Alabama also holding a seat (Hawkins, 2013). The Act further stated that students desiring admission would have to be at least fifteen years of age and would receive instruction free of charge provided he or she signed a written obligation to teach at least two years in the Alabama public school system. Admission also required passing an examination testing aptitude in orthography, reading, grammar, geography, arithmetic, and history of the United States. After gaining admission and completing the required two years’ curriculum, the student would be given a certificate allowing him or her to gain employment as a teacher (English, 1988).

The original campus of Troy University was located in present-day downtown Troy, Alabama (Hawkins, 2013). Troy, the county seat of Pike County, was originally known as Deer Stand Hill and was located on the Three Notch Trail, which ran from Fort Mitchell (near Columbus, Georgia) and snaked south through Alabama before ending in Pensacola, Florida (Hawkins, 2013). The building for the normal school began in 1887 and was completed in February of 1888. The inaugural annual report of the institution, released in June of 1888, cited a total of 128 students enrolled. Seventy-six of these students were residents of Troy, and 52 were non-residents. Nine counties were represented, and three students were from a state other than Alabama (Hawkins, 2013).

By the early 1920s, the institution had far outgrown its original modest campus and found itself landlocked in downtown Troy (English, 1988). A recommendation was made by the president, Dr. Edwin Madison Shackelford, to the Board of Trustees for the White Normal Schools of Alabama for relocation in 1921. This request was approved, and state funds were made available for the acquisition and construction of a new campus less than a mile from the
existing facility (1988). This location, which still exists as the main campus of Troy University, was appropriate as its sprawling flatlands allowed for the vision of future growth. Kilby Hall was erected as the campus lab school in 1924 (English, 1988). This was a facility where future teachers could get hands-on experience in teaching, demonstration, and observation (Sparks, 2015). In the ensuing years, other buildings would dot the landscape as the new campus transition took place (Hawkins, 2013).

While this change in physical location in the 1920’s had very little impact on people outside of Troy, Alabama, it would serve to be a harbinger of things to come. Within a few decades, Troy University would begin making moves to enter the global scale of higher education (Hawkins, 2009). Establishing a credible and reputable online education platform would contribute greatly to this endeavor. So too would its reputation of attracting foreign students to its main campus in an effort to promote cultural diversity; at times over 10% of the entire main campus student body came from outside the borders of the United States (Hawkins, 2009). While the establishment of online education and the recruitment of international students certainly proved to be a feather in the cap of the institution, other institutions also provided these services. The explosion of branch campuses, at times exceeding 60 teaching locations, is truly what makes Troy University in the second half of the 20th century an institution worth examining (Hawkins, 2009). The story to be told is not just about the branch campus growth. It is about the people behind the evolution of the institution. It is about the political forces in play, both internal and external. It is about the resources tapped and utilized. Finally, it is about the retraction of two autonomous campuses back under the umbrella of the main campus and the events that led to this decision. Troy University is an institution of higher learning and in many ways very unique, as a result of the institutional developments in the second half of the 20th century.
From Normal to University

The latter half of the 20th century resulted in major changes among institutions of higher education. The end of the second World War brought an influx of soldiers into colleges and universities across the country. This period also saw a great number of institutions evolving with regard to their missions and scopes. The institution type perhaps most impacted by these changes was the teachers college. These institutions, like Troy, found themselves in a bit of an identity crisis. Perhaps the foundational work to discuss this phenomenon is a work titled, College of the Forgotten Americans: A Profile of State Colleges and Regional Universities by E. Alden Dunham in 1969. This book examined the evolution of these institutions and gave some speculation on their direction leading up to the turn of the century.

Dunham (1969) frames his study by looking at three institutions that span across a broad spectrum. The spectrum Dunham sets out begins with institutions still deeply entrenched in the teachers college mold. At the time, these institutions still see the primary, and at times, only mission to be the training of teachers. These colleges are deeply committed to their original founding as normal schools. On the other end of the spectrum are those institutions that have greatly evolved. These institutions are in many cases now full-fledged universities. While most still offer teacher education programs, they have also embraced liberal studies degree programs. Most also have instituted other applied degree programs in areas such as business, engineering, and agriculture. The spectrum also houses institutions in between the two extremes. These are typically colleges still deeply in tune with the normal school mission but that have also recognized the need to expand offerings outside of this very narrow scope.

At the time of Dunham’s work in 1969, Troy found itself in the mist of the very evolution discussed, and true to the perspective set forth, the changes encompassed much more than just
program offerings. The progression of an institution, Dunham argues, includes administration, faculty, and students as well. For instance, in most cases, institutions that had substantially changed by the early 1970s saw a great shift in student demographics by enrolling male students in large numbers.

Placing an institution on Dunham’s spectrum often begins with an evaluation of the chief executive officer, or president of the institution. Presidents with education backgrounds, often Ed.D’s, were found to favor the original mission and typically stayed closely tethered to that end of the spectrum. In contrast, Dunham provided the example of the state of California in 1969. Of the 19 presidents considered, only two were from public schools. These colleges, at the time of the publication of the book, were all identified as highly evolving and moving toward the university status. This certainly suggests that institutions take on the image of their leader, and this may be seen to be the case in the evaluation of Troy University, as discussed later in detail.

**Multi-campus University/ Multi-campus System**

When thinking about a college or university, I argue that it is common to quickly associate that institution with a specific city or town. Most people think Ann Arbor when hearing of the University of Michigan or Athens when the University of Georgia is mentioned. This is not surprising, as within the confines of the main campus many essential aspects are contained, and vital functions are performed. The main campus is often seen as the hub of the wheel. Within this hub, one will often find the key administrators, athletic teams and facilities, and likely the most advanced and intensive research arm of the institution. However, just as the failure to consider the spokes will give an incomplete picture of a wheel, so too will the omission of sites outside of the main campus give an insufficient description of a college or university. These sites, carrying several different titles including branch locations, support centers, or
satellite campuses, are often forgotten, but the outreach they provide can hold substantial significance for many higher education institutions.

The idea of locations, which are geographically somewhere other than the main campus, can be somewhat complex. Lee and Bowen (1971) examine this topic and attempt to limit the confusion by creating a typology with two separate elements. They argue that there are distinct differences between the multi-campus institution and the multi-institution system, which will be discussed in further detail. Lee and Bowen state that the multi-campus system typically consists of separate campuses, often with the name beginning with the parent institution, with an “at” and the name of the geographic location. While possibly not the case in 1971, the word “in” is often used in place of “of” with regard to the location. An example of this would include the University of Alabama, with separate locations including the University of Alabama in Huntsville and the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Such arrangements are often called systems. In this format, the branch locations are viewed as separate institutions, often with unique academic programs, faculties, student bodies and sometimes separate accreditations.

The Lee and Bowen (1971) study required four criteria in order to be considered a multi-campus system for the purpose of their study.

1. Each had responsibility for only a portion of higher education in the state.
2. Each had more than one four-year campus.
3. Each had a system-wide executive with the title of president or chancellor.
4. This executive did not have specific responsibility for one of the campuses (p. 4).

Of the institutions and systems studied, they found that only 11 met the specific criteria. They are very clear that these are somewhat arbitrary baseline criteria. That being said these, criteria
allow the authors to compare entities with similar structures.

Trying to pin Troy into one of these typologies becomes very difficult. This is primarily because the fourth criteria of the Lee and Bowen typology. Troy always, since growing into a “system,” had one individual serving in the capacity of system Chancellor and Chief Executive Officer of the main campus. For this reason, Troy is very much an anomaly and does not find a home in the Lee and Bowen typology.

While the Lee and Bowen typology is widely used when classifying institutions with multiple locations, Hill (1985) examined this situation even further. Hill divided these systems organizations into one of two categories. The first, similar to the Lee and Bowen analysis, looks at single university multi-campus institutions. Hill, however, gives more attention to a second group of institutions. These are systems in which the head of the main campus is also the head of the system and has higher position status than the heads of the branch institutions. In this situation, the existence, or lack thereof, of a state governing agency is not the litmus test. For instance, both the University of Alabama and Troy University are in the state of Alabama, but one (University of Alabama) is a multi-institution university system with a system chancellor not leading any of the individual institution, and the other (Troy University) is a university system in which the president/chancellor of the main campus and the system as a whole are one and the same.

The concept of multi-campus universities is certainly not a new phenomenon of higher education in the United States. In 1824, the first head of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institution, Amos Eaton, began offering instruction through extension/branch locations (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997). Extension education gained more traction close to the turn of the 19th century when well-respected institutions such as Columbia, Wisconsin, Brown, Indiana, and Illinois joined the
movement (Rudolph, 1990). It would be another 50 years before this format of delivery would
grow to what we know today, but these early institutions certainly set the foundation.

Also, the idea of providing education throughout its home state began for Troy University
in the mid-1950s, but this was not revolutionary. In 1904, the president of the University of
Wisconsin, Charles R. Van Hise, envisioned his institution with arms reaching far outside the
believed that the entire state of Wisconsin was the university’s campus (Rudolph, 1990). To put
this in motion, he felt that the institutions should take education to the people. The university
went on the road delivering lectures relating to the issues of the day and sponsoring debates to
discuss the merits of controversial topics (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997). Extension education got
more momentum with the passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914. This Act further solidified
the relationship between land-grant institutions and federal government through the use of
extension services (Rudolph, 1990).

The multi-campus “boom” happened in the mid-1940s, following World War II. By 1951
around 8 million veterans had taken advantage of the G.I. Bill (Smith & Bender, 2008). The
United States government, fearful of the prospects of a depression caused by high
unemployment and wanting to reward veterans for their service, stepped in and passed The
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) in 1944 (Vaughan, 2000). The influx of so many new
students would flood the infrastructure of existing campus locations, hence the creation of
numerous branch locations (Blocker & Campbell, 1963; Catell, 1971; Medsker & Tillery, 1971).
While the existence of branch locations existed prior to the 1940s, it was the enrollment
explosion during this era that created the possibility of different structures that permeate higher
education even today.
Many institutions and systems choose the “multi” location format in order to enhance growth and revenue, but this does not suggest that unique problems and challenges do not exist. Some of these issues include but are not limited to institutional governance and budget allocation. Finding the appropriate balance between main campus and branch location authority and control can be very difficult. deGive (1996) examined this in her article, “The Making of a Branch Campus System: A Statewide Strategy of Coalition Building.” She studied branch campus evolution in the state of Washington and how the political systems theory is implemented. The deGive work discusses the need to satisfy many demands, sometimes competing, which encompass the social, economic, demographic, and political realms. In the Washington state example, the state formed a Higher Education Coordinating Board to create a master plan recommending branch campuses in urban areas. The structure of the branch or satellite campus maintaining some degree of autonomy while streamlining the processes and hierarchies of these institutions, as seen in the state of Washington, is a complex but very relevant endeavor to examine, as many institutions still operate in this format.

The distribution of funds throughout an institution can be a difficult and sometimes divisive issue. This can be compounded when considering this process from a multi-campus prospective. Burke et al. (1994) cite an obvious pitfall of this process as most will argue their own cause (campus) rather than what is good for the whole (institution). A decision made beholden to the main or flagship campus can also be problematic. A common goal that recognizes the need to adequately fund branch and satellite campuses, may further the larger goal of maintaining the best interest of the entire institution.

As previously mentioned, the explosion of the multi-campus institution or multi-campus system took place post-World War II to accommodate the growing demand of higher education.
This is not to say that it is the only reason for this structure of higher education. As early as the 1930s, scholars were forecasting the changes soon to come. Pollard (1931) pointed out that extreme duplication plagued higher education resulting in unnecessary waste. By this time five states (California, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Mississippi) were in the process of developing unitary structures of education. The unitary format Pollard mentioned seeks a much more centralized system and seeks to provide structure and organization which do not exist with the lack of this oversight. The same factors, outreach to distal areas, elimination of course duplication, and streamlined governance, seem to drive multi-campus expansion in the same manner that states approach multi-institution system growth.

In addition to the work examining the structure, organization, and governances of these institutions and systems during this growth period (1940s-1970s), several writers conducted studies focusing on students. Lee and Bowen (1971) initially argued that one of the primary advantages of multi-campus universities should be the ease of transfer between institutions. However, their 1971 study found this to not be the case. In fact, Lee and Bowen (1971) discovered that only three of the nine institutions examined in the study had policies in place to facilitate in-transfer between campus locations. The failure to adequately accommodate intra-institutional transfer is certainly not ideal. Not surprisingly, the eventual retraction of Troy University away from multiple separate accredited institutions considered this very issue (Fisher, 1989).

The difference between the multi-campus institution and the multi-university system is not one of simple semantics. Complexities must be considered in areas such as governance, fund allocation, and faculty perceptions. A study of Troy University during this period could reveal these complexities to be very much in play.
Conditions and External Factors

Any time an institution undergoes a major shift or evolution, it would be a mistake to not consider the environment at the time of the change. Simply using the word “environment” can be very broad, and perhaps it should be. The institution of higher education operates in multiple spheres and, for studies such as this one, it is fitting to consider them in their entirety. For instance, the political climate within the state and country must be considered. In the case of Troy, particular attention must be given to the status of the United States military and its position on higher education. So too must the status of regulatory bodies be examined. The strength, or lack thereof, and relationship between these entities and the institution, is of substantial relevance in a study such as this one. Likewise, it is important to pay particular attention to the direction of higher education in the time period being considered. This, perhaps as much as any other external factor, dictates which avenues of growth and evolution are available to an institution.

Military

Of the external factors considered, this study seeks most to examine the role the military played at Troy University during the time period being considered. Education in the United States military has a long-standing history. This relationship spans centuries, with origins dating back to the Revolutionary War. In the harsh winter of 1777-78 literary classes were created for soldiers using the Bible as the text of choice (Persyn & Polson, 2012). During times of peace but, more particularly, while the nation has been at war, the military has shown great interest in the education of its troops (Kofmehl, 1972). This expectation, that the armed forces provide non-military education to its soldiers, still continues in various capacities today.

The formal involvement of institutions of higher education in this endeavor has a much
shorter and more recent history. At the onset of World War I, the War Department established the Committee on Education and Special Training (Kofmehl, 1972). The purpose of this committee was to ensure that skilled servicemen could quickly prepare to join the conflict and contribute in specific areas of need. The University of Pittsburgh was selected as the institution to provide this training. By August of 1918, 2,000 troops had been selected to gain skills in gas engine and automobile repair (1972).

In addition to this technical training, colleges and universities also found a role with more academic missions. For example, the University of South Carolina at Columbia provided courses in French, history, mathematics, and topography (Kofmehl, 1972). The University of South Carolina at Columbia was joined in this endeavor by the University of Texas, which tasked professors with providing instruction at nearby Fort Bliss. The state universities of Wisconsin and California also assisted in the need for academic instruction by providing professors at stateside posts and campuses.

After a period of relative quiet between the two World Wars, the entry of the United States into WWII would reignite the relationship between higher education and the military. The new arrangement, which looked very similar to the World War I agreement, was designed to ensure a constant flow of skilled technical and professional soldiers into the armed forces. In areas including medicine, dentistry, engineering, foreign affairs, and languages, colleges and universities were charged with rapidly equipping soldiers. The initiative, designated as the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), proved to be a booming success with over 135,000 soldiers being educated at over 200 colleges and universities in December of 1943 (Kofmehl, 1972).

While the end of World War II brought many troops home, the era leading up to the
Vietnam War was certainly not quiet with regard to military activity (Foley, 2015). The country was on high alert because of the Cold War, and tremors of disruption both domestic and abroad were on the horizon. The end of the WWII had the country feeling a great sense of victory and pride, but concern about a growing ideology called communism was taking shape. Fresh off the exhibition of strength in both Europe and Asia, the United States felt a sense of global superiority (2015). Other issues, such as social justice, were beginning to boil, so celebration of entities such as the United States military and American higher education garnered a great deal of the attention due to a sense of global superiority. For the next several decades, these two entities would become tightly intertwined for better or worse. Institutions such as Troy University would find themselves positioned at just the right place at the right time to capitalize on this development.

The United States military enjoys a deep rich history as a partner of American higher education. This relationship spans all branches of the armed services and involves both financial benefits and course delivery components. The mutual benefits received by both parties have existed in wartime as well as during periods of peace. Course delivery has also been multifaceted including traditional on-campus, online, and base extension centers both stateside and abroad. While the extent of this relationship varies through administrations and individual institutions, the commitment between these two entities is still very strong.

Military installations were some of the pioneers of the distance learning education which is still prevalent in colleges and universities today. The forerunner to today’s online education format existed in print-based correspondence courses. The more recent history of higher education’s involvement with the military began just after end of World War II. Particularly key to this development was a restructuring of the military, which led to the creation of the United
States Air Force as a separate entity and on equal footing with the Army and Navy in 1947. In 1949, the Department of Navy and the Department of War became the Department of Defense (DoD), and the relationship with higher education would shift into overdrive (Kaswork, Rose, & Ross-Gordon, 2010).

Writing in 1964, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education, and Ben M. Zeff, former Deputy Director of Education Programs in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, discussed the importance of an educated military force (as cited in Brown, 1965). They wrote that, while the advancements in military machinery are beneficial, this alone is not enough. Katzenbach and Zeff suggest that, while there was great interest in the capabilities of both guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, this training and knowledge would be useless without the attainment of languages, history, sociology, economics, and psychology. For this reason, the writers argued for increased education for soldiers, as well as improvements in national higher education.

In the same study, Katzenbach and Zeff (as cited in Brown, 1965) mentioned the growth of higher education attainment by military personnel, specifically related to commissioned officers. Using data provided by the Department of Defense, the writers found that, in 1962, 64.6% of commissioned officers across all branches of the military had graduated from college compared to 46.6% in 1952. This growth was largely achieved through extension programs, or institutional offerings located on military bases (as cited in Brown, 1965). Ashworth and Lindley (1977) found that hundreds of institutions were offering courses and degree programs, from associates degrees to PhDs, thousands of miles away from their home locations. Most of these institutions were operating on bases within the United States, but there were exceptions. Abrams (1989) found that the University of Maryland’s overseas program enrolled over 17,000
students during the 1955-56 academic year. This expansive offering stretched across 12 countries and 168 different teaching locations. The success experienced by the University of Maryland was noted by Toynbee as "a noble experiment showing inventive imagination as a characteristic of American genius" (Rummell, 1965, p. 249).

While extension centers, both at home and abroad, found success in post-WWII, the aforementioned correspondence courses and other initiatives were also vital components in the development of this bilateral relationship. One such initiative, titled the "Bootstrap Program," allowed active duty soldiers to take a leave of absence to attend a college and return to service with a higher rank (Nicolls, 2011). Programs and initiatives such as this have created a relationship between the military and higher education and seek to benefit both entities.

Providing financial support for the educational endeavors of military veterans, active duty members, and dependents is a relatively new venture. Funds for returning soldiers to gain higher education credentials gathered the most steam in 1944 under the G.I. Bill. This piece of legislation was put in place for several reasons. One of these included the desire to avoid the mistakes of the post-WWI administration. The veterans of this war returned to the United States, were treated poorly, and suffered at the hands of an inept governmental system (Donnelly, 2008).

Veterans of the First World War were offered paltry benefits for the services they provided. Along with the option of vocational training, they were presented with $1,000 U.S. savings bonds, which were redeemable in 1945 (Mettler 2005; Donnelly, 2008). The dissatisfaction with the benefits received, along with the terrible economic conditions of the country in the 1930s, led to a march on Washington by WWI veterans in 1932 (Donnelly, 2008). This march, known as the Bonus March, brought a large number of WWI veterans to the
nation’s capital, and eventually over 20,000 of them settled in Washington, DC.

In an attempt to provide some assistance to this segment of the population, the Patman’s Veterans Bill was introduced. This bill, introduced in 1932 by Representative Wright Patman from Texas, would provide benefits to World War I veterans. While this bill passed the House by a 211-176 vote, it was voted down by the U.S. Senate. As could be expected, this was not well-received. It led to larger protest and rioting, which eventually resulted in President Hoover calling in federal troops to quell the unrest (Glass, 2009).

The black eye the nation received due to the treatment of World War I veterans would not be forgotten and not be repeated. President Roosevelt made it known very early that WWII soldiers would be treated well when returning stateside. Congressman Hamilton Fish argued that such a policy was necessary to avert “chaotic and revolutionary conditions” (Wilson, 1995, p. 72). U.S. citizens agreed en masse. A 1944 Gallup poll found that 70% of respondents supported higher taxes in return for increased benefits for veterans (Keene, 2001). Furthermore, 90% of Americans felt that servicemen should have the option to return to college at the government’s expense (Mettler, 2005). The foundation was laid and a far-reaching benefit plan, which would become the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill), was put in motion before the bombs fell on Nagasaki and Hiroshima ending the Second World War.

The G.I. Bill essentially provided returning soldiers who had been honorably discharged, four distinct benefits (Onkst, 1998). These benefits were:

1. Help from the United States Employment Service (USES) for veterans to find jobs that would match their skills.

2. Up to a full year of unemployment compensation for veterans at the rate of twenty dollars per week.
(3) Guaranteed home, farm, and business loans to veterans from the Veterans Administration.

(4) Four full years of education or vocational training paid by the government.

(p.518)

The educational and vocational benefits did not have quotas or limitations. The entitlement was available to all veterans and could be used at the school of their choice (Thelin, 2004). This was a deviation from past arrangements where the government hand-selected institutions to provide education to active duty soldiers.

The higher education boon of the G.I. Bill was not immediate. The reason for this is simple. In 1944, only 23% of those serving in the U. S. Army had a high school diploma. It would be the latter half of the 1940s and the early 1950s before the full benefits of the G.I. Bill would be realized. Through initiatives such as the General Educational Development (GED) and the Guide to the Evaluation Educational Experiences in the Armed Services, the groundwork was laid, and American higher education was set for unprecedented growth fueled by the G.I. Bill (Rose, 1994).

In 1950, 2.7 million students were enrolled in higher education. This was up from 1.5 million in 1940. This represents an increase of 80% in just ten short years (Kerr, 1994). As could be expected, institutions were not prepared, based on the information they had been given. According to Mettler (2005), the U.S. Army projected in 1943 that around 7% of G.I.’s would be interested in full-time higher education, with possibly another 17% considering it on a part-time basis. The eventual enrollment boom far exceeded those estimates and resulted in many college towns essentially becoming “tent cities” to accommodate the growth (Bennett, 1996). Institutions such as Indiana University found creative ways to deal with this student growth. One such
example was known as the Quonset hut. This temporary “dormitory” was essentially a farm silo, cut in half and placed on its side with students and sometimes entire families occupying the hut while pursuing their education (Thelin, 2004).

While the increase in higher education students is the most widely recognized impact of the G.I. Bill, major developments such as this do not exist in a vacuum. With this growth in students came an obvious shift in the demographics of American higher education. In 1947, according to Mettler (2005), almost half of all higher education students were veterans. Hofstadter and Smith (1961) concur with this evaluation, stating that over one million WWII veterans were enrolled in college in 1947. This increased the average age of the student enrolled in higher education, as well as greatly moved the needle of the male/female ratio, as most returning GIs were men (Blair, 1999; Barnum, 2011).

With the increase in the adult population seeking higher education, institutions sought new avenues to provide this education. While many relocated onto and enrolled on the traditional college campus, others found this to not be an option based on other obligations. Hence, the growth of satellite and extension centers would prove to be one answer. This delivery format, while not necessarily the answer in years directly following the end of World War II, certainly found momentum during the second half of the 20th century.

While the G.I. Bill was the trailblazer for military financial aid, the support did not end there. In the 1950s, the military created the credit tuition assistance (TA) program, under the Department of Defense (DOD), which would cover the cost of tuition up to 75% for active duty personnel. This program would be amended in 2002, however, increasing the coverage amount to 100%, although not to exceed $250 per credit hour (Woods, 2017). The original G.I. Bill was overhauled in 2008 creating the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, also known as the Veterans Educational
Assistance Act. This program allows veterans to receive support such as tuition and fees reimbursement, a monthly housing allowance, and a yearly textbook stipend (Radford, 2009).

The financial support received by both veterans and active duty military personnel opened the door for higher education access to many who would not have it otherwise. Regulatory agencies also played an important role in public higher education’s context in the post-World War II era.

**Regulatory Agencies**

To examine the success of an institution and its endeavors also demands a deep evaluation of the external factors present at the time. These factors span multiple areas and can be extremely far-reaching. Something that seems relatively unrelated can have a major impact either directly or indirectly on the landscape of higher education and specific institutions. One of the most influential external factors involves regulatory bodies. These include both regional and state entities. The state governance model is also of particular relevance. Finally, the political landscape and public policy priorities at both the state and national levels must be considered.

Beginning early in the 19th century, the Supreme Court set precedence for the states involvement in higher education. The landmark Dartmouth College case set limits on the state with regard to private institutions (Thelin, 2004). Further examination of this United States Supreme Court case by both scholars and legislators resulted in arguments that the opinion of the court was not intended to be limited to private institutions and public institutions were also protected, to some degree, from state interference (Whitehead & Herbst, 1986). The role of the state and its involvement with institutions within its boundaries are complex issues with many moving parts. This involvement, often referred to as “state governance,” was examined by
authors and foundations over the latter half of the 20th century. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1971) examined the various ways that states work with institutions they oversee. This report includes aspects such as the state’s power in granting charters, disseminating funds, appointing boards, and granting borrowing authority, as well as micro matters such as internal policy matters and programmatic decisions. This report also highlights the vast differences that exist from one state to the next in regard to how they choose to govern higher education.

The state’s involvement in higher education governance gained traction in the second half of the 20th century. As discussed by Paltridge (1965), only 17 states were involved in higher education governance in 1940. By 1965 this number had ballooned to 44. While much variation exists between the oversight exhibited from state to state, researchers agree that governance exists in essentially one of three forms: voluntary coordination, coordinating boards, and consolidated governing boards (McGuinness, Epper, & Arredondo, 1994).

When examined from a position of power and control, the governing board is seen as the most authoritative. These entities often supplant the institutional board in managing finances, conferring degrees, and deciding programs of instructions (Glenny, 1959). Occupying the other end of the spectrum are voluntary coordinating boards. These boards operate in a much more informal capacity and essentially decide issues such as budgeting and policies by consensus. Situated between these two extremes are coordinating boards. These boards operate with specific defined powers designed to facilitate the direction of higher education in the state. Coordinating boards are built with the idea that they will work with individual institutions but do not supplant existing institutional boards or exhibit control over them.

In 1971, the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University
of California produced a report examining state-wide coordination of higher education (Glenny, 1971). In this report, the author examined the strengths and weaknesses of state “coordinating boards” versus “governing boards.” The author argues that a coordinating board allows the autonomy needed by institutions, while still providing the oversight necessary for statewide higher education success. The decision by the state regarding the oversight of higher education plays strongly into the strategic planning of its individual institutions.

This is not meant to suggest that all scholars agree with the need for state oversight boards, be it governing or coordinating. M. M. Chambers of Illinois produced numerous works speaking out against the need for these entities (Chambers, 1961, 1965, 1974). Chambers sees the involvement of the state as a threat to individual freedom of choice and of institutional autonomy (Chambers, 1974). He takes particular issue with Dr. James Bryant Conant. Chambers argues that Conant’s theory that education beyond the high school years should be planned by state government was a “potentially dangerous exhortation” (Chambers, 1965, p.3).

One critique of the idea of centralized planning revolves around the theory of decreased competition. Unlike the capitalistic marketplace practiced in the United States, which has very little coordinated planning, statewide coordination does examine and make decisions on issues such as supply and demand. T.R. McConnell (1962) warns of this approach. McConnell, while not necessarily an opponent of statewide planning, does examine both the positive and negative implications. He states that “sensible competition between colleges and individual institutions” would have positive implications for American higher education (McConnell, 1962, p. 169).

Exactly what statewide planning boards, particularly coordinating boards, should do became a point of great discussion during the second half of the 20th century. Goodall (1974) found six primary issues faced statewide coordinating boards moving forward. Included in these
were,

(a) the defined role of the board as perceived by state stakeholders such as government officials and legislators; (b) the acceptance of the program review and approval process; (c) involvement in the budget process; (d) the parameters of authority; (e) the role in the coordination of retrenchment; and (f) defining what constitutes success for the board.

(p.227)

Goodall (1974) suggested that the lack of clarity on these issues would result in immediate and future trouble for coordinating boards.

The growth of higher education began at the end of the Second World War as soldiers returned to the U.S. from Europe and Asia, were welcomed into institutions of higher education, and were aided by the government with funds allocated by the G.I. Bill. This growth in students naturally led to institutional expansion. In the proceeding decades, statewide coordinating boards often found themselves as the volume control valve on the spigot of expansion. One of the outcomes would be statewide “master plans.” This idea of strategic planning designed by the governing or coordinating board proved to be an attempt to define comprehensive priorities to be carried out by the higher education institutions within the state.

In September of 1976, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), a multi-state consortium designed to evaluate regional educational effectiveness, set forth a position statement titled, “Priorities for Postsecondary Education in the South.” In this statement, the board spoke specifically of statewide planning by writing, “Statewide planning in postsecondary education must be assigned a high priority. Today the need for planning is intensified by the confusion of educational goals and activities now evident in the competing demands of institutions and clienteles” (Priorities for Postsecondary, 1976, p. 5). Clearly, the SREB recognized the vast
expansion of higher education, both within the diversification of the student body and the
mobility of the institution within and across state lines.

This trend of increased oversight continued into the last quarter of the 20th century. During the 1980s, 14 states engaged in governance reform. Of these 14 states, 12 of them decreased institutional autonomy in favor of more statewide governance (Marcus, 1997). In the spirit of centralization, states also began implementing quality control measurements. The scope of the governing board continued to expand, and by the 1990s the practice of statewide student assessment had expanded to two-thirds of the nation’s states (McGuinness et al., 1994).

Possessing knowledge and understanding of the governance structure in a state is crucial in the study of institutional history. The autonomy, or lack thereof, of an institution is of absolute relevance. Being able to have a grasp on the concept of “control” within an institution can provide clarity to some issues that are unclear without this knowledge. In the current study, understanding the existence, or possible absence of, a strong statewide governing body can possibly explain how an institution can grow rapidly within state boundaries, across state lines, and even abroad.

In addition to state governance, one must examine the involvement of regulatory agencies when conducting institutional histories. In particular, consideration must be given to the role of voluntary regional accreditation, which is a staple of higher education in the United States. Regional accrediting bodies are in place to provide quality improvement and quality assurance (Brittingham, 2008; Perley & Tanguay, 2008). In addition to these broad, overarching goals, Lubinescu et al. (2001) provide a more detailed description of the role of these agencies which include:
1. Fostering excellence through the development of criteria and guidelines for assessing effectiveness;

2. Encouraging improvement through ongoing self-study and planning;

3. Ensuring external constituents that a program has clearly defined goals and appropriate objectives, maintains faculty and facilities to attain them, demonstrates it is accomplishing them, and has the prospect for continuing to do so;

4. Providing advice and counsel to new and established programs in the accrediting process; and

5. Ensuring that programs receive sufficient support and are free from external influence that may impede their effectiveness and their freedom of inquiry. (p. 6)

Through the fulfillment of these goals, the existence of regional accreditation seeks to provide assurance to the stakeholders of higher education in the United States.

The use of accrediting bodies to ensure quality among institutions of higher education has a history dating back to the late 19th century. The establishment of the New England Association in 1885 proved to be the impetus of the regional accreditation system that is so familiar today (Bloland, 2001; Ewell, 2008). The New England Association would be renamed the New England Association of Schools and Colleges. Five other regional bodies, Middle States Commission on Higher Education, North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, and the Western Association of Schools and Colleges were created between 1887-1924, bringing the total to six regional accrediting agencies (Ewell, 2008).

Each of the six regional accrediting bodies operates largely independent from one another, though a relationship between the federal government and these agencies does exist. By
virtue of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and further modifications of that Act, regional accrediting agencies are required to receive approval from the federal government. This approval then allows the accreditation of individual institutions, which is necessary for the distribution of federal financial aid (Eaton, 2003; Ewell, 2008). Through the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) in conjunction with the Department of Education, these regional accreditation agencies are held accountable for oversight of their member institutions (Ewell, 2008).

The process undertaken by the regional accrediting agency to ensure quality among its member institutions has changed very little since the 1950s (Ewell, 2008). Institutions are closely examined through a self-study and written report, in addition to off-site reviews and on-site visits by a team representing the agency. In the years between visits, the institution is expected to provide periodic reports to ensure the standard of quality is being monitored. The evaluation can yield one of eight outcomes. These range from reaffirmation of the accreditation without conditions to removing the institution from the list of accredited institutions (Alsete, 2004). The failure of an institution to obtain satisfactory reports from its regional accrediting agency is extremely serious and can result in dire consequences, the worst of which is the loss of accreditation and Title IV funds.

**Presidential Leadership**

Any institutional history offering an overview, should include consider the work of the chief executive officer of the college or university during the time period being studied. This evaluation consists of decisions made and the reasons behind those decisions. In higher education, the person holding this position is generally given the title of president or chancellor. When examining an institution, particularly in an era involving substantive change, it is essential
to pay close attention to the actions taken by this individual. By so doing, the researcher can attempt to measure the impact of this individual in regard to the direction of the institution over a given period of time.

It is typical that the study of a person in a senior executive position to be evaluated regarding his or her leadership skills (Burns, 1978). This evaluation is essentially the baseline by which leaders can be compared and measured against one another. Involved in this critical analysis are the decisions made and initiatives undertaken by the institution. This moves the evaluation past the point of ability and skill to a point of action and implementation. Finally, the leader is critiqued, perhaps with the most scrutiny, by considering his or her legacy and mark on the organization. It is often at this point, usually many years after a leader has departed a position, when the true measure and worth of a leader can be determined.

The term “leadership” has literally hundreds of definitions. Burns (1978) says that leadership “is the recognition of real need, the uncovering and exploiting of contradictions among values and between values and practice, the realigning of values, the reorganization of institutions where necessary, and the governance of change” (p. 283). Gardner (1990) more succinctly states that leadership is “the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers” (p. 1). Stogdill (1974) says that “there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept” (p. 7).

Clearly, when definitions and examples abound, it can be difficult and often controversial to differentiate between great leaders and ineffective leaders. Most agree that the most basic way to determine leadership abilities comes through examining competencies. According to Ruben (2006), these competencies can be broken down to their most basic components by considering
knowledge and skills. Knowledge relates to a person’s understanding of a concept and his ability to reason through it. Skill refers to the ability of the individual to process this knowledge and create actions that translate into behaviors. As mentioned above, leaders must possess certain competencies, but this alone does not ensure success. It is the decisions made and people influenced that lead to a legacy by which leaders are evaluated.

Early studies of leadership often considered one very crucial question: are leaders born or made? Carlyle (1888) posited that certain individuals were born with traits necessary to lead other people. This idea, soon labeled as the Great Man Theory, argued that the superior few had the intelligence, energy, and moral fiber to be successful in leadership positions. The Great Man Theory, and others in a similar vein, were identified as trait theories (Northhouse, 2012). The work of Stogdill (1974) largely discounted this concept finding that the possession of certain traits did not distinguish successful leaders from other people. Trait theories have since given way to other perspectives, most notably behavioral theories and later contingency theories (Lord, Day, Zaccaro, Avolio, & Eagly, 2016).

Behavioral theories suggest that it is necessary to study the actions of the leader rather than simply his or her innate abilities. McGregor (1960) argued that the way an individual led was far more relevant than the skills he or she possessed. Likert (1967) agreed, finding a correlation in the treatment of others and the ability to jointly achieve a desired goal. Behavior theories brought to light the value of human relations when evaluating leadership success. While behavioral theories do not completely discount the worth of having virtuous traits, they argue that leadership cannot be adequately evaluated through this narrow scope.

Later studies suggested that evaluating behaviors alone was also insufficient. The circumstances and situations must be considered in their totality. These theories were categorized
as Contingency Theories (Hersey, Blanchard & Natemeyer, 1979). One such contingency theory that gained traction was the Path-Goal Theory. Evans (1970), whose work largely inspired the Path-Goal theory, stated that, “Effective leaders clarify the path to help their followers achieve goals and make the journey easier by reducing roadblocks and pitfalls” (p. 278). House (1971) was also instrumental in the formation of the Path-Goal Theory and agreed that the follower needed clear direction and help overcoming problems as they arose.

While the evaluation of leadership is crucial in any organizational study, I argue that an institutional history should include an assessment of the man or woman occupying the presidential suite. It is also relevant to include the research dating back to the era being studied. By undertaking this practice, the researcher can establish the prevailing mindset of the subject matter, in this case, presidential leadership, for the time period being considered. Evident when conducting this process is the evolution of the view on presidential leadership and how it strongly correlates to the shift across general leadership theories.

While most leadership definitions are general in nature and not specific to higher education, they are still applicable. It could be argued that the role of the higher education leader is more complex than those leading other organizations due to the vast number of stakeholders, multifaceted governance structure, and disjointed organizational structure (Birnbaum, 1988). This, however, does not limit the external critique of the higher education institutional leader, hereby identified as chancellor or president. Perhaps, at least in part, the scrutiny regarding presidents of higher education pertains to the path by which they reach the position. The majority of college presidents come from within the ranks of academia and are viewed by many external stakeholders as lacking the innovative, managerial, and fundraising experiences of their counterparts in business (McKenna, 2005).
Stoke (1959) studied the comparisons and contrasts between presidential leadership and their counterparts in business. He found that both executives shared many of the same challenges and opportunities. Both sets of leaders had strong internal and external forces at play. While this may indeed be the case, Richman and Farmer (1974) cited the dual or shared governing format found in higher education as an extremely difficult aspect of presidential leadership. Cohen and March (1974) agreed, discussing the role of ambiguity which exists due to this unique arrangement. The nuances of this format often find presidents responsible for aspects of the institution over which they have very little control.

For many years, the path to the college presidency was almost exclusively a rise through the ranks of academia. In the 1800s, the college president, according to Lucas (1994), was “seen as more than the first among equals and his authority in all manners was nearly absolute” (p. 124). Kerr (1991) cited this time period to be the “age of the presidential giants” (p. 218). Moving into the 20th century, very little had changed. While perhaps not as essential as in previous centuries, it was still preferable to seek an individual with strong fundraising acumen (Lucas, 1994). During the 20th century, Cohen and March (1974) found that it was standard for college presidents to hold a Ph.D, but the Ed.D was becoming increasingly popular.

Stoke (1959), however, noted a trend, which would prove to be somewhat foretelling in this particular study, stating that “the college president as a Man of Learning is giving way to the Man of Management” (p. 3). Later studies found that college presidents agreed with this assessment stating that they compared their position to that of a business CEO and felt that they were expected to undertake administrative, political, and entrepreneurial roles (Cohen & March, 1974). Internal forces (governance and student diversity) coupled with external demands (budget constraints, regulatory bodies and increased competition) found Stoke’s prediction to be
Katz and Kahn (1978) found the major challenges for a college president to fall in one of three categories: (1) role conflict, (2) role overload, and (3) role ambiguity. Role conflict and role ambiguity can be uniquely tied to higher education, as the shared governance model requires the president to be responsible to several entities including the board of trustees, faculty senates, federal and state governments, and regulatory agencies. One suggestion to handle role conflict was that the president apply “the principal of substitutability” (p. 418), thereby delegating this responsibility to trusted confidantes (Newcomb, et al., 1965). March and Simon (1958) discussed the issue of presidential role ambiguity, stating that this was often complicated by influential individuals or bodies operating in informal manners. Some of these noted were large donors, state legislators, and philanthropic entities.

As discussed in broad terms, the prevailing literature subscribes to the contingency theory as the most suitable to study presidential leadership. Katz and Kahn (1978) suggested that a study of traits or ability is simply insufficient. According to these authors, no person will lead effectively in all situations, and therefore the answer is often a combination of individual and organizational variables. The authors (1978) use the term “goodness of fit” to explain the necessary match between institutional needs and personal abilities and skills (p. 211). Scholars, however, are careful to state that “goodness of fit” is not simply limited to the internal aspects of the institution. Several external factors including: (1) demographic shifts and projections, (2) state and federal budgeting, (3) legislation, and (4) collective bargaining arrangements must be considered as well (Benezet, Kats, & Magusson, 1981; Carbone, 1981; Richman & Farmer, 1976). Litten (1980) pays particular attention to the aspect of external dynamics stating that any board of trustees would be wise to seek a president uniquely skilled in areas of public relations,
lobbying, and persuading.

On the heels of student led protests, strong faculty senates, and evolving student demographics, a new style of higher education leadership was quickly gaining steam in the latter half of the 20th century (Burns, 1978). Transformational and collaborative leadership found a home in the president’s office at many colleges and universities (Astin & Astin, 2000; Boggs, 2003; Robles, 1998). Kezar et al. (2006) noted that “no longer is the literature concerned with the perception that presidents and other leaders are weak if they do not mandate change or exert power. Instead, models of servant leaders and collective leadership have replaced the command-and-control leader” (p. 13). This evolution of perspective argues that the leader getting the organization to the desired destination is not in itself enough; the path by which he or she gets there and the people impacted are also considered.

Transformational leadership, according to Bass and Riggio (2006), is made up of four key components: (1) idealized influence, (2) inspirational motivation, (3) intellectual stimulation, and (4) individualized consideration. These criteria suggest other important themes, including empowering followers, trust, appreciation, and collaboration. In addition, other scholars have expounded on these essential responsibilities, noting that transformational leaders should also be willing to take responsibility, correct in a way that is respected by followers, and commit to a covenant of life-long learning (Galpin, 1996; Tichy & Devanna, 1986). Essentially, the transformational leader does not view himself or herself, or is not expected to be viewed as the “hero” but rather should reserve this role for the team (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). This idea of collaboration, according to Chrislip and Larson (1994), is “fundamentally different than those traditionally practiced; rather relying on advocacy, hierarchy, exclusion and brute power to achieve narrow ends, they rely on trust, inclusion, and constructive engagement to achieve
The study of leadership, particularly presidential leadership, is extremely relevant to the examination of an institution over a given period of time. Such work allows the scholar to better grasp the impact of certain individuals in the evolution of the college or university. It is also crucial to cross reference the literature of the period with the institution during the same era. By doing so, the scholar can make accurate assessments of the “goodness of fit” at a given institution during a defined period of time.

**Institutional Theory**

While I think that the progression of Troy has been largely driven by personalities and presidential leadership, it is also important to understand institutional theory relevant to this study. Scott (1995) addressed the study of institutions through an economic, political, and sociological lens. This study of Troy certainly involves evaluation from each of these perspectives. Morphew & Huisman (2002) considered “academic drift” as an aspect of institutional theory. They describe academic drift as a move towards the norms and structure of more prestigious institutions. An example given involves the shift of a comprehensive masters college or university moving into the realm of doctoral education. While this particular example did not happen during the time period of this study, the question of academic drift with regard to the massive branch expansion should certainly be considered.

A theory certainly deserving of attention for this particular study would be one of resource dependency. Davis & Cobb (2002) argued that resource dependency theory has expanded across multiple fields, including higher education. Resource dependency theory, according to Davis & Cobb, is a theory reliant on power. The power of one over another comes when resources are limited. Resource dependency theory certainly describes the situation at Troy
during the latter half of the 20th century. Higher education was in demand and Troy, largely because of the relationship with the United States military, found itself in perfect position to be one of the primary delivery vehicles. Nevertheless, I focus the dissertation on the leaders and their work; as the dissertation will show, their efforts were central, even fundamental, to the changes at Troy over the period studied.

Thesis

The evolution of Troy University presents the opportunity for a very interesting study. It is an institution that begins as a small normal school but grows into a university with massive outreach with over 60 locations located in over 20 countries. This growth was extremely rapid beginning in the late 1950s and reached its peak in the early 2000s. While the study of this expansion, with multiple sites having separate regional accreditations, would be an informative study, the later merger of the system adds even another layer of interest to the study. It is also crucial to consider the leadership elements, particularly of the two presidents/chancellors, in order to adequately grasp the progression of the institution during this forty-year period.

Any scholastic institutional history will likely examine the institution type. This study of Troy University is no exception. Beginning as a normal school, founded to train teachers in southeast Alabama, and moving through several classifications before eventually becoming a multi-campus international university, is quite rare in U.S. higher education. While many institutions began as normal schools and eventually developed as master’s comprehensive universities, few became multi-campus international universities. This study picks up early in this evolution. In 1954, Troy University was known as Troy State Teacher’s College and operated one location with an enrollment just above 1,200 students (Shackleford, 1972). Changes were afoot, however, and they would be quick and dramatic. Within ten short years, by
1964, the institution had hired an entrepreneurial chancellor, Ralph Adams, with deep and direct connections to the most powerful man in the state of Alabama, Governor George Wallace. Classes were then taught at multiple locations in south Alabama, and total enrollment had more than doubled to over 3,000 students (Troy internal report, 2006). The evolution of this teachers college would continue throughout the latter half of the 20th century, as the institution expanded.

External factors are incontrovertibly linked to the study of any institution of higher education. This examination of Troy University is no exception. In fact, external factors play an undeniably vital role in the massive growth of Troy. The absence of a strong state governance oversight body in the early stages of this growth cannot be overstated. This allowed the institution to operate with a level of autonomy not normally seen in university systems. The institution also found a very willing partner in the U.S. military. At the height of the usage of the G.I. Bill and later as the Cold War gathered steam, soldiers were seeking higher education. These students, however, needed unique arrangements. They could not uproot families and forgo military duties to move to a college campus. They needed higher education brought to them. In Troy University, primarily under the leadership of Chancellors Ralph Adams and later Jack Hawkins, Jr., the armed services found exactly what they needed. Both Adams and Hawkins were decorated military veterans and felt a strong affinity for those who had served and were serving. The loose oversight of regulatory bodies, both on the state and regional levels, along with the demand for on-site higher education in the U.S military, created opportunity for Troy University during this time period.

An examination of the institutional typology and the external factors that facilitated the Troy University expansion are relevant. Without in-depth consideration of these aspects, the institutional history would be incomplete. Giving significant attention to the external factors in
play, including the military and regulatory agencies, is also extremely insightful. It would also be negligent not to give specific attention to the leaders of the institution during the time period being considered. Understanding their leadership styles, decision making processes, and personal visions for the institution are essential. While this study is not exclusively devoted to the examination of presidential leadership, it certainly recognizes its value. Having the luxury of hindsight, careful consideration can be given to the role these individuals played in the Troy University saga during this era.

This study attempts to tie all of these pieces together. The fact that a normal school in one of the poorest states in the country grew to become a worldwide leader in satellite campus course delivery is important. The role that governing bodies and the U.S. military played in this are also noteworthy. The institution also reestablished the home location in Troy, Alabama, as the only regionally-accredited site, allowing the other locations to fall back under this umbrella of accreditation. Examining the individuals leading the drive for these events provides another layer of insight into the multifaceted institution that is Troy University. It also enriches the story of the master’s comprehensive college and university.

The format of this work is chronological, beginning with the hiring of Ralph Adams in 1964 which lead to great expansion, first at military bases at Fort Rucker and in Montgomery. Later the study examines other issues which would arise, beginning in the 1970s with external entities, including the ACHE and Alabama State University. The relationship between the military and the institution is a common theme which weaves throughout the study. While the study is largely chronological, because of the developments at various campus locations throughout the years, it does not stay tethered to that format. Often times aspects of certain locations will be discussed which are not strictly chronological. The dissertation concludes with
the shift of presidential leadership from Adams to Jack Hawkins in the late 1980s. Under the Hawkins administration the institution undertook major organization changes in the early 2000s which are covered in the study.
CHAPTER TWO

ADAMS, ALABAMA, THE ALABAMA COMMISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, AND THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS

Introduction

In the spring of 1963 Troy State College was under the leadership of its fifth president, Frank Ross Stewart. President Stewart was continuing the progress of his predecessor, Charles B. Smith, and the institution was seeing continued growth (English, 1988). This growth was primarily seen on the main campus, but the institution had also undertaken a new endeavor. In the 1950s, the college began offering college level courses at Camp Rucker, an Army base located 25 miles southwest of the city of Troy (Kirkland, 2005). By 1963, the course offerings were very minimal, and the primary focus of President Smith involved developments on the main campus in Troy. Since his appointment in 1961 President Stewart had developed slight enrollment growth and added numerous new buildings (English, 1988).

Tragedy would strike the institution in March of 1964 with the untimely death of President Stewart (Kirkland, 2005). This was the first time the institution had lost a president in office, and it certainly proved to be uncharted waters. The original action of the State of Alabama Board of Education involved moving into executive session on April 4, 1964 to discuss the Troy State College presidency, in addition to appointing other directors at newly formed trade schools and junior colleges. The first response involved delegating high ranking officials currently working at Troy to oversee all of the existing presidential duties. At this time, the institution was still under the governance of the Alabama State Board of Education and therefore, the appointment of a new president would come from this body. According to the minutes from this
April meeting, Governor George Wallace asked for a delay in the appointment of these positions as he had endured a “long absence from his desk” and would like more time to review the applicants and discuss with represented delegations (Alabama State Board of Education, 1964).

**Adams is Appointed**

The Board would reconvene on August 3, 1964 to discuss several appointments, including that of the President of Troy State College. State Superintendent of Education Austin Meadows informed the Board that one of his nominees, Dr. Leroy Brown, Superintendent of Anniston City Schools, had withdrawn his name from consideration. This left only Dr. George Layton and Dr. J.H. Hadley as the remaining nominees for the position at Troy State. Superintendent Meadows then presented the Board with the name and qualifications of Colonel Ralph W. Adams for consideration of the position. Board member J.T. Albritton moved that the nomination of Colonel Adams be approved and that he be offered the position of president of Troy State College at an annual salary of $16,000. All members present voted in favor. One member, Mr. Cecil Word, was absent, but the records show that he placed a phone call earlier in the day to assure Superintendent Meadows that he supported the recommendation of the Governor and the Superintendent. Dr. Leroy Brown, who had withdrawn his name from consideration, was nominated and approved to the position of president of the newly formed junior college in Jefferson County, also at a salary of $16,000 (Alabama State Board of Education, 1964).

The appointment of Colonel Adams to the position of President at Troy State College was unconventional to say the least, as his experience in education administration was limited. The other candidates being considered for this particular position all had extensive educational backgrounds. According the obituary of Dr. George Layton, he was not only a Troy graduate, but
entered the field of secondary school public education in 1946 and had served in positions of administration (Layton, 2002). Dr. Hadley was employed in the department of education at the University of Alabama in 1964 (Hubbert, 1964). The appointment of Col. Adams would raise questions of cronyism and favoritism for the duration of Adam’s tenure at Troy.

Ralph Wyatt Adams was born in Samson, Alabama in 1915. Adams’ father, Alfred E. Adams, a 1903 graduate of Troy Normal School, served as a teacher for several years before opening a drug store in the Samson area. Alfred Adams died in February of 1929, just prior to the devastating stock market crash that would rock the entire country. As with many small business owners, the devastating economic conditions resulted in the loss of both the store and the family home. Ralph attended high school at the Southern Institute in Camp Hill, Alabama. Upon completion at the Southern Institute, Adams moved to Birmingham to live with his uncle, Eason Adams. While in Birmingham, Adams attended Birmingham-Southern College and graduated in 1937 (Adams, 1995).

The time Adams spent at Birmingham-Southern somewhat foreshadowed what would come in the following years. He was elected vice president of the student body. He joined many clubs including the Lambda Chi Alpha social fraternity, the Ministerial Association, and the International Relations Club, and he served as business manager of the college annual. Perhaps most notable of his college days involved a summer job he held in 1936. Under the direction of Elton Stephens, who would soon become a Birmingham business tycoon, Adams began selling magazine subscriptions by going door to door in the local area. He proved to be very successful in this venture and would gain the position of team sales manager. His chief competitor was a young high school student in Clio, Alabama by the name of George Corley Wallace. Wallace and Adams operated sales teams and developed a friendly but fierce competition (Adams, 1995).
This spirit of entrepreneurship, as well as the mutual respect the two men found for one another, would prove valuable in the coming decades.

Adams graduated Birmingham-Southern with plans to attend Yale Divinity School and become a preacher. After some time of contemplation, Adams changed his mind and made his way to the University of Alabama to begin law school. The administrators of the law school strongly discouraged students from being employed so as to prevent distractions from their studies. Adams, still receiving very little support from home, knew that this presented him with some very difficult financial issues. With a loan of $1,500 provided by family members, Adams made a down payment on a rooming house. This would turn into a very profitable venture for Adams, as at one point the property housed more than one hundred boarders. Perhaps most notable of them turned out to be his friend from the magazine subscription business, George Wallace. Wallace enrolled in undergraduate school at the University of Alabama, and Adams immediately capitalized on the networking and entrepreneurial spirit he knew of Wallace. Adams offered Wallace a 10 percent discount on the price of his room for each additional boarder Wallace provided. In very short order Wallace was living and eating for free at the Adams boarding house, (nicknamed the Bastille), based on his success recruiting new tenants. During this time the two men also sold insurance for Eason Adams and titled their operation the Adams-Wallace agency (Adams, 1995).

Through these endeavors, the magazine subscription business, the insurance agency, and the boarding house arrangement, Adams and Wallace formed a close friendship and found many mutual qualities and interest. While Adams provided Wallace with a nice place of residence during his time at the University of Alabama, perhaps it was Wallace who gave Adams a much greater sign of affection. In 1938, Wallace introduced Adams to Dorothy Kelly, a young lady
George met while serving as a page in the Alabama State Senate. After several years of courtship, Adams would marry Ms. Kelly on September 5, 1942 (Adams, 1995).

Upon graduating law school, Adams would begin his professional career in law, but he would explore many other options before settling into his presidency at Troy in 1964. His time practicing law would be rather short, largely due to the onset of World War II, but included short stints with several partners, which, not surprisingly, included a venture with George Wallace. With the outbreak of World War II, Adams followed suit of many eligible men and volunteered for the U.S. Army Air Force. Adams became a navigator and spent the majority of his time overseas between Africa and Asia. Upon completion of World War II, Adams retired as a captain finding employment as a civilian, but his work in the military would be of lifelong duration (Adams, 1995).

Adams found immediate employment upon returning to the States as the deputy superintendent of insurance for the state of Alabama. This was an appointed position made by Governor Chauncey Sparks. After an unsuccessful run for a seat on the Alabama Public Service Commission, Adams took another appointment from Governor Sparks, this time as a Tuscaloosa County district judge. Adams found himself called back into military service with the U.S. Air Force as the conflict with Russia heated up in the late 1940s. Adams would extend his military career for nearly twenty more years holding down several posts including assistant dean of the law school at Maxwell Air Force Base, serving as a military prosecutor in Japan, and finally, receiving a promotion to lieutenant colonel in Colorado Springs, Colorado. It was in Colorado where Adams grew a deep affinity for higher education, teaching several classes at the University of Colorado. He later served for a short period as the acting dean of the Air University Law School. In addition to his service, Adams also formed a very successful insurance company.
In 1959 Adams would merge his company, Academy Life Insurance Company, with the well-known and established Security Life and Accident Insurance (Adams, 1995). Prior to his retirement from the Air Force (and joining the reserves) in 1964, Adams had built a successful military record with additional success as a businessman in the insurance industry.

While Adams had certainly established himself since his time as a law student at the University of Alabama, his long-time friend, George Wallace, was busy making a name for himself as well. Wallace began his political career being elected freshman president of the school of arts and sciences. This was particularly impressive based on the fact that Wallace did so without the backing of the “Machine,” an organization of fraternities and sororities that controlled most student elections on campus. Wallace would climb the political ranks of the state, delivering a staunch segregationist message. His first run for governor in 1958 was unsuccessful as Wallace was defeated by John Patterson. This would prove to be a minor setback, as Wallace, serving as a circuit judge in Barbour County, fought the federal government at every turn. This approach seemed to appeal to the voting masses in Alabama, and Wallace would win the governorship easily in his second attempt in 1962 (Adams, 1995).

Wallace was sworn in in 1963 and Adams quickly called in a favor to his long-time friend, roommate, and business partner. The position of director of the Alabama Selective Service came open and Adams was highly interested in this post. Ironically, the position was a federal appointment and therefore not appointed by the governor of Alabama, but rather the president of the United States. Adams reached out to Wallace to express his interest and requested the governor appeal to President John F. Kennedy on his behalf. Wallace did appeal and Kennedy made the appointment of Adams to this position. While the position was technically federal in nature, it was essentially a state-level cabinet position. Adams, as he would
do for many years to come, worked indirectly for the governor of the State of Alabama. As Adams had proven many times throughout his lifetime, he was a man on the move and this position, as many in the past, would be short-lived. Upon the unexpected death of Troy State College (TSC) President Stewart, the position of president at TSC became vacant, and Adams threw his name into the ring just months after accepting the position with the Alabama Selective Service (Adams, 1995).

The facts leading to the appointment of Adams to the position at Troy are a bit disputed. Adams writes that he approached Wallace about the position, to which Wallace replied, “Go ahead, you just want to find out if you can get the job, but you will come back to me then” (Adams, 1995, p. 58). This suggest it was Adams seeking the position and blessing of Governor Wallace. The minutes from the State Board of Education, and later quotes from members of the Board, suggest a slightly different narrative. According to the board minutes of April 9, 1964, Superintendent Meadows recommended the Board move into executive session to consider the appointment of the president of Troy State College, in addition to other open positions throughout the state. Upon returning from executive session, Governor Wallace requested that any appointments be postponed, allowing him to “see certain delegations seeking an audience” (Alabama State Board of Education, 1964, p. 151). Such delay was agreed upon by the Board, and the next meeting was held on April 17, 1964 to continue to discuss the position.

This meeting, like the one previously, came and went with no president being named for Troy State College. At the April 17th meeting, Superintendent Meadows presented his nominations for the position at Troy and stated that he would vote in favor of the nominee who received the most votes. Once again, the Board, for reasons not mentioned in the minutes, delayed making a recommendation based on the nominations of Meadows. It would not be until
the meeting of August 3rd when the appointment of Adams would be made (Alabama State Board of Education, 1964).

The fact that Adams had very little experience in academia could certainly raise some eyebrows. However, individuals such as Bill Buchanan, one-time director of university relations at Troy, argued that Adams’s experience made him uniquely qualified for the position. He noted how his experience in law prepared him for the many legal battles that would face the institution. His short time as a teacher and a dean prepared him for the transformation, which the institution would undertake in the following years. Finally, Buchanan discussed how Adams’s business acumen allowed him to lead the institution through many lean years of state appropriations and proration. Jim Oakley, former ACHE chairman, cited Adams’s two great strengths as his business and administrative savvy and his ability to work the state legislature for funds (Visser, 1988). Neither the Buchanan nor Oakley discussed the value of Adams’s successful military career, but it is likely this experience allowed the institution to capitalize on opportunities that would develop quickly after Adams took the helm.

The Wallace-Adams relationship and the role it played with regard to the appointment to Troy, has always been more of an issue of innuendo and question rather than fact. As Adams tells it, he approached Wallace about the position at Troy. The State Board of Education minutes provide no evidence that Wallace played a role in securing this position for Adams. However, a 1988 Birmingham News interview with former State Board of Education member Harold Martin told a different story. In this account, Martin claims that one of the two current candidates won a straw vote by a one-vote majority. Unhappy with this selection, Wallace then had Adams nominated for the position. Martin then claims that he personally asked another board member, “Who is Ralph Adams?” The answer from the board was, “He’s a close friend of the
governor’s.” At that point the vote was conducted again, and Adams received unanimous support according to Martin (Visser, 1988, p. 1A).

Former ACHE chairman, Jim Oakley, presented an alternative motive behind the appointment of Adams. He stated that Wallace took issue with the idea of academic elitism and wanted to prove that a businessman could run a college institution. Oakley pointed to the time that Wallace was booed off the stage by a crowd at the University of Alabama. He felt that a PhD was not required to excel in higher education leadership and wanted to prove this point with Adams, according to Oakley (Visser, 1988).

Regardless of how and why the selection took place, the appointment of a non-educator to the position of president of a college was certainly unusual. The vast majority of college presidents during this era, as well as today, come from the ranks of academia (Ginsberg, 2016). To not consider the Wallace connection in this appointment would be negligent. By Adams’s own account, he approached his close friend about his desire to pursue the position. How the relationship between these two men would have an impact on the fate of this institution during their coinciding tenures is perhaps the more intriguing vantage point to consider.

Some could claim that the Wallace-Adams relationship, not only with regard to the appointment at Troy, but the favor gained after the appointment wreaked of cronyism. A former executive of ACHE suggested that Adams capitalized on an already lassie fair system of politics operating in the state of Alabama prior to his appointment calling Adams a “central figure in the politicization of higher education in the Alabama” (Visser, 1988, p.1A). Allegations such as this at the time were easy to make but often hard to prove.
Wallace-Adams Relationship

Archival research does indeed show evidence of the close relationship between Wallace and Adams. While the 1960s and early 1970s presented great change and challenges to the higher education system in Alabama, so too was it the beginning of the evolution of Troy State Teachers College. In addition to the implementation of the massive two year-system junior college system, Wallace had, through the direction of the Alabama State Board of Education, appointed his longtime friend Ralph Adams as president at Troy. What role their preexisting relationship had on the appointment of Adams to Troy cannot be stated with certainty. But what is without question is the relationship they maintained while both were serving the state. This can be confirmed through examination of the correspondence between the two during the period. Much of this correspondence is typical of what one would expect between the governor and the president of a state institution. This included invitations to events, updates on enrollments, and questions about funding. However, other correspondence was certainly more personal in nature and could fuel the fire of those suggesting unfair play or preferential treatment. For instance, Governor Wallace on many occasions, would contact Adams asking for a favor regarding a potential student or to inquire about employment opportunities for friends or associates. Much of this, found in the preserved governmental documents from Wallace’s time in office, speaks to the Wallace-Adams relationship.

Wallace wrote Adams on behalf of Ralph von T. Napp. He stated, “Ralph von T. Napp, was a friend of mine in college. He has written to me stating that he was desirous of returning to Alabama in an administrative position, dean of students or in some other capacity” (Wallace to Adams, personal communication, July 20,1971). Wallace goes on to say, “When I knew him at the University he was a fine young man and a strong supporter of ours in political campaigns
there” (1971). The use of the word “ours” in that statement certainly supports the theory that Wallace viewed Adams as a strong political ally dating back many years. Adams responded stating, “We will make every effort to find a position for him, but, as you know, the employment of educators now is very tight” (Adams to Wallace, personal communication, July 22, 1971). Adams also states, “In the event that he would like to come for an interview, we can pay his expenses” (1971). No records found suggest that reimbursing traveling expenses for interviewees was or was not a common practice at Troy.

Adams found himself attempting to satisfy an employee who wished to be transferred from the Troy campus to the Montgomery campus. This employee, Carlanda Green, certainly had connections to Wallace, as the address on the letter went to Ms. Green in Clayton, Alabama, the hometown of Governor Wallace. Adams tells Ms. Green, “As you know, because of Governor Wallace, you were given preferential treatment when you were first hired at Troy State. At that time there were others with higher qualifications than yours” (Adams to Wallace, personal communication, October 14, 1971). Adams goes on to say, “Again you were given preferential treatment when you were given a twelve-month contract for the 1971-72 academic year when the majority of the teacher have only a nine-month contract” (1971). Adams explains that he would not be able to accommodate the request and sends a copy of the letter to Governor Wallace (1971).

Wallace also often reached out to Adams at the behest of students seeking admissions or financial support. Wallace sent a letter to Adams on behalf of a “mutual friend,” John Bell, seeking employment and scholarship opportunities for Mr. Bell’s two children entering Troy State in the fall of 1971 (Wallace to Adams, July 6, 1971). Adams responded promptly on stating that the University would do everything possible for this family (Adams to Wallace, July 14,
1971). These letters between the two men were frequent during the Wallace-Adams era. They range from simple inquires to more strongly worded directives. To understand the context, one must understand the figure George Wallace was at this time. He was, without question, the most powerful and influential man in the state of Alabama. He, with support of most of the state, had just defied the federal government with regard to school integration. Wallace wielded unprecedented power and called on his friend and ally, Ralph Adams, often.

Wallace also trusted Adams and used him as a confidant and sounding board for higher education funding. For instance, in June of 1971, Wallace was trying to determine how to fund the medical schools in the state based on the cost necessary to educate these students. Adams wrote Wallace on this issue. He spoke of his conversation with Dr. Clanton Williams, a sitting ACHE commissioner. He stated in a letter,

Dr. Clanton Williams has been advised by the Birmingham and Mobile medical school people that it costs fifteen thousand a year to educate a medical student. There is no one to challenge this figure except Dr. Clanton Williams and if he does- he is apprehensive that the Mobile and Birmingham delegations will clip the wings of his Commission on Higher Education. Therefore, his Commission should be strengthened and funded before he takes a position against these and other powerful forces (Adams to Wallace, personal communication, June 28, 1971).

Adams closed the letter stating that Dr. Williams found the cost to educate the medical student throughout the South around $7,000 per year (1971).

The Williams letter was not uncommon for Adams. He spent much of his presidency arguing for “equitable funding.” He preached this message to anyone who would listen, including and most important, the governor. As Troy began to grow, particularly at off-campus
locations, Adams became increasingly frustrated with how he felt Troy was being slighted. This would drive Adams and Troy to implement unconventional methods to seek funds for operations at the off-campus locations in the latter half of the 1970s.

It could be argued that Adams was selected for the position at Troy because of his success in the business world. His entrepreneurial spirit was evident from an early age. Among many other ventures, the boarding house he started while in law school at the University of Alabama proved extremely successful. This personality trait followed him to Troy, and exhibited itself time and time again during his presidency. Without a doubt, his legacy regarding his presidency is tied to his vision and commitment to grow the institution. This included, not only at the main campus in Troy, but throughout the nation and across the entire globe, through a branch campus system.

**History of Public Higher Education in Alabama**

The time when Adams took the helm at Troy proved to be a very volatile time of higher education in the state of Alabama. This volatility included, but was not limited to, mission, expansion, funding, and governance. To completely grasp the idea of higher education branch expansion in the state of Alabama, it is beneficial to first understand the history of state supported public higher education in the state. In 1819, just days after Alabama’s official admission to the Union, the state legislature created the University of Alabama. It was not until 1831, however, that this institution became operational (Randall, 2001). In 1832, the University of Alabama issued its first baccalaureate degree. During these early years, the state’s only institution of higher education focused on the traditional curriculum of liberal arts, with a focus on the classics and eschewing “professional” studies. The onset of the Civil War brought instruction to a halt, and it was not until 1868 that higher education would resume (Gipson,
In response to the devastation of the war, the state realized it needed to further educate its citizens. This led to the creation of Auburn University, on the heels of the Morrill Act of 1862 (Gipson, 1980). An institution, first opened as East Alabama Male College in 1856, became Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical College of Alabama in 1872. This institution changed names Alabama Polytechnic Institute in 1899 before settling on the name of Auburn University in 1960. This institution, in conjunction with the language set forth in the Morrill Act, would seek to educate students in areas related to agriculture and mechanical arts (Randall, 2001).

Between 1872 and 1887, the state undertook the issue of teacher training. It was during this 15-year period that four state normal schools were created. These institutions – Florence in 1872, Jacksonville in 1883, Livingston in 1883, and Troy in 1887 – were established to train teachers to educate the white children of the state (Alabama Commission of Higher Education, 1972).

Recognizing the need for specialized training, other than teachers, led to the creation of a School of Law at the University of Alabama in 1872. Similarly, in 1872, the state provided support to a medical school in Mobile, which would be a branch of the University of Alabama. Within the same time period, a school of engineering was added at both Auburn and Alabama (ACHE, 1972).

For the first fifty plus years of existence, neither Auburn nor Alabama admitted female students. Women were able to gain admission only into the teaching institutions and an institution specifically for women, the Alabama College for Women, was established in 1896. Both Alabama and Auburn admitted their first female students in the 1890’s (ACHE, 1972).
Black students had no access to higher education in Alabama until 1873. It was in this year that the state established The State Normal School and University for Colored Students and Teachers (Alabama State University) in Montgomery. In 1875 Huntsville Normal School (Alabama A&M) was to educate African-Americans in the Huntsville area. These institutions provided both industrial and normal training (ACHE, 1972). The Second Morrill Act, passed in 1890, required that states either admit blacks to land grand institutions or designate an institution to serve this purpose to black students. The state chose the second option, designating the former normal school near Huntsville to become the black land grant college with the name The State Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes (Alabama A&M) in 1891 (Randall, 2001).

Moving into the 20th century, the framework for state supported higher education in the state of Alabama was set. It consisted of two state institutions, four normal schools, two institutions for blacks, and one institution specifically for women. While there was a significant evolution of higher education during the first half of the 20th century, it was primarily within the framework of these established institutions.

Major developments took place within the University of Alabama. The establishment of schools of engineering and education was first. This was followed by schools of commerce and business, as well as a school for home economics. The institution also saw evolution within the school of medicine. The branch in Mobile was discontinued in lieu of a two-year program on the campus in Tuscaloosa. By 1945, the program in Tuscaloosa was also terminated, and the University set up a new branch location for the medical school in Birmingham (ACHE, 1972).

The early 1900’s also saw most of the normal schools expand their curriculum from a two-year teacher education program, to four-year bachelor of science degrees in education (ACHE, 1972). They also began a series of name changes, all becoming state teachers colleges in
the late 1940s. This expanded beyond the limited teachers’ curriculum and even transitioned into graduate work leading to master’s degrees (ACHE, 1972).

Alabama A&M and Alabama State experienced similar changes to that of the teachers colleges. They began offering four-year bachelor degrees in education and by the 1940s were granting master’s degrees as well. Like the state teachers colleges, they also expanded the curriculum to allow the granting of undergraduate degrees in the arts and sciences (ACHE, 1972).

The Alabama College for Women also changed its name and became the University of Montevallo. This institution, like others in the state, expanded its program offerings and by the mid-1950s offered several liberal arts degrees, in addition to teacher training. In 1956, the University of Montevallo became a coeducational institution, admitting both men and women (ACHE, 1972).

Midway through the 20th century, the state’s normal schools began to evolve. In 1957, with permission to grant general education degrees (arts and sciences), the transformation which limited the scope beyond just training teachers was well underway (ACHE, 1972). Graduate degrees would soon follow, and these institutions were on the way to becoming full-fledged universities in the not so distant future.

While the first half of the 20th Century brought changes within the state’s established higher education institutions, the state dramatically changed during the second half of the century. These changes included expansion from traditional institutions and the introduction of new institutions, most notably, the introduction of a massive junior college system.

In 1963, the state began creating junior colleges and technical institutes throughout the state. Within 10 years, this network of institutions showed tremendous growth. By the 1971-72
academic year, the state boasted eighteen junior colleges and enrolled more than 24,000 students. On top of the junior college boom, the state of Alabama also recognized twenty-seven technical institutes, which enrolled over 8,000 students (ACHE, 1972). Based on the inexpensive tuition, loose admissions policies, and wide geographic disbursement, it appeared that the state was successful in the mission of providing accessible and affordable education to its citizens.

The state colleges also saw elevation to university status during this period. The University of Alabama, now with branches in Birmingham, Mobile, and Huntsville, converted those sites to full-fledged four-year degree granting institutions. Auburn University and the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa widely expanded their doctoral programs. By the 1970s, both the University of Alabama in Birmingham and the University of Alabama in Huntsville were offering a limited number of PhD programs (ACHE, 1972).

State Governance of Alabama Higher Education

An examination of higher education in Alabama in the late 1960s saw one glaring absence – no coordinating, oversight, or governing body assigned specifically to manage this segment of state education. The State Board of Education governed the state’s 18 junior colleges. The same process was in place for the 27 technical institutions, also governed by the State Board of Education (Smith, 2012).

During this period, six of the state universities began to be governed by separate boards of trustees, appointed by the governor, who also served as an ex officio member. These six institutions included the original four teachers colleges, Florence, Jacksonville, Livingston, and Troy, as well as Montevallo. Alabama A&M and Alabama State were still to be governed by the State Board of Education. The most recent addition to this group was the University of South
Alabama. This institution filled a void in medical education when the University of Alabama moved out of the Mobile area (Randall, 2001).

Joining the junior/technical colleges and the state universities were the two comprehensive institutions, the University of Alabama and Auburn University. These institutions were separated at the time based on the offering of PhD programs, as well as the existence of multiple campus locations, each possessing its own chief administrative officer. A board of trustees selected by the board itself with approval from the state Senate governed these two institutions (ACHE, 1972).

Recognizing the lack of any form of coordination or oversight, the 1968 state legislature created the Alabama Education Study Commission. Governor Brewer addressed the need for examination in 1969 during a special session of the legislature stating that there was “an acute crisis” in education (“Solons to Tackle,” 1969, pg.1). At this point, the state had essentially three options to consider regarding higher education governance. One, the state could dictate that a single governing board could be created, which would exercise full authority over higher education in the state. Two, the state could institute a coordinating body that carried enforcement powers to compel institutions to abide by its direction. This option would provide the authority to,

(1) approve or disapprove new programs and campuses, as well as the power to review existing programs and locations; (2) initiate long-range comprehensive planning for higher education in the state; and (3) wield significant power with regard to budget and appropriations. The third and final option allowed for the state to create an advisory board with no power of enforcement, so it was dependent on voluntary compliance from the institutions within the state (Gipson, 1980, p. 157).
This final option would likely be beneficial only if backed by strong support from the legislature and governor.

This committee decided on the least intrusive option. This was the creation of a statewide advisory agency. This agency would have limited power and its scope was primarily in information gathering, recommending, and evaluating. This recommendation came to pass in 1969 in Act No. 14 during a special session of the state legislature. This act created the Alabama Commission of Higher Education (ACHE) with the following language:

To establish the Alabama Commission of Higher Education for the general purpose of promoting an educational system that will provide the highest possible quality of collegiate and university education to all persons in the state able and willing to profit from it; to provide through the Commission for continuous study, analyses, planning, reporting, and recommendations for long-range planning with established priorities on a state-wide basis to assure sound, vigorous, progressive and coordinated system of higher education for this State (Alabama Act, 1969, p. 28).

The language set forth in Act No. 14 specifically stated that the Commission shall serve in an advisory capacity and therefore did not have power to compel institutions to abide by policy recommendations (Alabama Act, 1969).

The Act creating ACHE also stated specifically what the commission would do. The language in the Act stated that the commission be made up of nine members appointed by the governor, with consent of the senate. The members would come from each of the eight congressional districts and one member at-large. Members were not allowed to serve past their seventieth birthday and were limited to a nine-year term. The Commission, by virtue of the language in the Act, was to elect annually a chairman and also appoint a highly qualified person...
to be the executive officer. The executive officer would oversee the staff and perform other duties assigned by the Commission. The funding for the Commission was to be allocated from appropriations of the Alabama Special Education Trust Fund (Alabama Act, 1969).

The language of the role of the Commission was often very specific. It said that the Commission should serve in an advisory capacity to the governor and the legislature. Regarding budgetary issues, the Commission was charged with making recommendations to the legislature regarding unified budget reports in addition to separate institutional budgets. That being said, the language did not restrict power of the institutions to communicate with entities including the state legislature and governor (Alabama Act, 1969).

The Act did not bestow upon the Commission the authority to deny the request of any institution to form a new unit of instruction, research, or public service, it simply allowed the right to express negative judgments (Alabama Act, 1969). This particular authority, or lack thereof, would prove to be controversial and divisive in the years following the formation of the Commission. Institutions moving forward with operations not supported by the Commission, while often resulting in admonishment, were not forbidden.

In 1972, after only a few years in existence, ACHE conducted a “self-study” to examine its role in conjunction with the intent of the legislative act. Several conclusions were made. For instance, the body found that while the state had a large number of postsecondary institutions (83), there was a great deal of uniformity rather than diversity. This was highlighted as an area of concern relative to the maximization of state funds by avoiding duplication. The report also specifically pointed out the close relationship institutions attempted to maintain with the governor and legislature, knowing that allocation of funds was ultimately decided at this level (ACHE, 1972).
Perhaps the most drastic suggestion to come from this evaluation was the consideration of the “Master Plan.” The goal of this Master Plan, according to the notes of the evaluation, was to address “the needs of post-secondary education in a pattern which, recognizing fully the public interest, yet encourages the substantive freedom which alone creates educational flexibility and diversity. These qualities are not now emphasized in an orderly fashion” (ACHE, 1972, p. 8). The plan spoke to the need to address both graduate and undergraduate studies. The report cited that in 1971, for example, seventeen colleges and universities granted master’s degrees in 108 (largely overlapping) areas of study. The committee suggested that the Master Plan would attempt to address this issue which “suggests unhealthy completion among post-secondary institutions, in the sense of duplicative programs beyond the capacity of the State to fund at a quality level” (ACHE, 1972, p.13).

Based on an examination of the geographic layout of higher education institutions, the committee cited the need for no further creation of public senior colleges or universities for the foreseeable future. That being said, the point was expressly made regarding the lack of control this committee garnered by Act No. 14. “The State will never be able to focus on the development of quality so long as every institution is free to initiate whatever program it sees fit, whenever it desires, and in the process to establish unjustifiably expensive programs that compete unnecessarily with existing offerings,” the report stated (ACHE, 1972, p.14).

This flaw in the system, the report argued, mandated the need for a Master Plan. The Master Plan would allow for, as in other states, the orderly and efficient growth and development of higher education in Alabama. Also, in line with what had been done in other states, it would align the programs offered by institutions with their respective role and classification. That being said, the report recognized that role definitions should be flexible and institutional departures
from constricted roles be allowed when necessary to enrich higher education within the state (ACHE, 1972).

The intention of the 1972 Master Plan also specifically identified institutions by type and classification. The goal of this was to limit duplication and allow resources to be allocated to institutions to specialize in line with their mission. The distribution was set forth as follows:

**Category I. Comprehensive Universities** - These institutions were described in the report as offering a complex array of undergraduate, professional, and graduate programs. These institutions also offered extensive offerings in doctoral education. The report also noted that the comprehensive universities should provide organized research which provided benefits at the local, state, and national levels. For the purpose of this 1972 report, the only institutions which met this criteria and category were the University of Alabama and Auburn University.

**Category II. Urban Universities** - These institutions provided broad undergraduate instruction and a limited number of offerings in professional or graduate studies. These institutions were expected to deliver higher education to the state’s large urban areas. The institutions which fit this category included the University of Alabama in Birmingham, the University of Alabama in Huntsville, the University of South Alabama, and Auburn University in Montgomery.

**Category III. Regional Universities** - These institutions provided primarily undergraduate instruction. However, the occasional professional program or graduate program was not unusual. The emphasis of the faculty revolved around teaching and instruction, but research was not discouraged. These student bodies were recognized as being largely residential and typically represent the geographic area of the institution. Those identified as regional institutions were
Alabama A&M, Alabama State, Florence State, Jacksonville State, Livingston, Troy State, and the University of Montevallo.

**Category IV. Junior Colleges and Technical Institutes** - Alabama law described a junior college as an educational institution offering instruction in arts and sciences on the level equivalent to the first two years above high school level. The report agreed with this assessment and added that the junior colleges should provide associate degree opportunities to all high school graduates throughout the state and do so at a reasonable cost. Unlike the regional universities, most students at junior colleges were identified as commuters (ACHE, 1972).

The vocational and technical institutes provided occupational and developmental education to students seeking immediate employment in various trades and occupations. Academic courses were generally very limited with the focus of the curriculum being specific to proficiency in the desired trade.

This classification, while acknowledged as imperfect, was done with the attempt of segmenting the various institutions of higher education existing in Alabama at the time. The report noted the existence of no public liberal arts colleges, so therefore, no comment was made regarding that type institution (ACHE, 1972).

Another external entity to be considered when looking at the advancement the Troy branch system is the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), particularly the Commission on Colleges (COC), which was the branch of SACS tasked with higher education. SACS is the regional body charged with accreditation of colleges in the southern portion of the United States, where Troy is located. Regional accrediting agencies, beginning with the New England Association of Colleges and Schools in 1855, serve as the peer-review system of
accountability for United States higher education. SAACS was created in 1895. The initial role of SACS was stated as an entity:

To organize southern schools and colleges for mutual assistance and corporation; (2) to elevate the standard of scholarship and bring about uniformity of entrance requirements; and (3) to develop preparatory schools and eliminate preparatory work from the college (Wiley & Zald, 1967, p. 40).

Troy, as well as every institution of higher education, valued the support of regional accreditation, such as SACS. Without such support an institution is destined for failure. Only institutions with regional accreditation are eligible for Title IX funding from the U.S. Government. As Troy grew branch operations, both stateside and abroad, the compliance with SACS always carried great importance.

Expansion would come fast and furious at Troy. This expansion, beginning in connection with military bases, would expand far beyond those boundaries. If an opportunity opened, the administration, under two different leaders looked to capitalize on the opening. These expansions began close to the main campus in Troy, Alabama, but eventually existed thousands of miles away and all the way across the globe.
CHAPTER THREE
EXPANSION BEGINS AT FORT RUCKER/DOTHAN
AND MONTGOMERY

Introduction

I would argue that the mass expansion of Troy was not original one of strategic planning. To the contrary, this study will present the argument that the lack of strategic planning regarding expansion proved to be detrimental. The origin, I would argue, was one of opportunity and convenience. Maximizing at a time of strong appetite for higher education within the U.S. military, Troy found itself in a perfect position, geographically and otherwise, to serve this need.

Fort Rucker- The Beginning of Expansion

About a decade prior to Adam’s arrival at Troy State College in 1964, the institution began offering courses at a military instillation named at Fort Rucker located about 25 miles southwest of Troy. Fort Rucker was an Army aviation base located in both Dale and Coffee Counties, near Daleville, Alabama, and originally opened on May 1, 1942. While course offerings at the installation (at the time named Camp Rucker) began in 1955, it was not until the creation of a resident center in 1961 that the location saw substantial growth. Through the resident center established on the base in 1961, students, mostly soldiers, but non-military citizens as well, could gain college academic coursework credit without leaving the base. Military personnel could participate in the Armed Forces “Bootstrap” program.
The Bootstrap program allowed for a soldier to complete the last two quarters of a college degree at the resident center. The program then required the student to request a six-month temporary duty assignment at the college so they could obtain the last two quarters’ coursework in a residency environment on campus. The Bootstrap program offered the opportunity for degree completion and also took into consideration the transient nature of this audience. While 145 individuals enrolled through the resident center in 1961-62, only 11 completed a degree with Troy by 1968 (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968).

Prior to his arrival at Troy in 1963, Adams had served a long military career and had spent time in the educational setting of the military in both Colorado and Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery. In short order, Adams saw that the Bootstrap program was not resulting in the awarding of a large number of Troy degrees. In conjunction with the military authority at Fort Rucker, the university dropped the campus requirement, which then allowed students to earn an entire degree on base. Students could earn B.S. degrees in history, business, and psychology at Fort Rucker. By June of 1967, Troy State University awarded its first degree to a student who completed all coursework at the Fort Rucker branch location (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968).

Due in large part to the escalation of the Vietnam War, the population at Fort Rucker continued to grow. By 1968, the base had grown to approximately 26,000, which included military personnel, dependents, and civilian workers. The Resident Center provided college services to all of these constituencies. Because of the large number of officers already holding baccalaureate degrees, the Center soon began offering graduate coursework. The combination of the growing population at the post, the increased diversified course offerings, and the interest of the civilian population in the area rapidly grew enrollments at the Resident Center at Fort
Rucker. While the student enrollment in the early 1960s at the Fort Rucker Center only slightly exceeded 100 students, enrollment had grown to 500 students during the 1967-68 academic year (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968).

In 1966, Governor Wallace appointed a board of trustees to govern Troy State College since it was no longer under the oversight of the State of Alabama Board of Education. This board relied on the president of the institution to control all operations. The branch campuses, the first being Fort Rucker, were governed by a director. The man selected to oversee the Fort Rucker Center in 1961 was Robert Paul. Paul had received his undergraduate degree from Troy in 1950 and his master’s degree from the University of Alabama in 1963. Paul was also a World War II veteran and former prisoner of war who would go on to have a long career with Troy. The director was assisted by a registrar, clerical staff, and faculty members. Many of the faculty members held full-time positions with the main campus, but some were appointed directly to the branch location (Kirkland, 2005).

Fort Rucker, originally known as Camp Rucker, traces its origins back to the summer of 1941 when the War Department purchased the land to construct the Ozark Triangular Division Camp in Dale and Coffee counties. The base remained active through the end of the Korean War, when it was placed on inactive status in June of 1954. This inactive status was short lived, as the U.S. Army Aviation School arrived in August of the same year (History of Fort Rucker, 1964). The school began as a fixed wing training center and enjoyed great success focusing on this aspect of flight. In the early 1960s, classes of 120 students were arriving at Fort Rucker monthly for fixed wing flight training. As the United States increased its involvement with the conflict in Vietnam, there became a high sense of urgency for pilots with rotary wing training (helicopters). Fort Rucker became a hub for this specialty training, as well as being a primary training base for
helicopter instrument training. The base reported a population of over 10,000 soldiers in December of 1971. This expansion of the base would prove beneficial to Troy in its endeavor to provide higher education at base locations (Historical supplement to Fort Rucker, 1971).

Based on the small staff employed by Fort Rucker, most matters outside of admissions, records, and instruction would have been handled by the main campus. For instance, the Vice President for Finance at the main campus usually handled budgetary matters while the Vice President for Student Affairs coordinated student personnel issues. The director of the base and the Vice President of Academics handled issues regarding instruction. All of these vice presidents reported to the president of the institution, who also served as Chief Executive Officer of the Troy system. Also key to the operation was the Education Officer of the base. This officer not only had control of what educational opportunities were allowed on the base, but also provided educational advice to military personnel. This individual, a civil service employee of the Army and not a Troy employee, was a significant player (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968). Making sure this individual was satisfied with the educational services provided on the installation was of great importance.

The student growth, driven in large part by the desire of the United States military to educate its armed forces, proved to be of financial benefit to Troy. The Fort Rucker Center began very modestly, as the income statements from the 1960s suggest. The 1964-1965 income statement actually reported a loss of $7,447 for the Center. This trend quickly changed and the Center reported a net income of $26,799 for the 1966-1967 academic year. This growth in net income was driven largely by revenue growth. Between 1963 and 1967, revenue from the Fort Rucker Center grew from $40,096 to $148,182. Because of the large portion of services provided to Fort Rucker by staff and faculty from the main campus, the Troy campus charged the branch
campus an overhead operations fee. This fee was 30% of total direct cost of the branch location (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968).

For perspective, the total revenue generated by student tuition at the main campus for the 1966-1967 academic year was $674,313. This is extremely relevant in understanding the value of the branch campus in its very early days. These revenue figures support this thesis as 18% of student tuition revenue was generated by newly formed branch campus system (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968). In conjunction with revenue growth, the student headcount at the Fort Rucker location also saw substantial increases during this period. By 1974, the year the Fort Rucker location began offering coursework further south in Houston County, student enrollment through the Fort Rucker location had seen substantial growth reported 1,525 students in Fall 1975 (Institutional Self-Study, 1975).

**Move to Dothan**

It was during 1974 that the institution, now named Troy State University, realized two aspects about the Fort Rucker location. One, attempting to provide education services to military personnel, dependents, and civilians on the base at Fort Rucker had become unmanageable. There was simply not enough space to carry out this endeavor. Two, there was a need for providing adult education to degree-seeking students in the Dothan, Alabama area. Dothan, located in Houston County about 30 miles south of Fort Rucker, was a rural but growing area in southeast Alabama. There was not a baccalaureate degree-granting institution in this area of the state with the exception of the residential campus in Troy, which was located about 60 miles north. The leaders of Troy State University, both on the main campus and at the Fort Rucker location, saw a need for adult education in this area, primarily night classes. Through a partnership with the local community college, George Wallace State Community College
(WSCC), Troy State University at Fort Rucker began to offer courses, including lower division courses not offered by WSCC, on the campus of WSCC (Kirkland, 2005). This relationship, while beginning very cordially, would become far less collegial in the coming years.

Since its inception in 1961, the Fort Rucker Resident Center, in 1970 re-named Troy State University at Fort Rucker, was completely self-funded (SACS Self-Study, 1980). It was receiving no direct funds from state appropriations for this extension center (“TSU at Fort,” 1973). Under the direction of President Adams, Fort Rucker, as well as its counterpart branch location in the Montgomery area, began the process of petitioning the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) for branch accreditation (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968). It is necessary to provide clarity to the accreditation of the Troy branch locations.

As early as 1971, Troy State University had received approval to offer full degree programs on location at Ft. Rucker, as well as at Maxwell-Gunter in Montgomery. These accreditations also required approval from agencies that oversaw the program offerings in various academic disciplines. Perhaps the more crucial accreditation change would begin in 1978, when Adams approved personnel at both Ft. Rucker and Maxwell/Gunter to initiate action leading to the separate accreditation for these two locations (Kirkland, 2005). This will be discussed further in this writing, but this action proved to be monumental when considering the history of the institution.

**Montgomery- Expansion Continues**

In response to the success the institution had seen with regard to branch expansion at the Fort Rucker location, Troy began to entertain other opportunities in the mid-1960s. One such opportunity became available just 50 miles north of Troy in the state capital city of Montgomery. Montgomery was the home to a very robust United States Air Force operation at two locations,
Gunter Air Force Base and Maxwell Air Force Base. Based on the ongoing issues in Vietnam and the distrust of the Soviet Union, the United States continued to seek ways to further educate its servicemen. The Air Force stations in Montgomery were fertile teaching grounds, and the proven success to deliver this service made Troy a natural partner.

In 1965, the University and the Air Force made it official with an agreement signed between 3800 Air Base Wing Commander Colonel Wilson R. Wood and Troy State College President Ralph Adams. This contract, similar to what existed at Fort Rucker, established a resident center of Troy State College at Maxwell Air Force Base. This resident center allowed for the completion of the Bachelor of Arts or Science degrees in several disciplines, including art, business, education, psychology, English, health, physical education, history, mathematics, music, and science. It also provided the opportunity to service members to obtain a master’s degree in education (Tate, 1965).

The Residential Center in Montgomery began classes in March 1965, offering 15 courses. The initial enrollment for the entering class in spring 1965 slightly exceeded 400 students. Much like the Fort Rucker Residential Center named a coordinator/director, the operation in Montgomery did the same. Serving as somewhat of a counterpart to Robert Paul at Fort Rucker, Troy named Roy E. Jeffcoat as the coordinator of the Gunter-Maxwell Center. At its inception, the center stated that courses were open to military and retired military personnel, as well as civil service employees and dependents who met entrance requirements (Report of the Institutional Self-Study, 1968). Also, keeping in line with arrangements at Fort Rucker, the institution stated that 75% of tuition would be covered by the military with tuition assistance from the institution covering the balance (Troy State College, 1965).
The Alabama news media, which would in turn become very critical of the growth of Troy, strongly supported this venture at the time. The *Montgomery Advertiser* published an article citing the value of an educated soldier. The article stated that, “Mandatory military quality of courage, under any definition, is positively correlated with intelligence” (“Troy State at,” 1965, p.4). In closing, the article suggested that “all who had a hand in the establishment of the new school here in Montgomery, which incidentally, is not limited to military students, deserves praise” (1965, p.4).

**Higher Education History in Montgomery**

Higher education, for white citizens, in Montgomery dates back to 1936 when the University of Alabama opened an extension center in the city. The Montgomery Chamber of Commerce had higher expectations for their city and desired a full-fledged university. Senator O. J. Goodwyn of Montgomery stated that “such a facility wound not only benefit present business and industrial concerns but would attract new enterprises to the area and complement the programs being offered on Maxwell Air Force Base” (Fair, 1981, p.1). In the summer of 1966, city leaders approached the University of Alabama about establishing a branch campus in Montgomery. They were rebuffed, as President Frank Rose cited lack of desire for more expansion based on the developments in Birmingham and Huntsville (Thompson, 1992).

Local Montgomery leaders were not satisfied with this answer. They then contacted Auburn University to discuss options for a university in Montgomery. This overture led to Auburn University purchasing the extension center from the University of Alabama and establishing an institution in Montgomery, provided Auburn could procure additional state appropriations to fund this location. In 1967, with the support of Senator Goodwyn, at that time serving as Chairman of the Finance and Taxation Committee, the state legislature approved the
Montgomery College bill, which authorized a five-million dollar bond issue. These funds, along with the negotiated deal between AU and UA, led to the creation of Auburn University in Montgomery (AUM) in 1970 (Fair, 1994). The establishment of AUM, along with the growth of Troy, resulted in three public higher education institutions in Montgomery; Alabama State University (ASU) was the third, one of the state’s public black colleges.

While this arrangement created an institution of higher education in Montgomery, it was not without detractors. In particular, not using these funds to bolster ASU ultimately resulted in legal action. Former Alabama Governor John Patterson stated that it was “another terrible mistake. The money should have been put into Alabama State so it could be built into a top-flight accredited institution” (Patterson in Randall, p. 151). Longtime Wallace friend and advocate Jimmy Faulkner agreed, stating that it was “Wallace’s biggest mistake” (Faulkner in Randall, 2001, p.151). The movement also resulted in the filing of a lawsuit by civil rights attorney Fred Gray. Gray agreed that these state funds should have been put to the betterment of ASU. Gray lost his lawsuit in federal district court and AUM was given the green light to proceed (Randall, 2001). The success of AUM in Montgomery was fast and furious. In fall of 1970 the institution reported enrollments of 990 students. This number ballooned nearly 500%, with an enrollment of 4,428 in the fall of 1978 at AUM. Similar to AUM, Troy grew rapidly in Montgomery and some saw this growth as detrimental to state higher education and in particular, to the well-being of Alabama State University (2001).

By the mid-1970s the Montgomery venture was growing and the mission had evolved. The location, adopting the name Troy State University-Montgomery (TSUM) in 1974, touted itself as an “evening university, offering programs for adults who work during the day, as well as programs for special occupational groups at times convenient to meet their needs” (MacGuire,
At this point, TSUM offered over 185 courses and promoted that it allowed students to work full-time to obtain associates, bachelor, and graduate degrees at their own pace.

**Military Partnerships Fuel Growth**

While the installation of a branch of higher education on the two Air Force bases in Montgomery was somewhat groundbreaking at those locations, delivering education was not an entirely foreign concept there. Since 1951, the Air Force had been offering correspondence courses through the Extension Course Institute (ECI). Gunter Air Force base in Montgomery served as the home of ECI, which by 1958, was serving over 200,000 USAF personnel at a cost of $18 per year per student, though it is not specified who bore the cost. The program consisted of four general education courses and over 80 courses in specific Air Force fields, including weather, electronics, photography, and vehicle maintenance. With the completion of the ECI program, an airman received a diploma that signified his commitment to betterment and increased job knowledge (Lewan, 1967).

Higher education for Air Force personnel saw dramatic growth in the early 1960s. In the period between July 1, 1961 and June 30, 1962, 108,623 officers and airmen enrolled in college coursework. This number grew to 148,605 in the following fiscal year. This represents a 22% annual increase. Tuition assistance from the Air Force also experienced drastic increases during this same period. The Air Force paid $3,127,440 towards tuition in 1962. This amount grew to $4,798,544 in 1963 (Lewan, 1967).

Active duty Air Force personnel were able to take advantage of two tuition reimbursement programs during this era. The first was called “Tuition Assistance” by the Department of Defense, allowing military members to have 75% of their higher education tuition covered by the government. The second benefit, titled the “Cold War G. I. Bill,” gave soldiers
$130.00 per month, or the amount of tuition, whichever was less, towards credit received from an accredited institution of higher education (Lewan, 1967).

George Washington University, located in Washington, D.C., was one of the first institutions to partner with the Air Force in higher education. In 1962, the institution created a cooperative degree program with the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). This program allowed for an officer to earn a baccalaureate or master of arts degree in international affairs by giving George Washington University credit for ACSC coursework. This program also became available to Air War College students (Tolson, 1980).

Upon the inception of the resident center on the base in February of 1965, Adams stated that the weapons of modern warfare required the soldiers to have greater technical skills, in addition to knowledge of the social sciences, foreign languages, and other subjects. “Our educational program is also designed for military personnel who must look forward to the termination of active military service and the return to some vocation or profession in civilian life,” Adams stated (Krantz, 1965, para. 11). The education of soldiers on base, like at Ft. Rucker, started as the primary mission of the offering of coursework in the Montgomery area.

While the establishment and success of the extension centers, particularly tied to military installations, were unique in the 1960s, the practice was not entirely unheard of. The University of Maryland, often seen as the pioneer of military branch expansion, began a relationship with the United States military as early as World War II in the 1940s. The University of Maryland program found its niche abroad. By partnering with military installations and bases overseas, both during times of war and peace, the institution found itself in the prime position to grow overall enrollments through this population (Clutter, 1984). As to be expected, Troy University
later followed the template set forth by Maryland and created a vast network of overseas educational centers tied to military installations.

When examining board minutes for Troy, it is surprisingly devoid of discussions about the growth of operations outside of the main campus. For instance, examination of the board minutes between 1967 (the first official board minutes after separation from the Alabama State Board of Education) and 1971 contain virtually no mention of the operations in Montgomery and Fort Rucker. While this seems unusual, a 1984 dissertation by Bill G. Clutter on the University of Maryland expansion tells a very similar story. The comparison to the University of Maryland is important with regard to this study because this institution also found great success offering courses across the globe on U.S. military bases. Clutter (1984), when writing about the University of Maryland, wrote that “no written record documents the starting point for the establishment of the College of Special and Continuation Studies of the University of Maryland” (p.55). The College of Special and Continuation Studies of the University of Maryland (UMUC) began much like the Troy expansion, as a way to educate military students not located in the area of the main campus. Also, much like Troy, it appears that this came under the direction of a very skilled and entrepreneurial leader. Clutter wrote that the University of Maryland President H.C. “Curley” Byrd by 1947 “had clearly established himself as one of the most powerful and charismatic leaders in the state (Clutter, 1984, pg. 55). Clutter (1984) also noted that “more often than not, the Board merely served as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the president’s actions, routine or otherwise” (p.55). The lack of mention regarding the activities in Montgomery and Fort Rucker in the Troy minutes seem to suggest a commonality between the Byrd/Adams presidency.

Just as seen in the Fort Rucker expansion, the move into Montgomery through Maxwell and Gunter proved very fruitful for the institution. Military personnel and their dependents, as
well as civil service personnel, took advantage of higher education opportunities on the bases. Executive committee notes from October 1968 noted Fall 1968 enrollments increased 11% at Maxwell/Gunter and 30% at Fort Rucker (Executive minutes of Troy State College, 1968). The late 1960s proved to be a prosperous and peaceful expansion for Troy. Trouble was on the horizon, however, with the establishment of ACHE. The Commission turned out to be a thorn in the side of President Adams and his growth agenda for many years to come. As Adams sought to expand his empire in Alabama, perhaps using his influence with Governor Wallace, ACHE was a worthy foe in their agenda to stop the rapid proliferation and duplication of higher education in the state.

**Expanding the Mission**

It was not long until the Maxwell-Gunter locations in Montgomery began opening up programs to civilians. The original movement onto the bases designated that programs would be for soldiers, dependents, and civil service employees working on base. In an August 1966 article in the *Montgomery Advertiser*, the institution stated that it would be begin a new master’s program in education. This program would allow civilian admission on a space-available basis (“Troy’s Maxwell-Gunter Center,” 1966). The new program would provide graduate level courses with three education concentrations including elementary and secondary education, and school administration (1966). While this quiet shift was likely unnoticed at the time, the decision to educate civilians in Montgomery would become a hot button issue in the years to come.

Only a year after the advancement into Montgomery, Troy State appeared to have loftier aspirations than simply educating the military. In August of 1966, the *Troy Messenger* ran an article citing the plans of the institution to acquire Jones Law School (“House approves measure,” 1966). According to the article, the Alabama House of Representatives approved a bill
during the 1966 session that supported the purchase of the law school by Troy. The school, which would be called the Walter B. Jones School of Law of Troy State College, would be the only established law school in the city. The bill, sponsored by Representative Joe Goodwyn of Montgomery, would appropriate $810,000 from the special education trust fund to allow Troy State College to acquire the assets and facilities of the existing law school. Beginning in September of 1967, according to the bill, the school would be allocated an additional $40,000 for operating expenses. If this arrangement were to be completed, it would allow Troy State to join Samford University and the University of Alabama as the state supported law schools in Alabama (1966).

This plan ran into early roadblocks, but alternatives were explored by the State Board of Education. An October 1966 article in the Birmingham News stated that an “education lobbyist” side-tracked a plan approved the previous summer for Troy to purchase the existing Walter B. Jones School of Law (Chisum, 1966). Apparently unfettered, the State Board of Education directed President Adams to conduct a study to gauge the feasibility of a separate law school attached to Troy State College. Superintendent Austin Meadows stated that this was “a resolution the governor [Wallace] sent down and wants us to pass” (1966, p.1A). The resolution suggested that the study include particular information about the “potential service to the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state government by such a school” (1966, p.1A). Though neither the plan to acquire the Jones School of Law or open a separate law school ever came to pass, it shows the ongoing drive to expand by Adams and the support from Wallace to push the envelope on these issues.
CHAPTER FOUR

ALABAMA HIGHER EDUCATION LANDSCAPE- 1965-1975

Introduction

Higher education, similar to Troy, lacked a great deal of strategic planning. This led to campuses, branches, satellites, and sites of colleges and universities peppering the geographic landscape of state during the second half of the 20th century (Dunham, 1969). Battles over funds, duplication, and missions dominated discussions about Alabama higher education during this era. Troy would find itself deeply entrenched of many of these conflicts.

Perception of Higher Education Proliferation in Alabama

As early as 1963, long before the massive expansion of higher education by Troy, state leaders expressed concern regarding the growth of higher education in the state. In a 1945 report by the Alabama Education Survey Commission, Governor Chauncey Sparks stated, “Alabama already has too many institutions of higher education, some of which are trying to do too many things” (Alabama educational survey, 1945 p. 36). This sentiment was echoed in the following decade after the state legislature created the Alabama Education Commission. This commission warned that “the total cost of higher education is approaching a size when extra precautions must be taken to assure that education funds are effectively spent” (Alabama Education Commission, 1958, p.3). This commission also recommended an agency, an obvious precursor to ACHE, to study the coordination issues that existed within higher education in the state. The Alabama Education Commission, while rather short-lived, was not void of radical ideas and
recommendations. The commission stated that “in future development of areas of professional instruction, the principle should be followed of assigning to the University of Alabama those fields most closely associated with humanities, social science and medicine, and to the Alabama Polytechnic Institute [Auburn University] natural science” (1958, p.3). Furthermore, it recommended closing Livingston State College, one of the five normal schools in the state. The commission found that “the continuation of this college is no longer needed and cannot be justified” (1958, p.3). While most of these recommended changes never came to fruition, it was clear that the state legislature had an agenda for higher education in the state and desired coordination, primarily through an oversight committee or agency.

The scope of this study allows only for in-depth discussion on the coordination, expansion, and regulation of four-year higher education in Alabama. However, the growth of Troy coincides with the massive expansion of the Alabama community college system and both are closely connected to Governor George Wallace. For this reason, some consideration of this system must be taken into account in this study. Most people attribute the establishment of the two-year system of higher education in Alabama to George Wallace. This assumption would not be unfounded. As early as 1947, while serving in the state legislature, Wallace sponsored the Wallace Trade School Act, establishing trade schools in Dothan, Tuscaloosa, Mobile, and Wenonah (Alabama Acts, 1947). This agenda was sent into overdrive upon his election as governor in 1962. Wallace promised during his inaugural address in January 1963 to “invest in the future through education” (“Text of incoming,” 1963, p.3C). This was largely realized through his implementation of a state junior college and trade school initiative. Some critical of the two-year college expansion found fault with the senior colleges, primarily the University of Alabama and Auburn University, for the rapid proliferation of the two-year system. Former
ACHE chairman said, “Complacency on the part of the University (UA) was a big reason for the huge number of junior colleges” (Oakley in Randall, 2001, pg. 101). Others, such as former president of the University of Alabama, disagreed stating, “Governor Wallace had almost total control of the state government and dominated the legislature, so he got what he wanted. I don’t know what the University of Alabama could have done if it had tried” (Mathews in Randall, 2001, p.101). The control wielded by Wallace, either perceived or factual, is a sentiment shared by most when reflecting on this period of Alabama history.

The early expansion of Troy, primarily at Fort Rucker and Maxwell/Gunter in Montgomery, was not accomplished on a whim. Examination of the environment of higher education in the state during this period coincided with this expansion. While the state had seriously discussed the importance of higher education in 1958 when the Alabama Education Commission recommended a vocational system for training of young citizens, it was not until the election of Governor Wallace in 1962 that events really began to move. Wallace addressed the legislature many times over the next couple of years, and the message was simple – only through education would the state of Alabama move forward.

By addressing education Wallace was speaking particularly about funding, both for K-12 and higher education. Wallace spoke of an “urgent and pressing need for a major breakthrough” (Alabama Acts, 1963, p. 171). While many assume that he was speaking of the junior/technical schools, which would spread across the state in the coming years, he also planned for substantial increases for colleges and universities. This agenda was carried through by his wife, Lurleen B. Wallace, who was elected governor in place of George because state law term limits forbade him from running. Lurleen died in office in 1968 and was replaced in office by Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer.
Funding Higher Education in Alabama

Funding higher education is always a hot button issue, and this was certainly the case in Alabama in the 1960s and 1970s. Education funding in Alabama was handled through the Special Education Trust Fund. This fund was driven by tax revenue (sales and income), therefore, growing populations and a stimulated economy drive this account higher. This is no more evident than during the period between 1963 and 1977. During these years, the revenue from this fund allocated to higher education grew by 1,087% (Randall, 2001).

The growth during this period can be attributed to a strong economy. The total population in the state showed only modest growth (Randall, 2001). The state of Alabama reported a population of 3.3 million in 1963, and 3.8 million in 1978. On the one hand, growth of 15% during a 15-year period is notable but certainly not remarkable. For comparison, growth in the southern portion of the country was of 28% during this same period (Demographic Trends, 2002). On the other hand, the growth of per capita income during the same period was substantial. Per capita income in the state of Alabama was $1,522 in 1960; by 1976 this number had grown to $5,106, in constant dollars. This number correlates to more income and state tax revenue, which flowed directly into the coffer of the Special Education Trust Fund. Education appropriations were $159,537,191 in 1963 and $1,019,784,294 in 1977 (Randall, 2001). As evidenced, economic prosperity for the state resulted politicians establishing large distributions for education.

Within the Special Education Trust Fund there was still further segmentation. First, the state legislature had to determine how much of the funds should go to “basic” education vs. higher education (Randall, 2001). While education as a whole was a winner during this period of prosperity, it was higher education that hit the jackpot. Some examples include comparisons of
higher education allocations to per capita income vs. higher education allocations against other education allocations. During the period between 1962 and 1977, appropriations for higher education grew by a factor of twelve. Per capita income, which, as previously stated, saw dramatic growth during this period, grew by a factor of three. With regard to total state income, higher education appropriations in Alabama accounted for 8.9% of total state revenue in 1963. This number grew to 22.3% by 1977. When compared to the allocation for basic education in the state, the difference in numbers was substantial. In 1962, higher education accounted for less than 20% of that of basic education. By 1977, allocations for higher education were equal to 50% of that allocated for basic education (Randall, 2001). With the state seeing growth from 9 institutions in 1960 to over 60 institutions in 1977, the table was set for battles to be fought at the state legislature, in the governor’s office, and through the media for decades to come with regard to funding and oversight.
A look at the higher education funds allocated for senior colleges for the 1962-1963 academic year tells a very interesting story, particularly when considering it from per student allocation standpoint (Gipson, 1980).

Table 1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Appropriation (excluding research and extension)</th>
<th>Appropriation Per Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>$5,293,358</td>
<td>$568.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auburn University</td>
<td>$4,903,744</td>
<td>$562.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama State</td>
<td>$1,082,313</td>
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<td>Alabama A &amp; M</td>
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<td>Jacksonville State</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence State</td>
<td>$739,576</td>
<td>$401.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama College</td>
<td>$732,826</td>
<td>$569.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy State</td>
<td>$706,612</td>
<td>$340.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston State</td>
<td>$367,315</td>
<td>$516.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data, at least in this year, seem to support the claim that Ralph Adams championed during his time at Troy. He stated many times, both in the media and to government agencies, that Troy was not being funded adequately on a per student basis (Harwell, 1971). Adams said, “Last year we got $2 million from the state, and that’s not much when you’ve got 6,000 students;
in fact that’s the least for any student in the state” (para. 18). The evidence presented here would eventually be one of the catalyst of the Dothan and Montgomery campuses seeking full funding. It was through this effort that the students attending these campuses would be accounted for separately, leading to additional funding for the Troy system.

In 1965 the Maxwell/Gunter location of Troy State College opened as an extension center. Soon, under the direction of James E. Bailey, Jr., the location advanced from an extension center to a branch in the fall of 1966. By becoming a branch, students were allowed full residence credit and were able to achieve a degree with all coursework being taken at the branch location on base. At the same time in 1966, the branch at Maxwell/Gunter expanded to include graduate work to achieve the Master of Science in Education degree. Another advantage of the branch, cited by Bailey in 1967, included student access to the Air University Library on base at Maxwell. This library, according to Bailey, was the largest military library in the nation at the time (“Troy State’s Maxwell-Gunter,” 1967).

Troy Evolves in Spite of ACHE

In the fall of 1968, administrators at Troy State University, in conjunction with branch directors at Fort Rucker and Maxwell Air Force base in Montgomery, began to explore the idea of separate accreditation for the branch locations. Studies were conducted by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) to evaluate this request. These studies, which consisted of a report in August of 1969, as well as follow-ups in May 1970 and May 1971, supported the request and granted full accreditation to these two branches in July 1971. This accreditation, granted in 1971, allowed a student to receive a degree from a branch location, but was not as substantial as the accreditation sought and granted in the early 1980s, which designated the branches as independent and separate from the main campus. That being said, this
1971 action was very unique. The *Montgomery Advertiser* stated that these branches were among very few that had received separate accreditation from SACS and the first such arrangement in Alabama. Adams found significance in this separate accreditation stating, “According to the State Department of Education figures, Troy State is the most popular institution of higher learning among Montgomery high school students, and this is just another step in our efforts to provide the best possible education for the most people” (“Troy State branch,” 1971, p.2). This action would set Troy apart as it soon began to advertise itself as “the only military installation in the United States having a fully autonomous university branch operated up through the master’s degree program” (1971, p.2). This move of separate accreditation, along with physical relocations of the branches, would not be received well by everyone, especially ACHE.

The contention between ACHE and Troy concerning Montgomery operations gained public exposure in 1973. The commission, in a June meeting, voted to recommend no funding for a proposed Troy Education Specialist degree program. The commission stated that only schools where it is possible to obtain a doctorate in education, Auburn University and the University of Alabama, should offer this degree program. Troy did not comply with the recommendation and announced it would be offering the program at both the Ft. Rucker and Montgomery locations. The *Montgomery Advertiser* covered this dispute in a December 1973 article where ACHE commission director Dr. John Porter, Jr. stated that “everybody will have to give up a little in the public interest if the commission is to work effectively in its advisory capacity” (James, 1973, p 2.).

It was not only in the area program approval where Troy State and ACHE were at odds. In the December 1974 meeting, the two entities found themselves far apart regarding funding for the coming biennium (Bailey, 1974). Troy State requested $21.6 million for the operation of the
three campuses. This represented an increase of 134% from the previous biennium of 9.2 million. The institution cited the large increase was necessary largely due to the Montgomery campus. This location was allocated $300,000 in the 1973-1975 cycle, and the request asked for $4.3 million for this location. The commission challenged this citing “needless duplication” being carried out at this location. The commission recommended that Troy University offer only courses at the Air Force Base locations, the police academy, and the nursing programs. More specifically, ACHE stated that “at neither the graduate nor undergraduate level should Troy State attempt to become a third general-purpose institution in Montgomery serving the civilian population” (Bailey, 1974, p.33). This conflicted with the plans of Troy State University, which was continuing to grow operations with the purchase of the Whitley Hotel as an additional location to provided education to non-traditional adult learners via night courses (Wasson, 1972). Commission staff member Dr. William Barnard, citing the strife between Troy State and ACHE, hoped the state legislature would make a decision on the growth of the institution to “end the acrimony” between school officials and ACHE. Dr. Adams stood by his long-standing position of equity funding, citing Troy State University as the lowest funded institution in the state on a per-student appropriation basis (McClusky, 1974, p.2).

Adams, while finding no friends with the ACHE during this period, was also finding the state media highly critical. With the notion of cronyism still floating about, based on his close relationship to Governor Wallace, the media took direct aim at the expansion of Troy, which was seen as a direct defiance of ACHE. A 1974 Birmingham News editorial titled “Emperor Adams” (1974) took issue with almost everything Adams was doing. It cited his lack of compliance as string that would unravel the entire design of a coordinating agency such as ACHE. The article stated that two things must be done to curb “incipient empire builders like Adams” (“Emperor
Adams”, 1974, para. 7). First, the legislature must refuse the funding of programs not approved by the commission. ACHE, the author argued, should be given enforcement powers to back up its recommendations. Such action might include the refusal of course transfer from non-approved programs and requesting assistance from accrediting bodies such as the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). The failure to do these two tasks, the article argued, left ACHE useless and impotent against empire builders such as Adams (1974).

Adams had more to offer to rock the boat than simply asking for a massive increase in state funding. It was reported in a July 1974 article in the *Alabama Journal* that Adams suggested that the Montgomery area should be consolidated under one president (“This week in,” 1974). As expected, this was poorly received by many. Alabama State University, the historically black institution in the city with its founding dating back to 1874, was certainly not on board. ACHE also harshly criticized the Adams plan. Adams, never one to back down from a challenge, made his resolve crystal clear in a letter to ACHE Executive Director John Porter. “Your efforts to stop us may be likened unto King Canute’s efforts to stop the tides,” Adams told Porter (“Troy chief sends,” 1974, para.33).

While many scoffed at the notion of the expansion of Troy in Montgomery and the addition of AUM, growth in enrollment supported the demand for these institutions. AUM showed a 22.14% increase from fall 1972 to fall 1973. Alabama State University, which desperately fought against the expansion of other institutions in Montgomery, saw an 18.55% increase in 1973 versus the previous fall. The campus of Troy State University in Montgomery showed an increase, but it was very minimal compared to the other institutions at 1.33%. The increase in Montgomery could not be contributed to an overall trend, however, as several state
institutions saw declines. Jacksonville State University was down 5.09%, and Livingston State reported a decline of 18.55% (James, 1974).

The contentious relationship between ACHE and Troy was an ongoing saga. In 1974 ACHE refused the request from Troy State University-Montgomery for a master’s degree in criminal justice. A similar program request was granted for AUM, and the commission denied Troy in an effort to avoid duplication (Hamilton, 1974). ACHE staff member Dr. Bill Barnard cited the lack of qualified staff members and the lack of a quality library as the reasons for the denial to Troy. Vice chairman of the commission, Sid McDonald, stated that “any compromise allowing Troy State to expand here would be in conflict of our policy…. I believe this community wants Auburn to be its expanding university” (Hamilton, 1974, p.2). McDonald went on to criticize Adams stating that “it is apparent Adams has no respect for any plan for higher education in the state except his own” (“TSU defies ACHE,” 1974, para. 4). ACHE, realizing it had no binding authority, grew increasingly frustrated with Troy and Adams. McDonald acknowledged this begrudgingly, stating that “there is but one place to take Dr. Adams’ actions to defy legislative intentions on higher education and that is back to the legislature” (1974, para. 6). McDonald went further in his criticism of Troy in an August 1974 commission meeting. He stated, “I’m tired of Troy State dominating everything we take up at commission meetings. This commission has almost gotten to the point of asking Troy if it will corporate. If we’re worth our salt, we won’t compromise” (“Troy State’s Montgomery,” 1974, para. 15).

By September of 1974, it was clear that Troy had no intentions of honoring the request of ACHE. Adams stated in an article in the Montgomery Advertiser that “the Master’s degree in criminal justice will definitely be offered in Montgomery by Troy’s operation there” (“Troy State goes,” 1974, p.1). A Troy spokesman commented specifically on the commission stating,
“the Act which created the Commission forbade it from interfering with the operation of the institutions in the state and left the responsibility of running the colleges up to the various boards of trustees” (1974, p.1). The Troy spokesman went on to say that “Adams doesn’t feel that Troy is in defiance of anybody. We simply saw a need for the program in the Montgomery area and we are moving to fill that need” (1974, p.1).

**Adams Battles ACHE**

Adams seemed to subscribe to the theory that one should keep friends close but enemies closer. In September of 1973, while the feuding with ACHE was gaining steam, Adams made the move of hiring a high-ranking official from ACHE to join his university in Troy. Dr. Fred Wood started his new position with Troy in the fall of 1973, serving as the Director of Institutional Research and of Contracts and Grants (“Dr. Adams hires,” 1973). This astute move was not unusual for Adams. It simply bolstered his image as a strategic architect often steps ahead of others.

In early 1974, Troy went on the offensive with an editorial piece in the *Birmingham News*. Dr. Wood, now serving as the Assistant to the President, attacked the paper for what he deemed “inaccurate and totally misleading” information (“TSU official denies,” 1974, para. 1). Wood argued that nothing Troy was doing was against the statute or the intention of the Commission. He stated, “ACHE has no authority under law to disapprove university action, ACHE can only recommend” (1974, para. 1). Dr. Wood would be back on the scene in September 1974 with another letter to the editor in the *Birmingham News*. This time he took particular offense to the attack on Troy regarding the growth in Montgomery. Wood stated that “Troy State University supports the Commission on Higher Education within the limits of Act #14, SS, 1969” (1974, para.1). Once again Wood argued that the decision made by Troy to move
forward against the recommendation of ACHE, did not amount to “defying Legislative intentions” (1974, para. 2). Wood closed by reiterating that state law allows for individual boards of trustees to make decisions regarding the direction of its institution (1974).

The strained relationship between Troy (Adams) and ACHE was undeniable by the mid-1970s, but early evidence suggested this tension did not exist in the beginning. Adams was quoted in a 1971 article in the Huntsville Times praising the creation of the Commission. When discussing the lack of equitable funding Troy received, Adams suggested that ACHE could be the remedy to this issue. Adams stated, “And that’s the reason I think the Commission on Higher Education is probably the greatest thing that’s ever happened to the state. The purpose is to recommend to the legislature an equitable distribution” (Harwell, 1971, para. 21). He went even further stating that,

I hope that the law which created this commission is amended to strengthen it and as a matter of fact I would like to see all money that’s appropriated to higher education to be appropriated to this commission and then let it divide the money up on a scientific and equitable basis (1971, para.23).

Furthermore, in the Joint Meeting of ACHE and Council of University Presidents held on September 22, 1972, Adams went to bat for ACHE. He stated that the fact that ACHE is only a coordinating agency is a problem, and the state should look at a State University System with a Board of Regents. Adams argued that ACHE should have the power to control appropriations and curriculum, but did not have that power (Wasson, 1972).

Where did the acrimonious relationship and heaping of praise Adams dealt to the Commission go awry? The answer could be as simple as misinterpretation. Adams saw the Commission as the referee to ensure fair play, particularly with regard to funding. Funding
allocated on a per student basis was the primary purpose of the Commission, according to Adams. ACHE saw its oversight to be much broader with the ability to recommend programs and locations, which would be adhered to by the institutions. For 20 years, from the creation of ACHE in 1969, to the retirement of Adams in 1989, there would be tension between these two state entities, which hung over higher education in the state.
CHAPTER FIVE

EXPANSION CONTINUES FOR ALABAMA AND TROY

Introduction

The move into the mid-1970s presented a Troy State University that looked far different from when Ralph Adams took the reins in 1964. First of all, the institution had undergone a substantial name change. When Adams arrived in Troy, Alabama, in 1964 it was because he was hired to be the president of Troy State College. The name of the institution, along with most former teachers colleges in the state, had now been designated as a “university.” For Troy, this change happened in 1967. The actual impact that accompanied this name change could certainly be debated. This name would remain consistent until 2005, when name of the institution dropped the “state” and simply became Troy University an effort to in appear more global and less regional (Hawkins, 2009).

A far more measurable change involved the expansion of the institution. Upon the arrival of Adams in 1964, Troy State College was an institution that focused on teacher preparation and offered classes almost exclusively on the main campus in Troy, Alabama. By the fall of 1974, this format was almost unrecognizable. The institution had capitalized on the desire of the military for educated servicemen and began to expand the institutional empire across the southeast United States, and soon across the entire globe. This worldwide expansion lead to the saying that “the sun never sets on Troy.”
Troy had also found a very conducive higher education governance system in the state of Alabama. The state had created an oversight body, ACHE, which had only basic advisory capacity. Finally, Troy had a proven businessman at the helm, who was driven, perhaps in spite of ACHE, to expand his institution to anywhere he saw fit. This entrepreneurial leadership, coupled with the two previously mentioned external factors, resulted in massive growth for the institution for the remainder of the Adams tenure at Troy.

This is not to suggest that this growth was under the guise of some type of utopian environment. The previously mentioned battles with ACHE only intensified. The city of Montgomery continued to be the battleground. Auburn University in Montgomery proved to be a formidable foe, but the spats with AUM were minor when compared to the war that was waged with Alabama State University. ASU found the actions of Troy, and AUM for that matter, to be grounds for legal action. The administration of ASU levied this battle in the judicial, legislative, and executive bodies of Alabama. The details of this event will be noted in more detail further in this writing. Things were just as tumultuous in the southern part of the state. The expansion from the Fort Rucker military base, further south to the city of Dothan, was not well-received by all higher education stakeholders. The conflict between George C. Wallace Community College in Dothan and Troy became particularly nasty. This writing will explain this event in more detail. As expected, ACHE found themselves in the middle of this turf war. Also, as expected based on history, the Commission found itself at odds with the Troy administration led by Adams.

Adams also used the final half of his tenure to globally expand the Troy institutional footprint. Finding fertile ground, beginning in Europe, Adams capitalized on military bases welcoming education for soldiers. Like any good businessman, Adams realized that there was no need to reinvent the wheel. He simply hired the right people to design the on-base instruction
process and took that program on the road to any base where he could get his foot in the door.
Specific details on this delegation will follow in this study. This model, pioneered by a few other
institutions, and very well done by Troy, would serve the institution for many decades, even
many years well beyond the Adams administration.

Statewide Public Higher Education in 1970s

An examination of total headcount for Alabama’s senior institutions for the latter half of
the 1970s tells several stories. The first is simply the growth of public higher education at four-
year institutions in Alabama during this period. Boasting a nearly 20% increase between
1974 and 1978, it is clear that higher education in Alabama was very healthy from a demand
standpoint (ACHE Headcount, 1974-1978). Comparatively, the nationwide growth for higher
education enrollment during this period was 7.4% (NCES, 1999). Six of the sixteen institutions
in Alabama had student enrollment that increased at least 30% during this period.

Only two institutions, the University of Montevallo and Livingston University, reported
declining enrollments. Also of note, particularly in light of the turmoil in the region, is the
growth of the Montgomery-area institutions. Alabama State University had over a 50% increase
in enrollment during this period, growing from 3,158 students in 1974, to 4,794 in 1978. Auburn
University in Montgomery was not far behind with a 40.9% enrollment increase. Finally, Troy
State University in Montgomery grew enrollment by 32.8% during this period. This averages out
to an increase of 41.83% in enrollments for Montgomery senior institutions during this period, In
Montgomery, 3,334 more students were enrolled in senior higher education institutions in 1978
than in 1974. To put this into perspective, the University of Alabama and Auburn University, the
two traditional powers of Alabama higher education, saw a combined increase of only 3,307
students during this time (ACHE Headcount, 1974-1978).
Table 2.

**ACHE Senior Institution Enrollment- 1974-1978 (ACHE, 1978)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama A&amp; M</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>4,520</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>4,643</td>
<td>4,425</td>
<td>9.70%</td>
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<td>Alabama State</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>4,153</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>4,794</td>
<td>51.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens State</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>53.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>16,013</td>
<td>17,044</td>
<td>17,523</td>
<td>17,977</td>
<td>18,105</td>
<td>13.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUM</td>
<td>3,142</td>
<td>3,797</td>
<td>3,857</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>40.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville State</td>
<td>5,591</td>
<td>6,461</td>
<td>6,955</td>
<td>7,011</td>
<td>7,028</td>
<td>25.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>-6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy State- Main</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>3,965</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>4,549</td>
<td>30.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy State- Ft Rucker/Dothan</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy State- Maxwell/Montgomery</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>15,638</td>
<td>16,891</td>
<td>16,510</td>
<td>16,920</td>
<td>16,853</td>
<td>7.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama-Huntsville</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>3,983</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>26.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama- Birmingham</td>
<td>9,105</td>
<td>10,861</td>
<td>11,120</td>
<td>11,974</td>
<td>12,504</td>
<td>37.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevallo</td>
<td>3,794</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>-21.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Alabama</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>4,817</td>
<td>5,054</td>
<td>5,229</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of South Alabama</td>
<td>6,053</td>
<td>6,506</td>
<td>6,605</td>
<td>6,707</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82,178</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,924</strong></td>
<td><strong>94,132</strong></td>
<td><strong>97,758</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,506</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.90%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Military Arrangement

The first contract (and the only one I found) between a military installation and Troy State University dates back to January 1977. This contract, dated January 20, 1977, was between the Department of the Army and Troy State University. There are several items of relevance included in the contract. The contract, titled, “Basic agreement for off-duty academic instruction” specifies the United States of America as “Government” and the contracting officer as Troy State University. The contract called for Troy to “instruct military personnel in off-duty graduate college courses; 75% of tuition cost, and 75% of laboratory fees, as established by the current catalog to be paid by the Government; the remainder to be paid by the student.” The contract stated that it will be effective at the time of signing and will continue until terminated. In the contract, the signature of the United States of America was executed by Jean Warren, with no title given, and by Robert Paul, vice president for Troy State University (US Army and Troy, 1977).

In addition to the standard terms of a performance contract, which included classes offered, beginning and ending months of terms, and how the government would be invoiced, this contract included a couple of interesting addendums (US Army and Troy, 1977). One is the lease contract between The Fort Rucker National Bank and the United States Government. The government, owning the property of the base, apparently found it important to include the specifics of the banking institution when contracting with Troy. The amount of the bank lease called for the bank to pay the government $2,400 per year. The lease lasted until August 31, 1994. Additionally, the government included a statement of non-discrimination. This clause titled, “Affirmative Action for Disabled Veterans and Veterans of the Vietnam Era,” called for the contractor, Troy State University, to not discriminate against this segment of the population
in any fashion including “employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, advertising, layoff or termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selection for training, including apprenticeship” (US Army and Troy, 1977, p. 39). The simple fact that the government, likely in standard contractual language of the time, would have to specify that Vietnam-era veterans would not be discriminated against speaks volumes to the treatment of these servicemen at this time. The requirement of a specific clause enabling these soldiers to receive rights equal to those for servicemen and women from other combat eras is shocking.

During the 1973-1974 fiscal year, Troy State University expanded outside of the boundaries of the state of Alabama. First, this involved an overseas expansion to military bases located in Europe. Little was available in the archival research, either externally or internally, regarding how this transaction took place, but one can only assume that the success Troy had shown stateside made the institution a potential partner for operations overseas.

In a memo from Troy Vice President William Wilkes updated Dr. Adams on the SACS visit to the European regions. Dr. Wilkes was very optimistic on his perspective of the visit. He told Dr. Adams that the SACS team visited every Troy location in Germany and England. He stated that the team was very complimentary of the operations the University was conducting. Dr. Wilkes did, however, point out some suggestions he felt needed to be implemented. Wilkes suggested firmer control over financial operations. He stated that “large sums of money are handled in somewhat loose fashion.” Furthermore, Dr. Wilkes stated that a profit of over $100,000 could be expected for the first year of operations and a plan of how to allocate these funds would be necessary (Wilks to Adams, personal communication, May 9, 1975).

In this memo to Dr. Adams, Dr. Wilkes also pointed out the fine work being done by former Alabama Governor John Patterson. True to form, and as he would later do with dear
friend George Wallace, Adams knew how to leverage all resources at his disposal. In this particular case, he hired former Alabama Governor John Patterson (1959-1963) as a “distinguished professor.” Patterson served the university by teaching American Government, but also provided considerable credibility to an oversight agency, such as SACS. As cited in this memo to Adams, Patterson proved to be an asset to the institution with regard to international endeavors.

**Phenix City/Fort Benning**

In 1974-75, Troy State University expanded to east, just across the Alabama state line and began offering classes at Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia. However, unlike the Montgomery and Dothan locations, the Ft. Benning (later called Phenix City) location never sought independent accreditation.

In what should come as very little surprise, the expansion into the military base in Columbus was not well-received by everyone. This was detailed in a November 10, 1977 memo from Dr. Paul Stansel, Director TSU Ft. Benning, to his supervisor, Dr. James Bailey, Vice President, TSUM. In this memo Dr. Stansel cited the displeasure of Columbus College regarding the educational operations of Troy in the area. Stansel stated that, in spite of Columbus College President Dr. Thomas Whitley’s objections to the advancement to Troy, the institution should have no reason for concern. In a list of bullet points, Stansel pointed to the strong relationship Troy had established with the U.S. Army. Stansel said that the educational service officer (ESO) at Ft. Benning was a strong supporter and would like for Troy and Embry-Riddle to have total responsibility of on-base undergraduate instruction. Stansel, however gave words of caution regarding student services which are still echoed over a half-century later. He said, “The inept administration of Columbus College Student Services will guarantee TSU the lion’s share of
students providing we do not fall into the snare of traditionalism in dealing with the adult student” (Stansel to Bailey, personal communication, November 10, 1977, p.3). This foresight, of recognizing the nuances of educating the adult student, is much different from that of the traditional residential student and is a trait that allowed Troy to excel in this market for many years.

Troy apparently responded to some of the criticism from other local institutions. In an effort to provide a “win-win” situation, Troy entered into a contractual agreement with Chattahoochee Valley Community College (CVCC). Unlike Columbus College, CVCC was a member of the Alabama two-year system and offered only freshman and sophomore level courses. The agreement, signed July 20, 1981, contained multiple stipulations required of each institution. For instance, CVCC would provide learning resources including books and materials for use by Troy State University-Phenix City students. CVCC would also pay Troy a fee for each student enrolled in the CVCC/TSU-PC dual enrollment program. Troy also agreed to certain stipulations. Perhaps most relevant, Troy agreed to “not offer courses which duplicate those listed in the CVCC catalog, except those courses listed at the 300 level or above in the TSU-PC catalog, or as mutually agreed by the CVCC President and the TSU-PC Director” (Troy/CVCC agreement, 1981, p.3). This particular restriction was most important to CVCC as it ensured that Troy would not be providing instruction to traditional freshmen and sophomores through this location. This would be a point of contention in the southeastern portion of the state as Troy and Wallace College struggled through issues of duplication of lower-level courses.

**Funding the Branches**

The Montgomery branch of Troy State University saw increased growth with winter 1975 enrollment of 2,017 students. This did not necessarily mean that all was well. The conflicts with
ACHE, previously focused around program offerings, quickly moved to funding. As cited in a February 18, 1975 article in the *Montgomery Advertiser*, Troy requested $4.3 million for the two-year funding period for the Montgomery operations (Kunstel, 1975). ACHE countered far below this figure at $437,908 in its request to the state legislature. ACHE cited two reasons for this figure, well below what was requested. First, the commission argued that it was in line with its continued policy of not funding operations located on military bases, since the tuition revenue was largely covered by the United States government. The Commission also restated its position that it had no interest in funding a third publicly-supported civilian institution in Montgomery.

Dr. Wood argued vehemently with this decision. He stated that Maxwell Air Force Base constituted only a component of Troy State University-Montgomery and not the entirety (1975).

ACHE remained steadfast in its opinion of the Montgomery operations of Troy State. Contrary to the plan of action for Troy, ACHE’s John Porter stated in the February 17, 1975 board minutes that funding for Troy in Montgomery should be limited to general administration and student services, which is consistent with ACHE’s position on funding operations held on military installations. Once again, ACHE stated that it did not support Troy establishing a third publicly-supported civilian institution in Montgomery (ACHE, 1975).

Later in this same February meeting, Dr. Wood provided a rebuttal stating that in 1969-1970 the Board of Trustees of Troy State University established Troy State University in Montgomery. At this point in time the operations in Montgomery were recognized by eleven state and federal agencies. Dr. Wood stated that the operations on Maxwell Air Force base were simply a component of the Troy State University in Montgomery program. He said that 2,017 students were enrolled in evening classes in Montgomery (ACHE, 1975). This rift between what
Troy was actually doing in Montgomery and what ACHE desired it to be doing was not new, nor was it anywhere near resolution.

Adams continued his quest for full funding for operations in Montgomery and Dothan when the opportunity presented itself. At the March 16, 1976 ACHE meeting, Adams broached this very topic with the ACHE members and staff. He stated, “The staff has given TSU no credit for credit hours produced at either of these locations” (ACHE, 1976, p. 2). ACHE member, Jack Rainer stated that it was his understanding that Troy had not formally requested separate funding for Dothan, which could be viewed different than Montgomery, since there were no senior institutions in the area. Dr. Adams stated that he could certainly provide that proposal (1976).

This meeting in March 1976 is also the first mention in ACHE minutes of Troy operations in Florida and Europe. Adams was questioned by ACHE about these operations, and he explained that these operations were completely self-sufficient and creating no cost for the Alabama taxpayer. In fact, he cited net revenue in Europe alone of $184,000 (1976).

In March of 1977 some constituents had grown frustrated with the lack of control bestowed upon ACHE. A March 5, 1977 article in the *Birmingham Post Herald* called for change. The article, titled “Replace ACHE, citizen unit asks,” a group named the Citizens’ Committee on Higher Education recommended a new agency to approve new programs at the junior and senior college levels. The group claimed that ACHE had been unable to hold public higher education institutions accountable because of strong political influence. The committee, according to the article, would have oversight over programs, construction, and off campus instruction. The Citizens’ Committee on Higher Education was a 30-member committee created through the subcommittee on budget control and led by Lt. Gov. Jere Beasley (“Replace ACHE citizen,” 1977). This call for reform, and in this case, replacement of ACHE, showed the
displeasure felt by stakeholders in the state within five years of the creation of the Commission. The lack of approval authority made many people involved in public higher education in the state restless. They demanded change. This particular committee supported drastic action, including the replacement of ACHE with a more powerful body. It would be several more years, but the state legislature finally addressed this issue giving ACHE the power many people felt it needed.

**Off-Campus Instruction**

During the mid to late 1970s, ACHE minutes show that the Commission spent a great deal of time dealing with off-campus programs. The initial discussion was often about what exactly constituted an off-campus program. That required a great deal of discussion for many years, and various committees weighed in on this topic. This was quickly followed by discussion regarding how to recommend funding these entities. While Troy State was usually at the forefront of these discussions with major operations in Dothan and Montgomery, other institutions often found themselves in these discussions as well. According to ACHE communication dated July 25, 1977, it was determined that a “branch” should be designated to be an “institution operating free-standing programs leading to a degree without required attendance at the main campus of the University” (ACHE, 1977a, p.3). In this same internal memo, the Committee of Off-Campus Activities considered a request from the University of Montevallo to offer courses in Pelham, Alabama, located just south of Birmingham. The committee recognized that these were only course offerings and not entire degree programs, and therefore, the need to review this operation as a branch was not necessary (1977a). These discussions were the absolute norm during this era. ACHE was spending a great deal of time
working with institutions to try to determine what an institution was asking to do and if it supported the request.

In addition to the question of branch operations, the issue of funding soon followed. In the ACHE meeting held December 2, 1977, the Commission spoke directly to the funding aspect. ACHE staff member Dr. Frank Brown clarified four issues regarding off-campus operations and funding:

1) off-campus courses would be recommended for funding for only administration and student services; 2) no funding would be recommended for non-credit courses; 3) courses taught on military bases would be recommended only for administration and student services funding; and 4) full-formula funding would be recommended only for those sites approved by ACHE as branches (ACHE, 1977b).

This explanation provided by Dr. Brown was certainly valuable and provided clarity to ACHE, institutions, and the legislature. It also set the rules in place. In order to achieve maximum funding, getting established as a branch which offered full programs and not located on a military base was of paramount importance.
Table 3.

*Alabama Higher Education Enrollment- Main Campus vs. Branch Campus (ACHE, 1978)*

Table 3 shows the full-time equivalency numbers for senior level institutions with regard to on-campus vs. off-campus instruction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>On-Campus</th>
<th>Off-Campus</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama A&amp; M</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama State</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>4,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens State</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>18,576</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>18,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUM</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>3,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville State</td>
<td>6,027</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy State</td>
<td>4,269</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>6,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>15,092</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>15,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Total Credit Hours</td>
<td>On-Campus Credit Hours</td>
<td>Total Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>9,744</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>10,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAH</td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevallo</td>
<td>2,484</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Alabama</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of South Alabama</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,727</td>
<td>3,877</td>
<td>86,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the glaring anomaly is Troy State. The notes mention that the “on-campus” portion for Troy State includes the main campus and students at the Dothan location of the Dothan/Ft. Rucker operation. This report is significant because it shows the importance of off-campus operations to Troy State compared to other institutions in the state. In the fall of 1978 Troy generated 37.3% of total credit hour production from off-campus instruction. This largely originated from the Montgomery location but also included operations at Fort Rucker, Bay Minette, Columbus/Phenix City, and small programs in Florida and Europe. Since the Dothan location had been designated as a branch for full-funding purposes, it was no longer considered off-campus for the purposes of these calculations and was assigned to the main campus. The closest traditional institution (Athens State was a newly formed institution offering only junior
and senior level courses) with regard to off-campus production was the University of Montevallo, which generated 3.9% of its credit hour production from off-campus operations. These enrollment differences speak to the commitment ACHE showed to try to control Troy State during the 1970s. Review of the ACHE minutes show that very few meetings occurred without discussion of “off-campus” operations. Clearly by this chart, only Troy State was operating in this arena with any level of magnitude. While more times than not, the minutes did not mention Troy State by name, the evidence of this table makes it clear that references made to the oversight of off-campus instruction had specific interest to the dealings of Ralph Adams and Troy State University.

**Operations in Mobile Area**

In addition to the on-going saga with at the Montgomery and Dothan locations, where ACHE clearly thought Troy was often operating outside of compliance. Troy approached ACHE about operations currently being conducted in the southwest corridor of the state in a December 12, 1978 proposal. In this proposal, Troy requested branch status for the Bay Minette, Alabama location. Bay Minette was a small town located in Baldwin County, just north of Mobile. In the justification, Troy cited that it first began offering courses on the campus of Faulkner State Junior College in 1974. The initial enrollment of 70 students in 1974 had grown to 525 students by the time of this request in 1978. At the time of the request, Troy was offering six undergraduate programs and ten masters programs at the Bay Minette location (ACHE, 1978).

ACHE denied this request. The denial cited three primary reasons. First, the Commission said that all the programs offered at Bay Minette, with the exception the masters in criminal justice were offered at the University of South Alabama, located about 35 miles from Bay Minette. In addition, ACHE stated that approximately 70% of current students at the Bay Minette
location lived closer to the University of South Alabama or the University of West Florida. Finally, ACHE stated that the state of Alabama had twice the number of public senior institutions per population than the national average. Approving this branch would add to this negative ratio which was not desired in this time of financial stringency regarding higher education in the state (ACHE, 1978).

At an ACHE meeting held just days after the Bay Minette decision, Dr. Adams clearly took issue with the denial. In discussion, Dr. Adams stated that there were reasons so many students came to Bay Minette campus even though the student was geographically closer to other institutions. Primarily, according to Dr. Adams, they found that the number of night classes being offered at Bay Minette fit the needs of many of the students and were not options at some of the other institutions. Dr. Adams also mentioned the use of part-time faculty members, which was cited as a negative in the ACHE consideration, was a way to provide lower-cost instruction, thus saving tax-payer dollars. Finally, Dr. Adams pointed out that the legislature had already been separately funding the Bay Minette operations and therefore, in his opinion, it had already been recognized as a branch location (ACHE, 1978).

The floor then opened to University of South Alabama president, Dr. Frederick Whiddon. Surprising no one, Dr. Whiddon applauded the Commission for its decision. He stated that approval of a branch campus at this location would open the flood gates to other institutions opening branch campuses at junior colleges across the state. Perhaps most controversially, Dr. Whiddon addressed the issue of quality. He stated that the programs at his university were indeed of higher quality. He said, “If this perception is incorrect, then we have misled the people of this state for many years in regards to expenditures for library and faculty needs” (ACHE, 1978).
Ultimately, the Commission, in a very narrow vote of 4 to 3, agreed to uphold the decision and denied the request for a Troy State University branch in Bay Minette (ACHE, 1978).

This simple discussion about a tiny satellite operation location in the southwestern corner of the state highlighted several areas of relevance to higher education in Alabama during this time. First, where should four-year institutions be allowed to operate and be recognized for funding? If, at the invitation of the junior college, this arrangement was in place, did the Commission support this format? Was this format, which largely utilized part-time faculty, a model of the highest and best use of the taxpayer dollars, or was this a watered down and unenvied process for educating the citizens of Alabama? Furthermore, it highlighted the ongoing strife between who was in charge, ACHE or the state legislature? This became even more apparent as Adams took his request directly to the legislature after the denial from ACHE. Reiterating a point made during the ACHE deliberations, Adams said that the state legislature allocating funds for Bay Minette in the previous year ($50,000) “made it law” (ACHE, 1978, p.5), that it was recognizing the branch. In other words, precedence had been set and then Troy specifically asked the legislature for the $958,300 denied by ACHE (“Troy State to,” 1978). While records show Troy was not allocated the requested amount from the legislature, this particular incident highlighted much of the discord that existed in Alabama higher education during this period, much of which involved Troy State University.

ACHE- Defining the Role

As the 1980s approached, ACHE was less than 10 years old and still trying to determine its role. An advisory group led by ACHE member Dr. William Carr took on this challenge by engaging institutions across the state for input. Each institution was asked to weigh in on issues including educational, economical, and political issues regarding the role of ACHE. Troy’s
comments were consistent with its position for the preceding years. With the response coming from Troy Executive Vice President Dr. James Robinson, Troy said that ACHE should “be a strong coordinating organization with authority for short and long-range planning, program review and legislative budgetary recommendations” (Robinson to ACHE, personal communication, 1974). Robinson, on behalf of Troy, went on to say that ACHE “should not have the authority to disapprove the initiation of an academic program that meets the needs of the local population, requested by that population and offered at that location based on formal request of Legislators and local political/educational authorities at that particular location” (1974). This position is consistent with what Troy and Adams had stated for many years. ACHE should follow the rules set forth by the legislative act by which it was created.

In the same memo, Troy also weighed in on the issue of “unwarranted duplications of off-campus offerings and programs” (Robinson to ACHE, personal communication, 1974). Several things are particularly relevant in Troy’s comments on this discussion point. Troy stated, “Off-campus degree programs offered at locations where there are no resident accredited educational institutions would be deemed as unwarranted if credit hour cost of those programs exceeded ACHE formula funding criterion, were inferior in quality according to accreditation standards, or were not otherwise meeting the educational needs of the community in which offered and were not requested by the community” (1974). Clearly, by this very carefully crafted and descriptive definition, Troy stated a firm position on “off-campus” instruction. The simple existence of academic delivery away from the home location did not meet the definition, according to Troy, of “unwarranted duplication.” Several other factors, including cost, quality (as determined by accreditation), and community needed consideration.
After years of ambiguity, ACHE finally received some reprieve from the state legislature in the 1979 session. House Bill 494, Act 79-461 amended the original Act which created the Commission. First, the bill changed the name from Alabama Commission of Higher Education to the Alabama Commission on Higher Education. Other than the modest name change, the bill carried several relevant changes. The Commission now gained the authority of approval for new units of programs of instruction for new and existing off-campus offerings. The legislation further stated that no state funds shall be expended on new unit or programs not approved by the Commission. The bill established ACHE as the statewide long-range planning agency and increased the membership of the Commission to twelve members (House Bill 494, 1979). This action by the state legislature finally gave some teeth to the agency that had lacked authority since its inception. Even Adams, often seen as the antagonist to ACHE, called for this type of authority in the early days of its establishment, although it is clear that he took advantage of the rules as they were defined in the interim.
CHAPTER SIX

MONTGOMERY AND DOTHAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Introduction

Since the expansion into Dothan and Montgomery, Troy faced plenty of opposition. External entities including ACHE, other institutions, the federal government, some in the state legislature, and many in the media took great issue with this expansion. The institution, under the direction of Adams, seemed to pay this little attention. As long as the boundaries of the law and restrictions of ACHE were not being violated, the institution continued to push its agenda forward. The mode of operation would continue throughout the Adams era, which would come to a close in 1989.

Duel System of Higher Education in Alabama

With the state legislature finally weighing in on the role of ACHE, it took up some very controversial but extremely relevant matters moving into the 1980s. One of these issues was related to developments in Huntsville and Montgomery. These two metropolitan areas were hot-button issues because they were homes to historically black colleges and universities (HBCU), which had seen large expansion of traditionally white institutions over the previous several decades. The HBCUs, Alabama A&M in the Huntsville area, and Alabama State University in the Montgomery area, were very unhappy with the role the state legislature and ACHE played in allowing this growth to happen. They found this to be a prime example of unnecessary duplication and correlated it directly to lack of funds and decreased enrollments at their institutions.
Since the focus of this particular study examines the evolution of Troy State University, which did not enter into the Huntsville market, the content here will focus on developments in Montgomery. Alabama State University (ASU) was established in Montgomery in 1874, first as a teachers college and later as a state university. ASU was joined in Montgomery by Troy State University in 1966 when Troy began offering instruction at Maxwell and Gunter Air Force bases. In 1970, Auburn University established Auburn University in Montgomery (AUM) in the area. Since that time stakeholders, including citizens, institutional administrators, ACHE, and state legislators had been trying to figure out the best way to serve this area including program approval and fund allocation.

ACHE first spoke to this in 1975 in its Planning Document Number One stating that “at neither the graduate nor undergraduate level should Troy State attempt to become a third general-purpose institution in Montgomery severing the general civilian population” (ACHE, 1975, p.71). Later, in December of 1979, ACHE produced a document titled, “Issues for the 80s: A Plan for the System of Higher Education in Alabama, 1980-1985.” This plan discussed the issue of Huntsville/Montgomery and its idea to avoid a “dual system” of higher education in these cities. The plan, according to the document, had three primary objectives:

1. Increase the educational opportunities in both Montgomery and Huntsville so that each city will have broad based-university offerings that it deserves.
2. Reduce the duplication and competition between institutions.
3. Eliminate any vestiges of a dual system of postsecondary education, while enhancing the role of the historically black institutions (1979, p.7).

The authors of the document stated that Montgomery presented far more complexities than Huntsville. Primarily, three institutions were involved and the issues involved much more
duplication (ACHE, 1979). This very complex problem would envelope all three institutions in some form or fashion for decades to come.

Alabama State University quickly responded to the published document from ACHE. In some aspects, it supported the position. For instance, ASU agreed with the three primary objectives and felt that ACHE was right on target and hoped that addressing these issues would lead to resolution of this matter. ASU, however, went much further than ACHE when suggesting a plan to remedy the problem in Montgomery. In a meeting held December 10, 1979 the Faculty Senate of ASU stated the following findings (statement in quotes are quotes by the ASU Faculty Senate regarding ACHE):

1. The Mission of Alabama State University

Regarding the dual system of higher education in Montgomery and Huntsville, ACHE’s document states that “in both cities, the institution with the longest tenure is a historically black institution that has a statewide mission to provide particular opportunities for black citizens of the state, as a result of the former de jure dual system of higher education” (p. 1). Educational opportunities at Alabama State University are not limited to the black citizens of the state. As the institution’s statement of its mission discloses, Alabama State University provides “to students from throughout the State without regard for their race, sex, religion or nationality affordable programs of high quality undergraduate and master’s level instruction designed for their intellectual and personal growth in pursuit of meaningful employment and responsible citizenship; and cultural enrichment, continuing education, research and public services for individuals who desire to better themselves and the world in which they live” (1979, p. 1).
2. Duplication and Competition Between Institutions

(a) ACHE’s document clearly discloses that Auburn University and Troy State University, in establishing branches in Montgomery, are responsible for the duplication of programs, services, and facilities already in existence at Alabama State University, a public state-supported institution in Montgomery for almost one hundred years. Furthermore, research indicates that “separately Auburn and Troy Universities at Montgomery account for program duplications of approximately 39% each, but their effect results in 48.95% of Alabama State University’s programs being duplicated” (1979, p. 2).

(b) Alabama State University and Auburn University in Montgomery have avoided needless duplication of ROTC programs by offering a different program on each campus. A similar procedure can be followed with other programs.

(c) Auburn University and Troy State University established branches in Montgomery under the condition that program duplication would not occur. However, undue proliferation of program duplication has persisted as a result of the presence of these branches in Montgomery. (Alabama State University Faculty Senate, 1979)

ASU faculty senate also took a preemptive attack by addressing the Metropolitan University System, of which ACHE had not officially discussed as a way forward in Montgomery,

3. The Metropolitan University System

(a) The Metropolitan University System poses a threat to the existence of Alabama State University by hastening its subordination to the more powerful and advantaged white institutions.
(b) The creation of a Metropolitan Systems Board would restrict and subordinate Alabama State University in its autonomy and administration and it would be greatly reduced as an institution of higher learning.

(c) Such a board would immeasurably weaken the power, functions, and role of the Board of Trustees of Alabama State University.

(d) The master plan for a Metropolitan University System fails to outline the specific procedures regarding implementation. For example, regarding “the retention of the best of all programs which are currently place” (1979, p.2) who decides which programs are the “best” and under what criteria. (Alabama State University Faculty Senate, 1979)

Just one day after this rebuke from the faculty senate, ASU President Levi Watkins sent a letter to his Board of Trustees stating his position on the ACHE proposal. Watkins stated on December 11, 1979 that the Board of Trustees is a governance board, “which could manage and control all public university operations in Montgomery” (Alabama State University, 1979, p.1). Watkins went on to say, “Governance of ASU, AUM and TSUM by the ASU Board of Trustees would in effect create a single public supported institution of higher education for Montgomery capable of offering broad curriculums for day, evening and weekend students” (1979, p. 2). In conclusion, Watkins made it clear that ASU did not support an ACHE plan that,

1) Did not give consideration to full utilization of the Board of Trustees for Alabama State University as the governing body for all university operations at Montgomery,

2) Places a governance body between ACHE and the ASU Board of Trustees and,

3) Moves forward with a Metropolitan University System which unfairly treats ASU (Watkins to ASU Board, personal communication, December 11, 1979, p. 2).
In this communication from Watkins to his board, he makes it abundantly clear that Alabama State University was not satisfied with the plans ACHE was considering for Montgomery moving into the 1980s and did not support the proposed direction.

**Troy Considers Mergers/Acquisitions**

While most politicians were critiquing the value, or lack thereof, duplication and branching, this sentiment was not universal. Citizen John Bitter wrote a letter to the editor of the *Montgomery Advertiser* titled, “Never too late” in 1976. In the letter, Bitter explained that in 1946 he was a high school drop-out with no idea what his future held. Seeking guidance and direction, he entered the military. After a long career in the military, he decided it was time for a change. Some thirty years after running away from education, he was back and now receiving his degree from Troy State-Montgomery. It would not be possible, Bitter said, without the option of night school, which Troy State offered. Bitter closed the piece by saying, “It’s never too late. And you’re never told old” (Bitter, 1976, p.4). Stories like this one are why Adams did not see places such as Montgomery and Dothan as needless duplication. Many traditional institutions were not equipped or interested in dealing with the demands of the part-time adult learner, and Troy was meeting this need.

While dealings in Montgomery were embroiled with negations and debates among three institutions – ACHE, the state legislature, and, as soon will be discussed, the federal government, something else was happening on the backburners that ironically found its way into local newspapers but is suspiciously absent in ACHE documentation. On August 22, 1979, the *Montgomery Advertiser* dropped a bombshell that would significantly factor into the issue of how to handle the Montgomery problem. This article titled, “Merger talks underway for UA, TSU,” stated that these two powerhouse institutions were considering merging into one mega-
university. Speaking on behalf of the plan, Troy State President Ralph Adams confirmed that discussions were still in the exploration phase and nothing concrete had been submitted. Adams went on to say, “I’m in favor of anything that would be beneficial to the university, its students, and staff” (“Merger talks underway,” 1979, p.1). Governor Fob James’s aide, Dr. Robert Lager, confirmed knowledge of the discussions and stated that it was, “Probably the most exciting and forward-looking proposal in higher education in Alabama in many years” (1979, p.1). This would become the first of many forays to address one of the problems of the day, unnecessary duplication and a dual-system of public higher education.

Not surprisingly, this arrangement did not sit well with some in higher education. Alabama State University supporter and chairman of the Alabama Democratic Conference Joe Reed blasted the plan. He made it very clear that any mergers taking place should be under the umbrella of ASU. He stated in a letter to Governor Fob James, “The Auburn University and Troy State University branches were put here to perpetuate a dual system of higher education. They have succeeded in their purpose, but that purpose has no logical basis for continued existence” (Blachard, 1979, para. 9). Former ACHE member and outspoken Troy State critic Sid McDonald suggested that Troy should merge with Auburn and not Alabama (1979, para. 9).

This issue, at least the consideration of the UA/TSU merger, would lay dormant for some time. It wasn’t until May of 1981 that Adams spoke publicly about it. In an interview with the *Birmingham News*, Adams confirmed that he was in favor of a merger. He said that he was an advocate for a one-university system but would also support a two-university system. In the interview Adams said, “if there were one or two spokesmen for higher education rather than 13 or more, much of the lobbying would automatically be cut out” (Harris, 1981, para. 48). This is a position most people in the state probably did not expect Adams to take. He had been seen over
his tenure as an empire builder. Adams had been viewed as a man driven relentlessly to expand
the Troy network far and wide. In this article, he suggested consolidation. Perhaps Adams had
evolved his perspective at this point in his career. Or perhaps, the argument could be made that
Adams had always been about serving the state’s higher education needs and his best mechanism
during the 1960s and 1970s was through the Troy branch expansion.

**Alabama State Lawsuit**

While the discussion regarding a UA/TSU merger quieted down, the issue regarding the
Montgomery/Huntsville situation did not. In January 1981, Joe Reed, representing Alabama
State University, filed a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court. This suit claimed that the state of
Alabama was operating a dual system of higher education. The filing of this suit came one week
after the U.S. Department of Education determined that segregation did exist in the higher
education system and the state must remedy this by ending the duplication of courses between
black and white institutions in the Montgomery and Huntsville areas (“Suit seeks school,” 1981).
Governor Fob James took a political shot when asked about the federal involvement in an early
January 1981 news article, stating, “At this stage in time and with this administration, they’re out
of their cotton-pickin minds” (Blachard & Smith, 1981, p.13).

While 1980 was rather stagnant regarding the discrimination issues in higher education in
the state, 1981 was just the opposite. It started with Governor Fob James receiving notice on
January 6, 1981 that the U.S. Department of Education had found vestiges of racial segregation
in the Alabama higher education system. A day later, on January 7, 1981, James was notified by
the Office of Civil Rights in Atlanta that his administration had until March of that year to
present a plan to deal with the duplication of courses and programs in Montgomery. On January
15, a group of Alabama State University constituents filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking the
merger of ASU, AUM and TSUM under the governance of ASU. Throughout the year, the James administration would ask for and receive several extensions regarding the proposal of a plan to integrate. In so doing, the U.S. District Court also agreed to stay the case filed by ASU until such a plan could be formulated (“Department of Education,” 1981).

The governor’s plan, released to the public and institution presidents on December 14, 1981, was comprehensive. As far as Montgomery was concerned, the plan called for a board including three trustees, an ACHE representative, and the governor to present a solution by March 31. Options included consolidation of programs, mergers, and even the swapping of students and faculty between institutions (Smith, 1981). As one could expect, many aspects of the plan were rejected by university presidents. After reaching a stalemate, the governor ended the year on December 29, 1981, by handing the matter over to the U.S. Justice Department (“Department of Education,” 1981).

While the Justice Department worked to find solutions, other elements, primarily driven by Alabama State University, were still in play. The federal lawsuit had still not been decided, and ASU and Joe Reed pushed forward a detailed plan for Montgomery consolidation under ASU (Beasley, 1982). ACHE Executive Director Joe Sutton addressed this, showing neither support nor disapproval but simply making the point that it would not save the state money. Sutton stated, “There should not be an illusion that it will save money,” suggesting that if ASU absorbed the two branches, the legislature would still insist on funding them at the same level (Beasley, 1982, p. 11).

After a brief attempt at national politics, including a failed third-party presidential campaign, former governor George Wallace was re-elected in 1982 to begin his fourth and final term in January 1983. Based on Wallace’s segregationist background, this likely gave little
optimism to those seeking to eliminate the dual-system of higher education in the state. Only months after his swearing in, Wallace was in the midst of the higher education turmoil that had mired the state, particularly Montgomery, for several years. Back on the table was the UA/TSU merger. Wallace gave the green light stating, “I just felt like two institutions, which independently felt like they ought to merge, should be able to do with without interference from the governor, legislature, or ACHE or anybody else” (Smith, 1983, 2d). This opened the door, under a Wallace administration, for Adams to move forward with something he supported years before. That being said, the merger would do very little in the way of solving the existing lawsuit and oversight from the U.S. Justice Department and Office of Civil Rights, as it would still leave Montgomery with two predominately white institutions (UA and AUM) intruding on ASU in the eyes of the federal government.

While Wallace dealt with federal officials still seeking remedy in Huntsville and Montgomery, the merger bill, sponsored by Representative John Casey of Heflin, found another opponent. Auburn University spokesman Herb White said that his institution had “some right serious concerns” about the bill (“AU, UA at,” 1983, 4d.). Chief among them was the fact that it interfered with the pending lawsuit in federal court. White’s comments seem to suggest that UA and TSU merging would leave Auburn to deal with the issue in Montgomery with ASU, and it did not support that plan of action (1983). White was clearly not speaking out of turn as AU Interim President Wilford Bailey addressed key alumni in order to rally their support to kill the bill. Bailey said, “We are very uncomfortable with this particular bill with the possible impact on Auburn University” (McCoy, 1983, 1d). Giving even more insight into the Auburn perspective, he said that passage of this bill, “Could be interpreted by the courts that merger is desirable” (1983, 1d). The fret Auburn was feeling was very evident by these words. As things unfolded in
Montgomery, Auburn wanted it very clear to the judicial system that senior institutions in Alabama did not endorse mergers. This would only open the door to an AUM/ASU merger, which Auburn strongly opposed.

In July 1983, after no movement on a plan to desegregate higher education in the state, particularly as it related to institutions in Huntsville and Montgomery, the U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit. Noting that the issues filed in a pending lawsuit were materially the same, the Justice Department discussed enjoining those plaintiffs, along with others, in the new lawsuit (“U.S. sues Alabama,” 1983). John Knight, one of the plaintiffs in the original complaint, agreed that the merits seeking merger of AUM and TSUM under ASU were essentially the same and the first lawsuit, originally filed in 1981, would be dropped if intervention was approved. The new lawsuit enjoined five plaintiffs with the Justice Department, including Knight, ASU students Catherine Coleman and Charles Anderson, as well as professors John Gibson and Alma Freeman (“Five ASU supporters,” 1983). The Knight lawsuit had particularly interest in Montgomery and Huntsville, but dealt with higher education in the entire state of Alabama. The lawsuit lasted over 30 years and was not settled until the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the case in 2007, making the 2004 U.S. District Court ruling binding (Klass, 2014).

As expected in a case this complex, there were several twists and turns, and the case would remain tied up in the United States court system for nearly thirty years. The case would eventually become known as Knight vs. Alabama. Paramount to the limits of this study are some key points that directly had an impact on the Troy system and in particular, Troy in Montgomery. In 1985, a month-long trial took place, and Judge U.W. Clemon sided with the plaintiffs finding a dual system of education was indeed in place. Clemon ordered the state and other stakeholders
(ACHE, Governor’s Office) to find a solution to this problem by February of 1986. (Cork, 1985). As expected, this decision was appealed and sent back to the district court. For years the case was on hold and in 1987 the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found Judge Clemon presented a conflict of interest, as the appellant court found his relationship to the plaintiffs could lead to the assumption of bias. The United States Supreme court upheld this ruling (Cork, 1988). Judge Harold Murphy was selected to retry the case. Because of the difficulty in finding a judge to try the case based on conflict of interest issues, it would be years later, in 1990, that Judge Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia retried the case (Elrod, 1992). By this time, Troy would be under the direction of the new Chancellor, Jack Hawkins, Jr. The implications of the resolution of the case will be discussed in more detail in that section of this dissertation.

**Separate Accreditation in Dothan and Montgomery**

Coinciding with the advancements in Dothan, Montgomery, and Phenix City, in spite of ACHE, Troy took on another challenge. This effort, led by the leadership at the branches in Montgomery and Dothan, resulted in the petitioning and eventually receiving separate regional accreditation for these locations from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). In Montgomery, this process officially began on November 1, 1982, at this point under the leadership of President Gene Elrod. It was at this time that Troy State University in Montgomery (TSUM) submitted an application to SACS to achieve separate accreditation. SACS responded with an advisory committee visit on May 15-18, 1983. On December 20, 1983, SACS informed TSUM of its approval for application as a separately accredited institution. The relative insignificance of this event is evident, as it was not even reported by the *Montgomery Advertiser*, a newspaper which covered TSUM with great detail.
In Dothan, the same process of separate accreditation was sought and obtained. On May 1, 1981, President of TSUD/FR Robert Paul submitted the application for candidacy to SACS for separate accreditation. This letter was received and a number of recommendation were made in response. TSUD/FR made these recommendations and the candidacy was approved in December of 1981. After receiving more recommendations from SACS, including the dropping of “Fort Rucker” from the official name, SACS approved the request and granted TSUD separate SACS accreditation in 1985 (Troy State University, 1989a).

Dr. James Rogers served as the executive director for the Commission on Colleges (COC), which is the higher education branch of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, from 1985-2005. While he admits that he does not have specific recollection of the Troy State situation regarding the separate accreditation of Montgomery and Dothan, he did provide a great deal of insight into the reason for these decisions. “It is status and ego. That is the only two words I can think of. Some board members are often very politically connected and they can see money coming into these satellite operations through separate accreditation and this is very attractive to them” (J. Rogers, personal communication, June 21, 2018).

Neither the location in Phenix City, nor any other branch or site, ever petitioned for separate accreditation. The question is, what drove this move at Montgomery and Dothan? What was the impetus behind this arduous and painstaking process? The comments from Dr. Rogers, with the COC of SACS provided some insight here, but very little source material is available to discuss the exact rational behind this action. In fact, the only relevant documentation located came from the June 5, 1981, Troy State University Board of Trustees meeting minutes. In these minutes, the Board stated that TSUM and TSU/D-FR were seeking independent accreditation in an effort to seek equitable funding from the state and enhance prestige and character of the
branches (Troy State University, 1981). Because of the lack of archival documentation citing the reason for independent accreditation, I am left with the opinions of an individual, who was not directly involved with the process. It should come as no surprise that with growth comes funding, or the seeking of funding. This was certainly the case with Troy State University in the 1970s. An examination of funds distributed from the Alabama Education Trust Fund shows that Troy State did not receive nearly as much as it requested. The majority of the discrepancy was related to the operations in Montgomery and Dothan. While ACHE had made it clear that it would not support the request for funds to educate students on military bases, the Troy expansion had grown outside of these bounds by the latter half of the 1970s. At this point Troy began to push, ironically with the support of ACHE, for more funding.

**Full Funding for Dothan**

As previously mentioned, by the mid 1970s, the Troy-Fort Rucker branch realized the potential for growth in south Alabama. The city of Dothan was home to a member institution of the Alabama junior college system, George C. Wallace State Community College (Wallace College), but there were no four-year institutions in the city. Wallace College president Phillip Ham, when hearing that Troy was looking to expand called Adams and said, “Bring those classes to Dothan” (Kirkland, 2005, p.7).

This had to be music to the ears of Adams. The existing higher education funding formula did not allow ACHE to request funds for instruction delivered on military installations. To move away from Ft. Rucker would not only allow Troy more access to civilian adult learners, but also open the door for the potential of state funding. With the invitation from Wallace College, Troy begin offering junior and senior level undergraduate classes in the Dothan area.
This arrangement, between Troy and Wallace, was short-lived. By 1975, Troy was looking to acquire property in Dothan. This next acquisition was also somewhat unorthodox. Troy moved its operation to downtown Dothan, leasing space in the unoccupied Houston Hotel. With this move, the operation became known as the Troy State University at Dothan/Fort Rucker (Kirkland, 2005). The writing was on the wall at this point. Adams and Troy were ready to jump at the opportunity of expansion. Adams saw a major opportunity for adult higher education in the city of Dothan, and he was making his move. While the move to Dothan, particularly evidenced by the fact that the original course offerings were held on the campus of Wallace College, was non-contentious, rough waters were ahead for this relationship. In early 1976, Troy began to look for more revenue from the State of Alabama. Citing the fact that the university was not being adequately funded for the students being educated at the branch locations, Troy began to lobby ACHE for funds related to these ventures. In the original request, dated March 16, 1976, Troy asked for ACHE to recognize these locations, particularly the Dothan/Ft. Rucker site, as branch locations and therefore eligible for separate funding outside of that distributed to the main campus (Adams to Porter, personal communication, March 16, 1976).

Promptly, ACHE Executive Director John Porter, responded to Dr. Adams noting receipt of the letter. Perhaps surprisingly, based on the tumultuous relationship between ACHE and Troy to this point, Porter gave Adams suggestions that should be further emphasized for this request to gain approval from ACHE. Some of these included more detail about the Dothan branch, descriptions of cooperative arrangements made with other institutions (particularly Wallace College), steps being taken to improve library facilities, and if there were plans to seek independent SACS accreditation (Porter to Adams, personal communication, March 26, 1976).
Recognizing the urgency on this matter, with an ACHE meeting planned for April 1976, Troy responded to the specific suggestions made by Porter. Two specific answers, in hindsight, garner specific attention. With regard to the arrangements with the local junior college Troy stated, “The Ft. Rucker/Dothan campus offers no associates degrees in the Dothan area. Lower-division undergraduates may not matriculate until they have earned maximum credits provided by the two-year institution in the area” (Adams to Porter, personal communication, March 30, 1976, p.3). The particular language here and in further communications would be scrutinized for many years after this arrangement. In addition, Troy answered the question regarding accreditation as follows:

Presently the Ft. Rucker/Dothan branch is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education under the umbrella of the system. At this time, no plans have been formulated to seek separate and independent accreditation. It should be noted, however, that the original accreditation report for the Ft. Rucker/Dothan campus was accepted as an independent operation. If separate and independent accreditation in the future would improve and upgrade the operation, the campus would seek such accreditation (1976, p.7).

On this point, Adams was very direct and did not mince words. If the institution felt that independent accreditation was in the best interest of the institution, he would move forward in that direction. These two points, particularly the arrangement of Wallace College and the independent accreditation, would further drive a wedge between Troy and ACHE in the coming years.
As the April 1976 ACHE meeting approached, Porter released a document on April 19, 1976 citing his full support for the funding of the Dothan location. The document stated under “Staff Recommendation:”

That the Dothan component of the Ft. Rucker/Dothan branch of Troy State University be approved by the Commission. This recommendation is made in large measure because there is a demonstrable need and demand by the civilian population of the Dothan area for the educational programs offered by Troy and because there is no other four-year institution in the area to meet these needs. (There is no region of the state which is more populous that is not served by a four-year institution.) Because future need and demand are uncertain, however, long-term commitments (particularly in facilities) should be avoided. Any plans for acquisition of permanent facilities should be reviewed by the institution and by ACHE in light of the prospective level of stability of need and demand. Recognition for full funding is limited to upper division undergraduate and the graduate offerings in Dothan which primarily serve the civilian population. It should be understood that, as outlined in the closing paragraphs of the background section, only those programs presently offered are under review here and that any proposals for changes and additions should follow the Commission’s normal review procedures.

(ACHE, 1976, p.1)

This decision by ACHE was a huge win for Adams and Troy. After years of battling ACHE for the practices of the Montgomery operation, to gain this funding support for the Dothan operation was monumental. Porter and ACHE were not oblivious to this either. The 21-page letter recommending full funding for Dothan stated,
It is scarcely news that the Commission has opposed the expansion of Troy’s operation at Maxwell Air Force Base into a general purpose institution serving the civilian population of Montgomery. The Commission’s position has been based primarily upon the existence of two public universities in Montgomery that between them are fully capable of meeting the educational needs of the state’s capital city. Such considerations have no bearing upon the situation in Dothan however. (1976, p.3)

Clearly, Porter and ACHE were making the point that the situations in Dothan and Montgomery were completely different. One, Dothan was almost exclusively a civilian operation with Ft. Rucker located more than 30 miles away, and two, Dothan did not pose the risk of duplication, as there was no four-year institution in the area, unlike the situation in Montgomery (1976).

The support from Porter proved to be sufficient as ACHE approved Dothan as a branch location at the April 1976 meeting. This provided exactly the leverage Troy needed from a funding standpoint. ACHE supported a recommended funding increase from $166,692 to $725,903 for the coming budget year. Outspoken Troy opponent and ACHE Vice Chairman Sid McDonald even voted in favor of the measure, although he stated that consideration of expanding the existing junior college in Dothan should have been considered first (ACHE, 1976, p.4).

**ACHE Feels That Troy Oversteps, Again**

In December 1977, the *Dothan Eagle* published an article titled, “Troy State Buys Old Houston Hotel.” The article cites that the university purchased the hotel, which it had previously been leasing for $590,090. Vice President of Troy State University Dothan/Fort Rucker, Robert Paul said, “Our project will be comparable to the urban life center of the Georgia State University in downtown Atlanta” (“Troy State buys,” p.1). As would be expected, Dr. Porter and
ACHE did not take favorably to this action. Dr. Porter wrote Dr. Adams stating that this action was “explicitly in contradiction to the conditions imposed by the Commission in its approval of the branch and Troy State University’s acceptance of these conditions” (Porter to Adams, personal communication, December 29, 1977, p.1). The conditions he was addressing were in the April 1976 full funding approval where the commission stated, “any future consideration of additional facilities in Dothan, particularly of permanent nature, should be reviewed by the institution and by ACHE in light of the prospective level of stability of need and demand” (1976, p.9). It is evident from the letter that Porter felt somewhat mislead by this action. He supported Troy in achieving full-funding for the Dothan location, and according to the ACHE staff recommendation above, Porter thought he had an agreement from Troy to not undertake large capital acquisitions without ACHE approval. There is no record of a response from Adams to Porter. Troy’s advancement on the purchase of the Houston Hotel was exactly what, in the opinion of Porter, Troy agreed not to do. The conflict between ACHE and Troy, which started in the early 1970s and generally surrounded operations in Montgomery, would pick up full steam in the latter half of the Adams administration and be of particular interest in Dothan.

**Troy Grows Dothan Campus**

In an internal document dated fall 1982, the Troy State University at Dothan/Ft. Rucker cited itself as “a coeducational institution offering associate, bachelor’s, master’s and educational specialist degrees” (TSUD/FR profile, 1982, p.1). The institution claimed it was a commuter University with 95% of its student body living within 60 minutes of Dothan, Alabama. The document specified that the Fort Rucker campus offered “undergraduate, as well as selected graduate programs to students who are in the military, their dependents, non-military personnel employed by the government and civilians” (p.1). The document cites the current status with the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools as a candidate for independent accreditation. As stated in this 1982 document, the governance structure for Troy State University at Dothan/Ft. Rucker, was an institution governed by the Troy State University Board of Trustees. The campus in Dothan was organized into divisions of Academic Affairs, Financial Affairs, and Student Affairs, with each having an administrative leader, who reported to the vice president, who, in turn, reported to the president of Troy State University (1982).

An internal report of operations related to Dothan was compiled in 1982. The report cited 471 degrees conferred by TSU-D/FR during the 1981-82 academic year. Fifty-one percent were undergraduate, 38% were master’s level and 11% were associate level. The enrollment for the 1981-82 year was 1,114 undergraduates with 26% of these students classifying as full-time and the other 74% being part-time. Of the undergraduates coming in as freshman, 46% were Alabama residents. The graduate enrollment during the same period was 456 students. Of the student body, 45% of them classified as full-time, while 55% were part-time students. 77% of the incoming graduate students were Alabama residents (TSUD/FR profile, 1982).

Several interesting things can be pulled from this institutional report. The first surrounds the issue of state funding. In a 1964 article in the *Enterprise Ledger*, Robert Paul, at the time serving as Director of the Ft. Rucker branch pointed out that no state funds were being used to fund this extension operation (1964). Obviously, as the move to Dothan happened in the mid-1970s, thereby increasing the number of civilians educated, the need and use of state funds came into play. The second area of interest surrounds the revenue and expenses of the Dothan location at this time. At its inception, it was generating net revenue for the institution. At the time of this report, however, it was essentially a breakeven venture. Finally, the percentage of incoming freshman from the state of Alabama, 46%, is surprising (TSUD/FR profile, 1982). Granted the
institution, located deep in the southeastern corner of the state, is less than 60 miles from both Florida and Georgia, but to have an incoming freshman headcount where the out of state students exceed those from in-state would have been an anomaly during this era.

**Troy-George C. Wallace Community College Feud**

The previously mentioned purchase of the Houston Hotel would prove to be a harbinger of things to come regarding the relationship between ACHE and Troy as far as the Dothan area was concerned. The first indication of trouble on the horizon can be found in a 1983 internal memo from Troy Vice President Dr. James Robinson to Dr. Adams. In this memo, Robinson mentioned a meeting between a Wallace College dean and a TSUD dean whereby course duplication between the two institutions was discussed. The Troy representative made it clear that the institution had no plans to either reduce or expand the number of lower division courses offered. Dr. Robinson told Dr. Adams that “junior colleges throughout the state would love to see all four-year colleges restricted from offering any freshman (100 level) or sophomore (200 level) courses. Were that done, there would be no public four-year undergraduate colleges in Alabama” (Robinson to Adams, personal communication, April 1, 1983). Much to the displeasure of administrators at Wallace College, Troy would maintain this position for the remainder of the Adams administration.

As expected, ACHE would soon enter the fray regarding this issue. In what would result in years of dialog between the institution and the commission, the issue of lower-level course instruction gained much attention. In July 6, 1983, ACHE Executive Director Joseph Sutton wrote Troy Executive Vice President James Robinson and copied George C. Wallace State Community College President Dr. Nathan Hodges. In the letter Sutton told Dr. Robinson that the apparent displeasure being voiced by Wallace College and Hodges related to the full-funding
formula approved in 1976. In particular, Sutton cited the wording that Troy would only offer
lower level courses in the event that,

Such a course is specifically and organically related to an existing degree program and
can best be offered by TSU rather than Wallace and unless such an offering has been
fully discussed with the appropriate administrative officials at Wallace and is acceptable
to them (Sutton to Robinson, personal communication, July 6, 1983).

As this issue still seemed unresolved and Troy sought clarification on related items,
Sutton wrote Adams on April 11, 1984. In this letter Sutton stated that “no new degree program
approval is required for Troy State University at Dothan to extend its emphasis on freshman and
sophomore level work inasmuch as baccalaureate degree inventory has already been established
for the institution” (Sutton to Adams, personal communication, April 11, 1984). That being said,
Sutton made other points which seemed to conflict with this statement. He said, “Consequently,
your expressed interested in developing Troy State University in Dothan into a free-standing four
year university of the TSU system becomes a matter of reconsideration of the restrictions placed
on the full formula funding by the Commission in 1976” (1984). Furthermore, Sutton said, “It
seems clear that a request from Troy for the Commission to release it from the non-duplication
restrictions would not be voluntarily acceptable to Wallace Community College” (1984). In
closing, Sutton stated, “An appropriate vehicle for doing this would be the five-year planning
statement which is currently scheduled to be provided to the Commission this summer” (1984).
This letter seemed to send a number of mixed signals. Sutton originally stated that nothing
needed to be done to further freshman and sophomore courses, since they had already been
approved in the inventory. He went on to mention that, according to the 1976 full-funding
document, Troy was advised to avoid duplication. In closing, however, Sutton provided a vehicle
for Adams to follow in order to revisit this issue, mentioning the upcoming five-year planning statement.

Following the instructions from Sutton, Adams moved forward addressing the issue through the five-year planning statement. By the required date of July 19, 1984, Troy submitted a revised Institutional Profile, which included a mission statement. This new statement provided that TSU Dothan/Ft. Rucker extended its emphasis and would offer lower level coursework to support associate, bachelors, masters, and educational specialist degrees. On August 24, 1984, according to Troy, ACHE met at Dauphin Island Sea Lab and unanimously approved the new mission of TSU Dothan/FR (Thomas Harrison to Ralph Adams, personal communication, 1986). Adams, who often allowed his administrators at the branch locations to handle these issues, found the need to inform long-time friend Governor George Wallace about the developments. Adams said in a letter to Wallace, “Our files reflect, after a thorough search, that Troy State University is authorized to offer the first two years of college work at Dothan” (Adams to Wallace, personal communication, July 22, 1986).

The crux of the situation in Dothan is very clear after review of files located in the archives of both ACHE and Troy. Wallace College claimed that the full-funding document, which allowed Troy to expand from Ft. Rucker operations into the Dothan area, provided very restrictive offerings for lower level courses. Troy, on the other hand, suggested that through directions from ACHE, these restrictions were removed by the approval of the five-year planning statement of 1984. This is a simple case of precedent. Which document overruled the other? Troy made it very clear that they felt the most recent, 1984, superseded the previous document of 1976. It would take a change in presidential leadership at Troy, with the appointment of Hawkins in 1989, to remedy this issue.
While the question of what to do about lower level courses and Wallace College certainly consumed much of the 1980s for TSU/FR, it was not the only issue that garnered great attention. Since locating in Dothan in 1975 Troy had been operating at the downtown Houston Hotel after a short stint on the campus of Wallace College. Based on a 1986 letter from Adams to Wallace, Troy was considering alternative arrangements. Adams wrote to Wallace and stated that the institution had outgrown its original facilities. Adams, clearly cognizant of the constant ACHE trepidation of expansion, assured Wallace that this should not be of concern. Adams told Wallace, “A simple relocation of our existing downtown campus does not constitute the establishment of a new extension center or the development of a new academic program” (Adams to Wallace, personal communication, August 6, 1986). Adams, still aware of the unresolved duplication issue, also mentioned the similar arrangements at the following institutions without conflict: The University of Alabama/Shelton State Community College, Auburn University/Southern Union State Junior College, the University of South Alabama/Bishop State Junior College and the University of Alabama in Birmingham/Lawson State Community College & Jefferson State Junior College (1986).

While the issue of campus location was hotly debated in the latter half of the 1980s, many internal and external documents, primarily between ACHE and Troy, show that institutional scope remained an unresolved problem. Troy-Dothan/FR wanted to be a full-fledged four-year university. ACHE clearly was not in agreement. An internal document between Troy Vice President James Robinson to Dr. Adams highlighted this issue. In the memo Robinson explained that the leadership at TSU-D/FR, under President Robert Paul, was committed to growth and expansion. ACHE, under the direction of Joseph Sutton, had other ideas. Sutton, according to Robinson, wished to form a Southeast Alabama consortium agreement. This
agreement would seek to see that all institutions in the area were adequately represented and funds were not being wasted on duplication. Robinson, though against the consortium and in favor of the path of growth for TSUD-FR, advised Adams that this matter should be handled strategically versus the more rigid approach suggested by Paul (Robinson to Adams, personal communication, July 13, 1984).

The light shed by this internal memo was very intriguing. The main campus of Troy State, supportive of its operation in Dothan, tried to finesse the situation with ACHE. Though Adams had been at odds with ACHE for many years, he suggested a less controversial way forward. Why is this? Adams often did not use this approach in when dealing with ACHE in the 1970s. It could be suggested that Adams and his chief lieutenants had realized that the way forward with ACHE was best served with them as an ally. One could see that once Adams had established the branches, which, by this time, were in the independent accreditation process, they had taken a back seat in these battles. Documentation for the remaining years of the Adams tenure, which would end in 1989, certainly support this theory. Almost all communication between ACHE, and even Governor Wallace, often originated from branch presidents versus Adams himself (Harrison to Sutton, personal communication, July 28, 1987).

**Harrison Takes the Reins in Dothan**

By 1986, Paul had moved on, and a new president was in place in Dothan. Thomas Harrison began running the Dothan operation on January 1, 1986. He quickly discovered the many challenges awaiting. Some of them, such as the Wallace College conundrum, had been going on for many years. Others, such as the discussion of a physical relocation, were of a more recent nature. Although related to each of these issues, Harrison found his first order of business to be to determine the direction of the TSU-D/FR campus. One thing was clear when Harrison
took the helm, the enrollment of TSU-D/FR had become extremely lopsided in favor of Dothan versus the base at Ft. Rucker. The fall 1986 enrollment data showed that 1,118 students were enrolled in the Dothan location, and only 384 students attended Ft. Rucker (TSUD internal report, 1986). With 74.4% of students in the TSU-D/FR system attending the Dothan campus, it was clear where Harrison needed to focus his attention.

It didn’t take long for Harrison to jump right in the fray with Sutton and the group from ACHE. In August of 1986, ACHE announced that the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) would conduct a study of the higher education needs in the southeastern region of Alabama. This body, initiated at the behest of ACHE, would “examine the question of need for existing, new or expanded higher education programs in the Wiregrass area” (Southern Regional Education Board, 1987). The SREB report, released in June 1987, was not good news for TSUD-FR. The board first examined the current position of Troy, which claimed that the 1984 five-year planning statement allowed for lower level course offerings in Dothan. In a May 1987 preliminary document the SREB team stated:

The implication in this TSUD chronology appears to be that ACHE had approved a new mission and role for the Dothan area program and thus there was no need to consult, coordinate and negotiate with Wallace State. This was not the case, however, because the adoption by ACHE of a new statewide strategic planning effort was not meant to supersede or abrogate the 1976 recommendation and agreement regarding recognition for the full formula funding for the Dothan component of Ft. Rucker/Dothan branch of Troy State University. (Southern Regional Education Board, 1987, p.215).
According to the SREB, Troy was out of compliance with the 1976 full-funding formula agreement, which allowed the TSUD/FR location state allocation. Of the eight recommendations to come out of the SREB (1987), number one stated, “The respective roles of Wallace College and TSU-Dothan should be defined. This definition should formally designate Wallace College as the primary provider of lower division instruction” (p.32 ).

Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, TSUD-FR commissioned its own study to be conducted by two independent consultants, Dr. Robert MacVittie and Dr. S.V. Martorana. The MacVittie and Martorana study titled, “Charting a Short-Range Future Course for a Regional University,” came to some very different conclusions from the SREB study. The study, commissioned by TSUD-FR and released in July of 1987, found, “a full range of strong undergraduate general education/liberal arts courses is necessary for students to achieve their best baccalaureate-level education” (MacVittie & Martorana, p. 19). Not surprisingly, Harrison and the supporters of the expanded scope and mission of the operations in Dothan agreed with this report, which further stated, “there will be some necessary duplication of of associate-degree and bachelor’s-degree focused courses to meet the needs of bachelor’s degree transfer students and first-time degree-credit students for well-developed undergraduate programs (p. 19).

With this information, Harrison went on the attack. In a speech given to the Houston County Rotary Club on August 11, 1987, Harrison announced the plans for growth in Dothan. He stated that 275 acres of land had been purchased on Highway 231 north for the building of a new Dothan location, as the downtown location was no longer adequate. Harrison also highlighted on the community support for this growth and expansion citing a telephone campaign commissioned using the Center for Business and Economic Service at Troy State University in Troy. The results of this campaign, according to the data shared from Harrison,
found that the people of Houston County resoundingly wanted a full four-year university. Furthermore, they did not favor a merger between Wallace College and Troy State. Harrison mentioned Montgomery, Mobile, and Birmingham when he stoked the fire with ACHE and Sutton stating, “Dr. Joseph Sutton, Executive Director of the Alabama Commission on Higher Education, has been quoted as saying that the state cannot necessarily support a university in every metropolitan area and that just because Dothan people want their full-fledged university does not necessarily mean that they will have one” (Harrison, 1987). In spite of the SREB report, Harrison had his own report and data that said Houston County and the city of Dothan wanted a four-year university and Troy State was going to deliver.

Harrison and Troy also implemented a grassroots ground war. Letters flooded ACHE and Sutton to blast the SREB report and the heavy handedness of the Commission on this matter. Most citizens outright supported what Troy was trying to do in the region; however, one such letter attacked ACHE specifically, stating, “The burden of years of a lack of governance of and coordination in Alabama Higher Education should not be placed on the backs of two young, robust institutions in an underdeveloped area of the state” (McArthur to Sutton, personal communication, August 12, 1987). These letters, while many from ordinary citizens seeking to advance the area, also came from power brokers in the area such as the Houston County Commission, the Dothan Area Chamber of Commerce, the president of SouthTrust Bank, and the president of Flowers Hospital. Harrison, only 18 months on the job, did not back down. He took the fight directly to ACHE.

Once again, the record finds Adams conspicuously absent during this time. There is no record of letters between Adams and Sutton being exchanged. There is no mention of the dealings of Dothan in the university minutes. The communication from Harrison to the main
campus would often be directed to Dean Donald Gibson, Administrative Assistant to the Chancellor. Gibson also served as the chief funding lobbyist from the TSU system. Most of the communication from TSUD and Gibson was in regard to funding for the Dothan location.

As Adams closed out the end of his tenure at Troy, the numbers tell the story. Adams grew the institution by nearly 40% during his last 15 years in office. The entrepreneurial spirit that Wallace likely envisioned when tapping Adams for the position turned into a reality.

**Enrollment Trends During End of Adams Tenure**

Midway through the Adams tenure, he capitalized on another opportunity. Following in the footsteps of the University of Maryland, Adams expanded the Troy operations overseas. As will be discussed in more detail, these operations began in Europe. As the numbers below show, this operation hit its peak in 1983. Shortly after, undergraduate offerings were discontinued in Europe, though archival data does not provide an explanation for this. Soon thereafter, European education offerings from Troy would be essentially completely abandoned. This shift will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Table 4 shows the story of enrollment growth, outside of Dothan/Fort Rucker, during the Adams administrative. Substantial growth is seen in sites outside of Alabama, these particularly include Ft. Benning and the Florida panhandle.
### Table 4.

*Troy System Enrollment 1975-1989 (Troy State University, 1989b).*

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<td>LOCATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troy-Main Campus</td>
<td>3,965</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>4,803</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>4,772</td>
<td>807</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dothan-FR</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>(199)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out of State-US</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1,699</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>2,801</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>693</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>Pacific</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total System Enrollment</td>
<td>10,136</td>
<td>11,294</td>
<td>12,141</td>
<td>12,466</td>
<td>12,958</td>
<td>11,451</td>
<td>13,234</td>
<td>14,068</td>
<td>3,718</td>
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</table>

- The Troy main campus number includes nursing offered at all locations. It also includes the Phenix City branch beginning in 1980. Until that time, Phenix City reported numbers under the Montgomery location.
- The Montgomery location includes Monroeville, Birmingham, Draper, Phenix City (until 1980), and Clanton.
- The Dothan location includes Ft. Rucker, Andalusia, and Eufaula.
- Out of state sites in the U.S. were largely limited to military bases in Florida and Ft. Benning, Georgia until further expansion after 1989.
- The European Division discontinued undergraduate operations after the fall of 1983.
An examination of the enrollment between the years of 1975 through 1989 tells several very interesting stories. Chief among these is the growth of the Troy campus system. With enrollments of 10,136 in the fall of 1975 to 14,068 in the fall of 1989, the system experienced total growth of 38.7% during this 15-year period. This vastly outpaced the total U.S. higher education enrollment, which grew by 21% during this same period (Troy internal report, 1989).

More specifically, the main campus of the institution saw growth of 20.5% during this period. Considering that the institution was devoting large resources to growth away from the main campus, including branches within close proximity in Dothan and Montgomery, this is extremely relevant. The institution was not opening up branches to compensate for losses at the main campus, but rather supplementing this growth with locations across Alabama, the southeast United States, and in Europe (Troy internal report, 1989).

The Dothan-Fort Rucker location actually experienced enrollment declines during this period. The high of 2,032 students in 1975 was never matched again, dropping as low as 1,403 in 1981. The total Dothan-Fort Rucker decline during this period was 9%. Clearly this decline was driven by the decrease of students enrolled at the Fort Rucker branch, as the primary operations shifted largely to Dothan in the late 1970s. The last time this report desegregated the data between Fort Rucker and Dothan, was in the fall of 1984 when 646 students were enrolled at Fort Rucker. This is a decline from the 1975 report which showed 1,535 students enrolled at Fort Rucker. While Dothan students grew from 497 in 1975 to 924 in 1984, this was not enough to offset the loss of students from Fort Rucker. The students assigned to places including Eufaula and Andalusia were inconsequential, never showing more than 57 enrolled students at any of these locations (Troy internal report, 1989).
The Montgomery location showed modest growth of 5.5% during this period increasing enrollments from 2,686 in the fall of 1975 to 2,834 in the fall of 1989. Enrollments at the Montgomery location dropped as low as 1,991 in the fall of 1981. The 1981 decrease could be explained in part by the change of reporting from of the Phenix City location to the main campus, as opposed to the Montgomery campus in years past (Troy internal report, 1989).

As evidenced by this data, the growth for Troy during the latter half of Adams’s tenure was not driven by Dothan or Montgomery. Steady consistent increases at the main campus, coupled with massive expansion at military bases in the southeastern United States (primarily in Florida and Georgia), and periods of strong growth in Europe drove the Troy State University machine during this era (Troy internal report, 1989).

In 1975 Troy enrolled 621 students on military bases located outside of the state of Alabama but within the contiguous United States. That number ballooned to 3,422 by 1989. Troy had taken the model that began at Fort Rucker, Maxwell, and Gunter in the 1960s and re-created it at other military bases, at this time largely in Florida and Georgia. By 1989, the institution was teaching classes at over 15 locations in the United States (Troy internal report, 1989).

The progress overseas was less clear cut during this era. There was a time of expansion; between 1975 and 1983 enrollments grew in Europe from 832 students to 1,878 students. This expansion came to a halt in 1984 as Troy began discontinued offering undergraduate courses in Europe. At the end of the Adams tenure, this number had decreased to 993 students, which still represents a 19% increase, but did not come close to keeping pace with the trend of the early 1980s (Troy internal report, 1989).

Troy State University evolved dramatically in the period between 1975 and 1989. The institution moved from one accredited institution with a few branches providing off-campus
instruction across the United States and abroad, to three separately accredited institutions with
teaching sites located across the globe. The institution found itself embroiled in a messy federal
lawsuit involving Alabama State University and the operations taking place in Montgomery.
Troy also was trying to navigate a tumultuous situation in the Dothan area. The institution had
decided to buy land and relocate away from the downtown location. This did not sit well with
everyone, as some in Alabama higher education, including the ACHE and Wallace Community
College, saw no need.

System Chancellor Ralph Adams was at the end of a long and prosperous 25-year tenure.
It was filled, however, with challenging and troublesome times. From his controversial hiring in
1964 through his retirement in 1989, most people would agree that Adams was a polarizing
figure in the area of Alabama higher education history. With seemingly little regard for norms
and unwritten rules, Adams forged the institution with growth and expansion at the forefront of
most decisions. Upon Adams’s retirement, a search committee was created by the university
board of trustees to fill the shoes of the man who piloted the evolution of a teachers college
located in rural southeast Alabama to a mega-campus empire over a tenure spanning a quarter of
a century.
CHAPTER SEVEN

HAWKINS AT THE HELM

Introduction

On Tuesday, June 7, 1988 Ralph Adams announced that he would be retiring as chancellor of the Troy State University system and president of the main campus effective August 31, 1989. Adams came to Troy in 1964 and had transformed the single-site institution located in southeastern Alabama to a worldwide deliverer of higher education. In the announcement cited by the *Montgomery Advertiser* on June 8, 1988, Troy State trustees said they planned to separate the jobs of chancellor of the system and president of the system after the retirement of Adams (Francis & Herring, 1988). Trustee Charles Martin said, “For the past 24 years he has had his hands on every bit of growth at the university and it was easier for him to serve in two capacities. It would be mighty hard for someone to fill both posts” (1988, 1A). While Adams was not quoted directly in this particular story, his letter to the trustees stated that his tenure at Troy “was the most challenging and rewarding” years of his life.

According to the *Montgomery Advertiser* article of June 8, 1988, the plan was for two separate search committees to begin immediately, one for the new chancellor and one for the new president of the main campus (Francis & Herring, 1988). Several months after this article was published, plans had already changed. The board had shifted course and would first fill the chancellor position before moving forward on the search for the new president of the main campus (Davis, 1989). According to Davis, this was influenced by a letter written to the board by Adams where he states that, “This would make it possible for the new chancellor to be an
integral part of the search for and selection of a president for the Troy campus” (Davis, 1989, para. 4). This, according to Adams, would provide the start to a strong working relationship between the new chancellor and president, which was essential, as the new chancellor would be inheriting oversight over the main campus, as well as Dothan, Montgomery, and 47 other branch locations (Davis, 1989).

The search committee for the chancellor went into action, and by May 1989 had narrowed the options down to four finalists after receiving and reviewing 79 applications (“AIDB’s Hawkins finalist,” 1989). The finalists included internal candidate Dr. Edward F. Barnett, who was serving as the vice-president of academic affairs. Joining Barnett for consideration were three external candidates. Dr. Clifford Eubanks, dean and professor of management at the University of Central Florida, Dr. Robert McChesney, vice-president for academic affairs and dean of the faculty at the University of Central Arkansas, and Dr. Jack Hawkins, president of the Alabama Institute for Deaf and Blind. Wallace D. Malone, Jr., President pro tempore of the Troy State University Board of Trustees, led the search committee and commented in the May article that the candidates would be recommended to the board with a selection to come in June or July (1989).

Hawkins Selected

As promised by Malone, the Board announced its decision on June 28, 1989 (Doring, 1989). They had selected Dr. Jack Hawkins for the position of chancellor of the Troy State University system, and he accepted the position. Hawkins was coming to Troy with a bachelor’s and a master’s degree from the University of Montevallo and a PhD from the University of Alabama. Hawkins, 44-years-old at the time of his appointment to Troy, had served for ten years as the president at Alabama Institute for Deaf and Blind (AIDB). Prior to his time at AIDB,
Hawkins served as an assistant dean and associate professor in the School of Health-related Professions at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) (1989).

Troy did not drift far from its roots with the hiring of Hawkins. Just as Adams before him, Hawkins had an impressive military background before moving into higher education. Hawkins enrolled in Alabama College (later named the University of Montevallo) as a route to a Marine Corps commission. After graduation from college, Hawkins was commissioned as a second lieutenant and deployed to Vietnam. For his service in Vietnam, Hawkins earned the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart, and a citation by the Korean Marine Corps. He returned to the United States as a first lieutenant and stayed active in the Marine Corps Reserves, leaving the Reserves with the title of captain (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

Hawkins, who had spurned interest from Jacksonville State University, the University of Montevallo, and Gallaudet University, took the position at Troy and addressed his reasoning behind the decision. “There has been an exciting dimension of entrepreneurship at Troy and the people there have not been affected by what I call a hardening of the arteries in academia; they’re not afraid to try new ideas and respond to new markets,” Hawkins said (Dorning, 1989, p. 1A). Hawkins also hinted that an overview of the current operations would need to take place. With regard to the expanding empire, Hawkins said, “Troy State has been referred to as the kudzu of higher education” (Yardley, 1989, p. 1C). To this end, Hawkins noted his early agenda would be to ensure that people promote the quality of Troy versus the quantity (Yardley, 1989).

When asked if he saw the word kudzu, or the title “Kudzu U” associated with Troy when he arrived as a negative connotation, Hawkins answered emphatically:

Absolutely. The interpretation was, and I can’t speak to the motive, but the focus of the public at that time and in the eyes of the newspapers and people like Dr. Sutton, who was
the head of the Alabama Commission on Higher Ed., more seemed to be better, but it was not perceived as better. And what we came and found was a high-quality experience that wasn’t being perceived that way. A high-quality experience that even our facilities did not reflect. And so we’ve always believed that quality and the perception of quality will sustain. And, so we had to eliminate this idea that Troy University was just running all over the world, hanging the shingle up for more students and there was nothing behind it. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

In October of 1990, Hawkins was officially installed as the second chancellor of the Troy State University System (Davis, 1990). In the symbolic passing of the torch, Alabama Governor Guy Hunt presented Hawkins with the medallion, previously worn only by Adams. Adams heaped praise upon the new chancellor stating that, “It is my considered judgment that Dr. Hawkins will be the greatest president this institution has ever had” (Davis, 1990, p. 1A). Hawkins, greeted by a standing ovation, once again made his agenda known. He cited the need to work with other institutions to eliminate costly duplication through collaboration (Davis, 1990). Clearly, less than one year into his administration, even the casual observer could see shifts in the direction from the Adams to Hawkins administration.

**The Fisher Report**

The traces of much of what would become of the early years of the Hawkins administration can be found in a study commissioned by Dr. Hawkins after his appointment in 1989. In what would become known as the *Fisher Report*, Hawkins asked higher education strategist Dr. James L. Fisher to provide insight on the Troy State University System. Dr. Fisher, joined by Dr. Kenneth Shaw, president of the University of Wisconsin system and Dr. David W. Ellis, president of Lafayette College, examined the institution and conducted 82 interviews
including students, faculty members, staff members, alumni, administrators, and board members (Troy, 1990). This report, spanning 103 pages, consisted of seven chapters including analysis on academic programs, finance, organization and administration, and governance. The study was conducted between October and December of 1989.

One of the most common themes of the Fisher Report dealt with the governance of the system. The report quoted an unnamed source as saying,

Dr. Adams was a visionary. He developed the branch campuses from scratch; and through good, solid decisions and through seat-of-the-pants management, made it happen. Because of his leadership, Troy State has prospered, but it is now time to formalize relationships. It is time to provide more structure to what we are doing. (Fisher, 1989, p. 18)

This formalization and structure are what the board expected from the Hawkins hire. While the system had worked effectively to this point, as will be discussed in more detail, the branches, as well as external agencies, such as SACS, wanted more structure. Figures 1 and 2 following show the organizational structure in 1984 vs. 2000.
Figure 1. Troy State University Organization Chart- 1984
Troy State University- Executive Organization Chart- 2000 (Troy Archives, 2000)

Figure 2. Troy State University Organization Chart-2000
The *Fisher Report* comments that the Troy University System was run “very informally” (Fisher, 1989, p. 41). There was no formal organizational chart approved by the Board of Trustees. Quite simply, the Chancellor oversaw the Troy State University operations, as well as the system. The other locations, Dothan and Montgomery, had presidents who reported to the chancellor. Operations, such as Phenix City and the College of Special Programs, did not have a president, but rather a chief operations officer, who also reported to the chancellor. Operations within the Dothan and Montgomery locations were extremely undefined and often varied between locations (Fisher, 1989).

The *Fisher Report* presented the four types of models of a higher education institution such as Troy and gave the pros and cons of each. In the end, Fisher suggested direction for Hawkins to remedy the structure he had inherited. The first structure Fisher spoke on was called “A Strong Chancellor System.” In this model, the chancellor was freed from any institutional obligations. Fisher cited examples such as Southern Illinois, Minnesota State Colleges, and the California State University system as examples. He pointed to the primary advantage of clear lines of responsibility and interests. However, Fisher also cited the primary disadvantage as cost, particularly for an institution the size of Troy. The expenditures needed to fully staff such an operation would not be insignificant as positions such as vice-chancellors and assistants would need to be filled. In conclusion, Fisher stated that a strong chancellor system for Troy State University was “hardly necessary, hardly prudent” (Fisher, 1989, p. 46).

Next, Fisher discussed another model, which he called “A Weak System.” In this model, there would be no need for a chancellor. Rather, each of the three separate institutions has a president who reports directly to the board of trustees. This model would be extremely cost
efficient, argued Fisher. The only additional cost would be the position of an executive secretary to plan meetings, prepare materials, and other duties such as writing minutes. The problem with this model, Fisher cited, would be the lack of a front person to represent the entire university in issues, primarily funding, which Adams had done adequately. In fact, according to Fisher, if this model were selected, he recommended that the three autonomous institutions break away from the system format and each report to their own board of trustees, thereby allowing each president to serve as the chief advocate for his or her institution (Fisher, 1989).

Third, Fisher discussed the “One University Model.” This format would be the least expensive. Troy State University would be one university with one president responsible for all activities. In this model, the Montgomery and Dothan locations would be led by a dean or vice presidents with major responsibilities. Divisional directors would exist at those locations, but they would report to the appropriate vice president located at the Troy campus. Fisher cited Arizona State University, Indiana University, and Purdue University as examples of this model. He did not avoid, however, the pitfalls in moving forward with this model. First, there was already in place a structure by which Dothan and Montgomery were separately accredited and somewhat autonomous. In addition, the missions of Dothan and Montgomery were clearly different from that of the main campus. While this format could create significant advantages and cost efficiencies, Fisher did not discount the significant backlash such move could create (Fisher, 1989).

Finally, Fisher proposed the “Responsive System.” This model was a variation of the present arrangement. Citing the quick responsiveness of the current system, Fisher actually praised the many advantages in play with the way Troy was operating. The current system, argued Fisher, was free from bureaucracy that negatively impeded institutions across the nation.
from acting quickly and decisively to take advantage of changing market conditions and external factors. The system, however, was not without flaws. As evidenced by the previous things mentioned, the system was entirely too laissez-faire, argued Fisher. As the system continued to grow, it would need structure. Furthermore, the chancellor, as had been referenced, often found himself in compromising situations between what was best for the system and what was best for the main campus, of which he was also the president (Fisher, 1989).

With each system being identified and considered, Fisher suggested that the last model, the Responsive System, would be the best option moving forward for Troy. Fisher made it very clear, that this worked only if several changes were made to the current method of operations. He stated these recommendations in the report,

(a) Policies and procedures of the Board of Trustees should be codified, promulgated and available for handy reference. Presently, no interviewee could cite a central place where they could quickly ascertain Board policy. Key policies should be kept in a loose-leaf binder and distributed throughout the system. This policy manual should be updated each year. In this way, there would be a formal record of Board policy and easy reference, thereby lessening the tendency to rely on institutional historians of debatable memory.

(b) The chancellor needs to designate a system by which policies are codified and promulgated. This same loose-leaf binder could contain a section on policies emanating from the chancellor’s office. The interested reader could quickly find what is needed to better understand System polices. This would also help to establish greater identify for the chancellor’s office.
(c) Each president should be required to annually submit his goals and accomplishments to the chancellor. These goals should be compatible with those of the chancellor’s. It should be made clear that the evaluation of the institutional presidents will include not only achieving campus but system goals, and that the presidents serve at the pleasure of the chancellor who expects both institutional and System loyalty. All goals and accomplishment statements should be a matter of public record; however, all conferences between the chancellor and a president should be in private, as is the chancellor’s with the Board. This approach will help to ensure that the chancellor’s concern is for more than just the needs of the Troy campus and that the presidents maintain a system perspective. The presidents should also be evaluated every three to five years by an outside authority appointed by the chancellor.

(d) There should be a Board-approved organizational chart for the System and for each campus. This should be done as soon as possible and should be promulgated throughout the System.

(e) Until the System has an opportunity to settle in to these new relationships, there should be no additional initiatives for free-standing branches. Nor should there be attempts to greatly expand the special programs initiatives. Growth should be deliberate, and only after every assurance is made that Troy State has the resources to provide high quality services. Troy State can ill-afford to further dissipate its resources through excessive expansion. The best way of avoiding such expansion would be for the chancellor to require that no expansion occur without a formal request being presented to him. Each request would be carefully
analyzed for resource and programmatic implications before a judgement would be made.

(f) Rather than the System taking on additional responsibilities or relinquishing existing ones, the chancellor should use the power of his office to appoint a self-destructing task force (s) to deal with a variety of questions. The task force (s) should be largely faculty and academic administrators and staff and special expertise should be provided by the appropriate president or vice president. The assistant to the chancellor for special projects should represent the chancellor on the task force (s). The charge would be to determine the most effective way to deliver services and report recommendations back to the chancellor in a timely fashion. Recommendations might include increasing the number of centralized services, decentralizing services that are presently centralized or some combination of both.

(g) After appointment by the chancellor, specific duties would be outlined, and the task force (s) would be assigned a completion date. Before making a final decision, the chancellor could share the recommendation with members of the university community and seek reactions of the campus presidents who in turn would ask for the opinions of their campus governance bodies.

(h) The chancellor should seriously consider implementing the enlightened recommendations made by the 1989 advancement team chaired by David W. Brown, the one exception being that all efforts to gain private support should be made in the name of a particular campus of project. People rarely give to “systems”.

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(i) The chancellor should formalize the approach as to how system/campus disputes are to be adjudicated. It should be made clear that the chancellor has overall responsibility for the system. His decisions are to be final excepting those that require Board approval. When there are differences of opinion between staff members performing system and campus functions, the following is suggested:

(1) Those in disagreement should attempt to work out their differences.

(2) If they can’t, they should determine those areas where they agree and those where they do not.

(3) This information should be presented to the assistant to the chancellor for special projects who will meet with the disputing parties and attempt to resolve differences.

(4) If these differences cannot be resolved, the chancellor would make a final decision. It would be binding. Employees can either accept his judgement or find other work.

(j) A task force should be formed to develop a means of determining the actual cost of providing central administrative services for the system. Presently, most of these services emanated from the Troy campus and are attributed to the Troy campus budget. A standard approach to determine cost would not only better assign cost, but it would also help determine the cost-effectiveness of the central administrative service approach versus a decentralized approach. Presently, Troy campus personnel seem to feel that they are paying for all the cost while the other
campuses believe they are asked to pay for services with no indication as to what the true cost are. Standardization will put to rest these concerns.

(k) The chancellor should encourage meetings of administrators who share similar functions. There needs to be a means by which ideas can be shared. The goal here would be to encourage communication, and these activities should not be confused with those of the various self-destructing task forces.

(l) In the area of governmental relations, the chancellor should develop a strategy team from representatives throughout the system to assist in developing an overall plan. Governmental relations should be centralized and, clearly, the chancellor should speak for the institution. Should the chancellor wish to continue to use the vice president for student affairs in this capacity, it should be done as an extra vice-presidential assignment; although the title assistant to the chancellor may be continued, it should be clearly view as a staff role only. The chancellor may want to explore the possibility of developing an advocates’ program—a program through which hundreds of Alabamians could be encouraged to serve as advocates for the System and assist in its lobbying activities.

(m) With respect to the organization of the system, the team agreed that while it is inappropriate to have a separate president for Troy, there should be created by the chancellor, a council of Presidents, that would include the presidents of Dothan and Montgomery, and the provost of Troy. The Council would by chaired by the chancellor.
(n) It is recommended that the assistant to the chancellor for special projects position be retitled vice president for system administration. The purpose of this position will be to assist the chancellor in managing system-wide activities and resolving system-wide issues related to budgeting, finance, personnel, policy development, and program coordination. (Fisher, 1989, pp. 50-58)

It is obvious that Fisher and his team had very strong feelings about the current structure and format Hawkins would be taking over. It could be found a bit surprising that a new model was not recommended. Interviews compiled in the report suggest issues present in the current structure, but Fisher deemed it best to only modify the current model. These modifications, of which fourteen were suggested, would allow the system to move forward with the least disruption but attempt to remedy the issues ailing the organization. Hawkins and his team, at least for the first several years, would subscribe to the model recommendations until the turn of century, when steps would be taken toward the eventual implementation of the “One University Model” described by Fisher.

As previously mentioned, upon the retirement of Adams, the Troy Board of Trustees stated that it would be conducting two separate search committees. One would be to fill the position of chancellor of the system, the other would be for the selection of the president of the main campus in Troy. Urged by Adams, the Board decided to first hire the system chancellor to allow him input on the campus president. Upon the hiring of Hawkins as chancellor the discussion of what to do about the president of the main campus would need to be resolved. The Fisher study recommended only modifications to the current system and did not suggest the need, at the time, to hire a president for the main campus. When asked about this, Hawkins agreed that there was not a need for a separate president at the main campus. Hawkins said that
the financial position of the institution would not support such a position. Hawkins further stated that in line with the *Fisher Report*, he concluded that one individual could serve in this capacity (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

**Hawkins Gets the Lay of the Land**

It took Hawkins very little time to begin to survey the empire he had inherited. In November of 1989, he took a seven-day trip to the Pacific region to examine first-hand the operations in this part of the world. This 20,000-mile round trip voyage included stops in Japan and Hawaii. Hawkins heaped high praise on Dr. Ed Peterson, Pacific Education Officer for TSU, stating that Peterson is “probably the single most important man to our success with the military branch campuses” (Davis, 1989, para 4.). As the evolution from Adams to Hawkins would take shape, a shift, rather than movement away from growth becomes evident. This early trip to the Pacific foreshadowed the shift afoot.

Regarding that early visit to Asia, Hawkins vividly recalls his perception of what would be the international presence of Troy moving forward:

During that period in time it became pretty clear what was going to happen. The Berlin Wall came down and subsequently the Soviet Union fell apart, which took about two or three years. Troy had been in Europe since 1974, but there was no need for us to have that kind of presence. It was logistically a real challenge. We were hiring faculty and sending them over there. It was a very expensive presence. We had so much invested in Europe that when they began to downsize, we began to lose students. We realized and we concluded that the future, and this was fairly evident at that time, the future was going to be Asia and we’ve seen that happen. I mean, you think about what’s happened in all of
those countries, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and now China. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

Back stateside, Hawkins was catching up on the other aspect of the College of Special Programs, the Phenix City branch location. Hawkins received a congratulatory letter in August of 1989 from the director of the Phenix City location, Dr. Curtis Pitts (Pitts to Hawkins, personal communication, August 4, 1989). Pitts, signing the letter CEO, TSU-PC, welcomed Dr. Hawkins to Troy and boasted of the fine work being done in Phenix City. Pitts informed Dr. Hawkins that unlike other entities within the College of Special Programs, Phenix City was not located on a military base and did receive state funding. Pitts, in the letter to Hawkins, highlighted the fact that the branch opened in 1975 and had been under the director of only one CEO (himself) since inception. Pitts briefed Hawkins on the undergraduate programs (business, nursing, counseling, and human services), as well as the graduate programs (education, human resource management, counseling, and human development). In closing, Pitts pointed to the financial stability of the TSU-PC operations, citing income over expenses of more than $300,000 for the 1985-88 academic years (1989).

Pitts also included a newspaper article in his letter to Hawkins. It had been published in The Georgia Ledger-Enquirer. The article glowingly praised Pitts (Johnson, 1987). As would be expected for someone in a leadership position at Troy State at the time, Pitts had a decorated military career. He received the “Top Gun” award for fighter pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Pitts stated that, “As an Air Force officer I was trained to do whatever it took to get the job done. That’s pretty much been my philosophy with Troy State” (Johnson, 1987, para. 4). Pitts would continue to serve Hawkins and Troy by heading the Phenix City branch until his retirement in 2010. This tenure, spanning over 30 years, would help maintain the strong process
of the institution in east Alabama and west Georgia, the latter primarily at Fort Benning.

**New Developments in Dothan**

The same year Hawkins arrived at Troy, 1989, the Troy State University Dothan location was in the midst of a self-study in preparation for an upcoming SACS visit. The self-study identified 21 recommendations, which needed to be dealt with immediately. Some of these were purely academic in nature, such as number three: “A faculty member with a terminal degree in Computer and Information Science needs to be added immediately” (TSUD, self-study, 1989, p. 21). Others dealt with internal operations, such as number 16, which said, “An annual plan for the maintenance and upkeep of institutional property and equipment at the existing campus should be implemented” (1989, p. 23). Still others spoke directly to the ambiguity of governance, which was touched on in the Fisher Report. For instance, number nine said, “The University should clearly specify the authority/responsibility relationship between the Troy State University Board of Trustees and the Troy State University System, and the relationship between the TSU System and TSUD. Also, specify the link(s) between TSUD and the TSU Board of Trustees” (1989, p. 22). More specifically, number 10 said, “In keeping with the independent status of TSUD within the TSU System, properly authorized expenditures for the Dothan campus should not require approval by the TSU System Vice President for Financial Affairs” (1989, p. 22).

Financial affairs for TSUD reported in the self-study show that the institution ran a very tight budget from 1983-1988. State appropriations grew from $1.15 million in 1983 to $1.65 million in 1988. Income from tuition grew from $1.32 million in 1983 to $1.67 million in 1988. This net income of $2.5 million in 1983 and $3.5 million in 1988, resulted in a net loss of around $300,000 in 1983 and a net loss of around $50,000 from academic operations in 1988. TSUD cited the lean operations stating that the institution was spending about 50% of revenue on
instruction versus the SACS average of 35% (TSUD, self-study, 1989).

While TSUD was clearly not generating positive cash flow, the decision had been made many years prior to move locations. In June 1990, the institution moved from its downtown home to the new location north of the city of Highway 231 (“TSU on the move,” 1990). The TSUD institutional self-study noted that,

Funds for purchasing land for the new campus were acquired through a state education bond issue, and money for constructing the first two buildings of the new TSUD campus was obtained from a bond issue authorized by the TSU Board of Trustees with full support of the TSU system. Response to local fundraising appeals has been somewhat below expectations. Once the new campus is actually operational, the local community should develop increased interest and provide additional support. (TSUD, Self-Study, 1989, p. 296)

The campus consisted of only two newly constructed buildings but sat on 250 sprawling acres. The buildings, one named after Chancellor-Emeritus Adams and the other after Board of Trustees member Wallace Malone, contained 23 classrooms, labs, and office space for administration (“TSU on the move,” 1990).

The issues of governance and financial affairs referenced in both the Fisher Report and the TSUD self-study would come to light early in the Hawkins administration. In April 1989, while obviously still under the leadership of Adams, TSUD President Thomas Harrison wrote William F. Hopper, TSU System Vice President for Financial Affairs (Harrison to Hopper, personal communication, April 24, 1989). In this letter, Harrison addressed the bill received by TSUD regarding the payment of the bond issued to build the new Dothan facility. Harrison said:
Before the bond issue was passed, and again at the time of its passage, I was told by Dr. Adams, Dr. Gibson, and Mr. Peeks that the bond issue was to be a TSU System bond issue, financed by the TSU System. All parties understood that TSUD, in the foreseeable future, could not afford to participate in the repayment plan. Troy State University at Dothan is most appreciative of the benefit it derived from the revenue bond and clearly understands its obligation to the System for being included in the receipt of funds from the bond issue. However, the matter needs to be settled so that until it is mutually agreed that TSUD is able to contribute to the repayment, the System does not send to TSUD notice of payment due. (1989)

Hopper responded to Harrison just two days later stating:

It was our intention to merely inform you of the amount to be charged to your expenditures. Troy State University at Troy understands that due to your cash flow situation, funds will have to be loaned from the Main campus to the Dothan campus in order that this obligation will be met. Accounting records at Dothan will reflect this payment by Main Campus in the appropriate expenditure and general ledger accounts. Accounting records at Main Campus will reflect Accounts Receivable from TSU at Dothan for the appropriate amount.

Notice of payment will continue to be provided to TSU Dothan in order that you may be aware of the basis of future adjustments to your accounting records. (Hopper to Harrison, personal communication, April 26, 1989).

Harrison would again write to Hopper, this time in November of 1989, and, copying new Chancellor Jack Hawkins, he cited the inability of TSUD to make payments towards this bond and ensured that for the time being this would need to be a loan from TSU Troy (Harrison to
Hopper, personal communication, November 1, 1989).

It is clear through this exchange that all parties were not on the same page, and it appears that tension existed. Perhaps most perplexing, and often the source of confusion and frustration, is specific language used by Mr. Hopper. Hopper stated in his response to Harrison, “Troy State University at Troy understands that due to your cash flow situation, funds will have to be loaned from the Main campus to the Dothan campus in order that this obligation will be met” (Hopper to Harrison, personal communication, November 7, 1989). If the bond was a TSU system bond, as Harrison suggested, why does Hopper reference the payment and loan from the main campus? This simple wording highlights many of the points made in the Fisher Report. What was the purpose of the Troy State University system? And furthermore, besides the separate SACS accreditation, what differentiated the Dothan and Montgomery locations from the Phenix City and other sites within the College of Special Programs that operated as branches of the main campus?

Hawkins was likely eager to find good news in Dothan, and he found this in the resolution of the ongoing feud with the local community college. The battle in Dothan between TSUD and George C. Wallace Community College was nearing a decade with no resolution. Proposals, discussions, and memos had been moved back and forth but settlement on lower-level course offerings was still a hot topic. The agreement finalized in June 1990 and essentially decided four issues that had been sticking points between the two parties for years. According to the agreement:

(1) Troy-Dothan will admit first-time freshman for the final time in the fall quarter of 1990.
(2) After the fall of 1990, Troy-Dothan will be allowed to accept transfers that are in their first two years academically, in order to maintain a limited freshman-sophomore program.

(3) Wallace-Dothan will be the primary lower division college in the Wiregrass area.

(4) Troy-Dothan will primarily concentrate on upper division and postgraduate programs.

(Ingram, 1990, para. 3).

This agreement ended a long-standing feud and was an early feather in the cap of Hawkins. Wallace Community College President Nathan Hodges stated that, “I am convinced this agreement addresses that goal, enables the growth of each institution and facilitates the role of postsecondary education in the development of the Wiregrass” (Ingram, 1990, para. 4). Troy-Dothan President Thomas Harrison echoed the sentiments of Hodges by saying, “We feel confident an agreement has been reached. We’re supportive and we’re encouraged of the possibility for common good for the region” (Ingram, 1990, para. 5).

Hawkins stated that he immediately recognized the need to solve that problem between TSUD and the community college. He mentioned the vision that he had for the entire institution, and going against the grain with ACHE on this issue in Dothan was not the way to get things accomplished. Hawkins stated that is why this might not have been the ideal resolution for Troy, but it certainly benefited the state and the two-year college. Hawkins said, “When Joe Sutton made that comment about kudzu, he was talking about more than the implications of campuses everywhere, he was looking internally at the state, and that kudzu was growing strong in southeast Alabama” (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

Montgomery Evolves and Deals With Lawsuit

In Montgomery, Hawkins found the TSUM operations spread out among various physical
locations. The recently purchased Whitley Hall was the largest operating center, which consisted of six floors used for classrooms and administrative offices. Bartlett Hall, also located in downtown Montgomery, housed the TSUM library, as well as additional classrooms and administrative offices. Both Maxwell and Gunter Air Force Bases were still functional sites of academic instruction, though not nearly at the same level as in the past. According to the self-study of 1989, TSUM was still operating at a profit with revenue of $4,898,000 versus expenses of $4,707,000 for the 1988-1989 fiscal year (TSUM, SACS self-study, 1989).

The organizational structure for TSUM, prior to the arrival of Hawkins, consisted of the president, and six vice presidents, all of whom reported to the TSUM President. The vice presidents consisted of: the vice president for academic affairs, the vice president of special activities, the vice president of student affairs, the vice president of institutional planning and research, the vice president of financial affairs and the vice president of university relations. The TSUM President was the chief executive officer of the institution and reported to the chancellor of the Troy State University system (TSUM SACS self-study, 1989).

As would come to no surprise to Hawkins, the biggest issue facing TSUM was the ongoing legal issue surrounding *Knight/U.S. vs. State of Alabama* lawsuit. The legal wrangling, which started in 1976 and was still unsettled when Hawkins arrived at Troy, involved the allegations by the plaintiffs that the state of Alabama operating a dual segregated system of higher education. In 1990, Judge Harold Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia tried the case. This was the second time the case had been tried, as the original verdict issued by Judge U.W. Clemons, was thrown out on appeal. In the first trial Judge Clemons ordered TSUM to be closed. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this case back to the lower court finding Clemons had a conflict of interest. At the conclusion of the second trial on December 27, 1991,
the court ordered a Remedial Decree and Judge Murphy accepted the Consent Decree Troy State University had reached with the Justice Department in 1990. The Consent Decree required TSUM to eliminate certain programs that were deemed to be in conflict and duplication with Alabama State University. It also required the institution to enter into three cooperative programs with ASU. Finally, it required that the TSU system materially increase its employment of black faculty and staff members (TSUM Internal Document, 1995).

On February 28, 1992, the Knight plaintiffs and Alabama A&M University filed Notices of Appeal to the Murphy ruling. Alabama State University did the same on March 13, 1992. On March 20, 1992, the TSU system filed a motion for the court to suspend the implementation of the Consent Decree requiring cooperative arrangements between TSUM and ASU (TSUM, Internal Document, 1995). Hawkins spoke about what he inherited in Montgomery very candidly:

I am not sure when we came to Troy that we were as aware of the magnitude of that issue as we became. I can certainly understand the perception of ASU. Two goliaths came into Montgomery and all of a sudden their very existence was threatened. We did what we had to do to keep that campus from being gobbled up and closed. There is a political saying that says “the reed that bends doesn’t break”, and as we moved through that process, its somewhat of the same rational as Dothan. Sometimes you have to find a compromise that works, or otherwise you can close the doors and go home. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

Hawkins faced another challenge in Montgomery with the retirement of longtime President Dr. Gene Elrod in April 1992. Elrod had been with the Montgomery campus since
1970 and took over the presidency in 1978. Elrod, when announcing his retirement, stated that, “Hopefully, my successor will come in without a long list of things I’ve left for him to do” (McCartney, 1992, p. 1B). Elrod had one thing wrong about his farewell speech. It would not be a “he” tapped to replace him. In September of 1989, Hawkins appointed Dr. Glenda McGaha to serve as president of TSUM. McGaha, previously holding the position of dean of the TSU School of Nursing, was the first female to hold an upper-level administration position with the institution. ACHE noted that McGaha was only the second female to hold the title of president of an institution in Alabama – the other being Julia Tutwiler at Livingston Academy in the early 1900s (Orndorff, 1989). Hawkins said, “Dr. McGaha is a gifted administrator and is eminently qualified to provide leadership for this unique institution” (Orndorff, 1992, p. 1A). Dr. McGaha held the rank of major in the U.S. Army Reserve, Army Nurse Corps (Orndorff, 1992).
CHAPTER EIGHT

CHANGE IS THE ONLY CONSTANT

Introduction

Hawkins stepped into a whirlwind of activity when taking the position at Troy. He inherited a massive legal issue, departures of several key executives, on-going external feuds, and some level of internal mistrust within the ranks of the organization. He would have to find ways to settle the waters. This would come largely through organizational changes and restructuring.

Changes to Organizational Structure

Not surprisingly Hawkins made administrative changes early in his tenure. In the spirit of the recommendation from Fisher, Hawkins created the position of vice chancellor for system administration. He appointed Dr. Douglas Patterson to this position. Hawkins created a new division titled the Division of Institutional Advancement and appointed Dr. David Brown. In what might have been a surprising move to some, Hawkins kept one of his competitors for the position he obtained, Dr. Edward Barnett, as provost (“TSU on the move,” 1989). Hawkins reflected on the governance structure he found when he arrived at Troy:

There was a lot of division here. A lot of internal division, not only as it related to these campuses but inside this University. A lot of hostility. Almost the absence of trust among many in the faculty to some in the administration. I don’t think that extended to Dr. Adams, but it stopped really close to him. When you come into a hostile environment, it is kind of like going into a combat zone. You have to surround yourself with people you
trust, people you can depend on, people who are loyal. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

Hawkins spoke specifically about the appointment of Dr. Patterson. Patterson and Hawkins had a relationship that had spanned nearly 25 years when they came to Troy together in 1989. They met as freshmen in college, joined the Marines together on the same day, and flew to Vietnam and back together on the same plane. They resumed their professional relationship when Hawkins hired Patterson as Chief Academic Officer at the Alabama School of the Deaf and Blind and later as the Vice Chancellor of System Administration at Troy. Hawkins said of the hiring of Patterson,

I thought it was a blending of strengths. He was analytical, thoughtful and introspective. He didn’t pick a fight, but he wouldn’t run from one either. For him it has always been about the mission and service to students. He was someone who I trusted with complete confidence. As I look back over these 50 years, I can find points of disagreement, but generally they were healthy points of disagreement. We had an agreement that we might get behind closed doors and fight it out, but when it stepped outside, it was one voice and we never violated that. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

Hawkins gave little room for interpretation. Patterson was his most trusted ally and important decisions made regarding Troy were seldom made without consulting Dr. Patterson.

Another one of the governance structure changes which went into place early in the Hawkins administration was the name change from the College of Special Programs to the University College. University College included Phenix City, as well as sites located almost exclusively on military bases both stateside and abroad. The University College organization chart essentially consisted of three professional positions working in Troy. The University
employed the Institutional Effectiveness Coordinator for the Atlantic region, the Director of Institutional Effectiveness for the Florida region and the Director for Institutional Effectiveness for the Southeast region.

**Enrollment Growth Under Hawkins**

The following tables, beginning with table 5, show the growth and shifts in enrollment under the direction of Hawkins. The institution saw headcount grow from 13,950 in 1990 to 17,304 in 1995. This represents an increase of 24% during this period. The bulk of this growth came between 1990 and 1991 when the institution showed tremendous growth at Ft. Benning, the Florida region, and University College. As mentioned previously, the European regions would continue to see significant declines during this time period.
Table 5.

*Enrollment Trends During Hawkins’ Early Years- 1990-1991 (Troy Archives)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment 1990 Fall</th>
<th>Enrollment 1991 Fall</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troy Main Campus</td>
<td>4,357</td>
<td>4,743</td>
<td>+8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenix City</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>+9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>2,876</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>+11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dothan</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>+5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total In-State</td>
<td>9,840</td>
<td>10,728</td>
<td>+9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>+20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Benning</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>+47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw AFB, SC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, MS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallon NAS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total University</td>
<td>4,110</td>
<td>5,344</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU System Total</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>16,072</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Hawkins administration experienced tremendous growth over the first full year in office. Only the European division saw a decline. Strong growth in-state, 9%, coupled with tremendous growth in the University College system, 30%, early indications suggest Hawkins was a good fit at Troy. The Florida region and Ft. Benning, GA were particularly strong drivers for the growth in University College.
Table 6.

*Enrollment Trends During Hawkins’ Early Years- 1991-1992 (Troy Archives)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment 1991 Fall</th>
<th>Enrollment 1992 Fall</th>
<th>Year (Fall Semester)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troy Main Campus</td>
<td>4,743</td>
<td>5,161</td>
<td>+8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenix City</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>+22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>+3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dothan</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>+13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total In-State</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,728</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,713</strong></td>
<td>+9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>+5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Benning</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>+.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>+60.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>-14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw AFB, SC</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, MS</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia (Atlantic Region)</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallon NAS</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total University College</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,344</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,590</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TSU System Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,072</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,303</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Between 1991 and 1992, the TSU system again saw enrollment headcount increases. The total system grew by 7.7%. Unlike the previous year, much of the growth came from in-state. The Phenix City (22.1%) and Montgomery (13.8%) locations were largely responsible, each posting growth in the double digits. Overseas sites saw declines in both the Pacific and European regions. It would be difficult to say what factors played into this, but soldiers actively engaged in the Gulf War could have limited time and access to educational opportunities. However, military bases stateside, such as Ft. Benning and several located in Florida, experienced strong growth during this period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment 1992 Fall</th>
<th>Enrollment 1993 Fall</th>
<th>Year (Fall Semester)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troy Main Campus</td>
<td>5,161</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>+5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenix City</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>+6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>+4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dothan</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>+7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total In-State</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,713</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,365</strong></td>
<td><strong>+5.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>+10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Benning</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>+4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>-72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw AFB, SC</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia (Atlantic Region)</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallon NAS</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total University College</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,590</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,581</strong></td>
<td><strong>.02%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU System Total</td>
<td>17,303</td>
<td>17,946</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The growth the institution experienced slowed dramatically during the 1992-1993 academic year. Branches in the state – Dothan, Montgomery, and Phenix City – still showed steady growth. However, University College, for the first time in many years, had a slight dip in enrollment. This was driven primarily by a substantial decline in Europe. In just three years, enrollments in the European division had declined from 923 in the Fall of 1990 to only 195 in 1993. Growth was present within University College stateside in locations such as the Florida region, Ft. Benning, and the Atlantic Region.
**Table 8.**

*Enrollment Trends During Hawkins’ Early Years- 1993-1994 (Troy Archives)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment 1993 Fall</th>
<th>Enrollment 1994 Fall</th>
<th>Year (Fall Semester)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troy Main Campus</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>+.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenix City</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>+2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dothan</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>-5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total In-State</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,365</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,232</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Benning</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>-.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>+1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw AFB, SC</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>+1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia (Atlantic Region)</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>-.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>+1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>+5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total University College</strong></td>
<td><strong>5581</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,259</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU System Total</td>
<td>17,946</td>
<td>17,491</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The TSU system saw enrollment declines during the 1993-1994 academic year. The declines were experienced at all branch locations, with the exception of Phenix City, as well as the main campus and University College. Ft. Benning and the Florida region experienced the largest declines from a headcount perspective, with the Florida region decreasing by 207 students and in Ft. Benning declining by 241 students. University College was down 7%, which represented the largest decline of any site or division since Hawkins took over in 1989.
### Table 9.

*Enrollment Trends During Hawkins’ Early Years- 1994-1995 (Troy Archives)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment 1994 Fall</th>
<th>Enrollment 1995 Fall</th>
<th>Year (Fall Semester)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troy Main Campus</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>5,420</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenix City</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>+10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dothan</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>-3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total In-State</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,232</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,129</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.08%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>2,465</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Benning</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>+10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>+41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw AFB, SC</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia (Atlantic Region)</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>+4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total University College</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,259</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,175</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TSU System Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,491</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,304</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For consecutive years, the TSU system saw declines, as the system was down 1.6% for the Fall 1995 semester. Leading the decline in the state was Dothan, which was down 3.9% or 93 students. Montgomery and the Troy main campus also saw declines. The Phenix City campus showed significant growth, up 10% during this time. In Global Campus, the institution saw a decline of 4.4%. The Florida region lost the most enrollment, losing almost 200 students or 6.7%. The bright spot for Global Campus was the Pacific region as 316 students were enrolled in 1995 versus 224 in 1994.

Hawkins spoke to the growth during his first several years in office. With regard to the Florida region he cited the lack of major competition.

The University of West Florida was kind of a fledging institution at that point and the two-year colleges had not really begun. The FSU campus in Panama City didn’t exist. And we kind of had free reign with strong relationships at Eglin and over in Pensacola. And the people we had in those areas were entrepreneurs. I mean they never saw a wall too steep to climb, and so they were aggressive. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018)

With regard to Phenix City and Ft. Benning, Hawkins cited similar reasons, referencing the fact that Columbus State University had not yet established themselves during these years. Hawkins also mentioned the lack of lottery systems in Florida and Georgia, which exist today and fund tuition for a large portion of students in those states (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

As Hawkins was getting his feet firmly planted on the ground, he found an ally from a very important figure. Just as Adams had flourished, likely in part to high relationship with
Governor Wallace, Hawkins found an admirer in an equally relevant position of power.

Executive Director of the Commission on Colleges for the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Dr. James Rogers immediately liked what he saw in Jack Hawkins.

> During my time with the Commission we strongly encouraged institutions to move away from the “old line” way of management that had been in place, and push these new leaders to learn what it took to build a quality higher education institution. I think the institution was fortunate to get Jack to come on board. We hit it off from the very beginning because I liked his personal style and level of relatability. It was encouraging to see someone who was willing to listen to the advice and suggestions the Commission had to offer. When I was the President at Brenau I had dealt with a President who wrote all the checks out of a big checkbook in his office and he made all the decisions. He did not want anyone telling him how to run his institution and I think Adams probably had a lot of that same philosophy. I was familiar with it. When I spotted it at Troy, I had experienced it personally and was very familiar with what I was looking at. The Commission was concerned with comparability. If you have locations all over the world, you have to show that what you are offering other places is comparable to what you are offering at your main campus. Hawkins did not have a “know it all” attitude and surrounded himself with practically minded people, I also liked and respected that. (J. Rogers, personal communication, June 21, 2018).

**Hawkins Lays Out Plans in When Addressing Faculty/Staff**

In 2009, the Troy University Foundation published, “Speeches and Addresses at Troy University, 1989-2009, Jack Hawkins, Jr., Chancellor of Troy University.” This 280-page book documented the speeches given by Hawkins during this 20-year period. The majority of the
speeches are convocation addresses given to the faculty and staff at the beginning of each academic year. The preface of the book, written by the Speeches and Addresses Committee consisting of John W. Schmidt (Chair), Tom Davis, Sandra Gouge, Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr., and Jean Laliberte, gave a brief synopsis of the twenty-year period, dividing the time period into four sections. Part one covered 1989-1994 and was titled, “The Initiation of the Vision.” The writers would explain this period as one where “University College met the potentially negative influences of military deployment with the positive response of increasing the number and locations of its sites” (Hawkins, 2009, p. vi). The writers stated that “Hawkins continually would seek and find untapped possibilities concealed beneath the veneer of apparent problems” (Hawkins, 2009, pg. vi). The early Hawkins years, according to the writers of the preface, acknowledge that the most substantial challenge came with the SACS self-study which would culminate in 1993. This would begin a thorough and ongoing evaluation of the institution’s off-campus programs.

Hawkins addressed the faculty and staff for the first time on September 8, 1989. He recognized the tremendous challenge he faced in replacing Dr. Adams, whom he said “revolutionized the thinking in higher education in Alabama” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 4). Hawkins cited the achievements going on throughout the institution, including an educational system with locations in Europe, the Pacific, Cuba, and all across the contiguous U.S. Hawkins also cited the changes that would lie ahead including organizational structure modifications. In closing, Hawkins made a statement, which would essentially become a self-fulfilling prophecy 15 years later, when he said, “(a)s one great university, the future will be exciting and will challenge each of us to the maximum” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 16).

With the SACS self-study looming, many of Hawkins’s speeches would take on a
common theme: accountability and institutional effectiveness. The address of 1990 was very specific to the success of the students instructed at TSU, to the point that several were named with their particular accomplishments highlighted. Hawkins said in this address that “I am convinced that we are quality driven, whether in Troy, Alabama, or in faraway Okinawa” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 21). Hawkins also, as mentioned by the writers of the preface, addressed issues such as the reduction of military personnel by the Department of Defense. To offset these projected losses, Hawkins sought new contracts in Arizona, South Carolina, New Mexico, Florida, and Virginia.

Hawkins was actually not inaugurated as chancellor of Troy State University until October 12, 1990. It was then that Hawkins gave his perspective of the state of education, including primary, secondary, and higher education, both in Alabama and nationwide. Hawkins recapped the Troy System, dating back to its founding as a Normal school in 1887. The new chancellor looked ahead, citing the year 2000, and said that the leaders for the new millennium were the same people who are leaders serving in faculty positions in places such as Troy, Dothan, Montgomery, Phenix City, Fort Benning, the Florida region, Europe, Asia, and many military sites in between. Hawkins, when speaking of TSU in the year 2000, said, “TSU 2000 will not be classified simply as a regional university. We are worldwide in our outreach and are becoming international in our perspective” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 35).

Like his predecessor, Hawkins believed the way forward for the Troy State University system was growth. He said in 1992:

The benefits of growth cannot be overestimated. Growth will give us the confidence to respond, not merely react. Growth will give us the resources to advance, rather than just maintain. Growth is not the end; it is the means to the end. It is the means by which we
will continue to be what we all want to be: a university concerned about people- our students, employees, and our community. (Hawkins, 2009, p. vii)

This commitment to growth, while attempting to maximize quality, would be the challenge for Hawkins not only during these first several years of his tenure, but throughout the period studied in this dissertation.

In 1993, Hawkins spoke to the faculty and staff again in what essentially could be deemed an annual “state of the institution” address. He highlighted several aspects of change since his arrival in 1989, much of which focused on the evolution outside the main campus. Hawkins noted the major step forward taken in Dothan with the struggle between TSUD and Wallace Community College, which had been gridlocked for years. He noted the foreseeable resolution to the Knight lawsuit in Montgomery. The chancellor also mentioned the tremendous growth at Phenix City, which necessitated breaking ground on a new facility to adequately serve the growing enrollment. Hawkins cited issues in Europe, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of many communist governments in Eastern Europe, and the continued downsizing of the Department of Defense. He provided an example from a Navy sailor who recently obtained his master’s degree from the Norfolk, Virginia site. The sailor said, “Literally dozens of my fellow shipmates have returned to the civilian community and have told me personally that they would not have been anywhere near prepared, if not for the education they received from Troy State University” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 76). This, as he would often do, was Hawkins providing evidence of the challenges facing the system, in this case abroad, but ensuring the faculty and staff that quality work is still being done.

The 1994 address provided an interesting perspective into Hawkins’s mindset of the landscape of higher education at the time. Hawkins discussed the rise and fall of New York’s
City College of New York. As Hawkins told it, the institution did not adapt to the winds of change and eventually found itself in deep trouble. City College, according to Hawkins, lost sight of its core values, primarily quality, and was currently a broken system with a long road ahead. Hawkins moved from that story directly into the changes at Troy. He cited the elimination of almost fifty programs and the merger or elimination of some 200 courses. With regard to the changes in higher education Hawkins said, “I believe Troy State University has remained ahead of this curve. We have reorganized and redirected. In the process, TSU is leaner and more productive and our focus on quality is indisputable” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 88).

Major Changes on the Horizon

As Hawkins approached the completion of his fifth year at Troy, little had changed from an organizational structure standpoint. As recapped in a 2005 internal document, the TSU system looked similar to the format under Adams for many years.

In 1995 the Troy State University System existed as a loose-knit consortium of three separately accredited universities reporting through a Chancellor to one board of trustees. Each university, Troy State University in Troy, Troy State University in Dothan and Troy State University in Montgomery had a president. There was commonality in some financial management and financial aid processing. Faculty and staff had also begun looking at a centralized management information system. Each institution had separate mission statements, curricula, strategic planning, and institutional effectiveness process (Transformational Strategic Planning, 2005, p. 1).

Also footnoted in this particular overview is that the president at Troy State University in Troy and the chancellor of the system were the same person, with Hawkins serving in both of these roles.
As any new leader takes a high-profile position, I would argue that expected organizational changes will happen. Most of these, for an institution like Troy State, receive very little fanfare and media coverage, but one such change didn’t manage to escape attention. In July of 1995, the institution decided it was time to part ways with long-time ally, former Governor George Wallace. Wallace was hired at Troy in 1987 after his fourth term as governor. His duties at Troy revolved around lobbying and fundraising. By 1995 Troy felt that the budget no longer allowed for the salary of $84,474 for the former governor (“Troy State officials,” 1995). This move did not sit well with the Wallace family. George Wallace Jr. spoke to the press just a week after the original announcement reached them and stated, “No one from the university has called my sisters, no one has called me, no one has come to talk to my father, and I deeply resent that my father could be treated with so little respect” (Smith, 1995, p. 1A). Troy official John Schmidt disagreed stating that the family had been consulted, though he did not mention who specifically. The younger Wallace took one more shot at the sitting chancellor stating, “I resent Jack Hawkins trying to push anything until my dad and the family have met with him, especially since we helped Hawkins get the job of Chancellor” (Smith, 1995, 1A). In closing he stated, “Just weeks after he got in, he tried to get rid of my father by going to the president of TSU and asking, what are we going to do about George Wallace?” (1A).

Hawkins recounts the issue involved Governor Wallace quite differently. To his recollection, he and Wallace Malone, a long-time Wallace friend and Troy Board of Trustees member, went to see Governor Wallace at his home in Montgomery. At this point, they told Wallace that it was not fiscally feasible to continue the current arrangement. He disputed the fact that the governor did not know about these plans as Wallace, Jr. alleged in the press. (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).
This public media spat would be the end of the Wallace-TSU era, which had been closely intertwined for over 30 years. The street running through the middle of campus still bears his name, and the library is named in honor of his wife Lurleen. The Troy story during this era is impossible to tell without discussing the role of Wallace, particularly as it pertained to his relationship with Adams. His eventual employment under Adams and elimination under the new administration, while newsworthy, should not come as surprising. The chancellor spoke of the financial strain facing the institution during this time and Hawkins certainly did not have the relationship to Wallace that Adams did. Wallace died in 1998, but his footprint on Troy is indelible. It is hard to imagine that Troy would become the institution it became without the aid of Wallace.

As of May of 1996, as previewed in the faculty and staff convocations in the previous years, the system was beginning the process of becoming leaner in some areas, but still seeking growth in others. Downsizing was happening in many areas overseas, particularly Europe, but growth across military bases in the U.S. served to fill that void. As of the Spring of 1996, University College was divided into six regions: Atlantic, Florida, Southeast, Western, European, and Pacific. These six regions were supported by teaching sites both stateside and abroad. The total teaching sites numbered 51 at this time with the Atlantic region being the largest. Teaching sites were located in twelve locations, mostly in the state of Virginia (Troy Archives, 1996).

In the second section of Hawkins’s speeches (1995-1999) to the faculty and staff, titled “The Development of the Vision,” Hawkins spent very little time addressing developments in University College. While he often spoke of “change” in broad terms, seldom in these speeches spanning five years, did the Chancellor speak specifically to developments in the massive University College system. An exception was the August 16, 1999 address when Hawkins said,
The end of the Cold War signaled a dramatic decrease in the number of American soldiers— from 2.13 million in 1989, to 1.36 million today. Despite this dramatic reduction in its traditional student base, University College enrollment has grown by 15% during this time— to 5,300 students. (Hawkins, 2009 p. 166)
University College Enrollment, Late 1990s

Numbers for University College during this time are in line with the comments made by Hawkins when addressing the faculty and staff in 1999, as Table 10 indicates.

Table 10.

*Fall 1995-1999 Headcount- University College (Troy Archives)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida Region</td>
<td>2,465</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>3,064</td>
<td>2,369</td>
<td>2,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Region</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Region</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Region</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>5,175</td>
<td>4,777</td>
<td>5,685</td>
<td>5,327</td>
<td>5,798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Effective Winter Term 1999, the European Region counts are included with the Florida Region
The status of University College had been dealt a shock with great reduction in military enlistments during this period but still found a way to grow total enrollments by over 500 students. Essentially all these sites, with the exception of Europe, saw increases, though some minimal during this period. Perhaps the most noticeable shift in Global Campus under the Hawkins administration versus that of the Adams administration was the increase of students on bases in the U.S. in the Atlantic and Western Regions.

Hawkins also provided insight to the growth of the branch locations in places like Virginia, Arizona, and New Mexico even though the Department of Defense had dramatically reduced military headcount after the First Gulf War. Hawkins recalled that Golden Gate University was operating on several of these bases but found themselves with accreditation issues and decided to withdraw from many of these military locations. Troy stepped in during this time and became the provider of on-base higher education when many of these opportunities became available (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

This is not to suggest that Hawkins had completely foregone the notion of growth overseas, but rather a move away from Europe. In 2000, Troy touted a new degree program in Malaysia with operations in three other countries including Cuba, Korea, and Japan (Roedl, 2000). By 2000 Troy had essentially ceased all course instruction in European countries, which had for many years included Germany, Belgium, Portugal and the UK.

**TSUD Seeks Identity**

In preparation for another SACS review, Troy State University-Dothan compiled a self-study, much like TSUM, a few years prior (TSUD self-study, 1999). This study provided a wealth of information regarding the status, structure, and attitudes of the institution at this time. The study stated that the institution had four major administrative divisions: financial affairs,
information services, library services, and study and community services. Each division was led by a director. The institution had three academic divisions: the College of Arts and Sciences, the School of Business, and the School of Education. Each of these were led by deans, who, like the directors, reported to the TSU system through the executive vice president at TSUD (TSUD self-study, 1999).

The evolution of these positions is detailed in this document. In June 1996, TSUD operated with four vice presidents: a vice president for academic affairs, a vice president for financial affairs and administration, a vice president for special programs, and a vice president for student affairs. Over the past several years, the four vice president positions were eliminated or not re-filled, which resulted in the late 1990s structure of directors over administrative duties and deans over academic functions. The self-study suggested that while this flattening of the organizational structure at TSUD was appealing, it had created an excess strain on the executive vice president. Recommendations listed include the hiring of an additional vice president to help fulfill the duties of the current vice president (TSUD self-study, 1999).

Revenue and expense charts accompanying the 1999 report show the financial status of TSUD in the years leading into 1999.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuition and Fees</td>
<td>$4,511,960</td>
<td>$4,666,765</td>
<td>$4,641,685</td>
<td>$4,945,775</td>
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<td>State Appropriations</td>
<td>$4,059,783</td>
<td>$4,098,821</td>
<td>$4,089,821</td>
<td>$4,459,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Grants</td>
<td>$1,021,755</td>
<td>$838,060</td>
<td>$1,273,952</td>
<td>$1,261,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$907,650</td>
<td>$913,027</td>
<td>$912,119</td>
<td>$932,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Revenue</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,501,148</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,516,673</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,917,577</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11,599,574</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,674,139</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,498,425</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,902,594</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11,594,207</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Gain/Loss</strong></td>
<td>-$172,991</td>
<td>$18,248</td>
<td>$14,983</td>
<td>$5,367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, TSUD was running a very tight budget during these years. Hawkins spoke frequently of looking for inefficiencies and maximization of resources. This would become even more prevalent in the coming years as the “One Great University” (OGU) movement took place.

Perhaps an even more interesting insight contrasting Adams and Hawkins can be found when looking at the faculty address Hawkins made in September of 1996. In this speech, Hawkins stated the decline in high school graduates in Alabama versus the increase in those graduating from Georgia and Florida (Hawkins, 2009). As mentioned earlier, one of the first actions taken by Hawkins related to TSUD was the settlement of the ongoing feud with Wallace-Community College. This essentially handcuffed TSUD from recruiting incoming freshman. With such close proximity to both Florida and Georgia, this move limited the institution from
potential growth, particularly relevant considering new campus construction. The legacy of Adams seemed to suggest a policy of growth at all cost. Hawkins, at least by virtue of his actions early in his tenure, was a proponent of growth but tempered within the confines of collegiality.

**TSUM Navigates Troubled Waters**

The second half of the 1990’s remained a bit tumultuous for Troy State University-Montgomery. Hawkins, realizing this when he took the position, addressed this several years later in 1995. Citing a long-standing desegregation lawsuit, which cost the state more than $20 million in legal fees, Hawkins addressed the option of a merger of the three institutions (TSUM, AUM, and ASU). Hawkins commented, “We’re opposed to a hostile takeover, but we’re not opposed to an orderly merger” (Sclater, 1995, para. 6). Hawkins went on to say that the only way this would work would be if an entire institution was created with a new board of directors appointed to oversee the new school. Hawkins stated that excessive higher education growth in the state of Alabama caused unnecessary duplication. He asked, “Do we need two medical schools? Six engineering programs (Sclater, 1995 para. 8)? While this merger never took place, it again shows that Hawkins sought compromise far more frequently than his predecessor.

These comments regarding a possible merger, happened to coincide with another court hearing on the Knight lawsuit. In January 1995, Judge Murphy retried the lawsuit. The trial concluded on March 16, 1995, and Murphy issued a court order/remedial decree on August 1, 1995. Murphy issued a ruling he deemed “the most desegregative remedy that is educationally-sound and practical” (Knight v. State of Alabama, 1995, p.5). The results of this retrial were largely favorable to TSUM. Murphy was highly critical of the leadership at ASU and Alabama A&M (AAMU) indicating that many of their wounds (failure to attract whites) were self-inflicted. The court praised TSUM for successful advertising and efficiency. The 1991 decree,
which found program duplication between TSUM and ASU, was moot. Finally, the court pointed out that in the past six years, ASU has average 2.5 times the FTE and $15-17 million more in annual appropriations, but TSUM has awarded just as many degrees. With the exception of restricting the growth of the TSUM physical plant, the 1995 judgement was largely beneficial to TSUM (1995). For all intents and purposes, the fact that TSUM was largely advertising itself and operating primarily as a night/adult education center provided shelter from the wrath of the courts on behalf of ASU.

While TSUM was able to rejoice in the good news related to the most recent lawsuit hearing, they would be struck with the departure of a key leader in early 1999. Successful TSUM President Glenda Curry announced her resignation from the institution in January 1999 (Spear, 1999). Curry, who was the first female president of an Alabama four-year university, left higher education to attend seminary seeking Episcopal priesthood in the Diocese of Alabama. Hawkins praised the work of Curry stating, “She provided a new breath of life to this downtown university, and she has focused like a laser beam on the clear and sole mission of providing higher education for adult working students” (Spear, 1999, p. 1A). He went on to say that, “TSUM has the best-defined mission of any university in Alabama. The TSUM that Dr. Curry is leaving is far, far better than the TSUM she found” (Spear, 1999, p. 2A).

As Dr. Hawkins closed out his first decade as chancellor of both the Troy State University system and Troy University, change was afoot. Harkening back to some of the undertones of the Fisher Report commissioned upon the arrival his arrival to Troy, an in-depth look into the structure of the system was in the works. Moving into the new millennium, the Hawkins administration would continue to stress themes identified in the early days of his tenure: efficiency and quality. This would mean tremendous change for the entire system, most
of all, those located in the separately accredited institutions in Dothan and Montgomery.

**One Great University (OGU)**

In October 2002, with state appropriations stagnant or falling, Hawkins asked some in his administration to form a concept paper that would address how to reduce system costs while still providing strong academic and student services. By early 2003, the study was complete, and the idea was shared with the chancellor. The paper titled, “A Case for Alabama’s 21st Century University,” outlined some very drastic changes. Chief among these was the merger of the institutions in Dothan (TSUD) and Montgomery (TSUM) under the main campus umbrella, creating one institution, Troy State University with multiple branches, including Dothan and Montgomery.

This operation, given the title “One Great University” (OGU), had many challenges, but according to the writers, had benefits that outweighed the negatives. Some of the challenges forecasted included gaining support from crucial stakeholders such as the governor, the federal courts, and SACS. Taking these challenges into account, Chancellor Hawkins presented the plan to the Board of Trustees in March 2003 with plans for full consolidation into one university by Fall 2005. The key benefits of this moved were highlighted in “A Case for Alabama’s 21st Century University” as listed below:

1. Accreditation. One institution will eliminate the need to seek separate SACS/specialized accreditation processes, resulting in cost savings and a reduction of faculty/staff time.

2. Program viability. Troy State University (main campus) already enjoys the highest program viability among Alabama public colleges and universities. Unification of
system campuses would immediately enhance program viability at all campuses and sites.

3. Eliminate duplication. The new University will issue one academic calendar, one faculty handbook, one student handbook, one undergraduate bulletin, and one graduate bulletin across all campuses and sites. Currently, each accredited campus releases its own version of these publications.

4. Academic excellence. The new Troy State University will be in a better position to receive ACHE approval to expand the graduate school to include need-driven doctoral programs. This will build on the University’s status as the largest provider of graduate degrees in Alabama.

5. Technology. The new Troy State University will be on the cutting edge of digital academic programing, distance learning, and the development of a “Virtual University” that will be international in scope. In effect, this will be a 24/7 interactive enterprise linking Alabama to the world.

6. Job and career development. A much larger and more visible university will gain even more attention from other graduate schools and corporations. Recognized nationally in the Kaplan/Newsweek College Catalog as a “treasure” in its quality and price, the new Troy State University will bring even more resources to bear on job placement and career development. (p. 6-7)

The document also highlighted other aspects of the consolidation including benefits to faculty, community, and the state of Alabama. In conclusion, the paper stated, “Troy State University will be the place where traditional values are successfully merged with cutting-edge technology through a rededication to student and community service” (“A Case for”, 2003, p. 13).
While the 2003 paper became the official document of the movement towards OGU, notes show that Hawkins had been in discussion with the Board for a few years prior. In February of 2000, Hawkins briefed the Board on “Over the Horizon,” a strategic plan highlighting the benefits of a one-university system. Furthermore, Hawkins launched an action plan in July of 2000 titled, “Coming Together as a System.” In the August 18, 2000 address to the faculty and staff, Hawkins said the following:

It has become clear that we need to reduce the confusion created by a university system with multiple campuses. Did you know, for example, that the most basic course we offer, freshman English composition, has either a different name, number or course description at Troy State University at Troy, TSUM, and TSUD? If that is confusing to us in administration and instruction, just imagine how our students feel. (Hawkins, 2009, p. 182)

Clearly, while the 2003 paper highlighted benefits, such as cost savings, accreditation, uniformity, and brand identity, the move to uniformity was far from an overnight decision.

One could argue that Hawkins, clearly much more deliberate than Adams, finally found himself in a position to execute much of what had been implied in the Fisher Report. Fisher stated in 1989:

Another question frequently voiced is whether the Dothan and Montgomery campuses should be treated as full equals of Troy or whether they should continue to be treated as branches or ‘step children,’ as one interviewee put it. At times, the three campuses seem to be competing, or at least not communicating with one another. (Fisher, 1989, p. 15)
Fisher continued:

There appears to be very little system-wide cooperation or coordination of academic programs. Even though many programs have ‘grown’ from TSU-Troy, its seems to the team that the push for independence and independent accreditation has significantly attenuated those ties. (Fisher, 1989, p. 26)

These comments from Fisher indicate that the independent accreditation of the two other locations in Montgomery and Dothan created unnecessary issues.

After receiving approval from the Board, Hawkins moved forward with the merger. On April 7, 2003, the University received a letter of no opposition from the United States District Court. This was an important step, as the Knight lawsuit and consent decree were still in place; the administrative restructuring approval was necessary in order to move forward (Letter from United States, 2003). With this approval granted, the next move involved approaching SACS about the proposed merger.

Hawkins wrote to SACS Executive Director Dr. James Rogers in April 2004, referencing communication on June 10, 2003, to confirm that the institution was indeed planning to merge the three separately-accredited institutions into one with an effective date of August 1, 2005 (Hawkins to Rogers, April 12, 2004). Rogers responded in May to inform Hawkins that he had received his correspondence and outlined the steps necessary when two or more COC-accredited institutions sought a merger. Most relevant included: a prospectus submitted at least six weeks prior to the Commission’s meeting in June or December; the appointment of a Substantive Change Committee; a visit from such committee within one year of final approval of the merger; and a reaffirmation of accreditation within five years of the approval (Rogers to Hawkins, personal communication, May 8, 2004).
While certainly some angst was felt among those in the system as the move to OGU became a reality, Hawkins addressed the faculty and staff on August 15, 2003. Hawkins attempted to alleviate anxiety felt throughout the system, primary in Dothan and Montgomery, by making the following proclamations:

1. Our faculty will still be in charge of what goes on in the classroom. Our academic success will remain in the hands of those who teach our students every day.

2. We will not close any campuses; indeed, we will continue to develop first-class facilities.

3. We will neither eliminate jobs nor reduce salaries. I believe the most important thing we do is hire people, develop people, and promote people. We need good people. And, as our institutional enrollment grows, we will grow our faculty and staff.

4. We will continue to need your leadership. Mayor Rudy Giuliani, in his new book on leadership, writes, “Leadership is more important than systems, or strategy or philosophy.” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 213)

Hawkins used the leadership style of Giuliani and assured those around him that challenges were abound, but the entity would result in something much stronger and more united than ever.

**Dotting the I’s and Crossing the T’s**

In December of 2004, the institution submitted the Prospectus to SACS which detailed the plans of the merger set to go into effect in August 2005. The Commission approved the Prospectus. In June of 2005 the institution received final approval from the Alabama Commission on Higher Education to proceed as one unified institution. By noting that the institution expected to yield expenditure savings of over $16 million over the next decade, the institution started operating in August of 2005 as one unified entity, Troy University. This entity
consisted of a main campus in Troy, Alabama, with branch campuses in Dothan, Montgomery, and Phenix City. Troy University still operated the University College division, which consisted of branches and teaching sites across the United States and overseas. The University College division also, by 2005, consisted of eCampus, which was online education. The governance structure now called the leaders at each of the three Alabama campuses and University College vice chancellors.

The institution held many gatherings to celebrate the culmination of the system into one single institution. Once such celebration was held on the Montgomery campus in July of 2005. At this gathering, Governor Bob Riley addressed the audience praising the work of the institution. Hawkins also spoke to the importance of what was taking place, stating:

The new Troy University will not abandon the tradition of excellence that has served our students since 1887. Innovation and concern for the student have been hallmarks at this university for 118 years, and it will be no less during the years ahead. And what an exciting time to reinvent a university that will reflect the times in which we live. (Pippins, 2005, p. 2C).

Following Hawkins to the podium was the keynote speaker, Dr. James Fisher. Fisher echoed the sentiment of Hawkins stating:

I have watched what I believe has been the most remarkable university transformation in America as the Troy State University System has evolved from an increasingly three-part system into a single university. I have every confidence that Troy will continue in the vanguard as you tentatively shape the model university of the 21st century. (Pippins, 2005, p. 2C)
While the OGU movement had a great impact on operations at the main campus, as well as at Dothan and Montgomery, the process at University College remained relatively unchanged. This division, led by Dr. Susan Aldridge, continued to seek new locations, usually connected to military installations, for Troy to provide academic studies. The desire to continue to expand did not slow down during this time. At the time of OGU in 2005, the University College division of physical locations had been broken down into four separate areas: Atlantic region, Western region, Pacific region, and Southeast region. Each region had a director who reported to Aldridge. In 2005, Troy was operating teaching locations in 17 states and 11 countries (Pippins, 2005).

With regard to OGU, Hawkins made it clear that this was not about consolidation and retraction. The institution still believed in expanding and seeking out quality growth opportunities during this time. The OGU movement was about further formalizing the relationship between the main campus and the branches in Montgomery and Dothan. It was about bringing uniformity to this entity. One catalog, one set of admission requirements, one curriculum for a degree program. Hawkins stated that the formation of the campus in Montgomery and Dothan was somewhat like the creation of the two-year community college system in Alabama. It didn’t have the necessary framework around it and was heavily influenced by large personalities. The OGU initiative served to provide the structure necessary for this type of operation (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

While in the process of the merger, a separate, but not unrelated action was taking place. The Board decided that the removal of the word “State” from the official title of the institution was in the best interest of the university moving forward. While this did not go into effect until 2005, the decision to rename Troy State University, Troy University was made the previous year.
While unfavorable with many students and alumni, Sandy Gouge, Executive Assistant and Chief Advancement Officer defended the change:

We know based on national research an adjustment in dropping state is perceived very favorably. We are looking for a name that would embody our expanded mission. Troy State defines a tightly regional mission. And we are now located around the world.

(Taylor, 2004, p. 1A)

The change would indeed happen in 2005 and Troy State University, in connection with the move to one single accredited institution, would become Troy University.
CHAPTER NINE

THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED

Introduction

ACHE’s Jim Sutton once labeled Troy State University “Kudzu U.” When asked if he viewed this moniker as negative, Chancellor Jack Hawkins answered in one word, “Absolutely” (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018). Hawkins said it is not only quality, but the perception of quality by which an institution can sustain itself. This study sought to examine the growth of a small state institution into a large multi-campus system with over 60 site locations located throughout the globe. The study found two key factors which aided this growth, strong entrepreneurial personalities and a welcoming external environment. The study also found that bigger was not always better and examined the challenges a new leader faced when inheriting a higher education empire with very little framework or structure. Examining this institution during the second half of the 20th century brought to light a multitude of subplots which could be overlooked if not carefully considered.

It began with the hiring of an entrepreneurial leader who had a very close relationship to the governor, whom was a powerful figure in the state of Alabama, George Corley Wallace. The institution flourished because the state lacked a strong centralized oversight body for higher education. Capitalizing on a niche with the United States military, the institution planted its flag all over the United States and as well as many countries in Europe and Asia. It faced a lawsuit from the United States Justice Department and was accused of perpetuating a system of
segregation in Alabama higher education. The institution was also accused of excessive duplication by both the state commission on higher education and other institutions.

Near the end of the 20th century, Troy State University faced the very difficult task of replacing a chancellor, Ralph Adams, finishing up a 25-year term. The torch was passed to Jack Hawkins and by his own account, he inherited an institution with very strong political forces internally and tremendous challenges externally. By commissioning an external study, the Fisher Report, Hawkins sought guidance on how to advance this very intricate organization. Early on Hawkins found a system with three separately accredited institutions and many other sites worldwide. Hawkins quickly recognized that the “system” format was unnecessary, but also realized that the political forces and personalities operating these entities were too great to tackle right way.

When asked how he navigated the lawsuit in Montgomery, Hawkins answered with one word, “cautiously” (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018). This same word could be applied to the way Hawkins navigated the branch campus system during the early years of his tenure. Strong personalities, such as Wallace Malone, CEO of SouthTrust Bank in Dothan, was a tremendous supporter of the separately accredited institution in Dothan. Similar stakeholders existed in places like Montgomery and the Florida Region as well. Hawkins, with the assistance of Vice-Chancellor Doug Patterson, were able to mend a broken relationship with ACHE, as well as address many issues related to SACS.

In the end, Hawkins decided to move forward with the consolidation of the separate branches. This did not, as one might think, result in a slowdown of the growth of other sites. New locations were still, at the end of this study in 2005, being developed and expanded when the opportunity presented itself. Hawkins, like Adams before him, still believed in going
anywhere that made operational sense. Hawkins also, as previously mentioned, had a very strong ally in Dr. Rogers with the COC at SACS and therefore likely had new locations highly vetted before moving forward. The entity which would become Troy University went through multiple name changes and at times operated over 60 teaching locations throughout the world. This 40-year period only saw two chief executive officers. The goal of the institution remained one of growth and expansion throughout this time, both under Adams and Hawkins, but with very different strategies.

This aim of this study was also to provide insight to readers, including historians, practitioners, and students, about the value of capitalizing on change. Multiple times Troy had to adjust to change in the external environment in order to stay relevant in Alabama higher education. Failure to do this would have greatly damaged the possibility of the institution to continue growth into the 21st century. Under the leadership of both presidents, the institutions made decisions and implemented strategies in an attempt to advance the university forward.

Personalities

As with any historical study of an Alabama public institution of higher education in the second half of the 20th century, the involvement of Governor George Wallace must be considered. Perhaps more than any other institution, certainly in the four-year sector, he played a pivotal role in the history of Troy. From the selection, confirmed by members of the Alabama State Board of Education, of Ralph Adams to the presidency in 1964, to his controversial termination from the institution in 1995, George Wallace was key player in the history of Troy. While few could argue that this is not the case, to what extent is debatable. Former member of the Alabama Senate Education Committee Sid McDonald (1974-78) said, “It was the governor’s office that always got his way in appropriations and other higher education matters and George
Wallace couldn’t say no to Ralph Adams” (Visser, 1988, p.14A). Former ACHE chairman, Jim Oakley agreed, saying, “He (Adams) had the corner on educational dollars” (Visser, p.14A). It is notable that Wallace ended the last of four terms as Alabama governor in 1987. Adams announced his retirement from Troy the following year, in 1988.

Hawkins, who succeeded Adams, took somewhat of a different view when considering the special treatment Troy received due to the relationship with Wallace. Hawkins pointed to the fact that Troy has never been funded on a per-student basis in line with most of its in-state peers, including the years Wallace and Adams were in office at the same time. Furthermore, Hawkins cited the lack of or even consideration of doctoral programs for Troy under the Wallace-Adams era. In light of those two facts, Hawkins found little evidence that Troy greatly benefited from the relationship it had with Governor Wallace (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018).

While this may be the case, the indirect impact is indisputable. Had Adams not had the personal relationship with Wallace, it is almost a certainty that he would not have been appointed to the position. He had very little academic experience and the others being considered were certainly qualified, so much so that they received appointments at other higher education entities in the state. What Adams did have, in addition to his relationship with Wallace, was dogged ambition and a tremendously aggressive entrepreneurial spirit. Wallace knew this about Adams and thereby made the recommendation which changed the course of Troy forever.

Adams grew up in rural south Alabama during the years of the Great Depression. His family lost everything including the family store and family home, and his father passed away when Ralph was only 13 years old. Despite these notable obstacles, Adams moved forward in all aspects including his education, the military, and later the professional world. Still in his teens,
Adams showed the entrepreneurial spirit, which he would be noted for during his lifetime, by selling magazine subscriptions door-to-door. While in law school at the University of Alabama, Adams borrowed money to buy a boarding house and made money to support other endeavors by renting rooms to students. Prior to the appointment at Troy, Adams found success in the military, insurance sales, and the practice of law.

Burns (1978) examined leadership and gives particular credit to those who can find need, exploit contradictions between values and practice, and oversee the governance of change. Adams track record at Troy certainly supports his ability in these areas. Upon arriving at the institution in 1964, Adams found that the institution had one very small satellite operation located at a military base about 20 miles southwest of the main campus. Within a few short years he had expanded this operation, most important, allowed a full degree to be earned by a soldier without ever having to attend the main campus. He duplicated this feat in the Montgomery area at two bases, Maxwell and Gunter. He recognized the need for higher education for soldiers and airmen and airwomen and found a way for his institution to serve this need. Over the next twenty-five years Adams expanded this model to locations throughout the entire world. This was a significant change from an institution that had operated within the boundaries of Pike County, Alabama for the previous eighty years of its existence.

The actions of Adams aligned well with contingency Path-Goal theory cited by Evans (1970). The theory suggests that followers will engage in behaviors which result in certain outcomes provided they believe the leader’s instructions will lead to these goals. Adams led the way on the branch expansion, first with no-state oversight body in place, and later with a very weak entity, by going wherever he saw a need for the institution. His followers, such as Robert Paul in Dothan, Curtis Pitts in Phenix City, and James Bailey in Montgomery, followed suit.
These leaders drove hard, looking for opportunities to advance their respective campus with the blessing of Adams.

Stoke (1959) took an interest in examining presidential leadership. Specifically, Stoke looked at the comparison of leaders in higher education to those in the private sector. Stoke, in 1959, recognized a shift that preceded the appointment of Adams by stating:

If I were to make a general observation about the qualifications of college presidents, it would be this: in recent years the factor of educational distinction has declined while factors of personality, management skills, and successful experience in business and administration have increased in importance. This fact reflects the gradual transformation of the college president from an intellectual leader into a manager, skilled in administration, a broker and personal and public relationships (p.15).

Stoke called this transaction a period of the CEO shifting from an “academic leader” to a “manager” (p.15). All indications suggest Troy timed this shift exactly right. Within five years of Stoke writing about the success of this type leader, Adams, who certainly fit the role of manager vs. academic leader, was appointed.

Perhaps the only piece of the Stoke definition not accurately defining Adams was his lack of responsiveness to public relationships. Adams never was concerned about this. Whether this related to government officials or leaders of other academic institutions, Adams spent very little time cultivating these relationships, except obviously with Governor Wallace. This would certainly be one of the difference seen when Hawkins was hired to fill the position vacated by Adams in 1989. One of the strengths of Hawkins was his willingness to promote collegiality, even seemingly at the expense of his own institution at times.
March and Simon (1958) discussed the issues which can arise when the subordinate deals with role ambiguity. They specifically discussed how informal relationships with influential parties can play a role in this challenge. By his own account, Hawkins found this to be the case when he arrived in Troy in 1989. The campuses, specifically Montgomery and Dothan, were largely set up informally, including the relationship with the Troy State University system. Powerful entities existed within those campuses which created an additional layer of difficulty with regard to management. This was specifically noted throughout the Fisher Report by many interviewed including, faculty members, staff members, and administrators.

Bass and Riggio (2006), Galpin (1996), Tichy and Devanna (1986), and Benison and Neumann (1993) all considered the concept of transformational leadership and the components common in such a leader. The leader meeting the criteria must be influential and motivating, as well as empowering followers through trust, appreciation, and collaboration. The record indicates that Adams exhibited many of these traits. He appointed leaders at branches across the world and allowed them to flourish. As previously mentioned, this resulted in some level of dysfunction as the lack of structure would ultimately become problematic. Contrary to the work of the previously listed authors, Chrislip and Larson (1994) might take issue with Adams being considered a transformational leader. Those writers suggest that the transformational leader is different than the traditional leader in that he or she eschews “hierarchy, exclusion and brute power to achieve narrow ends” (p.14). In lieu of this, Chrislip and Larson argued, the transformational leader relies on inclusion and constructive engagement in pursuit of broad unifying goals. With regard to his concept of the branch system, Adams would not fit this definition.
Likert (1967) considered four separate leadership styles: (1) Exploitative authoritative, (2) Benevolent authoritative, (3) Consultative system, and (4) Participative system. The actions taken by Hawkins soon after his appointment including the commission of the Fisher Report, the hiring of a strong ally in Patterson, and the shake-up within the leadership of the branches, suggest that he subscribed to the consultative system. The leadership style does allow lower-level employees to make decisions but in a more limited scope. It relies heavily on major policy decisions and actions to be made by upper-management. This style, as the actions of Hawkins, with the support of Patterson suggest, lead to more structure and intentional framework than what had previously been seen with the free-flowing, hands-off approach Adams had employed with regard to the branches.

Stogdill (1974) posit that the personality traits of an individuals were relevant in order for the potential for leadership to exist. These traits, among other included being dependable, persistent, self-confident, and decisive. However, Stogdill argued that these traits alone did not lead to strong leadership and the situation, combined with certain personality traits would determine the success of the leader. Stogdill’s theory proves extremely accurate in the case of Troy University. Both Adams and Hawkins possess many of the traits Stogdill recognized in a strong leader. That being said, it is unlikely either of them would have been as successful had they inherited the other’s situation. Adams was appointed to the position of president at a time ripe for his leadership style. His dear friend was the chief executive officer of the state and he was not bashful about capitalizing on this. The state had little to no oversight regulating growth and Adams used his entrepreneurship to exploit this. The military was gearing up for Vietnam and later the Cold War and chose to heavily invest in the educated solider. Adams had an
extensive successful military background and was able to make inroads across the globe. The situation Adams inherited was ideal for his particular traits and skills.

Hawkins on the other hand, while still aggressive and forward thinking, presented a much more collegial leadership approach. This was evidence by the immediate agreement with the community college in Dothan and the openly willingness to do what was necessary to bring peace to the disharmony in Montgomery related to the Knight lawsuit. Hawkins believed in the concept of “cutting off a finger to save the body” (J. Hawkins, personal communication, May 9, 2018) as he spoke of the arrangement with Wallace Community College in Dothan. Stogdill (1974) also mentioned he leadership skill of keen awareness of the social environment. Hawkins, during the years of this study, seemed to very attuned to the environment external to his organization. The decision to move from Europe to Asia proved extremely timely. The decision to step into many military branches throughout the U.S. which had been abandoned by Golden Gate University also payed dividends. The patience to deliberately address the merger of the Montgomery and Dothan locations likely set up the long tenure he still enjoys at the institution. A hastily employed consolidation tactic would have certainly been negatively received by the political powers in place at the time of his arrival to Troy. Stogdill’s position that specific leadership traits alone do not determine success but rather the environment and situation encountered proved accurate in this specific case.

The relationship between higher education and the military is long-standing. Many factors, including overseas conflicts, level of financial assistance, and accessibility of education have played a role in the activity level of the military. Troy University’s relationship with the military dates back to the 1950s when classes were offered to soldiers at Camp Rucker, located
about 20 miles southwest of the main campus in Troy. At its peak in the early 2000s Troy was offering instruction on over 50 military bases across the world.

In 1964, the Alabama State Board of Education hired a decorated military officer in Ralph Adams to lead the institution. Adams learned about the relationship at Camp Rucker (now Fort Rucker) and the benefits being provided to the active duty soldiers. At the time, higher education degrees, such as the ones being offered at Camp Rucker, were being completed through the Bootstrap program. This allowed soldiers to gain a great deal of instruction on the military base, but they would eventually have to take a leave of absence and serve a residency requirement at the main campus for degree attainment. Adams recognized the difficulty this created for the solider and gained approval for the degree to be gained completely on-base. This model would be duplicated at military bases throughout the United States and abroad during the tenure of Adams and his predecessor Jack Hawkins.

The personalities involved with Troy University between the years of 1964-2005 played a major role in the institution’s evolution. The political power held by these individuals was substantial, and they were able to use this to the benefit of the institution. Leadership at the highest level was crucial to the development during these years. When combined with the external factors in play, including the relationship with the United States military and the agencies charged with overseeing higher education, it proved to be an excellent confluence of factors for an institution seeking growth.

Military Relationships

The military recognized the value in the educated soldier and opened its doors to institutions such as Troy. Furthermore, it provided funds to pay for this endeavor. Onkst (1998) speaks to the benefits of the 1944 Serviceman’s Readjustment Act, or G.I. Bill, which yielded
qualified veterans several benefits, including funding for education. Mettler (2005) recognized
the contribution of the G.I. Bill through high percentages in civic, social, and political
engagement for those veterans who had taken advantage of the G.I. Bill. Beginning in 1948 the
U.S. military began the practice of providing tuition assistance for active duty military personnel.
Army Regulation 85-40-1 stated that active duty soldiers were reimbursed at 75% of the cost of
tuition, not to exceed $25 per three-semester hour course (Easterling, 1979). Within a decade,
Troy would aggressively respond to this move by initiating coursework directly on the military
base in Camp Rucker. Quick to rebut any concern of taxpayer dollars being spent on the on-base
operations, Robert Paul responded that the initiative on the military base was being done without
any funds from Alabama taxpayers. This could be semantics. A publication in 1972 from the
institution noted that through tuition assistance 75% of the cost of tuition will be paid. For the
remaining balance, the flyer states, “tuition assistance will be provided for the balance” (Troy
State College, 1972). Clearly, the 25% difference had to come from institutional funds, which
include state appropriations.

As the communism scare intensified in the 1950s, in conjunction with the Korean War,
the U.S. military increased its efforts to support higher education. Suggesting that education was
a bona fide avenue to block communist indoctrination of captured POWs, the Air Force released
AFL 34-23, a letter addressing the value of education. In the letter it recommended all education
programs “include the highest ideals of citizenship, faith in our form of government, respect for
dignity of the individual, confidence in the integrity of the U.S., a firm sense of mission and a
willingness and eagerness to serve in support of ideals of freedom” (AFL, 34-23, 1953).

Troy, under the direction of Adams, a staunch military supporter, charged forward with
this mission. When opening the Gunter/Maxwell branch in Montgomery, Adams said, “Because
of the increasing educational demands on the part of both officers and Enlisted personnel, Troy State College has agreed to offer college level instruction at Maxwell and Gunter” (Krantz, 1965, para. 8). The Troy Messenger said that, “It has been found that the mandatory military quality of courage, under any definition, is positively correlated with intelligence” (New Troy State, 1965, para. 12). The Montgomery program welcomed over 400 soldiers when class offerings began in 1965.

By the 1970’s the relationship between Troy and the military was flourishing. Classes were being offered on bases in the U.S., as well as overseas in Europe. Not everyone agreed with this strategy and brought forth serious allegations. Easterling (1979) cited a 1977 Ashworth and Lindly study that accused on-base institutions of being “diploma mills.” The rigor and quality of the programs were called into question, as well as the credentials of the faculty delivering instruction. Upon Hawkins arrival at Troy in 1989, these same questions would be on the table regarding his institution.

The number of active duty members has fluctuated during the period of study. That being said, responsiveness allowed Troy managed to maintain this niche even at times of low enlistments. Examples of this included the move from Europe to Asia after the de-escalation of troops in Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the aggressive approach to stateside bases under the direction of Hawkins. The long-standing and successful relationship with the military, without question, lead to the success to the branch expansion for Troy during the second half of the 20th century.

State Oversight

Other external factors also proved to be favorable to Troy during this period of expansion. Until 1969, the state of Alabama had no oversight committee charged with
monitoring, advising, or coordinating higher education in the state (Gipson, 1980). In 1967, the state legislature passed Act #187 which created the Alabama Education Study Commission to, among other things, address the governance of higher education in the state. This lead to a 1968 report which called for the creation of an entity to serve as an overseer of higher education, though did not specifically define the duties. Under the direction of Governor Albert Brewer, ACHE was created in 1969 by virtue of Act #14. In what would become very controversial in the preceding years, this body was creating as an advisory board rather than a coordinating board (1980).

Troy, particularly under Adams, subscribed strictly to the limited power given to ACHE by the language in Act #14. This language allowed for ACHE to study, review, and evaluate the actions and activities of the institutions of higher education and make recommendations to the state legislature. The Act clearly did not give the ultimate power, program or location approval, to ACHE (Acts of Alabama, 1969). This lack of connection between the power provided by ACHE by the language of the legislation, and what the commission attempted to do, provided a toxic relationship between Troy and ACHE.

Examples of this disconnect are plentiful during the Adams administration. One of the more public cases involved 1974 master’s of criminal justice situation regarding the Montgomery campus. In 1974 both AUM and Troy approached ACHE about the desire to start a graduate program in criminal justice. ACHE decided to approve the AUM program, primarily citing better library facilities. This did not deter Adams. As if ACHE had never spoken on the issue, Troy moved forward with the master’s in criminal justice at the Montgomery campus in the Fall of 1974.
Another very public example of the on-going feud between ACHE and Troy included the issue of lower-level studies in the Dothan area in the 1980’s. ACHE contended that the two-year institution, Wallace College, should be the provider of the lower-level general studies in the area. ACHE cited documentation that expressed this to Troy when ACHE supported a full-funding formula for the Dothan location. Troy disagreed, citing later communication in which Troy included the language of being a provider of a full four-year degree in its update “role and scope” documentation approved by ACHE. The acrimonious relationship between Troy and ACHE would persist for the duration of the Adams administration. It is evident through the research that the lack of authority given to ACHE in Act #14 of 1969, lead directly unfettered expansion of Troy in places such as Dothan, Montgomery, and Phenix City during the ten-year period between 1969-1979.

Hawkins inherited a different ACHE than that Adams had worked with for the majority of his administration. After constant questioning regarding the authority of the Commission, Act 79-461 was introduced and passed in 1979. This act gave ACHE approval authority of approving new programs, as well as authority over non-resident campus instruction. The Act also changed the name of the entity from the Alabama Commission of Higher Education to the Alabama Commission on Education (Acts of Alabama, 1979). Hawkins, as he quickly learned, had a lot of ground to make up with ACHE. He quickly made this a cornerstone of his agenda.

This agenda included many extensions of the proverbial olive branch. The settlement surrounding the feud of general studies offerings in Dothan was perhaps the first among these. This was quickly followed up by working with ACHE to try and find peace in Montgomery with the pending lawsuit regarding Alabama State University. Hawkins saw being on the right side of
ACHE was the best way forward for the institution. The record indicates this collegial, or diplomatic, approach was far different than that employed by Adams.

How these two leaders handled an external force like ACHE could been seen as two opposite methods to achieve the same goal, institutional advancement. However, one cannot overlook the fact that they were operating under different circumstances. Adams had already begun to expand the Troy empire across the state when ACHE came into existence. Furthermore, the language originally establishing ACHE did not forbid anything Adams did during his tenure. Adams even spoke of the need for the state to have a stronger regulatory body, but in the absence of such, he would do what was best for his institution. Hawkins, found an ACHE which have been granted, by the legislature, more authority, and therefore that certainly could have factored into his relationship with the entity.

Very little was able to be gleamed from the available research regarding the relationship between SACS and Troy during the early years of this study. It was obviously cordial enough to allow the branch expansion and even separate accreditation for Montgomery and Dothan. The first available commentary on this matter came from by way of Dr. Jim Rogers, who served as Executive Director of the Commission on Colleges, the higher education entity of SACS. Rogers suggested that while serving as Executive Director even though he generally examined issues from a very high level as contrasted with particular institutions, he was able to quickly make some generalizations about Troy. Those included the change in management styles which would have been necessary in the transition from Adams to Hawkins. Rogers suggested that the old line style of management which likely existed under Adams, would not have been successful under his tenure with the COC, which began in 1985. He spoke highly of his relationship with Hawkins
and the collegial nature he brought to the position, which fit nicely with the direction of regional accreditation during his tenure.

Adams, I would argue, played the hand he was dealt well. He wanted to grow is institution and drawing students from across the state or from out of state to a regional institution in rural south Alabama had its challenges. He used the military and a weak state coordinating body to accomplish his goal. Hawkins, while inheriting an institution with fraught with challenges, effectively managed a difficult situation. Seeing an institution through a federal lawsuit, implementing sweeping organizational changes, and ultimately merging three separate institutions into one required careful and meticulous attention to detail. I would argue Hawkins capably handled these task to the benefit of the institution.

Further Scholarship

This study of Troy University focused on the branch campus expansion during a defined period of time, 1964-2005. During the latter half of the 1990s online education became very popular as a delivery method of United States higher education. This was certainly true of Troy University. Archival documentation is available to show how the institution quickly adapted to the demand for this format of instruction and capitalized on this trend. Troy University found great success delivery online higher education at both the undergraduate and graduate level, to both military and non-military students and within the United States and abroad, providing another opportunity for further research.

Furtherly scholarly research on this institution could certainly include a deep investigation into Troy’s involvement in this arena of instruction. Why was the institution on the forefront of this? Was it related to the already established connections with the military? Did Troy have a unique and advanced infrastructure in place which allowed quick reaction to the
explosion of the internet? This realm of research, much like this study, would likely reveal some very interesting subplots which led to the success of the institution with regard to online distance learning.

While this study focused on the evolution of one institution during a specific period of time, it also opens the door for further research on similar institution types. Dunham’s 1969 book, *Colleges of the Forgotten Americans*, is now nearly fifty years old. Another study of these state and regional institutions, many finding their beginnings as normal schools, would certainly be a worthwhile endeavor. How many of these institutions have found their way to the rank of research institutions? How many have stayed at a regional level, focusing on instruction at the bachelor’s and master’s level? How many have disappeared for one reason or another including closure or merger?

Finally, the primary purpose of this study was to chart the change of the institution through branch expansion. It spent very little time discussing the main campus of Troy University, with the exception of those aspects directly related to the branches. The last in-depth study of the institution was a book completed in 1986 by writer Van English titled *Beyond the Normal*. The main campus of the institution has greatly evolved during that time. Enrollments have nearly doubled. The athletic program has moved to the highest competitive level, Division 1-A. The geographic footprint of the institution has vastly expanded. Further research is certainly warranted with regard to the last thirty years of the institution.

**Conclusion**

The story of the evolution of the branch campus system at Troy University painted a unique picture. Driven by personalities and the environment, both internally and externally, provided the fertile soil for massive expansion. The expansion presented roadblocks. However,
through a vision intent on growth, the institution found ways through or around most of these hurdles. No idea was ever off the table, including a merger with the powerful University of Alabama, or the takeover or creation of a law school, but many of these ideas never came to fruition.

The ideas that were undertaken, however, generally turned out to be the right call at the right time. From the hiring of the aggressive and well-connected Ralph Adams, to his replacement with Jack Hawkins, who pursued a more political and collegial path to expansion, the institution seemed to always make a good decision. Dodging metaphorical bullets including being sideways with ACHE for many years and the nearly potentially disastrous affair in Montgomery, by virtue of a favorable settlement in the Knight vs. State of Alabama lawsuit, Troy University often found itself in a position of strength. The institution continued to capitalize on opportunities to expand the entity.

I argue that success for an individual or entity generally requires some degree of luck, or as some might say, preparation plus opportunity. It is indisputable that Troy had its fair share of opportunistic moments during the forty-year period in question, and more times than not, these opportunities were capitalized on. This is not to suggest that the institution did everything right. As the archival research showed, many took offense to the hard-charging approach of Adams. The Fisher Report proved that these included internal stakeholders in addition to those external to the institution. The merger of the previously separately accredited institutions in Montgomery and Dothan under the umbrella of the main campus was certainly not well received by everyone. These facts were not, and should not, be glossed over when examining this institution. Through analyzing all the information available regarding the evolution of Troy University, with regard to
the branch campus system, adds to the research already in existence surrounding higher education institutional history.
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