THE GLOBE AND ANCHOR MEN:

U.S. MARINES, MANHOOD, AND AMERICAN CULTURE,

1914-1924

by

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A DISSERTATION

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This dissertation argues that between 1914 and 1924, U.S. Marines made manhood central to the communication of their image and culture, a strategy that underpinned the Corps’ effort to attract recruits from society and acquire funding from Congress. White manhood informed much of the Marines’ collective identity, which they believed set them apart from the other services. Interest in World War I, the campaigns in Hispaniola, and the development of amphibious warfare doctrine have made the Marine Corps during this period the focus of traditional military history. These histories often neglect a vital component of the Marine historical narrative: the ways Marines used masculinity and race to form positive connections with American society. For the Great War-era Marine Corps, those connections came from their claims to make good men out of America’s white youngsters. This project, therefore, fits with and expands the broader scholarly movement to put matters of race and gender at the center of military history.

It was along the lines of manhood that Marines were judged by society. In France, Marines came to represent all that was good and strong in American men. In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, however, they demonstrated the ironies and weaknesses of American manhood through cruel and inhumane treatment of natives. Marines maintained positive connections with society through this controversy regardless.

Throughout the Great War-Era, Marines promoted a style of manliness that emphasized popular Victorian notions of honor, courage, selflessness, self-control, hard work, and strength.
In doing so, they kept traditional ideals of manhood at a time when American men’s culture had begun to shift toward a newer form of masculinity that valued consumption over production and appearances over character. In the Great War Marines presented themselves as the knightly saviors of civilization. In Hispaniola they portrayed themselves as the enforcers of peace and law whose manhood was far superior to the Haitians’ and Dominicans’. As Marines promoted themselves as a man-making institution, one that could turn Americans into good citizens, they demonstrated how adaptive their manly image could be through peace, war, and foreign occupation duty.
DEDICATION

To Sarah
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INTRODUCTION

In 1957, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph M Pate, wrote a letter to Marine Brigadier General Victor “Brute” Krulak asking the question “Why does the U.S. need a Marine Corps?” Krulak responded that the United States does not need a Marine Corps at all. However, the American people want a Marine Corps for three reasons. First because the Marines are always ready. Second, because people believe Marines will accomplish whatever mission given them. His third and last point provides the genesis of this project:

The third thing they (the American people) believe about the Marines is that our Corps is downright good for the manhood of our country; that the Marines are masters of an unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud self-reliant stable citizens—citizens into whose hands the nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted.¹

This dissertation explores the U.S. Marine Corps’ history between the years 1914 and 1924. It argues that ideas of manhood shaped how Marines saw themselves, how they wanted the public to see them, and what they believed they contributed to American society.

Scholarly interest in the Great War, the campaigns in Hispaniola, and the development of amphibious warfare doctrine have made the Marine Corps during this period the focus of traditional military history with a few exceptions.² These histories neglect a significant component of the Marine historical narrative: the ways Marines used gendered and racialized

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rhetoric and imagery to communicate with each other and form favorable impressions on American society. Marine Corps historians have overlooked one of the central assertions of this dissertation: Marines claimed to be good for the manhood of their country in their own institutional magazines, in their recruiting literature, and during their experiences in war and counter insurgencies.

This project focuses on the Marine Corps in the years surrounding America’s involvement in the Great War. The war’s impact on American politics, society, race relations, citizenship, women’s suffrage, and the size and scope of the federal government is hard to overstate. The Great War also holds a strong place in Marine history, with historians pointing to the First World War as one of the most pivotal events of the Corps’ history in the twentieth century. Before the war, the Marines had a long history of colonial occupation, small engagements, and being a landing force for the Navy. One need look no further than the pre-

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Great War version of the Marines’ Hymn to realize how imbedded foreign service was in Marine culture: “From the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli / We fight our country’s battles on the land as on the sea.”5 “The Shores of Tripoli” references Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon and a handful of U.S. Marines’ participation in the expedition against Barbary pirates in 1805. “From the Halls of Montezuma” alludes to the bloody charge against the citadel of Chapultepec in Mexico City during the Mexican-American War. Marines went everywhere the Navy went in the late nineteenth century. Commodore Matthew Perry took a squadron accompanied by over two hundred Marines in 1853 to open trade with Japan. Marines guarded the Panama railroad across the narrow isthmus that connected North and South America in 1856 and 1860.

The popular phrase “The Marines have landed and have the situation well in hand,” came into use between the American Civil War and the Spanish-American War. The U.S. government dispatched the Navy with detachments of Marines to China, Japan, Formosa, Uruguay, Mexico, Korea, Panama, Hawaii, Egypt, Haiti, Samoa, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia from 1866-1898.6 During the Spanish-American War, they fought in Cuba and the Philippines. Marines took pride in their history of foreign expeditions and they used that history to forge an identity that was distinct from other services and communicate their worth to the American people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7

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5 The Marine’s Hymn has a history of its own which started in the early nineteenth-century. Marines emblazoned their flags with the phrase “To the Shores of Tripoli” after the Barbary wars. They added “Halls of Montezuma” after the Mexican-American War. Afterwards they changed the words on the colors to read “From the Shores of Tripoli to the Halls of Montezuma.” Sometime either during or after the Mexican-American War Marines affixed a tune of either French or Spanish folk song origin to the hymn. The French opera “Genevieve de Brabant” has a very similar aria as the Marine’s Hymn. Marines continued to add lines to the tune representing different campaigns until the Commandant of the Marine Corps authorized the use of the hymn that is in current use in 1929. United States Marine Corps History Division, “Customs and Traditions: Marines’ Hymn,” Marine Corps University. http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Customs_Traditions/Marines_Hymn.aspx. (accessed November 24, 2015).


7 Marshall, “It Means Something These Days to be a Marine,” 5.
The Great War served as the Corps’ first major foray into modern warfare. The battles of Belleau Wood, Soissons, and Mont Blanc where the Fourth Brigade of Marines fought valiantly against the Germans command a strong place in Marine Corps lore to this day. Many Marines would agree with Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak’s assertion that “World War I really established the picture of the Marine as first and foremost a fighter.”⁸ By analyzing the Marine Corps’ own service magazines, public relations efforts, and public perceptions of Marines, this dissertation aims to clarify the picture Krulak painted. Doing so, however, means that this project parts with most Marine Corps histories in significant ways.

This dissertation examines a time when the foundations for the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual (1940) and the Tentative Landing Operations Manual (1934) were being laid in the Greater Antilles, France, the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. For some Marine Corps historians, the nineteen-teens and early twenties serve mostly as preludes to World War II. The Great War and the years immediately following are important to Allan Millett, for example, because they fit his narrative of how Marines prepared to fight the Japanese Empire. Millett, who is the author of the most comprehensive single-volume history of the Marine Corps, lumps the years 1900-1939 into his recounting of Marine amphibious warfare doctrinal development.⁹ Doing so allows him to describe the Marines as remarkably adaptive and forward thinking. Merrill L. Bartlett argues that the Marine Corps under the leadership of Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune “embraced the amphibious assault mission, although it would be left to successive commandants of the Marine Corps to complete the transformation of

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⁸ Krulak, First to Fight, 188.
a tradition-bound elite corps of light infantry to a modern amphibious force.”

Bartlett, like Millett and others, have largely succeeded in painting the Great War-era Marine Corps as an amphibious force on the make.

This is a cultural history of the Marine Corps, not a history of tactics, logistics, organization, operations, and doctrinal development, although all play an important role here.

“The Globe and Anchor Men” contends that advanced base seizure doctrine and combat operations in France and Hispaniola had a significant impact on how Marines constructed masculine imagery of themselves and how the public perceived them. Around the time Marine officers began promoting the adoption of amphibious doctrine, Marine artists created masculine images of Marines in ship-to-shore assaults. To journalists, politicians, and parents, Marines were the representatives of American manhood in Hispaniola and France. For many in the press and in the U.S. government, however, this was a double-edged sword. As will be demonstrated here, Marine manhood, and by extension American manhood, appeared both brave and victorious in one conflict while cruel and barbaric in the other.

Marines’ deployments to the island of Hispaniola, therefore, are as important to this project as the Great War because their actions there serve as a counter-narrative to their claims of being good for American manhood. Like the U.S. occupation of the Philippines after the Spanish American War, these deployments were controversial because of accusations of illicit Marine conduct. Marine Corps histories of the 1915-1933 occupation of Haiti and the 1916-1924 occupation of the Dominican Republic are few and antiquated. They usually focus on the Marines’ versions of events and do not delve deeply into their behavior.

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11 Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic (Washington DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), 68; Edwin Howard Simmons, The United
Latin Americanist historians have produced a much more robust body of work on these occupations. Their histories often provide the perspective of natives who were subjected to foreign occupation of their country. My work draws upon Mary Renda’s *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation & the Culture of U.S. Imperialism* most directly. Her exploration of how Marines’ notions of race and paternalism influenced their interactions with Haitians and Dominicans has greatly informed this project. My work departs from hers in that Haiti and the Dominican Republic are examined together which illuminates a broader pattern of Marine behavior across the entire island. Also, the discussion here centers around how the Marine Corps’ actions on Hispaniola created a profoundly negative image of themselves, one that contrasted sharply with the reputation they had cultivated back in the States and won in France.

This dissertation is not a history of the making of the “modern” Marine Corps. Rather, it is one that examines the Corps within a specific historical context and it makes no claims of regarding modernity for several reasons. The word “modern” is thrown around often in Marine Corps history without any clear indication of what the historian means. Often, it seems “modern” means reaching a degree of development or sophistication on par with present-day standards. For Marine Corps historians in particular, “modern” tends to imply a certain level of achievement in technological, tactical, and organizational development.

The Great War-era has been a frequent dividing line between the pre-modern and the “modern” Marine Corps. Historians tend to point to the Corps’ leaders and great thinkers of the

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time as the promulgators of this shift. One historian describes Lejeune as “the father of the modern Corps” while at the same time naming Earl H. (Pete) Ellis as the “architect of the modern, forward-deployed, modular Marine Corps.” Another recent historian argues that General Thomas Holcomb “molded the Corps into the modern amphibious force that helped win the Pacific War.” This assertion echoes many like it that link modernization of the Marine Corps with its amphibious assault capabilities and the eventual development of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that came about in the 1960s. Regardless of implications or explications, all the above historians use “modern” without clarifying exactly what they mean.

Conceptions of modernity change over time. What Marines in the Seibo Province of the Dominican Republic in the summer of 1918 considered “modern” is not necessarily what the Marines believed forty-seven years later. They wore different uniforms, they used different weapon systems, and (most importantly I argue) they had very different ideas on what a real Marine was. Except for a twelve-month stint between August 1918 and 1919 when the Marine Corps enlisted several hundred women for recruiting and clerical duty, Marines were exclusively white men during the Great War-era. By 2017 standards, the Corps moved toward greater technological and tactical modernization in the late nineteen-teens and twenties. Socially speaking, however, especially regarding notions of race and gender, most of those Marines were probably main-stream by the standards of their time, but not by the standards of ours.

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This project is also a cultural history of American manhood. Historians of American culture have identified a shift in attitudes about what it meant to be a man in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before industry and corporate capitalism changed the very fabric of life for the middle and working classes, a culture of individual production reigned in the United States throughout the nineteenth century. Being a respectable man meant having good character, working hard at a career or trade, and practicing self-control. People frequently referenced these qualities when talking about manhood and historians today tend to associate these standards with Victorian manhood.

However, a new culture of consumption grew out of the world of big steel, oil, manufacturing, banking, and international commerce. The ideal man of this burgeoning new culture was concerned less about production and more about consumption. A man’s worth depended less on his character and more on his purchasing power. This more “modern” man cared very much about being liked and respected. Therefore, personality, self-expression, and how one looked defined a respectable man. Subscribers to these ideas of manliness used the term masculinity more than manhood. Therefore, historians tend to identify these men and their use of the term masculinity to denote a shift away from Victorian manhood toward a more modern masculinity.

There was no stark moment of arrival for the more modern masculinity. Technically, the Victorian age had passed by the coming of the Great War, but its cultural ideals still held sway throughout the period covered here. Victorian manhood, with its ties to the culture of production and its emphasis on character and work, existed in tandem with the new masculinity, with its ties to the culture of consumption and its emphasis on appearances and leisure. The United States Marine Corps’ own cult of manliness frequently followed the tenets of Victorian manhood. One of the central arguments of this work, therefore, is that the Marine Corps clung to older Victorian notions of manhood during a period when scholars believe there occurred a shift toward newer ideas about masculinity.

Therefore, when Marines talked about manhood between 1914 and 1924, before, during, and after the Great War, they were mostly referring to Victorian manhood. Overlap between traditional manliness and the newer masculinity existed within the Marine Corps, of course especially when one examines their own institutional magazines. On the very same pages slotted for stories that celebrated Victorian notions of manhood and character one could find advertisements tailored to an audience of men who were interested in consuming products. In this way the Corps’ own magazines mirrored other popular civilian magazines of the time. Tom Pendergast has argued that in the early twentieth century the creators of popular magazines constantly pandered to men who identified with the newer masculinity and consumerism. But they “were themselves so indebted to the Victorian cult of character that they celebrated old styles of masculinity regardless.”

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18 For more on turn of the twentieth century military institutions and manliness see Donald J. Mrozek, “The habit of victory; the American Military and the cult of manliness,” in Manliness and Morality: Middle-class masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, ed. J.A. Mangan and James Walvin (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 1987), 234.
19 Pendergast, Creating the Modern Man, 27.
Differences between Victorian, or traditional, manhood and more modern notions of masculinity can be subtle, but for my purposes they are important. Both have physical and mental aspects to differing degrees. Manhood, for example, usually referred to one’s character but it could also mean a stage in one’s life. Men of good character displayed courage, integrity, assertiveness, honesty, loyalty, and selflessness. Manhood came after boyhood and before old age. In this respect the opposite of manhood was childhood. At the turn of the twentieth century and during the Great War, Americans also understood manhood as a national resource, something utilized in times of peril.

Manhood could also be wasted, weakened, and corrupted in the moral and physical sense. Therefore, proponents of healthy American manhood, many of them progressives, advocated that men maintain their physical and mental health through exercise, religion, and “clean living.” Clean living involved self-restraint. Too much alcohol, sex, or rowdy behavior could weaken or corrupt one’s manhood, according to the prevailing middle-class wisdom of the time.20

Cultural historians have argued that the term “masculinity” became fashionable around the turn of the twentieth century largely in response to white middle-class paranoia concerning the strength of their own manhood.21 While manhood was about inner qualities such as character and morality, masculinity was more physical. It had to do with appearances, activities, ways of speech, and even virility.22 Femininity was its opposite. The male body was important to

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20 Gail Bederman’s chapter on G. Stanley Hall goes into great depth about this, Manliness and Civilization, 77-120.


22 Summers, Manliness and its Discontents, 16; Delvin, Between Profits and Primitivism, 9.
subscribers of both Victorian manhood and the new masculinity. But followers of the latter demonstrated their manliness less through production or moral uprightness and more through consumerism and muscular masculinity. Athena Delvin put it succinctly when she argued that the new form of men’s culture was “more physical and less intellectual, more competitive and less spiritual, more strenuous and less sensitive.” Strenuous activity was important precisely because the nature of middle-class work had changed. Masculinity needed demonstration in other ways since manual labor now largely fell to the working classes.

Many Americans during the Great War era, therefore, valued physical culture (strenuous exercise and even early forms of bodybuilding) to make up for the deficit of physical exertion in daily life. Sports were popular across class and racial lines in America during the nineteen-teens. For the middle class, however, athletics offered more than leisure. Largely gone from their lives were physical struggle and hardship. “Battle of Life” metaphors pervaded discourses on masculinity and manhood. These metaphors harkened back to times when men proved themselves through literal battles with their enemies or figurative ones against their own vices. The gymnasium, the boxing ring, the baseball diamond, the tennis court, or the football field served as sites where physical struggle could reinvigorate masculinity.

While the Marines largely adhered to Victorian manhood, they used imagery that appealed to the newer notions of masculinity to attract recruits. Sharply dressed Marines pervaded their own imagery. So, too, did pictures of them exercising and playing sports both in the United States and abroad. Images that emphasized what life in the Marine Corps could do to

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23 Delvin, Between Profits and Primitivism, 9.
24 Kimmel, Manhood in America, 102; Delvin, Between Profits and Primitivism, 17; Rotundo, American Manhood, 242-246.
the male body fit along with these masculine appeals.27 Marine recruiters promised to enhance recruits’ manhood by bolstering their character and giving them opportunities to produce service for their country. They also assured potential recruits that the Marine Corps would reinject the element of struggle back into young men’s lives, harden their bodies, make them more masculine, and pay them all the while.

Scholarship that explores manliness and the U.S. military is scant compared to general studies on manhood and masculinity regarding other facets of society. Kristin Hoganson’s Fighting for American Manhood is a strong example of scholarship that explores the significance of ideas like manhood in national discourses about war and imperialism. However, her work does not extend past the Spanish-American War.28 Perhaps the most useful collection is Military Masculinities edited by Paul R. Higate because it contains essays that address a range of subjects involving the history of masculinity in the military although none specifically about American military institutions during the Great War-era.29

There are works, however, that link American manhood during the war to older Victorian culture.30 This study supports Peter Gabriel Filene’s work in which he argued that Victorian ideals of manhood found “more concrete expression” during the Great War. Where Filene conducted a broader study about American attitudes toward the war, my research on the Marine

Corps supports his contention that people believed that “Through the crucible of combat a boy would emerge a man.”

Donald Mrozek’s 1987 essay, “The Habit of Victory: the American Military and the Cult of Manliness,” also points out that the American military often adhered to more conservative notions of manhood within their own institutional cultures. “As the idealistic pursuit of a ‘golden mean’ in the civilian realm was transformed into materialistic and sensory gratification,” Mrozek contends, “the Victorian tension which linked sacrifice and duty to fulfillment and gain remained strong within the military.”

Michael C.C. Adams’ *The Great Adventure* is perhaps the best exploration of the Victorian male’s understanding of war. Adams argues that American and British men at the turn of the nineteenth-century understood war as a man’s most convincing rite of passage. War was “an abrasive to cleanse and toughen society dissipated by material consumption.” My research on the Marines bolsters these authors’ arguments. At the same time, however, my research demonstrates that the Marine Corps was culturally flexible when it came to promoting Victorian notions of manhood and the newer ideas of masculinity.

Cultural studies of the U.S. Marine Corps are rare but not entirely new. The three most notable are Craig Cameron’s *American Samurai: Myth Imagination and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951*, Aaron O’Connell’s *Underdogs: The Making of the*

Cameron’s American Samurai argues that the myths and imaginations learned and carried by Marines of the First Marine Division in World War II influenced their conduct in battle. He explores how the Corps indoctrinated recruits with ideas about themselves, the war, and the Japanese. Cameron argues that gender became a crucial part of the Marine’s identity. Extolling hypermasculine ideals helped create a strong collective identity that valued strength, determination, and the ability to reduce “‘outsiders’—broadly defined—into potential objects for violent overthrow.” “At the heart of the process of . . . ‘making’ marines—was the manipulation of gender roles to both define and instill those ideals,” Cameron asserts.35 He makes a strong case for the importance of masculine ideals among Marines in World War II but does not acknowledge their importance to the Marines in World War I. His recounting of the Marines’ reputation before 1941 is bereft of any mention of the importance of masculinity to their institutional culture, public image, and identity.

O’Connell’s book examines the Marine Corps from 1941 to 1965 and argues three things: first, that Marines’ sense of exceptionalism set them apart from other branches of service; second, that this exceptionalism grew stronger during and after World War II; third, that “Marines’ culture not only helped their organization but also has had long-lasting effects on American society, national defense, and eventually the United States’ role in the world.”36 O’Connell points out that the 1950s Marine Corps claimed to be good for “both juvenile delinquency and flagging masculinity.”37 But Underdogs largely ignores how Marines made very

35 Cameron, American Samurai, 49.
36 O’Connell, Underdogs, 3-4.
37 Ibid., 229.
similar claims three and a half decades before. “Before World War II, the United States Marine Corps was tiny, unpopular, and institutionally disadvantaged,” he wrote. The dual increases in both the size and popularity of the Marine Corps during the Great War counter that claim. This dissertation contends that appeals to the manhood of the country and the demonstration of their manliness in war were significant reasons for that growth and popularity.

Heather Marshall’s work on the pre-World War I Marine Corps addresses gender as well but only in a limited sense. Marshall’s dissertation argues that Marines before the Great War created an elite warrior image of themselves that endeared them to the public and set themselves apart from the Army and Navy. In her chapter on Marine identity and imagery during the Great War, she asserts that masculine-charged rhetoric had crept into the Corps’ recruiting publications after 1914. She argues that during the years leading up to American entry into the Great War, the Marines’ Publicity Bureau “appealed to the enthusiasm for virile masculinity sweeping through society as a whole,” and that recruiters “drew on male insecurities to draw some to the Corps as a means of demonstrating their understandings of manhood.” But where Marshall sees appeals to masculinity as only recruiting tactics, my project asserts that manliness was a crucial part of the Marines’ identity during the Great War era. While she argues that “No matter the task in which the Marine was engaged, he was first and foremost a warrior,” I argue that according to their own image construction, Marines were, first and foremost, men.

The Marine Corps’ cultural notions of manhood and masculinity, therefore, course through the chapters of this project. Chapter One explores internal Marine rhetoric and imagery from 1914 through 1918 and the historical context from which those images and stories sprang.

38 Ibid., 1.
39 Marshall, It Means Something These Days to be a Marine, 309.
40 Ibid., 309-310.
41 Ibid., 5.
Marines often expressed themselves through gendered language to reinforce notions of their identity, justify their contributions to society, and bolster their public image. They tied ideas of Victorian manhood very closely to readiness, preparedness, and flexibility. These ideals stemmed from their history of service as an expeditionary force in readiness and from the preparedness movement that pervaded American politics with the eruption of the Great War in Europe. This chapter also demonstrates how Marines tethered manhood to whiteness. The early twentieth century Marine Corps was the most racially exclusive of all the U.S. military branches and its racial homogeneity led to the construction of images and stories that promoted notions of white male superiority.

The second chapter examines the Marines’ recruiting efforts from 1914 to 1918 and asserts that appeals to American notions of Victorian manhood were central to their public relations and recruiting efforts. Marines aimed to recruit the “best” men while claiming that the Corps enhanced Americans’ manhood. These claims became central to the Marines’ largest recruiting drive in the spring and summer of 1917. Civilian journalists played an important part in the Corps’ image construction. Marines followed advice from civilians who pushed them to advertise the Corps as a man-making institution. Journalists helped by publishing stories of manly Marines in newspapers. The Corps claimed to give young middle-class white men of sound body and mind a chance to become fit, develop good character, see the world, and be real men. In doing so Marines appealed to older notions of Victorian manhood through much of their rhetoric. They also, however, played to newer notions of American masculinity. Marines on posters looked sharp, strong, and confident, which fit well with new ideas of masculinity keyed to the culture of consumption. In doing so, the Corps expanded from 17,000 to 30,000 men without diluting recruiting standards. This chapter also demonstrates that Marines were a
significant voice shaping opinions about American manhood during the progressive era leading up to U.S. entry into the Great War.

Chapter Three examines how Americans, both Marines and civilians, understood the Great War as a test and a sacrifice of their manhood. German barbarity needed a manly response; America’s national honor had to be defended. Therefore, Marines drew upon chivalric imagery and prose to portray themselves as saviors of civilization. Through their actions in the summer and fall of 1918, U.S. Marines helped demonstrate that American men were strong, courageous, and willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good. The American press described the Marines as manly heroes. Marines demonstrated that American manhood could pass the test of war. In doing so, I argue that they became the pride of the country, and proof the United States made real men.

The fourth chapter argues that American cultural conceptions about race and manhood influenced how Marines perceived and interacted with Haitians and Dominicans from 1915 to 1922. Marines saw natives of Hispaniola as children which was consistent with contemporary discourses that denigrated the manhood of “colored” races. Embittered over having to miss the Great War to serve on Hispaniola among “inferior” races, some Marines lashed out, especially when insurgencies broke out in both countries in 1918. While fighting these undeclared wars, Marines behaved antithetically to Victorian notions of white manhood. Their lurid actions seemed to indicate the breakdown and degeneracy of their manhood, something public discourses acknowledged happened to white men who lingered too long in the tropics. Ultimately, the Corps would survive the investigations with its reputation intact because of the sympathy afforded them by Naval and Senate investigation committees and by some writers in the press. That sympathy was founded upon shared notions of the superiority of white manhood.
and the distrust of Haitian and Dominican testimony. Another reason Marines survived this bad press was because of the activities of Marine Corps headquarters back in the States.

Picking up with state side Marines in late 1919, Chapter Five argues that as the Corps faced post-war financial and manpower cuts, it continued to promote the service as a man-making institution. Marines would stay on expeditionary duty in the Dominican Republic until 1924, and in Haiti until 1933 during a long period of retrenchment among the armed services. Marines responded in several ways. First, they softened their warrior image. Roving Marines went around the country to demonstrate the kind of manhood that could not only fight but could sing, dance, and have fun. Second, the Corps established a vocational school in Quantico that they claimed would enhance manhood via education and athletics. Marines wanted to increase the efficiency of the men in their charge. American progressives understood efficiency as an important component of traditional manhood. Marines demonstrated their efficiency by guarding the U.S. mail and conducting Civil War reenactments. Mission and doctrine did not trouble Marine Corps leadership in the early nineteen-twenties as much as current inter-war Marine scholarship has contended. Recruiting and manpower were their chief concerns during these years, and Marines addressed them using a tried and true tactic: appeals to manhood.

A study of gender in the Marine Corps reveals an institution with a rich history, one that flexed strong cultural muscles that would contribute to its staying power throughout the twentieth century. It also reveals that there is still a great deal of work to do to fully understand and appreciate the history of America’s Marines.
1. WITH HARD TWO-FISTED HANDS:
WHITE MANHOOD IN MARINES’ SERVICE PUBLICATIONS, 1914-1918

An’ that’s how I learned—as I should have known then—
That U.S. Marines is some Regular Men,
The first ones ashore, and’ the last to come back,
When trouble is started with white men or black;
Yes, call ‘em “ship’s flatties,” and “leathernecks,” too,
They’re first-class he-fighters, who uses their beans,
An’—only a fool would say “Damn the Marines”!

Marines in the Great War era loved to tell stories about manhood. *The Marines Magazine*, an institutional publication for enlisted Marines, published one such story in the spring of 1917. Jimmie Decker enlisted in the Marine Corps but decided to desert after having trouble adjusting to military life. Jimmie claimed the Marine Corps lied to him. “Why had he enlisted, anyhow? To see the world, that was it,” the author wrote, “And they had kept him drilling and hiking at a dull recruiting depot for a month, and then had shanghaied him to a dull station ship at an even duller northern navy yard where he would have to remain at least a year before he could even think of transferring.”

Jimmie lacked discipline: he got in trouble for insubordination and for being late for duty several times. Unwilling to serve out his three-year contract in the Marine Corps, he opted to go absent without leave on a train to Montreal.

On the very train Jimmie boarded sat Sergeant McNab, a long-in-the-tooth veteran and the personification of Marine manliness, who would attempt to talk Jimmie into changing his mind about the Corps and about himself as a man. The author described the scene:

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Sergeant McNab, Irishman, five service stripes, and grizzled veteran of two wars, had seen and divined Jimmies’ intention. He knew the signs only too well. Numerous young Marines had McNab seen in his twenty-two years of service who thought Uncle Sam too severe in the matter of discipline, and who, therefore, decided to separate themselves from the Corps via the dishonorable route. And numerous of these disgusted young men had the grizzled one caught in time to set on the path of an honorable career using as a means of persuasion coaxing, threats, coercion, and appeals to manhood, according to the temperament of the individual.  

McNab decided to sit next to Jimmie on the train and have a chat with him. He aimed to change Jimmie’s mind by appealing to his manhood. Jimmie recognized Sergeant McNab immediately and feared the old vet would turn him in. McNab informed the wayward youngster that he had nothing to fear from him, however, because he was not worth turning in. 

McNab made Jimmie feel as though he was not man enough to serve in the Marine Corps. “Uncle Sam wants men only, not spineless scum,” McNab said, “The best thing for such mollycoddles to do is just exactly what you’re doing—run away.” Good riddance, too, according to McNab, because, “Old Glory is a jealous mistress, and will have none but strong men to serve her.” By the time McNab finished casting aspersions on Jimmie’s patriotism, loyalty, and courage, Jimmie had broken into tears. As McNab stood to leave, Jimmie reached for the older man’s hand but got only this in reply: “No, I wouldn’t shake hands with a man with no guts, that’s not a part of my creed.” McNab had accused Jimmie of cowardice and weakness, two of the worst transgressions a Marine could commit. McNab did not call Jimmie’s physical abilities into question; he impugned his character. By doing so, McNab reflected not only Marine standards of decorum and behavior, but also popular Victorian notions of manhood.

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3 Candee, “Sergeant McNab’s Strategy,” 8.
4 Ibid., 8.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
From 1914 through America’s entry into the Great War, U.S. Marines largely adhered to a style of manliness that stressed the inner qualities of courage, integrity, and toughness, all of which were in line with popular notions of Victorian manhood. These values existed in tandem with military virtues of readiness, preparedness, and flexibility. Taken all together these characteristics form the bulk of early twentieth century Marine manliness and institutional identity. The outbreak of war in Europe, and the preparedness craze that swept the nation soon after, influenced much of the Marines’ rhetoric regarding their public image and their usefulness to society. Marines saw themselves as warriors but more so as men who could handle any situation. The color of their skin was also an essential ingredient to their manhood. Marines of the Great War Era were white with no exceptions and their imagery and stories reflected notions of white superiority over other races.

They also harkened to the Victorian notion of manliness by claiming their Corps produced men of good character. As a man-making institution, the Marines claimed to inject struggle and hardship into men’s lives that toughened them and made them more masculine. Bootcamp, for example, with its impact on both the mind and body, enhanced the masculinity of recruits. Masculinity required more outward and physical attributes. Marine artwork frequently conveyed masculinity by making them appear sharply dressed and physically imposing. Marines told each other that they were Uncle Sam’s favorite body of fighting men because of their masculinity.

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7 Dubbert, “Progressivism and the Masculinity Crisis,” 309-310; Kimmel, Manhood in America, 88; Stearns, Be a Man! 10-11.
8 Kimmel, Manhood in America, 88; Summers, Manliness and its Discontents, 16; Delvin, Between Profits and Primitivism, 9.
Mission, Identity, and Imagery

The deployments to Hispaniola and the eruption of the Great War had a significant impact on Marines’ world view, their sense of mission, and their identity as a military institution. Marines often used masculine imagery during this time to communicate those ideas. Important debates on doctrine and mission informed these ideas as well. Even though the United States did not enter the Great War until April 1917, the war in Europe had been on Marines’ minds since its beginning two and a half years before.

Prompted by the war in Europe, an important debate took place between field grade officers in the Marine Corps Gazette. This debate revealed that readiness, flexibility, preparedness, and offensive action were key elements to the Corps’ identity. Notions of manhood did not come up in this discussion explicitly. But the authors cared very much about the Marine Corps obtaining greater prestige and glory. They debated the identity of an institution of fighting men and they would be best utilized in the future to earn the respect of the other branches of service and society. Marines then communicated these ideas through masculine images and stories designed for Marine audiences, and later, as images presented to the public.

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The Gazette was the brainchild of a group of officers who formed the Marine Corps Association in 1911 while stationed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A couple of years later, in 1913, Colonel Lincoln Karmany, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Lejeune, Captain Harold C. Snyder, and Captain Davis B. Wills formed the executive committee. In the first issue of the Gazette they claimed the journal was “For the purpose of recording and publishing the history of the Marine Corps, publishing a periodical journal for the dissemination of information concerning the aims, purposes and deeds of the Corps, and the interchange of ideas for the betterment and improvement of its officers and men.” Anonymous, “The Marine Corps Association: Its Formation and Objects,” The Marine Corps Gazette, June 1916, 73. In this professional journal, one of the Corps’ first, Marine officers published articles on a wide variety of topics pertaining to military service. Within the Gazette Marines found articles ranging from machine gun drill to service in Guam to garrison training. It kept Marines around the globe abreast of the latest regulations and orders. The journal also acted as a form of entertainment by publishing fiction and book reviews.
Colonel John A. Lejeune’s seminal article “The Mobile Defense of Advance Bases by the Marine Corps,” continued a discussion about the Marine Corps’ identity and possible future that had been going on since the turn of the century. “The most important factor,” he argued, “is the determination of the true mission of the Marine Corps in the event of war.”10 The Marine Corps that Lejeune envisioned would have a vital role in a war that required naval warfare as a leverage for victory. He asserted that the Corps had a chance to become the first to strike the enemies of the United States if it identified and prepared for a new general mission: advance naval base defense and seizure.11 This new orientation would have a positive psychological impact on Marines. If the Marine Corps made itself into “an Advance Base organization, it would have the opportunity to share with the Navy the glory always resting on those who strike the first blows at the enemy,” he claimed.12 According to his vision, Marines would be the first ground troops to fight on hostile shores to capture and defend naval installations.

While peace reigned Lejeune argued that the Marine Corps’ posture should be readiness. Marines needed to develop and train the force necessary for advance base seizure and defense.

“All, I believe, will agree that our training as an Advance Base organization, both as a mobile

10 John A. Lejeune, “The Mobile Defense of Advance Bases by the Marine Corps” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1916, 1. The footnote on the first page of this article reads “Lecture delivered to officers of Advance Base School, Philadelphia, in May, 1915. This paper is based very largely on Captain Earl Ellis’ lectures on Advance Bases.”

11 In the same article Lejeune defined advanced bases as follows: “As I understand the subject, the meaning of these words is too narrow to represent correctly the mission of this Brigade. Naval bases are classified in several ways. For our purposes the questions as to whether they are permanent or temporary, advance, or on the line of communications, or at home, etc., are not of as much importance as the question as to whether they are defended or undefended. It is my belief that the Marine Corps may be called upon to defend an undefended or partially defended naval base, or other important point on the coast irrespective of whether or not it be, strictly, an advance base.” (2) Lejeune’s main focus was on how Marines could defend insular and continental bases from enemy attacks. There is not much in the article on offensive maneuvers or the particulars of actual Advance Base seizure. That would come later with the works of Marine officer Earl Ellis. Lejeune’s defined insular and continental bases as follows: “By an insular base, fort, or city or thither locality, is meant one so situated that the attacking force can be met at the beach, there being no landing places beyond the radius of activity of the defending force.” (3) “By a continental base, etc., is meant one situated on a continent or on such a large island that the enemy may land at a distance from the base without opposition, and the defense of the base, fort, city, or other locality becomes the ordinary one of the preparation and occupation of a defensive position.” 3

12 Ibid., 1-2.
and as a fixed defense force, will best fit us for any or all of these roles,” he claimed, “and that such training should, therefore, be adopted as our special peace mission.” Preparing for war (i.e. advanced base training) would be the Corps’ peacetime mission, the commodity that it produced for society. Lejeune affirmed that preparedness was the goal when he argued, “Surely, this is a mission worthwhile, and one which furnishes a spur to energetic effort and zealous labor in time of peace, so as to attain the true soldier’s Elysian state, ‘preparedness for war.’” In terms of what Marines communicated among themselves, especially among the officer corps, preparedness for war was a primary concern in Marine culture. Lejeune and other Marines felt the Corps had much to prepare for, especially with the supposed “war to end all wars” raging across the Atlantic.

In fact, it was the Great War itself, not advance base seizure or defense, which prompted Major John H. Russell to publish “A Plea for a Mission and Doctrine” in the June 1916 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. He opened the essay: “As information from war torn Europe gradually drifts across the Atlantic, we learn of the use of new implements of war and the consequent changes to modern tactics.” He wrote that the forces engaged in Europe were the “Standard of Efficiency” to which Marines should measure themselves. Russell had measured the Marine Corps and found it wanting. Essentially, Marines had not paid enough attention to their own mission and doctrine. His hopes for the Corps’ future, like Lejeune’s, involved combat

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13 Ibid., 2.
Russell and Lejeune cared about the Corps’ reputation, which they believed would be enhanced through advanced base warfare and offensive action. They cared about glory and prestige, not just efficiency. For Lejeune being the first to fight as an advanced base organization would give Marines “the glory always resting on those who strike the first blows.”\(^\text{17}\) And for Russell, the adoption of an offensive doctrine “would greatly increase the . . . prestige of the Marine Corps.”\(^\text{18}\) With these assertions, the authors drifted away from the more tangible principles of efficiency and into the realm of cultural beliefs about what it meant to be a prestigious and elite institution.

Prior to the Great War, Marines used masculine imagery to depict the very ideals of glory and prestige that Russell and Lejeune espoused. Images of Marines storming beaches with rifles at the ready saturated their institutional publications. They placed three reoccurring images on recruiting posters and in *The Marines Magazine*. Entitled “U.S. Marines: Soldiers of the Sea,” “First to Fight,” and “Join the U.S. Marine Corps: Soldiers of the Sea,” they depict Marines attacking landward from the sea. These Marines appear masculine because of how they look and what they are doing. They are athletic, strong, and appear ready for a fight which were qualities associated with virile masculinity in early twentieth century America.\(^\text{19}\) “The Marines of our service are the finest trained body of riflemen in the world,” read the *Recruiters’ Bulletin*, because they were “the first men to land when the Navy has to land forces in turbulent districts; scattered in advanced posts over half the world, where the United States holds sway.”\(^\text{20}\) These

\(^{17}\) Lejeune, ““Mobile Defense,” 1-2.  
^{18}\) Russell, “Plea for a Doctrine,” 122.  
images serve as examples of how Marines expressed these ideas on mission and doctrine, both vital parts of the institution’s identity, through masculine imagery.

Figure 1: “Join the U.S. Marine Corps: Soldiers of the Sea”

Figure 2: “First to Fight”
*The Marines Magazine, June 1917, 1.*
Readiness coursed through other institutional publications that drew inspiration from Marines’ service in Latin America. Charles A. Ketcham, *The Marines Magazine* editor, offered an explanation as to why Marines cared so much about preparedness. “The Marine Corps is prepared for active service because it is generally engaged in active service,” he argued.\(^{21}\) Ketcham contended that the U.S. government’s decisions to deploy Marines on short notice to places such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Vera Cruz were demonstrations of the importance of readiness. “A large percentage of our men in recent years have had real experience in the field . . . actual service, demanding professional fitness and personal courage, and giving the men involved invaluable experience in the service of security and information and in actual field operations under fire,” Ketcham claimed. The frequency of their expeditions helped Marines distinguish themselves from the Army, whose missions involved more large-scale conflicts.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{22}\) Ketcham, “Marine Corps Efficiency,” 12.
Congress, he asserted, would be loathe to approve the necessary funding and legislation to raise an army for police actions in the Caribbean and Latin America. Yet America’s interests in those regions meant one thing to Ketcham: “the Marine Corps is prepared and must be prepared.” Ketcham concluded that in order for Marines to carry out their array of possible duties they had to be “trained not only as infantry, but as artillery, heavy and light, as engineers, as sappers and pioneers, as signalmen, and even as cavalry when necessary.”

Ketcham claimed, and wanted his readers to know, that a Marine should be able to do any task required of him.

Being ready for any mission required a high level of flexibility, the ability to switch from one task to another seamlessly. An image that came out in the June 1917 issue of *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* graphically represented how Marines liked to portray their flexibility. “All in the Day’s Work,” by Charles Gatchell is a busy image. Marines are conducting landing parties, training for street riots, practicing saber and cavalry drills, and fighting sham battles. They are also marching, rowing, and wall climbing. This busyness was the point. This image implied that Marines expected each other to be men ready for any task.

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23 Ibid., 12 (Author’s emphasis).
24 Ibid.
Another author, who went by the initials C.L.S., called on his Marine readership to take readiness seriously, for those who did not failed to live up to the Corps’ standards. For men to be ready and flexible they required constant and consistent training and the exercising of the body and mind to master any situation. C.L.S. warned: “If you are not ambitious; if you do not keep your brain active in figuring out what you would have done in some tight corner, in some
special situation which required quick thinking, quick action, you are not a true Marine.”25 The Marines’ ideal man, therefore, had the inner qualities of intelligence, initiative, and problem-solving skills. These attributes were signs of his character, one of the most important measuring sticks for Victorian notions of manhood.

The importance of readiness and flexibility coursed through other writings in The Marines Magazine as well. One author pointed out that flexibility translated into frequent study of various duties and constant training for various tasks. “For the last sixteen years I have seen officers and men of the Marine Corps up late at night working on some detail,” claimed First Sergeant Charles Dunbeck, “or trying to fathom some job or duties that had been assigned to the Corps . . . while their friends from the Army and Navy were lounging around the plaza listening to the evening concert.”26 He claimed that a Marine had to be ready for anything because “tomorrow he must build a bridge, lay 50 miles of submarine cable, erect a wireless station, mine the harbor at Culebra, and next month mount 12-inch guns on Grande Island, and upon returning to the States he finds himself Captain of an infantry company, to drill against the crack outfits from the Army and Navy, at Madison Square.”27 For Marines, Dunbeck asserted, their education comes not from specialized study at war colleges but from doing the job of a Marine around the world. “The Marine is not a soldier, sailor, nor a man from the engineer service corps, but nevertheless it takes all of these qualifications to make a good Marine,” Dunbeck claimed.28

When Marines did not live up to these standards, their manhood came into question. A tactic recruiters used to fill manpower quotas was to entice former Marines to reenter the Corps. Ketcham printed a letter from one, named Floyd M. Showalter, to make a point about the

28 Ibid., 11.
manhood of the men who fell short of the Corps’ ideal. Showalter wrote that “When there occurs a renaissance in military affairs . . . when those in power cease to follow the English caste system . . . when military and naval forces cease their ceremonies and circus parading . . . when as in the French army, there is a better understanding and confidence existing between enlisted men and officer, then I shall return to the colors.” 29 Ketcham responded by casting aspersions on Showalter’s manliness. He wrote:

He was not big enough to impress his own worth and significance as a man and soldier upon his officers. A “thin-skinned” man who does not possess a sense of proportion and of relative values conditioned upon time, place and circumstance, has a hard time in a military organization. Poor Floyd—good chap, no doubt, but he didn’t “catch on.” 30 Ketcham argued that Showalter was not man enough for the Marine Corps or any other military institution because he lacked a strong and assertive character. Being a “thin-skinned” man in Victorian cultural parlance meant being overly sensitive and thus unmanly. 31

These Marines did not pull these ideas from thin air. These discourses on readiness, identity, and manhood stemmed from the Corps’ involvement in military actions in Mexico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo and from the influence of the Great War in Europe on American military thought. Leading up to America’s entry into the Great War, discourses on how well the United States would respond if drawn into a war with another major power circulated around the country. Within these debates preparedness often became a measuring stick for America’s manhood. Some people understood that it was the manhood of the nation that would have to chase the wolf from the door if necessary. 32 “If the scourge of war should visit this fair land, we

31 Rotundo, American Manhood, 224-225; Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 172; Kimmel, Manhood in America, 88.
32 Kimmel, Manhood in America, 134; Filene, Him/Her/Self, 70; and “In Time of War,” 321-324.
would be found ready for it,” Alfred Percival, a columnist for the Syracuse Herald, claimed, “The manhood of the country would rise en masse to drive the hated foe away from our borders.” Some people, however, questioned that premise.

The Preparedness Movement

Between 1914 and 1917 a military preparedness campaign swept through the United States. One historian argues that, “by the fall of 1915, preparedness had become a popular fad and a craze, riding the progressive currents of national efficiency and individual duty.” Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Major General Leonard Wood, called for Army reform and national military readiness perhaps louder than any general officer of all the armed forces. The Army he left for retirement in 1914 could not stand up to any Army in Europe, he argued, because it was too small, too spread out, and too disorganized. It took the Army a long six weeks to assemble at the border of Mexico when the Mexican Revolution erupted in 1911. He claimed, “Our people have forgotten, in the rush and turmoil incident to the development of the national resources and the industries of our great country, the unnecessary cost both in blood and treasure of our past wars, and remember only that somehow or other we emerged from them successfully.” The Navy and Marine Corps became wrapped up in this campaign as well.

In response to the preparedness movement, Marines claimed that they were prepared to protect American interests at home and abroad. “Always prepared and ready for action,” is how

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Sergeant Claud Johnson described Marines.38 “While the entire country is crying ‘preparedness,’ the Marine Corps answers, ‘we are prepared,’” wrote Captain L.M. Harding in a proposed recruiting pamphlet. As a recruiter, Harding wanted to use the preparedness movement to convince young men to join the Corps. He asked applicants to consider joining the only service that was always prepared to protect their country and each other. He supplemented his argument with a direct reference to Marine manhood: “Its ranks are filled with young men of the highest qualities and highest ambitions.”39 In doing so, he made the quality of manhood an ingredient of preparedness.

Writers began to link preparedness to the strength of American manhood. If the former was weak then so was the latter. These ideas had been around for a few years by the time the Great War started. Homer Lea, a popular writer at the time, claimed that the United States was woefully unprepared for war and connected military unpreparedness with weak manhood in his 1909 book The Valor of Ignorance. He argued that Americans suffered from delusions: that they were safe from military invasion, that they need not concern themselves with military readiness, and that the United States could be a great nation without going to war. It took a certain level of valor to wallow purposefully in that kind of ignorance, he asserted, hence the book’s title and central theme. “Whenever a nation (the U.S. in this case) becomes excessively opulent and arrogant,” he argued, “at the same time being without military power to defend its opulence or support its arrogance, it is in a dangerous position.”40 He likened the nation to a man who needs to grow and become stronger to survive. He wrote:

40 Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1909), 20-21. Homer Lea was a diminutively small Coloradóan born in 1876 who had a penchant for military history and a desire to command troops in battle from a young age. His physical disabilities (i.e. bad eyes, chronic headaches, and he most likely had scoliosis) kept him out of military service in the United States. He went to China where he allegedly commanded
As manhood marks the height of physical vigor among mankind, so the military successes of a nation mark the zenith of its physical greatness. The decline of physical strength in the individual is significant of disease or old age culminating in death. In the same manner deterioration of military strength or militant capacity in a nation marks its decline; and, if there comes not a national renascence of it, decay will set in . . . 41

He claimed it possible for German or Japanese armies to land on either coast of the United States without much resistance. 42 Lea’s warnings tapped into a sentiment that appeared in other works as well.

R. Swinburne Clymer argued in 1914 that the United States had much to lose if its manhood was weak. “The moment a nation loses its sense of manhood and strength,” he wrote, “at that moment does it begin to decay and to decline.” 43 A people without strong manhood risked decline and foreign subjugation at the hands of manlier nations. Therefore, the United States needed “Manhood—virile, vigorous, strong, self-reliant, self-assertive manhood,” to survive the age. 44 Officials in the federal government echoed these sentiments. “A nation stands or falls, succeeds or fails, just in proportion to the high-mindedness, cleanliness, and manliness of each succeeding generation of men,” claimed a writer for the U.S. War Department. 45

Frederick Louis Huidekoper’s The Military Unpreparedness of the United States (1915) aimed to make Americans aware of the need to make ready in case of war. Major General Wood asserted that this book should be “carefully read by all Americans who are interested in the military history and policy of the country, and who desire to replace our past haphazard policy

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Chinese troops in battle. Lea came back to the United States after his adventures and felt deeply disturbed by the indifference to national defense that he saw there; Clare Boothe, introduction to Homer Lea’s 1942 edition of Valor of Ignorance, xxii-xxiii.

41 Lea, Valor of Ignorance, 9.
42 Ibid., 16.
by one which will be adequate to secure a reasonable degree of preparedness without in any way
building up a condition of militarism.”⁴⁶ Huidekoper argued that the United States had been
unprepared for every war it fought and that the defense policy (as of 1915) was as inadequate as
the policies of the past. He criticized Army organization and size, recruitment policies, length of
enlistments, dependence upon raw troops and their inefficiency in war, the combination of
regulars with volunteers and militia, lax discipline, and the indifference of the government and
the American people alike.⁴⁷ Some Marines were aware of and probably read Huidekoper’s book
with interest. The Marine Corps Gazette published a review of the book in June 1916 which
said, “The work is invaluable as an authoritative reference and would be equally invaluable to
the library of every student of the military art.”⁴⁸

Newspapers printed pieces that reflected these concerns as well. John T. McCutcheon’s
cartoon that appeared in the Joplin Globe on August 7, 1915, provides an example of how
military readiness supporters communicated their message to the general public and linked
readiness to American manhood. McCutcheon presented nine different types of Americans he
identified as “Dangerous Citizens” because of their unwillingness to support military
preparedness. The first three citizens appear guilty of gross ignorance concerning military
affairs. “The man who thinks the United States can lick all creation,” “The Man who thinks one
American can lick any five foreigners,” and, “The peace at any price man who thinks that

⁴⁶ Wood, in the introduction to The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, xiii.
inability of Congress and the American people to comprehend that military resources can only be utilized to best
advantage by the central Government to which the entire nation owes paramount allegiance; that war cannot be
conducted with that degrees of efficiency which the people have a right to demand in return for their sacrifices
unless the Government wields its power despotically; and that any delegation of that power to the States must
obviously weaken the national military strength and correspondingly increase the national expenditures beyond all
justification.”
⁴⁸ Anonymous, “Review of The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, by Frederick Louis
Huidekoper,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1916, 184.
gentleness and persuasion can prevail against an envious and determined enemy,” were all ignorant about the world and Americans’ place within it.

The next three citizens called for other people’s sons to fight well trained and dangerous troops but refused to let their own sons serve. “The man who wants the United States to adopt a firm stand against Germany, but who doesn’t want his son to fight in case of war,” “The man who would send untrained undisciplined troops against a trained and well organized enemy,” and “The mother who didn’t raise her son to be a soldier, but expects some other mother’s son to protect her in time of national danger,” all appear selfish and misguided. The mother and father of these three who protect their sons from military service seem to emasculate them. The man standing behind his mother holding a flower and dressed like a child illustrates this best.

The last three men are guilty of feigning patriotism and support for military preparedness. “The man who doesn’t know that an army without strong artillery would stand no more show in a modern war than a snowball in Mexico,” “The yap statesmen who orates about the glory of the flag, but who voted against every attempt to provide adequate protection for it,” and “The man who thinks that the richest most defenseless of all great nations can have a Monroe Doctrine and an Open Door in China policy without running the risk of getting into a war” are all just as damaging to the country as the others. Ignorant citizens and politicians shared the blame for America’s unpreparedness.

These images of white middle-class American men (and one woman) drew their persuasive power from their various distortions of masculinity. The man standing behind his mother, for example, has a jejune countenance and is wearing a child’s sailor uniform. By hiding behind his mother, he is more like a child than a man. McCutcheon probably received inspiration from discourses on the perceived damage that over-nurturing women inflicted on
young boys in America. Renowned psychologist Dr. G. Stanley Hall influenced much of this thinking. “Feminization of the school spirit, discipline, and personnel is bad for boys,” he argued, because women taught adolescent males genteel manners too soon, before “the brute and animal element have had opportunity to work themselves off in a healthful normal way.”

Leading up to World War I many American intellectuals, public figures, politicians, and military officers argued that the men of their country suffered from emasculation. Between the Civil War and the Spanish American War, some men felt emasculated because of the closing of the frontier, the concentration of capital, and rapid industrialization. They had lost their manly individualism and the ability to own their own land, control their own labor, and secure economic independence. Europe seemed in its death throes from the Great War, with men sacrificing their lives and putting their manhood to the ultimate test.

Military preparedness supporters often targeted the “Peace at any price man,” shown in the top right, as being particularly unmanly. He has a naïve smirk on his face and prefers “gentleness and persuasion . . . against an envious and determined enemy” because he himself is too gentle in the face of danger, which is not something that was associated with white middle class Victorian manhood. For example, Dr. William Lee Howard, author of *Sex Problems in Worry and Work*, argued that the “peace-at-any-price” variety of man is the result of an embarrassing physiological condition. Those men suffer from being “hysterical, always voluble

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and argumentative, but never decided or physically pugnacious.” Howard claimed this was the result of “early guiding of the boy through women’s eyes, ideas and emotions.”

Not long after the appearance of the “Dangerous Citizens” cartoon, some civilians looked to the Marine Corps as a fine example of military preparedness. A writer for the New York Evening Post wrote “Let Congress look at the Marines,” regarding the question of preparedness. He pointed to the Marines as a service that Americans could be proud of because “its admirable efficiency, the smartness, the neatness, the excellent set-up of the men and the esprit de corps of

Figure 5: “Dangerous Citizens”
*Joplin Globe, August 7, 1915.*

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its officers.”53 By addressing the Marines’ physical appearances this author commented on their masculinity more so than their manhood. Both ideas were intrinsic elements regarding the Marines and the preparedness movement.

Of course, others promoted different narratives. As one historian has pointed out, many Americans were probably indifferent to these debates.54 But American isolationists, pacifists, and progressives who saw war as a potential hindrance to their social and economic reforms put ink to paper proclaiming the futility of war and espoused the United States’ need to stay out of world affairs.55 While the proponents of military preparedness sided with Homer Lea and Huidekoper, others agreed with Norman Angell’s view that, “military power is socially and economically futile,” and that, “war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which people strive.”56 Angell argued that among industrialized nations, war would be too deadly and expensive to make any gains in territory worth the investment. William Jennings Bryan was a progressive “peace at any price man” who worked hard during his tenure as Secretary of State to keep the United States out of conflict.57 He wrote that military preparedness did not keep people safe but rather provoked war. “If preparedness would have stopped war there would be no war in Europe today,” he argued. “Had we been prepared for war with a big navy and army then we would have been in it long before this time.”58

55 Zieger, America’s Great War, 33; Kennedy, Over Here, 49; John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974), 122.
58 “Let us Lead a World at War to a World at Peace Former Secretary of State Urged Against Military Preparedness by U.S.” The Columbus Ledger (Columbus GA) November 25, 1915.
Anti-preparedness advocates evoked Victorian ideals of manhood, too, when they claimed that real bravery did not constitute giving in to one’s passions but rather restraining oneself from violence. Self-control, the ability to subdue one’s baser passions, was a common trait associated with manly character. Reverend Arthur P. Schultz preached that battlefield courage was only one form of bravery and that it “is of very low grade” because animals have the same form of courage. The difference was that animals lack self-control. Moral courage to stay out of a fight is much more commendable because, “the man who fights is only allowing the brute nature within himself to have full rein.” For authors like Shultz, manhood and national honor were not wrapped up in bellicosity, warmongering, and violence. They wanted American men to abhor war and did everything in their power to argue against it.

This rhetoric formed the context within which Marines constructed masculine images and narratives for themselves. Marines created manly images to define their identity and distinguish themselves in this political and cultural milieu. Their art and prose told stories about how a true Marine was a man ready, tough, and capable of any task put before him. Many of the writings that promoted readiness, preparedness, flexibility, and efficiency, therefore, were descriptions of the type of man Marines expected each other to be. These values were more than advertising slogans meant to fill the pages of recruiting pamphlets. They reveal that a kind of manliness, one that involved flexibility and readiness, was a foundational element of Marine identity and, at least in the Corps’ view, set them apart from regular soldiers, sailors, and civilians.


White Manhood

Whiteness, served as another crucial element of World War I-era Marine Corps identity.61 Far in the future, in the early 1970s, the director of the Marine Corps History and Museums division wrote, “Today’s generation of Marines serve in a fully integrated Corps. . . . Black officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates are omnipresent, their service so normal a part of Marine life that it escapes special notice.”62 The inverse was true six decades before: the complete absence of African Americans from the ranks of the Marine Corps was so pronounced that it escaped any special notice at all.

Whiteness was a broadly accepted precondition to becoming a Marine. In fact, the Marine Corps around this time was the only branch of service that had not enlisted men of color, a practice dating back to 1798. The Army and Navy had enlisted African Americans to suit their needs in the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. According to Ralph W. Donnelly and Henry I. Shaw, records exist of slaves serving in the Marine Corps during the War for American Independence, but after the Marines came back into legislated existence in 1798, they did not enlist blacks until World War II. From 1798 until 1941, “The Navy restricted its black volunteers to steward duty,” Shaw and Donnelly have asserted, “and the Marine Corps accepted no blacks at all.”63

Perhaps because of this racial exclusion, Marine Corps institutional journals and magazines generally refrained from mentioning people of color. There are a few clues, however, that help shed light on how Marines perceived African Americans leading up to the Great War.

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61 In this context meaning being of European descent without any Native American, Asian, or African ancestry.
63 Shaw and Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps, x.
*The Marines Magazine* and *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* published anecdotes for enlisted audiences interspersed throughout each issue. The *Bulletin* recounted a story in 1915 where two Marines, Sergeants Perry K. Tompkins and James F. Taite, spotted a man wearing a Marine blouse on a street in St Louis. He was Rufus White, an African American. Thinking at first that they were looking at a fellow Marine, they were “greatly startled to see Rufus’ dusky countenance.” Taite and Thompson would not stand for a black man wearing a Marine uniform. Rufus ran as they approached but they eventually cornered him. “Rufus said he found the blouse and that it was all he had to wear,” the author claimed. The two Marines took the blouse from him, returned to the recruiting office and burned it.

Another story in *The Marines Magazine* involved a joke about two Army artillerymen, two Marines, and two African Americans. The story proceeded:

Two darkies in the middle of the street were “argufying” as to just what branch of the service these men represented. Says one darkey, “Dose sojers are from the arsnl,” says the other, “dose gen’men are ’ Jirenes,” and I knows, cause on de caps I sees the picture of de rooster on de moon.”

The “rooster on de moon” is a reference to the eagle, globe, and anchor emblem that Marines wore on their uniforms to distinguish themselves from the Army and Navy. As the passage implies, Marines promoted a popular racial stereotype at the time that conveyed African Americans as intellectually inferior. Marines also did not spare overseas people of African or Asian descent of racial categorizing and dehumanization. One author described service overseas for Marines as “chasing Southeast mongrels and niggers.”

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One story that came out in the August 1917 issue of *The Marines Magazine* illustrates how Marines perceived African American valor. Race riots in St. Louis reminded one author of his conversation with Corporal Louis Kroeck about a shoot-out that occurred in a southern town between whites and blacks a few years previous. The story read:

The whites swept the field and there was a general stampede of the black clans. One of the negroes excitedly told his experiences to Kroeck the next day and, while taking credit for great valor, admitted that he had retired hastily from the field of battle. “I bet you ran like the wind,” remarked Kroeck. “Not ‘exactly,’” replied the negro, “but I passed a whole bunch of othuhs who was runnin like the wind.”

The author here associated “running like the wind” with African American cowardice, the very opposite of their preferred behavior in combat.

Despite racial exclusions, Marines of the time wrote as though the Corps was a melting pot of many races. Sergeant Luther H. La Barre claimed that American men were great soldiers and sailors because of immigration and “intermingling.” “We have the Irish with their wit, the English solidarity (sic), the Jewish thrift, the French valor and the Yankee progressiveness,” he wrote, “intermingling in marriage and giving us children with a wider scope of knowledge and temperament, making them good citizens and better soldiers than an army composed of one nationality.” It is doubtful that his omission of African Americans would have received any special notice by white Americans during this time. But that simply illustrates further that, first and foremost, Marines, “the branch with the greatest opportunities—sailor, soldier, and gentleman,” were of white complexion without exception.

The Marines’ ideal man, always ready, adaptable, strong, patriotic, and white, appears often in their poetry. Jack O’Donovan’s “Remember the U.S. Marine” starts out acknowledging the quality of the Army and Navy as military institutions. “But when going o’er the dispatches,”

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he wrote, “There’s a name that is always seen / And when landing he’s in the first batches / fore where work is, you find the / Marines.” 70 Marines, wherever the government sent them, completed their missions with patriotic zeal, according to O’Donovan. “And no matter where you send him / To uphold the starry FLAG / He takes the job and goes in with a vim / And never a heart does lag” he wrote. 71 One could not praise the U.S. military or the fighting spirit of its Soldiers and Sailors without including the Marines. “So, when singing the praises of Uncle Sam / And describing some desperate scene / twill be incomplete if you don’t include / THE UNITED STATES MARINE,” he concluded. 72

William J. Candee’s poem, “The Marine,” placed emphasis on Marines’ patriotism and fighting abilities. This poem is rife with masculine exceptionalism, a common trope in the stories and images Marines constructed for each other. “I am a soldier of the sea / With hard two-fisted hands / Old Glory’s fought her way with me / Through many foreign lands / I place the way in mortal strife / Of fighters, I am dean / These words express my place in life: / UNITED STATES MARINE” 73 Like O’Donovan’s poem, Candee links combat prowess and patriotism with rugged masculine identity.

Racial tones came up in poetry as well, especially the kind that drew upon Marines’ history of foreign intervention. The poem “Ask Them” mentioned many of the different races that Marines had encountered over the years. “Mention to the swarthy greaser / ‘Billy Blue U.S. Marine’ / if you want to see a mortal turn in fright to shades of green,” the author wrote, in all likelihood referring to Filipinos. 74 The author moved on to the island of Hispaniola next. “Ask

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70 Jack O’Donovan, “Remember the U.S. Marine,” The Marines Magazine, January 1917, 44.
71 O’Donovan, “Remember the U.S. Marine,” 44.
72 Ibid., 14.
the coal Black son of Haiti,” he continued, “What he knows of Billy Blue / And he’ll tell you he’s a fighter / For he has reason, too.”75 Finally he reached back to the Marines’ expeditions in the nineteenth century:

Ask the haughty Spanish soldier
Ask the sons of Tripoli
Ask the yellow skinned Coreans [sic]
For the straight veracity.

And they’ll tell you the same old story
That they’d rather tackle TWO
Howling demons linked together
Than ONE sturdy Billy Blue 76

This poem demonstrates how Marines used fights against racially distinct foreigners as badges of honor. Defeating them in battle meant Marines were superior soldiers and men. The Times Picayune published a report just after the 1914 Marine landing at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Marines advanced “Steadily in the face of a hail of bullets from Mexican guns,” the author wrote. “Men who had never before had seen service fought like veterans, and showed what American manhood can do.”77

Marines used this kind of racialized imagery to compare their manhood to that of other branches of the military well. One poem describes a violent scene from the perspective of a Sailor who did not care for Marines at all until one fateful day. The poem described a landing party of Sailors (Blue Jackets or “Jackies”) on a tropical island being attacked by natives. “Was jumped on by niggers, a thousand or more,” wrote the poet, “An’ there in the jungle we dropped to our knees / An’ fought for our lives in the brush an’ the trees.”78 The landing party feared the

76 Ibid.
worst but U.S. Marines came to the rescue, chased off the attackers, and saved the lives of all of the grateful Sailors. “We seen their old khaki, an’ say, in that muss / It looks like the garments of angels to us / The niggers they left that particular scene / An’ me—I was kissing’ a U.S. Marine,” the poem continued. The author depicted these Marines as the heroes of the story who proved their worth in a tight spot against tropical natives.

The author concluded the poem with a stanza praising the manhood of Marines. It included elements Marines used to promote their own masculine identity:

An’t that’s how I learned—as I should have known then—
That U.S. Marines is some Regular Men,
The first ones ashore, and’ the last to come back,
When trouble is started with white men or black;
Yes, call ’em “ship’s flatties,” and “leathernecks,” too,
They’re first-class he-fighters, who uses their beans,
An’—only a fool would say “Damn the Marines”\(^\text{79}\)

Marines liked to concoct stories of how they were the protectors and saviors of their fellow white men in foreign countries. They essentially created narratives of Marines as manly men, whose fighting prowess made them better than civilians, soldiers, sailors, and people of color.

**Kipling and Marine Identity**

Some Marines took the representation of masculine identity in prose and imagery very seriously. An example of this was a discussion over how well Rudyard Kipling’s poetry represented their lives. The enlisted Marines’ debate over Kipling had to do with popular conceptions of what a Marine was and what he could do as a man. One Marine described Kipling as having “won the admiration of thousands of service men all over the world by faithful portrayal of their life, his stirring narratives of their deeds of valor and his red-blooded tales of their noble sacrifices.”\(^\text{80}\) Marines particularly identified with “Soldier an’ Sailor Too,” from

Kipling’s 1892 *Barrack-Room Ballads*. Great Britain’s Royal Regiment of Marines inspired the poem but U.S. Marines felt a common bond with this institution due to the similar nature of their services and history.\(^{82}\)

By 1918, “Soldier An’ Sailor Too” had been around for twenty-five years and Marines adopted the poem as a literary representation of their institution. They seemed to like the following lines in particular:

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\begin{align*}
\text{An’, after, I met’ im all over the world, a-doin’ all kinds of things,} \\
\text{Like landin’ isself with a Gatlin’ gun to talk to them’ eaten kings;} \\
\text{‘E sleeps in an’ ammick instead of a cot, an’ ‘e drills with the deck on a slew,} \\
\text{For there isn’t a job on the top o’ the earth the beggar don’t know,} \\
\text{nor do—} \\
\text{You can leave’ im at night on a bald man’s ‘ead to paddle ’ is own canoe—} \\
\text{‘E’s a sort of a bloomin’ cosmopolouse-soldier and sailor too.} \quad \text{83}
\end{align*}
\]

Within these lines are characterizations of many things Marines liked to say about themselves leading up to the Great War. They served all over the world protecting American interests. They served in the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua to quell uprisings and guard American commercial property. Marines claimed they could do any job with which their government tasked them.

But not everyone appreciated Kipling’s characterization of Marines in “Soldier An’ Sailor, Too.” Sergeant Major Thomas R. Carney argued in the February 1917 issue of *The Marines Magazine* that Kipling characterized Marines as men culled from the dregs of society. “After toilsomely plodding through his pages,” Carney asserted, “one cannot but conclude that


\[\text{82 Kuhlen, “Kipling,” 63; Kuhlen asserted that “Kipling has gone far towards acquainting the uninitiated with the life of the serviceman, English or American. We belong to the same fraternity,” 65.}\]

\[\text{83 Kipling, “Soldier and Sailor, Too,” 427.}\]
the man in the ranks is an uncouth, blasphemous being, without principle or morals, devoid of human traits except thirst and appetite, and speaking a barbarous dialect unheard of until Kipling invented it.” Carney referred to the following lines as misrepresentations: “We’re most of us liars, we’re arf of us thieves / and the rest are as rank as can be / but once in a while we can finish in style / which I ope won’t happen to me.” Uncouth, blasphemous, immoral, and illiterate men, men of ill repute and bad character—these were not candidates for the rank and file of the Marine Corps.

Marines’ fondness of Kipling irritated Carney for a couple of reasons. First, Carney argued that language of that sort painted the speaker, who was taken as a representative of the enlisted man, as an “illiterate buffoon.” Second, Carney claimed that Kipling patronized Marines and even appeared contemptuous of them. For example:

I have never been able to discern, after all my ramblings through the overgrown fields of his verbiage, whether Kipling in his work is actuated by a patrician contempt for the man behind the gun, or whether he really holds him in some such patronizing regard as the pompous adult does the child whom he condescends to address in what he fancies is only language the object of his attentions is capable of comprehending. And still an innate viciousness displays itself ever and anon in the course of his maudlin vaporing that precludes an unreserved acceptance of the latter assumption.

According to Carney, Kipling made Marines sound less like men and more like children in need of adult supervision.

Something important was at stake, according to Carney. The people who needed the most convincing of the Marine Corps’ value to America’s manhood would be further convinced that the military was not for their sons if Marines kept using Kipling’s work to promote their identity. “A deluded world reads on,” he wrote, “and men with minds poisoned against the man

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86 Ibid., 8.
in khaki . . . raise up their hands and offer thanks . . . that they are not as these benighted publican soldiers, and un-Spartan mothers welcome with unholy rapture the thought that their sons are not to be raised to be defenders of their flag!”87 Worst of all for Carney was the fact that Marine recruiters used Kipling’s “A Soldier an’ Sailor Too” on recruiting pamphlets for Americans to read. “How far can we blame them,” he reasoned, “when we have given place and publicity to the scurrility of this Cagliostro of Literature in our military papers, magazine, and – Heaven save the mark!—in our recruiting publications!”88 He referred to an image used by recruiters and seen on recruiting pamphlets before and during World War I.

Figure 6: “Kipling Poem”


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87 Ibid., 8-9.
88 Ibid., 9.
The discussion that followed revolved around Marine identity and how well Kipling characterized the kinds of men who served in the military in general and the Corps in particular. Marines responded to Carney’s salvo against Kipling in subsequent issues of *The Marines Magazine*. Sergeant Paul F. Howard reported that a few Marines in his Iona Island, New York, detachment agreed with Carney to a certain extent. “First Sergeant Lewis thinks that the type of soldier described by Kipling is ‘the liar, the thief, the reprobate,’” he wrote, but that neither he (Howard) nor his First Sergeant had ever met a man of that sort in the Marine Corps or in the British Royal Marines.\(^8^9\) Howard asserted that those who condemned Kipling’s characterization of Marines did so because they thought the poet used a negative stereotype much the way Shakespeare did in some of his plays. “The whole objection of some Marines to Kipling seems to be like the objection of some few Hebrews to the ‘Merchant of Venice,’” Howard claimed, “Shakespeare did not make Shylock talk and act like a modern clothing merchant.”\(^9^0\) He pointed out that very few Marines took issue with Kipling’s description of enlisted men in the military.

Corporal A.A. Kuhlen defended Kipling and the servicemen who liked his work because the poet wrote in a manly style that Marines appreciated. Kuhlen argued that Marines preferred Kipling’s style to Carney’s because it was less pretentious. Carney used phrases like, “that *chef doevre* of vesicular vulgarity,” and “the evil-smelling pen of this modern Thersites” that were much worse that Kipling’s “E sleeps in an ‘ammick instead of a cot, an’ ‘e drills with the deck on a slew.”\(^9^1\) Marines saw straight talk as a masculine virtue and had little patience for ostentatious vocabulary, according to Kuhlen. “Why is Kipling the special bard of the service man?” Kuhlen asked rhetorically, “Because service men as a whole are red-blooded and vertebrate and prefer

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\(^9^0\) Howard, “Iona Island,” 25.
he-talk to meaningless twelve-cylindered words which express two cylindered ideas.” 92 He went on to explain in more gendered language why Marines identified with Kipling’s “Soldier An’ Sailor Too” and why they liked the poet:

They like a man’s man and have little use for the ninny or fossil. Kipling appeals to them as a man. Furthermore, he exploits, in his inimitable way, their works, he lives with them in spirit, he knows their ideals, their joys and their sorrows, he knows they are human, he understands and sympathizes with them. And we always have a feeling of kinship for those who know us and can appreciate our deeds. 93

While Carney complained that Kipling made Marines look like reprobates, Kuhler argued that to characterize Marines as paragons of virtue was equally egregious. “We resent being styled angels, fully as we resent being called ‘bums’ and ‘illiterates,’” he asserted, because neither represented the kind of men Kuhler believed Marines to be. 94

Kuhler also argued that Kipling made civilians more familiar with the manly superiority of the serviceman. “I believe it is generally conceded that the average American fighting man is mentally and physically superior to the average American civilian,” Kuhler claimed, “and Kipling has gone far towards acquainting the uninitiated with the life of the serviceman.” 95 For Kuhler, and perhaps other Marines like him, Kipling’s “A Soldier An’ Sailor Too” represented the Marines’ masculine identity. He concluded that “Kipling has won the admiration of thousands of servicemen all over the world by faithful portrayal of their life, his stirring narratives of their deeds of valor and his red-blooded tales of their noble sacrifices.” 96 The Marines in this discussion probably never settled the debate. When the U.S. entered the Great War, Marines appeared to drop the issue for more pressing concerns.

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92 Kuhlen, “Kipling,” 63-64.
93 Ibid., 63.
94 Ibid., 64.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
Making Men

One of the most important services that Marines believed they contributed to society was making men out of its citizenry. They created images that suggested that young men underwent a physical and mental change during the process of becoming a Marine. Essentially, the Marines had improved their bodies and their character by joining the Corps according to the imagery and stories they published for each other’s amusement. Upon graduation from recruit training new Marines had gone through an experience that made them more masculine and enhanced their manhood.

Physically speaking, they stood more erect with protruding chests, with their shoulders rolled back, their heads held high. In one image entitled “Port Royal Munitions Factory,” the artist presents three images of the same man. The first, from left to right, is a “Hayseed on arrival at Parris Island” with a weak chin and shoddy clothing. The image of “His First Uniform” shows the same recruit in the process of transforming into a Marine. His posture is slumped forward, and he appears uncomfortable. But the final image, “After a Year in the Service,” shows the finished product: a man with erect posture, a square jaw, a protruding chest, thicker legs, and an immaculate uniform.
This “finished product” was a man Uncle Sam could count on. The image entitled “Uncle Sam Knows” conveys the same notion. The Marines’ ideal man, white, disciplined, and dressed as though fully prepared for an expedition, stands at attention next to Uncle Sam. He proudly points toward the Marine as though showing him off to an audience, saying “Always Ready.”

The cover of *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* November 1917 issue plays on this same theme. Uncle Sam has his arm around a Marine with a square jaw and soldierly bearing saying, “My, how you’ve grown sonny!” Those who joined the Corps, so the reasoning went, became the
pride of their nation. The physical stature of these men implied confidence, strength, and readiness. While these images show the physical changes that men were expected to undergo, Marines wrote stories that demonstrated the improvement of their character as well.

![Figure 9: “Thanks Giving Number”](image)

Marine Corporal C. Hundertmark published “The Three Sons” in the January 1917 issue of *The Marines Magazine* and it illuminates how Marines thought life in the Corps benefited one’s character. Jimmie Hopper owned a farm in South Carolina. He had three sons, only one of whom, Frank, joined the Marine Corps, and therefore did not impose a burden on the family. Bob, the oldest, wasted his education and his father’s money in college after he spent most of his time in a cabaret chasing women. John, the middle son, graduated high school and worked for a bank but took on debts through gambling. “His mother was heartbroken, and only for her I gave him what money we had on hand and what we had banked for a rainy day . . . . The last we heard of him was when he had to leave the country,” Jimmie confessed bitterly.  

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It was Frank “who never cared much about books,” who made a man of himself the way his brothers never did by joining the Marine Corps as soon as he was old enough. “I did not approve of it at first,” Jimmy admitted, “but finally I gave in, thinking the soldier life and the strict discipline might make a man out of him.” With the money he earned in the Marine Corps, Frank helped his parents get out of financial trouble caused by his older brothers. Also, while at home on leave helping his aging father with farm work, Frank met a pretty, young local girl who Jimmie said “is going to be Frank’s partner for life in running things on this farm.” By saving his parents’ farm and winning the affections of a respectable young lady, Frank demonstrated that he was a man his family could depend on. According to this story, the Marine Corps enhanced Frank’s discipline, virility, and devotion to family and duty. It imbued him with Victorian manliness.

Conclusion

Within the Corps’ intra-service publications gender worked in several ways. Marines constructed a masculine identity through imagery and rhetoric that espoused readiness and flexibility to distinguish their institution from the Army, Navy, and civilians. This image construction was informed by two things: doctrinal debates that identified the importance of readiness and offensive action; and national interest in preparedness that stemmed from the Great War. Gender also worked as a means of promoting particular behaviors within the ranks. Often Marines understood desertion, training, courage, and their broader identity as an institution in terms of gender. Marines questioned the manliness of those whose courage faltered, who used language that was too intellectual, or who criticized the Corps. Marines saw themselves as soldiers of the sea who were ready to fight when their country needed them. But they also saw

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99 Ibid., 14.
themselves as members of a man-making institution, a service that churned out better citizens. Both ideas constitute how Marines understood their value to society.

By May 1917, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General George Barnett, convinced the Secretaries of the Army and Navy to send a regiment of Marines with the first American troops to France. \(^\text{100}\) What would become the 5\(^{\text{th}}\) Regiment of Marines set sail in June 1917. Marines exuded confidence going into the Great War. Drawing upon masculine rhetoric and imagery they told each other there was nothing Marines could not handle. “That the Marine Corps will conduct itself in a manner agreeable to the glorious traditions of its long history is a foregone conclusion,” claimed an author in *The Marines Magazine*. “Always prepared and always faithful, ready and able . . . to do what it is called upon to do, the Marine Corps will demonstrate upon occasion its keen fighting edge and the vigor of its stroke.” \(^\text{101}\) They also continued to steel each other for the trials ahead. Charles Ketcham told the readers of *The Marines Magazine* to “Start in right and square yourself with the best traditions of manliness and of the Marine Corps.” \(^\text{102}\) Those who did not do so, like Jimmie on the train to Montreal, revealed their emasculation.

McNab’s strategy of appealing to Jimmy’s manhood had the desired effect. His shaming made Jimmie “square” himself with the Corps’ manly ethos. The story ended with Jimmie wiping his tear-dimmed eyes, getting off at the next stop, and heading back to his unit to serve out his enlistment. A few years afterward, “James Decker had re-enlisted and had been reappointed a first sergeant.” \(^\text{103}\) McNab made the wayward young Marine realize that he risked becoming a fugitive and being labeled a coward. He learned that desertion from one’s duty was

\(^{100}\) Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 290-292.
\(^{103}\) Candee, “Sergeant McNab’s Strategy,” 9.
not manly behavior. Jimmie, who at first could not bear the thought of finishing his enlistment, then could not bear the thought of being a coward after his encounter with Sergeant McNab. So, he returned to his duty in the Corps, which is what Marines expected of each other.\textsuperscript{104}

Marines knew that appeals to manhood and masculine imagery were useful tools to communicate with outsiders as well. The Marine Corps Publicity Bureau and Marine recruiters would advertise the Corps’ manliness to the public and claim their institution was not only “the first to fight” but that it was good for American manhood. With the passage of the 1916 Naval Appropriations Act and the April 1917 declaration of war, the Marine Corps would expand greatly. Appeals to manhood would become a central part of the Corps’ recruiting efforts just before and during the Great War.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 8.
In the spring of 1918, a journalist interviewed Sergeant James F. Taite, a Marine recruiter stationed in St. Louis, Missouri, about the Marine Corps. “No other branch has turned out as many physically and mentally perfect men as it has,” Taite told the reporter. “It made a man out me,” Taite claimed, “I am better physically, mentally, and morally. I have been in a place that is among men.” Sergeant Taite said nothing different from what the Corps had been promoting to the public for the past several years. “Not every man is a Marine, but every Marine is a man . . . a rip-roaring he-man,” read a 1918 edition of the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau’s recruiting pamphlet. The Bureau had put Marine recruiters to work delivering this message to the American people. They were looking for the nation’s best young men to serve in what they argued was the nation’s best military institution. Recruiters like Taite manned their offices, placed posters in store windows, conversed with men on street corners, spoke at high schools, and walked the streets of cities and small towns handing out pamphlets for prospects to read. Appeals to manhood and the use of masculine rhetoric and imagery coursed through this literature. “Assert your manhood and go around to the recruiting station today,” the pamphlet read.\(^1\)

Appeals to the manhood of the nation and claims that the Marine Corps was a man-making institution were central components to Marines’ recruiting efforts during the Great War.

Marines claimed to turn away most applicants, citing high enlistment standards and manpower restrictions. They wanted men who were healthy and strong, both physically and mentally. The Marine Corps would then mold and shape them into their own image: assertive, confident, morally upright, and selfless. Marines would enhance the manhood of recruits by developing their character, a key element of Victorian manliness. They would also harden and toughen men’s bodies through training and strenuous living. Recruiters claimed that life in the Corps would make recruits look like the sharply dressed and physically impressive Marines on their recruiting posters. In doing so they appealed to the newer notions of masculinity that valued appearance and celebrated strong bodies. When the United States declared war on Germany, these claims became key components of the Marine Corps’ largest recruiting drive in its history in the spring and summer of 1917.

Marines received help in recruiting and image construction from civilian journalists in a couple of important ways. They explicitly advised Marines to advertise the Corps as a man-making institution to win over not just potential recruits, but also their families. Popular magazines like The Saturday Evening Post published articles and recruiting advertisements that espoused Marine manliness. With civilian help, the Marine Corps doubled its size in the second half of 1917. Recruiters also claimed to give American men the chance to fight the Germans first. Recruiting posters shifted from good looking Marines on duty to Marines actively fighting to create a newer masculine image tailored to the needs of wartime. The central claim of the Marines still stood through all of this, however, that the Marine Corps was good for American manhood.
American Manhood

According to American sociologists, physicians, politicians, and preachers, manhood was a many-sided thing. Manhood was a stage in one’s life that came after boyhood and before old age. Members of the white middle class also understood it as a national resource, something grown and harvested. The term manliness tended to mean physical, mental, and moral manifestations of one’s manhood. Strength, self-control, courage, integrity, and kindness were all qualities associated with it. Therefore, manhood often meant a man’s character, how honest, moral, and hardworking he was. The opposite of manliness and manhood in the nineteenth-century was childishness and childhood. For the newer men’s culture that focused on masculinity over manhood, femininity was the opposite.

Manhood could be molded like clay and hardened like steel. Therein lay the foundation of the Marines’ appeal: they shaped and molded men into their own image. They claimed to recruit the finest specimens of American manhood and make them even better. The result was a strong, brave, and morally upright man. He would be a man with a wealth of travel and experience behind him. He would be a proud and worthy citizen who had earned respect through his years of service, training, and struggle in the Marine Corps. Becoming a Marine benefited the man; the new Marine benefited the nation. As men became manlier so did the country.

Manhood could weaken or become sick, tainted, or corrupted. People took that risk seriously because many saw healthy manhood as essential for both man and nation. Strength,
assertiveness, bravery, and honesty were seen as manly virtues for the individual as well as the country itself.\(^4\) Real manhood manifested itself, became stronger even, during times of trial, adversity, and struggle. “Spurious manhood encounters trials and succumbs before them,” one author argued, “Real manhood meets the same obstacles, tramples them underfoot, and gains added courage and power by the very struggle and the joy of conquest.”\(^5\) The Corps claimed to give young men the opportunity to live the strenuous life that Theodore Roosevelt and other prominent citizens advocated for.\(^6\) Marines provided the element of struggle and adversity deemed necessary for assertive, rugged manhood. Indeed, they seemed immune to the feminizing effects of society that so worried educators, preachers, and doctors.

**Quality In: Quality Out**

One of the primary concerns of the Marine Corps leading up to U.S. entry into the Great War was manpower, and Marines promoted their readiness, flexibility, and military efficiency to acquire more men and funds. Major General George Barnett, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), wanted to increase the size of the Corps to perform its various duties as efficiently as possible and to maintain a high state of readiness. Barnett made all of this evident in his reports to the Secretary of the Navy. “The paramount need of the Marine Corps is an increase of officers and men,” he claimed, “as at present constituted it is inadequate to perform its varied and important duties.”\(^7\) Barnett argued that the Corps’ varied duties and expeditions in recent years (Vera Cruz in 1914 and Haiti in 1915) necessitated shifting personnel away from advanced base

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seizure and defense training, away from fleet detachments, and away from guarding naval yards. “Indisputably this is not only a poor makeshift,” Barnett argued, “but furthermore its continuance will interfere materially with the efficiency of the fleet and of advance base work, and will endanger the safety of the navy yards, naval magazines, etc.”

Barnett beseeched Congress for more Marines at the propitious time of preparedness fever. Marines used this campaign as an opportunity to advertise themselves. Preparedness camps sprang up across America. Aimed largely at white middle-class businessmen who worked in offices all day, these camps offered men chances to get outdoors, learn military drill, and shoot targets. “Get out of your automobiles, you bankers and business men,” Admiral Fullam proclaimed to businessmen gathered in San Francisco, “and win four weeks of physical, mental, and patriotic satisfaction . . . . Get into the open, let the wind blow through your whiskers; quit talking about preparedness and act.” Men went to these camps in Plattsburg, New York, and in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Marines made sure to be on hand to help.

A small group of Marine non-commissioned officers helped run the Philadelphia camp, organized and run by A. J. Drexel Biddle, although there were around two dozen Army officers on site as well. CMC Barnett inspected the camp and claimed afterwards, “Camps of this kind . . . would be of inestimable value to the nation in case of need, for, in the event of war, the regular service must necessarily depend entirely upon the will of the people to fill the ranks.” He also noted that this camp gave the American people exposure to the Marine Corps. “I feel that the whole affair was of great benefit to the Marine Corps,” he claimed, “for it gave knowledge of the

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Corps to many people who knew little or nothing of it before.” All three branches of the military used this opportunity to gain publicity and recruit.

The National Defense Act of 1916 represented a victory for preparedness advocates. This legislation called for a general increase in the size of the military. The Army would grow to 175,000 men, and a new reserve component would be formed, the Army National Guard. The Naval Appropriation Act, like the National Defense Act of the same year, increased the Navy and Marine Corps. Within the Naval Appropriation Act, Congress allowed the Marine Corps to increase forty percent, from 12,400 to 17,400. Barnett and the Marines got the increase they wanted; now they would have to recruit the men to fill their quotas.

Marine recruiters claimed to target the very best of American manhood to join their ranks. They wanted men who were intelligent, efficient, and physically fit. The Navy sought to recruit men of sound body and mind as well which shows that the Marines were not the only service concerned with this. Marines wanted high quality men for several reasons. Men of good character and sturdy constitution stood the best chance of serving out their full enlistment and maybe even reenlisting at the conclusion of their contract. They could bolster the Corps’ claims of being the finest fighting institution when people saw that upstanding young men joined their ranks. Good men also made the Corps more appealing to the parents of potential recruits. Good recruits would allow recruiters to claim to families that “the U.S. Marine Corps is made up

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of men such as your son; young men who are in a perfect state of health and are of good character, so you may rest assured that he will have the very best of associates.” Recruiters wanted people to believe that the Marine Corps was a wholesome and beneficial experience for recruits.

Letting undesirable men into the Corps could damage recruiting efforts and the Marines’ public image. Recruiters claimed that a significant portion of the United States had an unfavorable opinion of enlisted men. “The civilian seldom sees the good enlisted man as he is usually in civilian clothing,” wrote one recruiter, “but he does see the undesirables of the service as these men are usually in uniform . . . . intoxicated, foulmouthed, and insulting.” Recruiters wanted their fellow Marines to avoid scenes like one depicted in an image entitled “The Kind of Enlisted Man With Whom the Civilian is Acquainted.” A surly and disheveled looking Marine in uniform is walking down a street, arm-in-arm with a civilian, both clearly intoxicated. The text at the bottom of the image reads “For better recruiting results prevent scenes like this one.”

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Figure 10: “The Kind of Enlisted Man With Whom the Civilian is Acquainted”

*Recruiters’ Bulletin, January 1915, 11*

In Chicago, Illinois, Captain William Brackett walked near the State Unemployment Office. A long line of men waited outside the building. “A Gentlemen of large affairs” approached Captain Brackett and asked him, “Brackett, there is a fine crowd of bums looking for work; why don’t you enlist them?” Brackett wrote that this gentlemen’s question was well intentioned but revealed how little people knew about the kind of men Marines were and the quality of men they sought. Brackett contended that Marines were men of strength and good character, not bums looking for handouts. Marines had an ideal type of man they were interested in recruiting.

They did not just accept any man into their institution. For the Corps, “the greatest need is for the fit, the intelligent, the efficient and there is always room for them.” Brackett claimed that Marines avoided certain types of men: “the ne’er do well, the loafer, the drunkard, the debauche, and the diseased have about as much chance of a welcome awaiting them as the

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proverbial snow bird in Hades.”18 Their recruiting literature promoted this standard as well. “Men accustomed to a life of dissipation and irregular habits will find the regular life of the service irksome and distasteful,” claimed one of their booklets, “But for men of good character and regular habits the military life is a very near approach to the ideal.”19

This pickiness caused Marines to reject many applicants. *National Service Magazine* reported that from January to September 1916, the Corps only accepted 167 of 5,082 applicants within the recruiting district of New York.20 If applicants had crooked spines, obesity, or other physical problems they could be rejected. They could also fail examination for less tangible reasons such as intelligence. Sergeant Frank R. Busch’s poem addressed this problem in *The Recruiters’ Bulletin*: “We find you are some underweight, / If you do not carry lead, / But the worst objection that we have is that--/ you are crippled in the head.”21

Marines knew that they competed with colleges and universities for the cream of American manhood. Rev. Jasper S. Hogan delivered an address to alumni of Rutgers College that claimed that universities should improve their students’ manhood. College administrations and professors should encourage young men to become physically as well as intellectually fit, “to aid them to possess the qualities and traits of a true man.”22 Marines claimed to do that better than colleges. They argued that at the end of four years of college the average student’s body had suffered from countless hours of study. The result was “a poor physical wreck and nervous man.” After four years in the Marine Corps, however, a man would be healthier, smarter, and

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wiser. “His methodical and systematical physical training in the service is keeping him in the best of health, and the travels that he necessarily must do during the term of his enlistment, serve to broaden his mind, and give him that knowledge and experience which so many college men never attain,” asserted a Marine author. This desire for the best type of man is an important manifestation of how gender worked in the Marine Corps. It reveals that Marines cared very much about the quality of manhood entering their ranks as well as the quality of manhood that left.

**Bleyer’s Advice**

Marines sought professional help from the growing and relatively new field of advertising experts in order to attract the kinds of men they wanted. Clifford Bleyer, of the Taylor-Critchfield-Claque advertising firm of Chicago, Illinois, wrote two pieces for *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* in November 1916 and January 1917. Bleyer wanted Marines to expand their target audience and focus less on the fighting side of the Corps. “The Marine Corps is more than a fighting machine,” he wrote, “and its presentation to the public as such frustrates the real purpose of publicity, not only at a time when war is a topic to be thoroughly abhorred, but even when the world is at peace.”

They needed to appeal to young men and their parents. “As we view the proposition,” Bleyer cautioned, “the Marine Corps must be sold to the people of the United States—and by that we mean both adults and possible recruits—on its merits.”

To Bleyer, parents and elders were powerful persuasive forces in young men’s lives. He argued that Marines first needed “to command attention of young men and of those who have

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influence or authority over them.” Mothers, especially, could just as easily talk their sons out of joining the Marines as a recruiter could talk them into it. Bleyer wrote:

>This calls for an appeal that will not only reach the young, but adults as well. It would not be an easy matter to win the favor of fond parents if the ‘fighting’ side of Marine Corps life were emphasized. This is essentially true of mothers. The woman who “did not raise her boy to be a soldier” is very numerous, because her idea of ‘mothering’ is to see that the son has shelter at night, every delicacy he desires at mealtime, and a lot of ‘petting’ in between.

He pointed out that many American families cared little for the military, signaled by this reference to Alfred Bryan’s a popular anti-war song of 1915, “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier.” “We realize the fact that in better homes, particularly, there is a strong prejudice against military life,” he reasoned. Therefore, Marines needed to emphasize the benefits afforded young recruits to assuage prejudices parents might have toward the military.

He argued that since the nation was at peace, even advertisements that toned down the bellicosity and focused more on preparedness could discourage young men and their families. “The pugnacious appeal is not the one that will fill the ranks,” Bleyer advised, “Preparedness’, in the fighting sense, will not, it is a problem of individualism.” Surrendering one’s freedom in peace time to serve in the military could be a hard sell. Therefore, Bleyer urged Marines to make appeals of self-improvement. “Touch him with the appeal of personal advantage,” and the Marines could make their service much more attractive.

Bleyer wanted Marines to sell their institution to the young and old alike by promoting their service as beneficial to the potential recruit’s manhood, “to awaken the interest of the young men and their elders—not their interests in the Marine Corps as a mere fighting machine, but as

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
an instrument for the promotion of personal efficiency and the building of manhood.”

Joining the Marine Corps would enhance recruits’ manhood by broadening their experiences through discipline, travel, and service. The end goal was to convince young men and their parents that “the Marine Corps may so establish him in discipline and in ability to serve when service is required—that he will be better equipped if he adopts a life vocation—such a recruit will not only make a good soldier, but he is well prepared to make a good citizen and worker if he is again a civilian.” Advertising this way would allow Marines to appeal to notions of Victorian manhood that valued productive and trustworthy men.

Bleyer’s idea of targeting sons and parents alike took hold among Marines. Based on publications in *The Recruiters’ Bulletin*, they understood that women needed convincing that the military benefited the manhood of their sons. In concurrence with Bleyer’s suggestions, Captain C.S. McReynolds wrote that targeting families would overcome public ignorance of the Marine Corps. Reynolds wrote:

> The youth absorbs much of the morals and beliefs of the parent. The people of the United States know little of the military and naval services and the advantages and opportunities of service therein. This is true of the Marine Corps especially. Educate the parents, not the prospect only. Recruiting systems, generally, have to contend against the beliefs of uninformed or misinformed fathers and mothers.

McReynolds offered a letter written by a Mrs. Mollie Shelton of Placerville, Idaho, in support of this contention. Mollie worried about her son, John A. Shelton, who had enlisted in the Marines and reported to boot camp in December 1916. “It is with a sad heart I sign my name on this card,” Mrs. Shelton wrote to Captain McReynolds, “It is such a shock to me that I do hope and

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 13-14.
pray my Dear Boy will succeed.”33 His response to her, published in *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* for other Marines to see, is a strong example of how Marines communicated their worth to outsiders.

McReynolds tried to persuade Mrs. Shelton that “Our aim is to make every man a good soldier, and a good soldier is always a good citizen.” He wrote that “The Marine Corps standard is high; we are satisfied only with the best.”34 McReynolds ended his letter to Mrs. Shelton by arguing that John had chosen the best path to future employment and manhood. “Young men who have completed honorably an enlistment in the Marine Corps are able, almost without exception, to secure much more remunerative and promising industrial employment than they were able to do prior to entering the service,” he wrote.35 McReynolds admitted that military life would be difficult and potentially dangerous. “But I know of no better place for a man to develop the best type of manhood and citizenship,” he concluded.36

Using pamphlets and motion pictures, Bleyer suggested that Marines show how physically fit recruits would become. “We would present it as a life that promotes good health and builds sturdy manhood,” he wrote. Doing so, however, would steer Marines toward making appeals based on rugged masculinity in addition to ones focused on more traditional notions of restrained manhood. Advertisements that displayed the Marines’ “physical culture, outdoor exercises, and the various forms of wholesome sports” bolstered the Corps’ masculine appeal and helped emphasize “the care the government takes to have its men healthy and strong.”37 Bleyer reasoned that a healthy masculine body could be used by recruits to their own personal advantage in whatever profession they chose later in life.

34 C.S. McReynolds to Mollie Shelton, 15.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Personal advantage meant an enhanced manhood that prepared young men for the struggles of life. Bleyer provided an advertisement example entitled, “THE U.S. MARINE CORPS TRAINS YOU FOR THE BATTLE OF LIFE,” which claimed that young men learned leadership, discipline, and how to strengthen their bodies and minds. It argued that successful men in business all had discipline and leadership skills that recruits gained in the Marine Corps. “Today young men are joining the United States Marine Corps that they may form this habit of leading,” read the advertisement, “that they may learn to shoulder the responsibility of directing the activities of other men, of being Generals in the Battle of Life.”

Because being a Marine made leaders of the young men who joined, the advertisement claimed that the Corps offered a great long-term career. But Bleyer understood that for most young men the Marine Corps would be temporary. “If you intend to return later to civil life you will have gained the tremendous advantage of facing the Battle of Life, strong in body, confident in mind, steady, courageous, a man in the finest sense of the word,” his advertisement concluded.

Bleyer continued with the “battle of life” metaphor in another proposed advertisement. “Life is a battle,” which stated that “Success is a survival of the fittest.” It claimed that all of the most successful businessmen and statesmen were great leaders who derived their strength from self-discipline. “Men who rule themselves first and therefore are strong enough to rule others,” it argued, appealing to Victorian notions of manly restraint. The Marine Corps should claim to train, discipline, and teach men self-control. Bleyer’s sample advertisement read:

Marine Corps training is one of the surest methods to win this command of self—to acquire the strength of mind, will and body to win the battle of life. Every young man needs to discipline himself. One who learns how to take orders knows how to give orders. He who can obey can command. Now is the opportunity to gain a training that

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 14-15.
40 Ibid., 15.
41 Ibid.
will make a better man of you, whatever your ambitions may be. The Marine Corps trained man is fitted to be a leader. Marine Corps training in itself is a recommendation for a responsible position in every line of business. Parents, reflect upon the future of your son.42

Self-control was important because it had a direct bearing on one’s morality and character. One contemporary author identified “lust, uncleanness, drink, gambling, swearing, lying, dishonesty, [and] irreligion,” as habits that destroyed manhood.43 By 1917, the military had developed a reputation for all these things.44 Sexual immorality was particularly troublesome because proponents of healthy manhood believed it was harmful to the mind and body through the spread of venereal diseases.45

This rhetoric relied on the assumption that strength of mind and body, self-discipline, and leadership were all elements of successful men. Recruiters relied on this understanding about traditional manliness, and its appeal to applicants and their parents, when they employed Bleyer’s suggested advertising tactics.

The “Battle of Life” metaphor existed in tandem with the common belief that healthy manhood developed through struggle. Life threw obstacles in men’s paths. Strength, endurance, self-control, and judgment were all necessary to overcome and succeed. Some considered those traits as “the young man’s equipment to fight the battles of life.”46 George Walter Fiske, a popular American author on theology, wrote that, “attainment of manliness . . . is a struggle . . . it is a splendid victory won through struggle,” and he referred to that struggle as

42 Bleyer, “Stimulating Recruiting,” 15. (Emphasis added)
45 Nancy K. Bristow, Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 1-3; Raymond B. Fosdick, Keeping Our Fighters Fit for War and After (Commissions on Training Camp Activities, 1918), 191; Kennedy, Over Here, 145-146; Zieger, America’s Great War, 89.
“the battle royal of life.” Marines used this metaphor to explain how the Corps benefited American men. Rinaldo Livingstone was an old Civil War-era Marine who had enlisted in 1863. According to Rinaldo, the Marine Corps made him a better man because it gave him the courage and confidence to face the challenges of life. The training and discipline he received “taught me many useful lessons, not only to endure patiently the ills that could not be avoided, but at the same time inspired me with manly courage to fight the battle of life.”

The conclusion of the 1917 edition of the recruiting pamphlet *U.S. Marines—Soldiers of the Sea* summed up one of the central claims Marines made to outsiders to enhance their appeal. “Enlistment in the Marine Corps is a loyal, patriotic act,” the editors asserted “A man who has the right stuff in him will leave the service better qualified to succeed in the battles of life.” In essence, “The Marine Corps gives him every opportunity to become a strong, self-reliant man and a good citizen.”

**Marine Corps Week, June 10-16, 1917**

When America officially entered the Great War in April 1917, the Marine Corps undertook a substantial public relations campaign. Major General George Barnett, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Marines’ Publicity Bureau designated June 10-16, 1917 as “U.S. Marine Corps National Recruiting Week.” The slogan for this recruiting drive was “Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night.” “Marine Corps Week” was meant to break all previous recruiting records and take advantage of the *rage militaire* and patriotism that swept the country in the spring of 1917. For “Marine Corps Week,” recruiters received packages containing fresh prints of literature and posters. Each package contained copies of *Soldiers of*

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the Sea, U.S. Marines in Rhyme, Prose, and Cartoon, and The Marine Catechism—“Who am I?”⁵⁰ Collectively, these booklets represented the Corps’ main efforts in communicating its identity to outsiders, not only during “Marine Corps Week,” but over the span of several years leading up to the war.⁵¹ Marines designed this literature to inform the public about their history, persuade readers of their value to society, and attract potential recruits. But they would have help from civilians who were caught up in the fervor as well.⁵²

Marines used these booklets and posters to communicate several ideas to potential recruits and their parents. First, Marines were soldiers who served afloat with the Navy, but they were neither completely sailor nor soldier. Rather, they were a mix of both and better than either one.⁵³ Second, the Marine Corps offered young men not so much vocational skills, which are what the Army and Navy promoted around this time, but rather habits of mind such as personal efficiency, discipline (both associated with traditional manliness), and masculine bearing.⁵⁴ Third, all of these things benefited the potential recruit and were much more useful to a man, no matter what vocation he chose, when he returned to civilian life.

Bleyer would have been pleased to know that Marines’ recruiting literature claimed to enhance the manhood of recruits. “I am a two-fisted fighting rover. I am a United States Marine,” read The Marines Catechism which recruiters had used since at least 1914.⁵⁵ One

⁵⁰ “Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night,” 7; each one of these booklets went through several editions leading up to U.S. entry into the Great War. This package most likely contained the 7th edition of “Soldiers of the Sea,” and the 3rd edition of U.S. Marines in Rhyme, Prose, and Cartoon both of which came out in 1917.
⁵¹ The Marines Magazine gave an indication of how many pieces of recruiting literature Marines distributed: “During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1917, the Marine Corps Recruiting Service distributed 4,785,389 pieces of recruiting literature, comprising 1,547,690 handbooks, booklets, pamphlets, etc., 2,717,348 handbills of various kinds, 467,453 posters and 52,907 hangers,” The Marines Magazine, August 1917, 16.
⁵³ Heather Marshall’s dissertation argues this point persuasively; “It Means Something These Days to be a Marine.” iv.
⁵⁵ The Marine’s Catechism—Who Am I?, Cover page.
question near the end of *The Marine’s Catechism* asked, “How does an enlistment in the Marine Corps benefit one?” The response read:

An enlistment affords the average young American an opportunity for broadening travel to strange lands. Service in the Marine Corps will also build him up physically, improve his morals and his mind, and in every way make a better man of him. After his service he will be better able to grapple with the problems of life.\(^{56}\)

According to this booklet, sturdier manhood was the greatest and most lasting benefit for those who joined the Marines.

![Figure 11: “The Marine’s Catechism—Who Am I?”](Image)

That sturdier form of manhood was achieved in part through training and service. The editors of *Marines in Rhyme, Prose, and Cartoon* picked Robert G. Skerrit’s editorial in the *New York Sun* because it bolstered the claim that Marines were exceptional men as a result of their training. “Our sea soldiers,” he claimed, “are a vastly different body of men . . . in the physical

\(^{56}\) *The Marine’s Catechism—Who Am I?*, 7. (Emphasis added)
qualities that make for a better and a more enduring fighter.”

He wrote that their training prepared them for anything. “The public has had but little, if any, knowledge of the character of these drills,” Skerrit claimed, “and yet the training has well nigh revolutionized the all-round fitness of these ever-ready fighting men.”

James J. Montague’s poem about Marines further supported their claims about living a strenuous and dangerous life. Regarding the dangers Marines faced, the poem went,

Killed and wounded? Yes, a plenty, though their jobs are
Always small
That don’t make a bit less deadly a careerin’ rifle ball
In a war or in a scrimmage half an ounce of flying lead
Is as dangerous to soldiers, and will kill ‘em just as dead
They may not be splendid figures in historic battle scenes
But there are able-bodied fighters—those Marines

Here, Marines played to what they perceived were their strengths: courage and toughness, which people frequently associated with Victorian manliness and physical strength that was valued by the adherents to the newer muscular masculinity. Putting their lives in danger became one of their manly qualities.

Marines made the same claims in U.S. Marines—Soldiers of the Sea. While at sea Marines would train, drill, and maintain combat readiness. “Great mobility and facilities for quick action are required of the Marines,” they claimed, “They must be kept in readiness to move at a moment’s notice, and be prepared for service in any climate.”

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60 Theodore Roosevelt’s life and doctrine of “The Strenuous Life,” directly associated these attributes with strong manhood leading up to American entry into World War I; Kimmel, Manhood in America, 133-135; Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 193; Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, 139.
United States, Marines had many opportunities for self-improvement, such as gymnasium for physical exercise and libraries for studying:

By the time a Marine has served his enlistment of four years and returns to his home, he may have encircled the globe and visited many foreign countries. He usually comes back a healthier, more self-reliant and better man.\(^62\)

Echoing Clifford Bleyer’s suggestions, Marines promised to make men stronger and healthier. “Special attention and encouragement are given to athletic sports of all kinds,” the authors claimed. “This is done to encourage the men to take an active interest in athletics and physical culture, with the realization and appreciation of the fact that in so doing the men improve themselves physically.”\(^63\) The booklet asserted that Marines would have opportunities to box and play baseball and football, all activities identified as “masculine games.”\(^64\)

Marines made these claims during a time when people advocated sports as being good for the development of vigorous manhood. One writer wanted men to avoid becoming “narrow-chested, slope-shouldered, squeaky voiced . . . flabby muscled, namby-pamby molly-coddle(s).”\(^65\) Proponents of traditional manhood saw athletics as a crucial part of educating men on college campuses and “to produce the muscular element of manhood.”\(^66\) Marines understood this idea. Their Publicity Bureau provided pictures of Marines engaged in exercise of various kinds such as rowing, wall scaling, and calisthenics to demonstrate how men could improve their physical health while in the Corps.

\(^{62}\) Duties, Experiences, Opportunities, Pay, 13 (Emphasis added).
\(^{63}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{64}\) Ibid; Gulick, The Dynamic of Manhood, 90.
\(^{65}\) Hall, “Developing into Manhood,” 19.
\(^{66}\) Hogan, Manhood as an Objective in College Training, 6.
Figure 12: “Boat Drill”

Figure 13: “Wall Scaling”
Marines promised to make men “more desirable and capable soldiers, and better and healthier citizens.” They argued that getting an honorable discharge from the Marine Corps could open new opportunities for men looking for work. As a part of the benefits of honorable service, the booklet claimed:

Men who hold honorable discharges from the military or naval service of the United States are usually given preference in governmental, municipal, and civil service appointments. A man seeking employment in any walk of life can have no better recommendation to show to his prospective employer, as assurance of fidelity and good character, than an honorable discharge from the service of the United States Government.

Recruiters claimed that useful citizens stood a better chance of finding work after leaving the Corps.

Barnett and the Publicity Bureau made sure that recruiters had plenty of pamphlets and posters of to attract recruits, win the hearts of the American people, and portray the Corps as the premier military service. Recruiters received three posters in large quantities that were meant for

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67 Duties, Experiences, Opportunities, Pay, 16.
68 Ibid.
display across America. “Stores of the institutional type—the Jordan Marshes, the Wanamakers, the Marshall-Fields, all over the country, stand ready to help the Marine Corps,” Barnett told recruiters. Displaying posters would be mutually beneficial for these stores. “Marine Corps Recruiting Week,” Barnett claimed, “gives them the opportunity—and it is one of which they will be glad to take advantage; for it enables them to link up their store-news and their window displays with a current event of general popular interest.” Recruiters fanned out across the country with three different posters: “Active Service on Land and Sea,” “The Colors!” and “Marine Corps Week.”

These posters displayed the kinds of men recruits would become. They portrayed Marines as soldiers of the sea, possessed of masculine and soldierly qualities. Marines in these posters appear confident, courageous, disciplined, and controlled. “A Man’s Game” and “Active Service on Land and Sea” use the same image but convey different themes. They show a Marine NCO (non-commissioned officer) at right shoulder arms seemingly on guard at a naval station. He is tall, upright, walking with a confident gait in front of a docked battle ship, and dressed impeccably. “A Man’s Game” makes an explicit appeal to the manhood of the country. It asserts what Marines are, explicitly, while the other is more descriptive of what Marines do. Recruiters wanted these posters placed around police stations and fire houses. The Marine in both posters appears ready for anything, which may be why recruiters targeted police and fire stations. Policemen and firemen, whose jobs require flexibility and readiness to answer to any emergencies, might have identified with this image of a Marine.

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 12.
Figure 15: “A Man’s Game”  
Paul Woyshner Papers, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico VA.

Figure 16: “Active on Sea and Land”  
*Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night*, 9.
“The Colors” shows four Marines of a landing party carrying the United States and Marine Corps flags ashore. These Marines are not marching. Rather, they are moving forward quickly with rifles at the ready as though toward the enemy. Behind them are U.S. Navy vessels in support. The message here is that Marines are not just security guards at naval stations or on ship. They are soldiers of the sea, the vanguard, and warriors who carry their nation’s flag onto foreign shores. The creators of this poster designed it for store windows.\textsuperscript{72} The poster’s appeal comes from the adventurous spirit of the image. Many commentators leading up to WWI tended to believe that young men and boys who had been overexposed to women (mothers, schoolteachers) were becoming “sissies.”\textsuperscript{73} Emasculated American men could look at this homosocial image and see joining the Marines as a path to recapturing their manhood.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{spirit_of_1917.png}
\caption{“The Colors”}
\end{figure}

\textit{Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night, 9.}

These posters contained images that the Publicity Bureau used frequently leading up to America’s entry into the Great War for additional posters. “The Spirit of 1917,” for example,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Kimmel, \textit{Manhood in America}, 115.
\end{itemize}
had at least two versions. The Bureau entitled the original version of the image “U.S. Marines—Soldiers of the Sea,” in order to promote the Corps’ identity to the public. They used another version, the one shown above, to appeal more to young men’s patriotism. “The Spirit of 1917—Join the U.S. Marines,” showcases Marines’ manly identity, but also attempts to connect with potential applicants along emotional lines. The spring and early summer of 1917 saw an uptick in spirited bellicosity across the nation as many Americans began to embrace war.74

Marines designed the poster “Marine Corps Week” to spread the word about their recruiting drive. This poster is a slightly different representation of the same theme: a Marine displaying masculine and soldierly bearing, but with a formation of Marines standing at attention under the big guns of a battleship. While “A Man’s Game” depicts a Marine on guard duty, and the other shows a Marine landing party, this image shows a ship’s detachment of Marines, which was a very common duty for them with the U.S. Navy. This poster “is to be used universally,” instructed the writer, “barber shops, pool rooms, cigar stores, neighborhood stores; everywhere and any place you can get it before the public.”75 But it did more than convey dates of the recruiting drive.

74 Kennedy, Over Here, 51.
75 “Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night,” 12.
These posters served as graphic representations of how the Corps made men more masculine. The Marines in these posters share attractive physical attributes and appear brave, disciplined, and patriotic. Essentially, they showed what the Marine Corps could do for a man: “four years of training which will graduate him into the world equipped with a perfectly healthy body, an erect carriage, a broadened view of life from his contact with people and places, a quick, responsive intellect, a disciplined, reliable individual—an asset to any employer.”

With the American declaration of war, the Wilson administration enlisted the help of scholars, artists, editors, and journalists to convince the American people of the righteousness of its cause against the Central Powers. George Creel and his Committee on Public Information (CPI) worked hard to whip up patriotic fervor through posters, billboards, and other advertising media. Creel, according to one historian, “believed that America’s vast network of newspapers,

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libraries, schools, universities, and citizen associations could be used to promote the country’s war aims and policies.”

The military would benefit from the government’s campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the public. Many newspapers and magazines jumped at the chance to advertise for the military and promote government propaganda. Major General Barnett’s and the Publicity Bureau’s efforts to advertise through magazines during “Marine Corps Week” was thus a part of a much larger phenomenon that was sweeping the country at the time. The U.S. government and the American media networks cooperated on a grand scale.

Even before the war, Marines recruited the help of civilian journalists and advertising agents to improve their public relations. Recruiters in towns across the United States often made it a point to befriend the editors and writers of local newspapers. As early as 1915, Sergeant James F. Taite wrote that “Upon arrival in a city to open up or take charge of a station, I pay a visit to the local newspaper offices, introducing myself to the News Editor and informing him that I had arrived to open up a recruiting station and would thank him to give a little write up about the fact.” Sergeant Thomas G. Sterrett suggested that all recruiters should “‘bust’ into print all you can, get quoted whenever possible, and it won’t be long until everyone [in town] will know you, or will want to.” To secure good publicity Marines like Sterrett and Taite befriended journalists and got them to publish pieces on the Marines, leaving behind recruiting literature for them to reference. Through exchanges like these, journalists and advertising agencies became helpful unofficial mouthpieces for Marines.

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77 Zieger, America’s Great War, 79.
78 George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1972), 4; McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 290-292; Kennedy, Over Here, 59-61.
Marines received advertising help from Donovan & Armstrong National Advertising of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. They created recruiting posters for Marines that appealed explicitly to the manhood of potential recruits. One image entitled “Man Wanted—To Fit This Hat” shows a steel helmet with the Marine Corps emblem on the front. The poster challenged its readers: “Can you fit the hat? It’s no place for a man who must be cushioned against shock; who shuns risk or loathes adventure.” On another image, a Marine is about to throw a hand grenade. “Can you qualify?” the poster read, “Clear-eyed, alert-minded, vigorous manhood comes first.” A third poster echoed the others: “The U.S. Marine Corps is to be increased. A real red-blooded man’s opportunity for enlistment . . . Men of vigor in body and mind, ambitious for adventure and advancement are wanted.” Like the Publicity Bureau’s own recruiting literature, these images pitched the Marine Corps as a challenge to potential recruits while lauding the manhood of Marines. By asserting “The man who makes good at the Marine Corps Recruiting Station, will serve with men stalwart and square and valorous,” Donovan and Armstrong reinforced the Corps’ claims about being comprised of good men who could mold and shape youngsters into their own image.81

Figure 19: “Man Wanted—to Fill This Hat”

Figure 20: “Strike 3!”
Barnett and the Publicity Bureau also enlisted the help of the *Saturday Evening Post* to place numerous Marine advertisements in issues between May and June. “This publication blankets the United States with remarkable thoroughness,” the Bureau claimed, “upwards of eight millions of magazine displays pages and half pages, on the opportunities and allurement of patriotic service with the U.S. Marines.”

*The Saturday Evening Post* was an intelligent choice for an advertising platform because it was one of America’s most widely read men’s magazines. Tom Pendergast has argued that *The Saturday Evening Post* “was the first American magazine to appeal directly to a male audience, and for the first four decades of the twentieth century was the champion of Victorian masculine ideals.” George Horace Lorimer, the chief editor, made sure that *The Saturday Evening Post* published stories that appealed to white middle-class men. These stories were

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82 “Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night,” 5.
often about young men on the make or “the self-made man.” The magazine, therefore, targeted young men who “started with little and, through the diligent application of habits and values, became something and someone much richer.” The Marines very much fit this image because they themselves were “self-made men” and they could be an avenue toward personal and economic betterment.

Through the Saturday Evening Post, Marines got a chance to promote themselves on a scale unlike ever before. They laid out their plan explicitly:

This magazine advertising is planned to assist the recruiting service in getting the high type of men we all want to see in the ranks of the Marine Corps. It is thought out to build up public appreciation for Marine Corps service as the super-service; to make the appeal of the U.S. Marines a self-interest appeal to the young men of America; to cause a man to stop and think over his enlistment about to be made, and to discriminate when he enlists.

Pre-circulated Marine advertisements in The Saturday Evening Post would save recruiters time. They would not have to spend as much time explaining who the Marines were or what they did. “This magazine campaign shows the people what the U.S. Marine looks like in service; and what he does,” the Bureau claimed.

Manliness coursed through Marine stories and advertisements in The Saturday Evening Post. Edward G. Lowry, a popular journalist, wrote up a piece on the Marines for the publication’s June 9th issue. His story, entitled “The Marines Have Landed and Have the Situation Well in Hand,” ran for three and a half pages and described who the Marines were and what they did. In the beginning of the article, Lowry told a story of how he had met a Marine

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84 Pendergast, Creating the Modern Man, 55.
85 “Four Thousand Enlistments by Saturday Night,” 5.
86 Ibid.
A sergeant named Jantzen. He summed up Jantzen by describing him as “a sure-’nough man.”

Lowry described Jantzen as such:

He had seen everything twice and was willing to do anything once. If he had been at Babel they would have made him foreman of a gang and the Tower would have been built, for he could speak the tag-ends of all the tongues wherewith the people of this earth are afflicted, and getting things done was what he was here for. Wherever ships lie he had been. Brooklyn was his home, and Malta and Surabaya and Pondicherry and Archangle and Chefoo—all the ports of call of tall ships. Another Ulysses, he knew men and cities, and his wanderings had given him tolerance and wisdom, and competent to do quietly and skillfully whatever came to his hand to do.

While on assignment in Cuba, Lowry recounted how he and his party of Americans ran afoul of a group of rebels near Trinidad. He telegraphed the American consulate in Havana for help; the U.S. Ambassador dispatched twenty-five armed Marines. Lowry described what happened next:

Jantzen and his party arrived. They were received like Caesar’s conquering legions returning to Rome. I telegraphed the usual message to Mr. Taft, “The Marines have landed and have the situation well in hand,” and sailed away to Batabano with my nose out of joint. That was a simple routine job such as the Marines are always doing.

Lowry used the manliness of Jantzen to introduce readers, many of whom probably knew very little about Marines, to the Corps.

Lowry wrote that Marines sought real men to join their ranks, “men who take nobody’s dust.” Young men who wanted action and sought adventure needed to consider the Marines. “ROMANCE, action, adventure, active service, the lure of far off horizons, strange lands, and the queer, hot, outlying places of the world where trouble is bred—these are the things that bring men into the Marine Corps and keep them there every year,” he wrote. Referencing the military

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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 30.
91 Ibid.
preparedness movement that had swept through the nation recently, he claimed that Marines were always ready:

Don’t talk to the marines about preparedness. It makes them yawn. It is old stuff. They invented it. Whatever may be the state of readiness of the army or the navy, or the militia, or the citizens on foot who will make up the volunteer army, the marines are there, set, on their marks, and all their gear polished and scrubbed and ready for instant use.\textsuperscript{92}

The Marines claimed to be prepared long before President Wilson asked Congress to declare war against Germany. Because Marines were ready, new recruits stood the best chance of being the first to fight the Germans if they joined the Corps. “This is where the first flight of keen fighting men will turn,” Lowry boasted, men who “know the knack Marines have for getting into the thick of it first.”\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{The Saturday Evening Post} published another piece that associated manliness with Marines: Mary Roberts Rinehart’s “The Gray Mailed Fist.” In this article she wrote mostly about the U.S. Navy and how it fought to keep up its readiness and stay abreast of the latest technological advancements in the face of public apathy leading up to the war. While Rinehart spent time with the Atlantic Fleet at sea, she came across the fleet’s Marine detachments. She referenced people’s general knowledge of Marines and added that “peace and order follow the marines like the pause and hush after a cyclone.”\textsuperscript{94} Like Edward Lowry, Rinehart mentioned all of the things Marines wanted the public to know about them: they were manly, tough, ready, and flexible. “They are a highly mobile force, carrying with them practically all they need,” she wrote, “including the best brand of courage in the war market; each man has his packed kit ready.”\textsuperscript{95} She went on to convey to readers that Marines could handle any enemy. In a case of

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Rinehart, “The Gray Mailed Fist,” 45.
braggadocio, she claimed that Marines could handle “about twenty times their weight in German avoirdupois.”

She used gendered rhetoric to enhance and bolster this claim. Marines could defeat any foe because they were superb men. “Clear-eyed, businesslike, alert fighting men to their fingertips, they are as fine a body of men as our county can produce,” she told readers, “And that is a large order.”

Although both Rinehart and Lowry claimed to have met and seen Marines in either training or while on an expedition, it is likely they culled most of their information from the Corps’ own Publicity Bureau. They provided similar information about history, pay, duties, and experiences as the Marines provided in their recruiting literature.

Barnett and the Marine Publicity Bureau also made sure *The Saturday Evening Post* had flashy advertisements, replete with masculine imagery, to display on a weekly basis. “Enlist in the U.S. Marines!—The Masters of Any Situation,” claimed one of the larger ones. This advertisement referenced the Corps’ history by claiming that Marines are “a tight little band—occupying a distinctive place among America’s defenders.” It attempts to appeal to men who want to fight: “even more than a glorious past—to men of fighting blood—enlistment in the Marines means ACTION.” To the left of the advertisement’s text is an image of a Marine with the American flag caught in a breeze. The headline says “Where There’s Action,” and the armed Marine stepping on shore coolly and confidently seems to have found it.

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96 Avoirdupois meaning “weight,” Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
Marines appear ready, confident, disciplined, and manly to enhance the Corps’ attractiveness in other images, too. For example, “If you have the ambition and grit to render first line service to your country, and desire military experience in both naval warfare and land operations—abroad and at home—there is a place ready for you in this famous corps of fighting men,” the May 19th advertisement claimed. An image of an armed Marine, with that same look of ambition and grit the text mentions, rests atop the advertisement.

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These images collectively conveyed the many land and sea duties of Marines and tried to make them look exciting and even fun. At sea, they helped man the naval artillery; on land, they were the first to fight. The June 30 advertisement in the center explicitly conveys this idea.\footnote{“U.S. Marines,” The Saturday Evening Post, June 30, 1917, 69.} The June 2 advertisement informed readers, “So, whether the fighting is on sea or land or in the air,
you will find the Marines in the thick of it . . . . fighting, travel, adventure, fun—it’s all one to the U.S. Marine!”

Recruiters only enlisted 1,700 men between June 10 and 16, which was well below the 4,000 they wanted. “Many causes contributed to the small number enlisted,” claimed the editor of The Marines Magazine, Charles Ketcham, including other patriotic campaigns that “occupied part of the same week, and apparently diverted much of the public attention.” But the Corps grew quickly over the summer months as more and more men bought what the Marines were selling. By August of 1917, the Corps had expanded to 30,000 men. Some Marines worried that the influx of so many new men into the Corps would bring enlistment standards down. Colonel Albert S. McLemore from Marine Corps headquarters tried put those worries to bed. “We have reached the thirty thousand mark and have not lowered the standard,” he wrote. He congratulated recruiters not only for getting the quantity but also the necessary quality of men. McLemore insisted that, “Twenty thousand men—and real men too—in less than five months is a record of which you have every right to be proud.” Major General Barnett ordered recruiters to start accepting only a very limited number of applicants while still “maintaining the highest standard.”

Marines were proud of the recruits they enlisted and even advertised some of them in the Recruiters’ Bulletin. They were particularly proud of any college graduates who enlisted in the Corps. “Crack Yale Athletes Join Marines,” ran the heading of one piece in the Bulletin. One of them was Harry Le Gore, captain of Yale’s baseball team and a football player, too. Another was Johnny Overton, a cross-country track champion, and Louis Ferguson, who led Yale’s

103 Charles A. Ketcham, “Marine Corps Week,” The Marines Magazine, July 1917, 5
swimming team. Another piece entitled “College Students ‘Doing Their Bit’” boasted about how one-hundred and nineteen University of Minnesota students joined the Corps compared to only thirty-one and twenty who joined the Army and Navy respectively.

Perhaps the most famous enlistee the Marine Corps gained was former Congressman and successful Detroit attorney Edwin Denby. Nearly fifty, and weighing over two-hundred and fifty pounds, Denby was over age and did not meet the Corps’ physical standards. Nevertheless, Major General Barnett could not pass up on the opportunity to enlist a prominent American citizen. The Corps sent Private Denby down to the newly established recruit training depot at Parris Island, South Carolina. While there, he served as a motivational speaker for new enlistees. When asked by the press why he enlisted, Denby replied, “The country needs men.”

**Conclusion**

During the summer and fall of 1917 the U.S. Marine Corps became a source of masculine pride for the nation. Newspaper editors wrote of the Marines as the *beau ideal* of American manhood. They became a source of confidence for a country that was already swept up in a passion for arms. This pride stemmed in part from the type of men these editors believed Marines were. One claimed that the Marine Corps’ “ranks are filled with a class of men who rank second to none in the United States.” It also came from what they believed Marines could do. “The American Marine is the handiest man around the place,” F.M. Knowles of the *New York Evening Mail* boasted. “He can do any sort of chore, go on any sort of errand, and he

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107 Anonymous, “College Students Doing Their Bit,” *The Recruiters’ Bulletin*, August 1917, 21; George B. Ryan, the editor of *The Boston Herald*, claimed that “Marines appealed only to the best. Only the best could take the tests and pass. The publicity served to bring to the office the finest young men in Boston. Records of the men enlisted at the Marine Corps office show that young men prominent in college, civic, business and social life chose that branch of the service,” *The Recruiters’ Bulletin*, December 1917, 17.  
always brings home the bacon.” The Marines had not fought anyone yet. “Looking at their sturdy figures in the serviceable outfits of the Corps,” however, “there is no doubt in the minds of those who stay at home that the ever swelling Marine Corps will ‘come through,’” wrote the editor of the Buffalo Courier. Doubt in the abilities or virility of Marines cannot be found anywhere in these newspapermen’s writings. For these authors the Marines proved that American manhood was strong and ready for war.

For those around the country who had just enlisted in the Corps, the Marines would make real men out of them. Their manhood, like the manhood of the nation, would be molded and tempered by the Marine Corps and war. Their nationwide advertising and public relations campaigns of 1917 won thousands of recruits using these appeals.

By July 3, the 5th Regiment of Marines had landed in France. Barnett ordered this regiment thrown together quickly from veteran Marine companies in early June 1917. The first Marines in France, therefore, were mostly seasoned veterans, many of whom had deployments to Vera Cruz, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Santo Domingo under their belts. As the Corps grew to its new wartime strength of 75,000, some 23,000 Marines would follow the 5th Regiment to France. But most of the new Marines inducted into the Corps never saw France. Only two regiments, the 5th and 6th, plus one machinegun battalion, saw major combat action against the Germans in the summer and fall of 1918. A year after America entered the war, these Marines would turn their worst combat action into their most glorious; one of the most horrendous sacrifices of American manhood into its supreme test. It was a test that both Marines and the American public believed had been passed with flying colors despite the high casualties. The battles of the summer and

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fall of 1918 would come to be understood as true testaments to the strength and courage of Marine and American manhood.

Pompous, and blatant and arrogant,
Bedecked in their new array;
So sure were the Huns in their thick-skulled pride
That nothing on earth could stem the tide,
Or block them on their way.
Eight thousand men were pitted then
against the Prussian Guard of fiends.
In the power of might for the cause of right
Went the Fifth and Sixth marines. ¹

Many Americans understood the Great War as a new test for American manhood. The time had come for the men of the nation to do their duty, defend their country, and show the world that Americans could fight. Many people wanted to stay out of the war, but German treachery forced the U.S. government’s hand. President Woodrow Wilson and others saw the war as a matter of honor, and chivalric ideals manifested themselves in popular culture, government speeches, and Marine imagery. Harkening to traditional notions of manliness, the Marines presented themselves as heroes on a knightly quest to defend their nation’s honor and rescue civilization.

Testing manhood in war meant sacrificing lives. Falling in battle proved manliness in contemporary visions and Marines experienced very high casualties from June 1918 until the end of the war. Marines and journalists claimed those sacrifices were necessary for victory. When word arrived of Marine battlefield successes in the early summer of 1918, the country was

ebullient. Never in their history had Marines enjoyed such public praise. Upon their return in August 1919, the press heralded the Marines as heroes and the finest examples of American men in part because of their sacrifices for their country. Having witnessed the high Marine casualties first hand, Marine Colonel Albertus Catlin wrote that young men could still become Marines, but only if they were “man enough.”

Marine Corps historians have argued that the Great War was significant for Marines for different reasons. The war gave many officers important lessons in tactics, logistics, artillery, and air support that would be used later in amphibious doctrinal development. Allan Millett claims that “six months of extensive combat in France gave the Marine Corps enough practical experience to sustain two decades of serious study on the problems of attacking an entrenched enemy, problems particularly appropriate for an amphibious assault force.” Marines also “proved” that they were elite warriors. Heather Marshall’s *It Means Something These Days to Be a Marine* argues that the Great War “was the coming-of-age story, the fulfillment of everything it had sought to become on paper since the late nineteenth century,” because the war reinforced Marines’ carefully constructed image as the country’s best troops.

Like the millions of other American men caught up in the fervor of a world conflict, the war gave Marines the opportunity to prove their worth along traditional lines of wartime manliness. The U.S. government expected its men to fight honorably and courageously all while adhering to strict moral standards. These expectations were a part of a broader trend in

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3 Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 318; see also Daugherty, *To Fight Our Country’s Battles*, 55.
5 Marshall, *It Means Something These Days to be a Marine,* 353.
progressive thinking during the Great War. American wartime propaganda sanctified women and children and demonized Germans. Men, being the traditional protectors of the home, embarked on a crusade to protect their families and save civilization.

Therefore, the battles Marines participated in during the Great War were significant in part because of what they meant to the public. Marines fought bravely and honorably all while maintaining the moral and physical health standards advocated by progressives back home. Marines may have persuaded some that they were elite warriors, but deeper than that, the Great War helped them convince observers that they were exceptional men.

**The Test of Manhood**

Americans and Marines told themselves war would put their manhood to the ultimate test. That was how many justified conscripting hundreds of thousands of young men into the military and then sending them overseas to fight the Germans. A preacher who addressed Congress in the spring of 1917 called the draft “legislative action which will prepare, and build up the young manhood of America,” so it would be, “fit to take its place and to defend American rights and liberties.” Marines understood and used these ideas about manhood as well. “War puts manhood to a tremendous test, and be it said to a man’s credit, that the coward is the exception, not the rule,” a writer for *The Marines Magazine* claimed. Cowards and shirkers harmed their reputation. “The man who fails in his duty to his country, or to his comrades or to himself, creates a ghost which will haunt himself forever,” he warned. “Never in his conscious moments can he drive away the specter of his failure to do his manly duty.” Manly Marines did

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their duty in war, and those who did not were simply not real men. The consequences of failure were profound because an unmanly Marine failed not only himself, but his fellow Marines and his country.10

The test itself made men out of those with the courage to face it and those who passed. Those who rose, manfully, to meet the challenges of their times with courage would be richly rewarded. Courage was a common aspect of manliness in the World War I era. “Without courage a man is a poor specimen of a man, hardly worth calling a man,” wrote one author.11 “Never was time in the history of the human race when real sturdy manhood, manly vigor and manly courage counted for as much as they do now,” claimed another.12 This rhetoric that linked courage with manliness pervaded Marine writings as well. “If he plays a man’s part,” read The Marines Magazine in July 1917, “he is consciously the victor over danger, over hardship, over the temptation to avoid the difficult duty, over himself; he can look upon his destiny—yes, upon death itself—with clear eyes, unashamed and unafraid.”13 Essentially, this author encouraged Marine audiences to live up to the Victorian manly standards and imagery that they promoted among each other. But these messages were conveyed in the early days of U.S. belligerency, a full eleven months before any Marines saw combat. The test for veteran Marines would not come until the summer of 1918.

Sergeant Edwin Denby made sure recruits at Parris Island understood what was at stake for their manhood. Marines had to conduct themselves honorably and come back clean and upright. “Nowhere in the world does a man stand more squarely on his own feet, to make or mar his character, than in the military service,” he said. “If you want to go back worthy to look your

12 Anonymous, Manitoba Free Press, August 3, 1918, 19
women in the face . . . it is up to you, men; it is up to you.”14 Life in the military could bring honor or shame to a man. Denby was speaking to the deleterious impact that alcohol and sexual contact with diseased women had not just on men’s honor but their health as well. Often, when progressives spoke of “cleanliness” they meant clean bodies free from not just dirt and grime but also venereal diseases. Around this time American physicians and preachers associated “clean living” with strong and healthy manhood while “lust, uncleanness, drink, gambling, swearing, lying, dishonesty, irreligion,” could “ruin our Christian manhood.”15 The U.S. government promoted this idea as well: “A nation stands or falls, succeeds or fails, just in proportion to the high-mindedness, cleanliness, and manliness of each succeeding generation of men.”16 Sergeant Denby drew on all of these ideas when he spoke with recruits about how the Corps and the war would test them.

The test for many young men who had just joined the Marine Corps in the summer of 1917 began in boot camp.17 One recruit wrote home to his mother explaining the change he went through while at Parris Island:

The first day I was at camp I was afraid I was going to die. The next two weeks my sole fear was that I wasn’t going to die. And after that I knew I’d never die because I’d become so hard that nothing could kill me.18

Marine Corps boot camp was supposed to make young men stronger and their bodies harder. Rubin Jaffe’s letter from the recruit depot at Mare Island, California, claimed that the change in

18 Unidentified author, Kemper Frey Cowing and Courtney Ryley Cooper, eds., “Dear Folks at Home---”; *The Glorious Story of the United States Marines in France as Told by their Letters from the Battlefield* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), 3. (Hereafter referred to as *Dear Folks at Home*).
his manhood was so dramatic that his recruiting officers would not recognize him. No longer a
civilian, Jaffe sounded proud because he was a tougher, manlier version of himself. He wrote:

I’m afraid you wouldn’t recognize me now, my Dear Major—gun totin’, rip-roarin’, son-
of-a-gun of a hard-boiled Marine that I am. Why, I have grown so tough that the gobs
scurry to their holes when they hear my hobnails a-poundin’ the deck.¹⁹

He acquired this toughness from the physical training (PT) he and his fellow recruits suffered
through. Marines and the Army during this time used a system of PT called “Swedish
Exercises” that involved various forms of stretching and calisthenics.²⁰ Jaffe described the
exercises as “a cross between contorting, steeplejacking, and tail spinning and is designed to
make either a Man or a lunatic out of you.”²¹ He claimed that the PT made grown men cry on
occasion. But they had been instilled with the notion that Marines did not quit.

Jaffe wrote that Marine Corps training exposed recruits to a physically and mentally
challenging lifestyle. “This is rather a strenuous life,” he wrote, “It is—but at the same time a
most fascinating one, and we all love it.”²² He loved it, in part, because of the effect the whole
experience had on him and his fellow recruits. “They aim to make Men of us in the Marine
Corps,” and for good measure added, “Please be sure to spell that ‘Men’ always in capitals.”²³
Jaffe was becoming a man, and not just any man. He was becoming a man who was ready for
anything that Uncle Sam required:

I cannot express the feeling, the wonderful morale, that comes on us as the weeks
progress—the satisfaction that we are ready to do our damnedest for Uncle (Sam)—and

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¹⁹ Letter from Rubin Jaffe, no date provided, Dear Folks at Home, 4.
²⁰ E. John Solano described Swedish Exercises as “a judicious combination of scientific corrective and
preventative exercises and active recreative games and athletic sports,” in his book Physical Training (Junior
Course): Swedish Exercises, Games, Swimming, Diving, Life-Saving (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1914), 3d page of preface; See also Raymond B. Fosdick and Edward Frank Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit: For
²¹ Letter from Rubin Jaffe, no date provided, Dear Folks at Home, 5.
²² Letter from Rubin Jaffe, no date provided, Dear Folks at Home, 8.
²³ Letter from Rubin Jaffe, no date provided, Dear Folks at Home, 7.
every man is FIT for anything that may come up. It is that spirit that whips us on—that makes such damned egotists of us over the fact that we are United States Marines.24 Jaffe had acquired a new identity and a new sense of manliness through the strenuous life he had been living.

For many new Marines, the most challenging test of their manhood came after boot camp. Lewis A. Holmes wrote to his mother from France, where he served with the Fifth Regiment of Marines that would get bloodied at Belleau Wood two weeks later. “The only thing I live for is to do my bit and then return to you a brave, strong man, both mentally and physically, and prove to you that I am,” he told her.25 Lieutenant Silverthorne claimed in a letter to his parents after the Battle of Belleau Wood that combat made a man out of him. Facing death as a Marine was “an experience that has changed me overnight, from a youth seeking adventure to a man who has shaken dice with death.”26 And Corporal Willard P. Nelligan wrote home after Belleau Wood that fighting the Germans forced many young men to mature quickly. “I know from that battle that they (the Germans) are whipped, because those kids (men now every one of them), in the face of that awful machine-gun fire, hollered at the top of their voices, ducked in, and came up hollering for more,” he wrote. “The Germans can’t stop that spirit.”27 With courage, grit, and luck these Marines survived the rigors of training and combat and came out the other end as better men. The war, but also the Marine Corps, gave them that opportunity.

The Sacrifice of Manhood

Putting American manhood through the ultimate test of war meant sacrifice. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels reflected this line of thinking as well. In March 1918 he spoke before

24 Letter from Rubin Jaffe, no date provided, Dear Folks at Home, 9.
25 Letter Lewis A. Holmes to his Mother, May 12, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 9.
26 Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, July 1, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 118.
27 Williard P. Nelligan to his mother, June 27, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 211.
the Society of the Sons of St. Patrick in New York City. The central theme of his speech was “The Test of an American.” “There is no place in this country to-day,” he explained, “for any man who is not ready to give all he is, all he has, and all he hopes to be to bring victory to American arms.”28 American men had to be ready to sacrifice themselves for their nation’s cause in the Great War. Essentially, that was the test itself. In a time when people claimed “America for Americans!” demonstrating one’s patriotism could come in the form of sacrifice. “The supreme test for an American,” Daniels claimed, involved asking the following questions: “Does he love this country better than any other country under the sun? and will he gladly give his life to preserve the liberty which has blessed mankind?”29 The war was an offering of American manhood to the causes of democracy and liberty.

Woodrow Wilson attempted to persuade audiences of the need for this sacrifice by describing it in terms of honor and duty. His conscription proclamation of May 18, 1917, spoke of American manhood rising en masse to do its duty. Conscription, just like the preparedness movement, had been a contentious issue in American politics during the Great War. Preparedness and conscription had strong implications concerning the power of the federal government and citizens’ individual rights and obligations to their country.30 Many people saw the draft as a gross overstep of federal power. But Wilson wanted people to see its passage as “nothing less than the day upon which the manhood of the country shall step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals upon which this Nation is consecrated.”31

29 Josephus Daniels, “The Test of an American,” 117.
serve in some form or fashion. Obligations involved sacrifice. Wilson reasoned with his audiences further that “The stern sacrifice that is before us urges that it be carried in all our hearts as a great day of patriotic devotion and obligation, when the duty shall lie upon every man . . . to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated ages is written on these lists of honor.” For idealists like Wilson, therefore, conscription and war could be a good thing. It would teach men about honor, duty, obligation, sacrifice, all popular notions of Victorian-era manhood.

Many Americans perceived the war as a matter of honor. Wilson described the situation as such to persuade the American public of what was at stake:

What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand. American writing around this time took on chivalrous tones. The Germans insulted the United States with unrestricted submarine warfare that drowned American civilians. Minister Zimmerman’s telegram to Mexico City called on Mexicans to invade the United States. To restrain from violence would have meant shrinking in the face of the enemy. That was a decidedly unmanly thing for a nation to do. On the congressional floor, one orator proclaimed:

I regret that we are to have war; but if we are to maintain our self-respect, if we are to encourage the cultivation and development of those virile and patriotic virtues among our citizens, without which our Government cannot and should not survive, if we are not to become the laughing stock of mankind, mocked at and reviled by every other nation of the world, if we are not to be derided and sneered at as a Nation of degenerates, of money changers, and of cowards, is anything left to do consistent with a decent self-respect than to acknowledge the unquestioned fact that the German Government has waged war against us, to accept the challenge that has been so recklessly repeated in continued acts

33 Wilson, “Our Whole Nation an Army,” 84.
34 Adams, The Great Adventure, 51.
35 Woodrow Wilson, “Flag Day Address,” Liberty, Peace, and Justice (Chicago: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), 86. This speech was delivered in Washington D.C. on June 14, 1917.
of war and aggression against us, and to meet it like and in the only manner befitting a great and a patriotic and manly nation?36

Germany had thrown down the gauntlet and American manhood would have to accept the challenge or live in disgrace.

Chivalry was a common theme that coursed through Americans’ perceptions of their own manhood. Courage reappears in these discussions of manly behavior because that, too, was linked with chivalry. Popular Victorian conceptions of true manliness consisted of self-control and common sense on one hand, and possessing the courage to sacrifice for the greater good on the other.37 Men needed courage to “to play the man in life, to put his life in for all it is worth—this sort of manliness rings true, and often sounds its clear note of chivalry, nobility and Christian knighthood,” wrote George Walker Fiske.38 Even before America declared war on Germany, writers described American men as chivalrous. One author wrote, “we can no longer accuse it of being immersed in materialism, but on the contrary, must recognize our American man as the knightly soul of the twentieth-century.”39 In the context of the Great War, Americans and Marines saw themselves as chivalrous crusaders coming to the rescue of Western Europe and democracy.

When the United States entered the war, Marines portrayed themselves as crusaders and elite warriors who were strong and brave enough to save civilization itself. An image in the June 1917 issue of The Marines Magazine showed Marines connecting themselves directly to Christian crusaders and chivalry. In the foreground is a Marine charging through the fire and smoke-licked door of a church. Behind him is a crusader bedecked in armor with his sword

37 Adams, The Great Adventure, 25.
38 Fiske, Boy Life and Self-Government, 17.
39 Summerbell, Manhood in its American Type, 112-113.
drawn. The artist saw the Marines as the modern-day equivalent of crusaders of old: sent to fight for a high and holy cause (democracy in this case) in a foreign land against infidels (the Germans). The Marines, the neo-crusaders, sure of their cause and confident in the outcome, would fight to save western Europe like the chivalrous Americans they thought they were.

Figure 24: “The Crusaders: The Old and the New”
*The Marines Magazine, June 1917, 2.*

Two additional images conveyed the same theme of Marines coming to the rescue of western civilization. The first depicts a small Marine with a bayoneted rifle chasing a caricature of the European war fleeing in terror. Above him is a feminine looking angel of peace. The second image again shows a Marine confronting a savage looking German to save civilization, personified here in the form of a helpless woman on the ground. Behind them, Europe burns.
This imagery was founded upon the demonization of the German, the feminization of civilization, and the masculinization of Marines. Germans in these images appear barbaric and animalistic. Civilization appears in both images either as a woman supporting or being saved by the hero: the U.S. Marine. The savagery of the German is important in these images because of the stark contrast it creates with the other two figures. In these images, German barbarity revealed the manliness of the Marine and the femininity of the woman.
This artwork reflects American writings and speeches that demonized German soldiers. President Wilson claimed that Germans “have regarded smaller states, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination.”40 Professor John Tatlock of Stanford University wrote that “Our sense of humanity, justice, and chivalry was horrified by the German invasion of Belgium, a weak and innocent nation.”41 American authors and artists painted Germans as murderers of Belgian priests and children.42 According to another author, vicious brutality caused the German soldier to lose his manhood. He “is bidden by his officers to shut his heart to every tender feeling,” Ralph Flewelling claimed, “And the result has been that his manhood is lost somewhere in the meshes of military training, so that he has been guilty of barbarities and refinements of cruelty that savages would despise and be incapable of conceiving.”43 The Marines would have to stand up to the Germans and help put a stop to their barbarity.

Josephus Daniels spoke of this quest as a great opportunity for the young men of America. Fate had given them the chance to be heroes and to make the world a better place. To the Naval Academy’s 1918 graduating class he said:

Fortunate youth! Fortunate because it is given you to prove that the age of chivalry is not dead—that chivalry was never more alive than now. The holiest of crusades was motivated by no finer impulse than has brought us into this war. To prove that life means more than force; to prove that principle is still worth fighting for; to prove that freedom means more than dollars; that self-respect is better than compromise; to be ready to sacrifice all so that the world may be made the better—what nobler dedication of himself can a man make? 44

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40 Wilson, “Flag Day Address,” 87.
41 Tatlock, Why America Fights, 5.
42 Ibid., 5.
43 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Philosophy and the War (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1918), 35.
44 Josephus Daniels, “As They Go Forth to Battle,” The Navy and The Nation: The War-Time Addresses by Josephus Daniels Secretary of the Navy (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919), 171.
The young men going off to war had the chance to demonstrate American valor and honor. An entire American army, and two regiments of Marines in France, were about to get this opportunity.

The pitched battles that the Fourth Brigade of Marines fought against the Germans in the summer and fall of 1918 are very important to the Corps’ history and have received a great deal of both professional and amateur historical attention.\(^\text{45}\) A brief recounting of these battles helps explain their significance to Marines and American society. The Sixth and Fifth Regiments of Marines, plus the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, formed the Fourth Brigade of the U.S. Army’s Second Division. The brigade itself formed in France in October 1917, with Marine Colonel Charles A. Doyen in command. Major General James G. Harbord (U.S. Army) replaced Doyen as Fourth Brigade’s commanding officer in May 1918, and would serve in that capacity until July. In late July 1918, Marine Major General John A. Lejeune assumed command of the soldiers and Marines of the Second Division. Lejeune was the first Marine officer to command an Army division in war.\(^\text{46}\)


\(^{46}\) This information can be found in most histories concerning the Marines in World War I. This particular information was taken from Edwin N. McClellan, \textit{The United States Marine Corps in the World War}, updated and revised 3d ed. (Quantico VA: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2014), 33-76.
The Marines of the Fourth Brigade experienced their first major battle near Château Thierry in May and June of 1918. In late May, the German First and Seventh Armies launched a massive attack at Chemin des Dames, driving the French Sixth Army before them. The Germans aimed to make the allies shift troops from Flanders to the Château-Thierry sector closer to Paris. General Erich von Ludendorff hoped this feint would allow his armies to knock the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders out of the war entirely. The French high command hurried American divisions into the line to stem the German assault bearing down on Paris. They ordered the U.S. Second Division to move up to defensive positions near the Paris-Metz highway. This division, particularly the Fourth Brigade, repelled what was left of the German assault in the final days of May. The Germans in this sector then took up defensive positions in Belleau Wood, the town of Bouresches, and on Hill 142 to the northwest of the woods. From the 6th to the 26th of June, Marines conducted frontal assaults on German positions in and around Belleau Wood. Hill 142 and Bouresches fell to the Marines on June 6. It took three weeks of heavy and costly attacks and artillery barrages to force the Germans out of Belleau Wood.

Marine historians place a great deal of significance on an ill-planned and poorly supported assault on a heavily defended German position at Belleau Wood. That costly attack across a wheat field holds a strong place in Marine legend; the Fifth and Sixth Regiments of Marines suffered 1,087 casualties in a single day. Those who lived to write about it, like Colonel Albertus Catlin and Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates, were lucky. Catlin, author of *With the Help of God and a Few Marines*, commanded the Sixth Marines that day. He was evacuated after a sniper’s bullet struck him in the right lung. Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates, future Commandant of the Marine Corps, was tasked with leading his company to take Bouresches. “We charged across

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48 Catlin, *With the Help of God and a Few Marines*, 118.
an open field for eight hundred yards,” he wrote to his family, “and there were eleven machine
guns playing on us . . . (bullets) hitting the ground were as thick as rain drops—one hit me solid
on the helmet—denting a dent in it the size of an egg—it knocked me cold for a minute.” 49 One
of Cates’ own Marines revived him, and he carried on the attack. But casualty figures were
staggering.

Brigadier General Harbord ordered the attacks on Hill 142 and Belleau Wood without
appropriate artillery support, leading to horrific casualties. General John Pershing of the
American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), along with Harbord and his subordinate Marine
commanders, were proponents of “open warfare,” which emphasized massive infantry assaults
on major objectives. Machine guns, artillery, and trench mortars sent British, French, and
German troops into trenches and led to a stalemate on the western front. But the commanders of
the AEF’s Second Division were determined to make progress with the rifle, the bayonet, and the
infantryman, often without adequate artillery support. 50

As a result, Marines had a long summer of sacrifice ahead of them as they and the AEF
continued to use those tactics. The Second Division and its Marine Brigade assaulted headlong
into German positions at Soissons in mid-July. The Fifth Regiment of Marines took the town of
Vierzy, followed by the Sixth Regiment’s advance that pushed the allied lines forward almost a
mile. Marines suffered more casualties at Soissons (2,015) than at Belleau Wood. 51 The frontal
assaults at Soissons almost ground the Marines and the entire division into dust. “In June the
Second Division had spent three weeks in the line in Belleau Wood,” explains one recent

49 Clifton B. Cates to his Mother, June 14, 1918, Clifton B. Cates Papers, MCA, Quantico, VA.
50 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 209-226; Lengel, Thunder and Flames, 203. Clark, Devil Dogs,
101.
51 Simmons, United States Marines, 102; McClellan, Marine Corps in the World War, 115; Millett, Semper
Fidelis, 305-306.
historian. “At Soissons, it lasted two days before collapsing in exhaustion and having to be withdrawn.”

After a brief period of rest and refitting, along with taking on replacements, the Marine brigade conducted another frontal assault at Saint-Mihiel in September (903 casualties), then again at Mont Blanc in October (2,369 casualties). Marines fought and died steadily until the armistice. November 11, 1918, dawned on the Marines as they began their last hours of the Meuse-Argonne offensive (1,218 casualties).

Offensive tactics dominated European and American tactical thinking throughout the war. Marines were quite susceptible to the allure of offensive doctrine as well, even before the United States declared war on Germany. In 1916 Major John H. Russell asked, “Why should we not have a ‘cult’ of the Offensive.” Russell got his wish in France during the Great War, and the Marines paid for it. The AEF’s offensive tactics resulted in the highest casualties Marines had ever suffered in their entire existence up to that point: 11,968 officers and enlisted men. However, these casualty figures became a testament to Marine character and manhood.

Shortly after the armistice, three veteran Marines, Kemper F. Cowing, Courtney Ryley Cooper, and Morgan Dennis, published “Dear Folks at Home---”: The Glorious Story of the United States Marines in France as told by their Letters from the Battlefield. Cowing compiled wartime letters penned by Marines, Dennis provided illustrations, and Cooper served as the editor. The book is full of masculine imagery presented in prose and graphic art. The editors

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52 Lengel, Thunder and Flames, 283.
53 McClellan, Marine Corps in the World War, 115.
56 McClellan, Marine Corps in the World War, 115; See also “Marine Casualties at Belleau Wood,” Wall Street Journal, Dec 20, 1918, 9.
picked letters for public consumption, which transformed them from personal missives into public expressions of Marine masculine culture. Through these letters, “Dear Folks at Home” also captures a carefully curated version of Marines’ combat experience.

For much of the collection, Cowing and Cooper culled letters that contained ripping yarns of combat, danger, and Marine prowess. There was no cynicism or irony in these letters, which would later become common themes in post-Great War literature. These letters were full of bravado and masculine rhetoric to show readers the stuff of which Marines were made. Private Walter Scott Hiller expressed this pride to his mother when he wrote home from the front, “Do you think any man would regret being a part of such an organization, that have proven to be real fighters, that can go up against the Kaiser’s best-equipped and well-trained forces and give them the defeat we did? Not this man.” Cowing and Cooper used these letters to tell a glorious story of brave, young, American Marines who stopped the German drive on Paris in the summer of 1918.

Marines’ letters from France often expressed notions of manhood and sacrifice. One gets the impression that many of them fought and died at Belleau Wood with smiles on their faces. Lieutenant Silverthorne told his family Marines were happy to go over the top and fight the Germans:

The first time I went “over the top” was on June 6th. Oh, what a happy bunch we were! I and the best friend I had were shaking hands with one another, happy and exultant in the fact that at last we were “going over.”

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58 Walter Scott Hiller to his family, June 16, 1918, *Dear Folks at Home*, 118.

59 Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, July 1, 1918, *Dear Folks at Home*, 118.
When Silverthorne’s buddy (a Marine he identifies as Steve Sherman) died from machine gun fire during their assault across the wheat field, he expressed his sentiments in gendered terms: “he had met his end, but he met it like a hero, an American, and a man.” Silverthorne’s friend apparently died happy, at least according to the Marines who saw him fall: “they all are unanimous in saying he fell fighting with his face toward the enemy and a smile on his face.”

Corporal John F. Pinson’s letter home also spoke of Marines enjoying the battle because it got them out of the trenches and into open warfare. “It was a real battle, and being in the open through wheat-fields and farm lands, was much to the Americans’ liking,” he claimed. Apparently, Marines like Pinson felt comfortable charging across a field with bayonets fixed, closing with their enemy. “The boys all swung into action,” Pinson wrote, “laughing and kidding each other as they charged the German machine guns as if they were at a drill, dropping every twenty yards or so to rake the German lines with rifle and machine-gun fire.” The editors of “Dear Folks at Home” must have found this last quotation particularly inspiring. They used a drawing by Morgan Dennis to depict the very scene that Pinson described. The Marines in this picture seem happy conducting the attack, exploding shells notwithstanding.

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60 Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, July 1, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 118.
61 Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, July 1, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 119.
62 John F. Pinson to his family (no date given), Dear Folks at Home, 160.
63 John F. Pinson to his family (no date given), Dear Folks at Home, 160.
Cowing and Cooper used other images by Dennis Morgan to depict scenes of aggression and bravery that Marines described in their letters. Private E.A. Wahl wrote:

> The spirit of our men is wonderful. It is beyond the wildest imagination. They walk right into the rifle and machine-gun fire in the most matter-of-fact way. They have just taken the Boches off their feet.64

Captain George W. Hamilton wrote about the first day of the Battle of Belleau Wood (June 6th, 1918) when his company assaulted across a wheat field under heavy German machine gun fire. The 49th Company, Fifth Regiment of Marines, suffered heavy casualties that day. But his telling, accompanied by a drawing of a Marine charging a German machine gun crew, gives the impression that this was just another example of courage and prowess. “It was only because we rushed the positions that we were able to take them,” he claimed, “as there were too many guns to take in any other way.”65

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64 E.A. Wahl to Ann, June 27, 1918, *Dear Folks at Home*, 143-144.
65 George W. Hamilton to his family, June 25, 1918, *Dear Folks at Home*, 127.
Another image depicted a story told by Major Henry N. Manney, the quartermaster of the Sixth Regiment. According to Manney, the battle was deadly but "The Marines lived up to their reputation and even bettered it."66 "This is open warfare, just our style, and nothing could be finer than the way our men went to it."67 The image that accompanied Manney’s letter depicts a Marine zealously protecting a wounded comrade. Together they lay next to a thicket with artillery shells bursting mid-air in the background. The wounded Marine stares off into the distance, while dogged determination marks the face of his friend, protective but still battling.

66 Henry N. Manney to his Mother, June 10, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 135-136.
67 Henry N. Manney to his Mother, June 10, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 136.
To the compilers of this collection, tales of bravery and sacrifice meant Marines were exceptional men. Lieutenant Silverthorne wrote of losing some of his friends in combat. “A pang of deep sorrow will always pierce my heart when I think of some of my bosom friends,” he claimed, “men young in years, but men from the ground up, who have made the supreme sacrifice.”

Their sacrifices on the battlefields of France revealed that Marines’ identity went deeper than their warrior image. One of the editors wrote:

And these letters, with their optimism, with their cheer and their smiles, show that the Marines who were battling against the Hun were something more than fighters. They were men—men in action and men in thought, men who were big enough men to be tender and gentle, and who, while those they left behind “keep the home fires burning,” help to supply the spark that gives life to the flame of hope.

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68 Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, July 1, 1918, Dear Folks at Home, 117-118.
69 Kemper Frey Cowing and Courtney Ryley Cooper, Dear Folks at Home, 169.
The level of hope and emotions conveyed in their letters home meant their fighting spirit was restrained enough to hold on to their humanity. They had not given into the barbarism that American propaganda claimed had corrupted Germany’s manhood. Marines proved themselves warriors, but more importantly they proved themselves men.

**Passing the Test**

Floyd Gibbons, a *Chicago Tribune* correspondent who embedded himself with the Marines at Belleau Wood, also provided significant accounts of Marine combat and sacrifice. He wrote that Marines attacked German positions with shoulders squared, heads down, and rifles and bayonets pointed forward, and they paid the price for it:

> In such fashion did the Marines go through the Bois de Belleau. Their losses were heavy, but they did the work. The sacrifice was necessary. Paris was in danger. The Marines constituted the thin line between the enemy and Paris. The Marines not only held that line—they pushed it forward.⁷⁰

For Gibbons, Marines had become the *beau ideal* of American fighting manhood through their courage, tenacity, bravery, and sacrifice.

Sacrificing their own lives, in part, won Marines great acclaim despite official policies regarding press censorship. General Pershing’s press policy dictated that no specific information regarding individual units could be reported to the American newspapers. Reporters, however, could label troops as Marines or soldiers if they omitted designations of division, regiment, or battalion. Through that censorship loop-hole, the American public in June 1918 received joyous news of U.S. Marines defeating the Germans in battle. Floyd Gibbons had much to do with this public relations boon.⁷¹ After Marines successfully assaulted Hill 142 in the early morning hours

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⁷⁰ Floyd Gibbons, “*And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight.*” (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), 298; another version of Gibbons’ report can be found in Willis J. Abbot, *Soldiers of the Sea: The Story of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1918), 298-300.

of June 6, he sent a brief report of it to Paris, which then went on to the United States. The front page of the *Chicago Tribune* that day read: “U.S. Marines Smash Huns: Gain Glory in Brisk Fight on the Marne.”\(^{72}\) That evening Gibbons accompanied the Fifth Marines’ assault into Belleau Wood. A German machine gunner shot Gibbons three times: twice in the left arm, and once in the left eye. A few hours later, Gibbons crawled to safety under the cover of darkness.\(^{73}\)

What happened when news reached America of the U.S. Marines’ victory against the Germans was nothing short of a public relations dream for the Corps. “The United States Marines were the toast of New York yesterday,” the *New York Times* reported. “Everywhere one went in the cars, on the streets, in hotels or sky scrapers, the topic was on the marines, who are fighting with such glorious success in France.”\(^{74}\) Finally, the Marines had proved what many Americans wanted to believe: that American manhood could pass the supreme test of battle. “The battle on the entire front has lifted the Americans into the spotlight and convinced everyone that if needed the Americans have the spirit, dash, and tenacity to fight as well as any living soldiers,” read one column in the *Times Picayune*.\(^{75}\) The Marines “have proved that the American can fight, even if he wasn’t brought up to be a soldier,” read another article.\(^{76}\) Marine combat prowess became something to brag about, something that made Americans feel good about their own manhood. People asserted that Marines turned the tide of the war. The *New York Tribune Review* reported that “The European battlefield has seen no omen carrying such


\(^{73}\) Gibbons, “And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight,” 312-322.

\(^{74}\) “Valor of Marines Stirs All America,” *New York Times*, June 9, 1918, 2.


\(^{76}\) Don Martin, “U.S. Marines Scored One of Biggest Allied Success in Marne Fighting,” *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1918; “When the Marines at Château Thierry surprised their foes by the determination of their advance they evidenced the kind of enthusiasm that is characteristic of all Americans and more intensely characteristic of the Marine than any other branch of the American military establishment,” Anonymous, “Marines Carve Lasting Niche in Fame’s Hall Recruits Flock to Ranks of Corps Whose Slogan is ‘First to Fight,’” *Times Picayune*, June 24, 1918, 7.
portent to the German nation as the small but sweeping victory by American troops.” Dynamic
depictions of Marines in France covered the front page.

Figure 30: “The Marines Break Through!”
*New York Tribune Review, June 16, 1918*

Marine historians tend to agree that World War I brought more positive attention to the
Marine Corps than any other event in the service’s history. Marine manliness, performed and
demonstrated on the battlefields of France, was central to that popularity. “What sort of men

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77 “Marines Break Through!” *New York Tribune Review*, June 16, 1918, 1; “onrushing horde of Germans at
Chateau-Thierry. The Germans were stopped. Paris was saved. The turning-point in the war was reached. The
Marines made themselves immortal,” Lieutenant Newton Jenkins (U.S. Army), “Fighting in France with the

These Days to be a Marine,*” 353.

79 For how gender can be understood as a performance see Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
are they?” asked Reginald W. Kauffman, a journalist for The Living Age, “The best,’ they will say—and, after living among them, I am not so sure that they are wrong.”

The Marines at Belleau Wood convinced the Germans that Americans were a superior class of men, according to the journalist Floyd Gibbons. “The German has met the American on the battlefield of France and knows that man for man, the American soldier is better,” he boasted.

Gibbons constructed one of the most significant and powerful images of the Great War-era Marine Corps. Unlike Vera Cruz (1914) and the battles that came a generation later in World War II, there were no heroic photographs taken of Marines in France. However, Gibbons’ description of a Marine gunnery sergeant’s words to his men right before they attacked across the machine-gun-swept wheat fields created an indelible image:

The minute for the Marine advance was approaching. An old gunnery sergeant commanded the platoon in the absence of a lieutenant, who had been shot and was out of the fight. This old sergeant was a Marine veteran. His cheeks were bronzed with the wind and sun of the seven seas. The service bar across his left breast showed that he had fought in the Philippines, in Santo Domingo, at the walls of Pekin, and in the streets of Vera Cruz. I make no apologies for his language. Even if Hugo were not my precedent, I would make no apologies. To me his words were classic, if not sacred. As the minute for the advance arrived, he arose from the trees first and jumped out onto the exposed edge of that field that ran with lead, across which he and his men were to charge. Then he turned to give the charge order to the men of his platoon—his mates—the men he loved. He said: “Come on, you sons-o’-bitches! Do you want to live forever?”

Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly is thought to be the Marine that Gibbons described. By 1918, Daly had been in the Marine Corps for nineteen years. He won his first Medal of Honor in China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, and his second in Haiti in 1915. Daly was the epitome of

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80 Reginal Wright Kauffman, “The American Marines,” The Living Age, July 1918, 45.
82 Gibbons, “And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight,” 304.
83 Simmons, United States Marines, 99.
what a tough Marine should be among his contemporaries. Gibbons would help paint the soldiers of the sea as fearless heroes.

French accolades lent further credence to the notion that American manhood had passed the test of war. The French government renamed Belleau Wood *Le Bois de la Brigade de Marine* in honor of their victory. These were the woods “where the American Marines vanquished the flower of the Kaiser’s army.” Their success inspired their allies. “The Americans advanced in a solid phalanx, their strong determined faces and great physique an inspiration to their gallant French comrades,” claimed the *Washington Post*. The famous French painter Georges Scott created “La Brigade Marine Americaine Au Bois De Belleau” to commemorate the American victory there. Full of the detritus and drab colors of modern war, “La Brigade Marine” presents a powerful scene of Marines driving the Germans before them. The Germans, so often depicted as monsters in other images, are reeling in defeat.

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From 1917 to 1918, American society mobilized on a scale not seen since the Civil War to help defeat Germany. Men who left their jobs in the fields, factories, and offices to fight needed replacing somehow as the war necessitated the increased production of food and materiel. An editorial for the New Republic had an answer to the labor shortage: “It is now incumbent upon us to see how far we can substitute the labor of women for that of men.”  

entering the work force in greater (though not dramatic) numbers they entered the armed forces as well.\(^8^9\)

Josephus Daniels authorized the enlistment of women into the U.S. Navy in early 1917 and there were over two hundred female sailors by the time Congress declared war on Germany.\(^9^0\) The Marine Corps’ expansion and wartime activities increased the volume of paperwork and made administrative duties substantially more complex. Added to the administrative mess were the many requests from Marine clerks for transfers to fight in France before the war ended. On August 2, Major General Barnett requested authorization from Daniels to begin enlisting women in the Marine Corps reserve “where their services might be utilized to replace men who may be qualified for active field service.”\(^9^1\) Recruiters had already used women to motivate men to enlist since the United States entered the war. Sometimes, these women would even wear Marine-looking uniforms.\(^9^2\) But now women could officially enlist. On August 13, 1918, Opha Mae Johnson became the first woman to join the Marine Corps.\(^9^3\)

Women Marines served on clerical and recruiting duty in the United States between August 1918 and August 1919. According to Cowing and Cooper, women enlisted in the Corps so that “a real ‘he-man leatherneck,’ as the Marines call themselves, might take up his gun and march away to war.”\(^9^4\) Once given authorization, recruiters began targeting women to enlist with

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\(^9^1\) Barnett to Daniels, “Enrollment of women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty,” August 2, 1918, RG 127, General Correspondence, Office of the Commandant, 1913-1938, Box 126, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.

\(^9^2\) Marshall, *It Means Something These Days to be a Marine*, 360.


\(^9^4\) Cowing and Cooper, *Dear Folks at Home*, 15.
slogans like “Free a Man to Fight.” They sought out only “women of excellent character, neat appearance, and with some business of office experience.” By November 1918, only 277 women Marines served on active duty, and it is not known just how many male Marines they had replaced so they could go to France.

The idea that female Marines would only work office jobs and recruiting duty conformed with the traditional gender roles of the time. As Heather Marshall has argued, the Marine Corps “incorporated women into the institution in a manner consonant with its image as an elite institution . . . A Marine was a warrior who belonged with his brothers fighting in France, not sitting at typewriter in a New York City office.” Women had never served in the Marine Corps before (at least not officially) and there were fears that military service would cause an upheaval in American gender relations. Service in the military, long understood as an exclusively masculine domain, might cause women to pick up masculine vices or, even worse, lose their femininity. Their service might even help them accumulate civic credibility and lead to greater cries for women suffrage. The Marine Corps, however, made sure that women maintained their feminine appearances and qualities. Female Marines would wear heels instead of hobnail boots, long skirts instead of trousers, and even though “a man’s work will be required of all feminine Marines,” they would be exempted from “heavy muscular work.”

The September 1918 cover of The Recruiters’ Bulletin conveys this idea well. In her skirt and heels, a female Marine takes over the domain of office work while a male Marine, equipped with his rifle and campaign hat, is out the door to fulfill his traditional masculine role.

95 Gavin, American Women in World War I, 26.
96 John A. Lejeune to Isabel Smith, October 14, 1920, RG 127, General Correspondence, Office of the Commandant, 1913-1938, Box 126, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
97 Marshall, It Means Something These Days to be a Marine, 358.
of warfighting. “The Girl he Left Behind,” is a Marine, but more importantly, she is still feminine and ready, as he is, to do her part in winning the war.

![Image of The Recruiters' Bulletin, September 1918, cover page.]

Figure 32: “The Girl He Left Behind”
*The Recruiters’ Bulletin, September 1918, cover page.*

Heather Marshall has argued that the Marine Corps “manipulated these women to make larger statements about male Marines.” Female Marines themselves participated actively in promoting the Corps’ masculine image. They were not, as Kimberly Jensen has argued, challenging “the traditional gender bargain of men as the Protectors and women as the

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100 Marshall, *It Means Something These Days to be a Marine*, 358.
Women Marines of the Great War era did not attend boot camp nor were they trained to shoot or construct field fortifications like their male comrades. Female Marines were considered ladies and members of the gentler sex; they were considered ladies first, Marines second. “Since that fateful day last August when for the first time a lily white hand was raised at the Devil Dog recruiting station while a feminine voice sang out in dulcet tones “I do,” read *The Recruiters’ Bulletin*, Marines had been curious to know more about these women. “What are they like, these lady leathernicks, these hundred percent feminine Hun hunters?”

Corporal Martha Wilchinski helped shape the public’s and the Marine Corps’ own perceptions of Great War-era women Marines. Wilchinski served as one of the editors of the *The Recruiters’* and *The Marines’ Bulletin* where she published short stories and letters to her fictional fiancé named Bill. Using a comedic tone, she wrote of the trials and tribulations of a young female Marine getting used to the masculine world of the Marine Corps. “I've got the greatest news, Bill,” she wrote in one her first published letters, “Are you ready? Well, then—I’m a lady leathernick; I’m the last word in hun-hunters; I’m a real, live, honest-to-goodness Marine!” Her prose was full of confidence. “Well, if a regiment of Marines can make the Germans stand on their bone heads and yell ‘kamerad,’” she boasted, “can you imagine what a regiment of female Marines can do?” To a certain extent, the Marine Corps had changed her. In an implicit jab at the Corps’ reputation for sternness among its men, she signed off, “I can’t sign myself as affectionately as I used to Bill, you understand, I’m a soldier now and you wouldn’t want me to do anything that wasn’t in the manual.”

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But she had not parted with her feminine ways completely. In a cartoon of her entitled “Martha the Marine!” she is presented as a woman who joined the Corps not because of the traditional masculine reasons such as being the first to fight or to kill Germans. She chose the Marines because “they have the prettiest uniform!” She imagines that the uniform would look good on her and attract male admiration. The punch line of the cartoon, however, is that the uniform does not fit. In another letter to Bill, Martha wrote “When I put my uniform on I looked like a physical map of Colorado.”\textsuperscript{104} This was highly disappointing for Martha who wrote, “You know I joined the Marine Corps so I could get my clothes for nothing.”\textsuperscript{105}

![Figure 33; “Martha the Marine! The Uniform is the Thing!”](image)

\textit{The Marines’ Bulletin, November 1918, 31.}

Martha was a woman in a masculine world, hence her comedic appeal. She wrote of situations where Marines struggled to get used to her presence in the Corps. In one story, Corporal Martha reported for sea duty on the \textit{USS Arizona}. She approached the officer of the deck: “‘You’re reporting for duty?’ he asked incredulously. He was looking down at a blushing

\textsuperscript{104} Martha L. Wilchinski, “It’s ‘Us Corporals’ Now, Martha Tells Bill,” \textit{The Marines’ Bulletin}, November 1918, 31.

\textsuperscript{105} Martha L. Whilchinski, “War is Terrible but it Hasn’t Anything on Peace So Corporal Martha Discovers,” \textit{The Marines’ Bulletin}, December 1918, 52.
and stammering Marine; rank: corporal; sex: female.”

This encounter left the officer tongue tied. He called for one of the orderlies and said, “Turn this man—er—lady—er—Marine over to the first sergeant.” Martha then goes about getting acquainted with ship-life. She is introduced to hammocks, guard duty, and inspections. Morgan Dennis illustrated this story with several images that convey the surprise Marines probably had encountering their first woman in a men’s institution.

In another letter to Bill, Martha writes of an awkward encounter she had with a Marine lieutenant in front of an elevator. As the doors opened, Martha and the officer just looked at each other, not sure what to do.

Now, here’s the question. If I am a lady and he’s a gentleman, I go first. If he’s an officer and I’m a corporal, he goes first. It all depends on how you look at it. I didn’t know how he’d take it, so I thought I’d wait and see what he’d do. I guess he thought the same thing. So we both stood there eyeing each other up on the right oblique. Then he stepped forward and I stepped back. Then he stepped back and I stepped forward. Then we both stepped back. I was getting pretty dizzy by that time. I guess he was too.

Figure 34: “Martha on Ship”
*The Marines’ Bulletin, January 1919, 7 & 8.*

In another letter to Bill, Martha writes of an awkward encounter she had with a Marine lieutenant in front of an elevator. As the doors opened, Martha and the officer just looked at each other, not sure what to do.

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In the end, they both entered the elevator simultaneously. This incident illuminates two things: first, that women Marines, although receiving equal pay as their male counterparts of equal rank, were sometimes not seen as equals. Second, Martha and the officer were faced with a conundrum. What takes precedence? Traditional American gender relations or Marine Corps etiquette? The officer was not sure whether to treat Martha like a lady or to treat her like a subordinate. They very fact that she was a woman forced him to vacillate on Marine protocol regarding officer and enlisted relations.

As Heather Marshall has demonstrated, the Marines’ masculine wartime image was enhanced by the presence of these women. The November 1918 cover of the Marines’ Bulletin presents an image of a female Marine walking arm-in-arm with a male Marine as though she is guiding him into the future. The image provides a contrast between the man and woman. She is smiling and dressed in the Corps’ female uniform while the man is in dress blues, serious, straight-faced, reserved, and saluting good-bye to the woman on his right. On the surface this image represents the Publicity Bureau’s temporary switch from The Recruiters’ Bulletin to the Marines’ Bulletin, a magazine geared more towards a broader Marine audience. But it also illuminates how Marines perceived the service of their new female comrades. They had a supporting role within the Corps helped male Marines perform their duties. They also signified how the Great War had changed the Marine Corps. Wartime necessitated the employment of more and more members of American society, women included. And so it was with the Marines. This was a new Corps, one with room for women who, instead of weakening the Marines’ masculine image, threw it into greater relief.

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109 Marshall, It Means Something These Days to be a Marine, 368.
Women Marines were not entirely shielded from the realities of war, however. Pearl Chandley Oagley was one of the first female Marines who enlisted to help with recruiting. She worked directly for Colonel A. S. McLemore who oversaw the Publicity Bureau. She hung posters, talked to men on the street, and participated in parades. Part of her and the other women Marine’s jobs, however, involved writing letters to Marines in France. “A lot of spare time was spent writing to our service men,” she recalled, “for we realized that good letters did help a lot as we worked and waited for our boys to come home.” As August turned to September, then October to November, these women became more aware of the human toll of the war. “We took this all very seriously, we had no inkling the war would not last long,” she said. “Many did not
get back.” Martha Wilchinski made the Corps appear fun and comical, but it was not always so.

While she published stories, Oagley handled casualty correspondence. She wrote letters of encouragement to wounded Marines in France and had to forward news of those killed in action on to their families. “It was not a fun job,” she admitted, but “we instinctively developed a flair for words in such cases, and shared them with the loved ones, their grief, and also the pride of sacrifice made for our country.”

**Marines: The Pride of American Manhood**

For many Marines in France, occupation duty kept them busy along the Rhine until the summer of 1919. Most of them shipped home by August. When they arrived, the war had been over for nine months, and most of the troops had already returned. When the Second Division reached American shores, the press treated them like heroes.

On August 9, 1919, the Second Division, comprised of both Army infantry and Marines, marched in Washington D.C. in a grand parade. Leading the column was the division commander astride a bay charger, Marine Major General John A. Lejeune. The parade drew huge crowds of people who cheered them on, waved American flags, and pelted the troops with roses. “This beats hand grenades,” a Marine sergeant reportedly said after catching some roses for himself. Lejeune greeted the crowds with broad smiles and waves as he led his men down the street and through the throngs of people to where the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other high-ranking military officers waited to review the troops.

Near the public library stood the reviewing stand and about 500 wounded veterans of the war. The crowds cheered even louder when they saw Lejeune remove his hat and nod in tribute.

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110 Peal Oagley, “Memory Bits of a Girl Marine of World War I,” date unknown, Pearl Oagley Papers, MCA.
to them. “Here come the Marines!” many cried as the Fourth Brigade began to approach the reviewing stand led by Marine Brigadier General William C. Neville, “West Pointers never marched with more dash or vim than did these men,” a reporter claimed. “Everyone agreed that a finer body of men was never seen in Fifth Avenue than the men commanded by Neville,” the report read. As the column passed the reviewing stand, the wounded Marine veterans standing near the Public library “simply went wild.” Major General Commandant Barnett stood next to Assistant secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt turned to Barnett and said, “I never saw a finer looking body of men and I never witnessed a more inspiring parade.” Barnett replied, “No wonder the Germans lost.”

The Marines became a source of national pride. They did not defeat the Germans on their own, of course. The Army deserved more credit than it received from the press, despite attempts of some Marines and journalists to correct misinformation. But people connected the Marines to Germany’s defeat. *The Washington Post* published poems that credited the victory solely to the Marines. Isabel Likens Gates wrote a poem about the Marine fight at Belleau Wood:

Awful and fierce the combat raged.
As the huns came, wave on wave,
Against our men, and steel to steel,
Mid shot and shell, they’d break and reel
And at last before us gave
Our loss was great, but it sealed the fate
Of the Huns—and the world esteems
Like Spartans of old this tale will be told
Of Uncle Sam’s marines


\(^{112}\) Edwin L. James, “Stories of the War That Didn’t Happen: Even the Marines Themselves Admit They Have Received an Oversupply of Credit,” *The New York Times*, May 25, 1919, (page number illegible).

Bessie B. Croffut published a poem for the Marines shortly after their return home. The battles of the summer of 1918 were fresh in her mind as she wrote specifically to praise the returning Fourth Brigade. She presented the Marines as heroes:

    Invincibles, at Belleau Wood who
    fought
    (“Hellwood,” now Wood of the U.S.
    Marines!)
Who stayed the Hun and there his
lesson taught!
Whatever they call you, “leather-
necks,” “gyrenes,”
“Go-Getters,” “devil-dogs,” you were
the means
Under a righteous God! You inspira-
tion caught
From Freedom’s fount, to end those godless scenes
And immortality with your best life-
blood bought!
You have redeemed your boast,
that of your corps—
As of your country—first in fight
to be
Where brave men battle for the right
and true!
You've shown the world what you
had shown before
Sailors of air and soldiers of the
sea!
“There’s not a thing on earth U.S.
Marines can’t do!”

Marines had worked hard to get the American public to associate bravery, sacrifice, victory, and combat readiness with the Corps. Published work like this suggests that the prestige Marines sought before the war had finally been obtained.

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The editors of *The Recruiters' Bulletin* asked state governors from around the country to record their thoughts on the Corps, especially their performance in the Great War. Many of their responses were unequivocal. “In the Marine, the bloody Hun met his master,” Frederick D. Gardner of Missouri proclaimed, “the dauntless courage, the intrepidity and the dash of the Marines . . . filled the German soldiery with fear, sent a thrill through the armies of democracy and struck the world with wonder and amazement.”

If American manhood defeated Germany, then Marines were its best examples.

Not only did the Marines win, but they kept their bodies and honor clean while doing it. Or at least that is what people claimed. The U.S. government promised the nation that military life would be good for American men. The Commissions on Training Camp Activities aimed “to make the men fit for fighting, and after, to bring them back from war as fine and as clean as they went.” That meant keeping them away from sexual encounters with prostitutes. Contracting venereal diseases would sully the reputation of American men who came home from war. As of 1919, Marines appeared, at least, to have resisted such temptations. “The splendid achievements of the Marines in the World War are well known,” wrote Hugh M. Dorsey of Georgia, “They were the cleanest and strongest of our young manhood.” The Corps had become a cultural bastion that Americans looked to as an example of healthy, clean, and strong manhood. “The Marine Corps stands for all that is good in the ideals of manhood—for strength, for loyalty, for fidelity and for cleanliness in mind and body,” Colorado Governor Oliver H. Shoup asserted, “If you are a he-man, if you want action—enlist in the Marines!”

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after the war because they convinced many that they were the hardiest specimens of American manhood, unsullied by the potentially deleterious effects of war.

Recruiters appealed to manhood before the war, but now prominent officials seemed more convinced. Men who had served during the war improved their character and physical fitness. They “demonstrated the incalculable value of military training as an aid to character building, and to the highest degree of physical fitness,” claimed Governor Simon Bamberger of Utah, “therefore the benefits attending the training of the Marines are obvious in view of the fact that he is probably the most efficiently and variedly trained soldier in the world.” Americans wrote that Marines benefited American manhood because they made young boys in their own image. Therefore, young men learned from Marines how to live an honorable and successful life. “Any young man who enters the Marine Corps gains entrance into a selected company of manly, virile and helpful Americans,” the governor of Maryland wrote. “He is finding a career full of honor and opportunity.”

A cartoon image entitled “Honest Pride” shows a diminutive Marine private who had just entered the Corps looking up to a sergeant who is taller, has a thicker chest, broader shoulders, and stronger jaw line. The new Marine is impressed by the sergeant’s medals and exclaims, “Gosh, I’d never have room on my chest for all them medals.” The old timer replied, “Don’t worry; you’ll have enough chest when you’re with us a while. We guarantee to put a chest on an eel.” The images together convey the physical attributes men supposedly gained while in the Corps. The sergeant’s service in the Great War adds to his masculinity and prestige. In the

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background is a picture of him wearing the uniform that Marines wore on the western front with combat medals on his chest.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 36: “Honest Pride”**

In his memoirs published within a year of the war’s conclusion, Marine Colonel Albertus Catlin remarked with pride on how Marines had conducted themselves in battle. They proved to him that America still made men of great quality, men who could proudly stand with the manly generations that came before. “Can we read what our college boys did in Belleau Wood,” he asked readers, “without thanking God that the soil trod by Washington and Lincoln, the Pilgrim Fathers and the builders of the great West, can still produce men of such stuff as that?”

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Marines’ cause was a high and holy one. America “went into this war solely to save the ideals of Christianity from destruction,” he wrote. “It is my country that sent the flower of its manhood to fight and die for that cause.”

Not long after the war Reverend F. M. Johnson, a U.S. Navy Chaplain, spoke to this sacrifice when he wrote:

At the outposts of our Government,
   Neath the snows or tropic skies,
You will find the Globe and Anchor men
   Where’re the Old Flag Flies;
For these soldiers of the ocean
   Lie in graves that few have seen,
But they gave for God and Country,
   Each one called—U.S. Marine

Conclusion

World War I gave Marines opportunities both on and off the battlefields of France. First and foremost, the war placed Marines in a large, modern, deadly, and terrible conflict that tested their mettle as an institution. The war also subjected their usefulness to the court of public opinion. Americans saw Marines who fought and died in France as heroes. Marines also got the opportunity to construct images of themselves like never before. They did this in part by publishing letters home from the front, drawing pictures of Marines saving civilization, and charging across wheat fields. Through their bravery and sacrifice they had proven that American men could fight and win. The war could now be used as a new justification for older claims of manly resolve. Just like before, the American press helped the Marines with this image construction. It is hard to imagine the Marine Corps taking as much credit as they did during the Battle of Belleau Wood without the work of Floyd Gibbons. He staged a sweeping public

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relations coup for the Corps that put the Marines’ deeds on the front page of many American newspapers.

In the public culture of 1918 and 1919, Marines came to embody all the very best of traditional American manhood. Marine combat victories made Americans write about them in heroic terms. The old insecurities concerning the emasculation of American men that seemed to pervade pre-Great War American discourses on manhood were silent for the time being. The Marines and the war helped to change all of that for the moment.

By 1919, the Marines had drifted out of the public eye. American attention turned toward the League of Nations, the influenza pandemic, immigration, prohibition, race relations, and woman suffrage. While all those issues swirled around in American culture and politics, the Corps demobilized, discharged thousands of volunteers and draftees (including all the female Marines), and made Major General Lejeune their new commandant. Unfortunately for the Corps, they would not stay out of the newspapers for long. The Marines fought three wars simultaneously in the summer and fall of 1918. While Marines in France won acclaim for themselves and their country, the ones in Haiti and the Dominican Republic did not fare so well. Only the war in France received any special notice in the press.

When public attention swung back their way in late 1919, the Marine Corps had a public relations nightmare on their hands. News of atrocities committed by Marines against Haitians and Dominicans would threaten to undo the reputation the Corps had worked hard to build. This information had serious implications for the Marines and their manly image. Americans would soon be reminded that the Marines, the first to fight, the heroes of Belleau Wood, and the saviors of civilization—had a dark side.
4. TROPICALITIS:
MARINES, HISPANIOLA, AND THE DEGENERACY OF AMERICAN MANHOOD,
1915-1922

Marines are much exposed to the strange degenerating magic of the tropical sun. In the generation since the Spanish War our Corps has never known a day of peace. Marines have grown grey in the banana wars under the equator while the rest of the country has enjoyed unexampled quiet and prosperity. The history of our Corps is an unwritten saga of these unofficial wars. But service under the equator exacts its penalties.¹

On June 11, 1917, Smithson Taylor of New York City sent a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ office in Washington D.C. The day before, “Marine Corps Week,” the Marines’ largest recruiting drive in its history, had just kicked off around the country. Taylor used this opportunity to tell Major General George Barnett precisely how he felt about Marines. “Today’s papers are full of praise of the Marine Corps,” he pointed out. “Until a short time ago, I had considered the Marine Corps the finest branch of the military service in the U.S.A.” But Taylor had recently returned from Marine-occupied Santo Domingo. “I wish I could give you a movie film of what I saw, to show you why I have refused to allow my son to join the Marine Corps,” he wrote. Marines could always be found at the bar drunk, disorderly, and unkempt. Occasionally they bullied the locals. Taylor described the behavior of one Major Davis as being particularly egregious. “Major Davis sits in that café, with coat open and under-shirt displayed, then goes out and hits a coachman over the head with a bottle,” he claimed. He implored Barnett to act soon. “For the good name of your Corps, and the hope of someday creating good feeling

towards Americans down there,” he wrote, “DO SOMETHING.” Nothing would be done for the time being.²

Mr. Taylor witnessed what many other American observers would see in the coming years: Marines guilty of drunkenness, hair-trigger violence, and assault. The Marine Publicity Bureau had worked hard to persuade Americans that Marines were fine examples of manhood and that their sons would be, too, if they joined. However, their own behavior in Hispaniola produced a counternarrative that Marines were uncivilized and murderous. Marine manhood would not appear so wholesome and chivalrous, and white American manhood would be guilty by association.

Marines’ notions of race and manhood guided their interactions with Haitians and Dominicans. Many of them operated under the assumption that people of color were inferior. Their racial attitudes are not surprising considering contemporary discourses in the United States frequently asserted the superiority of white man over black. Paternalistic racism dictated that black and Hispanic men were like ignorant and lazy children in need of guidance, and sometimes punishment, to set them straight. Shortly after the United States declared war on Germany, Marine and indigenous relations worsened as disgruntled citizens of Haiti and the Dominican Republic launched insurgencies against occupation forces. In the undeclared wars that followed, Marines lost their sense of restraint and behaved contrary to Victorian notions of white manhood. Marine heavy-handedness would lead to investigations and courts martial. But the illicit behavior seemed to prove correct American psychologists and medical professionals who claimed that the mental and physical health of white men degenerated in tropical zones.

² Smithson Taylor to Major General George Barnett, June 11, 1917, Thad Taylor Personnel File, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis MO. (Hereafter Taylor’s Service Records, NPRC).
The racial tensions between Marines and natives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been acknowledged by both Latin American and Marine historians. As historian Alan McPherson has said, the former tend to view the occupations through “the eyes of the invaded.”

Marine Corps historians, mostly former Marines themselves, have told different stories, mostly from the eyes of the occupiers. They usually focus only on Marine accomplishments and victories in both countries. Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas’ “official” history of the Marines in the Dominican Republic, for example, argued in 1974 that Marines accomplished their missions while showing restraint and tactical resourcefulness.

The Haitian occupation is usually acknowledged by Marine Corps historians as the most problematic of America’s “Banana Wars,” but they assert that Marines, with the exception of only a few, served honorably. Allan R. Millett acknowledges Marine racism by simply stating that they were “no more immune to racial prejudice than their fellow Americans.” Breanne Robertson’s recent scholarship, however, has shed more light on the Marine occupation of the Dominican Republic. Her article “Rebellion, Repression, and Reform: U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic,”

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3 They have argued for decades that the Marine occupations of both countries were gross violations of their sovereignty. Victims of American strategic policy such as the Monroe Doctrine and cultural beliefs such as the “White Man’s Burden,” Haitians and Dominicans suffered through the indignity of long years of foreign domination, martial law, and violence. Marines built roads and formed two formidable constabularies: Gendarmerie D’Haiti and La Guardia Dominicana. But when the occupations ended both institutions would be used by subsequent violent dictatorships to solidify their political control. McPherson, The Invaded, 2, 265; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, xxviii; Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998); Ian Bell, The Dominican Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); Steve Coupeau, The History of Haiti (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008); Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995).

4 Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 68; See also Simmons, The United States Marines, 110; Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps, 370.


6 Millet, Simper Fidelis, 186.
explores Marines’ misbehavior and the popular protests against them in more depth than any previous Marine Corps historian.7

Other than Mary Renda’s book, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of Imperialism, historians have largely ignored how notions of white manhood may have shaped Marine behavior in the Caribbean.8 There are works that explore manhood and race within the context of the early twentieth century and the World War I Era.9 There is a small but growing body of literature that pays attention to race and gender in the U.S. military during this time.10 However there still exists a relative gap in the historiography and in our understanding of how cultural concepts such as manhood infused the history of American occupations of Hispaniola.11

The Marines Land

The Marine occupation of Haiti began under controversial conditions in the spring of 1915.12 Fearing that President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam would surrender Haitian sovereignty to the United States, a group of revolutionaries attacked the presidential palace on July 27, 1915. Guillaume Sam fled to the French Legation close by. When Haitians learned of the summary

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7 Breanne Robertson, “Rebellion, Repression, and Reform: U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic,” in Marine Corps History 2, no. 1 (Summer 2016), 31-54.
8 Renda, Taking Haiti, 15; She argues that paternalism, with its racial and gendered implications, was the central principle that guided American actions in Haiti. “Paternalism was an assertion of authority, superiority, and control expressed in the metaphor of a father’s relationship with his children,” and it became the cultural foundation of both illicit violence and the defense of Marine behavior. She demonstrates persuasively that Marines saw Haitians as children of sorts that needed guidance and discipline. This chapter reveals that her argument holds true in the Dominican Republic as well.
10 Huebner, “Gee I Wish I Were a Man,” 68-82; Keene, Doughboys and the Great War, 36.
11 For analysis on how manhood informed discourses on American occupations of foreign countries see Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, 180-199.
12 “Memoir on the Political, Economic, and Financial Conditions Existing in the Republic of Haiti Under the American Occupation by the Delegates to the Unites States of the Union Pariotique d’Hati,” contained in U.S. Senate, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee of Haiti and Santo Domingo, 2 vols., 67th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1922, 5-6. (Here after referred to as Senate Hearings); see also Allan Millett, Simper Fidelis, 184-185; Renda, Taking Haiti, 29-30; Coupeau, The History of Haiti, 68; Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 127-128.
executions of political prisoners in Port-au-Prince, a mob entered the legation, dragged the President out into the street, and literally ripped him to pieces. Woodrow Wilson deemed this action a threat to American lives and interests on the island and therefore believed it necessary to order Rear Admiral William B. Caperton to land Marines from the USS Washington near Port-au-Prince. The First Marine Brigade transferred over from Guantanamo, Cuba, established martial law, and restricted freedom of the press. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton and the U.S. State Department set about rebuilding Haiti’s government.

In May 1916, Marines took over the Dominican Republic’s government under similar conditions. As per Theodore Roosevelt’s 1907 customs treaty with the Dominican Republic, the U.S. State Department oversaw Dominican customs revenues and forbade the government from increasing the national debt. President Juan Isidro Jiménez had come to power with the support of the American State Department. Jiménez promised to allow the United States to supervise Dominican finances and to create a national army to help keep the peace. The country’s national assembly, however, opposed him because they understood financial independence as a necessary component of national sovereignty. When his own war minister, General Desiderio Arias, attempted to overthrow the president, Jiménez accepted an offer of intervention by U.S. naval forces waiting offshore. One hundred and fifty Marines from the USS Prairie landed in Santo

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13 Langley, Banana Wars, 122.
14 The declaration of martial law gave Marines a great deal of power while in country: “The commanding officer of the United States Expeditionary force, Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, is empowered to issue the necessary regulations and appoint the necessary officers to make this martial law effective,” Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, “Proclamation to the People of Port Au Prince, Haiti,” September 3, 1915, Russell Papers, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico Virginia (Hereafter referred to as MCA); The Marines vowed not to hinder the freedom of the press. However, by proclaiming “The publishing of false or incendiary propaganda of Haiti, or publishing any false, indecent or obscure propaganda, letters signed or unsigned, or matter which tends to disturb the public peace will be dealt with by the military courts,” they essentially stated that they would, in fact, hinder the press at their discretion; Captain Alexander S. Williams, “Office of the Provost Martial,” Port Au Prince, Haiti, September 3, 1915, Russell Papers, MCA; See also Millett, Semper Fidelis, 186.
Domingo followed quickly by hundreds more. Jiménez stepped down because he could not stomach the thought of regaining power with the aid of foreign troops.  

These were separate conflicts, but Marines in both countries faced similar challenges. They fought insurgents and established tenuous military and political control over the fractious regions as they could with the help of newly formed, local constabularies: *Gendarmerie D’Haiti* and *La Guardia Dominicana*. Low-ranking enlisted Marines often served as officers in *Gendarmerie* and *Guardia* forces. With the Marines, the State Department aimed to end the two revolutions on Hispaniola and to set up lasting, peaceful, and cooperative governments. While war raged in Europe, and over a year before American entry into World War I, the Corps fought smaller wars of its own in Hispaniola, wars historians characterize today as counterinsurgencies.

**Racialized Manhood in Imagery**

By 1917, Marines had a long history of fighting small scale wars on foreign shores. Whether it was the Boxer rebellion in China, the Spanish American War, the 1914 landing at Vera Cruz, or the occupations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, Marines used these events to bolster their public image. From these frequent deployments came the slogans, “First to Fight,” “Always Ready,” and “The Marines have landed and have the situation well in hand.”

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16 A Marine Private commanding a platoon of gendarmes, for example, would have a special and temporary rank of Lieutenant *Gendarmerie* but would still retain his normal rank within the Marine Corps itself. A Marine Sergeant would have the rank of Captain in the *Gendarmerie* and so forth. Marines in the Dominican Republic used the same system.
Such imagery graced the Marines’ own recruiting literature. Editors of *U.S. Marines in Rhyme, Prose and Cartoon* printed stories of Marines’ abilities to quell uprisings among the United States’ southern neighbors. “He is America’s ‘handy man,’ always ready to go anywhere and do anything, especially as a pacificator in struggling countries that run the risk of ruin through chronic revolution.”17 They also published a piece from the *Literary Digest* that described Marines as “‘Johnnies on the spot,’ who are ready whenever there is a dangerous, difficult work to be done in a hurry.”18 The author claimed that the popular phrase, “tell it to the Marines,” stemmed from the fact that Marines responded frequently to emergencies in the Caribbean and Latin America, where revolutions threatened to tear countries apart. “Today ‘Tell it to the Marines’ means tell them to get busy on a man size job that calls for courage and strength and determination to see the thing through to the finish,” claimed the author.19

The deployments to Haiti and the Dominican Republic also inspired the construction of an array of graphic imagery driven by themes of race and gender. Cartoons portrayed Marines as manly and strong while casting Haitians and Dominicans as infantile and weak. Marine artists promoted a kind of racial paternalism that reinforced narratives of superior white manhood governing the infantilized peoples of Hispaniola.

One image was named after the popular phrase “Tell it to the Marines,” and serves as a graphic representation of the phrase’s meaning. “Tell it to the Marines” depicts a large Marine walking onto a beach occupied by a small Latino man. Labeled “Insurrecto” by the artist, the small man flees immediately at the sight of the Marine and drops a sign that says, “down with

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the government.” “What did you say?” says the Marine the way a father would address an unruly child. This image tells a simple story: when there are revolutions or insurrections in Latin America, Marines will land, chase the insurgents away, and restore order.

Figure 37: “Tell it to the Marines”
*U.S. Marines in Rhyme, Prose, and Cartoon, 3d ed.*
(New York: U.S. Marine Corps Publicity Bureau, 1917), 12.

Another image entitled “Cheese it! De Cop!” tells the same story but expands the list of characters that Marines considered less manly than themselves. The artist shows small and terrified people fleeing a Marine marching confidently ashore twirling a nightstick in his hand. Craven “revolutionaries,” peace “disturbers,” “bandits,” “rebels,” and “insurrectos” all flee when the Marine arrives.
Marines saw themselves as missionaries of sorts, sent to spread democracy and to teach blacks and Hispanics how to run a peaceful government. Implicit behind these beliefs were racial assumptions about Haitian and Dominican inferiority. Gail Bederman’s assertion that white men linked “whiteness to male power” is evident here.\textsuperscript{20} Paternalism, underscored by these assumptions, tended to tint the lenses through which Marines saw the native populations of both countries.\textsuperscript{21} These elements are present in an image from a 1917 issue of \textit{The Marines Magazine} entitled “The Missionary.” A comically large Marine kneels on a tropical beach holding an obstreperous but small and armed Latino man. “Listen Son!” the Marine says to the man as an adult would say to a child, “do unto your brothers as you’d hav’em do unto you! Savvy?”\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Bederman, \textit{Manliness and Civilization}, 20.
\textsuperscript{21} Mary Renda, \textit{Taking Haiti}, 18; McPherson, \textit{The Invaded}, 128-129.
\textsuperscript{22} Paul Woyshner, “The Missionary,” \textit{The Marines Magazine}, April 1917, 2; Woyshner won an award “for the most original acceptable cartoon,” in January 1917 for this drawing, Paul Woyshner Papers, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico VA (hereafter MCA).
Another image infantilizes the people of the Dominican Republic. Uncle Sam, wearing a Marine Corps uniform, has a wailing child across his knees with the words “Santo” on one leg and “Domingo” on the other. Depicting Haitians and Dominicans as children only bolstered Marines’ senses of their own manhood. As historian Michael Kimmel has argued about American men at the turn of the last century, “Manhood had been understood to define an inner quality, the capacity for autonomy and responsibility, and had historically been seen as the opposite of childhood.” This kind of imagery repeated the infantilization of “Others” around the world and had been used to make military interventions seem benevolent since at least the Spanish American and Philippine-American Wars.

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Marines also used artistic representations of their deployments to Latin America to demonstrate their superiority over other branches of the U.S. military. Drawings that portrayed Marines as Uncle Sam’s favorite showed how they liked to see themselves compared to the Army and Navy. For example, in “Uncle Sam’s Pet Nephew,” Uncle Sam is watching a group of children playing, each one representing the Militia, Army, Navy, and Marines. “Some boy!” Uncle Sam exclaims as he watches with admiration the pluck and exuberance of the boy in a Marine uniform who yells, “Wee-e! Im Fightin Spicks!” The dog (perhaps representing Dominican or Haitian rebels) is frightened and runs away. The Navy child is clearly overweight and clueless. The Soldier, with his glasses and his toy howitzer, looks timid and intellectual. Finally, the Militia boy is exasperated as he sits down, sips his drink, and says, “He’s too rough to play with.” Marines argued that they were more active, more experienced, and in possession

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26 The word “Spick” is a racial pejorative in contemporary parlance. Marines claim to have invented the word: “The Marines refer to the natives of Latin-American countries as ‘hombres’ or ‘spicks.’ The former is a Spanish word for man, picked up by Marines in the Philippines. The latter is a corruption of the word “spigoty” and owes its incorporation into the leatherneck lingo to the natives who have long tried to tell the Marines that they ‘no spigoty English,’” Unknown Author, date circa 1921, RG 127, General Correspondence, Recruitment 1921-1939, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington DC.
of qualities Uncle Sam and the nation wanted most in a fighting man: the readiness and willingness to fight.

![Figure 41: “Uncle Sam’s Pet Nephew”](image)

*The Marines Magazine, April 1917, 5.*

The Great War enhanced even further Marines’ perceptions of their own racial and manly superiority over Haitians and Dominicans. One image that appeared in the July 1919 issue of *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* depicted a black man wearing nothing but a crown and a straw skirt. The crown on his head implies that he is a chieftain of some sort but he looks worried. His eyes are fixed on a German helmet that is attached to the belt of an armed Marine. “Your crown is safe as long as you’re good!” the Marine exclaims with a smile. The black man is standing with his toes pointed inward and his stomach pointing forward, a weak and child-like pose. The Marine, on the other hand, looks confident, assertive, and manly.
Marine perceptions of Haitians and Dominicans were extensions of American beliefs concerning race and manhood. Americans doctors, journalists, and politicians understood race and manhood to be inextricably linked. Some writers, both white and black, associated specific types of manhood with each race. They often disagreed, however, over what kind of manhood should be associated with the two races. White authors would either imply or explicitly state that white manhood was stronger and more valiant and vigorous than black manhood. They argued that white manhood had reached the furthest extent of human development while black manhood lagged behind. One author argued that “Infancy, childhood and youth precede manhood in the life of a nation as well as that of the individual,” and that Africans lacked “dignity, self-consciousness, perseverance, and steady application . . . all characteristic of a race in its childhood.”

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Some African American authors and activists argued the opposite but used the same metaphor. “The growth of a boy into manhood is the point of evolution that our race has reached today,” Roy Thomas Smith wrote.29 Francis J. Grimke, a Great War-era Pastor of the Fifteenth Street Presbyterian Church in Washington D.C. as well as prominent member of the NAACP, claimed explicitly that “the Negro is a man, and he will never be satisfied with anything less than a man’s treatment.”30 Grimke argued this at a time when he and other authors believed black men had proven their manhood fighting for their country in France.31 The war was supposed to change African American’s men lives for the better.32

Marine imagery, therefore, very much reflected the racial and gender norms of many white Americans. As men of a self-proclaimed superior race, they believed they would naturally dominate lesser peoples: to help them, to protect them from themselves, to punish them when necessary, all for their own good. The ease with which Marines supposedly imposed order over men of lesser races enhanced their manly image. For many Marines deployed there, however, these images did not accurately reflect the difficulties of counterinsurgency warfare.

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29 Roy Thomas Smith, The Sacred Honor and Duty of Black American Citizens Owe the Ethiopian Race (Kansas City, KN: 1918), 17.
30 Francis J. Grimke, The Race Problem—Two Suggestions as to its Solution, August 1919 (published speech that is missing publication information), Accessed via https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=emu.010002585890;q1=The%20Race%20Problem-Two%20Suggestions (last accessed February 7, 2017)
The Impact of the Great War

The Great War would have a significant impact on both occupations. Once the United States declared war on Germany, the government pulled companies of Marines off the island, much to the chagrin of the brigade and battalion commanders there. One officer in Haiti reported that “[t]he reduction of the number of Marines in Haiti by two companies is, in my opinion, a serious mistake . . . it is necessary in my mind that we increase our influence in this Island and not weaken it . . . to withdraw troops just at this time . . . cannot but have a very unfortunate effect.”33 Stripped of much needed manpower, materiel, and leadership, the Marine brigade in the Dominican Republic began to bend under a revival of insurgent activity in 1918.34 “To face this situation what do we have?” wrote one Marine officer. “Men of experience . . . have gone, other men . . . are on the limit of their two year period and probably on the eve of their departure.”35

Marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic faced serious insurgencies in the spring and summer of 1918, but they would receive little recognition. While the Fifth and Sixth Regiments of Marines in France won laurels fighting the Germans, elements of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Regiments of Marines stayed in Hispaniola. Establishing and maintaining control over the countryside became more difficult. Marines often resorted to harsh measures to do so.

The race of the native inhabitants made a significant difference in the attitudes of Marines in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and France. After landing in France, one Marine wrote enthusiastically that “here in France, among people of their own color and race, of paved streets

33 Quoted report from an unnamed brigade commander in Brigadier-General George Barnett to Secretary of Navy Report on Affair in the Republic of Haiti, June 1915 to June 30, 1920, Haitian Geographic Files, USMC HD, Quantico VA.
34 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 196.
35 L. Nogart to Joseph Pendleton, April 16, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
and taxicabs . . . coming and going in a steady stream to and from the front, the Marine is learning new things every day.”36 Meanwhile, in Haiti, where Marines were trying to teach people they considered “inferior” how to run their own country, Colonel L.W.T. Waller wrote to Colonel Smedley Butler to describe the Gendarmerie as “niggers in spite of the varnish of education and refinement. Down in their hearts they are just the same happy, idle irresponsible people we know of.”37

Many Marine officers in Hispaniola felt left out and some desperately tried to get orders to France. Smedley Butler, a giant figure in Marine Corps history, was one of them.38 He was an experienced officer who had served in the Spanish American War, the Philippines, China, and Mexico. Butler was content as the commander of Marine and Gendarmerie forces in Haiti until the United States entered the Great War. “This work here would be more interesting and worthwhile,” he wrote his parents in October 1917, “but under the circumstances it is unbearable. . . . This thing of being left out of the show is really more than I can stand and I tell you both very truthfully that I shall never show my face in West Chester again if I am not allowed to go to France.”39

In his letters to his family, whenever the subject of the war came up, Butler sounded profoundly depressed, to the point that he questioned his own manliness and his life decisions. “Had I remained in civil life,” he lamented, “I could have gone to France at least as a Lieutenant, and saved my face, while now . . . I must sit here under a foreign flag, while my country goes to war.”40 He was willing to do anything to go to France including being reduced in rank: “It isn’t

39 Smedley D. Butler to his parents, October 6, 1917, Butler Papers, MCA.
40 Butler to his parents, October 6, 1917, Butler Papers, MCA.
as if I asked to be sent as a General or even a Colonel or even a Lt. Colonel, I would welcome any position from private on down.”

Even the thought of his in-laws going to serve in France caused mental anguish:

Bunny has 14 near male relations in the Army, from Privates up to lieutenants and all my able bodied kinfolk have gone—all males on both sides but me the one professional soldier . . . they can readily see why I could never associate with anyone after the war. Someday my grandchildren will be subjected to the remark ‘where was your grandfather during the big war?’ And they will have to lurch their heads in shame and either lie or say ‘he was a policeman in the service of a foreign and black Republic.’

Butler’s sense of his own manhood was at stake here. Missing the fight would lessen his worth as a man despite his many years of service. In part because of his political connections through his father, Butler shipped out to France in March 1918, replaced by Colonel Alexander S. Williams. Many officers stayed behind in Hispaniola.

Those in the Dominican Republic expressed similar sentiments. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Russell requested a transfer from Santo Domingo to France only to receive the reply, “The work with which you are engaged in, whilst it may not bring as much notoriety as will the work in France, is equally important as makes for the good of the Marine Corps.” Brigadier General Joseph Pendleton, who commanded Marines in the Dominican Republic, wanted to go, too, but was told by the commandant, “as a matter of policy the War Department is opposed to sending general officers to France who are beyond a certain age, which unfortunately leaves you and me out.”

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 H.C. Haines to John H. Russell, June 27, 1917, Russell Papers, MCA; Writing ten years after the fact one journalist described Russell’s feelings about missing the war in France: “Not to have served with his men in the biggest show of his lifetime was a crushing blow to the general. He felt that the career he valued most had been blighted. When he and his extraordinarily able and attractive wife were newly married, they had resolved to work hard and faithfully, and hope as a reward to head the corps. To them the chance seemed gone forever,” Arthur Krock, “Russell of the Marines Justifies Cleveland’s Faith,” New York Times, February 24, 1934.
44 George Barnett to Joseph Pendleton, August 23, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
Corporal H.W. Houck wrote a poem for *The Marines Magazine* in September of 1917 that illustrates how enlisted Marines felt about having to serve in places like Nicaragua and Hispaniola rather than France. Houck wanted to fight the Germans where he and his fellow Marines stood the best chance of demonstrating their manhood. He wrote:

Now, we are not complaining, but here is our

Appeal,—

Return us to the USA, you know how

We feel.

*Our minds are only wandering now, but later
Will go wrong
And then you’ll all be sorry, for you’ll miss
us when we’re gone.*

One hundred and eight men are all we have,
And brave lads every one;
So give us a chance to go to France, for
We’re rip-roaring sons of guns.45

Instead he was doomed to wither away in the tropics. In Corps literature, that is what happened when Marines served too long in the Caribbean or Latin America: their minds degenerated, their morals loosened, their health waned.

**Racial Degeneracy**

These manly “rip-roaring sons of guns,” suffered from “Tropicalitis,” a Marine colloquialism that Mary Renda describes as “the mental and emotional degeneration that often afflicted or threatened to afflict white men on duty for any length of time near the equator.”46 John Houston Craige, a Marine officer who served in Haiti, described the condition in his 1933 book *Black Bagdad*. For many white men who stayed in the tropics too long, “the stolid slow up, the nervous blow up.”47

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Marines did not just dream up the concept of “Tropicalitis.” By the mid nineteen-teens academics had long asserted that too much exposure to “inferior” races caused white men in the tropics to degenerate. Ellsworth Huntington, a professor of geography at Yale University, argued that, “Experience in all parts of the world shows that the presence of an inferior race in large numbers tends constantly to lower the standards of the dominant race.”48 Authors like Huntington asserted that people native to the tropics were indolent, lude, crude, and licentious, all character traits that white middle-class men and women tried to keep suppressed. Through overexposure to natives, white men lost their sexual morality and work ethic. “All of these things may be looked upon as disadvantages of the lower race rather than of the higher,” Huntington claimed, “but I believe that the higher race reaps by far the greater injury.”49 Smedley Butler seemed to agree with this assessment. A year after his own departure from Haiti he wrote to a friend of his still stationed there, “trusting that the service among the blacks is not getting too much on your nerves, and that you will not stay there until you lose all your teeth as I did.”50

Another cause of degeneration was the tropical climate. Colonel John Russell wrote that Marines in Haiti “were subjected to tropical rains and sun”51 Contemporary authors frequently wrote about the insalubriousness of the Caribbean, where white men were susceptible to all manner of diseases. Too much sun was bad for the skin, but it could also cause much more serious damage. “Excessive exposure to the sun . . . almost invariably produces headache, slight fever, and ultimately a high degree of nervous irritability ending not infrequently in a nervous

49 Huntington, “The Adaptability of the White Man to Tropical America,” 195.
50 Smedley Butler to F. M. Wise, November 13, 1919, Butler Papers, MCA.
breakdown,” wrote one author.⁵² Down in Haiti, Russell would have agreed: “Malarial fever in Haiti is endemic and practically all officers and men who did patrol duty sooner or later acquired it.”⁵³

Craige wrote of the deleterious effect of the sun as well. “There is a strange magic in the rays of the sun,” he wrote, “A short exposure, bareheaded, brings sunstroke to the newly arrived white man.”⁵⁴ Craige told the story of one unfortunate Marine Lieutenant named South who was full of romantic notions of adventure before coming to Haiti. After a couple years, however, he began to lose his mind. For this young man, the tropical sun had leached his strength, turning him from a man of vigor to a nervous wreck. South’s comrades noticed him mumbling to himself increasingly, withdrawing from the company of others, and sometimes passing into fits of hysteria. “The Tropics have got him,” his fellow Marines would say.⁵⁵ To American academics and Marines, the degeneration of white men in the tropics was real.⁵⁶ These fears and misconceptions reveal how manhood pervaded Marines’ understanding of service in Hispaniola.

Illicit violence increased substantially in Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1918. In Haiti, Marines reinstituted the notorious corvee labor system which forced locals to construct roads. Haitians resisted because forced labor was tantamount to slavery. Marines treated those who resisted as bandits, which led to executions and more resistance. In the Dominican Republic, Captain Charles Merkel soon became known as the “Tiger of Seibo” after the eastern

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⁵⁴ Craige, *Black Bagdad*, 89.
province of Seibo that he terrorized, supposedly under the orders of his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe.

Court martial records from Haiti between the years 1915 and 1919 indicate a shift in the number and type of crimes committed. From the beginning of the occupation until 1917, the most common offenses were “AWOL,” “Drunkenness,” and “Scandalous Conduct.” By mid to late 1917 (after the U.S. entry in WWI) violent crimes became more common: “Murder; assault with a deadly weapon wounding another person,” “Assaulting superior officer with intent to kill,” and “Murder (of a native).” Among the officers tried by general courts martial, three stood trial in 1917, eleven in 1918 (which was the last year of the Great War and the period that saw a spike in insurgent activity), and twenty-six in 1919.

Part of the reason for this behavior probably had to do with the Great War itself. Once the United States intervened in Europe, Marines quickly saw their missions in Hispaniola as part of the war against Germany. Americans considered Germany their greatest economic and strategic rival in the Caribbean since the turn of the century. Following America’s entry into the war, numerous rumors began to fly among the local populace about U.S. and German intentions in Haiti. Colonel Eli K. Cole reported that some Haitian politicians “appeared to be laboring under the impression that our government was in danger of being overthrown by the Germans living in the United States, he having been told there were five hundred thousand armed Germans ready to start a revolution in the United States.” Some Haitians believed rumors such as “the United States Government will force every male Haitian between the ages of 15 and

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57 Memorandum RE General Courts-Martial, Haiti, July 28, 1915, to July, 1920, Inclusive, Haitian Geographic Files, USMC HD, Quantico VA.
58 Memorandum RE General Courts Martial Haiti, Haitian Geographic Files, USMC HD, Quantico VA.
59 For more information on how Germans had established themselves in the social and economic milieus of Haiti and the Dominican Republic see Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 22; Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 34-35, 68-69, 95; Renda, Taking Haiti, 51; “Reports Relating to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Operations in Haiti and Santo Domingo,” 1915-1921. RG 127, box 2, National Archives, Washington D.C.
55 to join a military force to fight against Germany.” Cole assured them that those claims were false.

Marines fell back on notions of paternalism, with their implications for racial manhood, to make sense of this situation. They often attributed Haitians’ willingness to believe these kinds of rumors to their childishness. “The Haitians,” Russell wrote to Barnett, “are a very hysterical people. Hundreds of rumors are circulated among them daily, that are simply ridiculous, but, like children, they believe them and completely lose their heads.” And Marine Captain J. L. Perkins described Haitians as “little more than children mentally.”

Because they seemed so infantile, it was simply impossible for some Marines to believe that the natives conducted an insurgency on their own. Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe wrote to his superior that “the general opinion here is that whoever is running this revolution . . . is getting a lot out of the niggers.” Marines blamed Germans for directing insurgent activity. Thorpe claimed that a recent spike in violence in the Dominican Republic “shows the handiwork of the German as certain as can be, there is no doubt in my mind that a German is commanding the enemy’s campaign.” A Marine officer in Santo Domingo claimed that “The pro German element is at work stirring up the minds of the people . . . . I believe that if the Germans had some big win in Europe we would have here a general insurrection.” Joseph Pendleton wrote

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60 “Marine Corps Operations in Haiti and Santo Domingo,” RG 127, Box 2, National Archives, Washington DC.
61 John Russell to George Barnett, October 17, 1919, Russell Papers, MCA.
62 J.L. Perkins to John H. Russell, “Account of patrol made in company with Mr. Herbert J. Seligman,” July 26, 1920, Russell Papers, MCA.
63 Col. George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton from Macoris Dominican Republic, August 18, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
64 Thorpe to Pendleton, August 18, 1918. Pendleton Papers, MCA.
65 L. Nogart to Joseph Pendleton, April 16, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA; Col. George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton from Macoris Dominican Republic, August 18, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
that Marines in the summer of 1918 “were campaigning against Germany, German influence, German money, and German inspired revolt.”

German-orchestrated attacks made more sense to the Marines than insurgencies led by “child-like” blacks and Hispanics. These beliefs, founded upon hierarchies of manhood and race, led to a misunderstanding of the situation in both countries. According to Bruce Calder’s research, what the Marines saw as German-led revolt conducted by bandit leaders was a grassroots resistance by Dominicans fighting against foreign intrusion and economic exploitation, led by trusted local political and military leaders.

**The Marines’ War in Hispaniola, 1918-1919**

Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe’s war in the Dominican Republic offers a lurid example of Marine conduct. Officers under Thorpe’s command began killing natives in early 1918 in retaliation for the murder and mutilation of Captain William Knox. Knox was liked, respected, and known as “a champion of civic improvement in his district.” First Lieutenant Hatton replaced Knox, and allegedly executed eleven suspected bandits associated with his murder. Knox’s friend, Captain Thad Taylor, turned sinister as well. After Knox’s death, Taylor believed “that all circumstances called for a campaign of frightfulness,” so he “arrested indiscriminately...”

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66 Brigadier General Joseph Pendleton to the Secretary of the Navy, July 24, 1919, Pendleton Papers, MCA; Historian Hans Schmidt argues that in Haiti, “[a]ll the investigations of rumors, surveillance of German firms, censoring of letters, and other counterespionage work failed to turn up much concrete evidence of German intrigue.” Schmidt, *Occupation of Haiti*, 92.

67 Bruce Calder argues that in the Dominican Republic the spike in insurgent activity in 1918 stemmed from a misunderstanding of or disrespect for local politics in the eastern provinces of the country. *Cuadillos*, local men who had charisma, military skills, economic resources, and important family ties controlled much of eastern Dominican Republic. Marines “either failed to understand it or completely misjudged the strength of the cuadillo system,” argues Calder. World War I also, hindered seriously the country’s export trade which negatively affected Dominican’s economic prospects. Bruce Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus the United States Marines: Guerilla Insurgency during the Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 58, no. 4 (November 1978): 656; see also Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 196.


69 LtCol George C Thorpe, *Confidential Report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris Provinces*, May 30 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
upon suspicion; then people rotted in jail pending investigation or search for evidence.”

According to Thorpe, Taylor’s retaliatory methods sowed discord and anarchy in the Seibo province.

Encountering stiff resistance from insurgent bands, Thorpe and his men resorted to drastic measures. On April 14, 1918, Taylor and a group of Marines captured a Syrian national living in Hayto Mayor, known locally as Agapito José, who they believed was involved in Knox’s murder. After Marines shot and killed Agapito in the street, Taylor allegedly “took a dagger and driving it in his (Agapito’s) throat slashed down to the abdomen.” Taylor’s accomplices in this act were Captain Russell W. Duck and newly arrived Captain Charles F. Merkel. In August, Thorpe instituted a campaign known by the locals as reconcentraciones, aimed at gathering Dominicans from the countryside into camps located in the larger urban centers. Thorpe believed that placing populations of Dominicans under surveillance and control would allow his Marines to separate the good Dominicans from the bad.

Merkel, commander of the 52d company of Marines, committed his most notorious crimes during this campaign. Throughout the month of September 1918, Merkel treated every Dominican he encountered outside of the concentrated zones as insurgents. He captured,

70 Thorpe, Confidential Report, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
71 Ibid. Thorpe also believed that Taylor’s actions corrupted the methods of many officers around him. “Captain Taylor,” Thorpe argued, “had a very bad effect upon other officers, who acquired the idea that lawlessness and utter disregard of civilians’ rights was proper and admirable conduct for military forces.”
72 Major General Commandant to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Nov 9, 1925. RG 80 General Correspondence, National Archives Washington D.C. Agapito was also known as Azepto Jose, he was a Syrian, and a store owner in the Dominican Republic. His real name was Habib Koziah.
73 Senate Hearings, 1136
74 Campaign Orders No. 1., Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Provisional Regiment, USMC, San Pedro de Macoris, DR, August 20, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
75 Langley, Banana Wars, 146; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 149. Dr. Alejandro Coradin of Hayto Mayor, who witnessed the concentration efforts first hand, however, described it as the “concentration of the wretched inhabitants of the commune of Hayto Mayor who had been locked up like pigs in stockades under the pretext of investigating whether or not they were bad persons, a procedure which we can call puerile,” Senate Hearings, 1119.
tortured, and allegedly murdered dozens of people. Thorpe had Merkel arrested on October 1. While in his cell, Merkel wrote a letter accusing Thorpe of ordering the killings. Merkel knew that the misery, death, and destruction he had wrought in the Seibo Province would damage the Marine Corps’ reputation. “I am doing this in order to save disgracing the M. Corps and myself,” Merkel claimed, “but I sincerely hope that god will punish Thorpe someday for he is not fit to have command of anything and his sole object is to get people into trouble.” Alone in a prison cell, Merkel shot himself in the head with a smuggled .38 revolver.

Thorpe denied involvement in Merkel’s crimes, but in a letter to his own superior, dated August 21, Thorpe strongly connected himself to them. To Brigadier General Joseph Pendleton, Thorpe indicated that he stood to benefit from the deaths of many Dominicans. “If I do a good job of clearing these two provinces of insurgents and kill a lot,” he claimed, “maybe I go to a more active field of endeavor too . . . I ought to show that I’d be a good German killer.”

Merkel accused Thorpe of ordering killings, but other Marines accused him of being too lenient on the natives. According to Special Agent Carlos J. Rohde’s report on the conditions in the Dominican Republic, many Marines hated Thorpe for being a “nigger lover.” Shortly after Merkel’s death, Thorpe released seventy prisoners who Marines had captured in supposed bandit camps upon their promises to live peacefully. This leniency infuriated Marines because he did not prosecute “these bands as rigidly as might be expected under the circumstances.” Thorpe reacted to Rohde’s accusations the same way he reacted to Merkel’s: denial. Calling Thorpe a

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76 Arrest of Captain Charles F. Merkel, M.C., October 18, 1918, Dominican Republic Geographic Files, 1917-1919, USMC HD, Quantico VA; Mark Folse, “The Tiger of Seibo: Charles Merkel, George C. Thorpe, and the Dark Side of Marine Corps History,” Marine Corps History 1, no. 2 (Winter 2016), 4-18.
77 Charles F. Merkel to Russell W. Duck, October 2, 1918, Charles Merkel’s Personnel File, NPRC, St Louis MO (Hereafter Merkel Personnel File).
78 George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, August 21, 1918, Pendleton Papers, MCA. (Italics mine)
79 Special Agent Carlos J. Rohde to Director of Naval Intelligence, “Conditions in Dominican Republic,” November 26, 1918. Thorpe’s Service Records, NPRC, St, Louis MO, 8 (Hereafter Thorpe’s Personnel File).
80 Rohde to Director of Naval Intelligence, “Conditions in Dominican Republic,” 3.
“nigger lover” was a significant insult that called his loyalty to his own men and race into question. He asserted adamantly that “I am not a nigger lover in any sense of the word.” Rohde further reported that Marines wanted to kill him. “I have had any number of Marines tell me that they feared that one of these days, when Colonel Thorpe might join them in one of their scouting expeditions, one of their own men would ‘accidentally’ shoot Colonel Thorpe,” he wrote. Painting a rather dark picture of the Marines’ war there, Rohde’s investigation has never been mentioned in any Marine Corps histories that address the Dominican Republic occupation of 1916-1924. All of this news regarding the Dominican Republic would remain out of the public eye for the time being.

Once again, much of the resistance Marines experienced in Haiti stemmed from the *corvee* work system. Realizing the resentment coerced labor had caused among Haitians, Colonel Alexander S. Williams abolished it in October 1918. But, one of Williams’ subordinates, Major Clarke H. Wells in the Hinche district, kept the *corvee* in his sector active through the early months of 1919—apparently without the permission or knowledge of his

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82 Special Agent Carlos J. Rohde to Director of Naval Intelligence, “Conditions in Dominican Republic,” November 26, 1918, Thorpe’s Personnel File, 7.
83 Perhaps in response to Merkel’s rampage, Thorpe had instituted an order forbidding all Marines from firing on any one unless fired upon first. This order left Marines feeling defenseless while patrolling the hills. Marines feared being captured by bandits most of all, especially considering how Knox’s body was mutilated. Many claimed they would commit suicide before being captured because the bandits would torture them, dissect them, and then hack them to death with machetes. Rumors spread of bandits cutting off the Marines’ private parts. Special Agent Carlos J. Rohde to Director of Naval Intelligence, “Conditions in Dominican Republic,” November 26, 1918, Thorpe’s Personnel Records, 3-7.
84 One of the occupation’s missions in Haiti was to build roads connecting the northern and southern provinces of the country. Marines meant this road to aid in the commercial development and to increase the occupation’s efficiency. To acquire workers Marines employed Haitians who could not pay the road tax to pay with their own labor. Since the system had been used before in Haiti, Marines assumed that it would work, but many Haitians saw it as slave labor and chose to resist. See Captain John H. Craig, *Development of the Republic of Haiti*, General Correspondence, Operations and Training Division, Intelligence Section: 1915-1934, H-134 Haiti Box 14, Entry 38, NA Washington D.C.
85 Testimony of Alexander S. Williams, Senate *Hearings*, 1822.
superiors. Wells claimed that volunteers worked the road. This was news to workers themselves, who knew their labor was forced.86

The corvee fanned the flames of an insurgency being conducted by Charlemagne Peralte. A charismatic escaped prisoner of the occupation, Peralte, who had been previously arrested for armed robbery and forced into hard labor, escaped from prison in the summer of 1918.87 When he fled to the countryside, he gathered supporters who were angry over the corvee. Making clear allusions to Germany’s invasion of Belgium during the Great War, Peralte proclaimed to the people of Port-au-Prince: “Haitians, let us be firm; let us follow the example of Belgium,” meaning resist the invaders at all costs.88

During this insurgency, Marines often had a hard time distinguishing innocent Haitians from dangerous ones, which led to indiscriminate counterinsurgency measures. Colonel R.S. Hooker became profoundly frustrated with Haitians who would not help the occupiers find Charlemagne. Hooker undoubtedly encouraged many natives to resist the Marines by proclaiming the following on a public notice:

I have told you several times to return to your homes and remain quiet. I have told you that I would accord protection to all those who are honest citizens, but what have you done for me? Nothing! . . . In view of your negligence in failing to denounce these people, I have found it necessary to take very stern measures. What are these measures? It is becoming necessary to burn huts in order that the bandits are unable to find protection from the rain; it is becoming necessary to kill cattle so that bandits will not be able to find meat to eat; it is becoming necessary to destroy life-sustaining supplies of every kind so that the bandits will not have beans, sugar-cane, bananas, etc., to eat. These measures hit the bandits, the innocent, and the good citizens equally.89

86 Testimony of Alexander S. Williams, Senate Hearings, 1820; See also Millett, Semper Fidelis, 196.
88 Proclamation posted in Port-au-Prince during the night of March 14, 1919, in “Statement of Colonel John H. Russell,” Russell Papers, MCA.
89 R.S. Hooker, Proclamation to the Haitian People in the Districts Where There are Bandits, 1919 exact date unknown, Russell Papers, MCA.
Marines then began to execute locals. They allegedly killed native prisoners in January 1919. One Marine accused Major Clarke H. Wells of ordering that “prisoners, if any were undesirable, [or] useless . . . bumped off, by this expression of course meant to kill them.” Acting under these orders Ernest Lavoie (A Captain in the Gendarmerie but a Private, U.S. Marine Corps) ordered the execution of nineteen prisoners.

Partly because of such killings, Peralte successfully painted the Marines as evil foreign occupiers bent on enslaving the population. Charlemagne led organized attacks against the occupation government at Hinche, Grand Riviere, and Le Trou. Marines finally caught up with Peralte and assassinated him in October 1919, putting his body on public display. But the insurgency did not end there.

Benoit Batraville picked up the torch of rebellion and carried it another year. Around the time of Peralte’s assassination, Colonel John H. Russell assumed command of Marine and Gendarmerie forces in Haiti. He immediately re-abolished all semblances of the corvee and increased the intensity of Marine patrols throughout the Haitian countryside. Eventually these patrols led to the finding and killing of Benoit in April 1920, which precipitated a lull in organized resistance. It was just after this counterinsurgency campaign that negative images of Marines began appearing in American newspapers. They seemed less the saviors of civilization than white men succumbing to brutality.

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91 Major Thomas C. Turner, “Report of investigation of certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by officers and enlisted man in the Republic of Haiti,” November 3, 1919, Haitian Geographic Files, USMC HD, Quantico VA; See also Senate Hearings, 1809.
92 Renda, Taking Haiti, 174; Schmidt, Occupation of Haiti, 102-103; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 198.
In September 1919, Commandant George Barnett ordered an investigation of Marines in Haiti after he heard of the courts martial of two Marines for killing a native prisoner. The cases led Barnett to believe that “practically indiscriminate killing of the natives has gone on now for some time.” Barnett was one of the principle proponents of the Marines’ popular image in the United States. In a private letter he was “shocked beyond all expression to hear of such things and to know that it was at all possible that duty could be so badly performed by marines of any class.” Investigations in Haiti would lead to subsequent investigations into Marine behavior in the Dominican Republic as well.

Newspapers in the United States acquired and published Barnett’s remarks which brought down a firestorm of bad press on the Marine Corps. Their accounts were sensationalist in tone. Long the darlings of the American press, and the self-proclaimed finest examples of American manhood, now Marines were cast in a much more negative light. “The military record in Haiti is a blot on the administration and a stain on the honor of the American people,” wrote one columnist for the New York Evening Post. News of Marines killing Haitian natives indiscriminately “is a shock to those who have cherished the conviction that American military rule did not imitate the coercive methods of some experienced and more callous governments,” claimed the author. The Philadelphia Public Ledger claimed that “While we were ‘making the world safe for democracy’ in France . . . we were ruthlessly practicing machine gun

94 Confidential letter From George Barnett to John H. Russell, October 2, 1919, George Barnett Papers, MCA. The incident that Barnett referred to involved two Marine Privates, identified only as McQuilkin and Johnson, who executed two prisoners near their own graves they were forced to dig. A Marine temporary Lieutenant named Brokaw, who was later committed to an insane asylum, ordered these Marines to shoot the prisoners, Senate Hearings, 425.

95 Confidential letter From George Barnett to John H. Russell, October 2, 1919, Barnett Papers, MCA.
imperialism.”96 And the Baltimore American used the most pointed rhetoric against Marines: “If
our marines in Haiti have been indiscriminately killing natives, the criminals should be brought
to justice in a way to remove such a hideous stain from the reputation of a branch of service of
which the nation is justly proud, especially since the splendid record the marines made in
France.”97

Two investigations took place in 1919 and 1920, both conducted by high-ranking Navy
and Marine Corps officers. Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, recently recovered from his
chest wound received at the Battle of Belleau Wood, conducted the first in late 1919. He
uncovered killings committed by Privates Lavoie, McQuilken, and Johnson, but could not
marshal evidence regarding other crimes. He relieved Major Clarke Wells and ordered a stop to
all summary executions no matter what the circumstances. Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels ordered the new Marine Commandant, John A. Lejeune, accompanied by Smedley
Butler, to conduct another investigation in Haiti in 1920.98 While there, Lejeune ordered that any
Marines who suffered from physical or mental breakdowns be sent home promptly.99

Journalists who went down to Hispaniola to see the occupation for themselves came back
with the impression that racism, often attributed to southern men, ruled the day. A frequent
visitor to the West Indies named Harry A. Franck found “many earnest young Southern officers
who . . . took a harsh view of their duty and placed too small a value on the lives of black

Understatement. Blot on the Administration. Haitian Record Also Seen as Stain on honor of American People.
Will Shock Humane Americans. Was Secretary Daniels Deceived? American Cannot afford Oppression. Lodge’s
Understatement. Blot on the Administration. Haitian Record Also Seen as Stain on honor of American People.
Will Shock Humane Americans. Was Secretary Daniels Deceived? American Cannot afford Oppression. Lodge’s
98 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 202.
99 Lieutenant Colonel Douglas, C. McDougal to Brigadier General Smedley Butler, September 17, 1921,
Butler Papers, MCA.
people.” He saw the predominance of Marines from the American South as part of the problem in Haiti. “These men were mainly men who did not get into the Great War,” Franck asserted, “and were anxious to have military feats to their credit.” Gulian Lansing Morrill leveled explicit judgement on the occupation. He blamed “the ‘nigger-hating’ politicians in the U.S. who sent ‘nigger-hating’ marines here, recruited from the South.”

A writer for The Nation, Herbert J. Seligmann, visited Marines in Haiti in the spring of 1920 and came back with this accusation:

The five years of American occupation, from 1915 to 1920, have served as a commentary upon the white civilization which still burns black men and women at the stake. For Haitian men, women, and children, to a number estimated at 3,000, innocent for the most part of any offense, have been shot down by American machine gun and rifle bullets; black men and women have been put to torture to make them give information; theft, arson, and murder have been committed almost with impunity upon the persons and property of Haitians by white men wearing the uniform of the United States.

While Marines from the Great War were portrayed as heroic, proud American fighting men, the ones in Hispaniola appeared cruel and murderous.

Marines began a campaign in 1920 to defend themselves against the perceived “sensationalism” of the press and restore their image. Lejeune wrote to The Nation, in direct response to Seligmann’s article, claiming that the work in Haiti was very hard for Marines. Mistakes had been made and courts-martial had been doled out, but “it has been and is the duty

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101 Ibid. Mr. Franck even calls into question Marine marksmanship by claiming “I read in one account that it was a testimonial to the marksmanship of the marines that only twelve of them had been killed, whereas they had killed more than 3,000 blacks. This is partly so, but the poor arms of the natives is another cause. Almost the only firearms they possess are eighteenth century weapons, relics of French days. You frequently see natives swaggering about with a revolver or two, neither of which has been capable of firing a shot for years. Some were armed with scythes. In some instances, a single American with a rifle or machine gun has routed forty or fifty natives with arms of the sort I described. I know Americans who have killed or wounded six or eight natives in a single brief encounter.”
and aim of the Marine Corps authorities here and in Haiti to work solely for the interests and advancement of Haiti and the Haitian people.”

The New York Times interviewed Major Philip T. Case (USMC retired) who tried to persuade readers that what they had read about Marines in Hispaniola was wrong. He claimed that “time and time again when I was with my men down there . . . we would be fired upon by natives without returning fire because we did not want to injure women and children.” Case proclaimed that despite the tough nature of the Hispaniola deployments, for the most part Marines showed remarkable restraint and professionalism in keeping with their manly image.

But another former Marine, this one from the South, admitted there were killings. Instead of denying it, he defended it and even attempted to justify it. “I am not trying to give the impression that there were no natives killed in Santo Domingo nor Haiti,” he admitted, “for there were, in both places, and probably there were a few ‘indiscriminate’ killings, but no more than in any place in our own Southland, where there are more negroes than white men.” This former Marine spoke to the prevailing idea that white men would naturally abuse inferior races when outnumbered. “Why are they continually harping on the killings of natives,” the author asked, “and never a word said about the killings of lone marines and small parties, with never a chance of quarter, even if a marine would lower themselves to ask quarter of a negro.”

This former Marine’s comments again brought up another perceived path toward racial and masculine degeneration: exposure. White men tended to behave savagely in the presence of

106 Ibid.
107 CFB to the Editor of the Advertiser, “Marines in Haiti and San Domingo,” The Montgomery Advertiser, October 22, 1920, 4.
108 CFB to the Editor, “Marines in Haiti and San Domingo,” 4.
too many people of an inferior race. According to Richard Henry Edwards, lynching was the ultimate form of white viciousness and atavism that “brutalizes whites and blacks alike.”

Lynching was a result of racial friction caused by exposure, so the reasoning went. It was “the vague, rather intangible, but wholly real feeling of ‘pressure’ which comes to the white man almost instinctively in the presence of a mass of people of a different race,” claimed one author on the subject.

According to early twentieth-century racial theory whites remained civilized only in areas where they made up a strong majority of the population. When outnumbered, however, these racial pressures would push white men to violence. “A few of one race may be tolerated among the many of another race on condition of inferiority,” wrote one author. “No instance in history is recalled where two distinct races lived together on equal terms—one must be dominant, the other subordinate.” To some observers and defenders of the Marine Corps, when the subordinate race seeks social and political equality, the dominate race resorts to brutality.

The official Naval investigation of Marine conduct in Hispaniola came back with a verdict of not guilty. The court regarded “the charges which have been published as ill considered, regrettable and thoroughly unwarranted reflections on a portion of the U.S. Marine Corps which has performed difficult, dangerous and delicate duty in Haiti in a manner which,

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109 H.H. McNeill, “Racial Antipathy: The Sentiment Has Existed Since Man’s Beginning,” Montgomery Advertiser, August 16, 1919, 4; Modern day scholars today are quick to identify this kind of rhetoric as a manifestation of social and cultural constructions. It is important to note, however, that these authors did not see it that way at all. They clung to these ideas as though they were both morally sanctioned and scientifically proven; George W. Murray, Race Ideals: Effects, Cause and Remedy for The Afro-American Race Troubles (Pittsburgh, PA: Art Engraving & Printing Co., 1914), 22; Suksdorf, Our Race Problems, 314; Junius Aryan, The Aryans and Mongrelized America: The Remedy (Philadelphia: Eagle Printing House, 1912), vi; Bailey, Race Orthodoxy in the South, 17; see also Bailey, “Race Orthodoxy in the South,” Neale’s Monthly, November 1913, 585; Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 110-113.


instead of calling for adverse criticism, is entitled to the highest commendations.” 113 With this verdict, Marines tried to lay the issue to rest with the press and reestablish their positive image in the papers. With the headline “Marines Quieted Haiti,” the Sun quoted Lejeune as saying, “there exists throughout Haiti a strong sentiment of gratitude to the marines for their work for the welfare of the people.” 114 Lejeune never abandoned the notion that Marines behaved well on the island.

Even papers that communicated a strong disdain for the interventionist policies of the U.S. government began to withdraw their criticism of the Marine Corps. The Washington Post reported that “the opinion (of the American people) will probably be held that the Marine Corps was a victim of the orders from Washington, rather than a willful offender on its own account.” 115 In 1920, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Giles Bishop Jr. published The Marines Have Landed, a book full of anecdotes and manly lessons for an audience of adolescent boys. 116 Characters in the book included a Gunnery Sergeant Miller who “strove at all times to teach his young charges the manly virtues of honesty, courage, self-control, obedience, industry and clean living.” 117 There was also a First Sergeant Douglass who would chastise junior Marines for being unmanly. “It’s a sneaking, unmanly trick, and marines are supposed to be men, not sneaks,” he would say. 118 But damage had been done.

113 Finding of Facts and Conclusion of Board of Investigation on Conditions in Haiti Ordered by the Secretary of the Navy,” October 19, 1920, Lejeune Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
114 “Marines Quieted Haiti, General Lejeune Says,” The Sun, October 6, 1920.
115 “The Haitian-Dominican Scandal,” The Washington Post, October 17, 1920. This paper went on to level charges of mismanagement and willful ignorance against the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels but not at the Marine Corps.
116 The purpose of the book, according to Giles, was: “It is the author’s desire in this volume to explain just who the marines are, what they do, where they go, so as to make every red-blooded American boy familiar with the services rendered by the United States Marine Corps to the nation in peace and war,” Lieutenant Colonel Giles Bishop, Jr., The Marines Have Landed (Philadelphia: The Penn Publishing Company, 1920), 5.
117 Bishop, Jr., The Marines Have Landed, 84.
118 Ibid., 203.
Because of the investigations this book was not received well by everyone. A writer for *The Nation*, a liberal publication that was critical of the Wilson administration, accused Bishop of over-romanticizing Marines. “His Marines are fine, manly youths who go ashore to help the Dominicans in the simple American way which consists of regarding the native of Caribbean islands as ‘niggers,’ . . . shooting all who show signs of being stubborn in behalf of their rights . . . In the book this is easy to justify, since these Dominicans are merely dirty bandits whom it is made almost an act of sanitation to exterminate.” Bishop was also charged with attempting to make a wholly disreputable conflict into an honorable one. “It is bad enough to make out that wars are pretty picnics,” *The Nation* claimed, “it is worse to make out that they are all honorable conflicts between one’s snow white countrymen and the sin-black foe.” This criticism demonstrates how Marine behavior on Hispaniola affected their public image quite negatively in this particular publication.

**The Rape of Hispaniola**

The negative press would continue through the 1920 presidential election. More information would come to light after President Warren G. Harding and his new Secretary of the Navy, former Marine Edwin Denby, took office. On May 9, 1921, delegates of the Union Patriotique d’Haiti handed the U.S. State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations committee the most damning accusation of the Haitian occupation: *Memoir on the Political, Economic and Financial Conditions Existing in the Republic of Haiti under the American Occupation*. Frequently referred to as the *Haitian Memoir*, it leveled charges of murder, torture, pillaging, rape, and the burning of entire villages. *The Nation* published a copy of the *Haitian Memoir* in its issue of May 25, 1921.

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120 “Fit For Boys,” 75.
While patrolling the hills of Haiti’s various districts in search of bandits, according to the memoirs, Marines killed men, women, and children. Some specific charges included burning suspects with red hot irons, hanging and burning victims, and shooting down pregnant women. For example, one group of Marines and Gendarmes reportedly assassinated and mutilated the body of an old man named Joseph Duclerc. This same group then went on a spree of violence that including shooting a female teacher through the mouth, burning more houses, and decapitating a blind man along with a child who was with him.\textsuperscript{121} The report described two dozen more cases of lurid Marine conduct against natives. While on these patrols, Marines and Gendarmes arrested many Haitians and sent them without trial to various prisons around the country.

It was the prisons and detainment camps where the Marine occupation proved the deadliest. Between 1918 and 1920, over 4,000 prisoners perished in the prisons of Cap-Haitien and 5,475 at Chabert. Unknown numbers of prisoners died in other camps. “The ghastly mortality in the prisons together with confirmation by survivors reveals a record of atrocities, of brutality, and cruelty which defies description.”\textsuperscript{122}

The \textit{Haitian Memoir} also asserted that the Naval Court of Inquiry that led the investigation of Marine conduct on the island was a sham. Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Rear Admiral James H. Oliver, Major General Wendell C. Neville (USMC), and Major Jesse F. Dyer

\begin{footnotes}
\item[121] “Memoir on the Political, Economic and Financial Conditions Existing in the Republic of Haiti under the American Occupation by the Delegates to the United States of the Union Patriotique d’Haiti,” \textit{The Nation}, May 25, 1921, 767-768; Memoir can also be found in complete form in U.S. Senate, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, \textit{Senate Hearings}, 30-32. (Here after “Haitian Memoir”); The Union Patriotique d’Haiti described itself as “a nonpartisan organization founded at Port-au-Prince, November 17, 1920, to crystallize the national aspirations of the Haitians for the return of their independence, maintained until the American invasion for one hundred and eleven years. Every one of the twenty-seven districts which constitute the Republic of Haiti is represented and the Union has virtually the unanimous support of the entire Haitian people,” \textit{The Nation}, May 25, 1921, 775.
\item[122] “Haitian Memoir,” 32.
\end{footnotes}
(USMC judge advocate) made up the court and initially inspired confidence in the proceedings because of their credentials as professional military officers. However, the court never established an effective system of hearing claims, collecting evidence, calling witnesses, and trying cases.\textsuperscript{123} Martial law throughout the country made it very hard for Haitians to move around. Even if those with grievances knew where the court was being held, therefore, their journey could easily be precluded by military authorities. The report also charged that many of the Haitians “who had anything to say regarding the numerous cases of murder, brutality, robbery, rape, arson . . . were systematically excluded.”\textsuperscript{124} Therefore, the court found very little evidence in support of Marine misconduct.

Two months later, The Anti-Election League of Santo Domingo published its own accusations against the occupation. Marines controlled the Dominican Republic, the report said, by “virtue of machine guns and bayonets.” According the Anti-Election League, the Marines were down right villainous: “They commit murder, burn, and concentrate the poor peasants of entire regions.”\textsuperscript{125} The League accused Marines of nearly everything that happened during Thorpe’s campaign and Merkel’s rampage. These accusations began to raise the ire of notable former Marines, but not because they were disappointed with the actions of the Corps.

Former Sergeant Edwin Denby, now the Secretary of the Navy in the Harding administration, had visited Haiti during the investigation and characterized the charges within the

\textsuperscript{123} “Not a single rule was ever established for the inquiry and no form of procedure was indicated. The court never made known where it would hold its sessions, on what days they would take place, whether they would be public, whether the court itself would call in witnesses, whether the people who were acquainted with the whole thing or who were victims of acts at the hands of the forces of occupation could go and testify freely before the court, or what guarantees of safety it offered to Haitian citizens who wished to prove charges of criminal acts against officers who still had military authority, knowing well the cruelty of martial law in the country for the past five years,” “Haitian Memoir,” 32.

\textsuperscript{124} “Haitian Memoir,” 28.

\textsuperscript{125} Senate Hearings, “Protest raised by the Anti-Election League of the Santo Domingo Province against the order of convocation promulgated on July 14, 1921, by the United States of America in the subjugated territory of the Dominican Republic,” 1121.
*Haitian Memoir* as complete “rot.” But *The Nation* challenged his credibility to comment accurately on the situation. “Mr. Denby is a former marine,” an editorial pointed out. “Apparently, he considers that the honor of the Marine Corps must be vindicated by an absolute denial that any marines are in anyway guilty of wrongdoing. This is a poor conception of his office.”126 Denby argued that by spreading these stories *The Nation* had dishonored the Marines who had worked hard to bring peace to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. But the editors of *The Nation* shot back “The men who commit atrocities are the ones who ‘besmirch the uniform’—not those who try for the sake of the good name of the entire organization and of the country to bring the offenders to book.”127 *The Nation* cited Haitian newspapers and claimed that Denby’s visit to Haiti lasted only twenty-four hours and simply was not thorough enough for him to know the truth.128

The *Haitian Memoir* and the Anti-Election League of Santo Domingo ripped open unhealed public relations wounds for the Marines and the government. Using clear allusions to rape, *The Cleveland Gazette* (a notable African American newspaper) printed “Southern American Democrats Despoil Little Black Republic.”129 Some writers argued that the country should be ashamed of the behavior of its Marines. The claims made by *The Memoir* “constitute an everlasting stain on American honor.”130 Regarding the Dominican Republic, *The Cleveland Gazette* reported “Outrage After Outrage Perpetrated in the little Mulatto Republic, As in Haiti, So in Santo Domingo.”131 The author accused Marines in the Dominican Republic of using

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127 *The Nation*, May 25, 1921, 727.
128 *The Nation*, May 25, 1921, 727.
130 Author Unknown, “A Terrific Indictment: Haiti Speaks!” *The Cleveland Gazette*, June 4, 1921, 1
131 *The Cleveland Gazette*, June 25, 1921.
“Belgium Congo, or Prussian-Belgian methods of eliciting information,” such as burning and torturing natives.132

Then more challenges to Marine notions of manliness and racial superiority appeared especially in black newspapers.133 The Washington Bee published the account of a journalist on assignment in Santo Domingo who saw a drunk Marine officer verbally and physically abuse the staff at a bar. “Here was a fair sample of the superior American, just arrived, with superiority undimmed,” the writer claimed. This Marine was not a man but an “overgrown boy.”134 Secretary of the NAACP, James Weldon Johnson, publicly accused the Marines of being low specimens of manhood. “Prejudice and small-calibre Americans had been sent down to Haiti,” he claimed, “creating friction with the natives by reason of the color prejudice they brought with them.”135

The Senate investigation hearings gave some Haitian and Dominican victims their day in court and undermined Marine/American manhood. The Senate investigation committee took several days to hear testimony from witnesses and survivors of Charles Merkel’s rampage, for example, where more specific details of murder and torture surfaced.136 This final investigation called many Marine officers to testify which made Marine Lieutenant Douglas McDougal nervous, “as one false move at this time by any of our officers could place us in a very embarrassing position.”137

132 Ibid.
137 McDougal to Butler, September 17, 1921, Butler Papers, MCA.
Haitians brought charges against Dorcas Williams, Ernest Lavoie, and Captain William F. Becker, to name a few. Becker in particular stood accused of heinous crimes. Madame Celicourt Rozier testified that in 1919, Marines under the command of Becker shot to death and then burned all of her children when they attacked her village.\textsuperscript{138} Heraux Belloni claimed that Becker killed his parents; his father was tied to a tree first before being executed.\textsuperscript{139} When Captain Becker testified during the investigation, he claimed that incidents like these were “battles” with insurgents. He did not remember any specific women being killed, but did acknowledge that it was possible that some did die in the fight, “because we were fighting right in the main bandit camp and there were women all around.”\textsuperscript{140} According to Martyn Summerbell, a prolific writer of the time, American men were “practical, and good humored, and courageous, and chivalrous, and generous, with warm heart that swells with compassion for any world-wide sorrow.”\textsuperscript{141} Accusations of the murder of women and children, no matter what the pretext, seriously contradicted that claim as well as the Marines’ own wholesome masculine image.

Many Great War-era Americas considered rape one of the ultimate forms of savagery: white masculine degeneracy at its worst.\textsuperscript{142} Western and allied propaganda painted Germans as savages attempting to defile a feminized representation of civilization during the Great War. Now, during the Senate hearings, the occupation forces stood accused of metaphorical rape of Haiti and the Dominican Republic’s constitutions while numerous Marines were accused of

\textsuperscript{138} Senate Hearings, 909.
\textsuperscript{139} Senate Hearings, 917.
\textsuperscript{140} Senate Hearings, 1547.
\textsuperscript{141} Summerbell, \textit{Manhood in its American Type}, 131.
\textsuperscript{142} Hoganson, \textit{Fighting for American Manhood}, 186-187; Bederman, \textit{Manliness and Civilization}, 84-45; Hall, \textit{Adolescence}, 373.
literal rape against individual women.\textsuperscript{143} Rape revealed a breakdown in morality and a rise in atavism in the perpetrators. D. P. Rhodes argued in his 1919 book, \textit{Our Immortality}, that “Of all human acts, rape is perhaps the one most clearly indicating a crude social experience in the ancestral lineage of the agent,” and that it must be “that any but the most backward in general development may deliberately plan a rape.”\textsuperscript{144} Rape was also understood to pose significant threats to a man’s body. Men who succumbed to their baser passions risked catching and spreading venereal disease.\textsuperscript{145}

But the rape of Haitians and Dominicans also meant miscegenation, one of the most insidious paths toward racial decline and masculine degeneracy according to white supremacists. Mixing white blood with “lesser” blood could lessen the purity of the white race. A white supremacist named Junius Aryan waxed fanatical about keeping the races separate. He defined racial interbreeding as “an unnatural and vulgar heterogenous union,” that threatened to “overthrow Aryan civilization in the country, which if effected would also destroy the Aryan European civilization . . . thus retarding the world’s civilization, which is entirely dependent upon the Aryan race in its purity.”\textsuperscript{146} “If white civilization goes down, the white race is irretrievably ruined,” warned Dr. Lothrop Stoddard. “It will be swamped by the triumphant...


\textsuperscript{146} Aryan, \textit{The Aryans and Mongrelized America}, V. He wanted congress to pass a law banning marriage and cohabitation between white people and darker races. The mixing with “any other race or person belonging to, or a mongrel of any branch of, the Negro, Mongolian or Semitic race,” threatened the “racial manhood” of whites, 351.
colored races, who will obliterate the white man by elimination or absorption." The rape of women in the tropics meant that white manhood and civilization itself could be ruined.

When word of these accusations got out, some writers accepted this news as fact. “The Rape of Haiti!” ran the headline of *The Cleveland Gazette*. One author claimed that “The Marines committed horrible rapes on Haitian women,” and that “Our own marines in Haiti are guilty of crimes that would have pleased Caligula.” *Leatherneck* magazine published the following poem not long after the investigations had concluded:

So come along, you Leatherneck—tell us what you know,
Goin’ down to Haiti, Bo, to make the niggers dance,
The way you used to strafe the Hun on the fields of France?

Now it was the Marines who looked depraved, and out of control, much like the Germans had during the Great War.

**Conclusion**

The insurgencies in Hispaniola proved that Haitians and Dominicans were not as easily conquered as Marines claimed. These were not wars the Corps wanted to fight; that war was in France. The killings, torture, rape, bad publicity, and investigations demonstrated that Marines were not always paragons of manly virtue. It appeared as though Marines, like any white men overly exposed to lesser races in the tropics, according to common beliefs, had the propensity to slip into savagery.

147 Lothrop Stoddard (Ph.D.), *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 303; see also Savoyard, “The Race Question,” *Quanah Tribune-Chief*, (Bryan Texas), November 25, 1921, 3.


But the Marine Corps did not implode, and the Marines did not lose the popularity they won in the years leading up to and during the Great War. Why not? Why did so few people condemn the Corps, or decide that the Marines would turn their sons into murderers? There are a few possibilities.

First, negative images of Marines painted by *The Nation*, the Union Patriotique d’Haiti, and the Anti-Election League of Santo Domingo competed with countervailing and probably more popular images of them. The Corps’ defenders often referenced the incredible restraint that most Marines must have exhibited in dealing with a backward and infuriating people. Colonel Joseph Pendleton called for more impartiality from members of the press, and claimed that if they went down to the Dominican Republic with open minds then “they will return . . . with entirely different ideas, and instead of decrying will give credit to the patient, tireless, human work and efforts of our officers and men who uplift and help the Dominican people.” In the fall of 1921, Lejeune seemed confident that the senators would find little fault with Marine conduct in Hispaniola because “the splendid work done by the Marines in Haiti has been placed before the Committee in a very favorable light by the Marine Corps officers who testified.” He was right to be optimistic. The Senate investigation committee itself was more inclined to praise than condemn the Marines. “The very small number of such individual crimes reflects credit on the discipline of the Marine Corps,” Senator Tasker Oddie claimed.

Throughout all the negative press there were numerous instances where Marines won sympathy. Samuel Guy Inman, a noted writer and traveler, wrote that “the men who were

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150 A speech by Joseph Pendleton, exact date unknown but written either 1919 or 1920, Pendleton Papers, MCA.
151 Record of Weekly Conference Held in Office of the Major General Commandant, Friday, November 18, 1921, Record Group 127, “General Correspondence,” Recruitment 1921-1939, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
152 Tasker L. Oddie, *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic*, “Report” June 26, 1922
actively campaigning in the bandit infested interior of Santo Domingo deserve our deepest sympathy.” They deserved sympathy because of their inglorious work and because they spent long periods of time away from modern amenities and recreation. Former Marine Captain John H. Craige echoed this sentiment in his published works ten years later. A Marine in Haiti “had no movies, no radio, none of the features of civilized life to which he was accustomed. He saw white faces rarely and white women hardly at all.” Even Seligmann, whom the Marines accused of publishing false accusations against them, tried to paint Marines in a sympathetic light by claiming that they resented their missions in Haiti. “Officers and men have criticized the entire Haitian adventure as a travesty upon humanity and civilization and as a lasting disgrace to the United States Marine Corps,” he wrote.

Among some observers there existed the notion that the government that sent the Marines, not the Marines themselves, should take responsibility for any crimes committed in Hispaniola. “It is the machine, not the man, that is to blame,” Inman wrote as he tried to defend the Marines in Hispaniola. During the 1920 presidential election campaign, Republican Senator Warren G. Harding claimed the Marines were tools misused by an incompetent Democratic administration. “I will not empower an assistant secretary of the navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of

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156 Seligmann, “Conquest of Haiti,” 36; A Marine Captain, whose patrol in the Haitian hills was accompanied by Seligmann, wrote “he was surely an unscrupulous, irresponsible writer, inspired perhaps by the politicians who were looking for flaws, and that he had come to Haiti burdened with delusions and in search of such news as he might need in preparing an article of Bolshevik nature,” Captain J. L. Perkins to Brigade Commander, “Account of Patrol Made in Company with Mr. Herbert J. Seligman, April 3-7, 1920,” Russell Papers, MCA.
157 Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 70.
bayonets borne by the United States Marines.”158 The Washington Post blamed Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels for “the misuse of American forces,” and the New York Tribune stated plainly that “the Marines were not primarily to blame.”159

Additionally, the Dominicans and Haitians themselves appeared completely untrustworthy to many white observers. Following popular white racial attitudes, Marines often described natives of both countries as habitual liars.160 Haitian politicians were the “lowest of all Haitians . . . who spread the improbable tales against our men and officers, which are there after repeated in the press of the United States by writers who are easily deceived.”161 The Senate committee itself sided with the Marines when they claimed that nearly all Haitians at one point or another fought against the occupation in some form. The committee summarized the credibility of Haitian witnesses against Marines: “the testimony of most native witnesses is highly unreliable and must be closely scrutinized . . . many unfounded accusations have been made.”162

Marines may have gained enough popularity in the summer of 1918 to see them through these dark post war years. Lejeune and the rest of the senior Marine Corps leadership would continue to assert that most Marines served honorably in Hispaniola as they had in France.163 In

160 J.L. Perkins to John H. Russell, “Account of patrol made in company with Mr. Herbert J. Seligman,” July 26, 1920, Russell Papers, MCA, Henry C. Davis to Regimental Commander, “Report of Field Operations,” June 1, 1917 USMC History Division, Quantico VA, 1; Edward A. Craig, interviewed by L.E. Tatem, 1968, Oral History Transcript, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico VA.
161 Board of Investigation on Conditions in Haiti, “Finding of Facts and Conclusions,” October 19, 1920, Russell Papers, MCA.
their minds the few isolated incidents of illicit behavior had been handled quickly and fairly by the military courts. In fact, they argued that those Marines fought a harder war in many ways and deserved more credit than they got from the press.

Perhaps just as important, military and civilian members of the investigating committees refused to believe that Americans could behave so savagely. “Ours is a Christian country; we make war as a Christian country should.”\textsuperscript{164} Ignoring evidence to the contrary, the Senate inquirers asserted that “Americans are not given to mutilating their dead enemies” and that “the committee is convinced that these cruel or inhuman acts were probably never committed by Americans.”\textsuperscript{165} To these observers, American men did not murder, torture, mutilate, and rape. Marines were supposed to be some of America’s best examples of manhood, not monsters.

Ultimately, Marines and many white middle-class American men subscribed to the notion that men and women of color were inferior. Marines wrote about Haitians and Dominicans as though they were wretched peoples. American college professors, preachers, politicians, and authors were of the same mind with Marines on the superiority of white manhood. Many white Americans would also find nothing untoward about white men using violence to keep lesser races under control in another country.

The brutality of white manhood dotted American newspapers throughout the Great War era. White journalists reported the gruesomeness of African American lynchings in the same tone one would report the weather. Many of these public displays of violence had to do with perceived assaults on white women. As Stephen Kantrowitz has pointed out, “White women’s

\textsuperscript{164} Board of Investigation on Conditions in Haiti, “Finding of Facts and Conclusions,” October 19, 1920, Russell Papers, MCA.  
\textsuperscript{165} Tasker L. Oddie, \textit{Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic}, “Report” June 26, 1922.
sexuality constituted a crucial defensive perimeter for white supremacy.” A black man’s assault on a white woman was perceived as an attack on white supremacy itself and white men would go to extraordinary lengths to impose vigilante justice. After almost killing the mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, a mob of whites lynched a black man accused of assaulting a white woman. In Texas, a county judge physically assaulted a white representative of the NAACP for being a “Negro Advocate.” Violence spilled forth against blacks and against whites who attempted to upset social order. “The black man must submit to the white or the white will destroy,” William P. Beard claimed in 1917 soon after a wealthy black businessman was lynched near Abbeville, South Carolina. The savagery of southern whites could not be ignored by some observers. “It is not uncommon to read accounts telling that the victim was tortured with hot irons, that his eyes were burned out, and that other monstrous cruelties were inflicted upon him,” Dr. A.A. Brill wrote, “Such bestiality can be recognized only as a form of perversion . . . Any one taking part or witnessing a lynching cannot remain a civilized person.”

This brutality appeared in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well. Allan Millett’s brief analysis is nonetheless true: Marines were “no more immune to racial prejudice than their fellow Americans.” Having sacrificed the cream of American manhood to save western

166 Stephen Kantrowitz, “White Supremacist Justice and the Rule of Law: Lynching, Honor, and the State in Ben Tillman’s South Carolina,” in Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America, ed., Pieter Spierenburg (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 218; see also Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy, 228; Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 105-107.
167 “Negro Taken from Train in Miss. Town and Severely Beaten,” and “Mob Attempts to Lynch Mayor of Omaha,” The Times-Enterprise, (Thomasville GA) September 30, 1919, 1.
171 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 186.
civilization in the Great War, some Americans undoubtedly were shocked to hear of U.S. Marines behaving in a way reminiscent of German barbarity. Simply put, Marines made American manhood appear strong and chivalrous in World War I; they made it look cruel and degenerate in Hispaniola. Those campaigns suggested that Marines were not, in fact, super men; they were only American men. But most white Americans probably did not see things this way. Nor would they have caught the irony in a poem by Percy Webb, a popular Marine writer of the day. He probably spoke for many Marines of his generation when he had this to say to his fellow Americans:

Drop your proud and haughty bearing
And your egotistic pride;
Get acquainted with the soldier
And the heart and soul, -- inside
Test and try to analyze him,
    Criticize him thru and thru,
    And you’ll, very likely, find him
JUST AS GOOD A MAN AS YOU ¹⁷²

¹⁷² Percy Webb, “Our Side of It,” Rhymes of a Marine (undated Manuscript), Percy Webb Papers, MCA. Author’s emphasis.
5. TO BUILD UP A CLASS OF MEN:
MARINES AND POST-WAR AMERICAN MANHOOD, 1919-1924

In early March 1922, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune reported in person to the House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs. It was his first official appearance before Congress, for he had not held the post long.\(^1\) He assumed the Commandancy of a Corps that faced drastic post-war retrenchments. Americans wanted a “return to normalcy” which meant, among other things, shrinkage of all the armed services. The cuts in men, money, and materiel drove him to make efficiency and economy top institutional priorities. With these things in mind, he laid out a plan on how the Corps would proceed:

In a military organization quality of production is represented by the physical condition, discipline, morale, and degree of military training and instruction of the officers and men. It depends upon the physique and character of the men appointed or enlisted and on the manner in which they are handled during their military service. How to bring the quality of the troops to a high degree of perfection is the greatest of the problems confronting us.\(^2\)

By emphasizing “physical condition,” discipline, morale, and character Lejeune focused on how the Marine Corps would continue to mold and shape American men within its ranks.

As Commandant, Lejeune worked to capitalize on the popularity Marines had won in the Great War. He did so by keeping Marines in the public eye as much as possible. With the help of Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, Lejeune would craft a more wholesome peacetime

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image of the Marine Corps. This image ran counter to the contemporaneous negative images coming out of Hispaniola. Efficient manhood, its development and improvement, would be central components of Marines’ recruiting and publicity efforts.

Historical scholarship on the post-Great War Marine has focused mostly on their development of amphibious warfare doctrine from the end of the Spanish-American War to the beginning of World War II. Many have been eager to recount a history of how adaptive and prescient Marines developed the tactics and logistical prerequisites to fight the Japanese. Earl H. “Pete” Ellis, the brilliant but alcoholic Marine officer whose 1921 *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* became one of the most influential treatises on a potential war with Japan, has thoroughly preoccupied Marine scholars. His work and mysterious death, coupled with the East Coast Expeditionary Force’s landing operations at Culebra in 1922 and 1923 and Hawaii in 1925, have received the most attention because they fit within this amphibious warfare story.³ Lost in this narrative is how Marines tried to fill their ranks with the men necessary to implement amphibious warfare doctrine and fulfill other duties.

Mission and doctrine were important concerns for the post-Great War Marine Corps. But during Lejeune’s first term as Commandant (1920-1924) his primary focus was manpower and recruiting. Robert Lindsay’s 1956 monograph, *This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps*, demonstrated that the post-Great War Marine Corps cared very much about

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public relations because of its implications for recruiting. However, he missed how important the idea of manhood was to Marines and their PR. The Marines’ appeals to the manhood of the nation, and their claims regarding how they could enhance and better young men’s lives, provide cultural context lacking in Lindsay’s and other works on this subject. Relatively few historians have looked at American masculinity specifically during the early nineteen-twenties, although the literature is growing. Other than Donald Mrozek, even fewer have examined closely notions of manhood and manliness in the U.S. military. Hans Schmidt wrote only in passing that Marines of this time had “both a convincing public image and a credible warrior ideal to suit contemporary notions of manliness.” Therefore, a fruitful field of study has been left untilled, and an important period in Marine Corps history remains obscured.

Despite the Corps’ ongoing deployments to Hispaniola, United States society reverted to a peace-time mindset. Post-Great War Marines adhered to the Victorian/traditional idea of manliness that emphasized production over consumption, self-improvement over self-indulgence, and efficiency over excessiveness. What Marines claimed to produce were reliable, healthy, and efficient men. They softened their public image with Roving Marines who toured the country, entertained thousands of people, and promoted the healthy manhood that the service produced. At Quantico, Virginia, Marines established a vocational school to sharpen enlisted men’s minds and a football team to show off the Corps’ physical prowess. They set about

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4 Robert Lindsay, This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 36-39.
5 Huebner, “Gee I Wish I Were a Man,” 68-82; Rotundo, American Manhood, 284-293; Stearns, Be a Man!, 162-165; Pendergast, Creating the Modern Man, 111-166; Summers, Manliness & its Discontents, 8; Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man, 3-19.
8 Kimmel, Manhood in America, 88; Pendergast, Creating the Modern Man, 13; Delvin, Between Profits and Primitivism, 17; Summers, Manliness & its Discontents, 8; Dubbert, “Progressivism and the Masculinity Crisis,” 309-310; Stearns, Be a Man!, 10-11.
demonstrating their efficiency by guarding mail trucks and post offices and by conducting elaborate Civil War reenactments. The development of advanced base seizure doctrine concerned Marine leadership much less than recruiting and manpower. They used appeals to the manhood of the nation to maintain their numbers and their positive connections with society.

**Wholesome Manhood**

Marines softened their warrior image soon after the war under Major General Barnett’s Commandancy. In the early spring of 1920, the Marine Publicity Bureau sent out several bands of Marines to entertain people across the country. These Marines rented out music halls, theaters, and high-school auditoriums to put on vaudeville shows with music, dancing, singing, boxing, and standup comedy. The Bureau dubbed these peripatetic groups the “Roving Marines.” They performed skits meant to show a flashy version of the life that Marines lived, one that included readiness, adventure, comradery, travel, and excitement. But at its fundamental level, “The idea was to show the country the sort of men that the Marine Corps makes out of the youngsters who enlist, as well as to advertise the service for the purpose of getting recruits.”

The following advertisement for the Roving Marines captures well much of what the band was meant to convey to audiences:

Are you looking for fun and excitement—
Do you find civil life pretty tame?
   Haven’t you got a hunch
   To be one of the bunch
Who are ready and willing and game?
Would you follow the Road of Adventure
With fellows who know what life means?
   It’s a pathway that’s thrilling
   For lads who are willing—

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The Trail of the Roving Marines!^

The trail leads through Cuba and Haiti,
Or wherever our flag is unfurled,
   There’s a chance for a rollick,
   A fight or a frolic,
   In any old place in the world.
Come, follow these globe-trotting Fighters
And learn about faraway scenes.
   Be a two-fisted rover
   And travel all over
The trail of the Roving Marines!

The Roving Marines were sheer publicity meant to shore up recruiting efforts. After the war, Marines left the service in droves from expired enlistments. This exodus from the ranks became a serious concern for a small organization that needed enough men to carry out its missions across the globe and in the States. “Due to the large number of discharges of duration-of-the-war men,” Lejeune reported, “the strength of the corps . . . reached its lowest point, 15,249.”

This number was ten thousand less than Congress had allotted to the Marine Corps in the naval appropriations of 1919. Lejeune made this plain in his report to Congress: “Discharges and separations from the service exceeded enlistments to such an extent that by the end of the calendar year 1919 the strength of the corps was over 11,000 short of that authorized by law, making it impossible for the corps to properly carry out its mission.” He convinced Congress for the needed appropriations, but that did not stop the Corps from dropping to 15,000 men his first year in office. “The most pressing matter at the present time is that of recruiting, as I am

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anxious to see the Corps brought up to its full permanent strength at as early a date as possible,” Lejeune wrote to a former staff officer.\textsuperscript{14}

Manhood and manliness were central components of this publicity campaign aimed at recovering postwar losses. “One factor that is preeminent in the make-up of the detachments is the fine standard of men who make up the parties, both in the point of physique and intelligence,” claimed one Marine author.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, the bureau picked a very select group of Marines to man the three different bands of Rovers. These men were mostly veterans of Hispaniola, France, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Lejeune claimed they were specifically picked “to show the recreation which a man serving in the Marine Corps could enjoy, the manhood that the service develops, and the high intellectual qualities of the personnel of the corps.”\textsuperscript{16}

The Publicity Bureau especially sought Veterans of the Great War to fill the Roving Marines’ ranks.

Perhaps the most famous Marine among the Rovers was First-Sergeant Dan Daly, a living legend within the Corps itself. A salty expeditionary Marine, winner of two congressional medals of honor (for service in China and Haiti), and veteran of the Battle of Belleau Wood, Daly had masculine credentials that many in and out the Corps admired. To the Marines he was the “most picturesque of the old-school soldiers.”\textsuperscript{17} Smedley Butler, a Marine just as well-known as Daly, said of him, “Daly is a real red-blooded Marine and it was an object lesson to have served with him.”\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] John A. Lejeune to Earl H. Ellis, July 7, 1920, Lejeune Papers, Reel 12, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.; See also The Officer in Charge of Recruiting to the Major General Commandant, September 12, 1921, RG 127, General Correspondence, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington DC.
\end{footnotes}
surrounding him. Even though photographs of him exist, he would frequently refuse to have his picture taken and during interviews he would never talk about himself for long. “Trying to gather biographical data about Daly from Daly is like quizzing the Sphinx,” one Marine wrote, “both are non-committal.”19 “You’ll have to be satisfied with whatever the corps officers tell you,” Daly told one reporter later in his life, “I don’t care for all this publicity, all I ask is to be left alone.”20 When a reporter from the New York World got a hold of Daly long enough to conduct an interview, the old Marine deflected every question thrown at him, and talked about one of his favorite past-times instead:

My own story of how I won those medals? Say we heard by wireless on the way home that New York has Sunday baseball now. Gee, that’s the best news I’ve ever heard in a long while. That affair in China? That’s a long time ago. That was about the time that Buck Ewing was good, wasn’t it? That boy was some catcher.21

Daly’s modesty was a testament to his character, and it endeared him to his fellow Marines as much as his fighting reputation. He appeared to serve only out of love for his fellow Marines and because of his own sense of duty, not because he wanted attention from the press.

Despite his qualms with publicity, Daly became one of the main attractions of the Roving Marines. They made Daly a part of an exhibit that displayed war trophies that included German helmets, mortars, and machine guns captured by the Marines in France.22 Rovers advertised him as the “only enlisted man in the United States who is holder of two congressional medals of honor.”23 Other distinguished Marines joined Daly. Gunnery Sergeant Charles Hoffman, “Another fighting man who has won the highest decorations of three nations for valor on the

22 Anonymous, “Roving Marines to Stage Big Jazz Show,” Boston Post, April 19, 1920, 13
23 Anonymous, “Roving Marines Make a Big Hit,” Recruiters’ Bulletin, February 1920, 3; See also “Roving Marines Coming to Boston,” Boston Evening Globe, April 6, 1920, 6; “Marines Please Large Crowds of Syracusans,” Syracuse Herald, April 11, 1920, 10;
battlefield,” was a part of the Roving Marines as well. Together, Hoffman and Daly represented the Marine Corps’ manly ideal on full public display.

According to the Publicity Bureau and newspapers, each performance of the Roving Marines had similar elements designed to “show the young men of the country the type of men who make up the peace time corps.” The audience watched motion pictures of Marines serving overseas in France and Hispaniola. The Rovers entertained them with a full jazz band, solo-singers, dancers, a lariat thrower, and comedians. Newspapers around the country reported on the quality of the music and dancing, but the comedic performances were particularly appreciated. Part of the appeal of this portion of the show was that the jokes were tailored towards a male audience. “Some of the jokes are regular he-man jokes that were never penned by any kimono-clad play wright in a pale-blue boudoir,” wrote the Richmond News-Leader. The Roving Marines also put on boxing exhibitions where a Marine would “square up” with members of the audience. “The boxing bouts were exceptionally clever, the opponents being types of manhood that are always looked up to by their fellow men for their prowess and manly art of self-defense,” wrote one spectator.

The Marines’ reputation for physical prowess could, in some instances, make potential recruits think twice about joining. The Publicity Bureau wanted the Roving Marines’ performance to change their minds. Therefore, a bit of image softening was in order. “They tell

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me only about one in 20 can pass the doctor, and you have to be a regular bruise,” claimed one potential applicant. “Get that out of your mind,” Sergeant James Higgins told him, “it isn’t always size and brawn, its proper, ‘physical machinery’ in him that we require.”

Boxing, war trophies, and close order drill demonstrations made Marines look strong and bellicose, but the singing, dancing, and comedic acts made the Corps appear more inviting.

These shows demonstrated how malleable the Corps’ image could be. Marines fought, chased bandits, and drilled with the rifle, but they also sang, danced, and played music and sports. Marines could do it all. It was not just the Marine Corps that was on display, however. Healthy, clean, and good-looking men on stage was an attempt to persuade audiences that the Corps was good for America’s manhood. Newspaper responses to the Roving Marines’ performances often praised them along these lines. “The Roving Marines are made up of as fine a looking set of men to be found anywhere, being a credit, not only to themselves, but to their country,” the Imperial Valley press remarked.

The Roving Marines did not target male audiences only. Reporters who witnessed their performances commented on the effect the uniformed men had on female members of the audiences. “Did you notice how the eyes of the Quincy girls roved yesterday every time a bevy of those roving Marines roved up and down the street?” one reporter wrote, “they were just ordinary, healthy and husky young men . . . but they had on dress uniforms—all neat and blue, with glaring read stripes you know!”

When the Roving Marines visited Montgomery, Alabama, a large number of the attendants were young women, “who gazed on the full-dress uniforms of

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Uncle Sam’s choicest picked fighters with unaffected appreciation.”

Apparently this attention from women in the audience irritated some of the men with them. “Some of the male members of the audience were heard to wonder why it is that so many girls get uniform struck,” noted the *Montgomery Advertiser.*

The Bureau hoped that the quality of the manhood on stage would impress American audiences and, thereby, stimulate recruiting. Marines on stage appearing attractive to the opposite sex was perhaps a part of this plan.

The tangible impact Roving Marines had on recruiting is difficult to measure precisely, but official reports were often positive. The shows created public exposure for the Marines in two ways: they provided information about the Corps via a vaudeville performance and gave recruiters a chance to mingle with local attendees and hand out recruiting literature. “This feature proves to be one of the best advertisements that can be obtained as the recruiters come in personal contact with the people on the street,” read one report.

Recruiters often received more inquiries from potential applicants after the Roving Marines left town. That, in part, had to do with newspaper advertisements more so than actual attendance. After a show in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, one recruiter reported that “Inquiries have increased very noticeably, especially by mail from the nearby towns which the Pittsburg papers have reached. This proving that the paid advertising is doing good work.”

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33 Roving Marines Leave Thursday for Georgia City,” 2.
34 Officer in Charge to Officer in Charge, Eastern Recruiting Division, “Report of Roving Marines,” March 22, 1920, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
35 R. F. Avery, “Memorandum for The Officer in Charge, Eastern Recruiting Division, Philadelphia, PA,” March 27, 1920, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
The Roving Marines only lasted from February 1 to June 30, 1920. This campaign took place mostly under his predecessor’s watch, but Lejeune was proud of what the Rovers accomplished:

While enlistment themselves did not immediately increase rapidly, inquiries for information about enlistments increased in some cases as high as 1,000 per cent immediately after the “Roving Marines” had been in a locality. The present gradual, but ever increasing recruiting results doubtless owe much to the (Roving Marines) campaign.36

Further budget cuts slotted for 1921 ended the trail of the Roving Marines. The recruiting service also took a big slash in manpower. There were 845 Marines on recruiting duty in the summer of 1920; that number dwindled to 375 by February 1921.37 Despite reduction of recruiters throughout the country, “At the beginning of the fiscal year 1921 recruiting was deemed the most important problem before the Marine Corps,” the officer in charge of recruiting wrote to Lejeune.38 Now the Marines had to shift recruiting tactics with a greater eye towards economy and efficiency.

Softening of the Marines’ peace-time image could be done cheaply, however, and it continued through other publicity stunts. At one point recruiting officers manufactured a human-interest story involving orphans. To make Marines appear family friendly, the officer in charge of the Eastern Recruiting Division, David D. Porter, concocted a plan. Recruiters in New York City would spend a day picnicking and chaperoning local orphans from the Home for Homeless Boys. The plan involved Marines picking up several dozen young, preferably disabled, orphans

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37 Officer in Charge of Recruiting to the Major General Commandant, “Data for Annual Report,” September 12, 1921, General Correspondence, Recruitment, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.

38 Officer in Charge of Recruiting to the Major General Commandant, “Data for Annual Report,” September 12, 1921, General Correspondence, Recruitment, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
and spending the day with them, “to afford a few moments of pleasure to the homeless little ones.”

Publicity was the motive here, not altruism. “Prior to the outing a carefully written story should be prepared giving the motive of the outing . . . this story should be delivered personally PERSONALLY to all City Editors by your publicity sergeant at least two days in advance of the outing to insure its publication,” Porter explained. He instructed recruiters to pitch the story to newspapers as a human-interest story: “The story must be good and at no time should the subject of recruiting be brought up.”

As Porter instructed, the recruiters in New York, in collaboration with the superintendent of the Home for Homeless Boys, picked up the boys in trucks with newspaper men and photographers present. After pictures had been taken, the Marines drove the young boys out to Rye Beach, New York, where they swam and played games. The Marines awarded prizes to the boys who excelled at these activities. Returning to the orphanage, the Marines drove the trucks filled with children down Broadway. “The children were in fine spirits upon their return and cheered (sic) and sang on the entire return trip,” T.B. Gale, a recruiter, reported, “As the return was made just about the time pleasure seeking crowds were in the down-town district, this drive attracted a great deal of attention.” Recruiters in Richmond Virginia repeated this stunt and reportedly achieved similar results.

39 “Memorandum for Officers in Charge of Districts,” September 13, 1922, General Correspondence, Correspondence Recruitment, 1921-1939, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
40 Memorandum for Officers in Charge of Districts,” September 13, 1922, General Correspondence, Correspondence Recruitment, 1921-1939, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C. (All caps author’s)
41 Memorandum for Officers in Charge of Districts,” September 13, 1922, General Correspondence, Correspondence Recruitment, 1921-1939, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
42 Officer in Charge, District of New York to Officer in charge, Eastern Recruiting Division, “Publicity,” August 23, 1922, General Correspondence, Correspondence Recruitment, 1921-1939, RG 127, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
A few public picnics with orphans did not solve the Marine Corps’ manpower problems, however. Lejeune was serious about the Corps’ dwindling ranks. He sensed, correctly, that the American people and Congress cared little for liberal military expenditures after the war. Since all branches of the military endured post-war cuts in funds and manpower, Lejeune asserted that the Corps would be cut even further if people thought Marines were idle and unproductive. “This belief we must combat by engaging in useful work,” Lejeune wrote. Reports of Marines indiscriminately killing Haitians and Dominicans plagued the Corps between 1920 and 1922. Counter images of Marines doing good work and producing dependable citizens were more crucial than ever before.

Lejeune wanted to convince the American people that Marines were engaged usefully at home and abroad. By his reckoning, Marines proved their worth, in part, by guarding government property (i.e. navy yards, ammunition depots, and naval bases) and by carrying out the government’s will in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. “That work is worth-while,” he claimed, “as is all work done for the benefit of other people.” He maintained, as he had done during the military and Senate investigations of Marine behavior in Hispaniola, that Marines were behaving chivalrously on the island.

One of the key services that the Corps provided, Lejeune claimed, was the development of manhood among Americans who enlisted in the Marines. “At Parris Island and Mare Island we are training young Americans to be better men physically, mentally and morally; and this process is continued here, on board ship, and wherever they may go during their enlistments,” he argued. Lejeune was a strong proponent of this idea and he believed that the Corps inculcated

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44 John A. Lejeune, “Preparation,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1922, 54; This article is a copy of an address that Lejeune delivered to Marines at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico VA, January 12, 1922.
45 Lejeune, “Preparation,” 54.
46 Ibid., 54.
several virtues among young men: “self-control—industry, energy, fidelity, unselfishness, honor, courage, and self-sacrifice.” These “military virtues” were all Victorian-era manly virtues and Lejeune would see to it that the Marines displayed them publicly and often.

Lieutenant Colonel E.B. Manwaring, stationed at Parris Island at the time, tried to help with this task when he collected recruits’ letters to use for publicity purposes. Writing to the Publicity Bureau, he claimed that “if desired for recruiting purposes, a large number of letters could be secured from men upon completion of their recruit training and printed in book form.”

Collectively, these letters portray an image of Marines that supported Commandant Lejeune’s public claims about the Corps’ benefits to American manhood. They also indicate that the healthful and wholesome man-making image of the Marines remained a central component of their post-war publicity efforts.

Recruits themselves wrote home to their friends proclaiming that life in the Marine Corps could make men out of them. One recruit described boot camp to his friend, claiming that the hiking, drill, and food had salubrious effects. “When you get out you will be a man,” he asserted. Other recruits expressed the same sentiments when writing home. “Altogether, recruit training is pretyy [sic] hard work but if you go into it with the right spirit, it will certainly make a man of you,” a recruit with the initials J.L.O. wrote. J.L.O. spoke to the notion that the Marines could make a man only out of mentally tough recruits. Essentially, they had to consist of the right material which the Corps could mold into their own Marine, and manly, image. “To

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47 Ibid., 55.
48 E.B. Manwaring, “Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 21, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
49 Letter quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” F.H.W., New York, January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
sum it up,” wrote E.A.M from Indiana, “the Marine Corps is just what I thought it was—a place where a man has to soldier to make anything out of himself.”

Recruits claimed that the rigors of training made them healthier specimens of manhood. “You would be surprised at the wonders it does for a man,” J.H.V.S. of Pennsylania wrote. The training had a significant physical and mental impact on the recruits:

Personally, I think this training is one of the best opportunities a man could ever have. It teaches one to become self-dependent because if anything is wrong no one gets the blame but the man himself. A man learns to be alert, to train his eyes, and to do other things which makes a good marine. The fact is, too many are used to have their mother do everything but with the Marines he soon learns differently. I presume that many of them do not see it in this life but personally I like it better every day.

They even saw the food, which often received the least praise, as a part of what made life in boot camp so wholesome. Despite claiming “once in a while we get a meal not quite so good,” J.B.LaC. asserted that, “You can believe me it is a healthy life.” Physical health was an essential element regarding ideal manhood.

Recruits also wrote about the character of the Marines they met. Before the Great War, recruiters often harped on the idea that young men would be surrounded not by drunkards and reprobates but by men of good character. “I found that the Marine Corps as a whole is composed of a very fine lot of men,” assured one recruit. “Our sergeant and corporals are very fine

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51 Letter quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” E.A.M, Indiana, January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
52 J.H.V.S., Pennsylvania, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
53 R.G.B., Ohio, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
54 J.B.LaC., Connecticut, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
55 J.A.S., New York, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
fellows,” wrote another.  

Recruits seemed to appreciate the cleanliness, discipline, and soldierly bearing of the Marines at Parris Island. “I can say that the sergeant in charge of us was one swell fellow,” a recruit from Massachusetts claimed, “of course he was strict with us in the line of discipline . . . I don’t believe he swore more than twice and believe me he was well liked by all the fellows.”

Training could be harsh, but Marines took care of them and treated them fairly, they claimed.

They often associated this good character with their drill instructors (DI’s), who to this very day are often the most iconic Marines. The recruits were raw material, Parris Island was the anvil, and drill instructors were the hammers used to pound and shape that material. DI’s turned recruits into Marines, and young boys into men according to these letters.

Recruits respected their DI’s, not only because of their rank, authority, knowledge, and experience in the Corps, but also because of what all of that added up to: the DI’s were real men in their eyes. “I was assigned to the 610th company with a real man over us,” one recruit wrote, “My first impression of him was he was the hardest and crankiest old fogy on the Island but I soon changed my mind; he sure was a prince.” They frequently described their DI’s as “swell fellows,” and “princes,” which meant men of good character. Letters painted these Marines as efficient, clean looking, tough, and “well-bred,” all of which the recruits understood as indications of red-blooded manhood. H.O.A’s drill instructor was quite simply “one of the finest

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56 F.E., New Jersey, quoted in “Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 21, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
57 F.X. MacD., Massachusetts, quoted in “Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 21, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
58 J.H.V.S., Pennsylvania, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.

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The manliness and character of these Marines was a large part of the reason why some recruits saw the Marine Corps as “the best man making outfit.”

Recruits’ parents also contributed to the idea that the Corps helped their sons transition from boyhood to manhood. One mother from Missouri wrote that she had tried her best to “teach him to be a man.” Before he went to boot camp, she had spent a fortune in tuition to send him to a military school hoping to facilitate that process, “and during the 2½ years he was there he never learned as much as he has learned in three months where he is now.” An ill father requested that his son be granted leave from boot camp to come home and be at his side. He wrote, “When he left me just a kid in his second pair of long pants I was afraid I was doing wrong to let him go but when I lay there fighting the old grim reaper and looked up and saw a hard boiled man standing by my bed and realized that it was my little boy grown up I was glad I let you have him and commenced getting well right off.”

In the post-war years, investigations of Marines in Hispaniola notwithstanding, many Americans still believed the Marine Corps turned their young boys into men.

Guarding the mail from November 1921 to March 1922 gave the Marines another opportunity to appear useful and efficient before the American public. Due to frequent mail robberies starting in 1921, the Postal Service requested help from President Harding. He

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59 H.O.A., Kentucky, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
60 A.A.S., Pennsylvania, quoted in “Addendum: Recruit Training at Parris Island,” January 25, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 118, National Archives, Washington D.C.
61 Commanding Officer to Major General Commandant, “Letters for publicity Purposes,” February 1, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
62 Commanding Officer to Major General Commandant, “Letters for publicity Purposes,” February 1, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
63 Commanding Officer to Major General Commandant, “Letters for publicity Purposes,” February 1, 1921, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C. (Author’s emphasis)
delegated the task to the Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby, who notified Lejeune. Lejeune appointed Brigadier General Logan Feland to implement a plan whereby armed Marines protected post offices, mail trucks, and trains from bandits.64 Across the country, Americans saw sharply dressed Marines armed with pistols and shotguns with orders to shoot anyone who attempted to rob the postal service.65 This new mission required Marines to work with the Postal Service and the public, which caused concern due to the potential danger involved.

After several months of working closely with the Postal Service, Lejeune reported to Congress that while Marines were on post, armed robberies ceased.66 The acting Postmaster General, Hubert Work, wrote to Lejeune that the Marines “performed their arduous and difficult duty in a most excellent manner and they have my most earnest praise and appreciation for their invaluable service to the public.”67 Through that service, Marines once again showed themselves ready to serve at a moment’s notice and that they could be trusted to do a dangerous mission among the populace efficiently and safely. “When we are needed we are needed in a hurry,” a Marine wrote, “In the past we have never failed to respond, no matter what the call. The public expects us to be ready, able, and willing. We ourselves confidently expect in every year ‘to lend a hand at every job’—to be Marines.”68 One of Lejeune’s goals for the Marine Corps after the Great War was to “Make the Marine Corps as useful as possible to the Government and the

64 Bettez, Kentucky Marine, 154-156.
65 Anonymous, “Marines to Stop Mail Robberies,” Bedford Daily Mail, November 10, 1921, 2;
66 House Committee on Naval Affairs, Statements of Maj. Gen. John a. Lejeune, commandant United States Marine Corps; Accompanied by Brig. Gen. Charles L. McCawley, Quartermaster; Maj. L.C. Shepherd; Lieut. Col. H.C. Shynder; and Mr. W.W. Trail, March 8, 1922, 645; See also Hubert Work to The Major General Commandant, March 14, 1922, Logan Feland Papers, MCA; Anonymous, “No Robberies of Mail During Marines’ Tour of Postal Duty,” The Leatherneck, April 1, 1922, 1.
People of the United States in peace as well as in war.”⁶⁹ Marines who guarded the mail helped fulfill this ambition.

It also gave them an opportunity to appear manly. Marines viewed this assignment as a credit to their manhood. “The order assigning Marines to do this duty contains a phrase which should thrill every Marine who reads it,” read *The Leatherneck*. “The mails must be delivered or a Marine must be dead at his post. A threat to cowards, but an invitation to brave men! Such an order could be issued only to an organization known to contain men.”⁷⁰ Like the Roving Marines, guarding the mail placed the Marines’ manliness on display. Percy Webb, the *de facto* poet laureate of the Great War-era Marine Corps, published this piece in the December issue of *The Leatherneck*:

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The Banker wasn’t worried
  When he had bonds to send,
For he had read the tidings
  That his troubles were to end.
“Put those bonds in the mail,” he said;
  “No one will dare to rob,
For everything is lovely when
  Marines are on the job!”

“Mother,” said the daughter,
  “I might enjoy this trip,
But I’m afraid that bandits
  Will steal my purse and grip.”
“Hush, daughter! Do not worry.”
  The mother softly said;
“U.S. Marines are riding
  In the baggage coach ahead”

The engineer climbed in the cab
  And threw the throttle wide,
Then shouted to the fireman:
  “Hey, Bill! Just let’er ride!
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If those mail robbers stop us
    They’re goin to learn some facts
And, furthermore, they’ll learn’em
    Where the chicken got the axe!”

The robber hand was waiting;
    The train came around the bend,
But when they saw the Leathernecks
    Their plans came to an end
“Lets beat it!” said the bandits,
    As they turned around to scoot;
“We’re off of robbin’ trains when the
    Marines commence to shoot!” 71

Guarding the mail went over so well for the Marines that Colonel Rufus Lane suggested in a group conference with the Commandant that Marines take over the job permanently. Lejeune agreed that guarding the mail afforded “a splendid example of the use to which our reserve may be put in time of emergency.” It gave the Marines another chance to demonstrate their readiness and efficiency. But Lejeune contended that the Corps should only be used for operations like that in times of emergency. “The spirit of the country is against the use of the military forces as a permanent thing in domestic affairs,” he told his staff officers at headquarters, “they are glad to have our men guard the mails now, but would not care to have them continuously on that duty.” 72 Lejeune was concerned that the allocation of Marines to guard the mail permanently would take manpower away from potential expeditionary duty—the Marines’ bread and butter. Marines were called upon to guard the mail temporarily again in 1926.

72 Record of Weekly Conference Held in Office of the Major General Commandant, Friday, November 18, 1921, General Correspondence, Recruitment 1921-1939, RG 127, National Archives, Washington D.C.
Efficient Manhood

Lejeune cared about efficiency for important reasons. He wanted Marines as efficient as possible in everything they did, especially in matters of recruiting, training, and expeditionary duty. In post-war America, efficiency became even more necessary as budget cuts and demobilization racked all the armed services. “Demobilization is a bad thing for a service like the Marine Corps because it could affect efficiency,” Lejeune asserted, “lack of efficiency could be fatal for an institution that does nothing the army cannot do.” Lejeune held no delusions regarding the fiscal situation in Washington D.C. and its potential to damage the Marine Corps. “Officers and men are now filled with the determination to work unceasingly to maintain the efficiency of the corps . . . It will be the mission of all to do all in their power to jealously guard its great reputation,” he wrote. Lejeune firmly believed that the Corps existed because the American people wanted it so. They wanted a Marine Corps, in part because of its reputation for efficiency.

Some Americans had changed their minds about the quality of American manhood since the Great War. The war brought hundreds of thousands of American men to draft boards that examined them for physical and mental defects. These screenings resulted in startling conclusions. Based on this data, General Charles E. Sawyer, a physician and surgeon for the Army, claimed that “Americans’ physical manhood is materially deficient. Its mental capacity is of mediocre type.” Less than five percent of drafted men scored above average marks for intelligence, and only about 67.5 percent met the draft board’s physical standards. Sawyer called

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75 Charles E. Sawyer, “Physical Manhood of America Weak,” Bar Harbor Times, February 8, 1922, 3. (Also in Quanah Tribune Chief, February 3, 1922, 3.)
for a systematized plan of education to develop America’s manhood both physically and mentally. This plan, he hoped, would “change us from a body of men shot through with physical weakness to a physical perfection that will make us not only strong as individuals but will make us strong as a nation.”

Studies like these broadened the post-war discourses on the quality of American manhood and how to improve it.

Increasing efficiency was one way to do just that. Americans frequently linked efficiency with healthy and virile manhood during this time. For example, government pamphlets considered physical, mental, and moral efficiency as prerequisites of a healthy and productive male citizen. “A man’s value to society is determined by the amount of work which he can perform, mental or physical,” the Young Men’s Christian Association claimed. James Samuel Knox, author of *Personal Efficiency* (1920), argued that the Great War exposed America’s need for more efficient men. “But scientific training of mind and body transformed many of these weaklings into strong, upstanding young men, full of ambition and initiative, who are now able to get things done,” the book argued. Physical training and intellectual development through education benefitted one’s manhood by making one more efficient and an efficient man could be successful in any walk of life.

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76 Sawyer, “Physical Manhood of America Weak,” 3.
78 Indiana State Board of Health, *Keeping Fit*, 3, 7, 10.
Educated Manhood

By focusing on efficiency, Lejeune bolstered the Marine Corps’ ability to perform its tasks and to maintain positive connections with society along the lines of developing manhood. Like other authors of his time interested in efficiency and manhood, Lejeune would place heavy emphasis on education to achieve both. The Corps became an educating institution which was consistent with outside discourses on developing efficient manhood. The nexus of Marine Corps Education would be the relatively new Marine Corps base, Quantico, Virginia.

Located just thirty-seven miles south of Washington D.C., the Marine Corps broke ground on Quantico in the spring of 1917, immediately after Congress declared war on Germany. Quantico served initially as an advanced infantry training facility where Marines, both officers and enlisted, trained specifically for deployment to France.\(^8\) After the war, Major General Lejeune became the base commander and he envisioned Quantico, as early as 1919, as the central hub of Marine Corps learning. When he became Commandant in June 1920, Brigadier General Smedley Butler took over the post. Quantico would expand and become the home of Marine education, both military and academic, under Butler’s command.\(^2\)

Manpower reductions and the continuous bad news coming out of Hispaniola equated to brief depression of spirit for the Corps. “The Marine Corps, like all other armed services, is pretty well down and out through lack of men,” Smedley Butler wrote from Quantico, “but we are slowly pulling ourselves together and will again be a ‘Corps’ I hope.”\(^3\) Lejeune and Butler wanted to create a Marine Corps vocational school to teach Marines trade skills, as well as basic reading, writing, and mathematics. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels fully supported the

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\(^{2}\) Fleming, *Quantico*, 39.

\(^{3}\) Smedley Butler to Major L.S. Schmitt, February 27, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
plan. “Write me that letter with reference to the vocational school . . . make it as full as you can,” Daniels requested of Butler, “I think it would carry with all the papers and would delight the people of America and would help recruiting very much for the class of young men that we are anxious to get in the Marine Corps.” As Daniels explicitly stated, and as Lejeune and Butler thoroughly understood, there was a publicity side to this plan. The Navy and the Marine Corps would enhance their claims of being beneficial to America’s manhood by advertising themselves as educating institutions.

With Lejeune’s support, Butler drafted a plan that called for the building and development of “nothing more nor less than a huge military university.” This university would produce vocational and academic training for Marines to enhance their efficiency while in the service and to help their prospects of finding employment once their enlistments ended. The education Marines would receive would not interfere at all with “the military instruction necessary to produce the finest type of soldier.” “Anyone familiar with the training of Marines will admit that as a steady diet, more than two hours of purely military training a day will make an enlisted man muscle bound and cause him to grow stale, except in time of war,” Butler claimed. Military instruction alone, especially in peacetime, only took a few hours a day and did not necessarily help young men learn useful trade skills that would help them in civilian life, according to Butler. With this in mind, he and Lejeune oversaw the establishment of three schools: automotive mechanics, music, and type-writing and shorthand.

Butler wanted the Marine Corps to enhance the ways in which it benefited the young men who joined. He wanted to help Marines advance in life:

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84 Josephus Daniels to Smedley Butler, January 10, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
85 Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA; see also Lieutenant Colonel Fleming et al., Quantico, 39.
Heretofore an enlistment in the regular service of the United States has been considered a waste of time unless a man intended to make it his life work, and as far as preparing him for any duty in civilian life aside from that of a policeman or a defender of his Nation in time of war, it certainly was. Men who had professions or trades when they entered the Corps necessarily ceased to advance during the period of their enlistment, and a man who does not continually advance goes backward; no man can stand still.\textsuperscript{86}

Butler was not a recruiter and he contradicted Marine recruiters’ claims regarding the value of military training. Since before the Great War, recruiters had claimed that becoming a Marine enhanced recruits’ manhood, which bettered their lives and prepared them for successful careers as civilians. Butler suggested otherwise: that the Corps, as of 1920, opened very few doors for those who returned to civilian life. Butler, however, would not have disagreed with the notion that the Marine Corps \textit{should} enhance one’s manhood. He only wanted the Corps to better fulfill that promise with vocational and academic education.

Butler had an ambitious plan. The troops would undergo military instruction in the mornings and vocational training of their choice in the afternoons. He wanted to invite employers from around the country to come and speak to the students about employment in their respective industries. Butler reasoned that this tactic would expose young Marines to possible avenues of career advancement and familiarize prominent businesses with veterans. This plan would help “secure positions for our men who complete their military training and . . . provide employment for them.”\textsuperscript{87} The Corps, according to Butler, would arrange for students to visit companies related to their vocational training to increase their chances of securing employment after their service. If these Marines decided to stay in, however, their training and education via the Marine Corps schools would make them candidates for future commissions in the officer ranks.\textsuperscript{88} In this way, what would eventually become the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) would

\begin{footnotes}
\item[86]Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
\item[87]Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA; Fleming, \textit{Quantico}, 39.
\item[88]Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA; Fleming, \textit{Quantico}, 39.
\end{footnotes}
grow to rival other military educational institutions like Annapolis, West Point, and the Citadel. That was the plan, at least.

Butler wrote to Daniels claiming that Marine Corps schools at Quantico would benefit the Corps along several lines. First, the schools would keep Marines on base busy and engaged in wholesome work. Boredom and idleness led to trouble, according to Butler. If Marines were not honing their military skills, then they would engage in academic or vocational studies. “This, Mr. Secretary, will nearly close up our prisons; in fact, since we have started this teaching some six weeks ago, our punishments have dropped to practically nothing,” Butler wrote. 89

Second, the instructors would be officers who would get valuable, hands-on leadership experience. Officers who led Marines in training could also lead them in the class room. Butler argued that “the closer contact an officer can maintain with his men, provided he is a proper man to hold a commission, the greater will be his influence over these same men, and it follows, naturally, the better leader he will be.” 90 To illustrate this point even further, he recounted an incident at Quantico where an officer discovered one of his junior Marines was illiterate. One of Butler’s other officers, First Lieutenant J.B. Neill, promptly offered to teach the young man how to read and write. Neill’s classroom soon grew to seventeen students needing instruction in basic grammar. Butler used this story to claim the following:

Mr. Secretary, the devotion of that young man to Mr. Neill is pathetic, and when you speak of leadership, that man will go through hell at the wink of Neill’s eye. Neill has more control over that man than he could have gotten in ten years of ‘right and left face’ on a parade ground. 91

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89 Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
90 Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
91 Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
Officers educating young Marines would increase the bond between them, Butler reasoned. Officers who cared not to interact with their Marines in this fashion would become highly suspect regarding their leadership qualities.

Ultimately, Marine schools at Quantico would make the Corps more attractive to American society and potential recruits in peacetime. He wrote:

It strikes me that the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau might do well to get up a catalogue of our university and widely distribute it. All other universities have catalogues and why shouldn’t we, who have the great American Government behind us? Let the people who are paying the bills for this establishment see what we are doing with their children and their money.\(^\text{92}\)

Butler reasoned that a vocational school at Quantico would help persuade the American public that their sons were not just training to defend their country. The Marines were educating them to be better men. When these Marines completed their enlistment, they would be “returned to civil life a good all-around American citizen.”\(^\text{93}\)

Lejeune and Butler’s efforts at educating Marines occurred at a time when professors and government officials worried about the education of American manhood. Edward Garstin Smith, a conservative author who frequently criticized progressive movements and the Wilson administration, argued that American manhood was degenerating, in part, because of a lack of quality education. “America suffers from an over production of rich men,” he asserted, and “an underproduction of educated men.”\(^\text{94}\) Threats from home and abroad, such as tyranny and socialism, riddled the post-war world. Educated manhood was the best way to combat those threats. Thames Ross Williamson’s *Problems in American Democracy* argued that educated men

\(^{92}\) Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.

\(^{93}\) Smedley Butler to Josephus Daniels, January 13, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.

were an essential component of a fully functioning and safe nation. Dr. Basil A. Yeaxlee, Secretary of the Universities Committee of the YMCA, asserted that “adult education is a permanent national necessity, an inseparable aspect of citizenship, and therefore should be universal and life-long.” These authors spoke against the common idea that school was important only for childhood, not manhood.

Dr. Henry Louis Smith deemed education a crucial step toward manhood among boys. “Before the boy can become a real man,” he must learn “independence, initiative, will-power, self-control, and self-direction,” all of which he could gain through a proper education. According to Smith, education was more than just a rite of passage that young boys should endure to reach manhood. It was also the surest way to improve one’s economic and social standing. The Great War, he argued, made it clear that “Never has the call for educated leadership been so insistent as now . . . and never has a thorough college education, backed by character and energy, promised such large and certain dividends of wealth, fame, and opportunity.” Some Americans like Garstin Smith, Williamson, and even Lejeune and Butler viewed education as a powerful force in their society, one that could make a man.

This power could be used for good or for evil, however; a man’s character made all the difference. Education without moral direction and the development of a man’s character could be dangerous. “The more you ‘educate’ a man who is defective in the intellectual and moral fundamentals, the more dangerous a man you make him,” Edward Garstin Smith argued.

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97 Henry Louis Smith, (PhD., LL.D) *Your Biggest Job School or Business: Some Words of Counsel for Red-Blooded Young Americans Who are Getting Tired of School* (New York: D. Appelton and Company, 1921), 64.
98 Smith, *Your Biggest Job School or Business*, 69.
99 Ibid.
100 Smith, *Americanism*, 15.
Henry Louis Smith identified bad campus atmospheres that enabled “childish, frivolous self-indulgence,” as threat to a good education’s foundation in character. For Henry Louis Smith, character meant “manhood.” He offered this advice to young men about to attend college:

> It then depends on your character and will power whether you will play with the shavings on the floor like a baby, look out the windows at the passers-by like a child, or use your tools like a man and make yourself a master workman. After you are once inside the college door, an ounce of manhood is worth of ton of units and ream of certificates.\(^{101}\)

Character and manhood, therefore, were foundational elements of a man’s education. With an education that bolstered his morality, a man then only needed the courage to follow his own moral compass. A “red-blooded man,” according to Julius A. Schaad, is one “Who has a vigorous enough conscience to govern, and a strong enough will to control his own moral action; who has courage enough to call his soul his own in any situation where moral decisions have to be made . . . who has strong enough convictions on moral questions to lead him to make sacrifices of himself or his interests for a great cause.”\(^{102}\) These educated and morally upright men were the kind of good American citizens that the Marine Corps sought to produce through vocational training.

Marines were sensitive to the manhood-morality-education nexus. To persuade Marine officers around the Corps of the value of the Marine Corps Institute, Captain Earl H. Jenkins published “Character—Building the Basis for High Morale,” in the March 1920, issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. In a rare moment when a Marine of this time wrote on class, he argued that most men who joined the Marine corps came from the working classes. That group could be divided in two: “those whose social influences have inculcated a devotion to duty, a respect for established authority, a Christian sense of right and wrong and a brotherhood of man; and the

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\(^{101}\) Smith, *Your Biggest Job School or Business*, 76.

uneducated man who has been surrounded by ignorance and prejudice from birth, who is suspicious of everybody and everything, who thinks every man’s hand is against him and whose hand is against everyman.”

The former, he argued, needed more prominence in the Marine Corps to maintain morale because “he is the material out of which a real guardian of American liberties can be made.”

Jenkins argued that the Marine Corps Institute served as a great tool for Marines to mold that material. “It is not so much in what is gained in knowledge as what is gained in character that makes school life a success or failure,” he asserted.

The Corps’ efforts toward educating its Marines were reactions to what was going on in the civilian world. Marine officers who helped Butler and Lejeune create the Marine Corps Institute heard the cries for more education coming from American society. “The subject of educating the nation’s young men has become a problem and a duty more urgent than ever before, and the people and the nation’s law-makers are thoroughly awakened and ready to support any movement looking toward that end,” First Lieutenant John H. Craige wrote in 1920.

They also knew that, given the post-war economic situation, selling the Marine Corps to potential recruits would be a challenge.

Advertising government pay would not attract the recruits Marines sought. “There is evidence also of a growing disposition on the part of young men to regard time spent in the military service as time wasted; years in which little is learned and no advance made in knowledge, capability and earning power,” Craige pointed out.

The Marine Corps Institute,

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104 Jenkins, “Character-Building,” 51.
105 Ibid., 51.
therefore, would be a great way to attract ambitious young men who appreciated the value of education in furthering their careers in post-war America.

The Publicity Bureau soon took to the newspapers across the country advertising vocational training at Quantico. The Marine Corps image softened even further. Before the Great War, Marines were America’s quick reaction force—rough men ready for anything. During the war, Marines had been chivalrous warriors, bent on the destruction of America’s foes. After the war, they became warriors who could sing, dance, and play music. With this publicity campaign, Marines became educators, shapers of men’s minds and character.

With information provided by the Marine Publicity Bureau, newspapers around the country advertised the Marine Corps Institute as a place for only the most promising of American manhood. Like pre-war recruiting efforts, writers presented life in the Marine Corps as a privilege. The Corps could mold and shape young men, but they had to consist of the right moral and physical material in the first place. “Recruits accepted in this class must be of the highest type and have the best qualifications of physique and character,” read one advertisement.108 “For this branch of service attracts the sort of a man who has the makings of a ‘good fellow,’” another advertisement read, “And no school, unless it is a military institution of the first rank, can approach the Marine Corps in giving a man the self-reliance, alertness and qualities of leadership which military training affords.”109

Frederick Haskin, a notable author around this time, wrote an advertisement for the Marines that centered around the MCI. He targeted an audience of young men “who have

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ambition, but not money, willing to work their way through a good education.”

Haskin acknowledged that Marines designed vocational and academic training at Quantico to get men to serve. But he pitched the idea this way: “it is an effort to put the whole business of military service on a higher plane, and to attract to it a higher type of men.” The quality of manhood among potential applicants still very much mattered in Marine publicity. The MCI helped them appeal to that audience in post-war America.

The institute would enable the Corps to further enhance the abilities of the young men in its charge. If they had the right physical and moral qualifications to enlist, the MCI would help mold them into a man, a Marine. Making men more efficient was essential. The idea, according to one advertisement, “is not to build up a class of men merely for work while in the Marine Corps, but to really educate them so that when their terms of enlistment have expired they can go back to civil life benefited by the broad education they have received while in the service.”

One writer described the schooling for Marines as “a practical application . . . of the principle that ‘the more a man knows the better soldier he makes.’” Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, echoed this very sentiment by arguing that educating Marines at Quantico made them better, more efficient, warriors. This emphasis was important because Marines stationed at Quantico would be a part of the newly formed expeditionary brigade there which could deploy on short notice.

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114 Josephus Daniels, “Training Men for the Navy and the Nation,” The Saturday Evening Post, April 9, 1921, 83.
In April 1921, *The Saturday Evening Post* published Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniel’s “Training Men for the Navy and the Nation,” which promoted the Navy as a teaching and education institution.\textsuperscript{115} He also highlighted the kinds of skills necessary to the Navy. Manning a modern naval warship required electricians, gunners, cooks, plumbers, engineers, and mechanics, all very technical jobs. Consequently, Sailors learned trade skills they could use in civilian life once their enlistments ended. According to Daniels, “The entire educational system of the Navy is designed to train men not only for the duties they are to perform but also to fit them so far as practicable for the trade profession they may select.”\textsuperscript{116} Daniels not only aimed to bolster publicity for the Navy, but for the Marine Corps as well.

Daniels wove together a narrative for readers of *The Saturday Evening Post* that made the Marines look economical, efficient, and sensitive to the value of educating men. According to Daniels, Lejeune and Butler saved the post-war Marine Corps from low morale and injected life and purpose back into their branch. The war had taught them that providing troops stationed in France with educational opportunities after the Armistice “strengthened esprit among men and officers and had prevented deterioration of morale and physique.”\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, “when these officers began the after-war task of recreating a strong Marine Corps, they came to the conclusion that the best way to build up and maintain the morale of the Marines was to give them a chance at an education.”\textsuperscript{118} Daniels, Lejeune, and Butler envisioned the vocational schools at Quantico as means to uplift individual Marines, give officers leadership experience, and enhance recruiting.

\textsuperscript{115} Daniels, “Training Men for the Navy and the Nation,” 24. 
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 24. 
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 80. 
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 80.
Marines on recruiting duty claimed that the MCI worked well in gaining new and high-quality recruits. “The Marine Corps Institute at Quantico has, without a doubt, been the most attractive inducement offered by any branch of the service to the young men of America and it is making its influence felt very noticeably with this district,” Major Logan Feland wrote.119 By 1923, recruiters still sung the MCI’s praises. For example, advertising the educational benefits of the Marine Corps allowed them entry into events such as the Chicago Vocational and Trade Schools Exposition. Setting up recruiting booths at educational fairs like these gave recruiters more opportunities to appeal to their target audience. “Here is a chance to get off of South State Street where the recruiters pick up men who are more or less down and out, and reach a class of determined young men who have gone into this exposition for the purpose of ascertaining how they can improve their condition in life.”120

**Football and Sports**

From the Barracks down at Quantico
To the field at Baltimore.
We are here to let the doughboys know
How the Devil Dogs can score.
We will let the whole Third Army see
Just exactly what it means
To buck a line that’s guarded by
The United States Marines.121

The most ambitious plans involved turning Quantico into a college campus, albeit one where the students were Marines with military duties and training. This change would “make life at Quantico so attractive and profitable that the worst punishment which can be inflicted

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119 Logan Feland to Smedley Butler, August 25, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
120 O.C. Lightner to Major General Wendel C. Neville, March 24, 1923, Office of the Commandant, General Correspondence 1913-1938, RG 127, Entry 18, National Archives, Washington D.C.
121 H.K. “Bits O’ Mud From Quantico,” *The Leatherneck*, December 3, 1921, 5; This poem was prefaced with “The long-looked-for additional verse to the Marine Hymn has been written and all Quantico is singing it. It was written for the football game in Baltimore with the Third Army Corps Area champs and just about predicts what is going to happen.”
upon an offender against camp order and discipline will be dismissal from the service.”

The Marines’ plan to make the MCI at Quantico a military university had more than just the intellectual and moral development of men in mind.

Marines had advertised their love of sports before the Great War. But it was during the war itself, especially after the armistice, when they gained experience forming teams and playing against other services. When the armistice went into effect on November 11, 1918, no American troops went home immediately. Troops on occupation duty needed to maintain physical fitness and morale. The Army, therefore, and by extension the Marines, established football, baseball, and basketball teams and participated in boxing matches. Athletics among the allied armies became so popular immediately after the war that teams from all co-belligerent nations competed against each other in the 1919 Inter-Allied Games. By the time U.S. troops had returned from the war, the armed forces placed greater emphasis on athletics for officers and enlisted men.

Marines made athletics an important part of school planning from the very beginning. To them, athletics were as necessary as education for developing manhood and attracting recruits. By the early nineteen-twenties, Marines had been forming sports teams everywhere they were stationed. Interest in “manly sports” was common in the U.S. military before, during, and after the Great War, and what Josephus Daniels said of the Navy held equally true of all the services: “Much attention is devoted to athletics, which are necessary to keep men in prime physical condition, clean limbed, agile and mentally alert.” Baseball, football, basketball, and boxing gave Marines stationed around the globe chances to blow off steam, maintain morale, and keep

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122 Craige, “Vocational Training in the Marine Corps,” 42.
Physically fit.\footnote{125} Sports teams at Quantico, therefore, would keep morale among the Marines high as well as enhance the collegiate atmosphere that Butler, Lejeune, and other officers wanted. It would also help retain good Marines and appeal to high quality recruits. “We have always boasted that the Marine Corps is represented by the highest type of young America,” Major Joseph Fegan wrote in the \textit{Gazette}, “If we are to keep up this high standard, we must offer attractions which will appeal to this type of man.”\footnote{126}

Butler and his staff at Quantico wanted the Corps’ athletic teams to be seen by the public. “In addition to its military and educational work,” Craige wrote, “there will be a football, baseball, and track teams that will compete with the teams of other universities and colleges.”\footnote{127} It would be Quantico’s football team that would most attract Butler’s attention, because of the game’s association with college athletics. After taking a tour of the base, which involved inspecting the educational facilities and watching the Marines play a football game, Secretary Daniels wrote to Butler that “I am happy that you are securing the true college spirit . . . I had the pleasure of looking into the faces of these upstanding, ambitious and sturdy young men.”\footnote{128} Daniels was an important audience to impress, because Marines needed his support, or at the very least, his permission, to take their athletic teams on the road to play other teams. From 1920 to 1922, Smedley Butler served as the driving force behind the Marine Corps’ football team. By November 1920, he had secured a game with Johns Hopkins University.\footnote{129}

Funding proved the Quantico football team’s greatest challenge. Traveling was expensive, for example. Butler wrote his family several times complaining about the cost of rail

fares. He failed to secure tickets at a reduced rate to Baltimore to play Johns Hopkins. “These Pennsylvania Railroad fellows are a lot of damned hogs . . . the railroads can go to hell,” Butler ranted. Incensed as he was at the Pennsylvania Railroad, he did not want to come across as whining. “We are men,” he said, accepting the situation, “and are not going to cry because we can’t get what we want.”

In keeping with creating a collegiate atmosphere in Quantico, Butler set about overseeing the building of an on-base football stadium. He planned the stadium to seat 33,000 spectators. This number represented the approximate number of Marines who had died in uniform since the institution’s founding in 1775. Butler’s command originally wanted to place bronze plates inscribed with the name of one of their fallen attached to each seat. As with most things during this period, economy was key. “Not only have the men voted to build this with their own labor, but, also, to pay for it from their own funds, and it, therefore, behooves me, as the father of this family, to do it as cheaply as possible.” Marines moved around 200,000 cubic yards of soil and built the grandstands themselves. Butler procured cement from companies at a discounted price. He wrote to railroad companies to acquire more discarded steel in the form of fish plates and angle bars to finish constructing the grandstands.

He planned on pitting the Marine football teams against the best teams in America. This stadium (which would eventually be named Butler Field) would help by demonstrating the Marines’ desire to be taken seriously. “We have gone to a tremendous amount of labor, although

130 Smedley Butler to Thomas Butler, November 19, 1920, Butler Papers, MCA.
131 Smedley Butler to Eppa Hunton, Jr., President, R.R.&P. Railroad, September 21, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA.
practically no expense, in the building of huge stadium here in Quantico, and are naturally anxious to get into the best class of athletics, which means playing the very best teams,” Butler wrote. “It is very hard for an organization such as ours to break into organized athletics and it is, therefore, necessary for us to appeal to anybody we know who has influence with first-class teams.” He reasoned that Americans, particularly colleges and universities, did not care for military football teams during peace-time which made “breaking into college athletics” difficult. So, he invited teams to come play at Quantico which would “open up our stadium and introduce us to the football world.” Despite securing games with the Naval Academy, West Point, and Georgetown the first couple of years of their existence, the Quantico football team played what Butler called “second rate colleges.”

However, the Marines won enough games to attract local and regional attention. Their first big victory came in September 1922, when they defeated Georgetown University 9 to 6. This victory “established the right of the Marine team to consideration at the hands of strong college teams,” claimed a writer for *The Leatherneck.* The game attracted a large crowd in Washington D.C., including the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. The game against Georgetown was everything Marines like Butler and Lejeune wanted: it attracted a crowd, it was a spectacle, and it was a victory. Calls for the game to become an annual event rang out from spectators and players alike. During the 1923 season, the Marines beat the University of

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133 Smedley Butler to Richard Peters, Jr., April 26, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA.
134 Smedley Butler to T.L. Eyre, September 22, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA.
135 Smedley Butler to Richard Peters, Jr., April 26, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA.
Michigan and the Army’s Westpoint team in a close game. Newspapers around the country reported on the Marines’ victories and losses throughout the early nineteen-twenties.  

The Quantico football team was a source of pride for Butler because it represented the quality of manhood that made up the Marine Corps. “We have 20,000 husky males to draw on, and we should be ‘hot stuff,’” he claimed. Butler planned on pulling the best Marines from wherever he could to play on the team, whether they were stationed in the United States or overseas. Despite his insinuation that any Marine would naturally be good at the game, those with college football backgrounds manned the team for the most part. Butler boasted that nearly all the Marines on the team had been college stars, which was partially true. The Quantico team’s best players were Frank Goettge, Johnny Beckett, Walter V. Brown and Harry Liversedge, from Ohio State, Oregon, Washington State College, and the University of California respectively. “We have collected the best football men in the Marine Corps and have a squad of seventy-five of the best players in this country, and our team will be as good as any in the United States,” Butler claimed. Because of the faith he had in his Marines, Butler had his sights set on bigger schools, such as Pennsylvania State, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Maryland.  

The Quantico Marines’ football team afforded the Corps much needed positive publicity in the post-war America of the nineteen-twenties. The games put Marine athleticism before throngs of people, and their victories over Army, Michigan, Georgetown, and others earned them

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139 Smedley Butler to Richard Peters, Jr., April 26, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA.

140 Smedley Butler to Richard Peters, Jr., April 26, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA; Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, 139.

141 Smedley Butler to T.L. Eyre, September 22, 1922, Butler Papers, MCA; Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, 129-143.
respect not just as a team, but as a branch of service, as men. Football games made the Marines better acquainted with the public, and vice-versa: “it educates those who are already members to be interested in what men of their ages are doing in civil life in the way of wholesome exercise.”

“Publicity of this character cannot be purchased—it is not on the market,” Major Joseph Fegan asserted. Fegan went on to claim that athletics in general, and football in particular, encouraged *esprit de corps*, team work, and athleticism among the men. “Last, and most important,” he argued, “it develops physically the young man; it makes him a better citizen; it makes him more able to combat hardship, but does it all in a less irksome way than if it were done in a military fashion.”

Lejeune and Butler had turned Quantico into the intellectual hub of the Marine Corps, replete with vocational courses and sports teams. With big victories over notable college teams, the Quantico football team helped bring public notoriety to the Corps throughout the early twenties. Academically, however, the Marine Corps Institute would never rise to the level of Annapolis or West Point. Lack of funds and resources plagued the endeavor from the beginning. Marines often had trouble acquiring textbooks for the courses they offered, for example. It was not long before the Corps had to outsource many of its basic courses to a correspondence school that operated out of Scranton, Pennsylvania. Marines taking correspondence classes fell short of the original plans to make Quantico more like a university than a military base. But the idea that educating Marines, beyond just training them, would make them better, more efficient men, stuck with the Corps for years to come.

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143 Fegan, “Athletics as Publicity,” 16.
144 Ibid., 17.
Military training remained important. Quantico was home to the Marine Corps’ East Coast Expeditionary Force, and all students of the MCI and all the athletes of Quantico’s teams were members of this unit first and foremost. This unit would be the Marine Corps’ quick reaction force of the early 1920s and had to maintain a high level of readiness. Always with an eye towards efficiency and publicity, Lejeune and Butler concocted another ploy to gain more attention and sharpen the Quantico Marines’ expeditionary edge: reenactments of Civil War battles. The four battlefield maneuvers that the East Coast Expeditionary Force conducted from 1921-1924 brought even more public attention to the Corps.

These maneuvers were about training Marines for war. Butler argued that marching Marines around northern Virginia to conduct in-depth training exercises for a fortnight would facilitate military readiness more efficiently than six months of in-class military instruction. Butler also wanted to demonstrate that “we are able to mobilize our scattered forces and have a small, well-trained army in a few days; any army of sufficient size to make some impression in case it is needed for international police work.”146 Butler and his aides assigned the Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments opposing roles, supported in the field by modern artillery and aviation units from Quantico.147 They conducted the reenactment of the battle of the Wilderness on September 1921, where the Marines hiked through northern Virginia to reach the site. Once there, and in public view, Marines built camps, conducted air raids, fired blank anti-aircraft rounds, supported infantry maneuvers with modern 155mm artillery, and showed the public how the battle would be fought with modern weapons and tactics.

146 Smedley Butler to Thomas Butler, September 2, 1921, Butler Papers, MCA.
147 Schmidt, Maverick Marine, 134-36; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 324. Moskin, Marine Corps Story, 207. Simmons, The United States Marines, 111.
The reenactments demonstrated what the Marine Corps could do during a time when ideas about military power were changing. Marines tried to demonstrate to the public and politicians that they could operate independently and employ modern weapons effectively and efficiently. Seven months earlier, in February 1921, Army Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell demonstrated the potential effectiveness of aerial bombing against battleships in the Chesapeake. Using 1,000-pound bombs, Mitchell’s pilots sunk the *Ostfriesland*, a captured German battleship. Afterwards Mitchell publicly announced that air power, not sea power, was America’s best defense. That bold claim raised the ire of Navy and Marine Corps leaders.

Near Chancellorsville, Butler had his Marines place anti-aircraft weaponry and search lights in an array similar to that found on a battleship. The firing of these anti-aircraft guns awed spectators and demonstrated “that the battleship, with proper overhead protection, is not an obsolete weapon as General Mitchell would have the country believe.” By doing so, the Marines helped the Navy cast doubt upon any premature claims regarding air-power’s dominance.

The Wilderness maneuvers also allowed the East Coast Expeditionary Force to practice the Corps’ own developing advance base seizure and defense doctrine. By 1921, Marine officers like Lejeune, Russell, and Earl H. “Pete” Ellis, had been at the forefront of turning the Marine Corps into an efficient body of amphibious warriors who specialized in conducting landing operations necessary to a naval campaign. “Wilderness Run was considered the shore line, and

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149 Smedley Butler to Thomas Butler, September 2, 1921, Butler Papers, MCA.

all terrain to the westward was considered to be the sea,” read an official report, “the problem was entirely a naval one, and the columns [sic] that advanced from the imaginary transports and battle ships.”\textsuperscript{151} The Marines attacked positions as though they were “islands” and they “landed” on the “beachhead” using trucks as though they were boats. This training proved valuable in a limited sense by giving Marines and officers experience in the field, whether they were marching, flying planes, or driving trucks. But it would not be until the 1930s that Marine amphibious doctrine would mature significantly and not until the next world war that they would put this kind of training to actual use. The Marines’ own Publicity Bureau stated that “While such pageants afforded entertainment for large numbers of spectators and brought the attention of the public to the Marine Corps, they were of little real value in training the personnel of the force in modern warfare.”\textsuperscript{152}

The immediate significance of the Wilderness maneuvers for the Marine Corps had to do with public relations. The Marine Corps had lost some public faith during the 1919 and 1920 investigations of their Haiti and Dominican Republic occupations. Things got worse in the spring of 1921, from a public relations standpoint, when \textit{The Nation} published \textit{The Haitian Memoir} which was full of damning accusations of Marine misconduct. Conditions had improved by the fall of 1921, when President Harding, cabinet members, senators, representatives, their families, and many other spectators from the D.C. area traveled to watch the Marines’ reenactment of the Battle of the Wilderness.\textsuperscript{153} The Marine Corps’ political connections in

\textsuperscript{151} Record of Conference Held in the Office of the Major General Commandant, October 7, 1921, RG 127, General Correspondence, Recruitment 1921-1939, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.

\textsuperscript{152} Fall Exercises, 1924: Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (Publicity Bureau: Force Headquarters MCEF, 1924), 3.

Washington, no doubt, helped convince powerful government officials to attend. Thomas Butler, Smedley’s father and prominent member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, and Edwin Denby, a former Marine and newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, all had a hand in drumming up support in Washington for the Marines’ reenactments. President Harding, who had criticized the Wilson administration and the Marines during the 1920 presidential election, now sang their praises. “I shall not exaggerate a single word,” he reportedly said to the Marines, “No commander-in-chief in the world could have a greater pride in, or a greater affection for, an arm of national defense, than I have come to have for you in this more intimate contact.”

The Marines showed the public that they were still a dependable, up to date, and efficient fighting force. “The Maneuvers . . . were of the greatest value to the people who participated in them, as well as to the spectators, from a military point of view and from the fact that there was a large number of distinguished guests present, especially the President of the United States,” Lejeune claimed, “every person who was there came away with renewed confidence in the Marine Corps and with great admiration for its efficiency.” In response to the negative press the Corps had received that year from the Senate investigation hearings, one observer of the reenactment wrote to Smedley Butler that “With such a reinforced brigade, the efficiency of which has probably never been equaled in any of our peace time forces, the Navy Department may well be proud and at ease regarding affairs in Latin America and throughout the Spanish Main.”

The Wilderness maneuvers proved successful enough to allow for another major exercise the following year. In June 1922, the East Coast Expeditionary Force took a barge from

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155 Record of Conference Held in the Office of the Major General Commandant, October 7, 1921, RG 127, General Correspondence, Recruitment 1921-1939, Entry 37, National Archives, Washington D.C.
156 H.A.M., to Smedley Butler, November 1, 1921, Butler Papers, MCA.
Quantico to Washington D.C., then marched north through the verdant hills of Maryland and southern Pennsylvania to Gettysburg. It was to be “one of the greatest and most comprehensive of troops maneuvers in the History of the United States in time of peace.”\footnote{Anonymous, “Marines to ‘Hike’ to Gettysburg and Return,” \textit{The Leatherneck}, June 17, 1922, 1.} Once again, high government and military officials attended the show that lasted from June 19 to July 12. One of the most spectacular performances of the month-long exercise was the Marine aviators who flew scouting and bombing missions, aerial “gymnastics,” and stunts. The flyers even shot down an old observation balloon to the glee of spectators. Two Marine pilots died on June 26 when their plane crashed, inexplicably, while conducting maneuvers.\footnote{Anonymous, “Marine Aviators Commended for Work During Maneuvers,” \textit{The Leatherneck}, July 15, 1922; See also Richard D.L. Fulton and James Rada Jr., “The Last to Fall: The 1922 March, Battles, and Deaths of the U.S. Marines at Gettysburg,” \textit{Marine Corps History} 3, no. 1 (Summer 2017), 15.}

Marine and Naval air power made a for a big show, but what the Corps wanted to display were Marines themselves. In late September 1923, the Marines from Quantico reenacted the battle of New Market in front of an estimated 150,000 spectators with the help of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Afterwards, the Expeditionary Force traveled to Lexington, Virginia, to play a football game against VMI. By October 5, the Marines had arrived in Washington D.C. for a parade and their annual football game against Georgetown University.\footnote{Anonymous, “Present Civil War Battle,” \textit{The Leatherneck}, September 25, 1923, 6.} Training, marching, flying, camping, and fighting in front of spectators, followed by two football games, equated to a very busy month for the East Coast Expeditionary Force. These maneuvers were meant to demonstrate “the fitness of the Marine for any undertaking that might come his way and will show the benefit of intensive training that is given the Marine at Parris Island, S.C., Training Station and the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.”\footnote{Anonymous, “Marines to ‘Hike’ to Gettysburg and Return,” \textit{The Leatherneck}, June 17, 1922, 1.} After the East Coast Expeditionary
Forces’ reenactment of Antietam in 1924, the Marines’ fall maneuvers would be discontinued for a decade partially because of further cuts in the military budget.

The Marines’ East Coast Expeditionary Force conducted advanced base seizure and defense training in tandem with the U.S. fleet from December 1923 to February 1924 at Culebra, Puerto Rico. The Marines had conducted a smaller scale exercise there in the spring of 1922 and would conduct a larger joint training expedition with the Navy three years later. For many of the thousands of Marines and sailors involved at the winter 1923/1924 landings, this marked their first large-scale landing based on the nascent precepts of advanced based seizure and defense. Marine and Naval officers realized that they had much to learn with this landing, as it revealed glaring weaknesses in logistics, naval gunfire support, landing coordination, and communication. But that proved to be only the view of experts. For one reporter, it was a different experience entirely because the exercises “revealed that the marine corps is being intensively trained with all the latest devices of warfare, and that the corps is remarkably efficient.” America’s young men who served in the Corps were training hard and were becoming efficient sea-soldiers. At least that is how they were trying to look. After 1925, the Corps’ amphibious landing exercises ceased until the 1930s.

Conclusion

Marines’ efforts to make it through both post-war retrenchments and negative press associated with Hispaniola centered around persuading the public that they were beneficial to America’s manhood. Roving Marines, publicity stunts with orphans, football, and the Marine Corps Institute provided a strong counter-narrative to the atrocities and brutality of Marines in

161 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 32; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 327; Isely and Crowl, The Marines and Amphibious War, 30-31; Krulak, First to Fight, 89. Simmons, The United States Marines, 112.
Hispaniola. Marines softened their wartime image without completely taking leave of their claims of readiness. Guarding the mail, reenacting Civil War battles, and conducting amphibious landings at Culebra made the Marines look efficient and ready at a time when many Americans wanted the manhood of the nation to be more efficient.

Making the Marine Corps look like it was a man-making institution was an important part of how Marines attempted to get recruits and convince the public of their usefulness. Caught up as they were in discourses about the country needing more efficient men, Marines claimed to do that by educating and training them. Military training would make them more efficient Marines, while vocational schooling would prepare them to be efficient citizens. Marines had to persuade Americans of this as economically as possible by using resources already at their disposal. Hence the collection of recruits’ letters from boot camp, most of which claimed to make men out of the young boys who joined.

Collectively, after the Great War and during the controversy surrounding crimes in Hispaniola, Marines pitched enlistment as a transformative and wholesome experience for men. Bootcamp would graduate them from boyhood to manhood. Vocational training would sharpen their minds; military training would toughen their bodies. All the while, they would be uplifted by other Marines of good character and proven physical prowess. Marines like medal of honor winners Dan Daly and Charles Hoffman, as well as the Corps’ football stars Frank Goettge and Harry Liversedge, all demonstrated the kind of manhood the Corps offered.

Roving Marines, football games, and Civil War reenactments provided an effective public image of the Corps when they really needed it. Those activities demonstrated where the bulk of Corps’ attention was focused during Lejeune’s first term as Commandant: recruiting and PR more so than amphibious warfare doctrine. Military retrenchments necessitated this
emphasis because Lejeune had to make sure he had enough Marines to carry out the Corps’ missions at home and abroad.

Ultimately, this study reveals how important cultural notions of American manhood were to the Marine Corps at a time when recruiting and public relations were priorities. Promoting their own manliness and promising to enhance the manhood of the men who enlisted were the main efforts behind Marine public relations in the early nineteen-twenties. Writing later in his memoirs, Lejeune explained to his readers why all the publicity and public relations were important to the postwar Marine Corps. “The Marine Corps is dependent on the confidence and the affection of the American people for its maintenance and support,” he asserted.163 For Lejeune, this idea led him “to endeavor, both by precept and example, to influence officers and men to so conduct themselves as to gain and to keep the good opinion and the friendship of the Good Americans with whom they might come in contact.”164 Connecting with the American public along the lines of manhood is how the Corps attempted to do just that.

CONCLUSION

The Great War and the dual occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic had a significant impact on the Marine Corps’ public reputation and image. Their battles against the Germans in France were not important solely because they were victories. They were important because of what those triumphs meant to the Marines themselves and to society. “I had the greatest honor fighting side by side with the unconquerable Second Marine Brigade during the World War,” an anonymous author wrote, “To me the Marines represented the American people.”¹ Near the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Belleau Wood, one Marine claimed that “Recollection of those days of strife stirs all that is best in us; pride in the manhood of America, pride in the achievements our Corps, pride in possession of our noble traditions.” The pride in themselves needed channeling into determination, “determination to be men, determination to keep bright the reputation won for us.”² They tried to persuade people that they were elite warriors. But, deeper than that, they convinced themselves and many others that they were men.

Marine actions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, however, damaged the image they had cultivated during the Great War. “The Marine Corps has made a wonderful name for itself,” wrote Arthur J. Burks, a Marine recruiter. He argued that when people described Marines they used descriptions in the following order: “cream of American manhood,’ ‘he-men,’ and the

like.” But he knew that Marines did not always live up to these ideals. Dishonorable men slipped through the recruiters’ filters frequently. He wrote:

I am sure that every man who reads this has met more than one fellow in uniform of the Corps who does not belong in that uniform, nor in any uniform, since he does not know the meaning of honor or would follow its dictates if he did know. Can’t you think of many a fine chap in civvies who could fill that chap’s shoes as they should be filled? Can you see those old friends at home in the position of the accused before a General Courts-martial on any charges involving moral turpitude? It is common knowledge that more than one strapping fellow, with the physical development of Hercules—and the morals of a degenerate-slides past the recruiting officer.

Moral degenerates failed to live up to the Marines own Victorian style of manliness and the consequences could be significant. Marines such as Charles Merkel, Dorcas Williams, Ernest Lavoie, and Captain William F. Becker, accused as they all were of brutality, lack of self-control, and killing women and children, all fell short of the Corps’ moral standards. One could argue that Burks was referring to Marines such as these. They besmirched their institution’s reputation for upright manliness at a time when Marines in France won glory for themselves and their country. Therefore, the Great War era’s impact on the Corps is complicated. Their deeds in France made them heroes; their deployments to Hispaniola made them villains.

Marines came to represent American manhood in France and Hispaniola. The ones at Belleau Wood made American men look heroic and brave. To The Nation and to African American Newspapers, however, Marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic made American manhood appear degenerate and savage. Unfortunately for the peoples of Hispaniola, the Marines who committed crimes against them did not treat them any differently than some whites treated African Americans across the rural areas of the United States. White supremacy

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4 Burks, “Selling the Corps,” 114.
pervaded United States culture during the Great War era; it was very popular among America’s Marines as well.

Through peace, mobilization, war, and counterinsurgencies, Marines claimed to be good for the manhood of the nation. Boot camp turned young American boys into men. “Many men were entering the service in such a weakened physical condition that they actually appeared unfit for military service at all,” one visitor to Parris Island noted in 1923. “To my surprise, and pleasurably so, in nine weeks these uncouth fellows were erect and healthy looking specimens of American manhood.”5 Life in the Marine Corps was supposed to inject the struggle and strife that old progressives believed American men had lost by the turn of the nineteenth century. Strong and properly developed manhood prepared them for any eventuality. During the United States’ preparedness movement, Marines claimed they were prepared. During the war when the nation called upon the cream of its manhood to answer Germany’s challenge, the Marines were ready. Haitian and Dominican bandits appeared no match for the superior manhood of the Marines. After the war, Marines’ public relations and recruiting efforts fell back on masculine appeals to bolster their depleted ranks.

They made these claims during a time when Victorian notions of manhood still had broad appeal among American men. Courage, self-control, and honor were intangibles that held value among Marines and civilian subscribers to older nineteenth century ideas of manliness. Appealing to the more traditional manhood that valued production, Marines claimed to produce men and service for their nation. Through their recruiting posters and advertisements, however, they also appealed to the emerging masculine culture that valued consumption and aesthetics.

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Although only serving for a year, the femininity of women Marines made the masculinity of their comrades even more visible. Women would have to wait until the next world war before becoming a permanent part of the Marine Corps, however. Zayna Bizri has discovered that Marines’ World War II recruiting still claimed to turn youngsters into “real men.” Regarding women, however, the Corps claimed not to change them at all. Instead recruiters advertised that “they would remain ‘real women.’” Marine Corps scholarship awaits a more in-depth study of women’s impact on the Corps’ masculine culture.

As Bizri has pointed out, Marines continued to make these claims regarding manhood in the decades following the Great War. In 1930 a writer for the Leatherneck claimed that Marines made men into gentlemen. Marines had “evolved from the mere waterfront brawlers of a former day to gentlemen of the first order,” and “it has not sapped their manhood or their ability to fight in the least.” During World War II, Captain Edward B. Irving claimed that the Marine Corps had reached the “full stature of its military manhood,” and still made “Gentlemen who can fight like hell!” In 1955, First Lieutenant Walter K. Wilson claimed that a man “should be sent to boot camp with the understanding that he is not only undergoing training and toughening up, but that he is encountering a test of manhood as well and is expected to face up to it.” Once he becomes a Marine, “he should feel that he is accepted as a man and that he is capable of shouldering his responsibilities.”

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Krulak’s letter to General Pate, where he claimed “that our Corps is downright good for the manhood of our country.” In the late 1970s Marine General Robert H. Barrow wrote:

The opportunity for legitimate proving of one’s manliness is shrinking. A notable exception is the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’ reputation, richly deserved, for physical toughness, courage and demands on mind and body, attracts those who want to prove their manliness. Here too their search ends.

Manliness and masculinity would continue as parts of the Corps’ image and appeal throughout the twentieth century. However, the extent to which they pervaded Marine institutional culture in the eight decades succeeding the Great War has yet to be explored.

Given the pervasiveness of masculinity in Marine institutional culture during the Great War-era and beyond, it is disappointing that most traditional Marine historians and scholars shy away from exploring it. A gendered approach to Marine Corps history is a cultural approach which, according to some, is fraught with dangers. One such danger is reducing peoples’ actions to simple expressions of culture. Professor John Shy pointed out that cultural approaches to military history impose “questions about wartime peculiarity prematurely and too sharply,” which leads “to answers that reduce explanation to some aspect of culture.” An example of this would be if I had argued that Charles Merkel and Ernest Lavoie executed Haitian and Dominican prisoners because of their ideas on white manhood. Popular notions of manliness alone do not explain people’s actions in complex situations such as war and foreign occupations. My aim here has not been solely to explain Marine actions. Rather it has been to show how cultural understandings of manhood and masculinity were an important part of the social and military environments in which those actions took place.

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Allan Millett suggested that “The task of the historian of a military service is to develop a model of organizational structure and behavior that blends the common characteristics of all organizations and the unique attributes of a military service.” He chose a structure within which he argued the history of the Marine Corps is one of “institutional survival and adaptation” bereft of any in-depth study of masculinity. If he had taken Marine cultural understandings of manhood into consideration he would have uncovered an important part of Marine history and identity that would have fleshed out his own thesis more so. For example, I have argued that Marines constructed a masculine identity they believed made them distinct from other branches of service and civilians on one hand, but one that also conformed to many popular notions of traditional manhood on the other. It is hoped that this study reveals how the Marines’ manly image was an important component of recruiting and public relations. It was also quite flexible and could be adapted to peacetime, war, and foreign interventions.

Some authors who operate outside of academia have also missed how masculinity has historically been a key component of Marine culture. James A. Warren’s American Spartans, based mostly on secondary sources, fails to include manliness as one of the “Elements of Marine Corps Culture,” and, therefore, paints an incomplete picture of the Corps since World War II. Others are blunter about the value of gender in Marine Corps culture. Marion F. Sturkey is a prime example of this. He prefaced his work on Marine culture with the following:

Gender? There is only one kind of U.S. Marine, the lethal fighting kind. Gender? Who knows? Who cares? . . . Therefore, with respect to gender this book contains no deranged psycho-babble. Readers will find no politically correct “he or she” foolishness or “him or her” lunacy. The Male pronoun suffices for all. Any wacko liberal wimps who dislike this Warrior Culture ethos should find something else to read.

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13 Millett, Semper Fidelis, xv.
14 Warren, American Spartans, 11-33.
These dismissals of gender as a useful form of cultural analysis regarding the Marine Corps reflect a glaring gap in most Marine historians’ understanding of their own subject matter.

Steven Zeeland expounded on Marine identity even further in his book *The Masculine Marine*. “To be a Marine is to be thought a man,” Zeeland asserts, “Masculine. *Unquestionably* heterosexual.”16 He acknowledges the centrality of masculine culture among Marines in the nineteen-nineties but devotes much of the book to its ironies and contradictions. He wrote:

Marines devote attention to appearance so fastidious as to be called effeminate or narcissistic. In building up and exhibiting their hard-muscled bodies, Marines may be mistaken for gay gym queens. In striving to be “more man than a man can ever be,” they may be called drag queens.17

Explorations of sexuality in the Great War-era Marine Corps are beyond the scope of this project. The existence of homosexual Marines in World War I is highly likely. Their impact on the culture of the Marine Corps in the Great War era, or the Corps impact on them, has yet to be uncovered.

Zeeland’s book also finds that what was true of the nineteen-teens and twenties reverberated within the Corps of the nineteen-nineties: the archetypal Marine is not only masculine, he is white.18 The Corps did not open its ranks to African Americans until World War II. How black men and women have successfully navigated through this predominately white male culture throughout the twentieth century awaits further study.

The Corps is a fighting institution, but it is also a men’s institution, even until this day. Marines pride themselves on being infantry focused. “Every Marine is a rifleman” is a popular saying which means that all Marines, no matter their job in the Corps, are basically trained

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18 Ibid., 83, 93.
marksman. Until very recently, only men served in the Marine infantry. Marines’ heroes, like Presley O’Bannon, Dan Daly, Chesty Puller, Carlos Hathcock, and Bradley Kasal are all men who distinguished themselves in combat.

Women have served in the Marine Corps continuously since World War II but in relatively small numbers. While the Corps has a reputation for turning boys into men it also has one for misogyny, particularly in the infantry, which makes an unwelcoming environment for women. Opponents of gender integration of the Marine Corps infantry cite the negative impact women will have on unit cohesion, meaning infantry platoons will not work together as efficiently. A 2015 RAND Corporation study found that “gender integration is more likely to have negative consequences on unit cohesion when the social context of the unit creates a hostile work environment for women.” The hostile “social context” stems from the Corps history of being a hyper masculine institution.

Proponents of women in the Marine Corps infantry tend to argue that gender is second to one’s capabilities. Historically speaking, one had to be a man first to be a Marine, much less a fighting one. Women joining the infantry are fighting not only against a male dominated culture and misogyny, they are fighting to alter a long standing historical trend. I for one hope these women succeed and believe the Corps will be stronger when they do.

Researching manhood and Marines of the nineteen teens and twenties often reminded me of my own experiences in recruit training and the Marine Corps. My recruiters used many of the same appeals that Marines of the Great War era used. I became convinced that the Marine Corps

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would make a man out of me the way I believed it made a man out of my father, who fought in Vietnam. I believed that the Corps would make me a more responsible and respectable citizen. I cannot speak for all Marines’ and their experiences, of course. However, as a former Marine infantryman, with combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, I feel confident in saying that the Corps I knew (2002-2006) was a masculine haven that, culturally speaking, was not all that different from the life Marines of the nineteen teens knew. While together in training or on deployment we were mostly free from feminine influences. We cussed, fought, read men’s magazines, and drank too much. We also led strenuous lives that required a great deal of physical training to prepare us for war. Our minds and bodies hardened in response to our experiences and we believed ourselves to be men, young men, but men nonetheless. When we returned home to our loved ones we were expected to open doors for women and the elderly, be gentlemen and upstanding citizens.

Like our early twentieth-century predecessors, however, we were not all paragons of manly virtue. Masculine culture in the Marine Corps places value on violence, assertiveness, and physical prowess. The Corps is a war-fighting institution first and foremost and in the Western tradition war has long been a man’s game. American attitudes about gender and war have shifted. Now that women are becoming infantry Marines and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has been repealed, it may behoove the Corps and those who study it to become more knowledgeable about Marines’ cultural history. They will find that masculinity is a central component of the Corps’ history, identity, and culture, for better or worse.

They will also find that the Corps has depended historically upon the good will of the society that it serves. During the Great War era, Marines fostered that good will through ideals of manhood that they believed society valued as well. Today, Marines still promote markers of
character such as honor, courage, and commitment, but will have to continue to adapt their
appeals to the continuing changes in American culture. As in the past, Marines can represent the
best in Americans and the worst. They are very much a reflection of the society they serve.
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APPENDIX

Archival Sources

Library of Congress, Washington, DC:

Papers of John A. Lejeune

National Personnel Record Center, St. Louis, MO:

Charles F. Merkel Personnel Files
George C. Thorpe Personnel Files
Thad Taylor Personnel Files

Marine Corps Archives, Quantico, VA:

History Division, Reference Branch, Subject and Biographical Files
Personal Papers Collection

George Barnett Papers
Hiram Bearss Papers
Smedley Butler Papers
Clifton Cates Papers
Albert W. Catlin Papers
Edward A. Craig Papers
Earl Ellis Papers
Logan Feland Papers
Ben Fuller Papers
Robert Huntington Papers
Joseph Pendleton Papers
L.S. Rose Papers
John H. Russell Papers
George C. Thorpe Papers
Alexander Vandegrift Papers
Littleton Waller Jr. Papers
Paul Woyshner Papers

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC:

RG 127 Records of the United States Marine Corps
General Correspondence, 1913-1938
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Operations and Training Division, Intelligence Section 1915-1934
Expeditionary Forces and Detachments 1835-1949
RG 80 General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1789-1947
Office of the Secretary of the Navy 1804-1947

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Armed Forces Journals, Magazines and Newspapers

*The Marines’ Bulletin*
*The Marine Corps Gazette*
*The Marines’ Magazine*
*Our Navy*
*The Recruiters’ Bulletin*
*United States Naval Institute Proceedings*

Non-Military Newspapers and Magazines

*The Ada* (Oklahoma) *Evening News*
*The Anniston* (Alabama) *Star*
*The Atlantic Monthly*
*Bar Harbor Times*
*The Biloxi* (Mississippi) *Daily Herald*
*The Boston Daily Globe*
*The Boston Evening Globe*
*Bryan* (Texas) *Daily Eagle*
*The Cleveland Gazette*
*The Chicago Daily Tribune*
*Des Moines Daily News*
*The Hattiesburg* (Mississippi) *American*
*Helena* (Montana) *Independent Record*
*The Journal of Race Development*
*The Literary Digest*
Madison Wisconsin State Journal
Manitoba Free Press
Metropolitan Magazine
Montgomery (Alabama) Advertiser
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The New Republic
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The New York Times
Pan American Magazine
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The Times-Enterprise (Thomasville, GA)
The Washington Bee
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