IS THERE A LONG ARC OF LEADERSHIP?:
THE DAVID MATHEWS ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
IN THE 1970s

by
EDWARD J. WALDRON, III
KARRI HOLLEY, COMMITTEE CHAIR
CLAIRE MAJOR
WAYNE URBAN
NATHANIEL BRAY
DAVID HARDY

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Educational Leadership,
Policy, and Technology Studies
in the Graduate School of
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA
2018
ABSTRACT

The new spirit, which asked serious questions of American democracy in the 1960s, turned into the actions and deliberations of the 1970s. Within Alabama, tectonic shifts in culture, economics, and politics – but especially civil rights - underpinned much of the Alabama experience in the 1970s. How would a 33-year-old president of a flagship university in the Deep South respond? The ethos guiding the Mathews’ Administration was a product of his times, which sought, in the words of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the "dignity of man, and the destiny of democracy." Two questions dominate this period in University history - First, what large issues confronted the University of Alabama during the 1970s, and what philosophical bases formed President Mathews’ decision making in confronting them? Second, what policy and political shifts existed in Alabama in this era? As Mathews quietly pushed the University of Alabama forward from desegregation toward full integration, many external factors began to weigh on the presidency of the University. Once an office of high autonomy, the presidency shifted as increasing pressures changed the University’s sense of identity and its relation within the state's political, economic, and social structures. Utilizing analytical essaying, this dissertation addresses the public flagship’s role to the public it serves while also understanding the implications a wider environment can have on a university’s mission. Ultimately asking whether this institution is a university in Alabama or the University of Alabama, Mathews saw education—more specifically the University's graduates and thus the University itself—as the best option toward improving the general welfare of Alabamians.
DEDICATION

Hattie Elizabeth Southall Williams
May 1, 1917 - January 30, 2012

This dissertation is dedicated to Hattie Elizabeth Southall Williams. Born in the mountains of North Carolina, she became a daughter of Southwest Alabama. “Murrs” initially attended Tulane University to pursue her degree in education, but she later left the university to become a teacher in the Mobile County Public School System. In the 1930s, she rode an open-air train through the sweltering heat of summer and the cold rains of winter to teach the young children of rural Mobile County. Some of the children she taught came to school tired, hungry, and in ragged clothes; these children came from poor home situations in communities with names like Chunchula, Citronelle, and Gulf Crest. Despite numerous obstacles, many of those children went on to become a successful part of Mobile County’s story in the 20th century, and some even entered careers education—because of her dedication. Her love for the Lord shone though many deep professional and personal chasms to inspire many children—including those in her own family, where she brought them together with the soft yet strong bonds of sharing, despite the personal difficulties surrounding her. As someone who loved the land, rural Alabama, history, and Mobile Bay, she fought constantly for their preservation, protection, and advancement. May this project be added to the history of Alabama in the same spirit that she embodied.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people to thank for their support, encouragement and even love throughout this chapter in my life. Many are close by, some are far away, and one is even in heaven. To Hattie Elizabeth Southall "Murrs" Williams, who had an impact on my educational journey from the beginning and carried on this impact though the annual ritual of purchasing multiple packs of college-ruled paper at the beginning of each academic year, even into the PhD: you are greatly missed. No sunset has ever touched my heart and mind more than the cool evening when I stepped out of Lloyd Hall and crossed the quad to the news of your present distance while I am a poor example, your passion for education and the land of Alabama has had a great impact on my own life and on the lives of a new generation born in 2016.

I am grateful to my wife, whose example of strength, poise, personality, and professionalism shine in my own life. She personifies the very idea that love knows little bounds. Indeed, strength and dignity are her clothing, and she laughs at the time to come. I thank you for the countless sleepless nights of conversations, ideas, and encouragement. That was no requirement, and it was sourced from nowhere but true love.

My parents have given so much that it is impossible to put it in words, all so that another generation of our family could rise and serve others: the church, our fellow Alabamians, and the glory of God. Thanks to you, I have limitless opportunities to serve others.

To Dr. Karri Holley, your knowledge, wisdom, and guidance throughout my education and time at the University of Alabama have been a tremendous blessing to me. Your enthusiasm
and understanding have energized my desire to push forward, to become better, and to hone myself and my mind as I seek to serve others through the avenue of higher education administration.

Lastly, I thank Dr. Wilton Bunch, the priest from the Church of England who, in 2007, rose to give two masterful dissections of Holy Writ. Covering the Second Chapter of St. Mark, your mastery did not come from your vast years spent as an MD Pediatric Orthopedist or from your PhD in Ethics. Your sermon, that the young men mentioned in the first five verses were old enough to be strong and resourceful but young enough not to understand barriers, sounded familiar to the person sitting in the pew – myself. The second sermon pierced through a cold, rainy November day: that the need for justice compels us in Alabama this day to discuss men and women, and black and white. In your discussion of Saint Paul's third chapter to the Galatians, beginning with Sojourner Truth's “Ain't I a Woman?,” you crescendoed with a Greek exegesis which changed the course of my life: "Those of us who believe that it is binding in our time, must teach God's word to all people... This is not a history from which we can retreat, and this is not what our text says it means to be baptized into Christ... as we consider the distinctions mentioned herein, we are able to see the thread of sin that runs through all distinctions: excessive pride, the first of the deadly sins." For this reminder - thank you for letting me glimpse the truth that is God's glory unto His whole creation: that indeed that the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.

Coram Deo et Veritas
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF MATHEWS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sources and Evidence</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Overview</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: MATHEWS’ EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophies: The Effect of Mathews’ Educational Past</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonian Feist meets Jeffersonian Polish</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration: Of not In</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institution as a Force… for Community</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of Leadership: Encouragement</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Practice: New College - Personalized Formality in Collaboration</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continual Questioning</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4: WISE MEN NE’ER SIT AND WAIL THEIR LOSS</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Environment and Decisions ..................................................................................................... 112

Competition? ........................................................................................................................... 121

The Faculty .............................................................................................................................. 123

External Relations in Light of Faculty Difficulties ................................................................. 138

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 145

The Continual Pursuit of Communication ............................................................................... 152

The Adaptive Leader ............................................................................................................... 154

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 162

APPENDIX: IRB APPROVAL .................................................................................................. 177
INTRODUCTION

Published in 1952, James Benson Sellers’ two volume set of the history of The University of Alabama continues as one of the seminal works of The University of Alabama history. Its depth and breadth definitively encapsulate the minutia details of the University of Alabama’s earliest years, while regaling the reader with a torrent of information. While a history of the University of Alabama needs to be written for the 1970s that is not the purpose of this dissertation. This dissertation is a series of analytical essays which delivers a robust opening to the conversation on the Mathews Presidency of The University of Alabama, while also adding to the body of work within a very specific arena - late 20th Century Higher Education Leadership & Policy in the South.

A shifting culture confronted the university during this time. Students’ opinions and concerns, let alone population, changed in dramatic fashion. While students changed, new economic and political realities burdened the university and its leadership with fundamental questions of purpose and relationship to stakeholders. Two questions loom behind understanding the 1970s at The University of Alabama. First, what large issues confronted The University of Alabama during the 1970s, and what philosophical bases formed President Mathews’ decision making in confronting them? Second, what policy and political shifts existed in Alabama in this era? While leadership, especially higher education leadership in the American South, was forced to respond to the new realities of insufficient resources in the late 20th Century – specifically how did the Mathews’ presidency of The University of Alabama respond to this new environment? Keen observers might want to see this work as an apologia of the
administration. Such a view cannot compensate for either Mathews’ interaction with key institutional stakeholders such as faculty or the hard evidence that University was vastly improved by 1980 compared to 1969. This analysis seeks to understand Mathews’ responses, environment, and decisions.

To open, my dissertation carefully considers Mathews’ own personal background from his time in Clarke County, Alabama through his time at The University of Alabama. Presentism could formulate opinions based on evidence of only certain periods of time. As an individual with ties to the State of Alabama from its earliest days, politically engaged family members allowed Mathews to see both positive and negative aspects of policy, politics, and its effect on the wider population. In considering the backdrop of his familial and personal life, we see someone for whom education’s importance was not a foreign concept, especially in light of his own dissertation which breaks the notion that early frontier families in Southern Alabama cared little for education, while practical realities augmented its deepest needs among the population.

Beginning with a delineation of primary resources, the second chapter allows the reader to see commonalities among other leaders locally and state-wide. With access to Mathews’ personal archives at the Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio, and the W.S. Hoole Special Collections Library, depth was sustained with analysis of Probate Court records in Clarke County and other university records. Secondary resources were used either to consider different situations among other university presidents and leaders, or to develop the backdrop and confirm historical realities which surrounded decision makers in similar arenas. The second chapter includes information which shows the present lack of solid biographical works of late-Twentieth Century University presidents in the South, while also acknowledging the phenomenal works on William Friday of the University of North Carolina, the multiple volumes on Theodore Hesburgh
of the University of Notre Dame, and a few other private university presidents. While these later works cover university leadership, the second chapter seeks for the reader to understand the different decision making realities between private and public institutions.

Chapter 3 develops a picture of Mathews’ leadership and its impact on the academic and various people groups within the institutions’ life. With a young university president who was almost immediately tested by fire – literally, with the Days of Rage – we see approaches with students which temporarily commanded both respect and distain, but respect won the permanence. A Jeffersonian polish with Jacksonian feist saw the problems of the state and the opportunities within academic units to begin addressing such problems, changing previously held understandings of “teaching, research, and service.” In bifurcating desegregation and integration, Mathews sought to increase the moral standing of the University by growing and integrating African-Americans on campus while keeping attrition rates equal to that of Caucasians. However, this analysis allows the larger question to still loom – was the Greek system’s lack of integration a possible hedge against the potential violence other institutions were experiencing, or was this an opportunity missed entirely no matter what?

The Fourth Chapter seeks to understand the full impact and import which political and bureaucratic processes had upon the University executive. Previous administrations at The University of Alabama enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. With growing bureaucracies from both within the University by the Board of Trustees, and the State of Alabama through the community college system and the Alabama Commission on Higher Education, Mathews contended with an entirely new dynamic to an entirely new presidency of The University of Alabama. The previous sesquicentennial of The University of Alabama’s presidential leadership capacity was ending almost as fast as Mathews came into office, while economic realities began
their insidious contraction on university resources and faculty salaries. At the point when Mathews would resign, Faculty Senates grievances ran the gamut of salaries to the division of labor within administrative decision-making. Not uncommon during the 1970s, other presidents in history navigated similar shoals.

To close the dissertation, Chapter 5 consolidates the previous four chapters of information into a picture of Mathews’ leadership which is then compared with other university presidents. Further, Chapter 5 seeks to give practical understandings which can be applied to younger professionals within higher education administration in the Deep South today, while also acknowledging the position of this dissertation within the University’s historical narrative. Beginning the conversation on Mathews’ successes and failures is the purpose of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF MATHEWS

When President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered his speech to Congress on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, he argued for the “dignity of man, and the destiny of democracy.”\(^1\) As a new spirit which began to eschew flawed understandings of human identity began to ask serious questions of American democracy in the 1960s, these questions of identity for people and institutions turned to the actions and deliberations of the 1970s. Within Alabama, tectonic shifts in culture, economics, and politics – but especially civil rights - underpinned much of the Alabama experience in the same decade. Within this framework, my dissertation relies on a series of analytic essays to understand how higher education—specifically, the leadership at Alabama’s flagship university, The University of Alabama—navigated the challenges of the 1970s. How would a 33-year-old president of a flagship university in the Deep South respond to shifts in multiple arenas within and beyond the University?

Even if David Mathews were studied by a historian for the sole purpose of completing a sequential biography of The University of Alabama presidents, his story would still be notable for other arenas. For Alabama, the 1970s were a time of chaos and confusion on many fronts, especially in the arenas of education and race relations.\(^2\) Despite the chaos in Alabama following the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Bobby Kennedy, Mathews pushed a flagship,


deep-south university forward with the hire of its first African-American faculty member, and he set a goal to increase minority student recruitment and retention to 1,500 by 1975.\textsuperscript{3} Ambition wedded to the tenacity of his presidential philosophy allowed Mathews to surpass this goal, which was especially ambitious in light of the fact that 1975 was a mere 11 years after the first group of only four African-American students had enrolled in the university.\textsuperscript{4} Despite the difficulties the large shifts in the political philosophy of Alabama’s Legislature in the late 1970s imposed on the University, the Mathews administration oversaw the establishment of six new colleges, seven new buildings, and a massive increase in library volume holdings; until 1979, this administration also saw the largest year-to-year percentage increase in contract, grants, and private contributions in the university’s history\textsuperscript{5}.

Defining the relationship between the State of Alabama and The University of Alabama as special would be an understatement. Alabama’s territorial constitution, submitted to the United States Congress for statehood in 1819, explicitly articulated residents’ desires for a state university\textsuperscript{6} as a seminary of learning. While the idea of a state university was no rarity, few other Southern states enshrined higher education in their own constitutions submitted for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3} Norman H. Bassett, “Ten Years of Trials and Triumphs,” \textit{The University of Alabama Alumni Bulletin} 33, no. 1 (September 1979): 3; Joyce Stallworth, “An Interview with Dr. Archie Wade.” \textit{The Capstone Educator} (Spring/Summer 2007), p. 10; Blanche Gunter to Dr. F. David Mathews, no date given. This personal communication was in regard to the Race and Public Schooling Project that Dr. Mathews was working on in approximately 2007. This document is located within Mathews’ personal files housed at The Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{4} Frank Anthony Rose, personal communication, Frank Rose Papers. Records & Admissions, Dean Hubert files, no date. The names and what dates the notes do hold show that these unpublished data are probably from December, 1963 (Dr. F. David Mathews, discussion with the author, October, 2014).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Annual Report of The University of Alabama to the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama. Annual reports accessed for each year 1969-1979} (University of Alabama); Bassett, “Ten Years,” 4.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Alabama Constitution of 1819}, art. IV.}
statehood. The tie between the State of Alabama and the University remains strong, even to the point of Alabamians developing a blind spot to the actual overall trajectory of the university. While this symbiosis exists between the State and University, it is perhaps more deeply felt among the state and it is important to understand the strength of this bond. This close relationship between University and people of Alabama means that the reach of the University’s chief executive goes beyond the public relations of teas and socials. Whether it is a 1922 alumna, over eighty years old, whose pen clearly shook as she handwrote a two-page letter to the president of The (her underlining) University of Alabama discussing the leadership of “my” university; the father who could speak to his son in the sweltering heat of segregation in 1950s Marengo County and say that The University of Alabama is “their University”; or the head football coach advertising for South Central Bell in 1980, saying, “Have you called your mama today? I sure wish I could call mine,” causing people with little direct connection with the university to overwhelm the main switch for the Tuscaloosa telephone system, and forcing the Tuscaloosa telephone operator to ask some of the customers why they were calling only to hear

---

7 While the debate continues as to whether the University of Georgia or University of North Carolina was the first state-supported institution of higher education, neither the Georgia Constitution of 1777 nor the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 mentions a state university. The Constitutions of Mississippi (1817), Tennessee (1796), and Louisiana (1812) likewise do not mention higher education. Florida’s 1838 Constitution is the only other initial governing document to mention higher education, outside of Alabama’s Constitutional submission to Congress for the purpose of Statehood in 1819.
8 David Mathews, “Speech to Alumni Dinner” (Speech, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, May 31, 1970); “Dothan Alumni Speech” (Speech, Dothan, Alabama, January 10, 1980).
11 Dr. Arthur Dunning (Vice President, University of Alabama System) in discussion with the author, November 6, 2012.
the simple reply, “Well, Bear told me to give y’all a call,” it is clear that this deep, resonant symbiosis is no mere orchestration of solely political fortune or means, and actually comes from a deep identity with the institution.

By modern metrics, the “good” university president should foster the growth of the institution in both concrete and abstract ways. However, the late 1970s forced Mathews to navigate a political and budgetary climate which suffered from oversimplified understandings of state governance, where the Governor even defined good governance as running the State of Alabama like a “Waffle House.” Perhaps what might set Mathews in the realm of the great university presidents is the execution of his philosophy despite these obstacles. I argue that the long arc of history will record the separation between good and great presidents and higher education institutions of our time not based on how many championships they won on the gridiron, but how they found the courage to confront the great questions and issues facing the states they serve. With his attempt to inculcate civility and a push toward understanding the university as key to the state’s deliberation on democracy, Mathews saw The University of Alabama at the core of the State’s social, cultural, and economic development in the latter 20th

---


century and beyond.\textsuperscript{15} Despite a new legislative budget climate of continual contraction, so
divergent from the preceding 50 years’ fiscal expansion, Mathews wanted to increase the
outreach and the problem-solving capability of the university.\textsuperscript{16} This ambition called for the
University to expand its ability to perceive the problems of the state and deliver answers for them
as a return on state taxpayers’ investment.\textsuperscript{17}

Some university presidents could be said to be on a crusade in support of the ideals that
guide their actions.\textsuperscript{18} Through their actions such presidents, unlike Mathews, allow their
philosophy to run ahead of their leadership instead of being its bedrock.\textsuperscript{19} Though some of his
ideas did not come to fruition, and some even failed, Mathews’ beliefs propelled many of his
executive decisions. One purpose of considering the Mathews’ administration is to explore and

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{18} Ron Schachter, “The Tumultuous Presidency,” \textit{University Business}, February 25, 2013, http://www.universitybusiness.com/article/tumultuous-presidency. This is not limited to university or academic perceptions alone. Public perceptions of higher education presidential leadership styles often color reality, as was the case with Alabama’s Andrew Sorenson. Dr. Sorenson, while popular in a few corners of Alabama, was not popular with the student body and the people of Alabama. See Ray Washington, “Sorenson a Controversial Enforcer for UF President,” \textit{Tuscaloosa News}, March 13, 1996.
\textsuperscript{19} Roger Soder, \textit{The Language of Leadership} (San Francisco: John Wiley and Son, 2001), 22.
\end{flushright}
define Mathews’ educational philosophy while analyzing his successes and failures by identifying the circumstances and leadership decisions which both propelled and impeded progress for The University of Alabama. In a book’s foreword on 19th Century Dutch political and educational philosopher\textsuperscript{20} Abraham Kuyper, Mark Noll laid out two questions which aptly parallel higher education history in Alabama. Who is F. David Mathews, and, in light of his time at the helm of the University of Alabama’s presidency, why should we care? In trying to answer the question “who is David Mathews?” particular attention must be paid to both his past immediate familial, and encountered environments, and his cognitive process. These factors should not be considered separately from one another, neither is this dissertation a simple linear history of events.

Mathews confronted head-on the great moral questions surrounding the State of Alabama’s flagship university, but he did so without rigid moralism. Rather, Mathews embodied the moral qualities of executive leadership of a public institution of higher education. But my dissertation must take great care to guard against presentism, applying ideas of today on decisions of history, while appropriately acknowledging morality’s effect on Mathews’ decision-making. In his discourses on historical narrative, Augustine said, “there is a difference between describing what has been done and describing what must be done. History relates past events in a faithful and useful way, whereas the books of haruspices in similar literature set out to teach things to be performed or observed, and offer impertinent advice, not reliable information.”\textsuperscript{21} Partial descriptions and whim-cast opinions cannot amplify the vectors of leadership for transformative change – leaders must explore to grasp that full understanding which will allow

\textsuperscript{20} James D. Bratt, \textit{Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat} (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2013), 3-25.
them to express an ethos of faithful and honest inquiry and application. To do anything other than what Augustine suggested would directly oppose the purposes of learning and fail to communicate “what is good and eradicate what is bad, and in this process of speaking… win over the antagonistic, rouse the apathetic, and make clear to those were not conversant with the matter under discussion, what they should expect.”

For leaders, an honest understanding of the University should awaken the reader (and the author) to explore how their own ideas, ethos, and moral identity (not moralism), while developing the same to persuasively transform their respective institutions for the betterment of the community.

In addition to considering Mathews’ personal biography, this dissertation will examine his connections to Clarke County. To ignore Mathews’ personal connection with Clarke County, Alabama would create a lackluster analysis and do a severe disservice to our understanding of how Mathews formed the philosophy girding his leadership. Mathews’ fundamental approach to administration is encapsulated by one central question turning on the idea of community: Are we a university in Alabama, or The University of Alabama?

For his time at the helm of the university, Mathews’ social and cultural roots are best defined by a line from Act II, Scene I of Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*: “what is past is prologue.”

Dr. Doug Phillips, a professor of Natural History at the University of Alabama, correctly noted, “it’s kind of difficult to write a song about Alabama without mentioning the rivers.”

---

Julia Tutwiler wrote “Broad the stream whose name thou bearest, grand thy Bigbee rolls along” in the state song, she laid out the vast majority of Clarke County’s borders. Sitting at the confluence of the Alabama and the Tombigbee, arguably two of the state’s most important transportation rivers, Clarke County was founded during the territorial days of Alabama’s beginning. In 1812, the Alabama Territory had fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, but this was enough for a Clarke County to begin. Fertile land, easy access to water resources, low land prices, and easy credit sparked a land boom for the state. “Alabama Fever” overtook settlers from Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, who poured into the newly formed State of Alabama, increasing the state’s population to 300,000 by 1840. Though the population of the state plateaued during the Civil War, settlers still came to Alabama, and Mathews’ influence among the people of Clarke County begins here.

With higher land prices in northern Alabama, poverty, as much as any characteristic, obliged the Mathews family to choose the sand flats of Clarke County in the 1840s. During this period, Josiah Allen Mathews and his ten children appeared in the census with comparatively small real estate holdings and only ten percent of other neighbors surrounding them. Despite the family’s poverty, early family stories show a firm belief in education’s potential for mobility,

---

27 Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, National Archives Microfilm Publication M432, 1009 rolls); Records of the Bureau of the Census, Record Group 29, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Census Place: Clarke, Alabama, Roll M432_3; Page 246B; Image: 492; Regina Wright, “Just Who is David Mathews?,” Tuscaloosa News, May 27, 1979, 2A.
and this belief continued to influence the Mathews family for generations. Though David Mathews spent time growing up in Bay Minette and Auburn,28 the vast majority of his developmental years were spent in Grove Hill. Given the Mathews’ civic-minded activities and positions, writing a history of Clarke County without mentioning the Mathews would be nearly impossible, as the family’s Clarke County roots date from the 1840s (only thirty years after the county was founded).29 David Mathews’ social exposure began with family members, who themselves have a record of ideas and philosophies brought to their civic duties. Mathews’ family had a profound impact on his overall development in two distinct ways: philosophically and politically. While it is difficult to separate the two, especially in the 20th century Deep South, the Mathews family of Clarke County wove these threads into the fabric of David’s existence, beginning with his grandfather, David Chapman Mathews.

David Chapman Mathews, born in 1886, held positions where his voice would influence the county. In the early 1900s, most people in Clarke County were engaged in agriculture and marked by a keen awareness of their ancestors’ service to the South in the Civil War. The son of a Civil War veteran, and a farmer himself, “Mr. Dave” (as he was often called) could easily relate with most people in the context of a rural Southern Alabama county.30 While his personal work had the potential to make relatability easy, the geography of his primary occupation and love of

---

education and teaching, displays how the Mathews’ family came into contact with so many people. Having taught just outside the Union community, he then taught “at the Pine Level School, now Leroy High, from 1911 to 1914. For nine years he was at the Tompkins School and taught briefly at Morrison and Arlington [communities]” and was principal of Jackson High School in the 1940s. But D.C. Mathews’ civic service was not limited to education alone—he also had a active career in politics.

1919 proved to be a successful campaign year for D.C. Mathews. He was elected to a seat in the Alabama State House of Representatives by a rather wide margin. The same seat was previously held by his father, James Waldrum Mathews, who was himself a populist in the William Jennings Bryan tradition but also maintained a deep and intense Jeffersonian commitment to the individual and commoner, as well as a deep belief in land ownership’s importance to the political and economic process. Though D.C. Mathews ran on the Prohibitionist Party ticket, not an uncommon philosophical position for a Baptist in Alabama at the time, he caucused with the Democratic Party in 1919 until his term ended in 1924, then ran

---


32 Children’s Stories, p. 1; Clarke County Democrat, May 16, 1918, p. 1; August 15, 1918, p. 1. At this time, if a county was a “split district,” the top two people who received votes won each seat in the county. Mathews received the most votes, and without the second place finisher included (who also won a seat), he beat other candidates by nearly a two-to-one margin. Interestingly enough, on the same ballot was a three mill increase in taxes dedicated to public schools in Clarke County. This also won by a wide margin.


34 Wright, “Just Who is David Mathews?” 2A.

as a Democrat in subsequent re-elections from 1932 through 1954. In his first sessions as a legislator, Mathews “conducted an aggressive fight”\textsuperscript{36} to secure millions in funding for Alabama schools, though his efforts would not produce the desired result. It is his 1929-1943 service that best reveals a strain of philosophy which would recur under F. David Mathews’ leadership of the University of Alabama, one which addresses the governing concerns of localities to their state and the state to their federal governments.

Alabama universities, both public and private, are no strangers to financial difficulties as early as the 1920s. At the opening of the 1927 Legislative Session, Governor Bibb Graves minced no words, stating the colleges and universities in Alabama “are in great distress for lack of buildings and equipment.”\textsuperscript{37} In response to this, Graves did not seek immediate cuts, wanting instead to pivot Alabama’s higher education policy toward making all levels of education “so related and connected as to make one harmonious whole.”\textsuperscript{38} In his voting record, Mathews backed this idea, even going so far as to abstain from voting on a bill regarding the election of the Clarke County Superintendency\textsuperscript{39} and instead favoring the State of Alabama’s input on appointment \textit{after consultation} with local officials. The issue of state vs. federal voice in education arose in the 1931 Session of the House, and Mathews positioned himself on to two traditionally powerful House Committees, Education and Public Roads.\textsuperscript{40} This constitutes an

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Clarke County Democrat}, October 2, 1919, 1.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Journal of the House of Representatives, 1927}, 24.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Journal of the House of Representatives, 1927}, 1572, 3031.
interesting combination given modern complexities which dictate that funding of these two are forever in opposition towards one another. Mathews voted for tax increases, but only those of a highly selective and defined nature. For example, he supported Benjamin Miller’s “Privilege Tax” on those making over $1200.00\textsuperscript{41} and Graves’ defined millage tax, to be divided equally amongst the universities, but he voted against a general agricultural land use tax.\textsuperscript{42}

Even in the face of severe opposition, Mathews held firm on his stance that opening the door to federal dollars could prove a backdoor to yet more unwanted consequences. In 1939, when Governor Graves submitted a plan to a special legislative session of the House allowing the State of Alabama to borrow from Federal Agencies backing such borrowing with the issuance of bonds at 4% interest, Mathews broke with his party. Of the 81 Democrats in session, 80 voted for it, and one did not: Mathews of Clarke County.\textsuperscript{43} Mathews began sensing an increasing disconnection between Montgomery and the localities it served, at one time stating, “I think it is worthwhile for a person to go to the Legislature and see how men who otherwise have common sense, act like cheap men and cowards,” and continuing, “just be who you are, don’t try to fool anybody.”\textsuperscript{44} Seeing high ideals meeting Montgomery’s lesser reality refocused Mathews, and he chose to return to Clarke County, becoming the County Superintendent of Schools.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Journal of the House of Representatives, 1939}, 106.  
\textsuperscript{44} David Chapman Mathews, \textit{Early Sketches of Southwest Alabama with Reminiscences} (Grove Hill: Clarke County Historical Society, 2008), 354.
In his capacity as Superintendent, Mathews challenged much of the status quo. As a teacher serving in various teaching positions throughout the rural parts of the county, making a “great salary” at $60-70 per month while supplementing his pay with part-time farming, he was also exposed to inequality.\textsuperscript{45} The disparities of education exposure among rural students, even those in the same family, bothered him greatly; he saw it as “un-American, undemocratic, and not Christian to have such a distinction.”\textsuperscript{46} To tackle this disparity, Mathews pushed for three plans for the county. First, he sought a restructuring of the Board’s protocols, which then allowed him to ask for an extended school year. Second, he needed the county to pass a millage rate increase for schools. In 1923, children were forced to pay $5.00 to $10.00 as fees to supplement public funds. Mathews wanted to see public education free at the point of delivery. Large corporations, which often owned large tracts of land, were being taxed at different rates than others (such as farmers) in the county. Mathews challenged this, and the millage increase passed. Third, and perhaps more significant, he was racially progressive for his time. During Mathews’ tenure as Superintendent, he did not tear down one rural school, but he built sixty-seven facilities for children and their education. In Mathews’ view, “the ideal for every child to finish high school and stay at home every night holds for both races, and this is as it should be.”\textsuperscript{47} He wanted every child to be able to finish their education and help their families.

Education ran in the Mathews family. Upon graduating from Clarke County High School in Grove Hill, D.C. Mathews’ son, Forrest Lee Mathews, attended Alabama Polytechnic

\textsuperscript{45} Mathews, \textit{Children’s Stories}.
\textsuperscript{46} Mathews, \textit{Children’s Stories}, 18.
\textsuperscript{47} Mathews, \textit{Children’s Stories}, 19.
University for his degree in education, being a roommate of Ralph “Shug” Jordan.48 As early as 1940, Forrest Lee was residing in Auburn49 with four-year-old Forrest David. After Forrest Lee chose to stay for his Master’s degree in Education,50 he and his son were exposed to a different world on South Gay Street: an economically diverse community where professors and dentists lived alongside construction workers and stenographers.51 Although F. L. Mathews changed careers and took advantage of the construction boom in post-war America, he returned to the classroom in 1946. Like his father before him, in 1957 and again in 1960, F. L. Mathews was elected superintendent by popular vote. Where his father focused on policy in education, F. L. Mathews contended with more practical realities of philosophical application – seemingly oxymoronic, but squarely addressing the needs of Clarke County citizens in the early 20th Century.

Until the late 20th century, the majority of the economy in Clarke County rested on highly cyclical agriculture production.52 When Forrest David Mathews entered school in 1940, only three in ten people in Clarke County would make it to high school, a rate on par with Wilcox County and below that of Greene County, commonly known as two of the poorest in the

49 David Chapman Mathews, Early Sketches; U.S. Census Bureau, “Census of Population, Clarke County, Grove Hill, Alabama” and “Lee County, Auburn, Alabama” (1940).
50 Dr. F. David Mathews in discussion with the author June 2014. His father received his BS and MS from Alabama Polytechnic Institute, now called Auburn University.
51 Auburn, Lee, Alabama, Roll: m-0627-00052; Page: 30B; Enumeration District: 41-17 (United States of America, Bureau of the Census); Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1940).
In 1950, only three in ten advanced beyond the poverty income level, putting Clarke on the same economic level with other Black Belt counties like Macon and Marengo. For African-Americans, economic figures were much worse. In an attempt to address this, F. L. Mathews worked to further implement practical education in the classroom. The county’s school curriculum revealed Mathews’ educational philosophy to be incredibly practical yet sensitive to the needs of hard-living, rural people of Clarke County at the turn of the century. Basic instruction in mathematics, reading, and grammar was augmented as needed with composition and advanced mathematics.

Rural Alabama in the 20th Century was not immune to the forces of complex change, such as rapid technological change, global business strategies, shifts in occupational demand, and access to working capital. In this manner, the rural context of Alabama, even well into the 20th century, was part and parcel of Mathews’ philosophy and understanding of people. When Mathews was nominated to become Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Senator John Sparkman leveraged rural understandings throughout the nomination process, saying, “Growing up in a small town can make you more sensitive to the subtleties of life.”

---

55 U.S. Census Bureau, General Characteristics of Alabama, 2-29.
56 David Chapman Mathews, Early Sketches, 354.
the 2010 Census, it is tempting to draw conclusions about the past based on present realities. But such presentism fails to comprehend and deliver the information we need to adjudicate better decisions for the future of Alabama. Annette Jones Watters, former Assistant Director of the Center for Economic and Business Research at the University of Alabama, noted that rural does not mean isolated. Of Alabama’s 67 counties, 46 have populations where more than fifty percent live in rural areas - said another way, two in three counties have greater rural populations than urban populations. Auburn University, in a 1979 report on Development Characteristics of Non-Metropolitan Alabama: Social Indicators and Industrialization, classified 49 counties in “rural”. The rural nature of Alabama’s population also translated into policy power at the ballot box; however, only a handful of people seemed to understand this power, as many sought Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile as bellwethers for gauging and identifying Alabama’s political philosophy. As late as 2012, political reporters expressed frustration at the “awful track record” of political prediction polls in Alabama. However, some, like Micah Cohen of the New York Times, rightly noted that rural counties would “largely determine” the outcome of

---

59 Annette Jones Watters, “Rural Alabama,” Rural Briefs (Center for Business and Economic Research, Culverhouse School of Business, University of Alabama, date), http://cber.cba.ua.edu/rbriefs/abwin02_rural.html.
Alabama’s 2012 elections. Historically, rural communities in Alabama exacted a great pull on educational policy. In the 1960s, when Alabama’s community college system saw large increases in capital appropriations and outlays, one in three of these institutions were built in “very rural” counties where the population was 1-169 people per square mile.63

In 20th century rural Alabama, there remained sense of “public responsibility for community welfare.”64 This idea of community remained a constant and sizable thread woven into Mathews’ own dissertation, “Education in the South: 1830-1860,” which he completed under Lawrence Cremin’s direction at Columbia University. Although 20th century Alabama history was marred by racial and economic divisions, some Southern leaders straddled different eras as defined by John Hardin Best. Darrin Harris’ dissertation, “Polishing Cornerstones: Tift College, Georgia Baptists’ Separate College for Women,” elucidated the lines Best drew in three distinct time periods defining Southern United States.65 According to these divisions, Mathews would have been brought up in a “New South” marked by “the transition to a free labor economy with the caste division of White and Black firmly in place.”66 Along with this division between races, this era was accompanied by efforts to reach beyond agriculture and develop a more diverse economy in towns and small cities. Yet, his personal philosophy was finally planted in

---

65 Darin S. Harris, “Polishing Cornerstones: Tift College, Georgia Baptists' Separate College for Women” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 2008), 6-8.
what Best defined as “the American South,” one where some characteristics of tradition were retained while society was brought closer to the American mainstream.⁶⁷ In this context, Forrest David began to emerge as engaging his community early in life.

Growing up in Grove Hill, Alabama, Forrest David, known simply as “David,” was named football co-captain, elected class president in 1954, and voted “most studious.”⁶⁸ He also began public speaking on issues that affected the lives of everyday citizens in his community. These speeches addressed topics ranging from soil conservation to patriotism and were often given significant community gathering spaces, such as the halls of local American Legions or Veterans of Foreign Wars. As David’s experience increased, so did his reputation as an “articulate spokesman of what he believed.”⁶⁹ To further pursue his family-fostered interest in community and history, David charted a different course than his father and chose the University of Alabama for his studies. For exploring questions of community and history, the University of Alabama during the 1950s and 1960s would prove a rich atmosphere.

Mathews became a balanced member of the University’s social and academic life, with memberships in Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Alpha Theta (History Honors society), Omicron Delta Kappa, Jasons Honor Society,⁷⁰ and religious organizations such as the Baptist Student Union. However, of greater importance is the time of Mathews’ attendance of the University. As he

---

⁶⁷ Harris, “Polishing Cornerstones,” 8.
earned his BA in History with a minor in Classical Greek at the University of Alabama\textsuperscript{71} from 1954-1958, Mathews witnessed history in the making as the University shifted its stance on desegregation. Mathews’ letters to his future wife Mary Chapman, also of Grove Hill, reveal the impact of the protests and counter protests that surrounded the admission of Autherine Lucy to the University and the palpable feeling of a state flagship university in the throes of change. In some ways, Mathews captured the mood when he wrote, “things are happening here, although I don’t believe many know exactly what,”\textsuperscript{72} and “everything here is finally quiet and we are hoping and praying it will stay that way.”\textsuperscript{73} Yet, instead of moving on to sundry campus and personal activities, Mathews continues his letter by capturing the mood of a university planning for those students who “sure have come out against the mob actions.”\textsuperscript{74} This sentiment is in line with what Dean Blackburn began attempting to accomplish by identifying certain individuals on campus who supported desegregation and meeting with them to form a network supportive of change on campus.\textsuperscript{75} By the time he graduated in with a BA in 1958 and an MA in History in 1959, Mathews had not only earned diplomas; he had also built a network of contacts at the University due to his reputation for quiet, but no less passionate, deliberation. By all outward

\textsuperscript{71} Charlotte J. Robertson, “Communities Fix Schools: An Interview with David Mathews,” http://www.southernscribe.com/zine/authors/Mathews_David.html
\textsuperscript{72} David Mathews to Mary Chapman, February 6, 1956, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{73} David Mathews to Mary Chapman, February 9, 1956, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{74} David Mathews to Mary Chapman. February 6, 1956, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{75} Earl H. Tilford, \textit{Turning the Tide: The University of Alabama in the 1960s} (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2014); Dale Wallace and Thomas E. Walker, interview with the author, October 9, 2016.
appearances, a one-year term of service in 1959-1960 as an infantry officer at Fort Benning Georgia\textsuperscript{76} would seem a detour. However, Mathews’ leadership style in later years proved that his one year as an Army officer had a greater impact than has been previously understood. After this year of service, Mathews returned to the University at the request of Dean John Blackburn. There, he became a counselor in 1960, the Director of Men’s Activities in 1961,\textsuperscript{77} and the Assistant to the Dean of Men from 1961 to 1962.\textsuperscript{78}

Mathews chose to continue his studies at Columbia University for his PhD.\textsuperscript{79} His primary focus was on educational history, especially Alabama’s educational history from 1830 to 1860.\textsuperscript{80} Even as he pursued his PhD in New York under the direction of Dr. Lawrence Cremin, Clarke County and the University of Alabama were never far from Mathews’ mind. As evidenced by his dissertation, speeches, and correspondence, Mathews’ primary academic interests were education, history, and the question of how these related to the development of community. Sharing these same interests, Lawrence Cremin oversaw Mathews’ dissertation, “The Politics of Education in the Deep South.” Cremin and Mathews paired well in 1960. They both experienced

\textsuperscript{76} “Dean Blackburn Returns, Mathews in New Post,” Mathews Personal Papers, Kettering Foundation Archives, Dayton, Ohio.


significant early career successes, and towards the end, they experienced the definite opinions of higher education faculty. Sharing an understanding of the commoner’s impact on education’s development in the United States, Cremin reinforced some of Mathews’ ideas within the framework of historical philosophy. With Cremin, this impact only deepened as Mathews’ personal ethos extended, through his widening philosophical framework as it pertains to higher education leadership.

As early as his 1960s dissertation, Mathews’ concern for all Alabamians was evident. In “The Politics of Education in the Deep South,” he looked closely at a segment of society and analyzed the ideas behind education development, not its philosophy. Though his advisor remained oft-critiqued for his “whiggish” interpretations and historiographical method which did not fluidly change with the burgeoning schools of radical revisionism, Mathews’ work does not

---


fall into this trap. Instead, the fundamental goal of Mathews’ dissertation was to inquire into the notion of education tradition as a top-down phenomenon while also understanding education history within broad, societal strokes – revising previous notions and biases while utilizing a more conservative historiography. Mathews succeeded by arguing for the desired and logical progression of rural Alabamians towards educational necessity and by avoiding the idea that educational progression was merely inevitable. As he concluded his education at Columbia University, Mathews wanted to return to Alabama and become a part of the changes to the University. When he returned to Tuscaloosa in 1965, Dean of Men John Blackburn was away completing his own PhD at Florida State University, and Mathews was named as Interim Dean in his place. In 1966, he moved to the President’s Office and worked for Frank Rose. Dr. Mathews experienced this rise to the President’s Office in a way best described as dynamic. From Assistant to the Dean of Men from 1962-1963, Mathews became Interim Dean of Men less than two years later in 1965, and by September of the same year, his position was made permanent. In 1968, President Frank Rose formally named Dr. Mathews to the newly created CEO position of the Tuscaloosa campus. As CEO, Mathews was responsible for operation and

coordination, particularly in relation to planning, while also continuing as a liaison officer between the university and the state government.86

As Executive Assistant within the President’s office, Frank Rose trusted Mathews with significant duties which included government relations, an area where Mathews’ abilities and the University’s ability to perform its core responsibilities were quickly tested. The 1966 and 1967 legislative sessions proved both complex and busy. The recently elected Governor, Lurleen Wallace, continued in her capacity despite a difficult battle with cancer, which she would lose in 1968. Higher education bills and resolutions took on abnormally high importance as Auburn University led with Senate bill #586, a successful $5,000,000 bond request to finance the “constructing, equipping, establishing, creating, supporting and maintaining a four-year college at Montgomery”87 under its authority. A cursory glance at higher education legislation from 1960 to 1965 shows only a few bills and laws concerning four-year higher education in Alabama, mainly in the form of bonds and financial allotments. Not content with building new institutions and bond issuance, the Legislatures of 1966 and 1967 attempted to pass resolutions and acts which went to the very heart and nature of the University of Alabama’s day-to-day operations. As Executive Assistant to President’s Office, it fell to Mathews to assuage these newfound concerns amongst the legislators and to contend with the multiple bills and resolutions which

came to both the House and Senate in a stunningly brisk fashion during the later legislative
sessions in the 1960s.

After the Frank Rose administration was accused of inviting communists to speak on
campus,88 Rose set to dispel these rumors at alumni meetings and fundraisers across the state. He
sent David Mathews to Montgomery to do the bulk of the work of stopping bills related to this
issue89 (outside of Rose’s own testimony before the Alabama State Senate). House Bill #41090
gave a commission the power “to regulate visiting speakers at state supported colleges and
universities.”91 Sent to the committee on Education,92 the bill passed out of committee late in the
session (on September 2, 1966). Mathews, to his credit, decided that the best course of action
was to intercept the bill in the Senate committee. As late as the 1960s, constituencies in the
statehouse were more apt to pass legislation reflective of the mood necessary for reelection,
whereas the Senate gave pause to the state’s needs. Although the debate over the legislature’s
ability to hold sway over the University’s operations died in the Senate committee, it did
anything but die out. In 1967, Senator Leland Childs93 moved “to create a joint legislative
committee to investigate charges of subversive activities at certain state educational institutions;

88 Tilford, Turning the Tide, 129.
89 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
90 Hugh Merrill to Frank Anthony Rose, 1967. The letter connotes that the bill is dead, but his-
tory will bear out that the bill still had some life within it. This marks a significant shift in think-
ing from the Legislature about the whole of Higher Education in Alabama. Further, it is unclear,
but likely given some hand written notes that the legislature was also watching House Bill #224.
91 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama, 1966 (Montgomery, AL:
State of Alabama, 1966), 1048.
93 Tilford, Turning the Tide, 114.
to provide appointment, membership, duties and powers of the committee.”\textsuperscript{94} In a July 17, 1967 memorandum, Mathews reported to Rose & J. Jefferson Bennett that “this resolution, according to the former Governor, is aimed specifically at the University of Alabama.”\textsuperscript{95} While the former Governor is unnamed in the memo, Chauncey Sparks and Gordon Persons both passed in 1965, leaving only three possibilities as to who the former governor was: James Elisha Folsom, John Malcom Patterson, or George Corley Wallace himself. Lurleen Wallace expressed reservations regarding her own support of the bill’s passage,\textsuperscript{96} but privately, Mathews’ attempt at opposition made the Wallaces more strident. Upon a procedural vote to kill the bill in committee, the bill died in the senate committee and failed to come to the floor for a vote. The alumni whom Mathews had marshaled quickly used the rules of the Senate to stop the bill.

Tilford correctly notes that supporters of the Speaker Ban Bill were able to pass House Joint Resolution #50, stating “that all state-supported institutions of higher learning should prominently display the Alabama flag and the Confederate Flag at Homecoming activities each year.”\textsuperscript{97} Although this resolution passed, it held no legal binding\textsuperscript{98} upon the University. In an April 1967 letter to John Caddell, the President Pro Tempore of the University Board of Trustees, President Rose noted that his administration had indeed come through the problem of

\textsuperscript{95} David Mathews, Memorandum to Frank Rose, Jul 17, 1967, Rose Papers, State Legislature File. W.S. Hoole Special Collections Library, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
\textsuperscript{96} Permaloff and Grafton, \textit{Political Power}, p. 262.
\textsuperscript{97} Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama, 1967, Montgomery, Alabama: State of Alabama, 1967. This language fell under House Resolution 50, which in and of itself is interesting as its placement would have been early, yet also, deep into the legislative calendar.
\textsuperscript{98} Tilford, \textit{Turning the Tide}, 129.
the Speaker Ban Bills, but not unscathed. He also noted “the Defeat of the Speaker Ban Bill
which would have taken our accreditation away from us.”99 The legislation of the 1966 and 1967
sessions displayed Mathews’ ability to gather support for the University at critical times as well
as the maturity with which he approached challenging situations, denying notions of optimism
and preconceived ideas.

Upon surviving the legislative sessions of 1966 and 1967, Mathews continued in his role
at the University, while Rose perhaps sensed the ill-ease of the Board of Trustees through 1967
and 1968. Whether it was major differences of opinion or simply a matter of a longevity which
had run its course is unclear. Rose retained a certain popularity within the State of Alabama
despite the significant and massive challenges and changes to the University.

Why this seeming digression into the background of F. David Mathews? Certain threads
of Mathews’ philosophy began weaving the fabric of his ideas on leadership from his early
upbringing in Clarke County, and he would later bring those ideas to bear on his presidency.
Mathews’ unique perspective on Alabama issues was formed early by a combination of family
service and geographical realities. With two generations of legislative service to Clarke County,
the high ideal of serving the public good was ingrained into Forrest David early and often.
Genuine service to local people remained at the core of his day-to-day life. The county’s school
curriculum revealed Mathews’ educational philosophy, inspired by his family’s example, to be
incredibly practical and sensitive to the needs of hard-living, rural people of Clarke County at the
turn of the century. Forrest David's background—including his family environment and the

Special Collections Library, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama
surrounding socioeconomic reality which allowed to recognize education as an opportunity for mobility—set the stage for his transformational leadership of the University of Alabama. Dr. Mathews was offered the presidency in 1969, and many commentators around the state and in the media agreed that he was a deserving candidate. However, such clarity came with reservations; Mathews faced an “uphill battle” for the position, as board members’ perceptions of youth and public perceptions of Mathews’ employment with the university allowed some doubts about his presidential accession. What carried Dr. Mathews to the presidency was neither his youth (a potential liability in the deeply traditional state of Alabama), nor his connections nor his ability to articulate a clear vision (as opposed to just articulating a mission). It was his ability to understand the vision’s vector with impact on people.


102 At this juncture of my research, vision is an organization’s or individual’s overall goal, while mission describes the values and guiding principles of how to arrive at the vision. See Wanda Scott and Karen Tokarz, “Won’t Spout Gospels, says Interim Dean of Men Mathews,” Crimson White, June 24, 1965. David Mathews Personal Papers, Kettering Foundation Archive, Dayton, Ohio
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Research on presidential leadership in higher education runs the gamut of topics, from administration to legal to budgetary concerns and seemingly everything in between. The first part of this dissertation’s literature review seeks to consider secondary research sources which specifically address presidential leadership and its relation to the primary constituency, presidential leadership, and decision-making. Lastly, this section identifies secondary sources which specifically address the historical context of Alabama during the 1970s.

This chapter seeks to understand the literature by working from the inside to the out. Beginning with a delineation of primary resources, the reader will gain the perspective of the depth of primary research within this dissertation. However ambitious the primary research was, the secondary source research was completed with equal fervor. Searching out the best of those sources which were applicable to higher education leadership, and especially the South in the 1970s, the considerations of higher education executives whose principles and similar circumstances were similar to Mathews’ framed this era’s difficulties. Closing with the 1970s in Alabama and its public policy, the research picture is completed. Regrettably, this has been a most difficult chapter to write. It would appear to the student of history that the literature would be voluminous. However, the same student would soon realize the error of thinking this. While much ink has been spilled regarding the 1970s, higher education history takes a back seat when compared to the political and economic chaos of this decade. Yet, it is in the very midst of this chaos that the foundations were laid for a quiet revolution in higher education’s executive leadership.
Methodology

While initially taking a historiographical approach, this changed as the nature of the study developed into understanding why Mathews was a polarizing figure in the 1980s. While conventional approaches to historiography were used in the initial phase of project development, proposal, and inquiry, it soon became apparent that such approaches were a strait jacket on the development of a whole picture. While some could look at this dissertation as a reflective history, such an identification would necessarily entail an assumption of Hegelian principle while concomitantly defending fact – leaving open the possibility of having to pull two ends of the same cord, at the same time. This would create confusion with the depth of primary research available to this dissertation. Therefore, this dissertation should be seen as analytical essaying.

An analytical essay should seek to establish the author’s abilities as a researcher who can undertake significant quantities of original research with differing qualities, to produce an evidentiary document which is a direct and original contribution to the field of study. Analytical essaying allows for the freedom of not only the reader’s analysis and challenged assumptions, but also allows for a philosophically accurate vein of the author to be reflected in the final document. Essentially, this dissertation unapologetically asks the reader to consider a different view by looking at specific evidentiary subsets which then thematically paint the portrait of Mathews’ decision making.

Primary Sources and Evidence

Given the scope of secondary publications, my dissertation must turn on historical facts as seen from primary sources. At this juncture, my research has been primarily organizational, while gauging the depth of resources for the thesis’ viability. At the time of writing this chapter, informal conversations with Dr. Mathews, a Former Speaker of the House Joseph
McCorquodale, and other personnel in the executive offices at the University, have added to the ideas which are found in various primary source texts. I have retained full and unfettered access to Dr. Mathews’ personal papers at the Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio as well as President Bonner’s permission to access the F. David Mathews Presidential Papers at the Hoole Special Collections Library at The University of Alabama. Both of these sources are replete with different types of papers and delivered different insights.

Having spent nearly two weeks with Dr. Mathews’ papers in Ohio, plenty of material exists within these papers alone to complete a dissertation. Well over 3,000 pages in length, Dr. Mathews’ personal papers at the Kettering Foundation in Ohio are highly detailed and rich in information. These papers include personal correspondence, personal notes taken on the general affairs of the university (including but not limited to budget, student affairs, the College of Community Health Sciences, etc.), and notes expressing Mathews’ personal views on the vision and mission of the university within Alabama and the South. Dr. Mathews’ papers at the Hoole Special Collections Library at The University of Alabama consist of equally rich information. This archive was used not so much to source information as it was to check the information found in Mathews’ notes. This includes minutes and notes on the actions of the Board of Trustees, student correspondence, and public documents on the state of the university (which includes budgets, legislative affairs, government documents, etc.). Marrying these two archives helps deliver a picture of President Mathew’s time at the helm of the state’s flagship institution.

At the outset of this dissertation, I feared that I would not have enough information from primary sources to conduct a full accounting and analysis of Dr. Mathews’ time. This has changed from “not enough” to “too much” and borders on “overwhelming.” Between personal papers at both locations (not only Dr. Mathews’ papers, but also those of other individuals with
whom he served); government documents in Birmingham, Tuscaloosa, and Montgomery; and the
many newspaper articles and editorial commentary regarding his administration found at the
Alabama Department of Archives and History in Montgomery, the information in speeches,
letters, and personal notes, deserve an even fuller vetting than this dissertation can deliver.

Literature Overview

The literature surrounding the Mathews administration is, admittedly, limited. However,
this lack does not necessarily equate to writing an analysis in a vacuum. The higher education
history of the 1970s is an emerging field. A brief literature review can be broken down into two
categories—higher education history and regional history—but first, general observations
regarding this initial approach to the literature are necessary.

Past staples of higher education history often paid little attention to, or outright glossed
over, the specific history of higher education in the South. Neither Fredrick Rudolph’s *The
American College and University: A History*¹⁰³ nor Laurence Veysey’s *The Emergence of the
American University*¹⁰⁴ devote significant attention to the South as a force in higher education.
Not until Christopher Lucas’ 1994 *American Higher Education: A History*¹⁰⁵ and John Thelin’s
2004 *A History of American Higher Education*¹⁰⁶ do we see significant inclusion of Southern
higher education history within a broad analysis of American higher education history. The
South’s own early history of a “unique economic system, a peculiar social structure, and a

¹⁰³ Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* (Athens: University of
¹⁰⁴ Laurence Vesey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965).
¹⁰⁵ Christopher Lucas, *American Higher Education: A History* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin,
1996).
Reducing Southern higher education in the 20th Century to a history of programmatic defeats, political failures, and significant backward thinking dangerously oversimplifies arguments while spurning a rich, regional complexity. While some histories (such as Flynt’s *Alabama in the Twentieth Century* or Gordon Harvey’s *History & Hope in the Heart of Dixie*) discuss higher education, the discussion is far too short to offer any proper understanding of the South’s vision for higher education. As education historians begin to engage the South of the 1970s, the historiography for Alabama higher education in the late 20th century remains woefully deficient but is nonetheless increasing. If there is to be a categorization of this historiographical approach, I would place it in John Whitehead's "new educational history" which sees the University of Alabama, alongside other Southern universities, "as part of the overall cultural, social, and even political history of the time."

A. Literature and Secondary Sources - Presidential Biographies

1) T. Marshall Hahn

Reducing Southern higher education in the 20th Century to a history of programmatic defeats, political failures, and significant backward thinking dangerously oversimplifies arguments while spurning a rich, regional complexity. The few books about university presidents

---

in the south during the 1970s show this. Warren Stother and Peter Wallenstein’s *From VPI to State University: President T. Marshall Hahn, Jr. and the Transformation of Virginia Tech, 1962-1974*\(^{111}\) opens the conversation about this period and gives some window onto the landscape of this period.

*From VPI to State University* shows the progress Marshall Hahn made as he transformed a male, military school into a research university with a wider scope in its relationship to the Commonwealth of Virginia. However, this progression involved difficult decisions which directly confronted the historical structure of the University. Hahn undertook massive changes to the University's character and nature by eliminating the requirement to serve in the corps of cadets, setting faculty salary structures in Blacksburg as a function of VPI itself as opposed to the Commonwealth in Richmond, and allowing women to enroll in Blacksburg for a Virginia Tech degree (rather than enrolling in the university’s attached Radford College). Further, it should not be overlooked that this volume addresses a publicly funded state university, not one that is private. Though the school's trajectory and educational desires in the days prior to the Hahn administration could be considered as cordoned off to many Virginians, Virginia Polytechnic Institute still relied on and actively sought interaction with the Commonwealth of Virginia for funding and purpose. These efforts culminated in the school’s name change to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

While there is little doubt that Strother and Wallenstein effectively show the magnitude of change at this Southern university, while Hahn’s presidency began in 1962, he was president for only four years during the decade in question of this dissertation, the 1970s. By then, the

tectonic political shifts of 1966 Virginia history had taken place and allowed for an easier pursuit of funding and understanding from the Commonwealth in Richmond. Further, as Roger Geiger noted in his review of the volume, Strother and Wallenstein's "work is essentially a story of the university rather than the man who led it for fourteen years."  

Little is mentioned about Hahn's decision to take bond issues as a funding mechanism in speeches and meetings across the Commonwealth, which began as early as 1968 and lasted until 1973. Instead of limiting the scope of Hahn's attempts at economic development to the immediate needs of Blacksburg, such as the expansion of the VPI airport runway and local hospital, wider research could have easily revealed a man who thought broadly about the needs of the entire Commonwealth of Virginia. While many people are mentioned in the book, this lack of breadth draws this reader’s attention from the wider picture to a forced focus on minutiae, which in turn denies the reader an understanding of Hahn's thought processes—both those that succeeded and those that failed. Upon completion, the reader is knowledgeable about university history but is left sorely wanting for the inner thoughts, machinations, and understandings of how a university president made decisions to successfully navigate the political climate and VPI alumni. However, there are other studies at the opposite end of the spectrum.

2) Alexander Heard

For the purpose of this dissertation, Alexander Heard’s volume on Vanderbilt University *Speaking of the University*, suffers from the opposite problem. In Heard's book, the reader is

---

115 Geiger, review of *From VPI to State University*.  

38
treated to a smorgasbord of examples where the president's decision-making processes are on display, but these are tempered by possible misinterpretation. In the spring of 1967, just before David Mathews became president at Alabama, Heard had his own difficulties with speaker bans. Calling it "overt friction," Heard describes in detail the significant difficulties of inviting speakers to address the topic of race in America. Among the speakers were Martin Luther King Jr., Senator Strom Thurmond, Allen Ginsburg, and Stokely Carmichael.¹¹⁶ But almost immediately, with a dissertation on the University of Alabama in the background, it is possible for the reader to see how different the operations of a public university on such an issue can be.

When a Speaker Ban Bill came before the Alabama Legislature (only a year prior to Vanderbilt's own speaker troubles), it encompassed the University and its operation. To this end, the University of Alabama was forced to consider its actions in light of the Board of Trustees, the state legislature, and the body politic—something Mathews understood as the individual chosen by then-President Rose to intercept the Speaker Ban Bill. When Alexander Heard saw the "spate of controversial speakers," he immediately got push back from Board of Trustees members, who took their frustrations out publicly in newspapers and media. Heard decided not to respond to the critics, and in time, after addressing the Vanderbilt Board of Trustees with a plan, he prevailed. However, his book provides a rich account of his thought processes, not only in the day-to-day operations of a university experiencing troubles but also in the larger philosophy of the university.

Heard's volume, replete with speeches and writings, plainly elucidates his fundamental principles and approaches to higher education. Heard’s speech to alumni in Chicago in 1967 bears striking resemblance to one he gave on campus in 1968, in that both highlight the ever-

increasing complexity of the institution’s relationship to the "daily life of the communities where they live." Hearing linked this concept to a broader economic theme in 1968 and to a theme of curricula in 1967, stating that the fundamental logic of classical antiquity should once again be part and parcel of liberal arts education. It is equally interesting that Heard makes a surgically-precise choice to say that the university lives in a community, whereas David Mathews believed that a University serves a community—an example of a stark difference between the two leaders’ different conceptions of the engaged university. It may well be that the university must be able to relate to its surrounding community, and while logic and koine Greek are wonderful discipline to study (as this author has), the question how these ideas might apply to rural health and poverty deservedly loomed large in the 1970s. Heard's volume can serve as a warning to readers who seek to read such books with a presentist mindset. A reader in the 21st century may seek to achieve a balanced curriculum but may not take into account the full range of changes to which a private university was subjected in the 1970s. One can see this point in the Kingsport News article announcing Heard’s arrival to deliver a speech to the Rotary Club. The article, of less than 150 words, delivers a rather cold recapitulation of a resume and event times; in contrast, articles about T. Marshall Hahn, Theodore Hesburgh, and David Mathews seem to at least inquire about speaking topics. This seeming distance was not limited to the local press either. In addressing wider campus unrest, articles on different dates and subjects from the Wisconsin State Journal of Madison and the Oakland Tribune both mention Heard in his capacity as an

117 Heard, Speaking of the University, 98.  
118 Heard, Speaking of the University, 143  
119 Heard, Speaking of the University, 102-103.  
120 "Vanderbilt Chancellor to Speak Here Twice," Kingsport News, April 5, 1972, 5.  
educational advisor to the President but do little to expand on his thoughts, speeches, or ideas. Instead, when it came to the issue of campus unrest in the United States, Heard's report to President Nixon was criticized for reducing the issue to a point of "national policy."

After reading *Speaking of the University*, the reader is left perplexed. On the one hand, though not a specifically mentioned case in Heard’s *Speaking of the University*, the thread of Daniel Webster’s brilliant advocacy (outright remonstrance would probably be the more appropriate term) in *Dartmouth vs. Woodward 1819*, breaking the definition of public as solely via state means, and vice versa, exists. Indeed, private higher education could have a public mission. Where Heard's volume excels is in its ability to show that the legacy of Webster's idea affected multiple speeches from Heard, particularly those in which he laid out his desire for an increase in outreach. However, looming in the background is the fact that public institutions (such as a university, which operates in a public bureaucracy) likely have time to consider options and to mitigate perceptions. While some continue to debate the extent of Heard’s success, evidence of Vanderbilt’s increased outreach (all accessible to all Tennesseans) does exist in the form of multiple health clinics, cultural resources and museums, and Vanderbilt Hospital. The third presidential biography justly shows a leader attempting to strike the balance between the maintenance of academic prowess and practical service to the people of Tennessee.

---

126 Heard, *Speaking of the University*, 102-103.
3) James T. Laney

F. Stuart Gulley’s *The Academic President as Moral Leader: James T. Laney at Emory University, 1977-1993*\(^\text{127}\) gives the researcher an excellent framework for the structure of my dissertation, its argument development, and evidentiary adequacy. I seem to resonate with Gulley’s book the best as his argument of Laney comes from the vantage of morality, much like the questions Mathews faced at the University of Alabama in the 1970s as Alabama sought to finally live up to the nation’s founding principle that “all men are created equal.” Further, Gulley’s heavy use of primary resource evidence closely parallels my own research on Mathews.

The story of Laney’s trajectory—from rural Arkansas, to Yale, to the US Army, back to Yale to become a Methodist pastor who was educated at a school deeply steeped in a modern Congregationalist theological tradition, to President of Emory University—is anything but routine or boring. Gulley’s book chronicles a leader’s decision-making processes which do not necessarily intersect with, but may run parallel to, those of David Mathews at Alabama.

From the outset, the reader is given a clear view of Gulley's work on the presidency and why a study on Laney should matter:

Laney more than any research university president of his era believed that an academic president was fundamentally a moral leader. The authority of the president, for Laney, derived from the fact that liberal arts education in and of itself was a moral endeavor. Thus, for Laney, the president was to demonstrate those qualities of moral leaders would have a leavening effect throughout the institution.\(^\text{128}\)

Seeing Laney process issues of university growth and expanded influence through the lens of education as a moral endeavor helps us understand the energy behind his decisions.


Gulley argues that it was Laney's ability to articulate the issues of the era which allowed him to succeed.\textsuperscript{129} He continues this theme by providing an overview of Laney's belief that the foundational mission of the university should be to cultivate a moral community of scholars. Though there are those who would see this as Laney's vision (as opposed to mission) for the university, Gulley offers a rather complete analysis of this finer point to close his work, identifying the "essential ingredients for effective leadership."\textsuperscript{130} Of these "essential ingredients," perhaps the most pertinent to this dissertation is how to "articulate a vision and gain the support of others," which, as Laney’s dealings with the Emory faculty between 1990-1993 show, may not always yield desired results.

Gulley's book is replete with examples of Laney's leadership tied to examples from other university presidents like Horace Mann Bond and Robert Maynard Hutchins. I gained from Gulley's volume the ability to think critically about the subject matter of my own subject, David Mathews. While arguments for the absolute are few, they do exist. There is not one single leader who was, is, or will ever be, that has not failed at some time. Gulley invites the higher education professional to engage with the idea that presidential leadership of excellence should experience failure, that pitfalls are normal, and that characterizations of decisions (and their execution) as simple would amount to a poor analysis indeed. Dissertation researchers often become enamored, and rightly so, with their subject—especially if that subject is a person. Yet, it was while reading the biography of Laney, the leader of a private university, that I began to consider the implications of what a public university presidency can bring to bear upon a state. I do no service either to the history of the State of Alabama or the University of Alabama if I fail to

\textsuperscript{129} Gulley, \textit{The Academic President}, 41.

\textsuperscript{130} Gulley, \textit{The Academic President}, 198.
accommodate room for error on the part of Mathews and, in hindsight, consider which decisions needed improvement.

Gulley recounts how, upon denying a faculty member tenure, Laney visited the department office to meet with the chair personally.¹³¹ Such personalization does not allow for the embalming of dead genius (as Jaroslav Pelikan called it), but it does raise the question of propriety in this day and time. Mathews’ resistance to the ivory tower developed as a hallmark of his leadership. Could such personalization happen today, given a higher education environment in which bureaucracy places an increasing distance between the executive leadership and the faculty? Or was this approach merely the logical outgrowth of Laney’s own ministerial view that the university’s moral purpose should be to develop that center of community—much in the same vein as another private institution president?

4) Theodore Hesburgh

The challenge in analyzing Hesburgh for a dissertation on Mathews is twofold. First, Hesburgh is admittedly not the president of a Southern university like Hahn, Heard, and Laney. As president of the University of Notre Dame, an institution with strong church roots and expectations, Hesburgh was not only the president of a university north of the Mason-Dixon Line; Notre Dame arguably had a broader national impact¹³² in the 1970s than the University of Alabama, given its ties to the church and its wider geographic alumni base.

Second, the sheer number of volumes which have been written about Hesburgh (both by others and by Hesburgh himself) makes it difficult to assess which ones best address the

¹³¹ Gulley, The Academic President, 218.
purposes of this dissertation. At the time this dissertation began, Father Hesburgh was alive. He has since passed away in 2015. Because Hesburgh was a hugely influential figure in both higher education and the Roman Catholic Church, the amount written about him increased tremendously after his passing. Therefore, I decided to limit this review to the following categories: first, sources written by Hesburgh himself; second, official biographies; and third, peer-reviewed or primary source articles.

Mathews assumed the presidency at thirty-three years old, but he tasted higher education administration as early as twenty-six. Father Hesburgh’s similar story begins when then-President Father John Cavanaugh told, not asked, a thirty-two-year-old Chaplain Hesburgh to become Executive Vice President of Notre Dame "today." When he acceded to the presidency four years later in 1952, Hesburgh's experience of making tough decisions proved invaluable. While organizing entire departments, significant changes in high level staff, and analysis of physical plans, Hesburgh held to a clear vision for Notre Dame's purpose, best summed up in his 1958 discourse on Patterns for Educational Growth. He argued, "our prime concern must be to offer to the service of God and men a worthy gift. Certainly we should not offer as our part in this divine symphony of all creation, the sour notes of intellectual mediocrity."

Of considerable interest for analyzing the similarities and differences between Hesburgh and Mathews is the concept of vision. The parallels are striking, indeed. Mathews sought a wider connection with the people of Alabama and not merely its government institutions. Internships

---

134 Hesburgh, God, Country, and Notre Dame, 57-59.
and the development of New College\textsuperscript{136} are two examples of how Mathews embraced the idea that higher education institutions should provide practical service to Alabama. O'Brien describes Hesburgh's similar attempt to "bring an element of spirituality to higher education and at the same time... bring an element of education to the spiritual.\textsuperscript{137}

Mathews recounted in personal notes well into his presidency "that the greatest social healing force is the human community as opposed to the 'institution.'\textsuperscript{138} Hesburgh's notion of university and community progress over time was not far from this view. Despite the fact that they clearly arrived at the same conclusion through different means, Hesburgh still maintained a wider separation between community and university than Mathews. For Hesburgh, community and university were both part of a greater institution—namely, the Roman Catholic Church. Similarly, in considering the modern challenges and "inner complexity of our times," Hesburgh quoted 19th Century Italian novelist Alessandro Manzoni, calling the complexity "the utter confusion in the heart of humanity." He continued in terms which connected the idea of community and university, stating, "any university should be a place... where both faculty and students together are seized by a deep compassion for the anguishes of mankind in our day and committed to proffer a helping hand, where every possible, in every aspect of man's material, intellectual, and cultural development.\textsuperscript{139} To communicate this sense of place, "The university is best prepared to understand this human confusion, to speak to it with faithful words that say something, to avoid meaningless formulas, empty phrases, words without weight.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{136} Notes on New College, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{137} O'Brien, \textit{Hesburgh}, 61.
\textsuperscript{138} Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{140} Theodore Hesburgh, ed., \textit{The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 9.
\end{flushright}
Although Hesburgh and Matthews agreed on the necessity of a practical component to the vision of a university, one area where the two differed was communication. Hesburgh skillfully communicated with his internal constituency (faculty, deans, and students) and his external constituency. His earlier tenure as an academic leader at Notre Dame saw Hesburgh cut his teeth on communicating with then-President Cavanaugh. In early memos to President Cavanaugh, Hesburgh was frank, honest, and even brash, going so far as to call for a new "top administration" in the College of Arts and Letters, which was then led by another Cavanaugh, the president's brother. In another memo, Hesburgh lamented that he was "appalled at the poor organization and operation" of the College of Commerce. In other early communications he tackled the College of Law, the Library, even the relations with the faculty, pausing at one point to say, "this may begin to sound like the anvil chorus."\(^{141}\) While it was difficult, it was in this "sluggish and tradition-bound" environment that Hesburgh learned to lead. President Cavanaugh saw promise in the face of crisis, telling Hesburgh, "Ted, I'm really going to load it on you, and you're going to hate me, but best you learn in a hurry."\(^{142}\) There seems to be a shift in Hesburgh's approach to communicating internally as his presidency progressed; he appears to have become softer, while retaining the honesty and forthright nature of his communication with faculty and students. This is especially evident in his responses to the campus protests of the late 1960's and early 1970's.\(^{143}\) Yet, the notion of tradition seems to persist. Early in his leadership at Notre Dame, Hesburgh called the institution "tradition-bound," and this view seemed to evolve during his presidency; he later called upon the University to serve as a “moral resource”\(^ {144}\) of tradition.

\(^{141}\) O'Brien, *Hesburgh*, 51.

\(^{142}\) Hesburgh, *God, Country, and Notre Dame*, 57.


\(^{144}\) Hesburgh, *The Challenge and Promise*, 9.
Some might look at the University of Alabama and define it as "sluggish and tradition-bound" as well. But Mathews would not have used these terms, as tradition for him was important. In one speech Mathews said,

> Tradition is a burden in many ways. To have a tradition like ours mean that you can't lose your "cool"; to have a tradition like ours means that you always have to show "class," even when you are not quite up to it; to have a tradition like ours means that you have to do some things that you don't want to do and some you even think you can't do, simply because the tradition demands it of you—on the other hand, tradition is the thing that sustains us. Tradition is that which allows us to prevail in ways that we could not otherwise.145

Mathews had a different approach to tradition because Mathews had different pressures and a different historical milieu. Hesburgh certainly faced external pressures as well, but an argument could be made that Notre Dame's challenges involved greater physical and abstract distances between the challenger and institution. For example, when Hesburgh was challenged by Cardinal Ottaviani regarding Notre Dame's inclusion of books and sources which had been either challenged or banned by the church, Hesburgh was able to stand firm and argue effectively for freedom of conscience and academic inquiry.146 When Mathews faced a speaker ban bill, he wrangled with legislators far closer to the university as alumni who sent their children there for football games and studies—closer than a Cardinal traveling from a different continent. While Notre Dame had a wider constituency, which allowed for more opportunities for objection, Mathews’ university administration contained an historical reality in which, for 150 years, an

entire race of people had been denied access to the state's flagship university. He faced not mere
desegregation but integration, and he sought to keep the public order and peace which had been
breached at similar institutions in other nearby states while continuing to expand opportunities
and resources for present students. Hesburgh reported to University Fellows and a Board of
Trustees that maintained similar philosophical backgrounds from 1967 into the later stages of
his presidency. Mathews' Board of Trustees changed dramatically, both geographically and in the
very structure of the University of Alabama in an effort to encompass two more institutions as
equals (despite the University in Tuscaloosa's legal mandate as a flagship institution from the late
1820s). Hesburgh, while having a public mission, still answered to the Board and, in a limited
way, to the Roman Catholic Church, a private entity. Mathews answered to a Board, a legislature
which gave funds necessary to the institution’s functioning, and to a wider body politic of the
State of Alabama—all simultaneously. Yet, Mathews still navigated these wildly changing
external relationships effectively. Newspapers from the multiple cities in Alabama demonstrate a
positive view of Mathews, even in the face of his resignation in 1980. Further, alumni
organizations and private citizens often wrote publicly about him in positive terms. He was
able to expand resources and restructure colleges despite the obstacles of upheaval-like change in
1970s Alabama. Where Mathews faltered was in communication with the internal constituents of
Alabama.

5) William Friday

147 "Board of Trustees - Leadership - About ND - University of Notre Dame," University of
148 “David Mathews Reflects Much Honor on Alabama,” Mobile Press Register, November 15,
1976, 10-A; Jerry Tait, “UA Head Under Fire, Mathews Supported,” Tuscaloosa News, October
25, 1979, 3.
149 Letters from Alumni, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton,
Ohio.
My initial approach to William Friday through the eyes of William Link’s biography came on the third floor of the UAB library in 2007 as I began reading higher education history. I saw Friday and Mathews as similar at the outset of this project, and I continue to believe that they are. Both are sons of rural America: Friday from rural Dallas, North Carolina, Mathews from rural Grove Hill, Alabama. Both learned the importance of education from an early age. Both served in the military and both rose to power at their respective universities at a young age, in similar fashion. In their philosophy of the university, Matthews and Friday agreed that presidents should be in but not of politics. And while both had similar issues to contend with, Friday and Mathews differ more based on external factors than internal ones.

Perhaps the most complicated to analyze, Friday’s presidency was marked by changes in North Carolina, yet it is terribly difficult to identify his stances with regard to those changes. While it is fair to state that "pragmatic calculations" governed many of his decisions, this pragmatism commenced in a different place and time than that of Laney, Hesburgh, and to a certain extent even Mathews. Similarities are not seen so much in time as in issue.

The Speaker Ban bill submitted before the General Assembly of North Carolina in 1963 contained few differences from Speaker Ban bills in other states such as Ohio and Alabama. While the multipole bills’ stated purpose was to ban communists from speaking on campus, in North Carolina, the bill's proponents were far from coy about defining their true objectives in hindsight. Senator Stone (one of the bill's primary supporters) "characterized the Speaker Ban

---

against communists as a blow against racial demonstrations.\textsuperscript{152} In 1963, Friday had been president for six years, and he had no qualms about using his authority and position at the University of North Carolina to personally lobby against the bill. When asked why he was visiting members of the General Assembly in Raleigh, Friday responded frankly, "You know full well what I'm doing over here."\textsuperscript{153}

During the passage of the Speaker Ban, Friday nearly had the bill defeated in the Senate and lost by only four votes. He even tried to get the bill recalled before it reached the enrolling office. Knowing that the Governor did not have the power to veto, Friday began a coordinated effort with his Board of Trustees and the press to see the law repealed; this effort later succeeded.

UNC had an issue of public perception which persisted through the entire Friday presidency: namely, that the university was displaying a typical "liberal" "arrogance"\textsuperscript{154} toward public opinion. When Mathews went to the Legislature to defeat a similar measure, he was not yet President and had only recently been appointed as an assistant by then-Alabama President Frank Anthony Rose. Mathews utilized more of a courtly style in his approach to the legislature, probably due to his attempts to obtain greater financial support for the university.\textsuperscript{155} This stands in stark contrast to the frank nature of Friday on this particular piece of legislation. Mathews succeeded in getting the Speaker Ban stopped where Friday did not.

In another similarity, North Carolina had a state-supported medical college, the University of North Carolina School of Medicine. However, the decade of the 1970s saw rapid


\textsuperscript{154} Link, \textit{Power and Purpose}, 112-113.

\textsuperscript{155} Tilford, \textit{Turning the Tide}, 128-129.
expansion of East Carolina University to the point where a small but effective core of qualified medical college faculty was assembled there. Friday moved quickly but was unsuccessful at pointing out to the legislature that the University of North Carolina was more than capable of graduating the number of medical students necessary to fulfill the entire state's need for medical doctors in urban and rural areas. However, political forces in the legislature had changed.

The state of North Carolina had just elected its first Republican governor since the 1890s, which left Jim Hunt as the most powerful Democrat, sitting in the lieutenant governor’s chair and guiding legislation. In a strange symbiosis and political dance, a newly ascended Republican Party worked with the Democrats and strongly supported the foundation of a new public medical college for the State of North Carolina. While the legislature "didn’t care about facts" in making their decision to support a new medical college, Friday turned the newly founded Brody School of Medicine at East Carolina University to his advantage when he brought it under the control of the university of North Carolina system, thereby allowing both colleges to exist and flourish.

Jennings Waggoner describes the differences that existed during Friday’s presidency—including issues of civil rights, a Speaker Ban law in North Carolina, and the coalescing of the University of North Carolina system—as disagreements between "state modernizers and traditionalists."\(^{156}\) In this environment, Hugh Davis Graham of Vanderbilt called Friday "the consummate compromiser."\(^{157}\) However, these ideas may need revising. Friday's genius at higher education administration, especially with regard to the Speaker Ban bill, was not born of his skill at compromise so much as it was personal action on his part coupled with the timing and patience that are so often necessary for compromise to work. Nor did Friday allow potentially


divisive and negative issues to outstrip the importance of a wider view of the university’s objectives. When East Carolina University began dominating university growth, compromise worked in the face of loss, primarily because the University of North Carolina remained understood as the state flagship among both the people of North Carolina and the political establishment. In these situations, we see a president who is not so much one for compromise as one who can live with results. Link called it Friday's ability to "adapt to new circumstances."\textsuperscript{158}

The circumstances of Friday's presidency make him a complex fit for analyzing the Mathews presidency. This complexity is evident from the outset. William Friday became president of the University of North Carolina in 1957. Desegregation of the University only occurred two very short years earlier, and only with involvement from the federal court system.\textsuperscript{159} The Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina fought very hard, even seeking to limit the breadth of Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas to elementary and high schools so that universities could continue their policy of discrimination at the undergraduate level.\textsuperscript{160} Friday turned his attention to integration, but this quickly took a back burner to other problems confronting the campus athletic department and later on Title IX.\textsuperscript{161} Though Friday was successful in his early presidency, by the time racial demonstrations and strife hit the state in cities like Greensboro and Wilmington in 1963 and 1968, he had been president for more than seven years, and he did not waste time in building structures of

\textsuperscript{158} Link, Power and Purpose, 245.
\textsuperscript{160} Cheek, “An Historical Study,” 201-207.
\textsuperscript{161} Cheek, “An Historical Study,” 201. Link, Power and Purpose, 306-336, provides an excellent backdrop for understanding the relationship between the presidency and expanding government involvement in the daily life of the institution.
pragmatic leadership with the political and administrative capital required to see the university through difficult times.

In stark contrast, David Mathews, who personally engaged in desegregating the Alabama campus in the 1960s, saw integration as a moral imperative early in his term as president. The year was 1969, and in his mind, the time had passed—long passed—to become what The University of Alabama needed to be. Other issues arose, but even in his personal notes,\textsuperscript{162} integration and service to the state were clear imperatives. Where Friday's pragmatism allowed for great flexibility in his defining of North Carolina's purpose and relations to the state until the early 1970s,\textsuperscript{163} David Mathews began with a clear vision for a university relating to its state. If the University was to be the seminary of learning for the State of Alabama,\textsuperscript{164} that meant every Alabamian.

Alabama's legislature in the 1960s was not diverse in terms of philosophical viewpoints, but this radically changed in the 1970s. North Carolina, while remaining politically aligned in both their General Assembly and Executive branch, elected legislators who maintained a wider view of education's importance to the life of the state throughout the 1960s. The views of politicians like Terry Sanford (a Southern Progressive governor who supported John F. Kennedy for president, against the trend of Southern Democrats who wanted to see Lyndon Baines

\textsuperscript{162} Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{163} In 1963, the Carlyle Commission would define five separate points in order to direct “the establishment and development of education beyond the high school in North Carolina.” It would not be until 1972-73 that the University of North Carolina would be actually codified into state law, despite receiving public resources since the late 1700s. This may explain some hesitation on the part of Friday to define the University, as the commission and legislature were working on that throughout the 1960s. Joseph Milton Hodges, Sr., “The governor's commission on education beyond the high school: The Carlyle commission, 1961-1963” (PhD diss., North Carolina State University, 1996).
\textsuperscript{164} Acts of the Alabama Legislature, 1829.
Johnson as president) and James Holhouser (a Republican who quietly supported the University of North Carolina), even though they were of different political parties, seemed to show parallel microcosms of V. O. Key's definition that North Carolina's political situation is a progressive plutocracy\textsuperscript{165} which allowed a pro-business climate to meet traditionally more human and quality of life-centered policies.

Mathews and Alabama were dealing with wildly different circumstances. Within government, Alabama's powerful executive\textsuperscript{166} branch changed hands often, and with the changes, policy was not insulated. George Wallace, a University of Alabama alumni who befriended education with the state's first billion-dollar education budget and community college system, still put pressure on higher education as political winds shifted toward fiscal conservatism. When David Mathews took office in 1969, Albert Brewer was enduring a bruising contest to secure the governorship and implement his legislative agenda. The Wallace name held sway despite that Wallace had been out of office for nearly three years (and his wife, Governor Lurleen Wallace, only one). Returning to the governorship in 1971, Wallace began to play to powerful constituency changes in the state's geographic and legislative agenda. This directly influenced his support of UAB and the medical school, as a new political constituency in suburbia (namely Homewood, Vestavia Hills, and Hoover) would become a significant voting demographic in the

\textsuperscript{165} V. O. Key, Jr., \textit{Southern Politics in State and nation: A New Edition}. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 223. He observed that Republicans and Democrats so affect one another’s party policy that instead of “bi-factional battle” the state’s policy is often the result of the machinations of a “multifunctional melee.” He was also correct in noting the business-heavy climate of North Carolina, in addition to geographical realities, as being a source of strength, forcing a type of ideology sans party vitriol, and more focused on policy.

future. Following Wallace was Forrest Hood "Fob" James, who ran on an austerity budget that defined good governance as running the State of Alabama like a "Waffle House."\(^{167}\)

Within higher education, the University of North Carolina system consolidated in 1972, yet the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill retained their flagship role in the state's higher education. Friday had a board of trustees and politicians who understood the importance of keeping UNC in its traditional flagship role.\(^{168}\) On the other hand, when The University of Alabama consolidated its system, Mathews watched as someone with little previous connection to the State of Alabama (Joseph Volker) took the university and put it alongside others, in essence stripping the University of its flagship status. Further, geographic changes in the board of trustees from a predominantly rural constituency to a suburban/urban-dominated Board changed the character of the University's Board and its understanding of Alabama's needs. In short, Friday experienced a sense of continuity despite significant changes, while Mathews and Alabama experienced a political and budgetary climate which suffered from oversimplified understandings of state governance and higher education's relationship to the state. Further hampering comparison to Friday is the complex nature of his similarities and differences to Mathews. In Friday, we see a president who was willing to be direct and frank yet did not compromise well on larger issues (despite his ability to do so). Yes, he did define a moral presidency like a Hesburgh or a Mathews—but not to the extent that I had thought in my initial approach to this dissertation. If one looks for a definition of the moral presidency which


resonates with their philosophy, they can find it in the presidencies of Hesburgh, Laney, and Mathews.

Why this foray into secondary sources when the literature on university presidential leadership in the 1970s is so lacking? First, I can confidently say that had any other topic been chosen for this dissertation, I still would consider these particular secondary sources, each for its own angle and potential impact on my analysis of opinions, ideas, and data. These books developed within me many arguments and points I would not have otherwise considered. Second, I believe this foray into the literature is important because it highlights the specific challenges Mathews had to overcome even though he faced problems similar to those faced by other presidents in the period. Further, these particular presidential biographies enabled me to consider the finer points of political decision-making that come with a public university versus a private one, as well as the impact internal structures (such as salaries) can have on wider relationships (with the Commonwealth, to use the example of VPI). In short, each of these books provided examples and background information which could be pared down as aptly communicating the functional nuances of both personal philosophy and interpersonal relationships which affect a president's decision-making and policy.

B. Literature and Secondary Sources - Higher Education and Policy-Making

Presidential biographies informed my engagement of Mathews' ideas on leadership and the place of a university in relation to its wider constituency. However, the course of my work began to show a common shortfall: biographies are often limited to the mechanical ideas of leadership, and few address the philosophical ideas that presidents bring to their leadership of a university. It is a case of more how and less why. In seeking a thorough, holistic approach to this subject, I sought other secondary sources which would specifically engage ideas of university
and society, philosophies specific to higher education institutional leadership, the ethics and
moral implications and consequences behind decision-making, and lastly, Alabama political
history.

Significant work on the relationships between colleges and their respective publics began
to emerge in the 1990s and early 21st Century. Questions of moral and civic responsibility are
beginning to intersect with inquiries about what higher education means for the public good.
Derek Bok's 2003 *Universities in the Marketplace* and many other volumes saw professors
affiliated with foundations and forums and beginning to run with the ideas of service, morality,
and learning. Stanford University President Emeritus Donald Kennedy's 1997 *Academic Duty*169
directly confronted this shift away from the public good170 and the concomitant turning of faculty
toward public service. Though Kennedy's concerns in the book often retreat inward as the
chapter progresses (for example, Chapter 5 begins brilliantly by defining "service to the
University" but ends up discussing tenure at length), Kennedy sums up precisely what Mathews
was seeing as early as 1972171 with the Carnegie Report. Calling for "increasing awareness of
duty to undergraduate students, lifelong learning, and transferability of course material to the real
world" and demanded institutional change in the form of "strong leadership and guidance from
top administration," the Carnegie Report read like a warning of the impending shift in the higher
education environment.172

The tie between civic mechanisms and the development of broad democracy cannot be
underestimated. In *Educating Citizens: Preparing America's Undergraduates for life of Moral

171 Letter to Student, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
172 Cody Arvidson, "*Academic Duty* by Donald Kennedy: A review by Cody Arvidson, University
and Civic Responsibility', Colby, Erlich, Beaumont, and Stevens defined these mechanisms as points of civic virtue. In contrast, Kezar, Chambers, and Burkhardt, in their compilation Higher Education for the Public Good: Emerging Voices from a National Movement, used the case of Mathews to engage the idea of the institution’s approach to its public defining its context through "listening." David Mathews' own later works in the same period, such as Politics for People and Ecology of Democracy, directly address this. However, it is his work, Why Public Schools? Whose Public Schools?, based on his dissertation, The Politics of Education in the Deep South: Georgia and Alabama 1830-1860, which delivers a compression of his idea that the philosophies of early Alabama settlers toward education show a great public interest in seeking education's proper role in community—an interest that continues to this day.

C. Literature and Secondary Sources - Alabama History

Alabama in the 1970s, like the rest of the US, was in a state of flux. Students at The University of Alabama in the 1970s were not insulated from the feelings of the state or the nation. The Corolla of 1970, the yearbook for The University of Alabama, went so far as to state:

The mood on campus is changing and life at Alabama is changing. It is impossible to decide which came first, if there is a causal relationship involved, but unquestionably the change has been evolutionary… For the most part, the change at Alabama is a reflection of a bigger change; a nationwide change in attitudes.

174 David Mathews in Kezar, Chambers, and Burkhardt, Higher Education for the Public Good, 71.
Not to speak of the environment the University faced in the body politic of the State of Alabama during the 1970s would constitute a fallacious record at best, and the presentism Dr. Wayne Urban so often warns of in his classes at worst. *Wallace: The Classic Portrait of Alabama Governor George Wallace* by Marshall Frady,\(^{178}\) *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* by Dan T. Carter,\(^{179}\) and others give us a window into the political realities swirling around the University at this time, yet these books must be viewed in light of their inability to separate message from ability, bordering on presentism, while lacking the personal complexity surrounding their subject. This is particularly true of Stephan Lesher’s *George Wallace: American Populist*, which is especially odd given Lesher’s understanding of populism’s drawing power.\(^{180}\) My admitted favorite, Wayne Flynt’s *Alabama in The Twentieth Century*, paints a picture of forces surrounding The University of Alabama and the moral questions confronting the state in the 1970s. Capturing the enigmas of an “ordinary people of an extraordinary state,”\(^{181}\) *Alabama in The Twentieth Century* does a great service by delivering a candid Alabama history through the book’s thematic, as opposed to chronological, structure.\(^{182}\) Flynt dedicates one whole chapter to education and a sizable subsection to higher education. Since William Rufus King’s own nomination to the Vice Presidency of The United States in 1853, no Alabamian has served in a higher executive office except for F. David Mathews, who served as Secretary of Health,


\(^{181}\) Flynt, *Alabama in the Twentieth Century*, 531.

\(^{182}\) Jeff Frederick, “Review of *Alabama in the Twentieth Century,*” *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 90, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 467-469.
Education and Welfare in the 1970s. Yet not once in the entire section on higher education does Flynt mention Mathews—quite a questionable omission regarding someone who, to this day in 2018, remains the second longest-serving president of the state’s flagship University, second only to George Hutcheson Denny and tied with Frank Anthony Rose.

As the secondary sources reveal, the 1970s were a time of turbulence and shifting sands in higher education administration. Each president had to contend with the realities history was now presenting. However, it was the great presidents like Friday at the University of North Carolina and Hesburgh at the University of Notre Dame which brought with them a definite philosophy to the position of the Presidency and adapted this philosophy to the occasion and even crisis before them – as opposed to leadership which allows the occasion to adapt the philosophy. Therefore, understanding Mathews’ philosophy is of keen importance.

---

183 Ethan A. Hitchcock was Secretary of the Interior under Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. However, while born to an Alabama Supreme Court Justice, Hitchcock quickly moved from his native Mobile to Missouri well before the Civil War’s beginning in 1861.
CHAPTER 3: MATHEWS’ EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

This chapter shows the reader the educational philosophy Mathews brought to the office of President. Beginning with a small recapitulation of his time with Cremin, the analytic essay presented in this chapter develops the realities which had a practical bearing on his philosophical vein. The nature of rural Alabama, political realities, and the engagement of his personality, showed that vestiges of traditional Southern political leaders were alive and well within Mathews’ leadership. Yet, Mathews will harness these to create actions within his decision-making to see the integration of races and women, to encourage those willing to disagree, and address issues confronting Alabama by using its best resource – its people. The institution, under this philosophy, stood as a force for community.

Seeing Mathews’ philosophy as its own organism, compartmentalizing it to its own section within the confines of other examples of leadership, is a serious flaw. This approach proves a weak effort to show both Mathews’ failings and successes; and it went against my goal of understanding leadership through the eyes of the Mathews administration. In an 1860 speech to the people of New Haven, Connecticut, Abraham Lincoln argued that no policy could endure that does not rest on the philosophical.184 Said another way, any policy shift of significance cannot be bifurcated from its philosophical bedrock. With this in mind, it is impossible to

separate Mathews’ actions as the president of The University of Alabama from his philosophy. Such a separation would make it impossible to attain a full understanding of his time at the helm of the State’s flagship. Leaders bring a definite philosophy and desired trajectory to their leadership. While this trajectory may change for a presidency which must address issues deeply rooted in the moral fabric of the institution, the north star of vision does not. Whether it is in vogue to call these preconceived notions is not for me to address here, but it is clear that Mathews’ responses to the issues he confronted were couched in a definitive philosophy.

Philosophies: The Effect of Mathews’ Educational Past

As was stated in Chapter One, Mathews (as evidenced by his dissertation, many speeches, and correspondence) had two primary academic interests: education and history. Lawrence Cremin, who shared these interests, oversaw Mathews’ dissertation, “The Politics of Education in the Deep South.” Cremin and Mathews paired well in 1960 and again in 1980. Cremin and Mathews experienced significant early career successes, and towards the end, Cremin and Mathews experienced the definite opinions and substantive criticisms of higher education faculty. While Lawrence Cremin had an impact on Mathew’s wider philosophical exposure, they shared an understanding of the commoner’s impact on education’s development

---


187 Cohen, Lawrence A. Cremin, 191-204.

in the United States, or what Diane Ravitch called the “social and political contexts in which schools were embedded.”189

Mathews’ concern for all Alabamians is reflected as early as his dissertation from Columbia in the early 1960s. “Education and Politics in the Deep South” examines a segment of society and considers the ideas behind education development, not its philosophy. The similarities between Mathews and Cremin are striking. Students of Cremin saw him as someone who delivered a softer side to the politics of education and who was intensely relational, more personalized, and more engaging.190 Marvin Lazerson, in his own review of Cremin’s American Education: The Metropolitan Experience, wrote,

   Indeed, like Jefferson, Emerson, and Dewey, he is at his best articulating his allegiance to education and noting the dilemmas that come with popular education. In The Metropolitan Experience, he is more explicitly concerned with the dark side of the politics of education than previously—the politics of the last few decades has taken its toll—but he is reluctant to pursue the moral limits, the structures of power, and the legitimacy of learning for its own ends…191

Mathews was not afraid to break from Cremin’s work. While Cremin saw a “dark side” to education forming, Mathews remained optimistic in tonality and view of purpose, even in the midst of his own difficulties as President of the University in the early 1980s.

Alabama’s politics was (and still is for many people) predominantly rural in nature.192 This rural focus of Alabama politics places the state in a quandary between the need for education and the practical realities of geography, times, and people. Mathews’ dissertation not only proved his thesis, but began to show what higher education in Alabama needed: concern for

190 Ravitch, "Lawrence A. Cremin," 83-84.
all Alabamians drawn from the state’s education’s history, but developed with intellectual rigor and delivered to the public with an intelligent voice which could see successes and failures with the historical minutiae and broad horizons of the past to correct the future. Mathews included the broad manner and intertwined complexities of rural Alabama’s relationship with education in his understanding of the university’s dynamic, which would inform his policy. By arguing for the desired and logical progression of rural Alabamians towards educational necessity, Mathews succeeded in his investigation while avoiding the idea that educational progression was merely inevitable.

With his rural past, and as President of The University of Alabama, Mathews contended with more practical applications. He had to acknowledge that leadership is philosophy in action. To fully appreciate this perspective, we must understand that the word “philosophy” should not be misconstrued to its present diluted definition of personal attitude or preferred approach. Such a diluted conception of philosophy would curtail the greater issues confronting the university, such as a university’s ability to relate with the entire State of Alabama. When philosophy focuses on values—for instance, on questions about what is right, what is wrong, and how we can know—it is called moral philosophy. When philosophy focuses on education—for instance, on questions about the aims of education—it is called philosophy of education.

193 “Higher Education: A Framework,” Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. I submit that Mathew’s thesis, within his dissertation and also wider view of education and society, is that society has something to say to educational institutions through community.
Mathews considered questions of purpose as affecting the sum totality of education. Where Cremin faced the uncomfortable question of how far to venture into matters of morality or ethics, Mathews did not have such freedom to choose, because he was confronted with broad issues of university identity which, in his view, demanded morally engaged leadership. While there is a definite morality undergirding his philosophy, it would be a mistake to describe Mathews’ call for service to the state as moralism. It was in a sense, from David Mathews’ perspective, a new tradition; Steven Sample, president of University of Southern California, noted that while tradition makes a university stable, it also "makes it so difficult to govern." Tradition for Mathews was not merely a useful pragmatism, but a conviction. It sat at the intersection of philosophical development, but only to the extent that it did not produce a metamorphosis into the “heady” traditionalism of the 1950s which sought a “retreat from the world outside academe.”

Jacksonian Feist meets Jeffersonian Polish

Jacksonian & Jeffersonian democracy was feisty by any stretch of the imagination, especially to those who ran against both Jackson and Jefferson. Jackson, an uneducated commoner, had ascended to the highest office in the land on the back of an expanded

---

198 Moralism, as discussed and addressed within Frederick Rudolph’s and Laurence Vesey’s higher education histories, is most important—as many university executives in early, foundational years of higher education were ministers. The moralism of Thelin, however, reflects a wider consensus. While retaining the traditional view of moralism within given social classes and economics, Thelin seems to more purposefully diverge into these issues of race and economics, which parallels later century shifts in higher education.


200 David Mathews, “What do you Profess, Professor?” Speech to the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, Atlanta, Georgia, April 6, 1977.
plebiscite by arguing for the power of individual responsibility for the public trust while maintaining a sharp view of the largesse of presidential power. Jefferson, with his deft handling of words with polish, vehemently defended the notion of the American democracy’s voice from the bottom up. Holding to an idea and controlling how an idea is disseminated are two different things, a principle Mathews understood. His undergirding Jeffersonian/Jacksonian feistiness was tempered with Jeffersonian polish. Mathews did believe in the power of the individual, in much the same Jacksonian vein, but with an almost muted tonality. Mathews’ *Voluntary Action in Higher Education: A Spirit for ’76*, a speech given to the American Association of Higher Education in October, 1973, in a roundabout way called for the renewal of a Jacksonian understanding of individuality that had been “obscured” by the litany of issues confronting the institution. As a result of “issues such as order on the campus, greater efficiency in the use of education resources, and the perceived need to avoid the twin evils of proliferation and duplication,” the individual was being subsumed by a movement to treat higher education as a public utility not to be utilized by the public. Lamenting that Civics had become a spectator sport, Mathews saw education’s direct correlation with individual responsibility for the common good, which could counterbalance “the pernicious effects of the special interest state.”


202 Meacham, *American Lion*, 266-274. Jackson’s statement, “the People sir, are with me” is


204 Mathews, “Voluntary Action.”

205 Mathews, “Voluntary Action.”

Present ideas call for democracy as representing “values bubbling up from the bottom to the top.”  

While the nature of democracy is still a matter for debate in these times, educational philosophies in the early to mid-20th century were replete with Dewey’s idea that “a democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associative living.”  

Dietrich Bonhoeffer questioned the role of the state in relation to institutions in one of his seminal works, *Ethics*. While Bonhoeffer’s primary concern was the Church, his book also touched on secular government, noting that the term government “does not essentially refer to the… polis; it may go beyond it; it is, for example, applicable even in the smallest form of community.”  

Bonhoeffer’s understanding of education’s impact is easily adapted, and possibly even serves as a bridge, to public higher education today in light of newfound understandings of the multiversity’s public mission. This is especially true in light of Crow’s 2015 *Designing the New American University*, which sees the “new American university” as a compression of Clark Kerr’s “multiversity” that seeks to combine “accessibility to an academic platform underpinned by discovery and knowledge production, inclusiveness to a broad demographic representative of the socio-economic diversity of the region and nation, and maximum societal impact.”  

---  

Kezar, Chambers, and Burkhardt’s 2005 proposition of the university as a mechanism for public action and a center for understanding democracy\textsuperscript{211} is a compression of Colby, Erlich, Beaumont and Stephens’ *Educating Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Civic Responsibility*. In their work, Kezar, Chambers and Burkhardt take the idea of purpose one step further beyond the institution by encouraging citizen action and engagement while also seeking to understand higher education context and citizen-ethic theory.\textsuperscript{212} Mathews’ view that education should touch community is the fingerprint of his identity within his notes and philosophy. This notion that the common man could, through the university, have an uncommon impact on wider communities was noted by many, with some students even writing Mathews to express, “We know that your vision of the University is Jeffersonian, that is has a responsibility to those who have chartered it. In fact, the university has the most responsible position to play in this democratic society it must educate people so that they might responsibly fill the office of citizen.”\textsuperscript{213} In this lay one of the great questions Mathews had to answer: how could the university become The University of Alabama and see this broad Jacksonian ideal practiced to its fullest when nearly one-fourth of the state’s population were not officially represented on the faculty? Even though some desegregation had occurred, by what measures could this same population say they had equal, fully, and unfettered opportunity? The answer came in the form of


\textsuperscript{212} Colby et al., *Educating Citizens*, 52-53.

\textsuperscript{213} “Sherry” to David Mathews, October 26, 1979, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
a challenge; the “challenge was no longer just ending segregation; it was fostering integration.”

Integration: Of not In

In his work on *Writing Through the Past: Federal Higher Education Policy*, Philo Hutcheson notes the Lockean foundational concept of education as the “enactment of an inalienable right (for participation in basic civic, political and economic opportunities)… and as a good (for the achievement of civic, political, and economic opportunities).” If this is true (which it is), then diversity and multiculturalism go directly to the heart of moral and civic competencies. In broader terms, Hutcheson’s statement means that for a university tightly coupled with its external constituency, that education as a right and good directly affects and is reflexively affected by the moral and civic virtue inexorably linked to family, nation, community and the world. Therefore, given that for 150 years the University had denied admissions to African-American students, the question arose: are we a university *in* Alabama or The University *of* Alabama?

As early as 1956, when Autherine Lucy arrived on the campus, David Mathews found himself writing home in increasingly philosophical terms. In letters dated from January and

---

214 “David Mathews, interview with Richard Norton Smith, June 1, 2009.”
216 Colby et al., *Educating Citizens*, 49-59. The sections on Spelman College and Messiah College should be of considerable interest given the striking parallels with Mathews’ idea of outward engagement and Spelman College’s mission and community relation mechanisms, and the social reality of religion in the Deep South, which is (or should be) closely mirrored in Messiah College’s mission and values statements.
February of 1956, Mathews recounts that students fell into two groups: the quiet ones who went about their business adopting a “wait and see” attitude, or the ones who made the papers by unifying with seedier elements in an attempt to continue racist policies that denied admission to African-Americans.\textsuperscript{218} A newly minted PhD, Mathews returned to the University as an Assistant to the Dean of Men working in residence halls, while also working on desegregation as early as the summer of 1963. Often meeting people in the course of their work, assistants like Mathews learned to build coalitions and work with various university departments and individuals—often the very ones who would later become members of the administration and faculty.\textsuperscript{219}

Mathews’ own notes at the time refer to the university’s desegregation. Later notes are clear reflections of Mathews’ belief that, while the university was desegregated under Frank Rose before his presidency, the university had not yet truly integrated.\textsuperscript{220} As Mathews observed, “It’s one thing to desegregate it, it’s quite another to integrate it.”\textsuperscript{221} The question before Mathews, then, was how to integrate. Any effort in this area went beyond student involvement and retention. Integration was a response to deeply internalized convictions, not merely to an external environment which often made decisions based on interpretations of reality that were in vogue in Alabama. Integration was an extension of philosophy, which was deeply personalized

\textsuperscript{218} David Mathews to Mary Chapman, February 1, 1956, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{219} Iredell Jenkins to David Mathews, October 28, 1979, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. Iredell Jenkins later became the long-time Chair in the Department of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences, while at one time also holding a dual role as Philosopher in Residence at the Yale School of Medicine.
\textsuperscript{220} Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. It is interesting to note the parallel with other southern leaders at this time like Rueben O’Donovan Askew of Florida, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, and William Winter of Mississippi—all members with Mathews on the Southern Growth Policies Board.
as ethics in action, a matter that was part and parcel of the very name of The University of Alabama. The titles of institutions should have meaning. According to Robert Sproul, “ethics are concerned with the imperative and morality is concerned with the indicative.” In Mathews’ case, the moral reality indicated that the University’s ethical foundations and policy had to change. While Rose’s administration saw moral and ethical policy changes, Mathews set the tone for practical implementation through his engaged ethos. The tone set was an ambitious one which met the university’s need for “a sound theoretical basis for dealing with pressing dilemmas” in the area of race relations.

Externally, Alabama newspapers compared George Wallace (who literally) and David Mathews who figuratively stood at the door of the university: “This year [1970] the man in the university door is different - he's not barring anybody he's waving them in… it has been a long way from 1963 to 1970. And it’s even longer from George Wallace to David Mathews. It is indeed a whole new ball game.” Unlike Wallace, Mathews “just didn’t get uptight about the race thing,” and he challenged regressive attitudes toward segregation in what the Saturday Review called a “sotto voce” style.

---

222 “David Mathews, interview with Richard Norton Smith, June 1, 2009.”
225 Tiede, “Quiet Young Man.” This story was picked up by the AP news and put in newspapers as far away as the Hazleton, Pennsylvania Standard-Speaker, a daily in the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton area - showing that this issue could possibly impact the University’s image beyond the borders of Alabama.
226 Tiede, “Quiet Young Man.”
Numerical studies are valuable tools for professionals to quantify the immediate effect of a policy, but they only offer a partial window into a policy’s true effectiveness. Quantifying the issue of integration—without understanding its underlying values, impact, and morality—could squelch the new kind of public involvement sought by university presidents like Mathews\textsuperscript{228} in the 1970s, by Kerr in 1998,\textsuperscript{229} and by Robert Behrdahl as late as 2004,\textsuperscript{230} if indeed education “mirrors society” as Mathews believed.\textsuperscript{231} The quality of relationships being built was just as important as the number of students entering the university.\textsuperscript{232} The numbers showed that Mathews initiated a period of successful integration. It must also be remembered that this period of integration began at a time when the State of Alabama still had over forty high schools designated for African-Americans, as late as 1970.\textsuperscript{233}

Mathews saw integration as an issue that went beyond his presidency. He believed that minority attendance and retention was not an issue to be relegated to the 1960s or 1970s,\textsuperscript{234} but one that must be addressed continually. Practical mechanisms included summer orientation

\textsuperscript{232} Memo to Blanche Gunter, Personal Files of F. David Mathews. Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{234} David Mathews, Speech to the National Minority Retention Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia, 1979.
program, fall meetings with students’ counselors, and the formation of the African-American Student Association. For Mathews, African-Americans, in order to become truly integrated, must be welcomed into the life of the university and have the same opportunities, standards, and achievements that white students held in the past. Despite the chaos that followed the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Bobby Kennedy, despite his youth as president (still dealing with lingering effects of campus protests), Mathews pushed a flagship, deep-south university forward with a goal to increase minority student recruitment and retention to 1,200 by 1975. Further, Mathews was not content to see these increases in undergraduate education alone; he also wanted similar increases to be reflected in graduate education and in broad disciplines. During Mathews’ time, greater numbers of students from Alabama saw the need for higher education as total enrollment increased by 34.1%, over a full one-third. In 1969, the University had 290 African-American students, 93 of whom were in graduate studies. By 1975, Mathews reached the goal of 1,200 students, and when Mathews left office in 1980, he could count 1,923 African-American students, with an equally impressive two-and-a-half fold growth in African-American graduate students by 1977. Said another way, within the 11 years of the Mathews Administration, African-American enrollment went from approximately 2 in 100, to 1 in 10. The 73% increase in students from 1974 to 1975 in the College of Engineering was partly

235 Mathews, Speech to the National Minority Retention Workshop.
236 Norman H. Bassett, “Ten Years of Trials and Triumphs,” The University of Alabama Alumni Bulletin 33, no. 1 (September 1979): 3; Joyce Stallworth, “An Interview with Dr. Archie Wade,” The Capstone Educator (Spring/Summer 2007): 10; David Mathews to Blanche Gunter, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. This was regarding the Race and Public Schooling project Dr. Mathews was working on in approximately 2007.
fueled by a greater “mix”\textsuperscript{238} of students, which included 56 African-Americans. The following year, the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges declared The University of Alabama among “the leading institutions of this kind providing higher education opportunities for this minority group.”\textsuperscript{239} By 1979, African-Americans’ attrition rate was no different than that of white students, three percent.\textsuperscript{240}

However, for Mathews, integration extended beyond race to gender. Though women were very much a part of the University community during the early years of his administration, they continued to take a back seat in many disciplines. Between 1973 and 1975, the College of Engineering saw a 300\% increase in the number of women attending. Further, women were not excluded from total enrollment growth, as total enrollment of women by percentage increased from 37.9\% in 1968 to 49.6\% when Mathews left office in 1980. Here we learn that progress, if not actively cultivated, can indeed regress. Sadly, in the years following Mathews’ presidency, this growth stopped, and the percentage of women actually saw contraction. This percentage would not gain the .4\% necessary to rise above 50\% until 1989, and it almost dipped back below 50\% in 1993.\textsuperscript{241}

The same ambitious presidential philosophy which allowed Mathews to surpass his goals for enrollment of women and African-American students undergirded his argument that the people of the university should be called “to mount a reconciliation campaign based on better

\textsuperscript{238} College of Engineering 1974-1975 notes, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{239} Minority Enrollment at State Universities and Land Grant Colleges: Fall 1976 (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, 1976); Personal Files of F. David Mathews. Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
\textsuperscript{240} David Mathews, Speech to the National Minority Retention Workshop.
understanding and managing civil rights grievances to try to reunite the impulse for community with the impulse for education and thereby get a better view to use in solving desegregation problems.242 Desegregation itself gives power to the university but integration demands full access to quality resources and opportunity, giving the power to the graduate themselves; only in this way could The University of Alabama matriculate the students needed to improve the state’s economic and cultural lot.

But what of opportunities missed? Presentism, as Hutcheson defines it, is the historical error of unknowingly or more disconcerting, unthinkingly, applying conditions of the present to the past, and thereby creating an interpretation that speaks little to the experiences, beliefs, and thoughts of those were the subject of the historical inquiry, but in fact offers a picture of what happened in the past as if it were the present.243

While the campus took desegregation head-on, the Greek system sidestepped the issue of integration in the 1970s, and Mathews did not push the point. Presentism would lambaste Mathews for such a move, but chastisement of the part would redact the truth of whole. In 1956, Mathews experienced the rumors and saw the mob surrounding Autherine Lucy. He saw the “Let George Handle It” bumper stickers in neighboring Marengo County, a reference to Wallace’s stance of supporting segregation at the University, even by violent means. This, combined with memories of Ole Miss and other violent reactions to integration around the nation, coupled with fresh memories of The University of Alabama’s own campus violence in the wake of the Vietnam War, lingered long in Alabama higher education’s collective consciousness.

Mathews said it best himself:

I think we would all give credit to Frank Rose and Jeff Bennett who had earlier guided the institution through the enrollment of Vivian Malone.

---

Jones and James Hood in 1963, despite the opposition from Gov. George Wallace. From today's perspective, that may be seen as a long delayed transition coming some seven years after the unsuccessful effort to enroll Autherine Lucy. But it wasn't; as the necessity to federalize the Alabama National Guard illustrates.\(^{244}\)

A fair question to ask would be: was this an attempt to integrate the university with a hedge against possible violence? Yes. Considering Mathews’ position on other issues and the methodical way in which each was tackled, care and concern for both the state’s image and the individual is a seam which runs throughout his policies. While today Mathews’ position may seem unthinkable, it becomes understandable if we consider the levels of violence and change that his administration was confronting at the time.

In essence, Mathews was redefining "public" for The University of Alabama. The nation has done well to achieve the aspirations of the founders, but our definition of "public" has nearly always excluded huge portions of the populace, and the public schools have nearly always had a narrow definition of those who deserve to be educated.\(^{245}\) Mathews began to correct that.

\(^{244}\) David Mathews. Reflections on the First African-American Students to have Scholarships in the University of Alabama Athletics Department. Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. November 21, 2000, 1.

The Institution as a Force… for Community

As federal government involvement with higher education ramped up in the 1970s, presidents wearily welcomed the new bureaucracy which loomed on the horizon.246 Like his predecessor Frank Anthony Rose, Mathews saw the emerging bureaucracy as useful, but only to a limited extent. This trepidation came not from the federal government’s ability to foster a more inclusive environment, but from the bureaucracy’s innate ability to hamstring university efforts toward serving Alabamians and the increasing “red tape” environment in which the university operated.247 For Mathews, bureaucracy was useful as an external mechanism which fostered accountability for the university’s efforts toward “debureaucratization” by ensuring that such efforts had the “moral integrity to discuss [its] proliferation” while adding “credibility to [the university’s] general stance when we ask the people at the state and other levels to do accordingly.”248 But why pursue debureaucratization in the first place?


248 Mathews, “Changing Issues.”
Americans in the 1970s were losing faith in superstructures of government, and this disillusionment ran parallel with the rise of a neo-conservatism.\textsuperscript{249}

For Mathews, allowing the university to be one of these “superstructures” would mean compromising its ability to relate to the needs of ordinary Alabamians and their leaders.\textsuperscript{250} Unlike some citizens and alumni, Mathews did not suffer from fear of local leadership (which sometimes was more political than capable in Alabama), but rather feared that these leaders would lose their sense of connection with the university. In a note to one alumnus who expressed dismay at the increasing red tape of higher education and “rednecks” in Alabama, Dr. Mathews made it clear what he feared most: “I am more afraid of the bureaucracy than the market. No redneck misperceives and harms education as much as any bureaucrat.”\textsuperscript{251} The kind of bureaucracy which was increasing, despite its usefulness as an external mechanism, forced The University of Alabama to pay a price too high in Mathews’ estimation. Mathews saw a direct correlation between the rise of bureaucracy and focus on government needs and the immediate drop of the University’s ability to focus on education and needs of Alabamians.\textsuperscript{252}

Mathews reasoned, rightly, that if the University could bring about massive change within itself through introspection and conversation as guided by the president, it could bring such change to Alabama in a conversational way. This introspection was no mere exercise of


\textsuperscript{250} F. David Mathews, Speech to the National Broadcast Editorial Association, Atlanta, Georgia, June 17, 1977.

\textsuperscript{251} F. David Mathews to Joan North, November 8, 1973.

\textsuperscript{252} “A New Federal Role in Education?” Speech to Legislative-Higher Education Conference Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 1977; Speech to faculty and Staff of Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri, July 15, 1980.
Kierkegaardian navel-gazing; rather, it was to have practical and dynamic conclusions. While Mathews does not seem to show fear in his administration of Alabama, one fear applies to his broad view of higher education: “an absence of a sense of purpose in what we do.” The university’s purpose was not radical transformation; Mathews argued for gradual change brought about through cooperation, suggesting that “change is probably reflected more in the subtle and the cumulative than it is in the sensational and the unique.” The cooperation Mathews envisioned was not a push toward a low utilitarianism for learning, which John Henry Cardinal Newman argued against. However, it did have some elements of arresting the possibility of The University of Alabama sliding toward the ivory tower which embalmed dead geniuses—a possible future that Pelikan had cautioned universities to avoid.

Mathews saw the purpose of the university as providing a location for the intellectual and catalyst for the practical. As he sought to move between these realms, he wanted to explore the proposition “that the greatest social healing social force is the human community as opposed to the ‘institution,’” but he also understood that the crux of university activity came from ideas, not intellectuals—that it was ideas fostered from a team environment which had the ability to advance and assuage problems, not individuals clamoring for credit. When practicality was

---

married to academic ability, education could open the eyes of people to the “creative adaptation to deprivation” which rural Alabama was experiencing. Education could ameliorate this deprivation, especially where “increased efforts in the area of education [were] largely negated by the out-migration of students.” This, in turn, quickened dynamics of community deterioration. The institution’s students and faculty were to “participate in the problem-solving process in all its stages: defining problems, planning remedial and preventative programs, and pursuing those programs to satisfactory conclusions.”

In some ways, this hard bent toward service closely mirrors Hesburgh’s ideas. As Hesburgh’s tenure as President of Notre Dame matured, he experienced a philosophical shift toward the “realities of life,” which emerged, over time, as a passion for aiding the poor. While Mathews was deeply exposed to the same message of Christ, Hesburgh at Notre Dame could utilize the message as the messenger. Mathews had to consider a rising secularization within academia. It is a mistake to believe that Mathews was searching to superimpose his own background upon the presidency, but it would be an equal mistake not to understand the same

---

background of the rural South as partly informing this notion, sans intellectual rigor.\textsuperscript{263} Though Mathews was equal to the intellectual rigor of an Alexander Heard of Vanderbilt, he diverged from Heard in one primary area: Mathews could reach people with a social warmth so desperately lacking in Heard. As previously mentioned, the \textit{Kingsport News} article,\textsuperscript{264} in addition to others from outside of Tennessee such as the \textit{Wisconsin State Journal} of Madison\textsuperscript{265} (which covers higher education extensively) and the \textit{Oakland Tribune}\textsuperscript{266} covered Heard’s visits in articles of extraordinary brevity and shocking coldness. This was in contrast to articles about T. Marshall Hahn in Virginia, Theodore Hesburgh, and David Mathews, which seem to at least inquire about speaking topics and other various thoughts.

Other institutions and traditions informed Abraham Kuyper of the Netherlands, the similarities surrounding Kuyper’s and Mathews’ desires for political institutions are striking. The institution was to involve not only those immediately connected with it, but those who were seen as “unenfranchised.”\textsuperscript{267} Kuyper argued that a redemptive cycle between the people and their politics could work for the benefit of the social whole; Mathews argued vigorously for a similar redemptive relationship between the University and the people of the State of Alabama through

\textsuperscript{263} David Mathews, notes for speech to the Selma Civic Club Luncheon, Selma, Alabama, Oct. 15, 1979, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio; David Mathews, “The Role of Colleges and Universities in the Redevelopment of the Rural South”; “Don’t Let History Play Tricks on You: Synopsis of an Address at the 1972 Commencement at the University of Tennessee in Martin.” In Toward a Better South: Major Speeches, 1969-1975 by David Mathews. F. David Mathews personal files, Kettering Foundation Archives, Dayton, Ohio. In the latter speech in Martin, Tennessee, Mathews warned of “abandoning the rural, small-town character of the region,” while in a later address noting that Camden (a small town in Wilcox County, Alabama) should not become New York – rather New York needed to take some cues from Camden.

\textsuperscript{264} “Vanderbilt Chancellor to Speak Here Twice,” \textit{Kingsport News}, April 5, 1972, 5.


\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Oakland Tribune}, May 8, 1970, 20.

\textsuperscript{267} Bratt, \textit{Abraham Kuyper}, 125.
community, not through the university alone. Though most university presidents were battening down the proverbial hatches against the coming onslaught of the 1980s institutional distrust, Mathews went in a polar opposite direction by embracing service as a method of giving the university significance to society. This direction would eventually be adopted widely in the 1990s.

To Mathews, American society as a whole was on an increasing trajectory toward lacking a theoretical basis for dealing with realities, and the University could engage this society. A narrow perceptionist would see Mathews’ ideas of society and institution as contradictory. The University of Alabama was not the institution Jaroslav Pelikan railed against regarding Cardinal Newman’s own perspectives. Rather, it was an institution capable of a conversation and relationship with the people of Alabama, which could speak to the theoretical basis of realities with a human touch. In a speech given in Selma, Mathews agreed that the University did not only exist to speak to the state or Selma, but that the university must also find “what Selma has to say to the University.” Hence, the university's purpose was inexorably not just tied to place, nor to an institutional self, but to a community.

The world out there is really the world in here. And…you need not worry when people say, “That's too parochial, we will never be distinguished if we do that. Nobody will ever hear of us.” It is just the opposite, just the

---


269 1975 Personal Notes, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. These particular notes were in regard to understanding the problems confronting the state and why such problems had not successfully been tackled.

270 David Mathews, notes for speech to the Selma Civic Club Luncheon, Selma, Alabama, Oct. 15, 1979, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
opposite. Everybody that is distinguished is distinguished because of something that is very close to them and that they care about very deeply.271

Thirty years later, academia is beginning to agree. Writing on higher education curriculum needs, Georg Pfleiderer of the University of Basel borrowed from Søren Kierkegaard when he warned of the perils which arise from a disconnect between universities and societies they serve. “Intellectual navel-gazing may not be the best way of demonstrating the academic potential and fruitfulness… for addressing and solving actual societal problems.”272 For Mathews, the institution’s propensity toward service guarded it from a Sartre-like existentialism, where the “oughts” or directions of the institution are entirely self-imposed.273 In some respects, his is an informed Lockean social contract, but with a bias toward community and service of the common good. In his 1997 Building Peace, John Lederbach of the University of Colorado argues that for conflicts and problems in society which confront "humans-in-relationship," building peace is rooted in being "responsive to the experiential and subjective realities shaping people's perspectives and needs.”274 But here again, balance must be weighed. In Mathews’ view, community engagement was not to the detriment of the University’s institutional autonomy, and yet Mathews held this view at a time when external mechanisms (such as a Board of Trustees) clearly sought greater influence. Broad factors such as geography, access, quality and equality, fiscal insufficiency, and necessity, informed—but did not dominate—Mathews’ perspective that

the university should be an active catalyst for societal improvement. In allowing for such a wide latitude to inform the University’s policy and use, Mathews spoke to leadership forty years ahead of his time by defining the university as an active catalyst, opposing notions of the university as
passive analyst or outright activist in its approach to the public it serves.\(^{275}\)

This philosophy, deeply entrenched in community and committed to the democratization of education, was part and parcel of Mathews’ style as the University’s chief executive.

**Style of Leadership: Encouragement**

Mathews’ leadership style was characterized by a three-pronged approach: personalized formality, encouragement, and continual questioning. With regard to formality, at a time when personalization of student interactions is gaining traction within education, the intensely personalized nature of Mathews' leadership was unusual at a time when higher education was seeing increased bureaucratization.\(^{276}\) Mathews was accessible to his staff. Former staff members, primarily composed of graduate students or students from the School of Law, recollect Mathews' desire for a free flow of information and ideas for the university during his time in office.\(^{277}\) Dialogue amongst staff, and between staff and others around the university, was encouraged. Often, Mathews answered personally in what seems to be an attempt to build community, openness, and transparency. In notes on return correspondence, he does write in strident philosophical terms. It is easy to see how this may have not been the best course of action, but here again my generation does not appreciate the degree to which radical


\(^{277}\) Dale Wallace and Thomas E. Walker, interview with the author, October 9, 2016.
transformation hampered American's view of institutional power in a post-Watergate 1970s, especially in higher education. By the mid-1960s and certainly by the late 1960s, there were signs across the country that all was not well—either within the universities or between the university community and the various public agencies, such as state legislators and federal bureaus, that had been supporters of higher education in the 1960s. The never-stated but assumed purposes of universities were questioned, and the loose, never-formalized, but effective alliance of faculty, students, alumni and general public became fragmented.278

Mathews' personal notes on decisions and actions of the university and Board of Trustees show his ability to think in terms of an action's possible result. This is especially true when it comes to decisions from the early days of a newly-minted Chancellor Volker with comparatively little understanding of Alabama politics,279 and the legislature. His preference for operating thematically typically addressed students and relationships with the state. However, as present-day higher education history bears out, the 1970s were not a decade of the engaged university; that accolade would belong to the 1990s and beyond.280 Given the complexity of issues confronting Alabama at this time, especially in health and economics, what was past was merely prologue.

279 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
280 Kezar, Chambers, and Burkhardt, Higher Education for the Public Good; Colby et al., Educating Citizens; Carole A. Beere, James C. Votruba, and Gail W. Wells, Becoming an Engaged Campus: A Practical Guide for Institutionalizing Public Engagement (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011). Each of these brings their own perspective on how engagement can benefit the university and the student, but Beere, Votruba and Wells have a holistically different approach in institutionalizing engagement, as opposed to making it part of the institution.
Mathews saw the University as an encouragement to the State of Alabama, and an organization of transformation in the lives of the people. It began by harnessing a new energy from young people as they could test and refine the answers needed to make the state a better place to live.

In Practice: New College - Personalized Formality in Collaboration

While it is easy to see Mathews’ ideas of New College as merely a vehicle of practical education, this view is both flawed and incomplete. New College, to Mathews, was to be a liberal arts college without elitism, “which would open the whole of the university to students and allow faculty who were in various divisions to experiment outside the college curriculum.” This openness, in turn, would enable students to bring themselves into the intersection of their studies and career. As research shows, his vision for New College could also be broadly applied to the entire university. For Mathews, a degree signified much more than pedagogic achievement; it was a means for personal transformation. Volumes of his notes are replete with ideas on the University’s ability to reach students and faculty who themselves were engaged with the community.

While master’s theses have been written on New College and other similar interdisciplinary programs, it is worth noting how New College projected Mathews’ distinctive philosophy. R. Albert Mohler, Jr., once noted that Saint Augustine defined the goal of teaching as “to see every student instructed, delighted, and moved… centuries before modern leadership had

---

281 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
283 LaToya Michelle Scott, “Perceptions of New College Students at the University of Alabama Regarding the Role and Value of Interdisciplinary Studies” (Master’s Thesis, University of Alabama, 2014); Steven Chase Palmer, “Strategies for Change and Innovation: New College” (Master’s Thesis, Southern Methodist University, 1975).
turned on concerns like motivation and the feedback loop, Augustine was telling leaders that our job is not done until [the previously mentioned] three things happen." 284 Eventually gaining national attention to the point where the University of Kansas 285 (among others) had an interest in the college’s development, The University of Alabama’s New College’s potential relationship to the student was probably best described by an academic who, as a United States Senator, “wrote more books than most senators have read.” 286 Although this may not have been the administration’s original intent, interdisciplinary works 287 and studies show that schools like New College gave students the opportunity to avoid what Daniel Patrick Moynihan termed the “distress with the idea of becoming a half-baked academic who’s growing more and more bitter at being deprived of the fruits of the great wide world beyond and being increasingly unsatisfied with the bitter fruit of the withered vines of the ivory tower.” 288 When Mathews called the New College initiative “A goad and catalyst for change,” he did not chose words politically adroit to

285 Clayton Koppes of the University of Kansas Extramural Independent Study Center to David Mathews, March 29, 1971.
287 Scott, “Perceptions of new college students.” Stuart Henry and Tanya Augsburg, *The Politics of Interdisciplinary Studies: Essays on Transformations in American Undergraduate Programs* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009); William H. Newell, "Academic Disciplines and Undergraduate Interdisciplinary Education: lessons from the School of Interdisciplinary Studies at Miami University, Ohio," *European Journal of Education* 27, no. 3 (1992): 211. Particular interest should be paid to page 219, when Newell notes a Miami University of Ohio study that retroactively considered the benefits of interdisciplinary study on their alumni. The effects were staggering in terms of critical thinking, higher scores, and significant increases in PhD pursuit among both men and women.
the task of explaining New College’s relationship to the University, but he certainly defined his spirit and desire to see transformational change within The University of Alabama’s approach to education.

The New College, for Mathews, had the potential to be the catalyst for wider change, despite the fact that a different choice of words would probably have been better. “In a broad sense,” he argued, “the challenge of the 70s is going to be to dream, not just greater dreams, but better ones. And the challenge is going to be to restate the purposes and goals of universities in ways that will draw together all of the various and varied constituencies of higher learning into a productive alliance for the seventies.” The job of the university president is, in part, interpreting his students to the general public; this is a corollary to what he does on the campus, namely interpreting the public to the students.

Mathews did not wish to squelch activism in an academic sense, calling it “involved idealism.” In his view, “the problem of the past few years was not too much activism but too little activism, too little of the searching, critical, constructive activism which seeks change, not merely for the sake of change, but for the sake of the better quality in the education we seek, in the society we build, and in the lives we live.” In Paper XII, which was aptly titled In Defense of the Younger Generation, Hesburgh agreed, though he sourced the questioning not so much from a place of service as from disillusionment, as well as setting the boundaries so that the student might not “disqualify himself” from the right to engage the boundaries. The New College

292 Hesburgh Papers, 130-133.
bridged new understandings of student involvement in the selection of their studies, “helping students achieve a high-quality education in an environment which places much of the responsibility for learning on the individual student. In other words, the College will assist the student in tailoring highly individualized program of study, work with him in integrating his course material into an understandable whole, and strive to develop in him the capacity and wisdom to relate this into great knowledge of the problems and opportunities facing modern man.”

Perhaps best delineated by its characteristics, The New College was to be “an individualized curricular experience” as a separate division, interdisciplinary in nature, yet small enough to make rapid change possible, with innovative teaching modes and educational programs. These new “innovative” teaching methods included “field studies, seminars, independent studies, and problem-oriented courses.” Though a large number of critics came from the faculty, Berte noted that “a benefit was also for faculty members who were able to bring new course ideas to New College and implement those ideas, even though the faculty member may be housed in another college on campus, where such experimental approaches were not supported.” While not expressly utilizing the term, most notes on the format are clearly in line with Problem-Based Learning. In this first decade of the 21st century, Problem-Based Learning,

is now a highly analyzed and regularly used method of course instruction across many
disciplines at varied colleges. Yet, these notes show that forms of PBL were used at The
University of Alabama’s New College in the 1970s when it was a burgeoning idea.297 In notes for
which is insightful and inventive and trains students to be independent and creative is an absolute
necessity for our future.”298 This was not unlike Anthony Kronman’s own characterization of the
Directed Studies program at Yale, where the student is actually pushed to see the connection
between the studies in four competing areas.299 Presently, a debate continues as to whether or not
conventional modes of instruction, especially listening to lectures and reading textbooks, are
especially likely to yield fragile and superficial understanding.300

Higher education mechanisms, departments, and structures like New College at Alabama
in the 1970s marked a permanent shift in focus from whether to how to make a difference. This
period also saw a concurrent shift for students, who were encouraged to move from the view that
they could be making a difference to the conviction that they should be making a difference
wherever there is a civic challenge.301 This spirit and philosophy was not unlike what Laney
implemented at Emory. When Laney became president in 1977, his vision for Emory called for
expanding the University’s prominence through increasing quality, recruitment, and retention in
graduate programs. Even a cursory glance can see Laney as correct that such growth in graduate

297 Notes on New College, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton,
Ohio.
298 F. David Mathews, notes for article “The New Decade,” Personal Files of F. David Mathews,
Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. Interestingly enough, this quote did not appear in the arti-
299 Kronman, Education’s End, 252.
300 Colby et al., Educating Citizens, 133.
301 Email from David Mathews, May 29, 2003, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering
Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
programs alone would have made Emory no better than Johns Hopkins, Harvard, or any other institution. But Laney’s fingerprint and stamp upon Emory’s rise was “the insistence that Emory would be defined as a moral community, where issues of the common good and service to society would be paramount.”

Where Laney took a common and traditional avenue and imprinted upon it, Mathews saw The University of Alabama as capable and ready to stretch in different ways—even if it meant challenging deeply held academic assumptions—to meet the demands of the state, the students, and the possibility of a better education. Alexander Heard, seeing the same issues of health and education in Tennessee, delivered multiple speeches about the subject, but saw it as confined as an issue of diversity sans practicality. In 1968, before Mathews became president, in a speech entitled “A New College for the University,” Mathews drew a direct and clear line to James Angell of Michigan, stating “In this day of unparalleled activity in college life, the institution which is not steadily advancing is falling behind. The University’s [Alabama’s] response to this challenge must be based on the insight that many old distinctions in higher education are now blurring.” For a conservative campus (the first chartered by the state legislature) in a smaller state in the Deep South, this might seem impossible, but Mathews made New College a reality.

In a sense, New College was establishing a type of new student identity on The University of Alabama campus. Traditional college structures were necessary, but for some students, these same structures hindered their full academic development. In his discussion on congruence and content, Chickering would resoundingly agree. Chickering identifies three types

302 Gulley, *The Academic President*, 120.
303 Heard, *Speaking of the University*, 269-274.
304 Personal Notes of F. David Mathews on New College. *A New College for the University*, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
of competence that college students develop, including intellectual abilities, manual skills, and interpersonal competences. While managing emotions was not a stated function of the college, it seeks to foster a sense of mature collaboration within the student. Through an interdisciplinary curriculum which sought to “develop in him the capacity and wisdom to relate this into great knowledge of the problems and opportunities facing modern man,” Mathews sought to understand students’ autonomy through the lens of interdependence and responsibility. By meeting a wider variety of people with varied interests, students would develop the interpersonal relationships necessary for the establishment of personal identity. This in turn, developed their sense of purpose and integrity.

The student of New College was not expected to sacrifice content at the expense of congruence, though Chickering did note that young people were beginning to ask, “What’s your position and what are you going to do about it?”, which in turn is an expression of the ultimate goal of the congruence within a student’s academic pursuits. Continuing, Chickering said, “content is secondary—for without congruence, content lacks force and meaning… perfection is not required, you can be a slightly cracked and dented old bell and still have an essential integrity.” Students agreed: “We were given important work to do and the freedom to do it. We were held responsible for choices we made and allowed to fail, and yet we were supported by an

---

array of mentors who took a personal interest in us.”³¹¹ The hope of New College was to produce the kind of student which was able to check what Amiati Etzioni lamented when he said that “there is no adequate attention to Civic Ethics.”³¹² In reflecting on the past alumni of New College, Mathews wrote that “the New College’s contribution to developing this sense of civic efficiency and responsibility may have been in allowing students with faculty guidance to be ‘the architects’ of their own education.”³¹³

Where Chickering differs from Mathews lies in their perceptions of the source of change. Mathews was correct to note that indeed it was the faculty who wanted change.³¹⁴ Even in the face of their disjointed efforts, faculty still like to see any change in curriculum as a groundswell from the bottom up.³¹⁵ In their 1970 report, they noted the obstacles in almost bullet point fashion:

First, the educational programs of existing academic divisions are not structured to permit more than a moderate amount of intradivisional course exchange. Second, even with in an academic division to strongly discipline oriented interests of faculty members make the implementation of the interdisciplinary programs difficult and often impossible. Third, the sheer size (usually large) and system of governance (usually consensus from faculty members of disparate viewpoints) Controlling curricular and other academic issues makes rapid and significant change in academic programs difficult and often impossible. Fourth, the strong professional

³¹¹ Email from David Mathews, May 29, 2003, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
³¹² “Roots of the Future,” Speech to Southeastern Regional Consortium, January 29, 1979. It is interesting that in this speech, Mathews sections off certain questions and puts the issue of Etzioni’s civic ethics within Questions of Imagination. Whether this was a forerunning to Etzioni’s communitarianism is up for debate as seen in Aneta Gawkowska, “Neutrality, Autonomy and Order: Amitai Etzioni’s Communitarian Critique of Liberalism Under Scrutiny,” in A Decade of Transformation, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 8 (Vienna, 1999).
³¹⁵ Chickering, Education and Identity, 241.
interests (manifested as an intense desire to carry on research) a faculty coupled with the diverse demands of teaching, research and service placed on them tend to hinder faculty experimentation with new and different educational programs and modes of teaching.316

Despite the objections, the committee warmed to the idea of New College as it was being established. While it was a faculty-led committee which ultimately came around to the idea of New College, the idea was first proposed in 1966-67 by Frank Rose317 (though this history remains unclear, as some say that it was more Mathews’ idea).318 The New College Advisory Board was comprised of a wide variety of students and professors. This, coupled with constant discussion with and among faculty, students, Deans, and other university personnel,319 mitigated, in large part, some of the concerns that New College was a way to funnel money and students away from other, traditional and established programs. However, points of contention still continued. As if it could not be said any more, the administration constantly confronted (and was even bombarded with) the idea that New College was merely a new Honors college, despite the fact that it was open to all with a minimal GPA entry requirement. As stated under Section 6 on page 15, “the University College [an early name for New College] will not be an honors college.”320 To bolster this point, as some faculty began to fear the New College’s ability to take students away from traditional Honors and college programs, Neal Berte, prior to becoming the first Dean of New College, wanted “some kind of clarification regarding the relationship” of new

college to Arts and Sciences, American Studies, and the New College experience. He took care to note that the admissions criteria in the Honors program “may” make enough of a difference in itself to set that particular option aside as a separate entity, but he continued to assert that it was important to coordinate efforts in those areas quickly so that a duplication of approach and resources would be less likely to occur.321 Vice President for Academic Affairs McClain took the reins of defending the new program, noting that “enrollment in the College of Arts and Sciences is around 4,000…[the New College] if it succeeds in its efforts would be having no more than 100 to 200 students form Arts and Sciences… hardly a threat academically.”322 While true, this response still did not allay trepidations about academic quality. Berte and Mathews worked together to ensure that “the assessment of nontraditional learning experiences was ‘built in’ before approval was received to register for those experiences.”323

Gregory Jones of Duke University said, “Vibrant institutions are characterized by traditioned innovation. They continually engage their traditions in ways that create space for innovative engagement in the future…and innovative leaders do not merely rely on their intelligence, nor do they merely engage their traditions in creative ways.”324 Interdisciplinary studies have gained traction at institutions well-known for their public sense-making325—including Emory, Duke, and Stanford to name a few—thereby enabling students to bring themselves into the intersection of their studies and career. As research shows, his vision for New

322 McClain to President Mathews, May 6, 1970.
323 Neal Berte interview, David Mathews papers, New College, University of Alabama. F. David Mathews Papers, Kettering Foundation Archives, Dayton, Ohio.
325 Colby et al., Educating Citizens, p. 194.
College could also be broadly applied to the entire university. The degree, for Mathews, signified much more than pedagogic achievement; it was a means of personal transformation.326

Was New College a success? While the number of New College attendees rose from 20 to 200 within the Mathews administration, the program’s true success might best be measured by the varieties of interdisciplinary education it provided for students: the obstetrician in Birmingham who needed Business, Arts, and Biology courses, or in the Birmingham attorney who can better serve his clients because they took courses across a wider range of subjects.327 Neal Berte, President of Birmingham-Southern, argues that it is in the alumni that New College should rise or fall.328 Perhaps the most significant impact of New College impact upon the university was its philosophy of student identity as tied to “‘making a difference,’ meaning collective actions more than individual actions of benevolence.”329 Though the idea never shows up in any of his personal notes, and while different in implementation, Mathews’ approach has the philosophical underpinnings of the Wisconsin Ideal.

While David Mathews was too regionally grounded to reflect a purely ideological Wisconsin Ideal, the New College, College of Community Health Sciences, and other programs at the University resembled Wisconsin’s approach of sifting through those ideas which could

327 Both of these examples came as a result of conversations with multiple alumni, who, while not formally interviewed, were perhaps more open and honest because of that fact. These alumni stated that New College opened doors for their personal development which makes them more successful in their fields today.
reach the people and winnowing them down to those which would best help students while also speaking to the university.

Continual Questioning

Another hallmark of the Mathews’ approach to leadership is the continual questioning of ideas. Unafraid to continually question the effects of his philosophy, Mathews sought to define and refine his concept of the University. On one hand, this could bring about the inability of others within the university to see his vision and leave them feeling in a state of flux. On the other, those in higher education administration should appreciate the full impact that continually questioning and refining has upon the organization. Mathews was unafraid to communicate, consider, and refine the idea that the University indeed had a mandate.331 While it is tempting to see Mathews as unwilling to consider benchmarks, he did in fact believe that the engagement of a university could be measured. In a 1975 collection of policy statements, Mathews wrote regarding purposes of academics at the University, “As citizens we have an obligation to examine the question more fundamentally and to ask whether society itself stands to gain or lose.”332 Expounding on the notions of gain or loss, Mathews laid out six which make an excellent university, but with a bent toward the South:

1.) One in which there is a continuous debate about purposes, both within the institution and the various constituents of the institution.
2.) One that gives constant attention to its curriculum.333

333 His exposition of what constitutes the attention paid to the curriculum is as true in 2018, as he proposed in 1978 – that the temptation to narrow the curriculum, to eliminate options, to say that all educated persona should share a common intellectual base” will in effect do much to regress.
3.) One that needs to be more intellectual than academic
4.) One that is aware of their obligations to all the agencies in our society that educate, whether they are labeled “educational” or not.
5.) One that is relatively successful in combating bureaucratic processes.
6.) One that knows where it is – we should have little patience with Southern institutions that want to be Harvards of the South. And that is no reflection on Harvard. Excellent universities must know where they are, whom they serve, and the pressing public issues.334

With this idea, there could not be a one-sided conversation, or a “sideline” university. For Mathews, the institution, if it failed to participate in the conversation, would lose the moral authority to lead. The time for the conversation to be had with the State of Alabama was now. Citing Clark Kerr’s report from the Carnegie Commission and Frank Newman of Stanford’s 1971 report from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Mathews commented:

Different as they [Kerr’s and Newman’s reports] are, there is a common strong suggestion that [higher education is] drifting in a direction that will not serve other educational or public interests well. To read the fine print is to sense that the whole educational enterprise is in serious peril of losing its ability to respond creatively to new problems and opportunities that are already on the horizon.335

In a speech to high school students, Mathews said, “the question for you is not how your contemporaries want to see you. The question for you is whether or not you are going to make the kind of difference that counts overall on the substantive issues that face this school.”336 Like Dewey,337 Mathews questioned prevailing views about professionalization. Professionalism, for

the student at a time when expansion to liberal arts among other disciplines will produce the students with an improved mind, but in ways that “do not always impress job interviewers.”

Mathews, was conduct—but what truly marked and defined professionalization for Mathews was an overbearing emphasis on expert opinion for the purpose of decision-making. In widening his scope of information, Mathews resisted the widespread bureaucratic controls which had so plagued Frank Rose, but these would continue to encroach on the presidency as his time in office continued. In turn, this challenge allowed very little room for course correction, thereby opening him up to failure on wider issues within the university community. However, in Mathews’ estimation, the connection of community to university was worth the risk. This view necessarily rejected the movement toward quantitative nature demanded by many university administrators, as well as TQM/CQI as Birnbaum called it. This did not mean that Mathews jettisoned quantitative understanding; rather, he embraced this form of understanding so long as it did not intensify “professionalization” to the point of bureaucratic stagnation, which would not be relatable to people external to the institution. This was one of Mathews’ critical miscalculations in this time, as arguments of legislative accountability, based on the rise and fall of numerical values, pressed themselves on to universities nation-wide. Interestingly, however, time is now beginning to bear Mathews out—especially within graduate studies, as multiple institutions such as Georgetown, Northwestern, & University of California Los Angeles have begun to raise serious questions about their quantitative-heavy admissions standards. Mathews was not rejecting the need to measure a program for the purposes of TQM/CQI or questioning an institution’s ability to do so; rather, he rejected the hard spirit that this form of measurement brought. In separating the spirit from the letter of the measurement, he was seen as, in effect, rejecting the whole idea outright. This was a misperception that Mathews does not seem to have ever corrected.

The 1970s were marked by turbulence, and Alabama’s past was already anything but quiet. We learn through constant refinement of ideas, that the State also needed leaders who were unafraid to try new ideas, while continually questioning old assumptions about education’s purposes. This spirit was quiet in the early years of the Mathews’ presidency but gained greater voice during his later years in office, almost as if he operated beyond the fear of failure. Given his desire to push the university toward more practical service for the people of Alabama, his 1977 remarks to a group of young people clearly displays that this lack of fear was part of his commitment to service:

The race is to those who will lead, persistent, determined, in what is right, and who stay with it after reversal, after reversal, after reversal. This state needs many things, the most important of which are people who invest in Alabama over the long haul with the kind of hard, tough decisions that aren’t always popular.339

With the storm clouds on the horizon, the words spoken to young people in 1977 were about to be tested. While the alumni would respond, would the Board of Trustees, the Faculty, and Montgomery political figures fully appreciate and comprehend their actions upon the University?

CHAPTER 4: WISE MEN NE’ER SIT AND WAIL THEIR LOSS

As progress occurred on the University campus, the storm clouds were beginning to brew, almost as quickly as Mathews came into office. This chapter defines the issues which would cause Mathews the greatest consternation. As bureaucratization unfolded on a state level, the Board of Trustees augmented this with their own desire for systemization. Mathews now had to contend with decision making under the lens of a Board of Trustees which did not fully comprehend their actions until it was too late to reverse systemization, and officials in a state capital attempting to define their own newly minted roles from the state government. As economic difficulties ensued nationally, The University of Alabama began to feel significant pressures, and especially on faculty salaries. Mathews would end up with the blame, despite earlier attempts by factions on campus to blame the Chancellor of The University of Alabama System, which in and of itself would constitute only a partial assessment.

When Queen Margaret in Shakespeare’s 3 Henry VI voices significant recriminations about her husband’s leadership, her own philosophy reflects a line of demarcation on adjudicating leadership actions: “wise men ne'er sit and wail their loss, but cheerily seek how to redress their harms” (5.4). It does not say that wise men do not consider their loss in seeking to redress harms, only that their stance should be one of continual forward movement. It is the better part of wisdom to understand the environment and context in which harms occur in order

to accurately portray historical understandings of F. David Mathews’ decisions. If any single phrase defines the Mathews administration of The University of Alabama, it is this: the University was seeking ways to redress past harms for a better south and a better Alabama, not merely a new one.

The relationship between Alabama’s economy and social capital development in the 1970s could rightly be called an enigma. Mathews entered office in 1969, with an Alabama poised to take advantage (albeit not a full advantage) of the preceding years of economic growth between 1961 and 1969 in the United States. Alabama was not immune from this growth. However, recessions (one in 1969-1970, and then the more severe commodity-fueled recession in 1973-1975 which hastened the President Ford’s Whip Inflation Now economic policy) pulled the markets back into an aggregate “bear” territory. The overall effect of inflation began to cycle through the economy broadly as an economic triumvirate of stubbornly high unemployment, stagnant wages, and interest rates contributed to an overall climate of “stagflation” nationally. Nationally, fluctuation and Keynesian stimulus guided the late 1970s federal budgets, causing consternation among those aligned with President Jimmy Carter who defined his own projections

of budgetary austerity.\textsuperscript{344} While national budgets seemed insulated from broader problems, state budgets and personal finances were not. Individuals were beginning to bear the brunt of unemployment and inflationary pressures. Unemployment in Alabama remained stubbornly high, fluctuating between 6.0 and 9.7\% between 1969 and 1980.\textsuperscript{345} The CPI (or Consumer Price Index), a harbinger on the personal effects of inflation, better reflects the insidious nature of economic conditions at this time. From 1969-1980, the CPI rose fifty points. To obtain the same fifty-point rise on prices of personal goods, one would have to calculate the CPI over 64 years—from 1913 to 1977.\textsuperscript{346} As inflation rose 10\% in 1978 and was set to climb even higher in 1979, "workers' purchasing power" continued to decline in the face of a "decrease in working hours combined with a sharp rise in consumer prices."\textsuperscript{347}

Much, though not all, of Alabama’s growth during the 1970s resulted from an influx of federal dollars. Wayne Flynt, Professor Emeritus of Alabama History at Auburn University, while noting the growth of Birmingham\textsuperscript{348} as a “mini-miracle,” also made it quite clear in his history on Alabama in the twentieth century that Huntsville and Mobile took the lead on growth in population and infrastructure. This was primarily due to the US Army’s Redstone Arsenal and National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s George C. Marshall Space Flight Center for

\textsuperscript{347} “Inflation Inches Upward,” Tuscaloosa News, July 1, 1978, 1, 3.
\textsuperscript{348} Flynt, Alabama in the 20th Century, 159. Flynt calls the growth initiated by the 1979 election of Richard Arrington a “minimiracle” given the growth and influx of federal dollars into Huntsville and toward other projects in the state.
Huntsville, along with heavier investment into ports, docks, and other infrastructure in Mobile. During the 1970s, the local government in Alabama ranked 19th out of 50 states in the reception of federal dollars: nearly $3,500 for each Alabamian, quite a sum at the time. For the first time in state history, revenue-sharing funds to the state topped one billion dollars, and three billion in direct and matching grants. As in other historic events in Alabama, however, the numbers do not always tell the whole story.

As Alabama’s economy shifted from an economy that had depended on agriculture for over 150 years toward a manufacturing and service-oriented economy, the state’s growth rate did not equal those of other states. Further, this shift was occurring at a time when the state was not immune to the effects of stagflation, and in fact had greater exposure to negative pressures in comparison to other similar states like Indiana. The most consequential effect was the lack of strategic investment into social capital. We learn from the Mathews administration that it is not policy, either from government or institutions, which changes things; it is the well-developed action which springs from an informed public seeking greater deliberation. This takes into account both the importance of policy and the centrality of action born of personal responsibility. However, this leads the higher education administrator to the question of strategy in policy.

Politically, the landscape of the South was undergoing tectonic shifts. Elections of progressive "New South" governors, such as William Lowe Waller and William Forrest Winter in Mississippi, Jimmy Carter in Georgia, Rueben O'Donovan Askew in Florida, and Richard

---

350 Flynt, Alabama in the 20th Century, 114-133.
Riley in South Carolina, provided new impetus for connecting higher education to economic
development and the development of social capital. This was especially true in the case of
William Winter of Mississippi and Richard Riley of South Carolina. Politically, Alabama found
itself in another enigma. After Lurleen Wallace's death in 1968, the state turned to Albert
Brewer, if only for a short time. In the election of 1970, Alabama turned back to George
Wallace, who would remain governor for the better part of Mathews' presidency at The
University of Alabama (until 1979). While Wallace was certainly not progressive as a governor,
in any sense of the word, to lambaste Wallace of the 1970s as an educational ogre is to deny and
even ignore the facts for the sole purpose of furthering an already established image. While it is
unfair to degrade Wallace's attempts as failing while he passed the first billion-dollar education
budget in the state's history, it is equally unfair to historical accuracy not to mention that Wallace
failed to connect intellectual capital and economic development.  

To couch Wallace's strategy as political, as opposed to educational, is accurate. While he
was indeed passing significant budgets, in higher education these increases were met with
additional pressures created by the rise of localization and regional universities. While some of
the universities (namely UAB, and Troy) had wider impacts beyond Alabama, the bulk of the
students at their main campuses hailed from towns and cities within the state.

Brewer, Reubin Askew, and John West” (PhD diss., Auburn University, 1998); William Winter,
The Measure of our Days; Writings of William F. Winter, ed. Andrew P. Mullins, Jr. (Oxford,
MI: University of Mississippi Press, 2006).
354 Wallace shrewdly used The Higher Education Facilities Act and the Appalachian Regional
Education Commission. Lane, Frederick S. "Government in Higher Education." Proceedings of
the Academy of Political Science 33, no. 2 (1978) p. 137, 141, 144-145; Michael Bradshaw, The
Appalachian Regional Commission: Twenty-Five Years of Government Policy (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 1992), ix-x.
While the state's higher education institutions suffered from a lack of direction from the State of Alabama, the Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama was undergoing significant shifts in thinking and membership. June 5, 1969 was a day of significant shifts for The University of Alabama. Trustee Lawson called the Board of Trustees to meet, as he had received word that Mathews was entertaining the presidency at another university. While not all trustees were present, all had communicated their full support for Mathews. Correctly, historians note that Mathews was the youngest president in the 138-year history of the University. But what University of Alabama did he become president of?

**Background**

The Board desired to adopt what they called the “Arizona Model” of higher education. While this intention was laudable, it appears that their desires would best be represented not by an Arizona-style Board of Regents but by today’s University of Illinois system. When then-Arizona Governor Sidney Preston Osborn signed House Bill 136 into law in March 1945, the Legislature of the State of Arizona called for the Governor, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as ex-officio members, and eight others to comprise the Board of Regents. But this call was placed on a group of Arizona universities that were well-established in their duties. The University of Arizona was both the traditional university of the State of Arizona and the state’s land-grant institution—much in the vein of Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University,

---

356 “Minutes of the Recessed Meeting of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama,” June 5, 1969.
357 Acts, Memorials and Resolutions of the Regular Session of the Seventeenth Legislature of the State of Arizona, 1945, 194-198. It is interesting to note not just what is present in this law, but what is also not present. The people and their offices are defined, but little else is. No other direction is given as to structure, seats, equity among colleges, or the designation of the University of Arizona as the flagship institution of the state, despite it being the only one with Colleges of Medicine, Law, and with plans to create the College of Veterinary Medicine—all on one campus.
University of Georgia, and the University of Florida. By the 1970s, the University of Arizona was well on its way to joining the American Association of Universities by 1985 (who coincidentally calls the University of Arizona a “super land-grant” by virtue of its two medical schools\textsuperscript{358}), while Arizona State University was doubling its enrollment and improving its academic reputation.\textsuperscript{359}

Alabama’s attempt at university systemization was different. In Arizona, the legislature took the impetus; in Alabama, the impetus was fashioned in a quasi-informational exchange between Governor Albert Brewer and the Board of Trustees. When considering this decision against Birnbaum’s \textit{Life Cycle of Academic Management Fads}, the reader is perplexed. One the one hand, the trustees did sense “a new era of massive and widespread social, economic, demographic, and technical change” in which, it was argued, past operating assumptions would no longer apply.\textsuperscript{360} But on the other hand, no crisis was on hand to bring this transformation about, nor was there a major change to any organizational subsystem. Mistrust of institutions alone does not justify this, as other institutions went through the same processes. Further, the University was still paying for decisions which had been reached in the 1800s; in other words, it was still dealing with being hamstrung by the legislature.

Colleges in Alabama were enjoined to their respective duties, and any attempt at branching out would have spelled political disaster with the legislature. The Schools of Medicine and Nursing were moved from the Tuscaloosa campus. While this was an understandable idea, since it enabled graduates to gain greater exposure to medical cases in a larger population center,

\textsuperscript{360} Birnbaum, \textit{Management Fads}, 126.
it denied the people of Alabama access to a comprehensive university. UAB, while medically inclined due to the decisions of Frank Rose, was not a land-grant institution in the traditional sense of Auburn University or Mississippi State University. Furthermore, prior to 1969, The University of Alabama Board had enjoyed a certain degree of freedom in electing their members. From 1821 to 1868, members of the Board were chosen by the legislature, from 1868 to 1874 by general election, and from 1875-1901 by the Governor. In all cases, these men were well-known in their respective districts, and political leverage was part and parcel of the process of becoming a Board member. The 1901 Constitution changed this to a self-perpetuating Board, a change that began to remove some political pressures from the Board of Trustees’ selection while also delegating increased powers to the President in management of the University’s functions.361

On March 20, 1969, the Board of Trustees established a “system of organizational structure for the university in which a chancellor would be selected as chief executive officer with presidents on three campuses.” This system lasted for only two months; then, on the same day Mathews was elected, the Board “rescinded” its action only to adopt a new, more direct organizational structure for the University. The new structure proposed by Trustee Williams stated that a “separate president will be elected for each of the three campuses of the University with each present reporting to the Board of Trustees.” Further, in the same resolution, the Board decided to adopt a Council of Presidents for the purpose of administrative coordination. Historically, this seems to be an attempt to retain the independence of The University of Alabama while simultaneously placating the aspirations of UAB and UAH to become independent institutions of equal power and stature—all while possibly retarding the effects or possibilities of institutional program duplication and budgetary overlap. Said another way, when

361 Robert McKenzie, “Historical development of the management systems at the University of Alabama,” Background Study for the Summer Workshop, University of Alabama, 1972, 2-10.
Mathews entered office, the Board of Trustees was in the midst of changing The University of Alabama. What was once a single University with two centers—one of those being the flagship with a mandate from the legislature as old as the state of Alabama itself—was now well on its way to becoming three distinct universities. While the Board took correct steps to unify the system, there exists room for debate as to whether or not the Arizona model ran ahead and even counter to the understanding of the original charter, purposes, and even potential for The University of Alabama. Prior to this decision, the University enjoyed a certain independence and flexibility in their relationship to the state. The University could respond, unfettered, in programs such as law and medicine. As Mathews wrote in his personal notes, “the University which since 1901 had been freer than most institutions by virtue of its Board, would ironically find itself in just the opposite position.” With the decision in favor of a larger Board, this independence was significantly affected. Mathews was navigating a completely new University of Alabama, different from the one he had attended only ten short years prior, and the influential dailies in Alabama echoed this sentiment.

In 1969, when the idea of a University System was formally laid before the Board, growing pains should have been expected. Mathews, according to Board minutes, was directly asked about ascending to the presidency in this different environment. The same was asked of the new UAB president, Joseph Volker. Both agreed to their respective positions of leadership within the context of a new Board environment. But even a cursory survey of Board minutes seems to suggest that neither Mathews nor the Board themselves could anticipate the growing pains which would ensue. Mathews moved quickly but with purpose in an effort to understand

---

362 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
the Board’s direction by proposing that faculty from the University in Tuscaloosa be asked to consult with the Board, especially Dr. Thomas Diener, the Director of the Institute of Higher Education Research and Services, who had a keen interest in the development of educational research at Alabama among minorities and women.\textsuperscript{364} In borrowing from Clark Kerr’s speech, “Destiny—Not so Manifest,” Diener echoed the call for vigorous presidential leadership even with the Boards.\textsuperscript{365} Mathews, already admiring Kerr’s Stanford University report on the state of higher education, agreed.

Environment and Decisions

The Board of Trustees of a University should focus their energies on policy and long-range planning, with a keen eye toward the consequences of institutional success or failure in hiring to make Board objectives a reality.\textsuperscript{366} Whereas the University of North Carolina’s shift to a 16-member Board affected most institutions of public higher education in the state, the Board of Trustees of the new University of Alabama System began by soliciting suggestions, listening to leaders, and making decisions as necessary. Perhaps the most striking decision concerned the leadership of this new system.

In 1969, when Frank Rose resigned as President of The University of Alabama, trustees began the conversation with the Board about moving toward a university system. In the March

\textsuperscript{364} Thomas Diener, “Project Growth: A Program at the University of Alabama for the Identification and Support of Women and Minorities in Educational Research and Leadership,” Institute of Higher Education Research and Services, University of Alabama, 1982.

\textsuperscript{365} Thomas Diener, memorandum to Executive Vice President Larry T. McGehee, April 1, 1971 from Diener thought out his points with reference to excellent, timely (and for the purposes of this dissertation, timeless) writing by leaders in higher education, including Frank Newman. Clark Kerr. “Destiny – Not so Manifest.” Address Presented at the 26\textsuperscript{th} National Conference on Higher Education, Chicago, Illinois, March 14, 1971. Accessed from: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED050670.pdf

20 meeting, the Board adopted the idea of a Chancellor, with the three presidents (UA, UAB, and UAH) as Chief Executive Officers of each campus respectively, and with coordination through a Council of Presidents. However, the June 5, 1969 meeting saw the March 20th resolution repealed before either Mathews or Volker took the reins of their respective institutions. The trustees had unanimously approved what was the closest attempt to the Arizona system, the one they chose to emulate. The Board of Trustees was the ultimate final authority, with three presidents (those of The University of Alabama, UAB, and UAH) reporting directly to the Board. Both Mathews and Volker were directly asked about their opinions regarding this new arrangement in structure, and both responded positively.

Across the United States, institutional boards were facing an increasing sense of frustration and distrust from the public at large. In one memo to the Board on the matter, Mathews used South Carolina as an example of this. Among the trustees, examples of the Illinois State University system were presented, in addition to their original plan of modeling the system after Arizona. The UAB Institutional Planning Committee diagnosed the results of this involvement as a positive move, but only if the necessary growing pains could be kept in check. Mathew’s personal notes show that not only did the Board desire more information; the staff of The University of Alabama responded with more publications, more reports, and a conscious effort to place more material on the Board agenda. Initial analysis might conclude this to be an overzealous representation of UA’s interests. However, the Board had also decided to increase their meetings from two to twelve. In 1972, ten meetings were planned for the first seven months alone. With only two of these meetings in Tuscaloosa and the others in Birmingham and

367 “Early Analysis of a Board Problem,” Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. The South Carolina Exposition and Protest notes are of particular importance.
Huntsville, coupled with a new Statement of Purpose for UAB (which, on March 4, 1970, included state-wide and academic department language beyond initial respective purposes for health),

it was not far-fetched for the University in Tuscaloosa to sense increasing focus on other necessities. This was in contrast to the flagship status it has enjoyed - the centerpiece of higher education in the state for the previous 138 years. While UAB was aggressively seeking statewide authority in academics, the new President of UAH, Benjamin Graves, saw UAH as a regional university. In 1971, the legislature began their own involvement in the functioning of the Board by introducing a bill requiring a chancellor for The University of Alabama System, which died in committee.

Mathews was directly asked (though Board Minutes do not mention by whom) whether UAB’s College of General Studies was having an adverse effect on the UA campus. In an effort at diplomacy, his answer split the difference between possible competition and supporting the University in Tuscaloosa. He noted that 2,500 out of 13,000 students come from Jefferson County. However, he also noted, specifically, that a residential institution with dormitory facilities for the College of General Studies students at UAB would adversely affect the Tuscaloosa campus, but a commuter program would not. Volker then stated that there were no plans for dormitories save those for “technical institute and nursing students.” While capital outlay requests are so generalized as not to show this, as early as 1975, funds were appropriated by the Legislature for the purchase of approximately 30 blocks (140 acres) of Urban Renewal lands for UAB expansion. It is also interesting to note that in 1973, appropriations to

---


UAB began to meet over 80% of appropriation requests, and in 1975, they actually exceeded appropriation requests by two million dollars. However, as with all Alabama universities in the late 1970s, proration at rates of 2.9811%, 6.1406%, and 3.568% deeply affected universities across the state.

For all the diplomacy Mathews showed, he vigorously argued to the Board that graduate program protection at UA must be addressed first and foremost. Personal notes pay special attention to the graduate departments and schools of Social Work, Journalism, and Law, coupled with a concern that PhD Level programs outside of the health field could pose a problem for the University in Tuscaloosa. Trustees did not pass a measure on this, saying only that new programs must be approved by the Council of Presidents and the Board. Trustee Eheny Camp did advance a resolution, stating that, “the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa be recognized as the capstone of the educational system in the State of Alabama and as its senior university and that every effort be made for this position be maintained and supported in the state.”

Historians define the United States between 1817 and 1825 as an Era of Good Feeling. This is perhaps the best way to define Mathews’ perceptions of 1972-1973 with the Board and other institutions. The Trustees found themselves trying to navigate this new environment of leadership, even going so far as to propose the “employment of a consultant organization” to “study the proper role of the Board in meeting its responsibilities as trustees of the UA System. One even suggested that “individual interviews” with the consultant organization would be helpful. In a May 31, 1972 Memorandum to Mathews, Joan North and Thomas Diener noted in almost case-study fashion that the employment of external consulting firms was the “least

---

370 Personal Notes from 1971, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
371 Minutes of the Workshop Meeting of the Elected Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, July 24, 1971.
effective” arrangement and was “generally too expensive to justify the results.” Robert Berdahl, then of the State University of New York, echoed this sentiment in a letter to Diener, noting that in a post-consultant review of results, many institutions were left wanting; the consultants were often regarded as “slick eastern planners.” The idea of employing consultants has not gone away quietly, even in this new millennium—despite the potential increases in distance between the Board and the President, and the stakeholders each are charged to serve. Yet, as early as 1973, the system was beginning to take form with the addition of new staff and a new Vice-Presidential structure. With staff persons added to assist in the operations of the Council of Presidents, uniformity in policy was beginning by the end of January, and cooperative approaches were developing.

As the Council of Presidents began to strengthen itself, it began to find its voice. Mathews spent much time “trying to understand trustee feelings,” but he also began to sense the establishment of good feelings between the Council of Presidents, and with good reason. Volker and Mathews worked together to submit a recommendation as to the nature of a study of the UA board, and both UAB and UA noted the better avenue of utilizing “educational statesmen” as the best avenue to understand and critically analyze the best decisions going forward. While not adopted, this idea did begin to consolidate the potential leadership of this Council of Presidents.

373 Susan Resnick Pierce, On Being Presidential: A Guide for College and University Leaders. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012), 46-48; Bryan J. Cook, “The American College President Study: Key Findings and Takeaways,” Presidency (May 2, 2012): 2-5. Cook’s one-page analysis of consultant retention, especially in the search for presidents, has touched nearly 80% of all colleges and universities in America. But at the same time, Novak and Johnston correctly show that without “some effort from within higher education to put its civic role into the accountability agenda, publicans’ political measurement of higher education’s results will continue to focus on performance measures that are much more utilitarian.”
374 Board Minutes, January 22, 1972.
375 Board Notes/Minutes, November 18, 1972.
However, growing pains were becoming more evident. At the outset, Presidents directly reported to the Board. But even with the move away from directly reporting to the Board and toward a Council of Presidents, the changes at universities “were characterized by tremendous growth; increasing complexity in organization, programs and functions; and more visible diversity in campus objectives. The board has found it particularly frustrating in trying to keep itself appropriately informed in order to meet its responsibility a public accountability.”376 Another letter described Board members’ frustration at their “the inability to remain aware of important events and decisions on all three of the campuses.”377 The same person went on to say, “We receive so much material that it is difficult to keep up with what is going on.”378 Even though good feelings were present, this frustration persisted.

Mathews’ notes from 1974 show a weakening of the Council of Presidents379 just as rumors of a University Chancellor began to circulate. As the system’s structure began to evolve rapidly in 1973, the Trustees began looking for a headquarters, but the Era of Good Feelings was over. UAB attempted to bring sections of The University of Alabama under its purview, even going so far as opposing a nursing school at UA, but this attempt did not succeed, as the University was allowed to structure the Capstone College of Nursing as early as 1975 and began holding classes as early as 1978. Mathews was beginning to have serious questions, and he began his own introspection as to what the University would need at this time. His personal notes on the board show a high degree of measured reflection. Further, his notes comprise many

376 UAB Institutional Planning Committee to Joseph F. Volker, June 30, 1972.
378 Caddell to David Mathews, May 16, 1972.
379 “Implementation: Recommendation vs. Results,” Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. These notes show that on January 26, 1974, the Board was moving into the executive committee for meetings; at the time the Council of Presidents was abolished.
questions and few statements. In trying to ascertain the functions which the Board would execute, Mathews saw eight distinct areas in which the Board should have clear oversight. These included Budget Review and approval, Land management, Endowment Management, Politics, and Program Review. Mathews raised questions as to whether this oversight would extend to planning and service on institutional committees, and he also wondered whether the recent involvement would “mean getting away from meetings” (a phrase that most likely refers to meetings with university executives).

Some would approach these as questions of support. Nothing could be further from the truth. Questions of purpose were not questions of support for Mathews; support and analysis were distinct from one another. Further notes show his approach, and overall positive disposition, toward working with the Board of Trustees:

1.) A strong public advocacy (System boards are principally judges of their institutions, paralleling or duplicating legislatures).
2.) And informal “working together” Meeting style indicating a partnership with the executive/ administrative officials. Mathews would move on this calling for “close administrative/board relationships”
3.) A close tie between the board and the presidents.
4.) Participation directly in university life (attendance at major events, participation in institutional functions, etc.)

Mathews supported the idea of a University System, and he saw the positives of Board Control, especially the ability of a Board to prevent political pressures from overwhelming University governance and day-to-day operation. He called on Board support in almost every facet of the University: Students, Faculty, Representing Institutions, and Outside Agencies. Further, in his exposition on the South Carolina method of systemization, he noted that a strong Board along with dedicated alumni could prove powerful allies for public advocacy. He referred back to the
Board’s 1901 decision to present a united front to the public in seeking its objectives. But in order for this (or any Board) to work, Mathews saw the needs of the University as threefold:

1.) Moral Support - the administration needs a sense that the board is standing behind them at a time there are attacks from every angle on administrative authority
2.) Protection - from public criticisms on touchy issues speakers on campus, faculty workloads, and dorm rules, etc. (To include protection from the Comm. on Higher Ed.)
3.) Flexibility - with little money, our flexibility to act quickly, to hire faculty and changing programs - is essential, indeed critical.

It might be said that when Mathews first voiced his support for Board coordination in 1969, as he was becoming president, the shifts underway were greater than either he or the Board had calculated. Some trustees were beginning to question their own decisions as early as January 1975, when Winton Blount, the Postmaster General of the United States and member of the Board of Trustees, stated “that the pendulum may have swung too far in board activism.” Loose definitions due to growing pains were beginning to have their effect. Trustees turned to Trustee John Caddell to express concern over Board-Staff activism. John Caddell, the very person who pushed for UAB’s University College to be unitized into the School of Arts and Sciences, the School of Business, etc., is also the Board member most receptive to Mathews’ comments. Caddell went so far as to forward Mathews’ reports to the members of the entire Board, in addition to Volker and Graves. Behind the scenes, however, the die was being cast. The Board had submitted the idea for direct oversight of the presidents in 1969, and then three years later supported a Council of Presidents. By late 1975, this same Board was causing the

381 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
382 Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
Just as Rose saw institutional complexity as a barrier to relationships, Mathews saw a need for the Board to change its evaluation strategy by shifting away from organization and budgets to definitions of scope and long-range plans. (This has not panned out in modern times, as more and more Universities are looked at through the lens of their checkbooks.)

The Board of Trustees of a University should focus their energies on policy and long-range planning with a keen eye toward the consequences of institutional success or failure in hiring in order to make Board objectives a reality. Yet this clarity was not always present in the case of The University of Alabama. From 1969 to 1975, the Board focused on “involvement.” The rapid shift in leadership structures should not be viewed as a Board suffering from a peripatessis, but rather as growing pains in a system that was trying to organize communications and give leadership. While the decision for a chancellor was a positive step toward answering questions (namely, those that stemmed from a public mistrust of institutions), the desire for “involvement” from the Board of Trustees combined with a rapidly changing political and demographic climate made their choice all the more critical and impactful. Their choice proved to show little interest in the best interests of The University of Alabama and decisions outside of UAB’s purview. Volker utilized Wallace’s political desires to grow UAB at the expense of respect for the history and mandate of The University of Alabama, something Chancellor Volker had no problem vocalizing, even to student news media outlets like the

Crimson White when he said of the University budget, “special consideration was not given to

---

384 Robin Mamlet and Sheila Murphy, "6 Qualities to look for in a college president," The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 17, 2017, 27.
the historical and unique role the university performs\textsuperscript{386} in public service and extension education.

Mathews’ keen ability to assess budgetary climates was underutilized. He expressed his support for tighter budgetary restrictions as early as 1971 in Trustee meetings. During these meetings, he showed that, despite no increase in taxes, appropriations from the Special Education Trust Fund were growing from $375,000,000 to $420,000,000, but still higher education was not getting its fair share. Wallace needed to be convinced of the political power of higher education in Alabama. While Wallace was convinced of higher education’s power, it was only within the confines of a political concern, which led to greater fragmentation in an effort to spread higher education around in other arenas. As Mathews moved through his administration, this became an age-old problem, i.e. where the budget met the faculty.

Competition?

The 1970s in Alabama was a decade of higher education proliferation. Both community colleges and regional four-year universities began to gain strength throughout the state and, more importantly, throughout the statehouse. The sizable increase in institutions across the state, while desperately needed, had little overall coherence when it came to placement, service, scope, and other institutional characteristics. The lack of policy, let alone strategy in policy, did not bode well for higher education, and especially for The University of Alabama. While the Board of Trustees followed the patterns of other states\textsuperscript{387} in their continual refining of system leadership positions, the legislature was creating another layer of leadership in the Alabama Commission on Higher Education. While today’s Commission on Higher Education has the coordination and


implementation of policy as its mission, this was not so clear in 1969; in fact, Mathews saw the Commission as yet another layer of bureaucracy, needed but perhaps initially ill-functioning. When Act 14 of the 1969 Legislature passed, it called for a commission “which would be responsible for advising the Legislature on matters concerning all aspects of higher learning from the junior college to the graduate level.” Prior to this, presidents at Auburn, Alabama, and other higher education institutions in the state enjoyed a certain level of direct communication with the Legislature. What would happen to this history with the creation of ACHE? It appears that few, if anyone, knew the answer to such a question. Mathews had a right to be worried. A positive approach to ACHE would consider welcoming another committee to the fray. But while it is easy to argue for a positive approach in 2017, the idea that a flagship university with a historical mandate and relationship with the history of the state was already moving toward equal status with other institutions which did not have the same characteristics was another avenue of the University’s possible funding and policy retrenchment. With the continual addition of layers, the optics through which Alabama the state saw Alabama the University was beginning to be seen through an opaque looking glass.

As additional layers of “leadership” were foisted upon The University of Alabama, so too was a lack of policy. While the Commission’s purpose was policy development, its functional structure and relationship to the Legislature and Universities had not yet been established. This relationship proved all the more difficult to clarify when institutions were undergoing the maelstrom of their own restructuring, or even birth. This lack of leadership on higher education policy created a vacuum into which 49 junior colleges, and 4 new urban universities entered,

388 Mathews, notes on ACHE, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
filling the void\textsuperscript{389} while also having significant impacts on higher education budgeting. This development would divide the educational budgetary pie into smaller slices. While Alabama colleges across the board saw increases in their state receipts, the established four-year universities were the second lowest recipients of these increases. Urban universities began to outpace their comprehensive counterparts in 1977-1978. Further, as previously noted, operational costs skyrocketed due to the CPI. On the other hand, with the same calculations, technical colleges saw an 819\% increase in appropriations. In 1978, Mathews was contending with a budget from the Legislature in which over half (54.2\%) of the entire appropriations for higher education were designated for new institutions which had not existed a quarter of a century earlier.\textsuperscript{390} It was in this environment that faculty discontent grew.

The Faculty

Richard Freeland, former President of Northeastern University and Vice Chancellor of City University of New York, once described higher education in the 1960s and 1970s as characterized by institutional disarray.\textsuperscript{391} His compression of two decades into two words should stand as the byline for understanding the higher education history of the later 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{392} The University of Alabama was no different; the feelings and reactions of all within the University had coalesced into a heightened state.

\textsuperscript{390} Gibson, “Public Policy,” 231.
\textsuperscript{392} In a letter to Mathews dated May 19, 1980, E.O. Wilson called the difficulties between Mathews and the Faculty a “causative background in overall university governance, a more frequent problem these days than people in the state appear to appreciate.”
The tenuous relationship between David Mathews and a limited number of faculty arguably began during the student protests at the University called the Days of Rage in 1970, when Matthews commented that some faculty were possibly fomenting discontent. This observation directly paralleled Lewis Mayhew’s suspicion that faculty were increasingly “making common cause with radical student groups.” While Burton Clark had defined theories of faculty behaviors, the faculty remained “an unknown quantity especially with respect to the nature and wellsprings of recent faculty demands for a greater voice in collegiate governance and experimentation with militant behavior to gain its ends.” As the 1970s dawned, the militancy seen by Mayhew gave way to Bertram Davis’ idea that the faculty’s authority “rests not upon presidential understanding or largesse, but upon the faculty’s right, as the institution’s foremost professional body, to exercise preeminent authority in all matters directly related to the institution’s professional work.” (Italics added for emphasis).

In 1974, Mathews saw the same principles of economic competition in capitalism, as forming within the very notions of education. In one of his many remarks on the Carnegie Report, Mathews noted that it was relying on the kind of idealism that had consistently driven higher education. However, 1974 America, according to Mathews, was on the precipice of “experiencing a real down market in idealism in this country.” Of particular concern to Mathews was the fact that a negative growth in idealism would adversely affect higher education,

393 Lewis B. Mayhew, “Faculty Demands and Faculty Militance,” The Journal of Higher Education 40, no. 5 (May 1969), 337.
395 Mayhew, “Faculty Demands,” 340.
“because college and universities are nothing other than a social institutionalization of the spirit of hopefulness.” The Newman Report, published in 1971, forced university administrators to take stock, especially as Newman contended that “we will not find our future in some better rationale, certainly not in some better form of control. We will more likely find it in a return to the forces of the educational market.” Essentially, Mathews was beginning to consider—but not to implement—the point that higher education would not prosper under constant bureaucracy, any more than the American economy would “prosper under a higher regulated set of directives.”³⁹⁷ In a stinging indictment of the status of education, Mathews wrote:

>The academic competition today in Alabama has been fostered by a harsh economic reality, namely, the lack of available funds in the state to support all of our ongoing education operations. The desirable expansion of student population in colleges has been characterized by an undesirable lack of foresight. We have overlooked the actual supply of qualified teachers and the fact that our neighboring States are paying their faculties far more in salary any operational challenges of running an institution of higher education learning; we have ignored library needs, physical facilities, and teaching equipment necessary for sound education; we have failed to look at our educational problems and needs as a whole. There is very little understanding of where we are headed; we have had to date no comprehensive manpower needs in all fields, no analysis of education opportunities, and no concrete programs that respond to these needs.³⁹⁸

Mathews was right to interpret these problems as the result of a lack of policy and understanding: “To have lived through this time of history and not to have invested in the effort to make our institutions more responsive to the people they serve, not to have invested in the effort to make our institutions more servants of good purposes, would be a great tragedy.”³⁹⁹

³⁹⁹ Mathews, “Who Is In Charge Here?”
Robert Maynard Hutchins characterized the modern university as “a series of separate schools and departments held together by a central heating system. In an area where heating is less important and the automobile more, I have sometimes thought of it as a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking.” Yet, the issues confronting the University’s faculty were far more than parking. But at their root, these issues congealed into faculty salaries in light of university spending. To merely reduce the issue to an either-or approach does little to understand the University as reflecting a wider mood prevailing in higher education at this time. Earl Cheit’s *The New Depression in Higher Education* argued that myriad factors, including but not limited to increased competition from other types of institutions along with a severe deceleration in state funding, were contributing to a new malaise in higher education. While Cheit’s book is a useful window into the significant financial challenges of the 1970s, Mathews was arguing that a new depression loomed on the horizon if idealism from the grassroots of students and faculty continued to be squelched. Forty years later, higher education is beginning to agree with Mathews’ 1970s assessment. A recent review of Zumeta et al.’s *Financing American Higher Education in the Era of Globalization* noted that financing had a direct impact on the university’s ability to respond to market conditions and that such inflexibility could affect efforts in ingenuity and efficiency, making human capital of greater importance to future desires in each respective state.

---

400 Crow and Dabars, *Designing the New American University*, 130.
Mathews’ approach to mitigating the circumstances in which the University found itself was twofold. First, he believed that “if you can’t beat ‘em, at least bring them to where you are.” Mathews believed the best way around a recession-prone market, both economically and potentially intellectually, was educational cooperation among institutions, namely in a consortium of instruction.403 Students could remain enrolled at the University while acquiring credits, hands-on instruction, and experiences with different universities. Another example that directly addressed rural development was the University Year for ACTION, a program which enabled students to work toward solving specific problems of low-income communities while receiving academic credit. The university was one of 27 institutions involved in this program.404 Second, and perhaps more importantly, as early as September 1977 Mathews was directly appealing to wider state agencies such as the Alabama Commission on Higher Education for help by arguing for a 12% increase in faculty salaries. But another agency, another Board, and another layer of newly-created bureaucracy confronted him. Mathews saw the need for direct action couched in flexibility, but some faculty, especially younger faculty, saw this increasing flexibility as an example of a loss of structure—and with it, power. William Bowin and Eugene Tobin correctly noted that the 1960s PhD hiring boom slowed considerably in the 1970s. With the economy external to the university beginning to reach academic saturation, there seemed to emerge a buyer’s market, “and since few tenured professors had the option to consider good jobs elsewhere, the balance of governance power shifted away from the faculty back to the administration.”405 While Bowin and Tobin see this in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this reality

404 “The Role of Colleges and Universities in the Redevelopment of the Rural South,” in Toward a Better South: Major Speeches of David Mathews.
did not emerge for The University of Alabama until the later 1970s, which does partially explain the lag in time for Faculty Senate ascendancy at the University compared to other peer institutions of similar size and stature in other states.

Concerns emerged over Volker’s lack of leadership. The October 1977 meeting of the Faculty Senate saw a proposed, negative resolution on Chancellorship of Volker. While it died by one vote (18-17), it finally laid bare the definitive and reflective mood of the Senate in two primary ways. First, the Faculty Senate was sensing waste, especially as university spending was concerned. Not only was the living space and rent for the Chancellor mentioned within the minutes of the meeting; the faculty also began to express wider dissatisfaction with facilities (namely office space, telephones, and travel expenses for faculty) and emphasized disparities between faculty and administrators. Yet, even as this dissatisfaction emerged, early Senate documents through 1977 show a Faculty Senate which seems thoughtful and deliberative. Joseph Arrendell, Chair of the Journalism Department, began discussions within the Faculty Senate, noting that there may not be a constitutional provision for governance over the Board or Chancellor; rather, the Faculty Senate only had power over the immediate university. Nonetheless, their concerns about Volker’s lack of leadership were not without merit.

The Faculty Senate’s resolution on Volker illustrates Richard Freeland’s notion that higher education in the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by institutional disarray.406 The lack of definition within this newly created position began to catch up with Volker, especially in his relations to the Legislature. As early as February 1977, less than a year after he became Chancellor, the Tuscaloosa News front page read, “UA Bottom of Budget Barrel.”407 In a

---

detailed analysis, Norman Bassett, the Associate Editor of the newspaper, laid bare the realities of the new University System’s budget. While comparisons to prior years would be made, the format of the executive budget was exceptionally different now that it was a unified system budget. Each University’s budget was consolidated into one appropriations request. Yet, despite this effort to present a united front, the capital funds appropriation was introduced on separate bills. Until this time, a University like Alabama or Auburn submitted capital outlay requests directly to the legislature as part of their budget to meet the needs of university facility upgrades, one of the direct concerns of the faculty senate. However, Volker changed this, and the change had draconian effects upon the University in Tuscaloosa. In an effort to save face, budget figures were made to look like increases through the inclusion of “federal and other funds,” dramatically inflating the true figure of funds allocated to the university.

After a week of reflection, the Editor published “Funds to University actually decreased in the final Wallace budget of the 1970s, any way you look at it, the University—flagship institution in higher education in the state—is far off of the pace in funding prospects for the coming fiscal year.” In the 1977-1978 budget, all universities combined received around 1 out of 4 dollars of the entire education budget. UA’s increase, in a time of inflation, was 4.8%. In the same time period, UAB received a budget increase of 17.8%, UAH received a 16.6% increase, and Auburn University and the University of South Alabama both received 13.9% increases. Yet, even in light of this reality, only six days earlier Volker had stated to the Montgomery Advertiser that “cooperation said increasing.” But was it?

---

As early as March, the education budget for the State of Alabama was stalled in the legislature. As the varied education lobbyists were all vying for increasingly large portions of a smaller pie, and by June, control emerged as the reason University System’s budget requests were on hold. Students at the Capstone began to take note. In a scathing editorial, the editorial board of The University of Alabama student newspaper, *The Crimson White*, wrote, “In our opinion, University of Alabama System Chancellor Joseph Volker, along with the majority of the University’s Board of Trustees, virtually killed all hopes for the additional appropriation when they supported the unified education budget instead of laying claim to what the University deserves and needs.” In their quest to declare a reason, the editorial board found the source to be “inner wishes to have complete control over the faculty and staff budgets, since the appropriation contained a clause which would have mandated salary increases.” Could this be?

In a separate article, Rep. Roy Johnson of Northport stated that Volker traded the $1.6 million for this power to control salaries. The next two paragraphs, which listed what was missed by the increase in appropriations, read like an indictment. This single appropriation alone defeated faculty salary raises, defeated an appropriation to the School of Nursing for $200,000, defeated general maintenance of University facilities by $700,000, and defeated the building of a diabetes clinic. Such a charge was serious, and it became even more so when the very same Rep. Roy Johnson repeated the charge that Volker was against the Senate (appropriations) bill because it mandated pay raises. In response, Volker stated that such an idea was “Johnson’s interpretation of it.” However, influential House of Representative Conference member Walter Owens of Bibb

---


413 Editorial Board, “1.6 Million.”
County agreed with Rep. Johnson, who continued stating, “If Volker continues to be ‘more concerned about equity for Jacksonville’ than University needs, I’m for taking the chancellor and his 57,000 salary and his home in Pinehurst and abolishing them.”414 This conflict was not only in the House. A Senator from Tuscaloosa stated Volker’s inability to relate to the legislature in passing legislation as “a big failure of the Chancellor’s office.”415 Volker was no fool. The man who had accomplished changing University governance for the State’s flagship university wanted to consolidate lobbying.416 However, in 1977, there is no record indicating that Volker ever reached out to Mathews (who had personal and professional experience with the Legislature), Thigpen, or any other official of the UA System for help in dealing with the Legislature. Further complicating matters, one member of the Board, in commenting about chancellorship term limits, stated that Mathews would be next logical choice to be in line for Chancellor.417

Within this environment, the Faculty Senate members, along with the rest of the faculty, were trying to find their way, their voice, and their limits. For the faculty to have a greater voice and relate to the administration on a personal level, University Council was established. In a conversation with UAB Faculty Council members, however, Carl Cecil submitted that the University Council was largely ineffective.418 With the majority of voting personnel as Deans, as

418 University College Senate Minutes. *UAB Report*. January 18, 1980. n.p. His remarks were to the UAB Faculty Council (the UAB version of the Faculty Senate in Tuscaloosa).
Professor of Law Wythe Holt stated, the faculty were inclined to believe that the agenda was controlled by the administration. The Faculty Senate was trying to bridge the two worlds: the anger of those who wanted a greater say in their academic planning and the worry of those who were considering the dire financial straits of the university. While previous leaders of the Senate, such as Professor Long, were reticent to take this position, the Faculty Senate nevertheless emerged as the organ charged with communicating this concern as changes in leadership and membership occurred. The pattern of issue development moves from a complexity of funding to merely salaries. The rapidity of the shift in understanding is staggering, and it parallels shifts in the Faculty Senate leadership. As late as 1978, there still existed a complicated understanding of faculty grievances. However, these grievances had begun to coalesce around two issues, salaries and administration.

As early as 1977, Mathews was open to discussions on all issues with Carl Cecil and Joe Lane, who both agreed that the “us vs. them” mentality needed to be curtailed. Where Mathews desired to operate with flexibility in philosophy and approaches, ironically, younger faculty members did not. In one letter, a new professor proceeded to write that Mathews “had failed to engage faculty in a critical academic process.” This professor went on to describe his “anger” at Mathews’ leadership, stating, “I feel I might know a bit more about [the department’s subject matter] than you give me credit for.” Yet, preceding these two points was the stunning statement, “I assume you made this decision. Other administrators said you did.” (Italics added). In looking at this and other letters, the tone, vernacular, and style show striking

421 John Ortiz Smykla to David Mathews, November 1, 1979.
differences between the polish of more experienced professors and the coarseness of younger, less experienced faculty. Charles Horn, a Professor in the College of Education, expressed his concerns in offering his “observations for consideration.” Pulling no punches, Horn deftly expressed his desire for a “clearly articulated statement of purpose for the decade of the 80s and beyond,” arguing that in the absence of a guiding “dream,” no amount of communication can suffice to inspire a faculty.422

These letters show the distance between the faculty perceptions and their understanding of their university’s administration. However, given the turbulence of these times for the University and the lack of clarity from executives in the System, this was to be expected. Faculty concerned with a seeming lack of vision for the future of the University were engaged in a balancing act, trying to understand the new system while utilizing understandings from the previous 150 years of university administration: namely, that it was the President of The University of Alabama who set the long-range goals for the University. This had changed and, as late as 1977, was up in the air. The new Chancellor abided by his 1969 premise that long-range planning is a function of University Presidents.423 Yet, in letter to Mathews, Volker states long-range planning is a function of the Chancellor in 1977.424 In an October 29, 1977 memo, Volker changes again, stating that a Chancellor’s Advisory Council will do the review of these plans. Until this time, the President of The University of Alabama had direct contact and access to the Board of Trustees for review and consideration of long-term planning, free from interference. In an August 23, 1977 memo, Volker states that “summaries should be succinct but contain

422 Horn, letter to Mathews, Nov 6, 1979.
424 Volker to Mathews, August 19, 1977.
sufficient information to acquaint board members with essential facts.”425 This was a shift toward sufficiency as the new arbiter of efficacious policy communication. For Mathews, such long-range planning could only be properly submitted after consultation with deans, assistant deans, and other university academic executives.

The Faculty of The University of Alabama were constituting a proper feedback loop analysis of their own retrenchment within a new bureaucracy. “Self-determination is the crux of the distinction between the bureaucratic mindset of an agency and the boundary spanning dynamism of an academic enterprise.”426 Until this time, internal political structures in higher education had largely remained unchanged for The University of Alabama since at least the late 1800s, but this was only one piece of faculty disenchantment puzzle. The notes circulating between faculty members or university personnel and their respective deans or university executives are worth noting for additional perspectives on faculty disenchantment. The faculty, whose primary concern was economic in nature, had distinct elements in their communication with both department and College-level leadership. While multiple memos exist, these characteristics are best reflected in a memo between W.W. Paulder (member of the Chemistry faculty) and Dean Douglas Jones of the College of Arts and Sciences. First, they acknowledge the problem but do so in strident and clear terms. Paulder wrote arguing for the needed improvement in faculty salaries. With state-imposed budget proration, the University’s salary scale began at $22,700, rose to $28,400, and was $34,100 for a full professor. Southern University Group data, written in the margins of the memo, suggested that while assistant and associate professor salaries were commensurate with marketplace realities, salaries for full

426 Crow and Dabars, Designing the New American University, 245.
professors exceeded $50,000. This made The University of Alabama’s salaries for a full professor an entire third lower than those of other universities in the South.\textsuperscript{427} 

Faculty were quick to describe their thoughts as the university operating “in spite of the Faculty Senate philosophy.”\textsuperscript{428} However, some like Stanley Hoole even though by 1979 an emeritus, expressed concern that the Faculty Senate’s desire of “fiscal command” could be used as a bargaining battering ram with the intent of holding decision-makers responsible “when a given executive decision proves unsuccessful.”\textsuperscript{429} Other university personnel took an approach that differed from that of the faculty, and were more open due to the community nature of their leadership. Hubert Kessler, Director of Personnel Services, organized a series of eight meetings in 1979 to communicate “the problems that you and your administration faced in trying to provide adequate financial support to the institution.”\textsuperscript{430} While problems of academic administration and the University’s financial health ensued, these did not seem to coalesce into one clear voice until the development of the Faculty Senate.

Ironically, in his haste to gain greater understanding of faculty problems, Mathews’ values of greater democratic participation did not stem the tide of those wanting greater input. The shift towards shared governance in higher education had the effect of decentralization of authority,\textsuperscript{431} a common problem for the 1970s. Balancing faculty engagement gained traction in

\textsuperscript{427} W.W. Paulder to Dean Douglas Jones, January 25, 1980.  
\textsuperscript{428} W.W. Paulder to Dean Douglas Jones, January 25, 1980.  
\textsuperscript{429} W. Stanley Hoole to David Mathews, October 25, 1979.  
\textsuperscript{430} Hubert Keller to Vice President Richard Thigpen. Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.  
\textsuperscript{431} R. Danforth Ross, “Decentralization of Authority in Colleges and Universities,” \textit{Research in Higher Education} 6, no. 2 (1977): 101. The reader should take note of Ross’ keen observation of decentralization’s abstract results—namely that “Even if the faculty do not make the actual decisions, decentralization may act to increase the influence of a highly qualified faculty by resulting in a person who is closer to them in the organizational hierarchy making the decisions.”
journal articles and especially with Seltzer who agreed with Burton Clark’s idea that “conflict reducing mechanism is the ‘bureaucratization’ of the faculty itself. The academic community becomes less of a community and more of a formal organization. An elaborate system of committees and representative bodies develops.” Seltzer continued, “[Burton] Clark emphasizes that strong faculty participation often means administrative inefficiency and instability, because rule by committees often implies a ‘certain slowness and hesitancy in decision making.”

It is hard to overstate the degree to which the Faculty Senate suffered from a case of hyperbole. In histories and in documents, the Faculty Senate directly accused the administration of creating a “secretive” budget. To accuse the President of a flagship university of such in the 20th century comes perilously close to accusing the same of both informational and budgetary malfeasance—especially in a time where many lacked faith in government institutions following Watergate. While it is arguable that such vernacular was merely a deeper reflection of the Faculty Senate’s lack of confidence in Mathews, grand juries have been summoned for less. Entire political administrations have risen and fallen on such issues, taking years in office to procure budgetary transparency. As late as 2009, then-President Obama’s Recovery Administration instituted websites which were, by the administration’s description, an attempt to engage in budgetary transparency.

432 Ronald Seltzer, “Faculty Role in Policy Making,” Improving College and University Teaching 22, no. 2 (Spring, 1974): 85.
433 Seltzer, “Faculty Role,” 85.
434 Minutes from Faculty Senate, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio; Wythe Holt, “The First Twenty-Five Years of the Faculty Senate at the University of Alabama,” http://facultysenate.ua.edu/files/2013/05/History-of-the-Faculty-Senate-1975-2000.pdf.
While it is unconscionable for those of us in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Generation (who see budgets on university websites with a few clicks) to think of gaining access to government budgets as difficult, it should be stated that even in the 1970s, it was by no means impossible. The appropriations were clearly delineated in the Journals of both House and Senate during this time period. Further, there is no indication that a formal request for a budget was sent from the Faculty Senate to the Board of Trustees, nor to the Chancellor, who had gained oversight and responsibility for both fiduciary and long-term planning. There appears to have been no formal request from the Faculty Senate to the Governor’s office. There appears to have been no formal request from the Faculty Senate to the Alabama Commission on Higher Education. While Mathews certainly held budget projections, he could also correctly say that release of these figures were the purview of the Chancellor. The Faculty Senate was correctly progressive in their idea that the budget of the entire university should be laid bare for the public and the University to analyze and see, but their inability to communicate their position without hyperbole, coupled with their inability to seek answers from correct sources, may indicate another example of the Faculty Senate’s lack of understanding toward the new governance of the University. At one point, the Faculty Senate even went so far as to blame Junior Colleges437 for the University’s problems, in a wider attempt to understand the exact nature of those problems.

Mathews was approachable and ready to engage in dialogue—arguably too much so. While Mathews did not show trepidation, neither did he dive into the problems with the faculty, an uncharacteristic choice on his part. While some may mark this as distance or disinterest, in this case it is the mark of a leadership that is firmly rooted in its philosophy. Mathews’ difficulty with the Faculty Senate is the moment when his action was a reflection of his philosophy of the

presidency and bureaucracy. He believed that bureaucracy was a wider danger to the University and that the presidency was increasingly encroached upon from within and from without by this bureaucratic tendency to deal with day-to-day concerns rather than larger issues which could prevent the University’s ability to fulfill its obligations of teaching, research, and service to the people of Alabama. By and large, the Faculty Senate had appropriate concerns and points; however, the Senate’s and other faculty’s ability to communicate moved from dynamic to frenetic, and with this, they overplayed their political hand.

External Relations in Light of Faculty Difficulties

If the October 1979 resolution calling for a new administration started the process, then the decision of some Faculty Senate members to go directly to the press to air their grievances was greatly accelerating their newly-found desires. Despite Mathews replying in (probably too much) detail to Cecil’s letters, despite the multiple meetings, despite committees and letters to all faculty members, the Faculty Senate decided to communicate directly with the press. Not only did this cause the Board significant consternation to the point where they passed a resolution less than 24 hours later in strong support of Mathews; the act of going to the press also allowed others to speak. With a resolution tantamount to a Vote of Confidence from the Board, the alumni of the University and people of Alabama began to make their feelings known.

438 April 15, 1980 and March 5, 1980—probably the most important memo in which Mathews lays out his ideas in outline, detailed, form, describing new organizational changes and actions taken to answer faculty concerns. This also included a “Governor’s proposed budget.” The charge of a lack of transparency could not continue following this memo.
The faculty, in their desire to show light on their plight, accomplished what few others could possibly have done. They had galvanized an entire alumni support network,\(^{440}\) only the support was for F. David Mathews.

The difficulties showed the growing chasm between the people of Alabama and the faculty’s research interests.\(^{441}\) Perception of faculty was changing nationwide and within higher education. With almost surgical precision, Max Ways’ “The Faculty is the Heart of the Trouble,” a 1969 *Fortune Magazine* article, articulated external stakeholders’ perception that faculty members were not asserting their power in an effort to gain greater control over the institutions’ work. Instead, the faculty discontent, as Ways noted, stemmed from the 1960s shift in which political power was no longer considered central to civilization; rather, it was knowledge which represented the potential of a given society.\(^{442}\) He concluded that both way, the source of the troubles was the faculty, and large sections of populations were beginning to have serious questions about their intentions. This was especially true for a school with a bond to the state’s history like The University of Alabama.

Prominent alumni were writing highly pointed letters about the University’s direction under Mathews’ leadership. In one exchange between Alto Lee and Robert Albritton, both past president of the Alumni Society, both were shockingly frank in their analysis. The opening of

\(^{440}\) Letter from Julius E. Talton to David Mathews, October 24, 1979. Included was a Statement by the then President of the University of Alabama National Alumni Association on behalf of the entire association.


\(^{442}\) Max Ways, “Faculty is the Heart of the Trouble,” *Fortune*, January 1969, 95.
the letter begins, “someone is trying to hold David accountable for their own ‘blunders’ in looking after the financial needs of the University. Both you and I as well as many others know that David has been attentive to these needs for many years but apparently his requests as well as his protests have fallen upon deaf ears.”443 What caused even more consternation among alumni, and could perhaps explain the quick action on a Vote of Confidence in Mathews’ leadership from the Board of Trustees, was alumni’s analysis as to the possible source of these problems: Volker. “I cannot understand why our university campus in Tuscaloosa continues to be the target of those whose first loyalty should be there but instead is centered on the desire to move everything to Birmingham and relegate Tuscaloosa to a branch campus,” one alumnus wrote. “God forbid the day that this ever happens but if it does, we may then see our great University of Alabama relegated to a further state of inferiority and no longer be the capstone of higher education in Alabama.”444 Members of the Board of Trustees were also becoming suspicious of faculty intentions. In the post-script to a letter addressed to a member of the Board, one prominent alumnus noted that “someone is apparently trying to hold you responsible for their own misgivings.”445 McCall called the action, “unbecoming” and “advocating as retributive punishment and vindictiveness…because of that group’s failure to gain financial aims.”446 Another member, Martha Simms, asked Volker (in a letter copied to all other Elected and Life Trustees), “has the Board ever iterated its policy regarding the pace of development of the

446 Daniel T. McCall to Mathews, October 23, 1979. It is interesting to note that this was a hand-written letter, with deep personalization.
various campuses? Would the Board hold back development of one campus in an attempt to further the development of another?"\textsuperscript{447}

Some letter-writers were diplomatic, acknowledging that Mathews was running a large university on a limited budget.\textsuperscript{448} Others, like members of the Alumni Association of Jefferson County, were more direct about their feelings toward the Governor and the faculty. The Jefferson branch passed a resolution in favor of Mathews and outright blaming Governor James’ biennium budget which forced Mathews and The University of Alabama to “prosper by cannibalism.”\textsuperscript{449} Still others, such as a District Attorney, found appropriate vernacular in “unreasonable, drastic, and immature actions.”\textsuperscript{450}

The letters of interest are those of external constituents who are expressing a diplomatic, albeit frustrated, view of university governance. The Superintendent of Tuscaloosa Schools couched his thoughts through the history of presidents when he said, “I have known and worked with Presidents Gallilee, Carmichael, Newman, Rose, and Mathews. In my book, you [Mathews] rate at the top.”\textsuperscript{451} In a letter dated the same day, Sprayberry continued, “The real issue in public education today is not salaries and inflation, as important as these are. The real issue on the part of some organizations and groups is ultimate control of all public institutions.”\textsuperscript{452} The first pediatrician in Decatur, C. Kermit Pitt, summed up his perspective in one sentence: “if faculty

\textsuperscript{447} Martha Simms, memo to Joseph Volker, Re: May 15, 1980 Letter to Trustees; Mathews, memo to Volker, May 20, 1980.
\textsuperscript{448} Reo Kirkland, Jr. to David Mathews, November 5, 1979. Kirkland was a state senator from Brewton, Alabama.
\textsuperscript{450} Reeves to Mathews, October 25, 1979.
\textsuperscript{451} Charles Sprayberry to Mathews, October 29, 1979.
\textsuperscript{452} Sprayberry to Ernest G. Williams, Oct. 29, 1979.
self-interest and limited vision are to determine its policy and direction. The University of Alabama’s destiny is provincialism and mediocrity.” These were the two things Mathews’ philosophy worked so feverishly against. The Student Dorm Association and members of the SGA supported Mathews, noting that “we don’t get everything we want.” The employees of Maintenance, Grounds, and Housekeeping showed their own support for Mathews when 162 signatures were delivered to the Board of Trustees on a petition reading, “We have become aware that another group of university staff have adopted a resolution asking for the resignation of University President Dr. David Matthews. We, the undersigned employees of the Maintenance, Grounds and Housekeeping departments at The University of Alabama, wish to go on record in opposition to the above mentioned resolution… Dr. Mathews is doing an admirable job under very trying circumstances.”

Perhaps the most striking letters come from faculty and the press themselves. Mark Mayfield of the Daily Mountain Eagle in Jasper, Alabama pulled no punches in a letter to the Faculty Senate President, saying, “Mathews is an administrator, not a politician, and your letter only attempts to involve the management of a major university in a political fracas.” Faculty members were also quick to note their support of Mathews. Even faculty in the Library

454 “Petition from Maintenance, Grounds and Housekeeping Departments at the University of Alabama,” October 24, 1979, Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
455 Mark Mayfield to Carl Cecil, October 24, 1979.
Department, which struggled mightily to achieve full funding, reiterated their support of Mathews’ vision\textsuperscript{456} and character; others attempted to “clear the air.”\textsuperscript{457}

To his credit Mathews never sought outside influences or supporters, save those connected directly with the situation and The University of Alabama whose express purpose would analyze change. He did not patronize the faculty, nor belittle their cause. In a time where the distinction between professionalism and professionalization was rampant - where professionalism is about practice, while professionalization is about status\textsuperscript{458} - Mathews chose professionalism in the face of a new reality where professionalization was the new order. Mathews was responsible for an institution where some in faculty leadership believed in a rugged democracy and where false perceptions of Mathews’ inaction to ameliorate the funding crisis (which began under Governor James in 1979) continued. Faculty Senate letters show that some held these false perceptions to a degree bordering on solipsism,\textsuperscript{459} and while Mathews did not navigate each problem perfectly, he brought a steadiness to the situation, despite the

\textsuperscript{456} Leslie S. Wright to Mathews, October 29, 1979; E.O. Wilson to Mathews, May 19, 1980; William Brown to Mathews, April 22, 1980; Mike Bynum to Mathews, April 10, 1980; VanderMeer to Mathews, April 9, 1980. It is interesting to note the professor’s mention of personal side of Mathews in relation to students who are asking in Education Administration classes about this period of University difficulties, addressing students with “warmth, generosity, and sincerity.” This is in line with the way he dealt with other students as early as 1973: “A Student’s Eye View of President David Mathews,” \textit{Alabama Alumni News}, September-October 1, 1973, 4-6.

\textsuperscript{457} Sheldon Hackney to Mathews, May 16, 1980.


\textsuperscript{459} W.W. Paulder, memo to Dean Douglas Jones, College of Arts and Sciences, January 25, 1980; Chancellor Joseph Volker to President David Mathews, January 29, 1980; Frank R. Rayburn, Faculty Executive Board, to David Mathews; College of Commerce and Business Administration Resolution of February 11, 1980 to David Mathews; Sandra Baxley Taylor, \textit{Fob! The Incredible Story of Fob James, Jr.} (Mobile, AL: Greenberry Publishing Company, 1990); Forest Hood James, \textit{Administration's 1981 Legislative Program} (Montgomery, AL: Governor's Office, 1981).
possibility that such an approach might only multiply some faculty members’ perceived reasons for dissatisfaction.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation opens a conversation about the Mathews administration. It is not a complete history. Much subject matter could be analyzed in future dissertations, including the College of Community Health Sciences, his time as Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, the Faculty Senate from 1977 to 1980, etc. But in opening the conversation about David Mathews’ leadership and its staunch philosophical character, the higher education student will be forced to inquire about the fundamental purposes of higher education. As we enter a new period of higher education history, one where accountability is the new byword for the public and legislatures, perhaps the reason higher education administrators choose not to ask these questions stems from our fear of what the answer might be. In this vein, this chapter seeks to ask – what can we learn from the Mathews Administration at The University of Alabama? Do we see a fear of failure, do we see communication lesson available to us in higher education administration? Should higher education administrators start changing from understanding servant-leadership to adaptive leadership as proposed by Heifetz of Harvard University?

The Mathews Administration reflects a changing presidency, a microcosm of broader administrative shifts within flagship American higher education. In an ethical or even moral sense, the Mathews administration teaches us how to make decisions. It shows that deliberation is necessary and, moreover, that such deliberation must be wedded to tenacity of beliefs. As many universities have adopted corporate decision-making models, organizations increasingly couch their decisions within policy. In putting his decision-making a priori to policy, Mathews essentially resisted the increasing corporatization of the American university and sought a
method of decision-making which allowed for greater flexibility, and one which included the
individual.

Historically, the heady 1950s gave way to the turbulent 1960s which produced the
defensive 1970s. This decade brought about “a remarkable shift in values and focus in higher
education.”460 Within the context of this large-scale shift, this dissertation sees Mathews’ time at
the helm of The University of Alabama as aspiring to address the dignity of man and the destiny
of democracy461 within an Alabamian context. Florida governor Rueben O’Donovan Askew, best
defined what the entire South was up against in the 1970s with his speech to the Southern
Governors Association. Askew correctly diagnosed the problem in education and the state in the
South, saying, “Ignorance is the midwife of demagoguery and oppression.”462 If the destiny of
democracy is tied to ignorance, or its lack of it, then Mathews’ presidency cannot be adjudicated
solely based on the success or failure of internal or external circumstances. The question must
be, historically, was the University in a better position to serve the state because of David
Mathews or in spite of him? As David Mathews himself said, “As citizens we have an obligation
to examine the question more fundamentally and to ask whether society itself stands to gain or
lose.”463 During the time Mathews was employed by The University of Alabama, the football
team won five national championships and eleven Southeastern Conference Championships. At a

460 David Mathews, “Speech at Commencement of Samford University,” Birmingham, AL, May
461 Lyndon Johnson. “The American Promise. President Johnson's Special Message to the Con-
462 Gordon E. Harvey, The Politics of Trust: Reubin Askew and Florida in the 1970s (Tusca-
loosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2015), 73.
and the Community,” The University of Alabama Draft of Major Speeches, Part V. 1965-1975.
The David Mathews Files, University of Alabama.
time when the University dominated the field of play, did the University, for its people, gain or lose?

During Mathews’ time, total enrollment increased by 34.1%, over a full one third. The 1969 academic year began with 290 African-American students enrolled. When Mathews left office in 1980, he could count 1,923 African-American students. Said another way, within the 11 years of the Mathews Administration, African-American enrollment went from 2 in 100, to 1 in 10. Women’s enrollment also increased, with women comprising 37.9% of the University population in 1968 and 49.6% when Mathews left office. The first African-American professor, the first time the total number of African-Americans crossed ten percent of total student population while ensuring that the university withdrawal rate among African-Americans was kept as low as for other students (a hallmark of true equality), rising enrollment for women, and expansion of resources despite significant external obstacles—all these happened under Mathews.

When Mathews left office, multiple newspapers noted that the University under his tenure “was marked by unprecedented academic growth.” As early as 1971, the Mathews Administration began seeing results from his emphasis on service. Notes for the General Faculty Convocation of September 21, 1971 indicate that the University was on the cusp of breaking 200,000 credit hours, with over 10% of time directly given to educational service projects. From 1,020 individual programs in every county in the state, a record 390 proposals brought in a combined $68 million in federal contract monies.464 Yet later successes were even more significant. In 1980, more than one out of four academic units were established under Mathews,

464 “Notes for the General Faculty Convocation of the University of Alabama, September 21, 1971,” Personal Files of F. David Mathews, Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio.
with nearly 20% of the student body enrolled in these units.\textsuperscript{465} Research grants alone, which totaled less than $5 million in 1969, totaled $13 million in 1980; in addition, library support tripled, and more than a million volumes were added. The faculty, the source of Mathews’ troubles in his last two years as president, increased to over 1,000 members. Assistant and Associate Professor faculty members with earned doctorates grew by 31% and 40%, respectively, and saw salary increases of 56.6% and 60.1%, respectively.\textsuperscript{466} However, I must admit unease about these figures. While they show the positive developments of the University, I submit that recording the history of The University of Alabama in the 1970s cannot run the risk of precisely what higher education went through in the same period. When faith in institutions began to wane in the 1970s, higher education “felt we were dealing with a public that would no longer believe people, so we substitute figures. The irony of the effort is that after nearly a decade, the public finds us no more acceptable than it did in the beginning…the vitality of higher education will be destroyed if we make our institutions places that are more hospitable to people who are skilled with forms that those who are skilled with ideas.”\textsuperscript{467} One key contribution of the Mathews administration was to strengthen University stakeholders’ ability to engage in conversation about the institution’s ideas, vision, and mission.

To consider leadership in the absence of moral vision is to consider a concept in the absence of its foundational roots. Mathews’ vision was to create a university of the people of


\textsuperscript{467} David Mathews, “What do you Profess, Professor? Speech to the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators,” Atlanta, Georgia, April 6, 1977.
Alabama, by the people of Alabama, and for the people of Alabama. To achieve these ends, the
University was to serve its students, its faculty, its staff, and the people of Alabama. To do
anything less would be an abdication of moral leadership, not in the moralism vein of Basil
Manly, Jr. or Joseph Caldwell of the University of North Carolina, but in the vein of Charles Van
Hise—one where the University is to serve the state. In his speech Van Hise believed that, “the
highest purpose of acquiring knowledge is to use it for the benefit of mankind.” Today, this
“Wisconsin Idea” can be described as the “vision of the many roles that education and
knowledge can play in helping the people of the State to keep their ecosystem balanced for true
self-governing democracy, and robust participation in the creation of prosperity.” While
Mathews would greatly disagree with Van Hise’s assessment of faculty duties, his leadership
shows agreement with Van Hise’s view that a strong relationship between the University and the
people of the State is the end goal of higher education, and not the means.

Considerable discussion surrounds Van Hise’s statement, “I shall never be content until
the beneficent influence of the University reaches every family of the state,” and whether or not
this idea was meant in concrete or abstract terms. Though, through extension services, Van

---


470 Charles Van Hise, “Speech before Press Association,” February 1905, https://www.wisc.edu/pdfs/VanHiseBeneficentAddress.pdf. Van Hise wanted to make a point in his 1905 address, going so far as to say, “If at the outset it was not clear, I hope it is plain now that the University is a state institution not supported in the interest of or for the professors. They are merely tools in the service of the state.” Many of Mathews’ writings, personally and professionally—already cited and mentioned—show that for Mathews, this was not the case.
Hise’s vision may well have been more concrete.\textsuperscript{471} In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, with our fascination with bureaucracy, offices, feedback loops, facilities, etc., it is easy to see the Wisconsin Idea by Van Hise as calling for a presence of The University of Alabama in every county in the state. While Van Hise’s idea may well have been brick and mortar, Mathews’ idea of The University of Alabama’s presence was more abstract, that alumni of the University were to be educated to develop a definitive knowledge and apply its framework “to the people and to aid in its application to economic, social, and political problems.”\textsuperscript{472} Forty years later, The University of Alabama is actively communicating this very idea to the people of the State, even going so far as to say, “Impact matters… We know you count on us to graduate students prepared to make lifelong contributions to our state… who will impact our communities, our businesses, our economy. Graduates who understand the complexities of a global world… who will expand our knowledge base in ways we cannot yet comprehend. As the flagship, we influence lives all across the state. Our enduring legacies are our alumni, our discoveries and our partnerships, all of which shape our future.”\textsuperscript{473}

Where Van Hise saw the University as serving the state, Mathews had to contend with additional realities which history correctly imposed upon his presidency. Mathews saw the university as a catalyst to improve the state and, in some cases, heal it from its past of injustices.


\textsuperscript{473} The idea of concrete vs. abstract impact is appropriately described on the Outreach website of the University of Alabama, noting the university’s impact on alumni’s lives: \url{https://www.ua.edu/outreach/impact/}.
and inabilities. While it took deft administration to improve the University’s standing in the
1970s, it would take leadership with the force of vision to finally achieve the Legislature’s 1829
objective to create a university for the State of Alabama, not merely a university in Alabama. To
achieve that vision required a tenacious leadership informed by a morality which saw the
University as open to all people and all ideas, with the best being sifted and winnowed\textsuperscript{474} into the
University’s central mission: teaching, research, and service.

As mentioned before, Robert Sproul once said, “ethics are concerned with the imperative
and morality is concerned with the indicative.”\textsuperscript{475} Arthur Holmes of Northwestern University
rightly asked, “When we argue about moral issues, to what do our arguments appeal?”\textsuperscript{476} For the
University president in the 1970s, arguments appealed then, as they should now, to the dignity of
man and the destiny of democracy. If ignorance is the midwife of demagoguery, then learning
can be the vehicle to hasten a new birth of freedom for the state. To transform the University
into a community of all, from a community of some, was to leave an immoral view behind. Van
Hise’s Wisconsin Idea speech, given in 1905, stated that education’s purpose is to support “the
enjoyment by the people of great intellectual and moral experiences of the [human] race.”\textsuperscript{477} If
segregation’s end reflected the history that “the distemper of which, as a community we are sick,
should be considered rather as a moral than a political malady.”\textsuperscript{478} If widening the University’s

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{474} Stephen J. Nelson, \textit{Decades of Chaos and Revolution: Showdowns for College Presidents}
  \textit{(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 45-46.}
  \item \textsuperscript{475} Sproul, \textit{How Should I Live; Webster, Karl Barth, 2nd Ed. (London: Continuum Books, Lon-
  don, 2004)},148.
  \item \textsuperscript{476} Holmes. \textit{Ethics}, 29.
  \item \textsuperscript{477} Van Hise, “Address Before the Press Association.”
  \item \textsuperscript{478} William Wilberforce, \textit{A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Chris-
  tians: In the Higher & Middle Classes in the Country Contrasted with Real Christianity}
  \textit{(Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1829), 279.}
\end{itemize}
purpose means that we are never wholly ourselves unless guided by a moral principle, if the reality that great-grandchildren of slaves whose ancestors once belonged to former university presidents in Tuscaloosa were graduating from the same university means that “all reality hinges on moral foundations,” then to what other concept can we ascribe the betterment of The University of Alabama than leadership wedded to tenacity of vision and informed by morality? Leaving such an idea either to administration through bureaucracy or calculation means that we only base decisions off of better numbers, with only a foundation of personal ethics which can shift like sand. Leaving such ideas to the “progress” of time and chance means acknowledging as correct what the late 20th-century British journalist and satirist Malcolm Muggeridge once wrote: “If chance be the father of all flesh, disaster is his rainbow in the sky.” As Hesburgh said, there is nothing automatic about the liberal education tradition. Chance is no decision-maker. Therefore, in looking at what Mathews accomplished, what can we learn from his administration?

The Continual Pursuit of Communication

First, continual pursuit of communication at all levels through both formal and informal structures is paramount. Indian author Reeta Raina explains that “communication is the process most central to the success or failure of an organization and many of the problems that occur in an organization are likely a result of communication failure.” To this end, the educational leader should not view such structures as the expansion of a bureaucracy, but should be molded

480 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Rediscovering Lost Values,” Second Baptist Church of Detroit, Michigan, February 28, 1954.
481 Hesburgh Papers, 118.
in such a way as to allow the formal structure to be a conduit for “educational encounters as breakthroughs for imaginative action.”483 Further, the educational leader must not be lulled by the idea that knowledge alone spurs transformative action, which more often than not, through transactional leadership, can create mediocrity.484 Roundtable discussions, more in-line with adaptive leadership, with their tendency to be more open and informal, allows for better avenues of honest and open communication.485 Birnbaum calls such a style “soft governance,”486 and it is where most governance of higher education institutions actually happens. While we can ask whether or not Mathews communicated the norms487 of his time, the vision that shaped Mathews’ governance was at the intersection of beliefs and tradition, as openness and service guided the fundamental axis along which education could take place. While this is the area in which Mathews and the University could improve, it also developed a new sense-making for the university, forcing the issue of greater participation in deliberative decision-making.

483 Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid, Tolerance and Dissent Within Education: On Cultivating Debate and Understanding (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 25.
Khan, Natalie. "Adaptive or Transactional Leadership in Current Higher Education: A Brief Comparison." International Review Of Research In Open And Distributed Learning 18, no. 3 (May 1, 2017): 179
The Adaptive Leader

Second, change will occur, and while values may not adapt, leadership styles should. Although many embrace the idea that institutional purpose and identity are inexorably linked, the higher education administrator must take care with such an idea, as identity has become nearly “meaningless” as a term, subsumed by anyone’s desire to define a “nature, character, and value-system” for an institution.488 Although Richard Bagnall argues that ethical “‘commitments’ are informed in the sense that they are grounded in an understanding of their meaning and place in society,”489 the differentials within society and the wide change in external factors will have a significant influence in the institution’s defining roles (as was the case under the Mathews administration). Great institutions are seldom built by giant leaps, but rather by small steps taken consistently in the same direction. And progress is faster if one first considers common understandings of culture and values.490 When confronted with a shifting landscape, steadiness must be sought in all times and circumstances.

Stylistically, it is nearly impossible to classify Mathews’ leadership. Gulley came to a similar conclusion in his analysis of Laney. The ivory tower was beginning to crack, and with it, one-dimensional classical approaches to leadership. Mathews’ presidential leadership borrows from Greenleaf’s “Servant-Leadership” philosophy, but he also acted within a transformational

490 Albert Yates, “Virtue and Leadership: Good Leaders Must First Be Good People,” in University Presidents as Moral Leaders, 112.
leadership framework which, as Sternberg and Thomsett both argue, can have profound overtones within the concept of service. Presently, higher education is unsure of the direction to take. Crow and Dabars bring to their leadership style an almost corporate rigidity while trying to grasp Kerr’s multiversity. Others, like Steven Fuller of the University of Warwick in England, border on a self-regretted yet continually imposed Machiavellian approach, seeing the University president as Caesar, not a partner. Leadership without definite philosophy results in the inability to know direction. Therefore, if the desired trajectory of leadership is to see greater service in academic and research pursuits, then a commitment to public good must be woven into daily decision-making. The 1970s proved that demographic shifts mean little if the cultural and philosophical structures of the institution remain stagnant. These structures must move with the times while still retaining and cultivating those principles which define the institution’s purpose and vision. In this regard, with a focus on the students and service to the state, Mathews was years ahead of his time. He was, in essence, arguing for the engaged university. While philosophy and culture may change, the values underpinning these should not. What values do we have underpinning leadership decisions at The University of Alabama today? Institutions without problems are institutions in stagnation, and it is the dynamic institution which delivers on the promise of higher education. Roger Soder, an education professor at the University of


493 Crow and Dabars, *Designing the New American University.*


495 Leo Benson, Ira Harkavy, and Matthew Hartley, “Integrating a Commitment to the Public Good into the Institutional Fabric,” in *Education for the Public Good*, 185-216.
Washington, considered the wider implications of Herodotus’ history of the Persian War on modern dynamics of change strategy. According to Soder,

> When people do not do what we want them to do, when they do not automatically follow along with what we propose, we say ‘they are afraid of change.’ And we bring in all sorts of consultants, change masters, and other experts we think will help our people understand that although change is threatening, change is a good thing. This is but a strategy of transference, however; it is a way of avoiding the fundamental question as to whether the proposition for change is actually good. We avoid that fundamental question by saying, usually in patronizing ways, that people are threatened by change.⁴⁹⁶

In all cases, a similar thread of concern emerges: that of development. While it is easy to see Mathews as engaging in encouragement at first glance, development was perhaps more central to his leadership.⁴⁹⁷ He saw the need to develop leaders with openness, as demonstrated by his openness with staff members⁴⁹⁸ and others associated with the University. This principle, coupled with Mathews’ value of service, meant he was causing a dynamic shift at the University, even as his leadership style remained the same. Second, Mathews’ development demanded a sense of service which opposed superficiality. The bureaucracy was encroaching, not just on leadership or offices, but on the very ideas of “teaching, research, and service.” Despite this obstacle, Mathews believed the president “should be a participant, capable of contributing ideas and challenging assumptions.”⁴⁹⁹

---

⁴⁹⁷ Larry Durham, Dale Wallace and Thomas E. Walker, interview with the author, October 9, 2016.
⁴⁹⁸ Dale Wallace and Thomas E. Walker, interview with the author, October 9, 2016.
⁴⁹⁹ F. David Mathews to Alumni, May 1980.
Although Mathews did not believe “that presidents should rule universities,”\textsuperscript{500} he did want to balance the presidential duties to be more engaging, arguing “that they should not just preside. They should do more than see that the sun rises and sets and that nobody moves Denny Chimes.”\textsuperscript{501} This was precisely the same attitude Laney brought to his leadership of Emory in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{502} Learning, deepening knowledge, produced service. Hesburgh’s idea that liberal education’s fruit is to free a person from ignorance parallels this view: “Liberal education should enable a person to humanize everything that he or she touches in life, which is to say that one is enabled not only to evaluate what one is or does, but that, in addition, one adds value consciously to relationships that might otherwise be banal or superficial.”\textsuperscript{503}

Third, Mathews wanted deliberative decision-making. Though many would be surprised to read this as one of the principal ideas I learned about in this process, it is stands as, perhaps, the most important. For Mathews, deliberative decision-making must precede policy. Policy does not drive decision-making; decision-making drives policy. During Mathews’ administration, the direct lines of leadership which the University had enjoyed for 150 years were gone. In their place was left the new reality that there is tremendous ambiguity which comes with the presidency of a large university.\textsuperscript{504} Where Laney took a stronger stance on committees, Mathews tried to make committees work as community. The new reality would not allow to this happen. The organized anarchy\textsuperscript{505} of Cohen and March had yet to come to the University of Alabama,

\textsuperscript{500} F. David Mathews, “Fine or Good?” Speech to the Rotary Club of Birmingham, Alabama, February 13, 1980.
\textsuperscript{501} Mathews, “Fine or Good?”
\textsuperscript{503} Hesburgh Papers, 116-117.
\textsuperscript{504} Gulley, The Academic President, 205.
\textsuperscript{505} Gulley, The Academic President, 197-224.
until the 1970s, when it finally did affect the University. Where Laney developed a certain rigidity to his system of decision-making, especially in demanding voluntary submission to imperative control, Mathews’ leadership style included flexibility. While this is perhaps the greatest point where the University and Mathews could have benefitted from greater definition, had Mathews not seen the virtues in flexibility, his time in leadership, which was marked by external shifts, could have harmed the University’s and his own reputation through a brutish and short presidency. Given this, while I personally would desire the leadership of Laney, the times demanded the philosophical leadership of Mathews.

In addition to these values, Mathews believed that a leader should lack a fear of failure. This is probably one of the most defining characteristics of the Mathews legacy. He tried new avenues. It is easy to state that pursuing these new avenues was akin to turning the ship too fast, and that in doing so, Mathews sunk his presidency through faculty anger. While there is an element of truth to the view that Mathews indeed moved too quickly, this idea cannot explain why students who are interested and engaged in education (and who understand the “two-way contract” of education’s importance) will be most capable of answering the great questions confronting society.

The ideas I learned from Mathews surrounding bureaucracy were the very concerns which troubled him. If anything, these concerns should be a reflection of the permanency of the impact the bureaucracy had on the university presidency, as well as the permanency of Mathews’ impact on The University of Alabama. On other hand, perhaps the larger qualities I learned took a greater place in the foundations of my own leadership style and philosophy. For all his mistakes and failures, Mathews always took issues confronting the state head-on, without

506 Gulley, The Academic President, 198.
engaging in the backdoor, petty politics that often characterize Alabama’s history.\textsuperscript{507} The idea that leadership requires values, that philosophies may change but values do not, should cause us to question what we value in our organizations and what hinders those values from being disseminated to every person in it. For the historian, the Mathews administration causes us to consider new ideas, new ways of thinking about the shifting sands of the 1970s. For the public, the Mathews administration should cause us to consider the wider implications of how our state budgets for higher education are developed and what kind of Alabama looms on the horizon, given that we cannot know what the world will look like next week (as Sir Ken Robinson asked).\textsuperscript{508} For the future administrator, we should ask what hinders us from developing openness to others a sense of service, flexibility, and a commitment to deliberative decision-making. What each of these groups can learn is to not fear failure.

Future scholarship on the Mathews Administration is needed. As has been said, this dissertation is but a robust opening. Scholarship is desperately needed on the College of Community Health Sciences, the New College, and the Board of Trustees changes in 1969 toward a University System, just to name a few of the options. Personally, I would like to engage the position of the public good of the public university theory in future scholarship as a field of expertise in higher education administration. Mathews argued, much later, that the university is part of what he termed, “the ecology of democracy.”\textsuperscript{509} The higher education administrator often


hears of how the University must engage its population. However, the rejoinder must be, how should the population engage its university? Scholarship in public deliberation within the context of an increasing environment of accountability is needed, and where I see my own scholarly research developing. This dissertation has also reenergized my own desire of working toward developing projects which will utilize undergraduate and graduate research seeking the elimination of problems such as childhood health, infant mortality, and education resource lack in rural areas of west central Alabama. Next steps in both arenas is to secure further investigative avenues and inquiry within higher education.

Mathews’ closing months were contentious, at best. As the Faculty Senate passed resolutions, one being a Vote of No Confidence which called for dramatic changes in university governance and faculty interaction, improvements in salaries were desperately needed. The faculty was right to note the disproportionate lack of their own salaries when compared with other universities. However, some of the proposed further changes by Faculty Senate in committee structure, presidential powers, and faculty powers would have directly affected, or been affected by, the new structure of the University, requiring actionable fact by the Board of Trustees. Evidence shows that faculty sentiments of distrust were not reflective of the broader faculty and the alumni, yet similar evidence shows the necessity for some significant changes for faculty improvement – myopically unseen by those outside of the University. However understandable the Faculty Senate’s passage of a vote of No Confidence in the Mathews Administration which hastened its end was, history will record its wanting when compared to the struggles experienced by the people of the State of Alabama in the same period. Essentially, in an environment of increasing bureaucracy and decreasing purview of the President’s Office, and the need for the University to engage the problems of Alabamians – Mathews saw himself facing
a choice. The choice between Alabamians whose problems in health, library access, economic
development and quality of life were significant, or the internal machinations of the University –
was clear. Despite the growth, he chose to focus on Alabamians. When leaders ask whether this
or any other institution is a university in the community or the university of the community, this
defines the core of philosophy and identity. Whether we are of or in, directly affects identity,
purpose, mission, and vision. This small but significant difference, begets our conclusion on
whether our title is fact, perception, or both – but greater still, our place in the State of
 Alabama’s future.

Despite the numerical, academic, and student growth of The University of Alabama in
the 1970s, despite the mistakes made in navigating an environment altogether different from that
of the preceding 150 years, and despite the possibilities missed and possibilities attained, these
were neither the greatest accomplishments nor the unfulfilled ideas of David Mathews. If Oliver
Cromwell Carmichael is the man in Alabama presidential history “whose credentials outweighed
Mathews deserves to stand as the President whose convictions outweighed his credentials.
Mathews began to transform an institution from a university in Alabama into The University of
Alabama, and despite its problems, his leadership hastened the beginning of an era in Alabama
history where the arc of the moral universe is long, but bends towards justice.\footnote{Martin Luther King, Jr., “Where Do We Go From Here?” Speech delivered August 16, 1967 to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Atlanta.}


Birnbaum, Robert. "The end of shared governance: Looking ahead or looking back." *New Directions for Higher Education* 2004, no. 127:


Frederick, Jeff. Review of Alabama in the Twentieth Century, by Wayne Flynt. Georgia Historical Quarterly 90, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 467-469.


King, Jr., Martin Luther. “Rediscovering Lost Values.” Speech/sermon delivered at the Second Baptist Church, Detroit, MI, February 28, 1954.


---. “Fine or Good?” Speech to the Rotary Club of Birmingham, AL, February 13, 1980;

---. “Inauguration of Dr. Walter Y. Murphy” Speech to Faculty, Staff, and Students of Andrew College, Cuthbert, Georgia, April 28, 1977


---. “Where Do We Go From Here?” Speech, delivered to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Atlanta, GA, August 16, 1967.


---. “What do you Profess, Professor?” Speech to the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, Atlanta, GA, April 6, 1977.

---. Speech at Commencement of Samford University, Birmingham, AL, May 27, 1978.

---. “Fine or Good?” Speech to the Rotary Club of Birmingham, AL, February 13, 1980.


McCurdy, Jr., Charles. Speech to Frank Rose, August 1961. W. S. Hoole Special Collections Library at the University of Alabama.


Rose, Frank. Speech to Ed Henry, February 1961, Presidential Papers of Frank Anthony Rose, W. S. Hoole Special Collections Library at the University of Alabama.

Rose, Frank. Speech to Hugh Comer, June 24, 1963, Presidential Papers of Frank Anthony Rose, W. S. Hoole Special Collections Library at the University of Alabama.


Tomsett, Peter J. F. "Transformational leadership in higher education research supervision." PhD diss., Bangor University, 2017.


APPENDIX: IRB APPROVAL

August 4, 2016

E.J. Waldron
EIPTS
College of Education
Box 870302

Re: IRB # 16-OR-271, "Fine or Good?: Moral Obligation and the University Executive as viewed through the F. David Matthews Presidency of the University of Alabama"

Dear Mr. Waldron:

The University of Alabama Institutional Review Board has granted approval for your proposed research.

Your application has been given expedited approval according to 45 CFR part 46. Approval has been given under expedited review category 7 as outlined below:

(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

Your application will expire on August 3, 2017. If your research will continue beyond this date, please complete the relevant portions of the IRB Renewal Application. If you wish to modify the application, please complete the Modification of an Approved Protocol Form. Changes in this study cannot be initiated without IRB approval, except when necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants. When the study closes, please complete the Request for Study Closure Form.

Please use reproductions of the IRB approved stamped consent forms to obtain consent from your participants.

Should you need to submit any further correspondence regarding this proposal, please include the above application number.

Good luck with your research.

Sincerely,

Carissanato T. Myers, M.N.A., C.M.A., L.I.R.
Director & Research Compliance Officer
Office for Research Compliance