

READING DEWEY AND FOUCAULT TOGETHER TOWARDS
A PHILOSOPHY OF DISCIPLINE AS PRODUCTION IN SCHOOLS

by

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ABSTRACT

A review of the literature of current discipline in educational settings found it littered with conceptualizations and unstated meanings, creating a confused semantic state. This state presented discipline in educational settings as vague and abstract. This confusion also contributed to its isolation from all educational processes, rendering it ineffective and stagnate. Discipline in educational settings was also found to be dated with little relevant research, and a gap was identified between theory and practice in regard to discipline in educational settings. John Dewey and Michel Foucault were read together and used as means of examining discipline in educational settings in greater detail. Both rejected current discipline as static, arbitrary and lifeless, and instead, presented a different view of discipline; one that was active, moving and changing.

Experience and Nature, by John Dewey and *Discipline and Punish* by Michel Foucault were used as foundational texts in regard to this examination of discipline in educational settings. Other texts and articles were used in relation to both theorists. While each theorist approached discipline from different angles, both shared a postmodern commonality that, melded together, produced a very different view of discipline in educational settings, revealing a new raw philosophy of discipline in educational settings.

The process of this project resulted in an active and changing approach to discipline in educational settings. Discipline is not an isolated entity separate from education. It was found to be an active part of the production of education.

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my wife and children who have sacrificed much in order to allow me to pursue this dream. I would not be who I am today without them. Thank you Sheri, Eli and Aubrey for granting me the opportunity to pursue my dream. This is yours as much as it is mine.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

My interests in discipline began as a teacher in educational settings; therefore, this project focuses on conceptualizations and unstated meanings of discipline as they inform its use and manifestations in educational settings. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), discipline has been an issue of concern for a long period of time. The NCES website, a component of the United States Department of Education, identified discipline as a variable of concern on all of its data regarding educational issues. However, the latest in-depth statistical report with a clear focus on student discipline published by the United States Department of Education (DOE) was a report entitled, “Violence and Discipline Problems in the United States Public Schools,” covering the years 1996 and 1997. This was the most current report offered by the DOE website to date, which presents a new issue in regard to relevancy.

According to the website, *Public Agenda* (2004), 93% of teachers in the public school system believe it is the school’s job to teach students to follow rules. *Public Agenda* (2004) also reported that 97% of teachers agree that good discipline and behavior are prerequisites for a successful school, and 55% of teachers support the belief that when school districts back down to assertive parents, it causes more discipline problems than it solves. Yet this same website reported that 78% of parents believe that schools need good discipline and behavior to be successful, which indicated a dilemma in regard to the conceptualization of discipline. Discipline, no matter the stakeholder group, is perceived as an important and necessary part of education.

The point here is twofold. First, it is simply to suggest that “discipline” is a perennial concern in education. Second, we begin to reveal in such reports the unstated meanings and conceptualizations attached to the idea of discipline, its meaning and its purpose. The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to work toward a philosophy of discipline in education. In the next chapter, I provide a deeper analysis of the reports mentioned above, as well as other publications dealing with discipline, to draw out the “received” understandings of discipline. How is discipline conceptualized, implicitly or explicitly, in the literature? What are the purposes of discipline? How does it manifest? These three basic questions drive my analysis for comparative purposes. Having fleshed out the perceived understanding of discipline in Chapter 2, I turn to a discussion of two different understandings of discipline: that of John Dewey (Chapter 3) and of Michele Foucault (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, I provide a discussion of how these particular understandings of discipline inform and complicate received notions. I conclude with my statement toward a philosophy of discipline.

I begin this project with the underlying assumption that education generally is a process; more specifically, I agree with Smith (2015), that education is or should be a process of “inviting truth and possibility, of encouraging and giving time to discovery.” This should not, Smith suggests, be confused with “schooling.” Education is a social process analogous to living itself. Schooling, on the other hand, is something that is not living but mechanical. In this way, we might consider that education is a process or idea that acts **with** people, whereas schooling is that which acts **on** people. Such a distinction points to very different conceptualizations of discipline, its role in the classroom, and its relationship to learning. There are then, of course, myriad concomitant implications for pedagogy. If education, as a process, is one that acts in accord with students, then the discipline that is part of that process should not counter the fundamental

orientation of the processes. Smith referenced the Greek notion of “*educere*” which presented an ethos suggesting a “bringing out” of sorts or the development of individual potential. It is “the wise, hopeful and respectful cultivation of learning undertaken on the belief that all should have the chance to share in life” (p.1). In this sense, education is or should be oriented to act in accord with students’ interests and “insatiable desires” and teachers’ professional disposition towards such “respectful cultivation.” Even in such an ideal understanding of education as a process with students, some form or conceptualization or understanding of discipline is entailed in the process. Thus, the question is not whether discipline is or should be a part of the educational process but a number of other questions such as how, by what understanding, and towards what end? As Skiba & Losen (2016) observed, “We stand today in the middle of an important debate on the role, function and practice of school discipline” (p.4). Since most discipline strategies are aiming at defusing conflict and reducing potential discipline issues, according to Skiba & Losen, the debate speaks to the question just raised. Notice that there is an understanding of discipline as external and toward the end of behavior management.

Certainly discipline understood and deployed in this way can be argued to be important to learning. Education has always been about inculcation and the instilling of certain truths and behaviors adults deemed as important. Here we see the distinction between education and schooling becoming more blurred, but either way, schools have always helped to define who children are. The process of education found in schools in the past and today, according to Gray (2013), has changed little. Gray asserted that the educational process was an extension of the kind of labor children used to do before the existence of schools. Control and intentionality, i.e. discipline, while not the focus of Gray’s theory, are prominent in his historical accounts of education.

Smith (2015), in his article, never once mentioned or referenced the term, “discipline,” but he does invoke concepts like “acting in hope” and “being respectful,” which create something akin to the ethos Gray suggested. Smith wrote regarding respect, “The process of education flows from a basic orientation of respect – respect for truth, others and themselves, and the world” (p.3). While these could mean many things to many different people, the general ideas behind “acting in hope” and “being respectful” begin with a focus that is “deliberately” and “purposely” other-oriented and relational. Skiba & Losen (2016) referenced this aspect as well when they wrote, “As the evidence of what does work has grown, strategies, emphasizing relationship building, social – emotional learning, and structural change; have emerged as promising paths to a comprehensive approach to developing positive school climates” (p.11). Each idea presented by Skiba & Losen reference, albeit subtly, a balanced idea of intentionality and control. But now I have begun the work I intended in Chapter 2.

The Origin of Discipline, its Semantics and Etymology

Before moving on, it is instructive to consider some basic, general definitions of discipline as well as the etymology of the term, for these things set some basic coordinates to understanding discipline, especially as concerns what I have referred to as “received” understandings. I begin with a very general definition found in most common dictionaries. Defined, “discipline” refers to, “control that is gained by requiring that rules or orders be obeyed and by punishing bad behavior: a way of behaving that shows a willingness to obey rules: behavior that is judged by how well it follows a set of rules or orders” (“discipline”, 2014). This definition was supported by various other dictionaries and websites, specifically *Dictionary.com*, which confirmed this current general idea of discipline. Other ideas were also communicated regarding this idea and the sub-ideas associated with it: training, obedience, self-control and

orderliness (“discipline”, 2014). The idea of punishment was also found in these current definitions and concepts associated with current thoughts on discipline as well.

There are some key ideas that are expressed in these definitions that warrant deeper examination in order to begin to reveal what seem to be basic assumptions regarding understandings of discipline and, therefore, our approach to its use. Using these words as starting points, I examined them, their definitions and their synonyms in order to determine the key ideas found inside the word, “discipline,” concurrently. Behavior, particularly the control of behavior, was a general theme found in most current definitions concerning discipline. The control of behavior was referenced, at times, as control of individual behavior while in other instances, it was referenced as control of collective behavior, but it was clear; current semantics associated with the word, “discipline,” in educational situations, was a reference to the control of behavior. The noun version of this word presented three main ideas, and all of them focused on the control of behavior. From “control that is gained” to “a way of behaving” to “behavior” itself, all have clear ties to behavior that was external and outside of the individual with a focus on the control of that individual’s behavior from an external point of reference.

In support of this general idea regarding the external control of behavior, the verb version of this word embeds these thoughts and ideas even deeper by emphasizing the means of arriving at the control of external behavior. The idea of punishment was found in the verb form of the word. Punishment is nothing more than a means of external control of behavior through consequences of actions. Often it is used in the process of operant conditioning to decrease certain behaviors. These ideas of external control become more apparent in an examination of synonyms associated with the verb form of “discipline;” synonyms included but not limited to

the word are: “control, restraint, practice, education, method, drill, conduct and orderliness” (“discipline”, 2014). Each word is a reference to an external means of controlling behavior.

In an examination of related words to the verb form of “discipline,” an interesting trend was discovered. Words such as breed, raise, castigate, censure and chasten appear in relation to the verb form while the word, “code,” appears in regard to the noun version of the word. A clear theme emerged; a focus on external behavior and the control of that behavior was clearly present, as referenced earlier. This trend suggested that the earlier the reference the deeper the reference was rooted in this extreme control of external behavior. The related words explored earlier are words that control behavior with, in most cases, extreme or painful consequences for the lack of controlled behavior.

The Etymology Online Dictionary (EOD) was a resource I used to examine the history of the semantics of the word, “discipline.” An examination of the EOD revealed an origin that was different from the current ideas associated with this word. According to the EOD, the semantics of “discipline” began as “an order necessary for instruction,” associated with instruction that is educational. This concept was presented as an internal trait to be honed and nurtured by an individual, by way of a process of instruction (“discipline,” 2014). This older concept attached to the word, “discipline,” was rooted in ideas of self-control more than ideas of the external control of behavior. Control associated with discipline was, in many cases, associated with instruction. Discipline was perceived as an internal trait to be nurtured in the young so it would manifest as self-control in adulthood. By these definitions, it is understood that discipline is about control, the control of behavior either as internal self-control or the external control of behavior. Origins of the word were associated with instruction and education early, but over time conceptualizations of discipline expanded away from education, branching out well beyond

education into general culture. Such notions continue to inform and build received understandings of discipline. Again, my focus is on understanding discipline in educational settings, its uses, purposes and manifestations in schools.

“Of course,” such understandings have, of course, ancient roots. We can consider, for example, the extent to which discipline was an integral part of the Spartan educational system, the goal of which was to produce men who were physically fit and psychologically self-controlled (Panthee, 2010). Similarly, we might consider the extent to which related terms such as “training” and “molding” were used in Plato’s educational ideals, or the use of the myth of metals to induce a self-discipline necessary for order in the city-state referenced by Plato (Rouse, 1984). Further, we see back and forth shifts in discipline as inner and outer, penitential or caring (Adler and Hutchins, 1952) and the implementation of minute and diffuse micro-practices of rules, duties and punishments. Perhaps in a foreshadowing of Foucault, such micro-practices included, for example, in the Lancasterian system, detailed spatial organizations (Newman, 1998).

The Methodology of the Project

Discipline and its Epistemic Value. This project is a conceptual analysis, which by its nature, seeks to increase understanding of a concept’s usage by deduction, at least in the first instance, of the complexity surrounding its fundamental understanding (Harper, 2012). I will seek to unravel the many connotations wrapped around the concept of discipline through this process of conceptual analysis. Harper proposed that the process of conceptual analysis is “epistemically valuable in an interesting oblique sense” (p.243). While I acknowledge an “oblique sense” to ideas associated with discipline in education, I also want to acknowledge that there is epistemic value attached to discipline, especially as a component of the educational

process. Harper defined three different epistemic values that a process like a conceptual analysis can identify, and each have redeeming qualities vital to this conceptual analysis of discipline.

Harper (2012) posited that, first, there is a *fundamental* epistemic value. Harper (2012) wrote regarding fundamental epistemic values, “These are our epistemic goals; nowadays we are mostly interested in states of knowledge, justified beliefs, or some form of apt belief” (p.244). Harper referenced that these need not be intrinsically valued; they are often pragmatically valued in a singular method with no consistent connection of any kind. Regarding to discipline, there is a fundamental epistemic value attached to it because of its status. Teachers value it because it works in keeping students in control. Parents value it because of the control it exercises over their children. Any educator and all of them will tell you how important discipline is. Yet, as the definitions above have begun to reveal, the ideals and practices that the item itself – smuggles – in its historical development must be revealed and problematized, for it is there that the debate surfaces. Again, the question is not whether to discipline, but how and to what end. Is it the cruelty of the classrooms of the Puritans (Petry, 2008; Bushman, 1967) or, even later, puritanical classrooms of the mid-1800s (Kaestle, 1978)? Or, should it reflect Horace Mann’s skepticism of the older order of punishment?

This raises the second value which is the *process* epistemic value. This was, for Harper (2012), a belief formation taking place inside the subject, as one deduces from evidence. Harper included generalizations that led to deep-seated beliefs by default. His example was malicious murder. When we come across an instance of malicious murder, we form, by default, an automated belief that this is wrong regardless of the circumstances. If we hear of murder, in the general sense of the word, our thoughts are almost always associated with the negative. However, if we hear the word in conjunction with other terms like battle or self-defense, we are

slower to move toward the negative. We find this same generalization in discipline as well, which leads to a default position and the labeling of students as good or problematic. Those with the label, “problematic,” will have disciplinary issues which will become two things: evidence in support of their problematic label and/or in prediction of their future problematic issues. Both contribute to current views of discipline.

And finally, the third value, according to Harper (2012), was *criterion* epistemic value. This value, for Harper, pertained to the criteria that guided our beliefs in the determination of value. Harper (2012) wrote regarding criterion epistemic value, “A criterion is judged by how much it helps us to choose the correct processes and maximize our stock of fundamental epistemic value” (p. 245). Harper acknowledges that criteria are especially helpful in domains where it is not always clear whether value has been obtained or not; discipline certainly qualifies as one of these domains. In some instances, the discipline of the school clearly helps the teacher control and teach, but in other instances, the discipline does nothing to help in any area. Each adds or subtracts value according to the results generated and tends to influence our future thoughts and views of the subject of discipline. All three values provide assurances for the selection of the methodology while providing a filter of guidance forward.

Methodology of the Study

A Conceptual Analysis. The idea of discipline, for me, is one that lives inside a paradox. In one sense, everyone understands, in some way, the idea of discipline, but then in another sense, very few share the same understanding because of the communal speculation of agreement regarding that understanding. The idea of discipline tends to mean different things to different people and different cultures. For example, even as we may or may not know their particular “philosophy” of discipline, mention the word to any coach and most will respond positively.

Discipline is welcomed and needed for success. One can find the same response from military personnel, public service personnel and health and fitness personnel. But, if one mentions the word to educators, parents or students in relation to the school setting, the response is often different. Initial responses tend to be negative to the extent that the term invokes frequently related consequences such as detention and expulsion. This said, if a conversation takes place and the idea of discipline is explained from the perspective of discipline as self-control, responses are inevitably positive. Of course, one philosophical concern here involves teasing out what is likely a false binary of internal/external.

With this understanding in mind, this project will follow a conceptual analysis framework. As previously mentioned my argument will unfold as follows: In Chapter two, I provide a review of current literature on discipline. This will include both empirical and philosophical/theoretical work. Literature chosen for the review had to meet three criteria: it had to be about discipline as marked by control and intentionality, it had to reference discipline in an educational setting, and it had to examine literature rooted in the educational ideas of classroom management, teaching and learning, and teacher education.

In chapters three and four, I will provide an overview and analysis of two very different conceptualizations of discipline. In chapter three, discipline will be explored through the progressive ideas of John Dewey. Dewey's ideas regarding education will highlight discipline as applied in a very progressive holistic way in an educational setting. While Dewey's ideas were many, covering a wide spectrum of areas, he was consistent throughout his thinking, especially in respect to discipline. In chapter four, I will provide another overview and analysis of discipline through the work of Michel Foucault. Drawing primarily on his *Discipline and Punishment*, I explore Foucault's notion of power as it relates to discipline.

Regarding terms and phrases, four will be prominent throughout this study and important to this study. Therefore, defining each before moving forward is important to the understanding of the entire project. The first is the phrase, “unstated meanings.” The phrase, “unstated meanings,” refers to that which is assumed as discipline or seemingly synonymous with discipline consistently but does not actually have any meaning associated with discipline. All “unstated meanings” impact discipline, but the danger of “unstated meanings” are that they become attached to the ideas of discipline. The second is the word, “conceptualization.” Conceptualization is the formation of the idea of something as it is perceived and thought about in interaction with culture and others. My reference to the conceptualizations of discipline will be references to how it is found in thought and perceived in conversation, research and theory. It is a reference to current reality regarding discipline. The third word is, “ideology.” A reference to ideology is a reference to the current system of ideas and ideals that collectively compose the semantics of discipline as understood currently in culture. The difference between conceptualization and ideology, for me, is one of time. Conceptualizations are ongoing formations and always in motion while an ideology is the most popular and practiced definition in place. Ideology will be a reference to what is static and concrete while conceptualizations will be a reference to the fluidity of change in reference to the associated perceptions of the formations of meaning. The fourth term is, “domain.” Domain refers to a dominant environment that contains discipline in such a way that it becomes commonly associated with discipline even though it is not part of its semantic ideology. All four terms will be used consistently throughout this study.

Harper (2012) posited that while conceptual analysis, as a process, will produce, in most instances, epistemically valuable hypotheses, it is still an epistemically valuable process even if

void of a product of hypothesis. Harper (2012) wrote, “Conceptual analysis is a coarser grained process that gives rise to finer grained epistemically valuable processes” (p. 247). That is my overarching goal in this project... to produce a finer grained understanding of the conceptualizations of discipline in an educational setting toward the development of a philosophy of discipline.

CHAPTER 2

A LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of literature will support two earlier general points presented in the introduction of this project: that discipline is a perennial concern in education, and that this concern positions discipline to allow many unstated meanings and conceptualizations to become attached to discipline. These unstated meanings and conceptualizations become attached to discipline and become part of the ideology of discipline, contributing to its current state which will be revealed in this work.

As I work my way towards a general philosophy of discipline in education, I begin that work with a literature review in search of trends and themes of conceptualizations and unstated meanings, revealing answers to the three important questions driving this study: how is discipline conceptualized in literature? What is the purpose of discipline? How does it manifest? Discipline is a concept found both inside and outside education, but for my purposes and subsequent study, discipline is strictly confined to the discipline found in educational settings, which presents the first of several obstacles to overcome: what do I mean by education? Due to the nature of this study, this question must be answered first in order to move forward. As I define education, I begin by addressing the older and more ingrained attached idea to discipline: the educative domain.

The Educative Domain of Discipline

The domain associated with discipline in this study is educative. As a domain of discipline, it is the most influential and the most impacting. Even though the domain is assumed,

due to the nature of this project, the assumption offers no information regarding the nature of discipline or its semantics as a product. The natural progression of linear thought leads to defining general education first in order to reference its influence in lieu of those conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached to discipline. There are a multitude of ways to look at general education, but I believe all literature regarding anything educational begins with a basic assumption rooted in socialization.

In the Introduction to this review, Smith (2015) highlighted the first paradox regarding education: as a process, is it one that acts with people or on people? Smith referenced this paradox of the social nature of education versus the mechanical nature of schooling. What began as one paradox turned into an introduction to the paradoxical nature regarding the semantics of education. Meyer (1977) provided a deeper deconstruction of semantical assumptions of education from social perspectives that is helpful, especially in regard to establishing and understanding the educative domain in which discipline lives. Meyer (1977) wrote regarding initially commonly-held ideas of education, “They [schools] are organized networks of socializing experiences which prepare individuals to act in society” (p. 55). Meyer’s focal point was to present education as more of an allocation than an education, but for my purposes, his research regarding the social aspects of education is helpful in understand the domain of education in which discipline operates. Meyer suggested a different perspective regarding education: one with a view of education as an allocating institution instead of an educating body, changing the perception of education and creating a more perilous position for discipline, especially in conjunction with Smith’s ideas regarding education and schooling.

Meyer (1977) saw education through the lens of socialization, calling it “an organized set of socializing experiences;” he saw education as that which powerfully allocated adult roles

according to years of education and types of schools. These two aspects suggested that ideas of allocation actually reign over all other aspects of education. This was a helpful perspective, and a consistent paradox found in the literature moving forward. Meyer (1977) wrote regarding this thought, “Education is thus more a selector, sorter and allocator than it is a socializer” (p. 59). Meyer claimed that the contrast between education seen as socialization, and as a social process, and one seen as allocation, and as a status of competition, had hidden the fact that both are inconsistent as they would appear. Education in current ideologies is associated with elitism and has ties to certain schools and colleges. In this way, education is assumed to possess both the practicality of high quality instruction as well as the pedigree of a school name.

Meyer presented a strong case that current education was actually more about the allocation of students as graduates than it was about the education of children, which presented an interesting perspective regarding education as a dominant domain of discipline. Meyer’s ideas suggested that the ideas of Smith (2015) concerning schooling were now the dominant factor in regard to educational process. Meyer (1977) wrote, “Educational allocation rules create a situation in which schooling is a fixed capital asset in the career of the individual, more durable than work or income, more stable than family life and relations and less subject to market fluctuations than ‘real’ property” (p.62). The general implication here was that education, whatever its conceptualizations are, was a better predictor of future success than any other elements combined, which created confusion inside the idea of education. This confusion allowed for ideas to move from fixed to fluid. What Meyer was positing was an idea of education as an institution of allocation, which has real and significant implications regarding discipline in educational settings, especially in light of the ideas of Smith (2015) regarding the battle between education that was social and education that was mechanical.

Meyer (1977) first asserted that education, as an institution of allocation, was built into the rules and understandings that guided allocation processes in general society. These processes range from the collective, in vocation, to the personal choices of individuals. All are impacted, according to Meyer, by an educational process perceived as an institution of allocation and not one rooted in socialization. Education, from this perspective, according to Meyer built rules, into society, which are hyper-pragmatic with a focus on allocation; these rules tend to be created to position one to become a member of the institution because of its allocation reputation. Once the rules become effective in achieving the desired results they become a natural and dominant part of decision making whether collective or individual. Meyers (1977) referenced two aspects of educational systems that support his suggestion: schools are extensions of classifications that categorize adult population by level and specialty, and schools are all institutionalized, state-controlled and used to enforce daily life in accord with the vision promoted by the state. The clean and smooth idea of education was now rough and bumpy, creating plenty of points of attachment for unstated meanings and conceptualizations of discipline and other ideas. Both Meyer (1977) and Smith (2015) referenced evidence for the paradoxical nature of the educative domain, and it is this paradoxical nature that provides a breeding ground for conceptualizations and unstated meanings to live.

Dewey (1904) provides an added consideration in regard to this paradox nature. He considered, in an article, the relation of theory to practice in education, attempting to bridge the gap of the two for the betterment of education as a whole. In his attempt to bridge that gap, I believe he advertently created a broader and deeper gap which, in the paradoxical landscape of education, provides even more fuel to breed conceptualizations and unstated meanings. To fully understand the domain of education in which discipline currently rests, Dewey's bridge must be

examined in the context of understanding education from the perspective of Meyer (1977) and Smith (2015).

Dewey acknowledged the difficulty in defining the proper relationship between theory and practice in his opening statement of the article. Dewey (1904) wrote regarding the two, “Two controlling purposes may be entertained so different from each other as radically to alter the amount, conditions and method of practice work” (p.1). Dewey has highlighted the vulnerability of the ideology of discipline inside the paradoxical domain of education. He acknowledged a shift towards more training for students to be proficient in a practical skill and less in the areas of thinking skills, highlighting quite clearly the paradox both Meyer and Smith referenced. This shift produced two problems for Dewey: first, this shift towards training moved the student into the educational equation, which presented an issue with a process that was more mechanical than living. The shift also exposed the issue of time, adding a living thing to a mechanical process; time, as schools quickly discovered, was absorbed differently by the living than it was by the mechanical. Once students were deemed to need more training, the school day was discovered to be too short to accommodate anything additional. The issue became a math problem: do we add more time to the day or use the time we have in a better way? The answer was to better use the time given, an answer rooted in the mechanical more than the social. Butchart (1995), later in this review, referenced some of the more popular methods of re-orienting both. Corporal punishment, Lancasterian Discipline and Canter’s Assertive Discipline are just a few examples of the push towards becoming more efficient in classroom control in order to maximize the current school day.

Dewey (1904) recognized that this shift also revealed two issues in education that had been assumed positively: teacher proficiency and student control. Both were deemed as solutions

to the problem of time and space. A better trained teacher coupled with a more controlled class would maximize the time allotted for the school day, allowing the additional time and space for needed future changes. Teachers were trained with expectations that each would become masters in both subject-matter and educational techniques, including classroom management. Dewey recognized the immediate issue, “This does not mean that the two problems are in any way isolated or independent” (p. 7). Dewey referenced both as “strictly correlative” in relationship, but the mere reference of both in separate thoughts created an immediate gap, separating discipline from all other educational aspects. It was subtle and not intentional, but discipline became isolated from education because, in accord with Meyer (1977) and Smith (2015), discipline was seen as the answer to problems that were mechanical. While the rest of education stayed generally social, discipline, (i.e., classroom management), took on tendencies that were more oriented towards schooling as referenced by Smith and allocation as referenced by Meyer, creating a paradox of ambiguity inside the domain of education. This paradoxical state of the educational domain in which discipline finds its home prepared the perfect breeding ground for unstated meanings and conceptualizations.

The Conceptualization of Safety Associated with Discipline in Educational Settings:

In my review of literature associated with discipline, the conceptualization of safety was found attached to the majority of literature; discipline and its relationship to safety is a concern for the general public and it is a concern for the government. Both examine discipline and address discipline through this conceptualization of safety. When asked to consider discipline in educational settings, both the government and the general public default to the conceptualization of safety as an important element of discipline for one simple reason: discipline to them equals

student safety. An examination of government statistics and survey results of the general public will confirm this conceptualization's reality in regard to discipline.

The Department of Education (DOE) examined various aspects of discipline again in the 2013-2014 academic year and found issues like bullying and harassment still present. Discipline involving bullying occurred at least once a month for 31% of all public schools, with verbal abuse occurring in 10% of all public schools and disrespect in 18% of all public schools. Regarding violent annual incidents, 65% of all public schools reported serious incidents of violence in their schools, with 13% of all schools reporting multiple serious violent incidents. Clearly misbehavior is an issue of concern in our schools, and it is an issue of concern for schools and the general public. The DOE's last major in-depth report on discipline, as reference earlier in this document, dates back to the 1996-1997 academic year. The DOE refers to National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) in regard to all its data analysis. In an examination of the NCES 2013-2014 report, the majority of the report covered policies, procedures, programs and positions added in years following the 1996-1997 report in response to the issues raised in that report. The latest report referenced issues like the presence of resource police officers in schools, the number of drills completed and the amount of staff training conducted, but there was precious little actual data regarding current discipline statistics. The presence of websites like Public Agenda, Students Against Violence Everywhere (SAVE) and TeachSafeSchools.org speak to the issue of student misbehavior in schools, and the continued concern regarding discipline and the conceptualization of safety attached to the idea of discipline in an educational setting.

These groups and websites were created to fill what is perceived to be a gap in our educational system regarding safety, and each is clearly operating with a clear understanding of

safety as an understood conceptualization of discipline. A visit to the Teach Safe School website introduces its mission: ... to assist school personnel in the development of a supportive, safe and inviting learning environment where students can thrive and be successful. SAVE is another student-driven response to the concern of misbehavior and violence in our schools. The SAVE website defines itself as “a unique and powerful approach to youth safety.” One can find SAVE chapters in more and more schools around the country. The issue of school discipline has not gone away or become any less of a concern; it is still a valid safety concern for educators, the general public and students, indicating that the discipline we use in our schools matters greatly to everyone involved. The conceptualization of safety associated with discipline by these organizations and other contributes to the pliable nature of discipline. Safety is and has been for many years a conceptualization associated with discipline. Its association has created a breeding ground for other conceptualizations. An examination of current discipline policies in schools across the country supports the assertion that the theme of safety is an ingrained conceptualization of current thinking on discipline.

Again, schools in California, specifically in San Diego, again, support the conceptualization of safety associated with discipline. The vision of one school district actually states the obvious: discipline is “critical in maintaining a safe environment” in schools, but then offers no real concrete policy in support of the stated vision. What is offered are vague consequences that leave plenty of room for interpretation and extrapolation. Informal consequences offered range from one-on-one counseling with the teacher to counseling with the administrative team. More formal consequences range from “some” out-of-school suspensions to “some” expulsions, but there is no consistent concrete consequence assigned to any specific student action, and all formal disciplinary consequences must be approved by the Board of

Education. There is nothing of substance offered and many policies read as suggestions in regard to what could happen in these situation. An examination of other California public schools follows the same pattern: the overall purpose is safety-related, but there is no real policy, but only vague language and lots of room for interpretation and extrapolation.

A move east to Utah offers little change. The vision of many school districts is again rooted in providing a *safe* positive school environment. Several school districts in Utah, but not all, root their discipline systems in prohibitive policies. There was a clear difference in the language of the policy compared the policy in California. Several policies were structured in ways that clearly stated what will *not* be done in a school setting and the resulting consequences for violating those policies. Many policies began with an absolute “you will be removed” from a school setting if you do these things. These were all criminal acts such as physical altercations, drug possession and theft. The policies quickly moved to a less than absolute “you may be removed” from school for these issues, such as willful disobedience, defying authority, disruptive behavior, foul profane language, truancy and theft. Again, for a student to be expelled from school the Board of Education would be required to approve this action. Surveying school systems in the west revealed an array of discipline systems with policies ranging from weak and vague to pragmatic, all with the goal of creating a safe environment.

The state of New Mexico offered a discipline policy that was vastly different than those found in California and Utah. Again, the theme of safety was prominent in the policy, but there were also other minor themes, all punitive in nature, presenting a conceptualization rooted clearly in punishment. One school district built their discipline policy on a scale that increased the consequences each time a student engaged the system. This seemed to be very antiquated and was very rare. It was the only example found in my search. Consequences began with parent

contact and moved to lunch detentions. For example, in this system if a student incurs four tardies that student must serve three lunch detentions. As the student incurs more tardies, the number of lunch detentions increase. Minor behavior offenses in this district result in lunch detentions as well. The first minor offense results in 3 lunch detentions. The entire discipline system is built in this manner. The rules for lunch detention are spelled out and published on the website for everyone to see. The entire discipline system is concrete and clear. There is no room for grace or space to move. This system leaves no doubt to the consequences for each discipline infraction. Everything is covered in great detail. The presentation was clear, organized and positive, implying that this school district already had a safe positive environment and wanted to continue to sustain it.

Moving east to the Atlantic coast, discipline is addressed in similar but different ways. A school district in New Jersey published their discipline plan in a 122-page booklet authorized by the superintendent and the forty plus discipline committee members that put the plan together. The mission and vision was layered and multi-dimensional, but inside those layers was again the theme of safety. However, this theme of safety was dualistic in nature. The discipline system was designed to create a safe environment for the students and to keep the school safe from any threat of litigation that could jeopardize its future. A reading of this book revealed a legal orientation as every policy and procedure was referenced to a law code in the state of New Jersey. Each section was carefully crafted stating expectations, policies and conduct in a positive manner. In the Code of Conduct section, each section began with the words, “students shall,” and then followed with words like conform, respect, obey, report and review. In the Parent/Guardian sections, parents and guardians were “responsible” for reviewing the student code of conduct and then signing it. There was a section for administration and staff, and each was expected to review, arrange,

conduct and communicate in certain ways. Each aspect of the discipline system was covered in great detail and rooted deeply in the laws and codes of the state so as to protect the students and the school district. School systems in Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York also had similar legal focuses to their discipline systems as well. After examining several, the same thick discipline system was found with a dualistic safety theme, focused both on creating a safe student environment while keeping the school safe from liturgical threats.

Moving back down the Atlantic coast to Georgia, many school districts, specifically those in Atlanta, offer a similar pragmatic approach to the one found in New Mexico. Discipline procedures were carefully crafted and all students, teachers and administration were expected to follow them religiously for multiple purposes, safety being one of them. The discipline system reads as an instruction manual, written in ways that every teacher, from the novice to the experienced, will understand the consequences that are to be handed down to students who violate the discipline system. For example, the first infraction was written to make it clear that the consequence was only to be teacher interaction. Teacher interaction was then defined in great detail with multiple examples given, specifying what teacher interaction should be. The second infraction resulted in a teacher/student conference; the third resulted in a team conference, and the consequences continue to escalate from there. There is also a legal orientation associated with this discipline system, but it is not as blatant nor as obvious as those in the northeast, but the unstated meaning of safety was clearly part of the conceptualization of discipline.

Moving back to a more rural part of our country, Colorado and Idaho offer another glimpse of discipline from a different perspective. One school district in Colorado approached discipline with a vision. At the beginning of their discipline policy, the district stated clearly their vision for discipline and then, as best as I could tell, allowed that vision to drive the values,

beliefs and goals of the school district regarding discipline. These were stated as clear statements that then manifested as student rights, student responsibilities and a code of conduct, all stated positively and, all with the student in mind. The discipline policies were simple and clear, written and backed by the vision of the school district, which actually provided reasons for discipline and their discipline policies. Safety was a theme, but it was not nearly as pronounced as in the other schools and districts. In the code of conduct, verbs associated with the phrase, “students shall,” were act, accept, follow, refrain, maintain, report and engage. The manner in which they were stated was a balanced approach to educating parents and students to the multi-faceted nature of discipline: the positives and negatives of discipline.

The Department of Education(DOE) and the general public have consistently assumed discipline and safety to be the same thing. The compiled statistics of the DOE, survey results and the visited websites all consistently reference discipline and safety as being the same. In summarizing discipline policies found around the country in school districts, three issues stand out to me regarding the conceptualization of safety. First, the policies differ greatly according to geographic location, and this, I feel, is more a reflection of culture than anything else. What stood out was that the discipline location reflected the important safety issues of the culture in what location. Beyond maintaining safety, discipline was clearly being used as an external tool to control students, to preempt and manage misbehavior and to provide signals to guide them through the current issues of the local culture for the overall safety of all students. Second, discipline, for all of these school districts but one, was a reaction to safety issues of the past regarding the school or in general culture. The Colorado school district was the lone exception: offering a discipline system with a proactive vision, but even with that vision, the discipline system was still a response and an attempt to control students for their safety. Each discipline

system was designed to communicate how students should act inside the respective district's schools. There were no other explicit goals or motives associated with these discipline systems. And, third issue was ambiguity. As I read through these policies, I was never confronted with the nature of discipline or a belief in what discipline was. Discipline in each system, including Colorado, seems to be something external to education itself. Many discipline systems read like a safety instruction manual, with clearly stated steps to follow. There were certain conceptualizations associated with each system, but as far as purpose, there were none stated. The Colorado school district clearly had a vision, but in the end, the vision was safety, student control and communication of acceptable behavior. Regarding manifestations of discipline, each school district clearly used it as a means to an end. Some incorporated their faculty and staff into the system along with students, but all systems presented discipline as the manifestation of control for the safety of all students.

Regarding literature, Gregory, Cornell, Fan, Sheras, Shih & Huang (2010), in their review of Authoritative School Discipline, link safety to discipline when they reference the wide disparity of high school discipline practices and the lack of research in the characteristics of safe schools. Gregory et al. (2010) indicate that school safety was not confined to a few troubled schools, but instead it is wide spread to all schools. The authors spend multiple pages identifying safety problems in schools, problems ranging from bullying and fighting to student misbehavior are all indicative of the issue of unsafe schools. The study extends the concepts of authoritative parenting into the classroom under the guise of discipline. The issue is not the manner of discipline but the conceptualization of safety associated with the idea of discipline. Gregory et al. reference that students need structure and support similar to what they would receive in an authoritative parenting environment. Gregory et al. (2010) wrote, "Authoritative discipline

theory offers a promising framework to examine the conditions that are associated with school safety” (p. 485). The article examines discipline through the conceptualization of safety as if discipline is defined by school safety.

Sprague, Walker, Golly, White, Myers & Shannon (2000) presented a study designed to describe the effects of a universal intervention package [school discipline] designed to improve safety and social behavior of students in elementary and middle schools. Sprague et al. wrote regarding the study, “Our challenge is to understand how to prevent and decrease the prevalence and incidence of children and youth that display behaviors that foster antisocial lifestyles” (p. 3). The authors referenced students that presented “behaviors dangerous to themselves” as a threat to the safety of other students. This was yet another article that referenced discipline strictly as the conceptualization of safety. Sprague et al. referenced school climate factors in conjunction with risk factors of family and community as contributing to this antisocial behavior.

The results of this study examined office discipline referrals, perceptions of school safety, school vandalism and focus group interviews as the occurred in “treatment schools,” which were those that participated in the study in comparison with those school that did not take part in the study (comparison schools). The issue was not the results, but instead, the issue was the conceptualization of safety promoted as discipline and the lack of system control regarding what was an element of discipline and what was not.

Stansfield (2011), in his review of Kupchik’s article, *Homeroom Security: School Discipline in an Age of Fear*, highlighted the conceptualization of safety in his review. Stansfield wrote, “With the growing judicial support for schools to maintain safe and drug free environments, disciplinary matters have come to be handled more formally under zero-tolerance policy” (p. 1). Stansfield highlights that discipline in many schools equates to the violation of

rules meant to be enforced; in conjunction with this, he referenced Kupchik's point regarding the addition of Security Resource Officers (SROs) to many schools.

In his review, Stansfield (2011) cited the number incidents in which the presence of an SRO escalated minor infraction into major criminal issues. The issue was not just the presence of SRO, but the presence of the SRO and the zero tolerance orientation of most policies. Stansfield refers to the book's reference in the decline of school crime, but the decline is not attributed to the SRO. The review examines the themes presented in the book, but for our purposes, the clear presentation of discipline is through the conceptualization of safety by both author and reviewer. There is no question regarding what discipline is to both; it is safety.

This conceptualization of safety is consistently associated with discipline in statistics, data and literature in either formal or informal means. The conceptualization of safety is deeply rooted in the idea of discipline, broad-based assumptions that present school discipline as school safety. This conceptualization was the most prevalent and the most foundational and deeply rooted in school discipline; it was found to contribute to the forthcoming conceptualizations and unstated meanings covered in this literature review. The paradoxical nature of the educative domain in which it lives was also a strong contributing factor, offering no resistant to the conceptualization of discipline as safety.

Additional Conceptualizations of Discipline

A general review of current literature in regard to student discipline began with three areas of research: teacher education, teaching and learning and classroom management. In this chapter, the literature review came out of these three general topics. However, an important point to note, examined in greater detail later, is this issue of one over the other two. Discipline, at least the educative discipline sought in this study, was far more prevalent under the heading of

classroom management than under the heading of teacher education or teaching learning. Why is that? There is precious little relevant research in regard to discipline. I did a search for articles containing the phrase, “classroom management” in them. Of the 128 articles I examined, only 13 of those articles were from the years 2010-2016. However, 46 articles were from the years, 2000 – 2009, 27 articles were from the 1990s and 33 articles from the 1980s. I did another search using the phrase, “classroom discipline” in them. Of the 140 articles I examined, only 13 of those articles were from years 2010 – 2016. However, just as the previous phrase, 38 articles were from years 2000 – 2009, 41 articles from the 1990s and 31 articles from the 1980s. The final search I did was using the phrase, “corporal punishment.” Of the 123 articles I examined, only 11 were from the years 2010-2016. Again, just as before, there were 50 articles from the years 2000 – 2009, 48 articles from the 1990s and 48 articles from the 1980s. These numbers say nothing to the content of the articles and whether they were quality articles or not. However, these numbers do speak to the attention, or the lack of attention, given to discipline and classroom management currently. The numbers point to an escalating conceptualization associated with discipline, that of punishment.

Discipline as Punishment

Punishment is a conceptualization of discipline, almost as powerful as the conceptualization of safety. Article after article referenced punishment in one form or another as a part of discipline, but the references were predominately negative and, in most instances, in the past. Past articles, expressing in the behaviorism of the time, presented punishment as an unfortunate, but, necessary part of discipline. As ideas of punishment fell out of favor, ideologies of discipline moved away from conceptualizations of punishment, especially corporal punishment. Discipline was quick to separate itself practically from corporal punishment, but

theoretically, discipline and punishment are still almost always referenced as one in articles regarding discipline in educational settings. The references are always negative, but the references continue, which keeps discipline and punishment linked.

All reviews of literature pertaining to discipline as punishment begin with Butchart (1995), his article on discipline stemming from a speech given a year earlier, and his book, *Classroom Discipline in American Schools*, edited by Butchart and McEwan (1996). Butchart and McEwan represent the most recent major statement made on discipline in education. Butchart and McEwan's work has uncovered many conceptualizations of discipline that have become attached to the ideology of discipline. Butchart and McEwan (1996), in presenting discipline, do so consistently out of a domain of education and primarily as a conceptualization of punishment. In their zeal to present discipline's historicity, they almost exclusively analyze discipline out of and through conceptualizations of punishment, always in the context of the history of discipline.

In his initial article, Butchart (1995) first addressed the history of student discipline in great detail, but as I mentioned earlier, in addressing the not so glorious past of discipline, he actually inadvertently reinforced conceptualizations of punishment in ways that established them presently while securing them for the future. Butchart acknowledged that discipline, in social foundational circles, was an area that received little current attention, a notion which supported my early findings regarding relevance, but at the same time he also acknowledged that discipline was an area crucial to teacher success, acknowledging and reinforcing the current space discipline occupied in the educative domain. Discipline, according to Butchart and others, is a need in education as acknowledged by its inclusion in educational literature. Butchart (1995) suggested, correctly, that corporal punishment was detrimental to education; he reported that the

use of corporal punishment stopped, abruptly, within one generation, which was accurate and proper, but even when its use stopped, the conceptualization of corporal punishment continued, remaining as a strong presence in the literature. The issue was not its continued use, as that had ended. The issue was the continued presence and discussion of corporal punishment as the past of discipline.

The reluctance to let go of this idea of corporal punishment, exhibited by Butchart (1995), Beyer (1998), Carson (1996), Sunshine (1973) and Kaestle (1978) was telling. Even though their references were negative and cyclical in nature, they still continued to keep the idea of corporal punishment alive, reinforcing the conceptualization of punishment as discipline. It was done so well and so consistently that the conceptualization of punishment is still a large part of most literature associated with school discipline. Butchart (1995) was not alone in reinforcing this conceptualization of corporal punishment; the vast majority of articles examined for this project referenced corporal punishment at some point, contributing to the deep-seated nature of the conceptualization of punishment, and the reinforcement of the idea of corporal punishment as a part of discipline. Butchart never does present corporal punishment in a positive light, nor has anyone else in many years, but yet, this idea of corporal punishment continues to hold a prominent place in his article and book and surfaces in the vast majority of articles read for this project. Corporal punishment, while perceived poorly in education settings, still continues to hold a place in education as most theories and studies reference it. As theories and studies were examined, the conceptualization of punishment was surprisingly still considered valid and very much alive as discipline.

This conceptualization of punishment was a means of selection and a tool to be used as evidenced by its prevalent nature. The conceptualization of safety was found to be more

powerful and more prevalent due to several issues. First, safety was social in the way it was conceptualized as discipline. Secondly, it valued students and was used as a tool of the education process to keep students safe. Finally, the conceptualization was positive, shared easily, embraced and effective which added a polish to the ideology of discipline. This polish was enough for discipline to be considered, in most instances, as educative and social while, in reality, safety was as mechanical and unstable as any other conceptualization, thus the reason for its power. The conceptualization of safety created an unstable nature in discipline which when coupled with the paradoxical nature of the educative domain, created the breeding ground for other conceptualizations inside the ideology of discipline. Punishment, while powerful and prevalent as a conceptualization, was not ambiguous. There was no confusion regarding the conceptualization of punishment as discipline. The unstable nature of the ideology of discipline created by the conceptualization of safety and the paradoxical nature of the educative domain has allowed punishment to continue to be associated with discipline. This was a surprise to me, prompting me to reflect back on some informal data from my past.

Over the last three years, I have spoken to no less than twenty administrators in the states of Georgia, Alabama, Texas and South Carolina, and in the matter of pressing issues, there is no contest. The discipline of students that continues to present issues to administrators. It frustrates seasoned administrators and drives new administrators out of the profession. After reading articles on discipline for the past two years, holding informal conversations with teachers over my twenty-year career and interacting with Butchart and other researchers, I have arrived at two general thoughts that must be addressed before going forward. First, there is an underlying veiled averseness preventing this idea of discipline as punishment from disappearing all together from education. In the literature it functions as a scapegoat, if you will, that every educator can

pull out and throw on the table when all else fails. When the issue of discipline comes up and the conversation shifts to the total elimination of discipline as punishment in education, almost everyone I have spoken to over the last two years was not willing to do away with it totally, which I found odd in light of quality research clearly indicating how detrimental it is to students and the entire educational process. The second thought is more complicated than the first. Discipline, as perceived by many teachers, students, parents and administrators, is, as a concept, accepted as dysfunctional. No one inside education or outside of education expects the issue of discipline to fit with education in general or with curriculum, pedagogy or teacher education for one simple reason: most assume that discipline used in educational settings is still a form of punishment.

But, in the vast majority of conversations with parents and students that I have had over a twenty-year period, there is an overwhelming assumption that discipline is, in its worst form, a functional and necessary part of education. Over the last two years, I have arrived at these two thoughts from the literature, from the culture, from other educators and from Butchart's books and an email exchange. These two thoughts produce an additional abstract as part of the conceptualization of punishment expressed in different ways by those inside education. The best way to explain it is by expressing it as this thought, "With discipline in a constantly dysfunctional state, the educator and the institution are in some way released from total responsibility for the failure of the education delivered because discipline can always be at fault, a scapegoat." Discipline, in some strange way, allows education to share responsibility with the students, the parents and even society. I am not asserting that this is intentional or even conscious, but I am positing that this is a reinforced conditioned conceptualization that has become an abstraction inside the conceptualization of punishment.

Butchart and McEwan's book, *Classroom Discipline in American Schools* provides multiple examples of this abstraction as well as of the continuous strong presence of both punishment and safety as parts of discipline. Butchart (1996), in the first chapter review, and Beyer (1996), in the second chapter present discipline as educative, as punishment and as a means of safety. Butchart (1996), in his introduction to the book, presented three purposes of the book: to revive dialogue regarding discipline, to suggest additional research, and to build a case against "the modes of discipline and management that have become mainstream practice." Butchart (1996) asserted that the book was not calling for a move away from order and to chaos in classrooms, but instead, his call was not for action but analysis (Butchart, 1996). Butchart acknowledged that the book's criticism of discipline practices reaches a level where one might perceive the book as promoting chaos, but that was not the book's intent nor was it Butchart's view. For Butchart, corporal punishment was a relatively minor issue, at least according to the way he saw at the time. Yet, as an issue, it seemed to be the one that Butchart & McEwan commonly associated with most problems regarding to student discipline. This is the first of several examples of the abstraction referenced earlier. Both authors included corporal punishment in their comments and seemed reluctant to dismiss it totally because of one issue: the safety of students.

Hirschfield (2008) also supported this notion in his assertions regarding the criminalization of American education when he wrote, "Order and discipline have always been an animus of American public schools, especially those serving children of the working class and the poor" (p. 79). Hirschfield presents the idea that American schools are more comparable to her prisons than her other schools. Hirschfield presented three dimensions of school criminalization and in that presentation he posited that the discipline administered was a major

factor in this movement. Hirschfield wrote, “The first major trend is that school punishment has become more formal and actuarial” (p.81). Hirschfield, throughout the article, referenced the phrase, “school punishment,” in reference to school discipline, discussing the increased push toward punishment as more procedural. He referenced that “disciplinary” guidelines centered more on the offense than the discretion of the teachers, resulting in an increase in the use of police and security guards, supporting his assertion of the criminalization of the American education system. My point is neither to support nor deny his assertion, but instead, to present his default to the conceptualization of punishment when speaking of school discipline.

Hirschfield (2008) made several salient points regarding punishment in support of his assertion. The author cited two powerful elements contributing to the criminalization of American education: the moral panic framework and the school accountability narrative. Both are powerful points flowing out of culture with ample evidence in support for each. Hirschfield does quality work making his case for the educational connection to criminalization, but he never does come to the point of discrediting school punishment in totality, revealing the abstraction mentioned earlier.

Roache & Lewis (2011) presented their theories, despite their assertions, in a classroom management context regarding student discipline. Roache & Lewis (2011) emphasized that the key issue in classroom management and, for that matter in student discipline, should be to develop the entire student. Roache & Lewis said that most students, regardless of school, ethnicity or belief, believe that their teachers were characterized by one of two discipline styles: students believed that either teachers are coercive in their disciplinary nature and depend heavily on punishments and aggressive teacher behavior, or that they were relational with their discipline, depending instead on their use of relationships that are characterized by discussions,

hinting, recognition and appropriate involvement when punishing. These assumptions are characteristic of the paradox of discipline and the myriad of unstated meanings comprising current conceptualizations of discipline.

Roache & Lewis (2011) suggested that students' perceptions of discipline affected the effectiveness of discipline, and did so through the conceptualization of punishment. Roache & Lewis (2011) wrote, "Nevertheless, it appears that not all punishment is equally justified or effective" (p.242). Punishment, in response to misbehavior, was a forgone conclusion, but Roache & Lewis asserted that the styles and strategies used in the discipline process matter greatly. Students must, at times, be punished; the question the authors raised was not should we punish, but instead, how should we punish? As theories were presented throughout the work discipline was clearly perceived as punishment. Roache & Lewis (2011) affirmed, through their research, that those strategies involving a relational aspect regarding discipline correlated to positive student responses concerning discipline, but interestingly, they did not correlate to teacher justification, which again speaks to the growing ambiguity and confusion associated with the ideology of discipline.

Discussions, hinting and recognition have implications for what Roache & Lewis (2011) referenced as the "ripple effect" regarding discipline. The "ripple effect" was to understand that disciplining one student will have a "ripple" effect on other students in a class, and that effect will always be either positive or negative; there will be no position of neutrality when it comes to discipline. Roache & Lewis identified aggression as the only discipline technique that undermined the relationship between the teacher and the student. Aggression, while a recognizable trait, was more associated with punishment than discipline and reinforced the conceptualization of punishment as discipline. Any punitive discipline, regardless of the method,

was recognized by students as aggressive in nature. Roache & Lewish asserted that this perception of aggression had no effect on the responsibility students feel regarding being part of the school's discipline process. Roache & Lewis (2011) acknowledged that students tend place the blame of discipline on teachers; this was especially true when discipline was aggressive with little to no relational aspect to it, which was a perception of punishment. In sum, Roache & Lewis proclaimed that teachers should avoid coercive styles of discipline in favor of strategies that are relational, that reinforce the relationship between the teacher and the student, adding, unfortunately more confusion to the ideology of discipline. Roache & Lewish (2011) confirmed in their research the continued presence of constructivism in student discipline, pointing out that discipline which was impacting and qualitative tended to be relational but at no time did they distinguish between punishment and discipline. Roache & Lewis addressed discipline as punishment from a schooling perspective, adding more confusion and ambiguity to the ideology of discipline.

Butchart & McEwan (1996) earlier presented an equally valid argument for further exploration of discipline outside the confines of punishment. Both chapters presented clearly all that was wrong with discipline, rooting "wrong" discipline firmly inside the conceptualization of punishment, but both never strayed too far away from the need for safety in our schools, which justified the continued presence of discipline as punishment. The book followed the prescribed path laid out by Butchart in his introductory chapter; authors either unpacked student discipline as punishment or made a broad-based assumption that punishment was the problematic issue in regard to student discipline, but the issue of safety was always in the distant background, which seemed to prevent punishment from being eliminated.

Each chapter pounded away at discipline as punishment with the exception of the last chapter, “Empathic Caring in Classroom Management and Discipline,” which presented the need for safety as the forefront issue that trumped all others. In reading the chapter, the first heading one encounters presented negativity, “The Failure of Care for the Human Dimension.” The chapter was about the care of students and how current society fails to care for people as a collective group. Stanley (1998) stated that children need “caring pedagogy” and guidance if they are to become quality adults. Stanley used this section to transition into a section entitled, “Impersonal Classroom Management.” In this section, the student’s emotional stability is examined in light of abusive and dominant discipline tendencies. Stanley proposed that there was no need for a conflict to exist between care and control. Both are valid and can coexist if a “caring classroom community” emerged. According to Stanley, a caring classroom community emerged when teachers were in a reciprocal relationship with students. These relationships were rooted in care and concern for the safety and well-being of the student. Stanley never called for the total elimination of discipline, but instead the call was for discipline rooted in “educational caring,” which in turn was clearly rooted in the conceptualization of safety.

The conceptualization of punishment was and is very much a part of discipline in educational settings despite the attempts to destroy. *It* is presented only as negative, seen as destructive and used as a means to introduce other methods, but it never does go away. It was present in every article and book read for this project no matter the heading, date or subject. Its owes its continued presence to the paradoxes present inside the educative domain referenced earlier and to the dominant conceptualization of safety associated with discipline.

Discipline as Control and Negativity

The conceptualizations of control and negativity are secondary in nature to the more powerful primary conceptualizations of punishment and safety. Control is a part of the semantical ideology of discipline, but as a conceptualization, it is secondary to safety in influence. Wlodkowski (1982) referenced the conceptualizations of control and negativity when he called discipline “the great false hope.” His point was that discipline, as a word, lacks clear meaning and distinction required for successful education. Wlodkowski (1982) wrote, “In schools, the most widely accepted and practiced interpretation of the word discipline is control – student acceptance of or submission to teacher authority” (p. 2). Wlodkowski said that discipline was a concern for prospective and beginning teachers, and yet it was a term with no clear meaning, with the clearest meaning being that of control: “Because discipline is so often applied as control, it come across to the student as a form of direct or applied threat” (p. 6). The author does not deny the need for control in the classroom, but he does acknowledge that there was no account for the emotional side-effect of the threat which is resentment and negative in nature. Resentment for being coerced into a behavior that is not voluntary can reveal that coercion is punishment, and will always be presented as negative, causing more difficulties than remedies. For discipline alone does not contribute to education, and discipline presented as control, as negative and as external to all other education, will never contribute in positive ways to the educational process.

Butchart (1995), in his historical review, focused directly on the individual classrooms of the time, also revealing the conceptualization of control and the conceptualization of negativity together by educating the reader in the history of the classroom. All classrooms, according to Butchart, were directed by schoolmasters, again establishing ideas of punishment, but instead of leaving punishment in isolation, two other conceptualizations are referenced, those of control and

negativity. According to Butchart, schoolmasters often worked one-on-one with students, leaving all other students unsupervised for long periods of time in the same room... the proverbial one room school house at work (Butchart, 1995). According to Butchart (1996), discipline, in this environment, began as authoritative, strict and very pragmatic. Schoolmasters used what worked best for the situation, and discipline rooted in punishment, control and negativity worked best in order to produce a “safe” environment for education.

Students were well aware of who held the power, and conformed, on most occasions to the rules of the classroom. Butchart (1995) wrote regarding current culture, “Authority and power were unambiguous and external, residing in the king and the nobility, and delegating through them to patriarchs in their families, and to masters, whether guild masters, slave masters, or schoolmasters” (p.169). There was little confusion about discipline at this time. Its power rested in the schoolmaster who held absolute disciplinary power, and it was swift, authoritarian, often in the form of punishment and almost always presented as negative. It was never a positive thing to be disciplined in school or in society, especially early in education. The conceptualizations attached to discipline were all rooted in punishment, control and negativity and were equally justified by the conceptualization of safety. Discipline, while used to control students, was also used to establish the submissive relationship of students to teacher, clearly communicating that students were to submit to the schoolmaster in all educational settings for many purposes. But one of the more prominent ones was to ensure that students would learn in their youth what would be expected from them in adulthood (Butchart, 1996).

Butchart (1995) highlighted at the turn of the century, the first major educational reform. Inside this educational reform, he identified an important link between discipline and education. This reform took two different methods, but both were contained within the process of discipline.

The first reform took the form of *bureaucratic discipline*, and it was often found institutionalized in most urban centers. This form of discipline was best demonstrated by Joseph Lancaster's monitorial schools (Burchart, 1995). Lancaster removed the one-on-one discipline between a teacher and student and replaced it with a group relationship between students and a student monitor, empowered by the teacher (Burchart, 1995). Advanced students in the Lancaster model would, according to acquired merit, hold rank over all other students, and it was these more advanced students that would monitor all other students (Butchart, 1995; Newman, 1998). Butchart (1995) wrote, "In place of fear, he [Lancaster] stimulated motivation by an elaborate system of rewards, prizes, and promotions, including promotion into and within the ranks of monitors, with a badge and chain to be worn around the neck" (p. 170). Lancaster's idea was to remove fear and replace it with motivation; corporal punishment, while technically gone, was still very much alive in spirit. While the idea seemed good and oriented towards the positive side, there was little difference between this and the punishment orientation of the past. Discipline continued to be focused on alternate forms of corporal punishment, replacing the physical aspect of it with a mental one in the form of motivation (Butchart, 1995; Newman, 1995). Lancaster took the punishment, control and negativity of discipline and converted it to an intrinsic motivational discipline that was not physical but cognitive and motivational, though it was still rooted in punishment, control and negativity (Butchart, 1995).

Butchart (1995), in his review, referenced that Lancaster developed a disciplinary pedagogy known as "disciplinary structures," which altered the nature of the authority and surveillance of discipline in order to motivate students in their behavior. The Lancaster model, according to Butchart, embedded new disciplinary techniques inside older and established disciplinary structures. Some of those techniques included continuous competitive normative

exams, academic promotions, and structured and embedded reward systems (Butchart, 1995). Rewards replaced punishment in the new system. Instead of controlling behavior with punishment, behavior would be motivated with rewards and prizes in addition to new forms of teacher-directed humiliation and corporal punishment (Butchart, 1995). Discipline was still conceptualized as a form of corporal punishment even though efforts to eliminate corporal punishment were under way. Butchart (1996) considered discipline as punishment throughout his work while, at the same time, painting discipline as punishment as negative. The Lancaster model of discipline rooted itself in the same paradoxes of the past: practicing allocation and schooling while presenting words of socialization and education. Butchart (1995, Butchart, 1996) reveals the paradoxical nature of the educative domain present in the Lancasterian educational methodology.

Butchart (1995) traced a second reform known as “soft pedagogy” or “New England Pedagogy.” This reform, according to Butchart, was planted firmly in the Protestantism of New England. It promoted deeply personal individualized relationships marked by emotional and intense affection. Butchart (1995) wrote regarding this different pedagogy, “Rather than an internalized authority built on an omnipresent surveilling of others, these reformers devised a disciplinary pedagogy that constructed authority on emotional ties, guilt, and an internalized self-surveillance” (p.171). This “affectionate authority” as it was known, was designed to produce automated obedient responses from students (Butchart, 1995). Butchart asserted that while the Lancasterian discipline model instilled a possessive individualism, the New England pedagogy taught an affective individualism. Both, while attempting to motivate from within, still aimed at the control of behavior through an external means, and present discipline as punishment, control and negative. The New England “soft” pedagogy attempted to soften the negative aspect of it by

internalizing the motivation, but this did little for the widely held perceptions associated with discipline. It was still widely viewed as punishment, control and negative. Presenting no new alternative methods offered, Butchart actually contributed unwittingly to the entrenchment of the conceptualizations of punishment, control and negativity associated with discipline. Butchart (1995) noted that the identified shifts in 19th century classrooms were found in both the affectional discipline of the New England pedagogy and the bureaucratic discipline of Lancaster's model. However, during the 19th century, a new mode of education arose, partly in response to the Lancaster model, and with it seemingly new modes of discipline as well as new opportunities for new ideas, referenced as unstated meanings, to become associated with discipline (Butchart, 1995).

Discipline as Management

Slee (1997) addressed discipline from yet another perspective, suggesting, in the introductory section of his article, that school discipline and behavior management are two areas of considerable "contest and struggle" regarding educational policy. Slee attempted to distinguish between discipline as a discourse of classroom management and discipline as an educational theory. Slee never left the idea of discipline as classroom management and asserted regarding school discipline, "Research and literature in the field of school discipline are subject to conceptual slippage and reductionism" (p. 5). This slippage and reductionism, according to Slee, can be found occurring between two slopes: the discourse of management and the control of behavior. Both can be found in discussions about school discipline, in current literature and in the debate and subsequent failure to establish any clear conceptual distinctions between discipline and control (Slee, 1997). With no clear distinctions, discipline slips into the

conceptualization of classroom management. There was an ordinate amount of literature referenced as classroom management.

Slee (1997) acknowledged that the reductionist tendency does indeed tend to fall, in most cases, into the behaviorist camp, writing, “Simplification and reduction have been endemic to behaviorist models of classroom management” (p. 6). The reductionist tendency, reduced discipline as an educational process into one rooted in a pragmatic process of the control of student behavior and subsequently into the schooling camp. This schooling perspective addressed discipline as mechanical and not social, allowing the conceptualization of classroom management space to live.

Slee (1997) presented what he called a different discipline, one rooted in ideas of consistency between curriculum, pedagogies, processes and school government. He stressed that attention ought to be paid to the cognitive and social development of the learner as an individual and not just as one member of a social whole. This view asserted a progressive tendency and implied that discipline was more internal than external. Slee (1997) wrote, “If ‘discipline’ is reduced to a euphemism for behavior modification, the educational value of the disciplinary regimen is compromised” (p.7). Slee referenced Dewey, adding evidence to his progressive tendency, as he referenced the idea that successful discipline was discipline that had a symbiotic relationship with the pedagogical process. Like Dewey, he recognized that a connection to the learner by all parts of the educational process, including discipline, was foundational and paramount to the successful education of that learner.

Slee (1997) suggested that the discipline we dispense was influenced by the collapse of the unskilled youth labor market writing, “Failure was not a problem for schools. The underachiever, the slow child and even the disruptive student had somewhere else to go” (p.10). That was no

longer the case, according to him, adding an extra burden to discipline. No longer was its sole purpose to root out the underachiever and the disruptive student. Now, it had an added purpose of forcing those unwilling to conform to do so for the sake of all others, which, despite his assertions, was more management than progressive. Slee (1997) wrote, “Restricting our disciplinary gaze to aberrant individuals simultaneously deflects from other contributing factors” (p.11). And, I will add, it also keeps discipline firmly in the camp of schooling, unable to move to the camp of education. Slee, while acknowledging a needed change, also acknowledged the impossibility of change brought on by society, which justified the conceptualization of classroom management and others.

Weinstein, Tomlinson-Clarke & Curran (2004) in discussions surrounding culturally responsive classroom management (CRCM), posited that a lack of multicultural competence exacerbated the difficulties novice teachers had with classroom management, clearly speaking from the perspective of discipline as classroom management. The authors acknowledge that the literature on classroom management, presenting discipline as classroom management, has paid little attention to cultural diversity. Weinstein et al. (2004) suggested, “Teacher educators and researchers interested in classroom management must begin to make cultural diversity an integral part of the conversation” (p. 27). The authors do acknowledge that the CRCM is more a frame of mind than a set of strategies or practices guiding decisions. The authors asserted that the goal of classroom management was not compliance but equitable opportunities for all students. Weinstein et al. (2004) suggested, “In sum, they [teachers] understand that CRCM is classroom management in service of social justice” (p.27). The word, “discipline” was not referenced in a positive manner in the article; classroom management, however, was presented consistently as a means of controlling students.

Even with a social bent, the idea of discipline presented as classroom management had more in common with a schooling orientation than educational one. The authors' goal, as stated throughout the article, was to position classroom management as it should be: creating an environment in which students "behave" appropriately, not out of fear but out of a sense of personal responsibility. The authors make a clear distinction in their article between classroom management – ways of creating the proper classroom environment - and discipline – ways of responding to inappropriate behavior which rooted discipline to an end, as a tool to be used to achieve that desired end.

Lennon (2009) also addressed discipline from a classroom management perspective, asserting that the classroom climate was a powerful factor in student achievement. Lennon (2009) posited that there were many variables to examine when seeking answers to the problem of student misbehavior and disruption. Student preferences, according to Lennon, factored greatly into whether discipline theories are successful or not. Lennon recognized that a common theme in regard to maintaining quality classroom management was the creation of a positive, nurturing environment where all students feel safe and comfortable. Throughout the article, Lennon moved back and forth between the term, "discipline" and the phrase, "classroom management," in which teacher personality became a salient factor.

Lennon wrote, "Teacher personality and exuberance are abstract indicators, difficult to address in a teacher preparedness program, yet for many master teachers, they are the most common identifiers to success" (p.5). Conceptually, Lennon was suggesting something not quantifiable... something intangible and contrary to the conceptualization of classroom management which is more rooted in a school orientation. Lennon was suggesting something that was a bit of an anomaly: a view of the teacher as a leader who would encourage students to

learn through motivation while presenting it through a phrase not associated with the social orientation of education. Lennon wrote regarding this, “Classroom management is a comprehensive blend of exuberance and love for teaching and students, with an established, successful curriculum consisting of high student expectations, consistency and rigor” (p. 6). The author’s use of a mechanical phrase with social language creates confusion and adds to the ambiguity of the ideology of discipline.

Lennon (2009) addressed discipline as a tool of classroom management while at the same time suggesting it was more than a tool, which contributed to the ambiguity of discipline. Lennon conceptually was suggesting that discipline was akin to knowledge, requiring a better and more proper distribution of it for success. He was suggesting that discipline, presented throughout his article as a mechanical tool, had to be social to be impacting.

Allen (2010) examined the relationship between classroom management and bullying through the conceptualization of classroom management. The author wrote that research suggested that variables like harsh and punitive discipline, low quality instruction, disorder and antisocial behavior contributed to the creation of environments conducive to bullying. Allen began with an examination of classroom management, seeking evidence of bullying. He wrote regarding the issue of classroom management, “A narrow view of classroom management sees it primarily as discipline and management of student misbehavior” (p.2). Allen suggested something broader; classroom management was a more “holistic descriptor” of the composite of teacher actions in governing the classroom learning environment.

Allen (2010) suggested a mediating variable that determined the onset of bullying, namely the “social structure” of the class. Allen posited that the more a teacher cared for her students, promoted and ensure positive relationships between students and managed the entire

classroom in a positive way, the less likely it was that bullying would develop. The issue was, again, discipline addressed as classroom management while promoting a solution that was social in nature. Clearly, Allen sees education and, for that matter, classroom management as social and, presented both that way consistently throughout his work. Allen, throughout the article, attached other elements to the social aspect of classroom management, adding more confusion. While the social aspects of the problem are prominent throughout the article they are strikingly absent in the conclusion, which promotes, in the end, a discipline that is more partial than complete.

Caner & Tertemiz (2014) presented their findings in a study regarding prospective teachers in English Language Teaching Programs (ELT) with an orientation toward classroom management. The authors begin their article, like so many others before them, acknowledging that classroom management was one of the more challenging tasks teachers face. By acknowledging the challenge of classroom management, Caner & Tertemiz moved beyond acknowledgment to a reinforcement of discipline as classroom management.

The authors employ, openly, the conceptualization of a continuum developed in 1980 by Glickman and Tamashiro. The authors repeat the issue of challenge regarding classroom management throughout the article. They write, “Establishing and maintaining order in a classroom, so as to maximize learning experiences, is a challenging task for teachers in general” (p. 156).

Caner & Tertemiz (2014) found that most ELT student teachers initially expressed a strong desire to control their students. They also found that gender matters when it came to classroom control. When it came to classroom management male student teachers seem to favor

a more interventionist orientation than an interactionist. This language, never clearly defined in detail, reminds one of the punishment vs. caring conceptualizations of discipline.

The article reinforced that discipline was an ongoing challenge, which reinforced the conceptualization of classroom management on discipline. With discipline defined as an ongoing challenge, the authors created more opportunities for conceptualizations and unstated meanings to become part of discipline in the future. Caner& Tertemiz (2014), without realizing it, contributed to the challenge of classroom management by associating the idea of “challenge” with discipline. Without realizing it, this sentiment dominated the article, pushing everything else aside. A novice teacher reading this article would notice only one thing: classroom management will be an ongoing challenge and cringe in anticipation.

Tran (2016) studied copying styles of teachers, seeking to identify how teachers use various copying styles with student misbehavior and whether those styles relate to classroom management techniques. The author’s study was yet another study examining discipline through the conceptualization of classroom management. Tran (2016), like most of his counterparts, stated clearly, at the onset, the importance of effective classroom management. The author’s stated purpose positions discipline distinctly inside the schooling mentality. Tran (2016) posited that one purpose for classroom discipline was to establish order to allow teachers the proper venue in which to instruct students. An additional purpose was to provide an “appropriate educational experience” that would shape the values of students and educate them in the rights of individuals. While I agree that both may be purposes of discipline, Tran clearly was addressing discipline from a conceptualization of classroom management. The second purpose, the shaping of student values and the creation of individual rights is presented as a social educational mindset of discipline, which was not relevant to the author’s main assertion.

Regarding classroom management styles, Tran (2016) suggested that students view teachers from two different and distinct perspectives: one was identified as coercive, including punishment and aggression. The other style was referenced as “relationship-based management” and contained strategies including but not limited to discussions, hints, recognition, rewards and praise. Tran believed that students who received more relationship-based management were less disruptive and generally acted more responsible in class. In contrast, the coercive management styles produced more student distraction from class work and less responsibility. While Tran presented the two styles, he used discipline throughout the article in a mechanical classroom management orientation. Tran (2016) suggested that there was a strong possible connection between classroom management styles and student responsibility, and that this connection was found in a teacher’s copying style. Tran (2016) wrote regarding copying, “Copying is typically viewed as the cognitive and effective responses used by an individual to deal with problems encountered in everyday life” (p. 2). Tran (2016) clarified by suggesting that the stressor, in this case, was student misbehavior and the copying was the cognitive and affective teacher response to the stress associated with student misbehavior.

Tran (2016) suggested that coping styles play a significant role in mediating relationships between teachers and students, especially in the management of student misbehavior. He found that teachers who are more concerned with student misbehavior tended to use more aggressive classroom management techniques; he also found teachers who perceived that their classes contained more badly behaved students than normal would use punishment and aggression more than other teachers. The issues were accurate, but the use of a classroom management orientation created cloudy assertions instead of clear ones. The author’s study assessed five classroom strategies: punishment, recognition and reward, hinting, discussion and aggression. The author’s

study assessed three teacher coping styles: passive avoidant coping, social problem solving and relaxation. The study's results obtained from a correlation analyses indicated that the coping styles of teachers better mediated their relationships with their students. Tran (2016) wrote regarding the study's findings, "Misbehavior in classes relates to greater use of punishment and aggression" (p.8). He supports an earlier assertion that teachers who employ poor management techniques contribute to their own classroom management problems (Roache & Lewis, 2009). The use of the conceptualization of classroom management regarding discipline hide the real issue: discipline was not management. Tran, much like many others, addressed discipline from a schooling sense, and as a mechanical device needing calibration. While the author does address the relational aspect of the classroom several times, he never does acknowledge the perspective of the students, confining his statistical analysis to one side of the equation, the teacher. This prevented him from recognizing how addressing discipline as classroom management was contributing to the confusion associated with the ideology of discipline.

Unstated Meanings of Discipline

What follows is a series of unstated meanings moving towards the status of conceptualization. As referenced earlier in this work, unstated meanings are not as powerful as conceptualizations but are on the path to becoming a permanent part of the semantical nature of discipline. There are two unstated meanings that will be explored in greater detail in this work. Each is the polar opposite of the other and considered the next two unstated meanings most likely to become conceptualizations of discipline. Because of this polarized nature, both have the opportunity not only to become conceptualizations of discipline, but they also have the opportunity to contribute to the paradoxical nature of the educative domain by being associated with discipline. And, finally, each has a proponent that has put each into practice and theory. The

two unstated meanings I reference are those of progressivism and power. The first unstated meaning will address the idea of progressive education.

The Unstated Meaning of Progressivism. Progressive education looked at the child in a different way, especially regarding discipline. Progressive discipline was rooted in a new form of authority, and that authority was professional psychology marked by expertise, scientific study and professional relationships (Butchart, 1995). The term, progressivism, according to Lefstein (2002), described educational ideas that “sought to replace traditional schooling practices with more scientifically advanced ideas” in regard to student learning. Lefstein presented Dewey as the chief proponent of this thinking, saying that Dewey and most progressives think that learning should be a continuous process of authentic experience in which the child is rooted in the center of the whole process, which presented a problem regarding school discipline. Lefstein (2002) referenced that progressive education was active learning; he wrote in reference to this active progressive learning, “Good learning engages the child in activity both verbal and physical” (p. 1634). This conceptualization of progressivism associated with discipline is a contradiction to all discipline before it. The issues raised in progressivism in regard to discipline were many.

Lefstein (2002) cited student control was one of these issues. Students in progressive classrooms are expected to be active, not docile. The progressive activity of a classroom was to never be uniform because “students learn with different interests, styles and paces.” There, therefore, is a standing perception that discipline and progressive education cannot coexist. Lefstein (2002) wrote regarding this, “Not only are progressivists’ pedagogical practices antithetical to disciplinary technologies, but also the idea of maintaining discipline in the sense of classroom control was and is ideologically problematic and even downright distasteful for most progressive educators” (p. 1636). This unstated meaning of progressivism, found attached

to discipline in an educational setting, manifests as non-discipline or no discipline. It is a hostile attempt to find ways around all discipline.

Lefstein (2002) conveyed this sentiment when he wrote, “Moreover, strict discipline also teaches a lesson, not necessarily congruent with progressivist aims” (p. 1637). Progressivists perceive any order as a thing unto itself. It is a means of control, thought to stifle creativity and harm the progressive educational process. The manifestations of progressive discipline became a lack of discipline all together, actually causing discipline issues. The unstated meaning of progressivism attached to discipline actually deconstructed discipline all together, leaving the teacher with nothing more than idle hope. Lefstein (2002) wrote, “Often teachers ignore the initial disturbances, hoping, as one teacher explained, that they would dissipate once he or she gets the lesson going and students become interested” (p. 1641). The unstated meaning of progressivism produced,] in teachers,] a dilemma, reducing them down to the idea that to discipline students is to fail as a progressive teacher.

Butchart (1995) stated that progressivism was backed by and integrated in science, and thus it became almost impossible to question and even harder to dispute due to the authority granted to psychology. Butchart (1995) referenced that progressive educators linked standardized testing to ability grouping which lead to a differentiated curriculum and more opportunities for disruption. According to Butchart (1995) and Lefstein (2002), the progressive educational methodology still produced the same effects. Some students, given this freedom, disrupted instruction. Progressive educators had not anticipated this issue and initially had no answer. The conceptualizations of negativity and control, which became part of discipline through the conceptualization of corporal punishment, were still attached to the ideology, and according to Butchart, progressive education did little to change that. There were still discipline problems

with no real answers, and, just like the past, punishment again became a focal point. Any analysis of past disciplinary issues presented the conceptualizations of punishment, control and negativity, reinforcing them again into the present situation. It has become the proverbial vicious cycle; new ideas are presented and old issues surface, leading to another examination of the past for the purposes of the future. The perennial concern regarding discipline has never waned because of these conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached to the ideology of discipline.

Butchart (1995) referenced that progressive education privileged the authority of scientific rationality, which continued to promote, in the classroom, the internalization of external authority rooted in science and expertise. While progressive education championed the child as the center of the learning process, it did little to change the power and authority structures of the past. They were still the same; progressivism was just the new means to the same end. Discipline modes continued movement toward ideas of control. Control was always at the forefront of the purpose of discipline, whether internal self-control or external control of behavior, but external control was often associated with punishment and negativity. Progressive education pulled control away from external control and punishment and negativity by way of a new attack on corporal punishment. This scientific rationality did many things but, in regard to student discipline, it embedded and justified the same conceptualization of punishment, control and negativity by continuing the focus on the external control of behavior. Psychology justified the control of student behavior as long as it was done according to their standards, but the question of how to control student behavior was still a valid question and concern because the conceptualization of safety was always active. Thus, zero tolerance policies became popular for a time, but the majority of those policies were behaviorism driven by scientific efficiency. In the end, these policies, like those before them, were rooted in conceptualizations of punishment

reinforcing conceptualizations of control and negativity, with little or no change from the past. Despite this influence, the vast majority of literature continued to operate according to similar standards.

Beyer (1998) attempted to clarify understandings of discipline according to a summary of literature in the field. Beyer suggested that discipline was either a disposition governing and guiding an action forward to its success (self-control), or it was an action done to others who are unruly and disobedient (control of behavior). Beyer was referencing the practical empiricism of discipline, but in doing so, past conceptualizations were reinforced, creating new opportunities for new unstated meanings to breed. Beyer (1998) acknowledged the difference in the two views of control in one important way. He presented the first view as “primarily self-initiated and self-regulated” while presenting the second view as “constraints” imposed from the outside.

Beyer (1998) presented an empirically-oriented “mechanistic” view of discipline, one rooted in the stimulus-response understanding of human behavior found in the behaviorism of B.F. Skinner and others (Beyer, 1998), which was just a move back to the past. Beyer, in his review of behaviorism, suggested that behavior controlled by stimuli was a suitable and viable option in regard to discipline because it also established effective classroom management that was systematic. Beyer noted that behaviorists, like Skinner, suggested that behavior could be controlled through the use of positive and negative reinforcements, presenting discipline as a means of allocation and from a school orientation, which was progressive in nature. Beyer suggested a move from behaviorists’ ideas to Alderian psychological ideas, which is noteworthy for one reason: they were a form of progressive education.

Progressive Alderian Meanings of Discipline. Regarding student discipline, Carson (1996) agreed generally with Butchart: the topic of student discipline and classroom management

was a topic long overdue for debate and discussion (Carson, 1996). Acknowledging issues, whether in agreement or not, also attaches those same issues to the similar ideas. Carson, while disagreeing with Butchart, employed similar strategies when he entered into the discussion of student discipline by way of an alternate thought on discipline: Adlerian Psychology. Adlerian Psychology was another unstated meaning that attached to the ideology of discipline.

Carson (1996) wrote concerning Adlerian Psychology, “Briefly stated, the Adlerians have developed practical techniques in which the purpose of discipline is not to control others but to assist them in learning self-control” (p. 207). This appears, at first, to be a reference to discipline as internal. Carson, in his reference to Adlerian Psychology, revealed yet another issue with the idea of discipline: the polarization of meanings associated with the educative domain. Carson re-introduced the idea of self-control into the discussion of student discipline, but he also introduced into the contextualization of discipline a paradox of inner control versus outer control. Discipline cannot be both internal self-control and external control of behavior, especially when used in educational settings. The stated meanings sown into the ideology of discipline now had a new dilemma. Is discipline the external control of behavior, or is it internal self-control? The acceptance of both meanings creates multiple problems and adds another layer of ambiguity to all future conceptualizations of discipline. The educational issue, from a progressive orientation, was one of discipline. Discipline was standing in the way of widespread acceptance of progressive education (Carson, 1996).

Carson (1996) noted that throughout much of the 20th century, behaviorism dominated both pedagogy and classroom management regarding to education, but he saw behaviorism fading and constructivism rising in prominence. Constructivism focused on the needs of the learner and, with its primary view of the learner being the locus of control, offered an alternative

in the area of discipline. Constructivism, with roots in the Enlightenment, sought to break human beings free from the authoritarian grip of culture, suggesting progressive education as the method and process that would provide the means for this release was progressive education (Carson, 1996). The issue with progressive education was discipline, but Adlerian ideas seemingly had the answer. Carson presented the view that much of what we attribute to constructivism was Adlerian in nature. Carson (1996) wrote, “Our primary intention in this article is to establish that, even during the great and dismal heyday of the behavior hegemony, there was an alternative that was effectively silenced” (p. 209). And, that silent alternative was rooted in Adlerian thought, viewing discipline as internal self-control. Progressivism had placed the students at the center of the learning process, but it was Adlerian ideas that suggested an internal alternative to discipline. Carson, in his promotion of an Adlerian view of discipline, committed the same mistakes as those before him, justifying Adlerian ideas by deconstructing past ideas rooted in the conceptualization of discipline as punishment.

Carson (1996), much like Butchart (1995), offered his own insight into Adlerian ideas, by countering other views of discipline. Carson (1996) referenced that Adler’s focus in regard to human beings was in regard to mental health (inner attention), and Adler believed that the main condition for good mental health was social interest and a social concern for others (external attention). Adler’s focus was not one of a mechanical schooling, but more in line with education as a social process. Carson shifted his focus from Adler to one of Adler’s own students, Rudolf Dreikurs. It was Dreikurs who helped develop a different model for misbehavior, one that built on the ideas of Adler’s version of progressivism. Dreikurs attempted to solve the discipline issue of progressivism by unpacking misbehavior as the means to solve the discipline issue in a very progressive “hands off” manner. Dreikurs featured four mistaken goals in his model that lead to

misbehavior: the bid for attention, inappropriate exercise of power, the seeking of revenge and the expression of disability or helplessness (Carson, 1996). In each instance, the social concern shifted from others to a focus on self-preservation, which, according to Adlerians, was a life out of balance and in poor mental health. Carson (1996) wrote about Adlerian, “The teacher’s challenge is not to keep on correcting individual incidents of misbehavior [the control of external behavior] but to establish within the classroom a different set of social pressures that will support individual efforts to grow, to belong and to contribute to the work of the group [internal self-control]” (p.211).

Carson (1996) presented Adlerian methods as those that would encourage and assist the teacher in incidents of misbehavior and encourage the teacher to look beyond the child; Adlerian thought pushed the teacher to examine themselves as well as the student. Adlerians believed that their emotional response to a child’s behavior should also be an important factor to be considered in regard to misbehavior (Carson, 1996). Carson asserted that, for Adlerians, all decisions contributed greatly to the development of the human being. The Adlerian teacher’s role was not to force change, impose constraint or aggressively punish. Instead, the Adlerian teacher’s role settled into an assisting pattern alongside processes of growth to ensure that the natural and logical consequences of behavior were experienced by the student (Carson, 1996). The difference came down simply to the external control of others versus the internal control of self. The Adlerian idea was a progressive process of social adjustment more than one of social correction, all of which fit well into the progressive “hands off” approach to discipline. According to Carson, Adlerians even viewed praise with suspicion, tending to view it as judgment of the person being praised. They tended to avoid it, choosing instead to focus on authentic encouragement of the actual effort and not the student. The thinking behind this was

that praise, even though positive in nature, was still an effort to manipulate and influence others, and therefore, an actual external control of another's behavior. The Adlerian goal was a progressive avoidance of external control of behavior. Carson while presenting his case for a new Adlerian discipline, was actually reinforcing past conceptualizations and unstated meanings of discipline.

In light of the work of both Butchart (1995) and Carson (1996), the unstated meaning of progressivism was, beyond Adlerian ideas, also manifested in two additional ideas referenced in this work: behaviorism and constructivism. Behaviorism and constructivism are two different flavors of the progressive conceptualization and in need of clarification. Behaviorism, to clarify, is a theory out of the school of psychology based on the study of behavior, defined as that which is observable and measurable (Rohmann, 1999). Behavior is seen in terms of conditioned responses to stimuli and the environment. Behaviorism's theory rests in the belief that all behaviors could be learned through conditioning, and that conditioning occurs through interaction with the environment and our responses to that interaction (Rohmann, 1999). Behaviorists were concerned with observable behavior only; they gave little credence to unobservable behavior, matters of the mind or anything pertaining to the internal unconscious workings of the human being. Behaviorism's effect on student discipline was initially large, especially in the reinforcement of student discipline with a focus on the external control of behavior as a pure stimulus-response orientation.

Constructivism and Discipline

Constructivism, or the more accurate term, social constructivism, is a theory that holds that reality is not objective but constructed by people in different ways through their interaction with each other and with their environment (Rohmann, 1999). Rohmann stated that social

constructivism was pioneered by the Russian psychologists Lev Vygotsky. It was Vygotsky who located the mind not in the person but in the personal social interactions people have with each other (Rohmann, 1999). Vygotsky, according to Rohmann (1999), saw learning not as a passive process of acquiring preexisting knowledge, but instead, he saw the learning process as a creative process in which the student was part of the structuring experience, with the process of learning taking place through his or her interaction with the social environment. As behaviorism faded, constructivism rose to prominence, and its influence, especially in the area of student discipline, was and still is large. Both provide an example of the progressive cycle found in discipline. Both entered the process as unstated meanings, backed by powerful and influential research which quickly moved each from an obscure to a prominent unstated meaning of discipline. Over the years, behaviorism faded because its theories and practices solved none of the issues of discipline. Constructivism has stepped into its place and continues to be influential, especially in progressive tendencies.

The Unstated Meaning of Palpability

The influence and impact of progressivism was powerful, providing opportunities for outlying unstated meanings. Sunshine (1973) referenced the changing landscape of American education in regard to discipline. Sunshine (1973) suggested that despite past definitions and theories, to most teachers, continued to refer to a degree of classroom order, control and punishment. Progressivism presented not just a new methodology but an alternate philosophical consideration regarding education. Discipline, prior to Progressivism, was almost always seen as a strategy by which to achieve classroom control, and it was almost always perceived inside as a euphemism for punishment even if not employed as a usable strategy (Sunshine, 1973). The issue, when considering Progressive tendencies, was now reflective of the paradoxical nature of

the educative domain: classroom control was needed, but it was a mystery on how to achieve that control. Progressives offered many educational solutions, but discipline was not one of them.

Teachers were taught early and often that their classrooms need to be ordered to be effective; students needed to be “on task,” and if they are not on task, then discipline, i.e. punishment, had to be imposed in order to bring about control (Sunshine, 1973). While being two distinct and separate ideas (discipline and punishment), punishment became a strong conceptualization of discipline (Sunshine, 1973). Discipline, according to Sunshine (1973) was seen in a new light, in substantive sense with a palpability by the teacher. Discipline was considered as something to be possessed. Teachers came to understand that in order to be a quality teacher one had to be in possession of this ability to discipline students; the unstated meaning of palpability was active. To most, discipline, in this substantive sense, was the absence or presence of something inside a setting, but that setting was not the student nor was it the teacher; the setting was... the classroom. This idea of palpability became even more attached in subtle ways to the ideology of discipline. Reverting discipline to a seemingly tangible classroom feature contributed heavily to the ambiguity associated with the current semantics of discipline. Sunshine (1973) does not suggest that discipline was conceptually considered as a tangible piece of matter; he does suggest, however, that it was presented, taught and perceived that way for multiple reasons. Over time, out of this palpability, two main views emerge on how to address discipline: management and punishment (Sunshine, 1973). He wrote that discipline, in a management sense, referred to those methods teachers employed, believing that they were effective in establishing order in the classroom. Presenting discipline as management meant that the “something” would be possessed by teachers and not by the students; this reaffirmed discipline as the external control of behavior which in turn classified discipline more along the

lines of schooling than education. These managerial methods of discipline were referenced as “employable” by the teacher, in much the same way one would reference computers or Ipads as employable today. Employable, according to managerial methodology, as meant rooted in the unstated meaning of palpability. Discipline was literally being addressed as a tool for the teacher’s toolbox; it was not social or living. It was mechanical and not living, something that acts on students and not with students; there it had a palpable trait to it. Discipline, according to Sunshine (1973) was a conceptual amalgam; it was a term with too many meanings which removed any identifiable meaning at all, a notion which supports the main assertion of this study. This ambiguity, referenced earlier, contributed to a fractured nature and reinforced the palpable nature of discipline. This fractured nature opened the idea of discipline to rapid and radical change.

Kaestle (1978) referenced a “quantum shift” in the purposes, methods and importance of student discipline in the 19th century. He argued that discipline manifested by virtue of the ascribed position of the teacher. Student discipline was administered through threats and the exercise of the rod. These were done to support and reinforce the ascribed position of the teacher (Kaestle, 1978). Discipline was a tool the teachers could use to reinforce the authority of their position. I would add that this reinforcement of the teacher was an accumulation of power directed at controlling student behavior in ways that acted on students not with them, which again is more a schooling orientation than an educational social one. Many reports at the time referenced a need for student discipline and often pointed to the breakdown of family discipline as the likely cause for student disorder (Kaestle, 1978). The concern for discipline coming out of the conceptualization of safety was stronger than it had ever been, and yet the idea of discipline

housed inside the paradoxical nature of the educative domain was as ambiguous as it had ever been.

According to Kaestle (1978), there were a number of new developments in the discipline of the 19th century and each one was produced by the unstated meaning of palpability. Most relevantly, in regard to discipline and schooling, moral discipline became clearly associated with schooling for the first time; discipline was now asked to bear responsibility for the morality of students, and seen clearly as a tangible tool to be used on students.

Kaestle (1978) reported that during the years 1830 – 1860 the building of character increased in importance in regard to schools, and so did the attempt to systematize schooling and consolidate control. Emphasis on school attendance and quality were two means by which the state was asserting more control over the students and their families (Kaestle, 1978). Kaestle referenced that Massachusetts public schooling was designed as a “universal agency of socialization, with the goal being to produce workers who were self-disciplined, orderly, punctual and honest. Massachusetts, as a state, was making a clear statement regarding education and its purposes (Kaestle, 1978). Yes, Massachusetts sought to provide education to children, but more importantly, the state wanted to make sure children grew into the kind of adults that the state desired. The discipline used was as a palpable tool and a means of controlling students.

Kaestle (1978) observed that many school leaders and social reformers of the time attributed poverty and crime to a failure in character development, which was attributed to the collective failure of the family. Kaestle suggested that many believed that better student discipline would lead to stability which would directly benefit the individual, the family and the general culture. Therefore, the by-product of these beliefs was the character–training movement which embroiled discipline into the movement (Kaestle, 1978). The demand that the school

begin to engage the student in moral issues suddenly changed the landscape of student discipline (Kaestle, 1978). Tried and true methods and models of punitive discipline were not only seen as out of touch and old, but in need of being eliminated; student discipline shifted back to a discipline rooted in the individual student and the student's character (Kaestle, 1978). This appeared to be a move back to ideas of discipline as internal self-control, but the move was not a move back but a move forward, towards punitive discipline presented as something different.

Kaestle (1978) averred that this conflict was not actually a concern in regard to the value being taught but instead, it was a struggle over how much authority the teacher possessed and how much authority the parents retained. Kaestle (1978) wrote, "Common school officials asserted for the first time that the teacher stood *in loco parentis*, a doctrine previously associated with residential colleges" (p.9). Kaestle (1978) suggested that, in the past, poor discipline at school was often laid at the parents' feet; it was the parents' responsibility to take care of their child's discipline. In unison with this new doctrine, more and more school committees emphasized that the teacher's authority should never be challenged, not even by the parents; the teacher's authority was presented as untouchable and crucial to successful education, thus ascribing to teachers a disciplining power previously not seen in education (Kaestle, 1978). Corporal punishment became wide spread, defended and justified by school committees as discipline became the most powerful tool a teacher possessed (Kaestle, 1978). Many school committees actually urged parents to side with the school without question when differences arose, arguing that in the long run it was best for their children (Kaestle, 1978).

The Unstated Meaning of Power

Kearney, Plax, Richmond, & McCrosky (1983) addressed the issue of power as associated with classroom discipline. Kearney et al. (1983) defined power in the classroom as

that which refers to the teacher's ability to control the classroom, asserting that it was necessary element for success. Kearney et al. (1983) wrote, "Thus, the ability of teachers to employ power impacts the effectiveness of their classroom management" (p.2). Power strategies, per the authors, are behavior-oriented strategies used to control student actions; Kearney et al. assumed that learning cannot happen without control, and therefore, they presented classroom discipline as power. Kearney et al. referenced in their work that traditionally discipline has been linked to power, contributing to a perspective that led to some historical interpretations of schools as "despotic structures." The same perspective defined teachers as "dominating rulers" and presented teachers as the authority to which all students were expected to submit. Kearney et al. did not present this as positive or negative, but they did consistently present discipline as power throughout the article.

However, the unstated meaning of power has not gained more traction for several reasons. Kearney et al. referenced that while traditional schools have defined discipline as an optimal goal, contemporary education, and especially progressive education has moved more towards the rights of students, which actual challenged the teachers' complete authority in the classroom (Kearney et al., 1983). Progressives like Dewey and others believed in a balanced classroom with students as equal participants. Students and teachers were to have a symbiotic relationship in the progressive classroom; power structures of all kinds were perceived as poison to symbiotic relationships. Kearney et al. spoke of the ambiguity of discipline, "Within the context of classroom management, discipline loses its name, meaning and pervasive emphasis" (as cited in Rutter et al., 1979; Wlodkowski, 1982). Kearney et al. identified a turn in the ideology of classroom management as it moved from the control of students toward those "teacher behaviors" that produce student involvement in the class.

Kearney et al. continued to reference the semantical flux as a contributing factor in the confused state of power inside education. The issue of control has shifted from an authoritarian power to a power rooted in coercion, adding to the burden of the teacher. Kearney et al, wrote regarding this, “Effective managers [teachers] are able to both encourage behaviors appropriate for learning and reduce student misbehaviors” (p. 5). The design of this was to position students more positively to the overall learning environment and to use classroom management as the means to do this (Kearney et al., 1983). The issue was more progressive than one of power; discipline as power was not equipped to address both tasks as one task. Discipline, as power, was a schooling mechanical process but it was now being asked to accomplish the same task as a social process. Power-based discipline strategies, per Kearney et al., no longer referred to control of students only; now they also referred to the teachers’ ability to induce students to make positive choices. Kearney et al. cited McCroskey & Richmond (1983) in this area of power. In their work, they spoke of power as a conceptualization of discipline that manifested in different power strategies. While McCroskey & Richmond may have been justified at the time in referencing power as a conceptualization of discipline, but currently power is an unstated meaning due to the shift from teacher authority to student rights.

Many, but not all, of the issues that caused unrest between schools and parents resulted from the use of corporal punishment in the classroom (Kaestle, 1978). Kaestle (1978) wrote, “Whether we use umbrella terms like industrialization, the rise of capitalism, or modernization, it can be established that in the period roughly from 1790 – 1860 in the American Northeast several long-range trends accelerated” (p.13). Some of those trends referenced by Kaestle included urbanization, commercial development, increased manufacturing workforce, technical innovations in agriculture, an influx of immigrants and the centralization and extension of

government services. All of these trends collectively transformed culture in a radical way and did so quickly. This transformation created space and justification for power to continue to be part of discipline despite the progressive push of the day. The issue of discipline as power presented in the literature was reflective of the culture of the day, as referenced by Kaestle (1978).

With society changing and the population swelling, there came an increased need for educational and service-oriented provisions which allowed relevance to the unstated meaning of power. Progressive education presented an alternative disciplinary option, one void of power. But now the need for power was back, due to the continued issue of student misbehavior (Kaestle, 1978). These cultural changes forced both parents into the workforce, resulting in all children being sent to school (Kaestle, 1978). At this time, the state began to intervene into familial affairs through the means of education (Kaestle, 1978). Tied to the state, the school was given more educational responsibility and authority, the school, through its authority from the state, asserted more power over the family through the education it provided. Inside that education, the means to educate started with the discipline used to control students (Kaestle, 1978). While the school received more power, and the family lost power, all through the general process of education (Kaestle, 1978).

Kaestle (1978) stressed that the parents of the 19th century granted schools custody of their older children, believing they were doing so for the purposes of educational training in skills and attitudes, which reinforced the power structures associated with discipline. Kaestle (1978) asserted that this parental choice created a loss of control over their children's education, giving power to the state. Kaestle (1978) posited, "The state successfully exerted its right to discipline all children in values that served, first and foremost, the operational necessities of the school, but that also served the social leaders' image of appropriate adult behavior and the

parent's image of appropriate childhood behavior" (p.15). Discipline, as asserted by the school, was conceived as a means of controlling the behavior of the student through external means.

Deacon (2002) dwells in Foucault's ideas of discipline throughout the work. Deacon asserted that Foucault's work highlighted power as that of disciplines, which extracted time and labor from individuals through a "system of continuous and coercive surveillance." As it relates to discipline, Deacon's reference to Foucault regarding power was a reference to the criminalization of education which presented discipline as power. Deacon (2002) wrote regarding Foucault's views of discipline, "The objective of disciplines is the inculcation in bodies of an imminent spiral of increasing compliance and utility" (p. 447). Compliance was a term connected with control and referenced consistently as a goal of school discipline. Deacon described this connection to power by referencing it as a Foucaultian apparatus of uninterrupted examination that functions to produce and to discipline. While acknowledging Foucault's polarized view of discipline and power's role in it, he contributed to the unstated meaning of power being associated with discipline.

Strong Suggestions

Discipline, as has been referenced, is a word with an ambiguous and confused semantical foundation. This study has presented conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline, but I have also revealed several strong suggestions associated with discipline. These suggestions are not consistent enough to be classified as conceptualizations or unstated meanings, but they have been uncovered and are more powerfully evident and warrant acknowledgement.

Discipline as compliance. In their article, Bergin & Bergin (1999) presented a new discipline strategy, one they called, "*persistent persuasion*." The authors suggested, as many

other authors have already done, that discipline was the “most consistent serious problem” in our schools today and was only getting worse. They suggested that discipline was a primary social event that was meant to influence children’s acquisition of values and behavior patterns. Bergin & Bergin (1999) posited, “The ultimate goal of discipline should not be mere compliance, but rather self-control and internalization of societal values” (p.190). The authors further asserted that the ultimate goal of discipline was to help children behave in “socially pleasing ways” so that society will not be filled with “hostile, aggressive people.”

Bergin & Bergin (1999) referenced compliance as a means to an end, distinguishing between committed and situational compliance. According to the authors, committed compliance existed when students appeared to accept an authority figure’s agenda as their own; situational compliance however existed when children, though cooperative, lacked sincere commitment and required sustained control by the authority figure. The authors suggested that committed compliance should be the goal of every discipline encounter because it was the only form of compliance leading to internalization. They also suggested that most teachers use forms of discipline only to promote situational compliance, which does not lead to internalization. Regarding the actual relationship of the discipline encounter, the authors viewed the student’s internalization as that which leads to self-control. Bergin & Bergin (1999) wrote, “Discipline takes place in the context of a relationship that is highly salient to children” (p. 191). The authors suggested that the manner in which adults interacted in those situations and managed their authority had profound implications on whether students developed into “prosocial and self-controlling” adults. Discipline, in this form of compliance, was different in the sense that the language presented as control that was social in nature, which was unique in a context presenting discipline as control. The authors suggested a compliance that was a soft control of behavior

dependent on the degree of self-control in students. While intentional in some respects regarding compliance, the authors presented no intentionality related to self-control, leaving self-control as a by-product with no plan to develop it.

Bergin & Bergin (1999) proceed to review various discipline theories; operant conditioning, power-assertive discipline, and effective discipline are all covered in detail in the article, and all are covered in ways that support the authors' own theory: persistent persuasion. The authors defined compliance as a "positive response to an adult's request" or long-term observance of rules. According to the authors, self-assertion and negotiation on the part of the child during discipline encounters may "reflect sophisticated social skills." The authors suggested that a "no" from a child in a discipline encounter could be negotiation and not defiance.

Bergin & Bergin (1999), in sum, suggested that both the developmental literature on parent-child interaction and the motivational literature on the effects of external control support the notion that the controlling management of students produced only short-term payoffs and does not contribute to the child's development of self-control. The authors caution that it can create anger and hostility regarding the relationship between child and adult. They suggested a form of discipline that would be powerful enough to achieve compliance while exerting power in ways that are subtle. The beauty of this theory, according to the authors, was that it produced positive relationships between the disciplinarians and the students. Bergin & Bergin (1999) wrote regarding their theory, "Persistent persuasion involves the adult continually restating a command until the child complies, but without increasing the level of power or using threats" (p. 200). Nevertheless, while the author's theory seemed plausible because it was compared to

aggressive discipline designs, the orientation derives from the same schooling mentality acting on students instead of acting with them.

Discipline as empathy. Cameron & Sheppard (2006) identified research that established a relationship between school discipline and a variety of negative student outcomes. Examples include poor academic performance and psychosocial difficulties. Cameron & Sheppard (2006) wrote, “The emerging picture, however, strongly suggests that conventional methods of disciplining students may be used prejudicially, and in some cases, to the detriment of the students disciplined” (p. 16). The authors also approached discipline from a social perspective, specifically through social work. They suggested that the research and subsequent findings represent the “best contemporary conceptualizations” on the impact that school discipline has on students. At the same time, they acknowledged that school discipline has received little to no attention from the field of social work.

Cameron & Sheppard (2006) referenced corporal punishment, behavior confirmation theory and punitive discipline as negative and detrimental to students. The authors considered operant conditioning as a collectively ineffective strategy; both neither punishment nor reward do not do enough to discourage unwanted behavior or encourage wanted behavior. The authors suggested that teachers who do not understand, appreciate or empathize with student behavior may also be unwittingly contributing to student misbehavior through a distancing from the student and a movement to a more disapproving ethos in response to the student. The authors suggested that there was a substantial body of literature demonstrating that students of color are disciplined disproportionately compared to other students. While this is still true, the issue is not one of truth but one of context and meaning. Discipline, presented as empathy, was new with very little research support.

Cameron & Sheppard (2006) suggested that students needed to be given some power inside the classroom but presented power strictly from a student perspective. They suggested that classroom management practices that deny some form of student empowerment may drive students toward manifestations expressing their perceived need for power. Cameron & Sheppard (2006) contextualized their views on student discipline when they wrote, “School discipline may act as part of a larger organizational system that treats students as untrustworthy and incompetent, suggesting to them that they are best off following directions and conforming to expectations” (p.19). While this may be reality for some schools, it may not be for others, creating more ambiguity regarding the ideology of discipline. This idea adds to the conglomeration of unstated meanings and conceptualizations associated with the ideology of discipline. The authors worked their way through the article deconstructing discipline as a valid idea only to conclude their article with a statement about its necessity. This does nothing more than contribute to the current ambiguous state of discipline.

Discipline as negotiation. Pane (2010) suggested that the conventional view of learning that was so deeply interrelated with “schooling” in American culture also drove views of discipline. Pane’s use of the term “schooling” added confusion, as schooling in this work has been clearly referenced as a mechanical version of education. Instead, Pane asserted that classroom discipline was a negotiated social interaction, one which suggested an educative view of discipline while using a mechanical term. Regarding terms used, Pane presented a hyperbolic example of the confusion surrounding education and discipline. Throughout the article, Pane used a variety of different terms, adding to the reader’s confusion and the ambiguity associated with the terms “education” and “discipline.” As observed previously, Pane asserted that

classroom discipline should be a negotiated social interaction as opposed to exclusionary discipline as the primary administrator of punishment to disruptive students.

Pane (2010) sought to unite learning and discipline through culturally social negotiated interactions. The author referenced research suggesting that effective classroom managers also engaged students in learning, understanding that students are a product of culture. Pane (2010) posited, “This often means that the troublemaker is looked on differently by the teacher, and discipline is worked out in the classroom via a proactive, interactive process” (p. 90). This interactive process, according to Pane, was a negotiated interaction between teacher and student. Pane viewed learning as social, referencing Vygotsky and his Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) as a prime example of a properly negotiated interaction. Pane proposed a view of classroom discipline as having the primary focus of the “processes of social transformation.” Pane suggested that looking at learning from a strictly social perspective assumed several things: knowledge is constructed; power operates through language; and people have agency and are part of the construct of knowledge. Considering these “truths,” Pane (2010) suggested that from this perspective, classrooms were created to provide culture that allows the teacher and students access to each other, which laid the foundation for social negotiated interaction.

Pane (2010) asserted that learning was a social construction and more than just involvement in new activities and new tasks. Learning, to Pane, was becoming something new, involving the construction of identities and relationships through “participation in communities of practice” marked by “societal systems of relations.” Pane (2010) wrote regarding the social aspect of learning, “A relational view of the person and learning constructs whole persons with agency who define themselves in practice” (p. 94). And, how we discipline students was one of the practices that defines us, per Pane. Pane (2010) presented an educational view of learning

marked by social interactions and relationships. The author suggested that if we find ways to transform classroom interactions, learning processes and discipline practices then we will influence what happens outside the classroom in life.

Pane (2010) suggested that viewing classroom practices, including discipline, as negotiable social practices encourages dialogue, explanation and analysis of social and academic aspects of the learning process. Pane's study involved African American students, but the important aspect of the study was the consistent social theme throughout. Learning, pedagogy and discipline were viewed from a distinctly social educative perspective. There was evidence throughout the article that the idea of education collectively was one that worked with students and not on students or over students, and thus was social in nature.

Discipline in the objective state. Xenos (2012) presented guiding principles governing the design of a point system that promoted discipline and academic rigor in the secondary classroom. Xenos (2012) supported his ideas, writing, "Thirty percent of new teachers leave the profession after three years and nearly 50 percent leave after five (National Commission of Teaching and America's Future 2008)" (p.248). According to Xenos the deciding factor cited by almost all educators was student misbehavior. The author sought to develop a point system by fostering a "constructivist environment" through a "behaviorist approach." According to the author, a point system was to be designed for two outcomes: improved classroom management and improved academic achievement. The question driving the author's study was simple: what disruptive situations adversely affect the individual ideal classroom learning environment? There was a clear intention on the part of the author to address discipline from a schooling perspective and to make it objective in nature. Using the metaphor of the tool, the author suggested each teacher create their own point system as their answer to the question of student misbehavior. The

implications regarding discipline presented by the author are innovative but still mechanical, pragmatic and lifeless.

Xenos (2012) suggested that the process was individualized, demanding visualization on the part of the teacher regarding how their individual classroom actually functions in comparison to how it should be functioning. The author encouraged a dichotomy regarding student behaviors: expected and encouraged. The author suggested that the role of the point system (or discipline system) was to move students from expected (behavior exhibited without instruction) to encouraged behavior (behavior needed for a successful class). The design of the point system was to take something abstract and subjective and convert it to an objective state for adjustment and correction. Xenos goes into detail implementing and managing such a system, focusing energy on the process with little regard for the students. Xenos (2012) suggested, “The point system is a classroom management and assessment tool for the teacher” (p. 251). According to Xenos , students are informed consistently of their status, which was to be a tool for the teacher. Xenos acknowledged that when a teacher’s time was dominated by discipline issues, academic issues suffered adversely. While this point system may work, the issue was still the same. It was a reinforcement of discipline as a mechanical objective process that was used on students to control their behavior.

Discipline as addition. Irby (2013) added the subject of student success to the discussion and brought up the question: does the type of discipline used alter success in students? Irby (2013) suggested that the answer to this question was, indeed, yes. Irby (2013) provided research to suggest that the enforcement of discipline, in some settings, can take precedence over other school issues, even teaching and learning. This appears to position discipline in an educational social sense instead of a schooling one. Irby posited that there was consensus among many

researchers regarding “positive behavioral and proactive approaches” to discipline; most believed both would do more to foster student achievement than punitive disciplinary approaches.

Irby (2013) stressed that punitive discipline was not grounded in sound educational philosophy and practice. Instead, it often relied on “militaristic philosophies” as forms of punishment. Irby (2013) stressed, “At issue are the different ways these traditional disciplinary measures play out in punitive regulatory frameworks” (p. 198). Irby took issue with the fact that students tended to remain at the center of punitive contexts and were always on the receiving end of punishments that varied. Yet, they are rarely part of any actual process of change in discipline, which was innovative and not found in other literature. Irby asserted the consistency in the findings regarding students who get into trouble; the findings suggested that when students engaged the discipline system it was not necessarily because of their actions but because of the label assigned to their actions by administrators.

Irby (2013) suggested that student actions have not changed all that much over time, but what has changed have been those actions deemed severe. Irby affirmed a clear trend in discipline policy, a trend toward more encompassing and punitive disciplinary perspectives that tended to mirror punishment trends of the past. Irby (2013) posited that the real problem, from his perspective, was the addition of more rules and more violations. The addition of rules changed an environment, especially if those rules narrowed the parameters of acceptable behavior. Irby identified this schooling mechanical mindset referenced throughout this work as one associated with most common school discipline.

Irby (2013) acknowledged that rule construction and addition was often based on certain agreed upon values which became problematic when those being affected by the rules were not

part of discussions regarding the rules. The other issue regarding rule construction and addition was two-fold: the consistent enforcement of the consequences and the values promoted by the rules. Irby asserted that, in matters of school discipline, codes of conduct tended to be that which governed discipline. Yet, the students who suffered the consequences of the rules were usually the ones left outside of the process and the last ones to be educated on codes of conduct. According to Irby, it was the codes of conduct that framed and reinforced those behaviors that were acceptable and those that were not. It was the codes of conduct that defined what actions would cause the student to engage in the discipline system, and yet Irby found that the student was never part of this process nor educated in the process.

Irby (2013) suggested that rule adjustments in schools usually involved adding rules; rarely were rules removed when adjustments were made. When students break these rules they typically “fall” into what Irby (2013) referred to as the “school discipline nets of social control.” The reference here was an important one as it was a clear indication to discipline acting on students in a schooling mentality in ways of control. According to Irby (2013), with policies constantly shifting and changing in accordance with the shifting societal and communal values, students were forced to keep up with the changes on their own. However, many of them did not, especially those already caught in the discipline system. This pointed to the absence of the ethos Smith (2015) referenced as “inviting truth and possibility” into the process. Irby asserted that such disciplinary flux regarding policy and rules was an ongoing issue for students engaging the discipline system. According to Irby (2013), “Corrective action additions increase the number of ways a student can be punished” (p. 207). This addition, according to Irby, tended to create a “piling on” mentality in regard to discipline, and actually increasing the burden required of the student in order to get out of trouble. While it appeared that more students entered the discipline

system, Irby's research suggested that the real issue was a discipline system that had been "deepened" by way of addition. Irby's research revealed a growing list of rules and policies that reinforced a discipline mentality focused on the control of behavior by punishment. Irby's reference to a system "deepened" by addition was a reference to a deepening of the conceptualization of punishment by way of a deeper discipline system.

A Summation of the Literature

In sum, this review has confirmed several general ideas regarding discipline. First, discipline is still a concern of education. It is still perceived as negative, as a threat and as something that holds education back from being what it was intended to be. Each article that was examined was written from the perspective of concern out of the conceptualization of safety. This issue of safety for our students has not waned and seems to only have become portentous. Yet, as an issue, discipline is garnering less attention than in the past as evidenced by the number of articles on the subject. The second general point is that discipline is an issue clearly in need of greater study. As indicated at the beginning of this review, the issue of discipline or classroom management held the attention of educators and researchers in the 80s and 90s, but that attention has waned, having been reduced to virtually no attention today in comparison to past years. This fact has been acknowledged specifically in articles by Butchart (1995), Slee (1997) and Mayer (1995) as well as the qualitative references regarding articles on the subject pertaining to years. Skiba & Peterson (2000) wrote regarding both these points, "The gap appears to be especially acute in the areas of school discipline and behavior" (p. 336). The authors posited that there was a growing gap in discipline between research and practice. Third, there is a strong semantical attachment to the idea of control associated with discipline. This idea of control is part of the semantics of discipline and a conceptualization of discipline. It is a conceptualization that is a

foundational part of its semantics and a plank in the foundation of its ideology. The control found in conceptualization is one rooted primarily in the external control of behavior while the control referenced in the ideology of discipline is both external control and internal self-control. There is an element of control regarding discipline that is commonly accepted. This could explain its appearance as a conceptualization as well as part of its ideology. The important point is that its impact was surprisingly minor relative to other conceptualizations and unstated meanings.

My general thoughts, after dwelling inside this issue for the better part of two years, are many. First, it is clear to me that the subject of discipline was never directly addressed according to its nature, and the evidence supporting that statement is the fact that there is no real agreement regarding its true semantical nature. In education, it has been seen for the most part as an insignificant part of a greater whole. There is no standard in regard to it, and there is very little current research as to its place alongside such educational stalwarts as human nature, pedagogy, learning theory or motivation. It is given little attention in any of the aforementioned subjects, and yet it continues to hold its annual place as an educational concern.

It is metaphorically like that pesky fly that disrupts your night reading on the back porch... you cannot see it, but you know it is there because it keeps disturbing you. It demands so little attention that you almost forget about it until it makes its presence known once again. You will never enjoy that book on the back porch to its fullest unless you solve the problem of that pesky fly. Do you stop reading and devote some time to ending its existence, or do you put up with it as it is just a pesky little fly? This is where I find discipline today. Discipline holds little value in educational circles as evidenced by the lack of collective attention it has received. Yet, it is seen in a negative light and primarily as something that negatively impacts education.

Why the lack of attention? The answer lies in the answers to the three questions driving this study.

The first question is this: how is discipline conceptualized in the literature? The easy and generally answer is negatively! In each article addressed, discipline is seen in a negative light. Over 70% of the time discipline is referenced in a negative manner and corporal punishment is referenced somewhere in the article; corporal punishment is no longer acceptable. Yet it is still addressed, albeit as detrimental and oppressive. The issue is that it is still being addressed in most articles examined for this project, which keeps it alive and a very real part of all conceptualizations of discipline. A continuous reference to its past keeps its past influential, active and current, and prevents anyone from moving on from it.

The second general context associated with discipline is the idea of schooling. Smith (2015) referenced that the contrasting ideas of schooling, an educative action imposed **on** students, and education, an educative action conducted in union **with** students were not equally represented when it came to the context of discipline. The perception of discipline, was largely dominated by this schooling sense. Most articles presented alternative theories as fixes to old outdated theories. Most articles addressed discipline as a tangible, mechanical and external part of the educational process. There was a reluctance to address discipline as a real essential part of the educational process. Within this reluctance was an idea of discipline as a non-issue in relation to education. Both of these themes served as the foundation for other contexts, contributing to discipline's current status and to the ethos inside education. To understand how discipline arrived at this point the three questions driving this study must be addressed in greater detail. In the following pages, each question will be answered in a manner that borrows from the literature review just presented.

How is discipline conceptualized implicitly or explicitly? There are many conceptualizations of discipline, but the two just referenced are two that are stated consistently and explicitly. These two general themes, negativity and with a schooling orientation, are clearly stated in their association with discipline and have become a part of current ideology. Most authors offer no resistance to either context, but inside both there are subgroups of an assortment of unstated meanings that deconstruct anything positive associated with discipline. This, in turn, prevents education, as a complete process, from becoming anything substantial. Over the next several pages I will address several major conceptualizations that are implicitly stated, and over time, have become attached to ideas of discipline. These conceptualizations were found to be underlying and foundational in regard to all conceptualizations and unstated meanings of discipline in educational settings. They are subgroups and contributory to entrenching the two explicit general themes of discipline namely, as negative and with a schooling mindset.

The first subgroup actually used discipline as a vehicle presenting an alternate theory. The unstated meaning attached is not so much a new meaning as an ethos of shifting meanings. As a vehicle, discipline was often blamed as either a scapegoat for the ills of society, or because of its lack, as the cause for all the problems related to education. With each reference came an alternative response springing from a new pragmatic theory. Multiple articles referenced discipline in this manner.

The second subgroup of unstated meanings associated with discipline in the literature was the idea of discipline being tangible. In many articles, discipline was presented as if you could possess it. It was a tool to be used; it was a trait to be possessed. In several articles it was presented as the one thing teachers must have to be successful. Discipline viewed as tangible will never become part of the overall educational process. When something is tangible it is useable for a

variety of different purposes. When something is tangible it tends to be concrete, simple and easily changeable. For example, if I have a ring that I do not like I can sell it and then take the money from the sale to buy another ring that I do like. The solution is as simple as getting rid of that which I do not like or that which does not work and buying that which I like and that which works. Discipline is not this simple; it is certainly not tangible, simple nor easily manipulated. Yet, in the articles that referenced the complex problematic abstract nature of discipline, the solutions tended to be simple and concrete.

The third subgroup of unstated meaning associated with discipline is a paradoxical nature. A paradox is a statement that is self-contradictory; it often contains two true statements, but generally they cannot be true at the same time. When examining the literature associated with discipline, in most cases the literature presented a paradox in regard to discipline. The four main paradoxes found associated with discipline were internal vs. external, self-control vs. control of others, assertive vs. passive and right vs. wrong. There were others present but these were the four major paradoxes associated with discipline, all four hold equal status as conceptualizations of discipline. These do not take into account the paradoxes of the educative domain referenced at the beginning of this chapter. Debates still rage as to whether discipline is intrinsic or extrinsic motivation; whether discipline is self-control or the control of others; whether it should be assertive and aggressive or passive, or whether it is right or wrong. The issue with these paradoxes is not that there is a right one and a wrong one; the issue is that they are all presented as valid in regard to discipline, reducing ideas of discipline to a dualistic ideology of polarized ideas battling each other within the very concept of discipline.

The fourth subgroup of unstated meaning associated with discipline is confliction. In the literature review, which included literature not referenced in this review, there was confliction in

regard to the importance of discipline and the responsibility of discipline. In one sense, discipline was addressed as if it were minor in importance in regard to all things educational. It has not been given the status of curriculum, learning theory or pedagogy; instead, it was and is equal in stature to a non-category of education equivalent to a substitute teacher. Substitute teachers, while essential and vital, are not held to the same standards of regular teachers. They are allowed to give seat work, to be inconsistent, and to be unprepared for class because they are, in essence, a placeholder for the regular teacher. Right or wrong, this is, for the most part, reality when it comes to substitute teaching. For better or worse, this is the mentality I found associated with discipline in the literature.

Discipline is perceived as a placeholder, meant to set the stage for the real work done by the teachers, curriculum, pedagogy and learning theories. Yet, when there are issues in education needing a solution, the first place usually examined for the cause of the problem is discipline. Poor test scores are the result of an out-of-control classroom. A break down in our youth culture is the responsibility of a lack of discipline in our schools. There is confliction associated with discipline. Teachers are conflicted to its importance. They are told that their chances for success without a controlled classroom are minimal, and yet there is virtually no training on how to manage a classroom in any teacher program. Parents are conflicted to its value as they are told to not discipline in an assertive way at home, but then are asked to give the school freedom to assertively discipline their children at school. As long as confliction is associated with discipline, discipline will continue to be an issue in education.

The fifth and final subgroup of unstated meaning associated with discipline is that of behavior. In reading all the literature associated with discipline over the last two years, I kept coming back to one issue relating to discipline. Yet, until now, the words to write about that

thought escaped me. This last subgroup of unstated meaning can be best stated as behavioral. Not Skinnerian, what I mean by behavior here, is this: student behavior is defined by schools according to its discipline. Students are perceived and even labelled in regard to a school's discipline policies and defined in regards to their behavior in accord with those discipline policies. If students have issues with school discipline, then the labels attached to them resulting from their negative interactions with the school's discipline will be negative. If students have no issues with school discipline, then their behavior will be seen as positive and the corresponding labels will be positive. Right or wrong, education, in general has allowed discipline to define students in terms of behavior. This is manifested in a number of diverse ways, with power being one of the more prominent ones. Power will be explored in greater detail in this project through the work of Michel Foucault. Discipline has become akin to a class or to knowledge itself. It has become something additional that teachers and students must address. It has become another box to check and a category into which students must fit. This is the more abstract subgroup of the previous four. Aforementioned, it is not as the rest, but it is prominent and influential. Its presence is subtle, but there is no way to miss the power of its influence.

Collectively, these five subgroups of unstated meaning have created one additional explicitly stated meaning that is clearly associated with discipline, namely, ambiguity. The rapid decline of current articles in reference to discipline is a sign of the ambiguity associated with discipline. The five subgroups are only the most prevalent unstated meanings; there are many more, and they tend to have no order or structure to them. As a vehicle, discipline has been used to promote cultural diversity, to oppose bullying, as the reason for aggression, poverty and low school involvement and as militaristic. Discipline has also been referred to as that which is important, instills self-control, promotes change, breeds order and produces freedom. Ambiguity

is an “uncertainty” or an “inexactness of meaning” in language. It is that which is vague and obscure, and in regard to discipline in school settings, this is reality when it comes to conceptualizations of discipline. What should conceptualizations of discipline be? The answer is not as simple and concrete as mere words. The answer lies beyond this question and the next two; it lies after a thorough analysis of the concept of discipline in a school setting.

What is the purpose of discipline? The second question driving this project is no less important than the first, but the answer to this question demands clarification. First, the answers associated with the purposes of education are not my answers nor are they necessarily the right answers. They are the answers reflected in the literature for this project. Second, the purposes of discipline are influenced by the many conceptualizations and unstated meanings of discipline, as shall be referenced. And finally, the idea of purpose reflects the reason something is done or created. The purposes of discipline reveal true perceptions of discipline or at least the concepts and meanings of discipline that are most important. They are the ones out into action.

Initially, the purposes of discipline were centered on students. Historically, the general purpose of discipline was seen as a necessity for education and as motivation for students to be part of the educational process. Several articles referenced instilling self-control or character in students, but these ideas tended to be from the past, antiquated ideas. The idea of promoting social, moral and political order was also referenced, as was the internalizing of societal values. Governance, guidance, correction and adjustment of students were all mentioned. These represent the majority of purposes which had in common the internalized motivation of students. Several articles went so far as to insist that discipline was for the expressed purpose of producing good citizens who contributed to the greater good. This focus on the internal seemed out of place

and out of sync with the conceptualizations of discipline that overwhelmingly focused on the tangible aspect of discipline.

There were articles focused on instilling authority, managing classrooms and punishing students, but these were clearly the minority. Other articles focused on prevention in the areas of bullying and misbehavior, but again these were minor in comparison to the clear majority sentiment presented earlier. Regarding the purposes of discipline, there appeared to be a disconnect to the many conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline.

As I went back over my notes, I started to notice action verbs everywhere, verbs like instilling, promoting, governing, controlling, creating, helping, preventing, eliminating, allowing, developing and improving. The presence of action verbs presented an ethos of action and authority, which was almost the polar opposite of the ethos presented by the many conceptualization and unstated meanings associated with discipline. The purposes of discipline, before examining any of the themes present, clearly suggesting an authority not found in any of the conceptualizations previously examined.

In regard to the difference between an educative sense and a schooling sense, the split was just about right down the middle. There were as many purposes presenting an educative sense as there were presenting a schooling sense. However, when it came to examining whether the purpose was internal or external, the numbers shifted with two thirds being rooted in an external orientation. This confused state about the purposes of discipline reflected the ambiguity mentioned earlier. There was a clear uncertainty as to discipline's place in education and to its continued usefulness. Nevertheless, there was also a reluctance to cast it aside as completely useless. The ambiguity found in conceptualizations of discipline have collectively become rather schizophrenic in nature. The idea of what was real when it comes to discipline was being lost,

eroding away with each newer article. Ideas of discipline that were presented as positive and right in one situation were presented as wrong in another, manifesting in false beliefs, lack of clarity and confusion. This was a clear example of the conflictive and paradoxical states referenced earlier. The many different conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline add to this schizophrenic nature of discipline, especially when considering purpose.

How does discipline manifest? This question may be even more important than the two before. The manifestations of discipline are indicative of the present ideology associated with discipline as an idea in current culture. Manifestations are clear indicators of how discipline is perceived and used in education today. Initially, manifestations centered on the idea of punishment, specifically corporal punishment. As mentioned earlier in this document, corporal punishment, while seen as archaic and wrong, was still very much a part of most manifestations of discipline. Other manifestations of discipline included test scores, student outcomes, poor academic performance and change. While many manifestations are not outwardly rooted in the idea of punishment, a deeper analysis revealed a punishment-edifice, with roots in control and objectivity. Failure on the part of the students to be disciplined resulted in low test scores, poor student outcomes, poor academic performances and change. Of course, change can be good but is often perceived as bad.

In examining manifestations, there are no clear consistent emerging outward themes with the exception of punishment. As discipline manifested in articles from older to newer, two themes began to emerge. These are two themes that have also manifested in the culture and concepts of education over the years. As a matter of fact, the presence of these two themes in culture guided my search for them in manifestations of discipline.

In one area, manifestations of discipline as punishment, surveillance, control, authority, regulation and correction speak to a foundational manifestation of power. This review and the summation of this review reveal a widespread foundational manifestation of power as referenced in this review. In the past, discipline has been seen as the panacea to the ills of the classroom; it has been seen as that which teachers must master to be successful. This idea of power, which has been a strong past manifestation, will be explored in great detail through the work of Michel Foucault later in the project as it related to discipline in an educational setting.

The second theme found inside discipline is even more subtly represented in manifestations like morality, behaviorism, constructivism, choice, individualism and relationships between teachers and students. Each of these expressions have, as their foundational manifestation, a focus on the student as being freed and as an important part of the learning process. This manifestation, unlike power, is a new manifestation associated with discipline. It is not a consistent idea represented, and as a conceptualization of discipline, is fragmented in its semantics in regard to discipline and its use. This manifestation will be explored through the work of John Dewey's progressive views in regard to education and discipline in the next section of this project. Power and progressivism are polarized unstated meanings of discipline. Neither was classified as a conceptualization due to their status in culture. Each has a history that is short, containing minor controversy and negative connotations. These were enough to contain it from being a conceptualization. Each one is also a response to the many conceptualizations associated with discipline and to the ambiguity and confusion about the purposes of discipline. Each response is an orientation of differing composites; power and progressivism are not responses differing only in direction but in composition, culture and

orientation. In the chapters to come, each will be explored in great detail in regard to their role in current conceptualizations, purposes and manifestations of discipline.

CHAPTER 3

JOHN DEWEY AND DISCIPLINE

With so much to examine, it is difficult to decide where to begin in regard to Dewey. He was a complex man with an assortment of strongly held views in a multitude of venues, but each has a history and an origin. It is impossible to deny the impact of his family or of his upbringing on him as a scholar. Dewey was influenced in his early life by a number of issues reflected later in this work: the carnage of the Civil War (in which his father fought), the rapid growth and diversity brought about by the industrialization, the strong Protestantism of his mother (which irritated Dewey), and, of course, his study at the University of Vermont (Westbrook, 1991). After his graduation, Dewey spent three years teaching high school. Teaching and education, as is well-known, would become a primary focus of Dewey's scholarship.

Regarding discipline, a cursory examination of all of Dewey's work yields little regarding Deweyan statements specifically addressing the concept of discipline. Why then use Dewey to examine the unstated meaning of discipline? First, progressivism was a prominent unstated meaning attached to the ideology of discipline, and second, as far as an influence, current education and its discipline is still affected by its tendencies. Regarding progressivism, Dewey was the prominent voice in the progressive field, and his thinking, progressive or not, was more consistent theoretically than the most progressive learning theorist.

Dewey did not write explicitly on the subject of discipline, but in that same sense, it is almost impossible to say that Dewey did not address the subject. Dewey (1962) presented some

of his more precise ideas on discipline in an article attempting to bridge the gap between theory and practice. In that article, he posited, among other things, that all children had inner and outer attention, which has relevance to this discussion about discipline. For Dewey, the inner attention was “given of the mind,” and it was “first hand,” a “personal play of the mental powers.” Dewey did not hide his thoughts on this inner attention when he wrote, “As such, it [inner attention] is a fundamental condition of mental growth” (p. 7).” External attention was the attention a child gave a book or a teacher, a notion of minor importance to Dewey other than to maximize the inner attention reserved for the real work in the mind. This distinction was clear and representative of Dewey’s general view regarding discipline. Dewey called keeping order in the classroom a “pressing and practical problem” but defined it strictly according to this external “minor” attention.

Inside his progressive orientation, Dewey was supremely focused on integrating the students into the learning process, doing this primary through their inner attention. His initial view of discipline was as a technique learned through the experience of the teacher, which was again minor and could change from teacher-to-teacher (Dewey, 1962). It was interesting and important to note that, in his address of theory and practice, discipline played a more prominent role than one would expect. “It [discipline] provides control over the means necessary to achieve ends and the ability to value and test ends” (cited in Rich, 1985, p.155). This presents a dilemma in regard to Dewey and discipline. What is discipline to Dewey?

For Dewey, discipline was in the first place, positive and in the second, constructive. This would suggest something creative and ordered, but it was not really order or control to Dewey (Rich, 1985), at least not in the many senses explored in the previous chapter. “Control” was, for Dewey, freedom in the confines of space. Dewey saw everything as an action that may or may

not involve us in a space in which we occupy (Dewey, 1958). Dewey (1927) wrote regarding freedom, “One is free to the extent of acting in harmony with the knowledge one possesses; freedom implies an understanding and mastery of the situation” (p.249). Situations were, like anything else, actions and occurrences in space. As a progressive, Dewey subscribed to the notion that students should be free to act in harmony with the knowledge which they possess; discipline, for Dewey, must be managed in a way that would not obstruct this path to harmony. According to Rich (1985), Dewey was presenting freedom as a means to an interactive experience and though that push never included discipline, it did not disqualify discipline either.

Rich (1985) suggested that Dewey could not accept the “child-centered progressives” *laissez-faire* conception of freedom. Dewey was clear; we have a role in reality. Reality can become what we wish it to be in conjunction with our analysis of its defects. (Dewey, 1958). Dewey saw us as interactive in our own reality. For Dewey, reality was space and what we did with it. Dewey (1958) viewed reality [society] as an “organic union” of social beings; he understood that this union happened in time and space. He viewed the school strictly as a mode of social life in which each member had a role. The school was part of reality which he saw in time and space. Earlier, I posited that education was a composite of social processes. I also asserted that discipline was a clear process of education and therefore social in nature. Dewey offered this same idea in his presentation of the school as a social mode of life and a place (space) where the student gained moral training in social interactions.

Rich (1985) suggested that Dewey perceived school as a place that should be allowed to organize itself on a social agenda. Rich wrote, “Order is relative to an end; therefore, if the end is the development of social cooperation and community life, discipline must grow out of these conditions and be relative to these conditions, not an end in itself” (p, 155). Discipline, in the

progressive sense, was to be given the ability to have a natural flow. It was not to be restrictive. Dewey wrote, “Experience exhibits ability to possess harmonious objects” (p. 60). The concept of an absolute experience, which Dewey described as only and always absolute and good, explicated the desired from the actual. Current discipline, to Dewey, would get in the way of absolute experience, preventing the real, which was only formed by clarifying the desired from the actual. Discipline would be perceived as a barrier to the process, which was first, social for Dewey. The social aspects of the educational process, for him, fell along two social lines of the larger educational equation: process and product. In reading Dewey, I have arrived at the distinct impression that discipline would be rejected by him if it was external and driven toward the control of behavior.

In previous sections of this work it was revealed that discipline existed in an educative domain that was paradoxical in nature. It was also revealed that there was a certain ambiguity associated with the educative domain that transferred to discipline. The ideology was discovered to have conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached in ways that affected its semantics. These all point to a confused semantical state regarding discipline and an example of what Dewey wrote about in *Experience and Nature*, particularly in his assertion of the union of experience and nature. Dewey did conceptualize discipline inside his progressive education. It was progressive education that Dewey presented as the better alternative to traditional education without reference to discipline. What is discipline in educational settings to Dewey?

Dewey and Discipline as Experience

Westbrook (1991) wrote regarding *Experience and Nature*, “In *Experience and Nature*, his [John Dewey] most important book of the twenties, Dewey returned to metaphysics on a grand scale” (p.321). Metaphysics, for Dewey, was about critical analysis. Boisvert (1998)

posited that Dewey's view of metaphysics was one which was tasked with providing a "ground-map for the province of criticism or evaluation." Dewey's metaphysical ideas begin with experience.

In metaphysics, especially in *Experience and Nature*, Dewey goes against most traditional philosophers of his day, as most of them recognized the field of metaphysics as that which documented, described and addressed ultimate reality from the perspective of being. Dewey went deeper, addressing the "original material" and affairs of "every-day primary experience" through experience instead of being. Experience contained the relational interactive piece necessary for Dewey. Dewey went even deeper than the experience of being as Boisvert (1998) wrote, "Dewey employs alternative formulations" (p.22). In a general sense, metaphysics was the study of ultimate reality, but for Dewey, that study would involve experience for the sole purpose of its relational nature. That was where his path went in a different direction from most philosophers of his day. His views of experience drove him forward in areas pertaining to education, informing his views regarding discipline.

In 1915, Dewey wrote an article entitled, "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry." In this article, Dewey indicated that his issue was not so much with the field of metaphysics as it was with the traditional metaphysics that governed the "epistemological preoccupation" of most philosophers of the day (Westbrook, 1991). Dewey took the same approach with traditional education. Dewey took issue with metaphysics' additional preoccupation with the search for a "temporally original" ultimate causal being (Westbrook, 1991). For Dewey (1925), this search was a form of the dualism between sensation and idea, which he rejected. Dewey's emphasis on metaphysics, as expressed in *Experience and Nature*, was one rooted in Science and the recent evolutionary process of science, which gave him a feeling of connection and comfort. Westbrook

(1991) referenced Dewey's assertion that science was to reveal how we came to have the world as it is, while metaphysics was to assist in the understanding of what kind of world we have.

Dewey viewed the separation of the two as a wall that had to come down.

Dewey (1958) began with an attack on the fundamental separation of experience and nature. Dewey did not rail against the separation of the two; instead, he pushed for a general recognition of the continuity of both together (Dewey, 1958). Westbrook (1991) asserted that Dewey believed that experience was not to be a veil or barrier to nature, but instead, it was to be a path into the world as a whole [nature]. Dewey saw experience as the interaction of things, including things in nature (Westbrook, 1991). This interactive characteristic would be essential to Dewey and to this project in regard to discipline in educational settings. Everything was social and relational to Dewey. Dewey (1958) wrote regarding this thought, "In the natural sciences there is a union of experience and nature which is not greeted as a monstrosity; on the contrary, the inquirer must use empirical method if his findings are to be treated genuinely scientific" (p. 2a).

To understand Dewey's views regarding discipline in educational settings, we must explore his views regarding experience must be explored. According to Westbrook (1991), Dewey saw experience as that which reached down into nature through its own depth and breadth. Experience, in a disciplinary sense, was not represented anywhere in the literature. Dewey (1958) explained experience:

It is not experience which is experienced, but nature – stones, plants animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced linked in certain other ways with another natural object – the human organism – they are

how things are experienced as well. (p. 4a)

Westbrook (1991) suggested, and I believe correctly, that Dewey had a sense of urgency in aligning science with general common sense because in the natural sciences this union was already assumed, and he knew that the initial assumption was weak. The scientific method was rooted in empirical thought; scientists, through the scientific method, controlled experience in ways that revealed truthful laws and facts of nature. Dewey thought that experience, especially the empirical method, could bring experience and nature together. In regard to discipline and the unstated meaning of progressivism, the battle between experience and nature was a battle between power and progressivism and how to reconcile one with the other. I have found the same battle between discipline and education.

Dewey (1958) believed that experience, reaching into nature with depth and breadth, and had elastic extent, meaning that experience stretches, giving it inference. This elastic extent was problematic regarding the practical discipline employed in that day. Elastic extent gave rise to Dewey's thoughts on an occurrence. Dewey (1958) wrote regarding an occurrence, "The fact the something is an occurrence does not decide what kind of occurrence it is; that can be found out only by examination" (p.1). Dewey believed that in an occurrence "something happens," and what that something was demanded study and inquiry. This was the existence of science and proof that experience penetrated nature, expanding through nature without limits (Dewey, 1958). Current discipline, for Dewey, would not be seen as having elastic extent or occurrence.

Westbrook (1991) asserted that Dewey believed the root cause for the failure of most philosophers regarding experience was a confusion regarding the semantics of the word "experience." Ironically, I am positing that this same confusion is present in the word, "discipline." Dewey (1958) referenced the term William James used to describe this confusion;

James referred to experience's nature as double-barreled, denoting two uses of the word: the subject-matter experienced and the process of experiencing. This was a reference to the confused semantics of experience which again mirrors the confusion occurring today with discipline.

Dewey (1958) wrote in reference to this double-barreled meaning, "It is 'double-barreled' in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality" (p.8). Westbrook (1991) wrote regarding Dewey's views of this confusion, "Rather they [most philosophers] had taken as their starting point the reflective division of primary experience into subject and object and mistaken treated this reflective product as primary" (p. 324). This assumption, as understood by Dewey, by-passed the questions of how and why the subject matter came to be. Instead, it settled on a division of cause and effect, which was a form of dualism rejected by Dewey. As has been referenced, discipline too has a multiple-barrel problem when it comes to semantics. Progressive views of discipline added to this confused state because, like Dewey, most progressives seek freedom first, which allows conceptualizations and unstated meanings to become part of the semantics in the name of freedom. Freedom, for Dewey, was not freedom as we know it. It was reactive and relational which placed requirements and restrictions on it, which leaves us questioning whether the term "freedom" should be used at all.

According to Dewey (1958), the separation of the subject matter of experience from the process of experiencing drained nature of its true qualities and presented experience as something it was not (Westbrook, 1991). Westbrook asserted that Dewey believed that when an object is isolated from the actual experience that reaches them and in which they actually function, then experience is treated as complete, a means and an end into itself, and it ceases in its existence as a process; for Dewey, experience without process was not experience at all.

This was how Dewey conceptualized discipline, as an experience or action without a process. Dewey (1958) wrote explaining this idea, “It is significant that “life” and “history” have the same fullness of undivided meaning” (p.9). For Dewey, life denotes function and comprehensive action of organism and environment, and only after “reflective analysis” was it broken up into external conditions, and there was no guarantee that those were correct conditions.

For Dewey, the empirical method was the only method capable of doing justice to this “inclusive integrity of experience” he referenced. Education was social for Dewey, but discipline was not. Dewey’s conceptualization of discipline was as an “external” attention, minor in comparison to the importance of “internal” attention. Discipline was a part of life, human nature and experience, but to Dewey, it was conceptually an object isolated from the actual experience of education. Discipline, in isolation from other educational experiences, had become a completed end to itself. It was not seen as a process or as anything relational or active. It had no ability to interact or relate. As a process, it had lost its status as “education,” and it had become, as Dewey forecasted, not even a true experience. It had no ability to be elastic, interactive or an occurrence. Reviewing the literature of discipline presented evidence of this as well. For Dewey, this would disqualify it from significance.

Education was rooted in primary experience and the objective, and there was not greater evidence of that than the standardized test (Dewey, 1958). A strong case can be made for the abstraction of education, as a whole. Dewey wrote regarding this process of abstraction, “The abstraction of certain qualities of things as due to human acts and states is the *pou sto* [vantage point] of ability in control” (p.13). Dewey posited that these primary experiences are so

“arresting” and “engrossing” that we readily accept them as truth without analysis. This was an issue in education and one of the conditions of concern for Dewey regarding discipline.

Dewey (1958) does not under-estimate the power of the educational process. He wrote regarding this power, “Thus we discover that we believe many things not because the things are so, but because we have become habituated through the weight of authority, by imitation, prestige, instruction, the unconscious effect of language ...” (p. 14). Dewey’s progressive views of education were not views rooted in the norm, as the norm, but they were static and without relation. As referenced earlier, discipline was perceived as a natural and intentional part of who we are. It was a social issue for parents, teacher and society. It had become, for better or worse, a custom of the educational process that possessed power beyond what we consider. That possession of power was an issue for Dewey. Power was not progressive, but the opposite of progressive. It was limiting, static and presented problems for true freedom.

Discipline, for progressives, was conceptually a form of control and therefore considered a commodity of power. Dewey (1958) recognized that the power of custom and tradition in both scientific and moral belief systems, if void of analysis, would never incur in a true series of checks and balances. Analysis, according to Dewey, revealed truth and the effect of “personal ways of believing upon things believed” and the extent to which these beliefs are influenced by static social customs and traditions. Dewey, I believe, would address current discipline, from the perspective of a social custom and tradition. Yes, discipline was a social process inside the educational system, but because he saw the school as a “mode of social life” and a microcosm of society, which he defined as an organic union of social beings, he would deem, maybe reluctantly, discipline as moral training through social interaction and begin to judge it along these lines. The school, for Dewey, was social and evolving constantly. For discipline to be

considered a part of the school it would have to be evolving constantly. Discipline, for him, would be another experience and educational process that should be allowed to organize itself according to a social agenda, but my sense is the Dewey did not really believe current discipline to be capable of this. He did not believe discipline could evolve to a point of socially organizing itself. To do so would require a fundamental change to its structure in order for it to become socially organized. For Dewey (1958) social interaction was an experience which he saw in an objective light. Dewey (1958) wrote regarding this thought, “The de-personalizing and de-socializing of some objects, to be henceforth the objects of physical science, was a necessary precondition of ability to regulate experience by directing attitudes and objects that enter into it” (p. 15). Could Dewey conceptually see discipline as a “precondition of ability” used to regulate other educational experiences? It had all the necessary qualifications; it was control and had become a commodity of power used to control behavior. For discipline to become progressive, discipline would have to undergo a foundational change, because a failure to change would result in discipline being the regulation through a “precondition of ability” which would result in a dualism which Dewey would reject. Dewey (1958) posited what this would look like in the following passage:

But for lack of such a method, because of isolation from empirical origin and instrumental use, the results of psychological inquiry were conceived to form a separate and isolated mental world in and of itself, self-sufficient and self-enclosed. Since the psychological movement necessary coincided with that which set up physical objects as correspondingly complete and self-enclosed, there resulted that dualism of mind and matter, of a physical and a psychical [mental] world, which from the day of Descartes to the present dominates the formulation of philosophical problems. (p. 15)

Dewey (1958) referenced the rise of psychology and its overt emphasis on the mental state of being. For him, mental ways of experience were treated as self-sufficient and complete and, more importantly, as primary experience due to their mental internal nature. For Dewey, this reduced genuine primary experiences down to two elements: either they were regarded as “not-given dubious things” that could be reached by the only certain thing: the mental, or they were denied existence, reduced to secondary complexities of mental states (Dewey, 1958). For Dewey, conceptually, discipline would be considered a secondary complexity.

Dewey (1958) documented two consequences of this issue. First, “experience” was reduced to traits connected with the actual act of experiencing. Second, recognition was of an object of experience, which according to Dewey, was “indefinitely other” and more than what was originally asserted to be experienced (Dewey, 1958). This created subjectivism as a philosophical position; through reflective analysis, a situation was created as a means of moving something that was subjective by way of actual experience to become something primary (Dewey, 1958). Discipline, defined as a social process, was reduced, according to Dewey, to something that was secondary and lacking in importance even though it was viewed as social, as important and as relevant. Dewey, at this point, provided a summary, and it is this summary that I will use to clarify his early position on discipline.

Dewey (1958) thought that “primacy and “ultimacy” of the material of ordinary experience” provided protection from the creation of artificial problems which he thought added confusion to real problems. This process also provided a method of testing for conclusions of philosophical inquiry while providing a reminder that those ordinary experiences must be replaced in the experience in which they arose for them to become confirmed or modified by that which they introduced (Dewey, 1958). Dewey (1958) asserted that the philosophical results from

this process, themselves, must acquire empirical value for them to contribute to the common experience. Failure to acquire empirical value would result in a reduced role as merely curiosities that are temporal.

Early, Dewey most likely encountered discipline in a “curious” state in the educational setting. Discipline was a separate and almost independent aspect of education, although there was no intentionality nor responsibility for its state; it just existed, and it existed for several reasons. Discipline was an outlier from all aspects of education; it was an outlier in past literature, and it is an outlier in current literature for a variety of reasons. Dewey most likely saw it as an outlier due to its volatile nature of change as referenced by the conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached to the ideology of discipline. Dewey did not see discipline in union with any educational philosophy or trend, nor did he see it flow out of any aspect of education. It received very little attention in regard to research, pedagogy or curriculum. It was often employed in isolation with little to no analysis and no means of accountability. The state of discipline tended to be static and powerful with no means of relation or adjustment. There was no real training or education on discipline, and for Dewey, that placed it in an external isolated state with no relational aspect to it. It was neither social nor was it experience.

Dewey, Discipline and Transactional Constructivism

For Dewey, his views on experience presented a dilemma. To address experience as social required a move away from the behaviorism and the stimulus-response mindset that was the foundation of the scientific method and the objective positivist movement. Dewey moved to a framework of transactional constructivism in response to this according to Vanderstraeten (2002). Vanderstraeten suggested that Dewey presented his transactional constructivist model initially through his criticism of the prevailing physiological model of the day, the reflex arc.

Vanderstraeten (2002) wrote regarding Dewey's main criticism, "Dewey's main objection to the stimulus-response (the reflex arc) model is that it assumes the existence of an isolated, passive organism that only (re)acts upon external stimulation" (p. 234). Dewey saw organisms as "already and always active" and not inactive until stimulated as the reflex arc modeled assumed. Dewey saw a stimulus as "a change in the environment" which was connected with a change also in activity. Vanderstraeten (2002) posited that Dewey saw both stimulus and response as "functioning factors" within a single "concrete whole" and not as separate reactive entities. The reflex arc, or the stimulus-response model, should be seen according to Dewey as a composite and as "the process all the way around." It was this process "all the way around" that was interaction for Dewey, and it was this interaction, in its purest form, which Dewey referred to as the "transaction" of organism and environment. This transaction rooted itself in ideas of space. Foucault identified this issue of space in regard to discipline, and Dewey did the same while working towards a freedom of space for all occupants through his idea of transaction. Transaction was total freedom of a space for all in the space with each other and with the space.

Vanderstraeten (2002) suggested that Dewey saw the transaction as a balanced and equal coordination of organism and environmental action. Dewey saw organism and environment together and not separate. Dewey acknowledged that stimulus and response were seen as separate entities with one acting on the other; in a stimulus-response environment one was always dependent on the other. Dewey saw stimulus and response not as external to the action, but instead, he saw both inside the coordination (action) of both. It was this coordination which gave rise to the actual stimulus because there was conflict inside the coordination. The internal conflict was a direct result of the composite balanced focus found inside the coordination which Dewey referenced as transaction. It was this conflict or doubt, as he referred to it, regarding the

next action which actually produced the stimulus. For Dewey, the organism must actively seek the stimulus in order to discover it. This was transaction to Dewey. Dewey did not see the organism inventing the stimulus nor did he see the stimulus as some kind of external occurrence that determined the behavior of the organism. He saw them together as one. Vanderstraeten (2002) suggested that Dewey saw the stimulus as a construction of the “coordination-seeking activities” of the organism which was a result of the organism’s interaction with its environment. Vanderstraeten (2002) wrote, “Although the construction is an achievement of the organism, it is not a construction that is exclusively located on the side of the organism” (p. 236). This constituted a rejection by Dewey of any form of behaviorism defining behavior in terms of stimulus or response and of either having an any advantage over the other. Construction, for Dewey, concerned the “process all the way around,” and this “process all the way around” was transaction.

Dewey & Bentley (1975) explained ideas regarding transaction in great detail, in their article, *Knowing and the Known*. Their position in regard to transaction was one rooted in Darwinism, viewing man as an organism progressing alongside other organisms in an evolution in which all of man’s “behaviors” were treated not as “higher” activities but as processes of “the full situation of organism-environment occurring in a space. Man did not have preference nor was he dominant. Man was an organism equal to all other organisms. Transaction was a technical expression, initially understood as an object in the midst of and equal to all other objects; transaction was unfractured observation (knowing) just as it is. Dewey & Bentley (1975) rejected attention directed at one particular side of the equation (organism or environment) because the attention would only be focused on one side of the *transaction*.

Dewey & Bentley (1975) attempt to explain transaction by presenting three manners of naming and knowing. They named the three levels Self-Action, Interaction, and Transaction. The authors call these human behaviors and presentations of the world. These behaviors and presentations are the action of organisms in space interacting both with each other and with the actual space (environment). Self-Action was defined as those things viewed as acting under their own powers. Self-Action was a focus on self over all other interactions. Inter-action was defined as those things balanced against other things in causal interconnection. Interaction was the precursor to trans-action. Trans-action was defined as systems of description and naming employed to handle aspects and phases of action without attribution to anything of finality. Dewey chose the word “transaction” in order to stress a systems orientation that was equal and balanced, an orientation which the word “interaction” would not be able to stress. Dewey and Bentley (1975) wrote regarding transaction:

It was said of Transaction in Chapter IV that it represents that late level of inquiry in which observation and presentation could be carried on without attribution of the aspects and phases of action to independent self-actors or to independently inter-acting elements or relations. (p. 136)

The idea of knowing and naming was rooted in “the process all the way around” in order to avoid dominance of one side, which was the problem of dualism and objectivity. Knowing and naming was thought to be unique to man, giving man a position of preference that would destroy the process itself. Hammarstrom (2010) wrote regarding this issue, “In Dewey’s trans-actional perspective there is no place for the idea of something mind-independent in the world of man, and still there is a possibility for knowledge and science” (p.2). Dewey saw freedom as that which produced true knowledge. Dominance was power and not freedom to Dewey.

Hammarstrom suggested that the difference of transaction was that there was no separation between subject and object and between observer and observed; instead, there was balance which presented the opportunity for freedom. The issue was space and what happen in it.

The determination of objects as themselves was in itself trans-actional. What does this mean? According to Hammarstrom (2010), it meant that “knowing is co-operative, open and flexible” in ways that exclude the “assertions of fixity.” It meant that knowledge was both a goal within inquiry and actually this inquiry itself. This aligns with Dewey’s view that all of man’s “behaviors” are processes of organism-environment and not primarily individual. Hammarstrom wrote, “It is not enough to consider the organism-as-a-whole, what is needed is to consider the organism-in-environment-as-a-whole” (p.4). For Dewey, in a transaction, there was no differentiation between subject and object; there was no domination of the knower over the known due to the knower existing in a different realm of entity or reality or due to the knower dominating the occupied space. This was implying that there were spatial constructs governed by someone over someone or something else. Dewey (1925) wrote in *Conduct and Experience* regarding this, “No organism is so isolated that it can be understood apart from the environment in which it lives” (p.220). Dewey presented the idea of structure as that which flows out of an “immediate qualitative presence” formed in “recurrent modes of interaction” that take place between one organism and its environment. It was this interaction that was important for Dewey, but to differentiate the two required deep analysis and selective abstraction. This analysis and abstraction would place organism over environment and destroy the balanced process Dewey sought. The behavior of the organism would be that which conducted the analysis and abstraction. For Dewey, behavior was always serial; behavior can be resolved into individual

acts but those individual acts cannot be understood apart from the series of actions; this was the social aspect of the process. It was this seriality that pushed Dewey to consider transaction.

Dewey's ideas of transaction align with Foucault's ideas regarding space. Foucault (1977) suggested that knowledge was produced by the struggle inside power relations occurring in space. Foucault posited that power and knowledge were relational in reciprocal ways that produced each other. Dewey was suggesting similar ideas inside transaction. Dewey & Bentley (1975) wrote, "The transactional point of view for behaviors, difficult as it may be to acquire at the start, gains freedom from the old duplicities and confusions as soon as it is put to firm use" (p. 141). Dewey & Bentley presented several examples of this production by way of struggle presented by Foucault. Dewey & Bentley ask the questions: can we examine talking without hearing, writing without reading, buying without selling or supply without demand? Dewey & Bentley are suggesting the same production by way of struggle as seen in ordinary everyday behavior occurring in space. Dewey would suggest that current discipline is a stimulus-response behavior occurring in space.

Dewey, Discipline and Metaphysics (as it relates to experience)

In light of transaction, Dewey's Metaphysics, as it relates to experience, becomes relevant. Garrison (2009) posited that the question of metaphysics, for Dewey, extended beyond being even beyond existence to the question of human essence. Garrison (2009) wrote regarding Dewey's views on human essence, "For Dewey, there is no fixed and final human essence, no ultimate foundation, no perfect *telos* and no substantial subject" (p.90). This statement highlighted the profound impact of evolutionary science on Dewey; everything, for him, was evolving as referenced earlier in his views regarding transaction. However, I posit that Dewey needed metaphysics to deal properly with the problem of the social individual in accord with

evolutionary theory. Garrison (2009) suggested that Dewey separated metaphysical existence from logical essence by way of language, insisting that language produce a composite of the two by bringing them together. Language and communication are both important in regard to transaction. Dewey posited that the coordination of organism and environment was not just dependent of action, but it was also “embedded in symbolic operations (Garrison, 2009, Vanderstraeten, 2002).

It was language that was distinctly human and distinctly social, and I will add, it was language that was also a means to “experience,” which was required for any strong Deweyan position. Dewey, from my perspective, addressed metaphysics in two distinct ways: through experience by way of language and through being by way of interaction (transaction). Before addressing his metaphysical views through being, his metaphysical ideas regarding experience must be explored, along with a series of other issues, concluding with his metaphysical ideas of being. In lieu of the addition of language, and its distinctly human aspect, Dewey urged avoidance of three fallacies that he felt would be temptations going forward (Garrison, 2009). Language was a “metaphysicality” specific to human beings. Therefore, Dewey was always careful of language, drawing attention to those temptations to avoid it becoming a means to a dominant position.

The first fallacy to avoid, according to Dewey, was the “philosophical fallacy,” which was the temptation to convert “eventual functions” into “antecedent existences” (Garrison, 2009). Dewey opposed the solution of universals through the appeal to things or events that existed independently of or before the actual inquiries that were undertaken (Dewey, 1958). Garrison suggested that, for Dewey, language provided meaning while logic determined whether we could warrant linguistic meaning as true. Dewey believed we get our human essence from the

distinct constructive and creative process (experience) of language and logic, in that order (Garrison, 2009).

The second fallacy, according to Dewey, was that of intellectualism and the mindset that all experience was an actual mode of knowing awaiting a process of reductionism, reducing all knowledge to the point of being defined in identical terms, i.e. science (Garrison, 2009).

Garrison (2009) wrote regarding this, “For Dewey, all inquiry begins with immediate, qualitative experiences (p.90). Dewey believed that we first have and feel existence before we know it, which means that much of experience will never be named or even known even though language is part of the experience (Garrison, 2009).

And, the third and final fallacy, according to Dewey, was the danger of dualism. Garrison asserted that all dualism was rejected by Dewey: mind over matter, knower over known, self over society, culture over nature and good over bad. Garrison (2009) wrote regarding Dewey statement on dualism, “We are participants in existence, not spectators” (p. 90). All three fallacies supported Dewey’s view that the social factor was the “inclusive philosophical idea” and not the metaphysical one, thus explaining his focus on the importance of the educational process. For Dewey, all true meaning was social. Garrison (2009) suggested that Dewey viewed metaphysics as the “last philosophy” and a product of language and inquiry.

Discipline, as an educational process, cannot escape these three fallacies. According to Garrison, Dewey clearly believed that language was that “natural” bridge that linked existence with essence through communication, but he also believed it was a bridge with destructive tendencies. Dewey (1958) wrote regarding this bridge:

Essence, as has been intimated, is but a pronounced instance of meaning;
to be partial, and to assign a meaning to a thing as the meaning is but to

evince human subjection to bias. Since consequences differ also in their consequence and hence importance, practical good sense may attach to this one-sided partiality, for the meaning seized upon as essence may designate extensive and recurrent consequences. . . Essence is never existence, and yet it is the essence, the distilled import, of existence; the significant thing about it. . . (p. 183)

Garrison (2009) intimated that, for Dewey, the distinction between essence and existence was for all beings, but only those “linguistic” beings could bridge this distinction in a right way. This destroyed the dichotomy of organism and environment, elevating the organism above the environment by means of language.

Garrison (2009) asserted that, for Dewey, existence was an event. Dewey saw nature as consisting of events and viewed existence as the subject matter of metaphysics, “an event of events,” that was about processes over substances, which referenced Dewey’s focus on interactions from a social position (Garrison, 2009). One cannot ignore the reference to space. These events and existences are all in a space of some sort. Garrison asserted that in Deweyan metaphysics there were no absolute origins, foundations or fixed or final ends. Everything was in flux including existence and essence, which Dewey referred to as the “distilled import” of existence (Garrison, 2009). Everything changes, according to Dewey, and will eventually be deconstructed or destroyed and reconstructed in an ongoing interaction (transaction) of organism and environment. For discipline to be part of this universe, it too, would also have to be active and evolving with the ability to be deconstructed, destroyed and reconstructed, and thus become an equal part of the organism-environment dichotomy.

Dewey and Discipline Related to Habits

Dewey (2012) referred to habits as physiological functions akin to breathing seeing and digesting. Breathing, seeing and digesting are unique to organisms and to their interaction with environment, but Dewey asserted that breathing was an affair of the air as much as it was of the lungs, and digesting was an affair of food as much as it was the stomach. These metaphoric references reveal Dewey's view of the habit (as he relates them) to his views of interaction (transaction). Dewey believed that breathing could not be defined as a process that was self-contained within the body; for it to be a complete process, the process had to interact with the environment in an equal and balanced way. Dewey believed that habits were more than biological functions; they were also part of a larger moral discussion regarding the interaction (transaction) of being and environment, which was consistent with his views of metaphysics.

Dewey (2012) wrote regarding morality, "Moral dispositions are thought of [by others] as belonging exclusively to self. The self was thereby isolated from natural and social surroundings" (p. 11). Dewey, of course, opposed this view, and believed, instead, that all virtues and vices are working adaptations of individual capacities in conjunction with environmental forces. Habits are individual interactions of the individual with the world, according to Dewey. Habits do not happen in a moral vacuum; they require environment and environment was always necessary for them (Dewey, 2012). Dewey believed that there was no such thing as neutrality; conduct was always shared, which referenced his belief in social interaction. Dewey wrote regarding this social nature of habits, "It is not an ethical 'ought' that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or good" (p.11). Discipline is an interaction of being and the environment and therefore, according to Dewey, social and interaction (transaction).

Because habits are social interactions for Dewey, causes and courses of action are perceived in a different manner. Dewey (2012) posited that those things which placed blame exclusively on an individual fall into one of the many traps of dualism, disqualifying them from being interaction (transaction). Dewey (2012) wrote, “Causes for an act always exist, but cause are not excuses” (p. 11). Dewey believed that questions of causation are physical questions and not moral ones. When we place cause on something in singularity we give way to our passions and our own calls for justice. Dewey wrote regarding this, “Our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to prevent recognition of social partnering in producing crime; it falls in with a belief in a metaphysical free will” (p.12). This thought consistently falls in line with his ideas on interaction (transaction). The same can be said of discipline as it follows the path of punitive justice, isolating the student or students from the rest of the school in ways that allow them to be forgotten and removed from their place in the collective whole. Discipline that places blame exclusively on the student would be considered by Dewey a form of dualism and rejected; it would also not be considered habitual.

Dewey (2012) believed that society and for that matter, the school laid all the blame on the individual for the purpose of excusing itself from responsibility. The effect, according to Dewey, was moving the issue back to causation, thus preventing it from ever being considered as a moral one. Dewey wrote regarding morals, “For morals has to do with acts still within our control, acts still to be performed” (p.12). Dewey would consider acts within our control as non-interactive and as self-action; acts exclusively under our control would not be transaction since the organism would be in a dominate position regarding the environment.

In order to consider discipline in the context of habits this analysis must follow Dewey (2012) deeper into the place, where habits occupy our daily activities, including the processes of

education. Dewey first examined those habits that would be considered bad or poor habits. For him, any thought regarding habit was inside the context of a union of habit and desire. When we think of good habits we think of them as “passive tools” waiting to be called into action when needed (Dewey, 2012). But, when we think of bad habits we think of them as almost separate from us and as something we can shed or remove. Dewey wrote regarding these bad habits, “A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, a command over us” (p.13). The bad habit for Dewey has autonomy and a life of its own. This would not be considered interactive or transaction.

In analyzing discipline through the same lens, it is easy to project this onto the student engaging the discipline system. However, I am not convinced that Dewey would see the situation in that way. I believe Dewey (2012) would project the situation onto the school and push the school to acknowledge that the discipline issues for most students should be owned by the schools as much students. The school was also trying to rid itself of its bad habits by distancing itself from responsibility and by activating a discipline process that pushed the issue back on the students as the cause. Discipline, in an educational setting, was a social interaction, which according to Dewey (2012) qualified it as means. Dewey believed that habits are something more than means. Dewey asserted, “They [habits] are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting” (p. 14). What does Dewey mean here by active means? Dewey (2012) explained that the “end” was a series of acts observed at a remote part of a process while a “means” was a series viewed at the earlier one. For Dewey (2012), this distinction was an important one because it surveyed a connected series within time. Dewey (2012), regarding means and ends posited, “The “end” is the last act thought of; the means are the acts to be performed prior to it in time” (p. 17). For Dewey, to reach an end required taking

our mind off of the end itself and focusing our attention on the next act to be performed; that next act must be the immediate end that was close to the last act.

The issue in regard to discipline was the deviation from this process. Dewey (2012) stated that any deviation from this process deferred one to finding an act different from the usual one. For Dewey, the discovery of this different act, which was in most cases the wrong act, became the end that demanded all attention because of the attention given to it. And all attention, in regard to the discipline process, was focused on the different act, whatever that act was. Attention that should be devoted to the next act, leading to the proper end had been diverted backward to the last act, thereby diverting the entire process to an end, that was not really an end at all. Dewey (2012) stated that to stop this process we must do as one would do with a bad habit... develop, what he called, a “flank movement.” Dewey stated that we must stop this act or thought cold and avoid it all together. Dewey (2012), wrote regarding this counter-process, “We must start to do another thing which on one side inhibits our falling into the customary bad position and on the other side is the beginning of a series of acts which may lead into the correct posture” (p.18). Dewey was consistent within his belief in interaction as a key to experience.

Dewey (2012) saw means and ends as two names from the same reality which informs perspectives regarding discipline. While most perceive them as terms of division or as terms in regard to one leading to another, Dewey thought of them as distinctions in judgement. Dewey (2012) thought this point was the key to understanding habits; therefore, he went deeper by presenting “end” as the name given to a series of acts collectively while “means” was the name give for the same series distributively. Dewey wrote regarding this:

To think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act performed. It means to look at the next act in perspective, not permitting it

to occupy the entire field of vision. To bear the end in mind signifies that we should not stop thinking about our next act until we form some reasonably clear idea of the course of action to which it commits us. (p. 18)

Dewey (2012) stated that to say an end was remote was to treat that end as a series of means, which would destroy Dewey's entire point. This is the issue of discipline as it divides ends and means into separate and different entities with one often leading to another. This was not interaction (transaction) to Dewey.

Dewey posited that if "ends" continued to remain distant then they would eventually become dream-like, illusionary or merely a thought. For Dewey, this equated to projection and required a backward work in thought regarding it. The end that was remote appears as a series of "what nexts," according to Dewey, with the nearest one to the current one in action and this action resulted in the nearest one merely by its location becoming the most important one. As an end was converted into means as it would naturally be if left alone, it was "conceived and intellectually defined." Now as an end, it had become vague and impressionistic according to Dewey. This is correlates to discipline that is pragmatic and rules-oriented.

Dewey (2012) wrote regarding the result of this process of ends and means, "Now the thing which is closest to us, the means within our power, is a habit" (p. 18). Like or not, Dewey was positing that, in accord with location, that which was closest in proximity would become habit-like. The habit now, according to Dewey, moved towards some end or result, projected or not, as an end-view and became operational. Dewey referenced this as "character" when he wrote, "Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could exist" (p.19). Dewey's conception of character followed his conception of habits (Gribov, 2001). According to Dewey, character was habit interpretation (Gribov, 2001).

Character, for Dewey, was habits in the forms of means and ends interacting with environment in ways that were rooted in transactional constructivism. The transactional perspective of Dewey all but eliminated the difference between ends and means. They, essentially, became one.

Character, according to Dewey, was dependent on the continued operation of all habits interacting equally in every act. However, in matters of discipline associated with education, the process is broken. The continued operation of all habits would no longer be part of every act for students if discipline continued in this wrong trajectory. Discipline itself could be the blame. The idea of zero tolerance best illustrates this issue. Discipline, in accord with the concept of zero tolerance, operates from a means-oriented philosophy. Zero tolerance discipline avoids ends and deals only in certain means. There are no acts that are thought or done collectively. There are only a series of means (early acts) that are tied directly and absolutely to the code of conduct associated with school discipline, and then, there are single “*stays*” followed by one “*ending*.” I use the terms *stays* and *ending* for two reasons: first, to avoid confusion with Deweyan terms, and two, to imply that both terms refer to singular linear externally controlled action imposed on the individual by a school’s discipline policy.

A *stay* is an engagement of the discipline system. The term *stay* implies that the engagement does not involved anything educational; it merely punishes the students for a violation of policy or procedure and leaves the student right where the student was found. The current discipline system leaves every student in the same muddled position: the student *stays* in the same position was before the engagement of the discipline system. The term *ending* is as it implies. The student has reached the *ending* thus concluding the student’s time in the specific educational setting. There is no series of acts or thoughts on the part of the student interacting with the environment, i.e., the school. There is only blind robotic submission, and this

submission is in most cases to a list of rules, i.e. the environment, and not to someone. A student engaged in any discipline system rooted in a philosophy like zero tolerance incurs a short series of *stays* that attempt to manipulate the student into conforming to the code of conduct. There is no interaction (transaction) with the environment. If these *stays* fail to reform the student, then the *stays* accumulate to form one final *ending* which removes the student from the collective whole (the school) with no means or opportunity for return.

Dewey, Discipline and Moral Imagination

Ideas of morality and ethics have a home in Dewey's interaction (transaction). Fesmire (2003) asserted that pragmatism understood the practical value of principles, rules and values, and how each played a role in orienting and economizing decisions. Regarding the revitalization of pragmatic ethics, Fesmire wrote, "For ethics to be revitalized, what needs to be challenged is the belief that principles, rules and the systems they comprise must constitute the tethering center of either ethical theory or practice" (p. 3). A rejection of this "dogma," (Fesmire's term) would add to understanding while liberating principles to actually work as they were created to work. Fesmire (2003) believed that this dual process of understanding and liberating would "emancipate" moral philosophy in two profound ways: first, it would release moral philosophy from the "idolatrous worship of systematized rules." Secondly, it would also reject the ongoing search for a "one size fits all" system (Fesmire, 2003). Both issues are struggles of moral philosophy, ethics and discipline. It is this collective struggle that I believe relates each to the other and blends them into one ideal... morality.

Fesmire (2003) referenced the foundational thought behind most moral theory; a belief that rested in the idea that there was to be a moral bedrock that would direct all to the right way to think and the right way to address moral problems. Dewey's response to this, according to

Fesmire, was to reject this mindset in the name of interaction. Fesmire (2003) referenced Dewey's assertion that ethical theorists should abandon the search of one unitary moral and ethical principle, and instead, each should engage in a process of reconciliation of inherent conflicts and irreducible forces that characterized all situations of moral uncertainty, which bore all the references of Deweyan interaction. The traditional thinking on any kind of morality has been grounded in this unitary principle, which for Dewey was always problematic due to its polarized nature. His solution to the problem was moral imagination.

According to Fesmire, imagination was conceived by Dewey as autonomous mental power, as a force instead of a function, and as that whose task was to do specific things such as form images. Fesmire (2003) wrote regarding the common perception of imagination:

Imagination's job, the dominant story ran, is to synthesize sensations from Perception into reproducible images (Kant's reproductive imagination) and relate them to the understanding, which classifies and schematizes the images (what Kant called productive imagination) as instances of universal concepts (a process of judgement). Understanding then passes these on to Reason, which decides, perhaps consulting Memory, what to do about the matter. (p. 61)

Fesmire (2003) suggested that Dewey's view of imagination was as much a normal part of human activity as the movement of muscles. Imagination was no better than any other part of the body. Fesmire asserted that both Dewey and Charles Pierce argued that imagination was inherent interaction (transaction) in humans in much the same way as breathing. Fesmire asserted that Dewey felt strongly that reasoning and all the processes that make human intelligence are performed in imagination. Fesmire (2003) referenced Dewey's belief was that all active

intellectual life was imaginative, to a degree, because all of it was also interactive. What does imagination have to do with discipline?

Fesmire (2003) referenced two “imagnations” that are recurring themes for Dewey. The first, according to Fesmire, Dewey called *empathetic projection*. Fesmire asserted that, for Dewey, empathy was the animating mold of moral judgement, which worked out in our taking on the attitudes of others that moved us beyond ourselves, to a place of consideration for others feelings, interests, worries as if they were our own. Empathy was consistent with Dewey’s desired interactive nature and his emphasis on transaction as the “processes all the way around.” Empathy, it would seem, required a good bit of imagination to be interactive (transaction), and as interaction, it possessed the traits Dewey felt were most important.

According to Fesmire (2003), the second theme Dewey referred to was *creativity tapping a situation’s possibility*. Fesmire referenced that this theme was Dewey’s central meaning behind imagination. Here, according to Fesmire, was where Dewey stated that imagination was the chief instrument of good by way of the inertia of habits overriding adjustments of past (and even present), yielding that which was uniform and routine in response to others. Imagination was an instrument of construction of the organism and the environment working equally together. Fesmire (2003) referenced imagination as the synthesizing of sensations, and in doing so, he was also referencing Dewey’s inclusion of experience into the realm of imagination. It was experience that produced the sensation that would be synthesized into imagination in a balanced composite way. If imagination was the chief instrument of good it was because, according to Fesmire’s view of Dewey, it allowed this composite construction to take place between organism and environment.

Fesmire (2003) argued that imagination, for Dewey, was capable of reaching deep into the “hard stuff” of the world, especially physical and social experiences by way of empathy and creativity. It was the physical and social experiences that were unique to each individual that would be so hard to balance as a part of the organism-environment composite. Imagination actively interacted with both physical and social experiences, according to Dewey, to produce new relations for thought and action. This produced new aims and ideals guiding behavior toward a new way from past ways. It was this guidance of behavior that was of interest in discussions regarding discipline; imagination, while not the opposite of discipline, would certainly present a different perspective on the guidance of behavior leading to experience.

This new way, Fesmire (2003) suggested, would be one that incorporated all that was before it and presently with it in order to create something new beyond it. This same mindset was found in both empathy and creativity. Fesmire was suggesting that imagination was a precursor or an early stage of transaction. Imagination would be the synthesizing of sensations produced by experience coupled with imagination, operating according to the morality of an individual and the individual’s interaction with environment. This, for Dewey, was morality working actively by way of imagination in order to produce habit through ways rooted in interaction (transaction). Fesmire (2003) wrote regarding imagination that according to Dewey, “It constitutes an extension of the environment to which we respond” (p.66). This response, for Dewey, was true imagination both as *empathy* and as the *creativity* (creative tapping of possibilities) (Fesmire, 2003).

The idea of moral imagination was not a place where Dewey was willing to stop regarding his theory of morality; he would move beyond imagination into the area of ethics. Fesmire (2003) wrote regarding Deweyan ethics, “Central to Dewey’s approach is that ethics is

understood as the art of helping people to live richer, more responsive, and more emotionally engaged lives” (p. 92). Fesmire suggested picturing a metaphoric union of Deweyan ethics and jazz music in the form of improvisation in order to better understand Dewey’ ideas regarding ethics, a notion which I found accurate and helpful in understanding discipline. Improvisation was the major metaphor that Dewey used. Improvisation contained several important references: the selfless individual, the harmony of life and continuity of the music. Fesmire wrote, “A jazz combo spotlights and illustrates the empathetic, impromptu and inherently social dimensions or moral compositions” (p. 93). This metaphor, according to Fesmire, called attention to the habits we cultivated that enabled construction of improvisational ideas to move forward in response to problematic situations, all in interaction (transaction). Improvisation presented interaction as transaction in the truest sense of the word. Interaction is not transaction as long as there is a hint of dominance on one side of the equation, thus we find the reason for the addition of (transaction) to the word, interaction.

Improvisation, whether it be jazz, public speaking or problem solving, depended on the things Dewey valued the most when it came to human conduct. Fesmire (2003) referenced that according to Dewey there are two extremes when it comes to conduct: one falls along the lines of improvisation and the other was almost the opposite of improvisation. Fesmire (2003) wrote regarding these two extremes, “One relies on routine ends, fixed doctrines, or closed systems of ready-made principles. . . The other relies on no forethought or discipline and results in behavior that is slapdash, unorganized and in the dictionary sense of offhand” (p. 93). Both, according to Dewey, can have a detrimental effect on moral imagination, but for Dewey it was the metaphoric improvisation that he valued most in regard to moral imagination and ethics because improvisation was transaction in its truest form (Fesmire, 2003).

Fesmire (2003) referred back to the jazz improvisation in reference to Deweyan ethics and moral imagination; much like the jazz musician “played into the past tone” to determine “possibilities for future tones,” so too was the movement of moral imagination and ethics.

Fesmire (2003) extended the metaphor forward:

Moral-agents/patients must respond empathetically to each other instead of imposing insular designs, and they must rigorously imagine how others respond to their actions. This is learned, with experience and practice. Only to the degree that we are immature, unexercised in thinking and uncultivated in perception, do we imagine anything enduringly good will come from immediate satisfaction of stray, self-interested desires. (p. 95)

Dewey’s moral imagination was always about others first and never about self even though it required self to engage in a qualitative way. In the same way the jazz musician would doom herself to a level below her best if she thought only of herself; the same fate would await the individual if ethics were not part of the social process. The beauty of the metaphor was the foundational element improvisation holds in all of jazz music. Fesmire (2003) referenced the importance of deep perception of the other in regard to improvisation while holding a deep and equal consideration for self. A jazz musician had to think more of the others than of herself in order to respond properly in an improvisational situation, but the jazz musician could not think only of others. She must also think equally of herself. Fesmire (2003) wrote, “Moral imagination may collapse [without deep perception of others] into a pseudo-empathy of the Golden Rule variety (in one common interpretation), in which others’ values and intentions are reduced to one’s own” (p. 95). Improvisation, the nature of the “art of helping others,” was the foundation

of Deweyan ethics and the engine behind Deweyan moral imagination because it was truly interaction as transaction.

Dewey, Discipline and Metaphysics (as it relates to being)

Earlier, metaphysics was addressed in accordance with experience. Here, I will address metaphysics in accordance with being as it relates to experience. While Dewey did not share an aversion for the term “being” in regard to metaphysics, he did share Aristotle’s macro-view of metaphysics (Boisvert, 1988). According to Boisvert, Dewey characterized metaphysics as that which involved the “cognizance of the generic traits of existence.” Dewey argued that metaphysics has generic as well as specific traits in relation to being while Aristotle referenced disciplines that addressed being partially or universally. According to Boisvert (1988), both Dewey and Aristotle agree on the important fundamental issues:

For each, (a) metaphysics is defined according to its unique subject matter; (b) that subject matter is described in the most general of terms as either “being as being” or the “generic traits of existence;” and (c) metaphysical knowledge is thought to be as much a possibility as knowledge in other disciplines (p.127).

The idea of metaphysics, as an idea of ontology, could not bypass an idea of evolution. Dewey, as the true philosopher, does not avoid the evolutionary issue, but instead addressed it through his metaphysical ideas. Dewey embraces the evolutionary issue throughout all of his philosophy, and metaphysics was no exception.

As referenced earlier, interaction (transaction) was, for Dewey, important to all of his philosophical and educational views. In regard to being, his metaphysics leave interaction momentarily in order to address interaction in a singular way, which he called forms. Dewey’s

forms were important in regard to transaction. Boisvert (1988) asserted that, for Dewey, there were three main interconnecting points to be made regarding these forms. Boisvert asserted that the first was a failure to accept “the primordial nature” of the organism-environment interaction as the cause of the mistaken dualistic view of form from matter. Boisvert further asserts that form, for Dewey, did not exist separately from matter; form was matter in all its interactivity. Second, Dewey, according to Boisvert, believed that forms should be viewed as results and never as “pre-existing givens.” This view was rooted more in Dewey’s views of evolution than in anything else, again flowing out of his transactional constructivism. And, third, Boisvert suggested that, for Dewey, forms and materials were correlative in a response to the dualism associated with matter.

Dewey, according to Boisvert, rejected all dualism as false due to its destruction of the union, in this case, the union of matter and form. For Dewey, it was the interaction (transaction) of being and environment that reaffirmed the union of form and matter. Boisvert (1988) wrote regarding this union, “This interaction is the ‘cause’ of the “union” of form and matter” (p. 131). However, Boisvert clarified the connection of form and matter by referencing, again, the subject of art; according to Dewey, in *Art as Experience*, the connection does not mean that they are identical. This was important because if they were identical, form and matter would have no connection at all. Form and matter would be different and have very little interactivity because they would be, in essence, the same. Art, for Dewey, was representative of “formed matter,” which was experienced as the interaction or union of form and matter. Art, when right and true, was a three dimensional transaction. Both were one, for Dewey, which would destroy any ideas of dualism associated with form or matter.

Boisvert (1988) asserted that Dewey saw forms not as already existing data, but instead, as the product of interaction (transaction), i.e., “formed matter.” Dewey saw the interaction of environment with organism as the source of all true experience; again, this idea was consistently represented in his metaphysics through his forms. For Dewey, forms were not isolated from beings nor were they independent of a being’s activities. They were not even independent of human interactions. Forms were all these things and more. Forms were transactional.

Despite similarities to Plato’s forms, Dewey’s forms were not Plato’s forms nor were they a theory of forms (Boisvert, 1988). Dewey’s forms do not exist apart from other entities. Instead, they seem to spring from the interactions with other entities. They were transactional constructivist product. Boisvert made the connection of forms to structure, which Dewey wrote about in *Experience and Nature*. Dewey, according to Boisvert, spoke of structure in the same manner as forms; structure cannot be isolated nor was it ever a means to itself. Structure was only found in conjunction or interaction with something else, which makes construction possible. Foucault suggested a similar idea in regard to structure. Foucault (1967) posited that structuralism was the attempt to connect elements on a temporal axis presented as opposed to one another in ways that each implicated the other. This would make impossible the necessary struggle between power and knowledge, referenced by Foucault, impossible. Foucault saw power and knowledge producing each other through struggle, a notion was similar to Dewey. Boisvert (1988) wrote regarding Dewey’s connection of structure and form, “What Dewey says here about structure can also be said of form” (p. 133). Boisvert asserted that Dewey saw forms as having a “relational or complimentary” existence, which supported his ultimate metaphysical position: that beings are “beings-in-interaction” with their environment.

Dewey's metaphysical position was consistently relational-oriented, and, according to Boisvert (1988), always constituted form. This implied that the process associated with form was always ongoing and being constructed. Boisvert (1988) wrote regarding this Deweyan idea, "The aspects of change (disorder) and permanence (order) are blended together in such a way that both must be considered fundamental" (p.135). According to Dewey, for both to be considered fundamental, both must be an equal part of the processes of existence. Boisvert asserted that this order that Dewey proposed was made out of "relations of harmonious interactions" that empowered one another. I posit that this fundamental blend of disorder (change) and order (permanence) manifests itself in harmonious interaction, which Dewey would reference as transaction.

Dewey saw everything as existing in temporary conditions moving forward. Current views of discipline come pre-packaged with a variety of connotations rooted in a static fixed state. Dewey would reject this static fixed state as anti-interaction and would certainly never see it as transaction. Many ideas of discipline have no relational aspect to them, which, again, Dewey would reject. These two situations present a barrier to the possibility of considering discipline in the dual way of process and form. To rid himself of this barrier, Dewey moved away from Hegelian views of an Absolute transcendental mind and towards a Darwinian view of an evolved mind interacting with the environment (Russell, 1993). Hegel could not provide Dewey with the means to transaction; Darwin could. An evolved mind, in Dewey's view, would have as its future, interaction with the environment, while an absolute transcendental mind would not interact with anything but instead would dominate. However, there was still the presence of a dichotomy with dualistic tendencies that must be addressed. In order to explore this aspect of

Dewey's metaphysics, his connection with a Russian theorist, Lev Vygotsky, must be examined briefly.

Russell (1993) linked Dewey to Vygotsky, a Russian theorist with many commonalities to Dewey. Both attacked these dichotomies: student/content, subject/matter and academic/discipline. Dewey, according to Russell (1993), pointed out that the dichotomies allowed battle lines to be drawn. Russell asserted that, according to Dewey, those who favored the subject matter side of the student/subject matter dichotomy tended to phrase their arguments in terms of adjustment and discipline, while those who favored the student side tended to phrase their argument in terms of self-realization and liberation. Russell asserted, regarding these dichotomies, that theorists on both sides of the divide shared an essentially dualist picture of the educational process. Dewey deplored this idea.

According to Russell (1993), Dewey argued against this dualist dichotomous view as it tended to create an "unreal" and "insoluble" problem, moving issues further away from any kind of interaction (transaction). Dewey, and Vygotsky favored approaching dichotomies as "two limits that define a single process" and not as opposing static entities. Vygotsky, as referenced by Russell, preferred a view of dichotomies as a journey of "continuous reconstruction." While this mindset was applied to students and subjects in a holistic way, it also incorporated the entire education process. Russell (1993) wrote regarding this view, "Truths and disciplines are as organic and dynamic and vital as the student is because they are all made of the same stuff: human experience in social activity" (p. 176). This was interaction and necessary for transaction.

Russell (1993) referenced that Vygotsky, like Dewey, built his education theory on Darwin and not Descartes or Kant, who both did this because they believed human beings to be adaptive to change in the environment. But both also believed in using internal humanity in a

non-dualistic way. Both rejected a Cartesian view of the world; instead, they favored a dynamic process of growth, development and constant change, which rejected all dualism and dichotomies (Russell, 1993). Russell pointed out that this changed the view of knowledge from one rooted in the idea of getting something right to one that was a continuous process of acquisition and transformation interacting with the environment in ways that lead to construction. This presented a view of knowledge that was always changing and should also present a similar view of discipline. Both Vygotsky and Dewey would reject a discipline rooted in a list of rights and wrongs in favor an interactive approach to discipline, provided it had the ability to change and evolve.

Russell (1993) asserted that both Dewey and Vygotsky in their separate approaches sought to do away with the Cartesian epistemological dichotomies in order to discover the interactions that change continuously. Russell pointed out that both Dewey and Vygotsky captured the idea that one has to be social to be human; both advocated for changing the direction of interaction and moving from the social to the individual. This direction, according to Russell, reflected the view that the social and cultural gave rise to an understanding of the consciousness.

Russell posited that learning, according to both Dewey and Vygotsky, took place through social interaction. Foreign language instruction is often deemed incomplete until one “thinks” in the language being learned. Both Dewey and Vygotsky, according to Russell, believed that knowledge was primarily about the acquisition of habits of the mind that took place as a social interaction between being and environment. Russell (1993) suggested that both Dewey and Vygotsky fought the idea that man is at war with society. According to Russell, Dewey saw most of what we call human nature as plastic and somewhat set. Vygotsky, according to Russell, saw

socialization not as dual reality, but instead, as social activity which gave rise to consciousness flowing out of the being – environmental interaction.

Russell (1993) asserted that both Dewey and Vygotsky believed that experience was not discriminatory regardless of whether it was good experience and bad experience. All experience was thought to impact the student. Dewey offers criteria for what would qualify as experience in his book, *Experience and Education*. Dewey (1938) devoted an entire chapter to the criteria of experience in regard to education; in it he referenced back to his views on habit in regard to experience. Dewey (1938) wrote regarding habit, “The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences” (p. 35). For Dewey, the principle of continuity of experience was a primary criterion of experience and meant that each experience takes something from the past to modify something for the future in ways that are interactive (transaction). There was no wasted or neutral experience; there was always an element of continuity to each experience, according to Dewey.

For Dewey (1938), continuity referred to his belief that every experience affects the quality of future experiences, whether for better or worse. Dewey (1938) wrote regarding this, “Moreover, every experience influences in some degree the objective conditions under which further experiences are had” (p.37). For Dewey, continuity was but one aspect of experience; there was another equally important aspect of experience. Dewey (1938) wrote regarding this other aspect of experience, “Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had” (p.39). Dewey was clear; experience was not merely that which occurred internally in body and mind, but experience was also composed of external sources, i.e., interaction with the environment. Dewey placed great

importance on the internal, but he also understood its interaction with the external. Dewey (1938) believed if the external experiences were discounted or destroyed experiences, these external experiences would be reducing experiences, as a composite, to that which is only internal to the individual and not in balance or in interaction with the environment. This, according to Dewey, reduced experience to that which was internal, eliminating that which was external and creating a polarized experience that was not interaction in any form.

In regard to this balance of external and internal influences, Dewey (1938) believed in a holistic idea of experience, one which influenced his beliefs in education, especially the primary educational responsibilities. For Dewey, this primary educational responsibility included awareness of the role education played in shaping actual experience as well as recognizing the conditions that are conducive to producing actual experiences. Dewey (1938) took exception to any theory that assumed that the objective aspect of experience was of greater importance and would impose external control that limited freedom of individuals; experience, for Dewey, was not true experience when all other aspects of experience were subordinate to objective experience. Issues in education that operated upon this idea of “subordinating objective conditions to internal ones” was not experience or education to Dewey. He favored one that involved the interaction of objective conditions with internal (subjective) ones in equal and balanced ways.

This idea of interaction (transaction), for Dewey (1938) expressed his third criterion in regard to experience. For Dewey, interaction assigned equal rights to both objective and internal conditions. Dewey wrote regarding normal experience, “Any normal experience is an interplay of those two sets of conditions” (p. 42). Together in their interactive state, external and internal conditions of experience form, what Dewey called, the *situation*. For Dewey, this was the issue

with traditional education. Its issue was not that it overemphasized the external conditional aspect of experience, but that it did not give enough attention to the internal conditions of experience. According to Dewey, this was in direct violation of his principle of interaction from the side of internal condition.

Dewey (1938) believed that individuals lived in a world of *situations*. For Dewey, the term *situation* meant that the individual lived in a world of constant interactions between the individual and objects and other individuals. The idea of interaction does not live in Dewey's world without the idea of *situation*. Dewey believed that an experience was always what it was because there were consistent and constant transactions taking place between individuals and the environment. Dewey wrote regarding his idea of environment, "The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had" (p. 44).

The two criteria, continuity and interaction, were not separate from each other, according to Dewey (1938). They intercepted and united in ways that form experience. Dewey referred to them as the "longitudinal and lateral" aspects of experience. The condition of continuity, according to Dewey, allowed different situations to succeed one another because something was carried over from earlier situations to later ones. Dewey saw individuals passing from one situation to another in an expanding and contracting environment. Regarding educational movement in this expanding and contracting world, Dewey (1938) wrote, "What he [the student] learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which follow" (p. 44).

Closing Reflections of Dewey and Discipline

For discipline to become meaningful in accord with Dewey, it would have to be classified first as interaction (transaction) then as experience. There is no delay in this process for Dewey because to remain an interaction would be to become unbalanced and a non-experience. From the onset of this project, I set out to study discipline as it appeared in an educational setting only to find this very unbalanced multiple conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with it that have confused its perception, use and future. Dewey conceptualized discipline in many different ways. He conceptualized it as control and saw it manifested in multiple ways, but he also recognized that it was not a moral issue along the lines of good and bad. For Dewey, experience was evolving, active and relational. It was interaction (transaction). It was not an intentional control, but more of an evolved state of mutual equal interaction of organism and environment in space.

Dewey addressed experience, habit, moral imagination and other issues with the delicate brush of interaction (transaction), careful to stay consistently inside his theories. Each idea flowed artistically out of his united views of experience and nature through interaction (transaction). Dewey (1938), in *Art and Experience*, presented three criteria that quantified experience. The first criterion was the principle of continuity which implied that each experience took something from the past to make something new in the future (Dewey, 1938). Dewey (1938) presented the second criterion as activity which was both internal and external. For Dewey, experience was that which occurred internally in body and mind in unison with interaction of experience that was composed of external sources, i.e., the environment.

The third criterion is that criterion which captures the first two, and that criterion is interaction (Dewey, 1938). For Dewey, external and internal conditions of experience form, what

Dewey called, *situations*; situations were a balance of objective (external) and internal conditional interaction. In most instances, I presented interaction with a reference to transaction for one reason: rarely would anything referenced qualify as true transaction according to Dewey. When referencing art and improvisation I used the term transaction without interaction because both capture pure transaction according to Dewey.

Discipline is, by every means, a social experience to Dewey. Discipline is not a desired experience of Dewey, but the issue was not whether it was a good or bad experience; the issue was whether it was an experience. Garrison (2009) asserted that, for Dewey, there was nothing fixed or static; discipline was an experience by its very nature but was presented in the literature as fixed and static. Discipline in accord with education would need to be a balanced interactive process for Dewey. Dewey sees education as life and as a social experience. Dewey's metaphysical position was a relational-oriented one that gave equal attention to both process and form through interaction (transaction) (Boisvert, 1988).

Boisvert (1998) referenced that, for Dewey, experience was linked with nature, but it was also different than nature itself. Experience reaches down into nature, into its depth and breadth, in ways that stretches experience beyond nature. This stretching that Dewey equated to experience is noticeably absent in current discipline as well as in most current conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline. Current discipline is more plastic than flexible. Westbrook (1991) referenced that Dewey believed that objects in isolation prevented actual experiences from reaching them. This then defined the experiences associated with them as complete and as a means and an end unto itself or as plastic. The experience, in this plastic state, ceases to exist as any kind of process and becomes an occurrence where "something happens" but no one is sure what. In this situation discipline becomes only a form of control and a

commodity of power because of its isolation; it is void of any interactive state. It becomes stagnate and plastic, not even an occurrence to consider, with no hope of becoming interactive (transaction). As plastic and stagnate, any space it occupies it does so without any possibility of interaction with the space (environment) or other organisms. This notion would be rejected by Dewey.

CHAPTER 4

MICHEL FOUCAULT AND DISCIPLINE

Michel Foucault spent most of his life researching and writing about power. While this project is not directly addressing power, it is examining power as an unstated meaning of discipline. Power has become a tangible objective capable of being used as a tool of influence, especially in educational settings. This qualifies the use of Foucault's work on power especially as it is applied to discipline in educational settings. Foucault addressed power. I am using his work as a complement to the progressivism of Dewey with its evolutionary focus on freedom and the conceptualization of discipline through the unstated meaning of power.

Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983) referenced that Michel Foucault was born in Poitiers, France in 1926. He became academically prominent with a historical account of the Western experience of madness. This was a significant work for Foucault as was his masterpiece, *Discipline and Punish*, which will be used prominently in this project. Foucault, according to Dreyfus & Rabinow, thought the study of human beings took a decisive turn at the end of the eighteenth century when "human beings came to be interpreted as knowing subjects" and the "objects of their own knowledge." It was at this time that discipline took a turn as well. Following Foucault's tracking of the shifts in power relations reveals an eerily similar track inside educational discipline. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983) observed that "Foucault's early works center on the analysis of historically situated systems of institutions and discursive practices" (p. xxiv). Discipline, if nothing else, is certainly an historically situated system producing some discursive practices. Discursive practices, for Foucault, was a reference to reality coming into being

(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Foucault argued that human sciences could be presented as having an internal self-regulation and autonomy, avoiding the establishment of labels such as truth or sensibility.

The theme of disorder was an early prominent theme for Foucault, according to Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983), as he does not present it as medical or physical but instead as excess and irregularity, which is an interesting position. Both terms are direct references to space, revealing Foucault's intentions regarding power relations. He presented an emerging contrast of reason and madness that changed quickly over periods of time. Foucault asserted that this change was an adjustment by reason and madness to "an unseizable ontological condition of pure otherness" which was serving as the norm which he initially used for his adjustment and subsequent correction. Early in his work, connections and specific mechanisms of order and power were not clearly defined, which prompted him to examine the European culture of confinement and the role of poverty and madness in confinement. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983) observed, "Why was it, Foucault asks, that within the space of several months in 1656 one out of every hundred people in Paris was confined" (p. 4)? Confinement, to Foucault, became an answer to the many punitive issues of the time in Europe, and so naturally he began to identify power initially through confinement. The term, "confinement" was a term Foucault used to present the larger concept of space.

Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983) referenced that Foucault observed modern relations with the insane had exploded after the French Revolution, creating a melding of the criminal with the insane in the same confined space. Confinement in regard to space became a means used to solve a variety of social problems (Foucault, 1965). Confinement became an acceptable practice for many human conditions, but humane use of space in regard to the mad and poor was the broader

more foundational answer. Foucault saw much of discipline through this spatial way. I reference confinement here as a means to reference space and the role it plays both in Foucault's perception of power and in my perception of discipline in educational settings. Confinement embodies the manifestation of spatial issues better than any other term. The word confinement also presents power both in special constructs and from the perspective of the collective whole; both are important and prominent in this discussion. Discipline, in educational settings, has [as one of its more impacting unstated meanings] power. How is it used? How does it manifest? By examining Foucault's ideas regarding power, especially inside the idea of space, I hope to unpack power and reveal how it manifests as discipline in school settings.

Understanding Foucault's idea of power is difficult. Before unpacking it, we need to establish a context of what Foucault meant by power and his transition to his ideas regarding biopolitics. Foucault (1978) perceived power as deriving from two specific categories: the sovereign and the disciplinary (Piro, 2008, Lefsteing, 2002). Piro (2008) asserted that Foucault primarily thought of the sovereign as the power of government or monarchy as applied upon those who were not sovereign; the disciplinary power, according to Foucault, was best perceived as that power which created and defined norms and could be considered as a result of the power of the sovereign. Initially, the two could be said to be mutually inclusive. Power was relations for Foucault (1965) that were nonegalitarian and active; it was "political technologies throughout the social body," as referenced by Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983). Dreyfus & Rabinow asserted that Foucault suggested that power was also productive and that which came "from below." Power, to Foucault, was not an idea that was concrete or possessed contextually; that would present as it was not. Power, for Foucault, was relations; it was active and moving in tension. His conceptualization of power was strictly through his ideas regarding power relations.

The Issue of Power as Space

Examining progressivism through Dewey presented an economy of control concerned with traditional boundaries and parameters seen as restrictive and detrimental as can only be seen through the idea of space. Discipline, in the Deweyan progressive sense, was one of ultimate freedom, which “freed” the student to take his or her rightful place in the educational process as an occupation of space. For Dewey, freedom was the removal of restraints and restrictions as imposed by traditional educative methodology, allowing students to be released and free in their pursuits of education; freedom was also the autonomy to move in and out of space. Maher (1999) suggested that for Dewey a key educational goal was societal harmony and unity, which was rooted in how one moves about with others in space. The achievement of unity in space was paramount to Dewey’s educational pursuits; it was freedom. Power would be perceived by Dewey as a barrier to unity, that which confined movement in space and ultimately destroyed all freedom of movement in space. Power, as presented by Foucault, was presented from multiple dimensions, with all of them flowing from a sense of an economy of scale regarding space and not initially as any one solution to any of the issues facing discipline in education.

Lefstein (2002) asserted that the failure of progressive education was a failure of the relationship between pedagogy and classroom control, i.e., discipline. Lefstein suggested, by way of Foucault, that discipline, as a technology of power, could be the element needed by progressive education to become “the” educational process. This suggestion presented discipline as it has been found in the literature, as a tangible objective used as a tool of influence. Discipline was seen and addressed by both Dewey and Foucault in ways pertaining to space. Lefstein (2002) presented Foucault as an answer to the dilemma of progressive education, but his ideas were flawed from the beginning. Foucault’s work on power is not the answer to

progressivism, but it is a lens that can be used in conjunction with Dewey to examine discipline as a spatial construct.

Any suggestion of discipline, without a reference to space, was a reference to power inside power, but not to power as perceived by Foucault, or, for that matter, Dewey. While Foucault does address power he does not present power as a solution or as an end. Foucault suggested that the major problem facing 18th century social institutions (prisons, factories, schools, etc.) was this: how to manage many people in a small space to maximize productivity and minimize threats to the institution (Lefstein, 2002). Foucault (2003) suggested that this 18th century problem manifested into the basic phenomena of the 19th century: power as space. Power had a hold over all of life by way of acquisition over the totality of man, and this totality was not just cultural it was a totality through to the biological end. Foucault saw power as capable of yielding the biological nature of man (the living part of being) to state control.

Foucault (2003) highlighted this control of the biological nature as a shift that occurred in power through a change in the Classical Theory of the Sovereignty (CTS). Foucault called the right of life and death in the CTS as a “strange right.” In one sense, according to Foucault, the sovereign has the right of life and death granted by the CTS; the sovereign can put people to death or keep them alive. In terms of relationships, Foucault (2003) saw this as reducing the subject to no status. The subject was neither alive nor dead; the subject was, instead, reduced to a position of neutrality, which, in essence, reduces the subject’s right to live or to die, making it the sole right of the sovereign. This right of life and death was unbalanced and that unbalance was always leaning toward the side of death, according to Foucault (2003). The issue of space in discipline becomes an issue of life and death because the right of life and death was also a right to punish, and that right belonged to the sovereign. This was the initial question of power as

exercised on the individual body as manifested in discipline as well, but over time, that too changed and that change involved space.

Foucault (1967) suggested that space was not as much an innovation as an intersection. He suggested that the history of space was a history of an ensemble of places in space and time: sacred and profane, protected and open, and urban and rural to name a few. The punishment of the individual took place in a public space. It was the individual that must conform to the sovereign. The rebellion of the individual against the sovereign was due to confusion and paranoia manifesting as anxiety (Foucault, 1967). During Medieval time, space was referred to by Foucault as the space of emplacement. It was this space of emplacement, according to Foucault (1967), that was opened by Galileo and his ideas regarding the solar system, and this presentation of open space identified the real “human anxiety” was being one of space. The conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline reflect anxiousness and semantical confusion and, most are spatial in nature with little reference or concern for time. The anxiety is not really a discipline issue but an issue of space and time, with space being the real issue because, of the two, it is space that can be controlled by man through power.

The ideas of space and discipline are ideas prominent in this project. Discipline, in educational settings, as discovered in the literature, has been reduced, in many instances, to a tangible objective, i.e., a tool of influence, and space has become the point of action in that reduction. Foucault (1967) explained that there were two main types of space: internal and external. Internal space where our dreams and passions live. Internal space is ours. Internal space was untouchable even when the power of the sovereign was aimed at the individual and the body. External space, according to Foucault, is where we live with others. External space draws us out, “claws and gnaws at us.” Foucault (1967) referred to this external space as heterogeneous

space, a space with sets of relations that delineates sites (living spaces) which are, according to Foucault, “irreducible to one another” and never “superimposed” on one another. For Foucault, it was the external spaces that contained power relations, and therefore it was these spaces that the sovereign power claimed.

Foucault (1967) suggested that there were two main external spaces: utopias and heterotopias. Utopias, according to Foucault, were sites with no real places. They were perfect with perfect form which made them unreal places. Utopias might exist internally, but not externally. Externally, Foucault saw only heterotopias. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, existed in every culture. Foucault (1967) wrote regarding describing heterotopias, “As a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live, this description could be called heterotopology” (p. 4). Foucault presented the mirror as a metaphor of both utopia and heterotopia. Foucault suggested that the mirror was a utopia because it was a placeless place, but he also suggested that the mirror was a heterotopia because it does actually exist in reality. Utopias and heterotopias are important in regard to discipline because both are constructs centered and built in regard to space. Foucault would identify discipline as a heterotopia because space was its primary means. Dewey’s transactional perspective also clearly identifies discipline as space.

To clarify discipline as a heterotopia, Foucault (1967) presented six principles to clarify heterotopias. The first principle posits that all cultures have heterotopias that fall into one of two categories: heterotopias of crisis or heterotopias of deviation. Heterotopias of crisis tend to be reserved, privileged or sacred spaces reserved for members in crisis. Heterotopias of deviation are spaces set aside in society for those whose behavior deviates from the norm. These are quickly replacing heterotopias of crisis.

The second through sixth principles are all reflective of space. The second principle stated that heterotopias tend to have a specific function that reflect the society in which they exist. The third principle stated that true heterotopias are capable of bringing multiple incompatible spaces together into a single space. Fourth, true heterotopias are linked to real “slices in time” and will break from traditional passage of time. Fifth, heterotopias have a system of how to enter and exit the space. And, finally, the sixth principle is the most confusing. Foucault’s heterotopias have a specific relationship with the space, that remains as illusion or compensation. While confusing, the core issue remains the same... space. Discipline according to these six principles, can be defined according to heterotopic space. In this way, Foucault aligns with Dewey in presenting a strong case for finding current discipline in spatial constructs. The issue of space now shifts to the internal/external dichotomy. Foucault suggested, through his biopolitics, that even our internal space was no longer safe.

Biopolitics was an attack on the internal space of the individual. It was an attack on the living being. Biopolitics, for Foucault, identified the transition from the power of the sovereign to the power of the sovereign of the next world. Foucault suggested that death was outside the power relationship paradigm and beyond the reach of any power except in the case of mortality. The issue, for Foucault (2003) was not that this power had control over death, but that this power does not recognize death and actually ignores death. This was an attack on the internal space, the living space where we establish who we are. Foucault (2003) wrote regarding this, “This is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (p. 249). There were the power relations Foucault discovered; power relations that were heterotopic and biopolitical.

Lefstein (2002) asserted that discipline in a school setting operated through four different techniques that are manifestations of heterotopias: distribution of space, control of activity, hierarchical observation, and normalizing judgement and examination. Regarding students, the control of activity was managed in increments through daily schedules, classroom rules, tests or athletics. The hierarchical observations were managed through surveillance, whether it be administration-to-faculty or faculty-to-students. And, finally, the normalizing of judgment and examination was managed through expectations for student achievement via multiple means of assessment, or through a school and classroom behavioral expectations. Through these four techniques, Lefstein asserted that power does not have to be active to be impacting, a notion which pulls Foucault and Dewey closer together. Lefstein (2002) wrote, “In Foucault’s (1978) analysis, power does not have to be actively and consciously exercised by teachers; it is distributed throughout the school structure, in the minute details of spatial, temporal, and organizational arrangements” (p. 1631). Again, the issue of space is presented in heterotopic ways as well as biopolitical ways. Lefstein asserted that these tactics are at the “foreground of school power relationships” and are actively employed by the teachers while, at times, being actively resisted by the students. Discipline, in educational settings, seeks to eliminate this resistance, but Foucault would suggest as would Dewey that this resistance is necessary.

Lefstein (2002) posited a solution to the problem of reconciling progressive ideology with the consistent existence of discipline problems in, what he called, “cognitive partition,” that is thinking of power and pedagogy apart from each other. He proposed concentrating learning theories, curricula, lesson plans and teaching methods in the pedagogical region, while concentrating problem students, discipline strategies, incentives and punishments in the disciplinary region. Lefstein (2002) was, in essence, replacing physical walls with symbolic and

metaphoric walls, which was the manipulation of space. Discipline, ideologically, is about many things; it is control; it is space. It is also punishment and management; it has progressive tendencies and is considered to have palpability. It is considered power, the enactment of which appears to be something very different from progressivism. Nevertheless, Foucault's tension-laced relationship of self-regulation and autonomy suggests something more. Discipline lives inside an educative domain that has a paradoxical nature, allowing easy breeding and attachment of differing conceptualizations and unstated meanings. The issue at hand is power as space, and how it manifests as discipline.

Power and Madness

Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* examined power in the form of discipline from the classical period, 1660 to the end of the 19th century. Foucault presented this period as the birth place for many of the institutions and structures of modernity. *Discipline and Punish* was a history of sorts of the penal system and how it handled punishment in the form of power. When Foucault (1977) began his analysis he defined it as "when the entire economy of punishment was redistributed." In order to arrive at power as heterotopic, I must begin with the penal system and punishment. Foucault presented the prison as a clear example of a heterotopia. Foucault began his analysis at the point of one major change: the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle. This is prominent as it was not merely an elimination of torture from society, but it was also the first of two shifts in power relations, from that which was physical and individualized against the body of man to that which was directed at collective man as a specie.

Foucault pointed out that in the mid 17th century, punishment, in the form of torture, was a spectacle for all to see; the shift was away from the public spectacle of individual man, and toward the "most hidden part" of the penal process. While the shift appeared positive, Foucault

pointed out several consequences of the shift. The shift was away from public punishment, moving punishment to a more abstract consciousness. Its effectiveness shifted from visible intensity to inevitability and certainty of punishment. Both shifts imposed on the state more responsibility for punishment and its understanding. Foucault (1977) wrote regarding this, “As a result, justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice” (p. 9). The responsibility that was assumed by all of society in the witnessing of public punishment against individual man was now distributed differently; the publicity of witness, according to Foucault, had shifted to the trial and to the sentence of the punishment, which was a shift to, what Foucault referred to as, “massifying,” which directed the punishment on man as a specie. This shift, according to Foucault, marked a “slackening of the hold on the body” regarding punishment. The body was no longer touched; it now served as an instrument; in this case, it was deprived of individual liberty that was both a right and property bequeathed to the individual by the state. This reinforced the state’s role over collective man. This shift was important in regard to punishment in educational settings. Each element of this shift was one of space as heterotopic.

Foucault also presents madness in conjunction with punishment. In mental pathology, according to Foucault, mental illness initially was seen very much like all other illness, as confined to having reality and meaning only within a structured personality. Foucault defined mental illness in language bearing similarities to discipline in educational settings. Foucault (1954) wrote:

In fact mental illness effaces, but it also emphasizes; on one hand, it suppresses, but on the other, it accentuates; the essence of mental illness

lies not only in the void that it hollows out, but also in the positive plenitude of the activities of the replacement that fill the void. (p. 28)

Discipline, in educational settings, could be defined as that which emphasizes obedience and suppresses disobedience. Inside discipline one can find positive plenitudes and replacement activities. The correlation is an important one. Madness has many conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached to it that alter its semantics in a manner very similar to discipline, reducing it to a tangible objective. Foucault asserted that it had only been in recent history that madness was considered as something other than its current semantics; Foucault (1958) wrote:

In fact, before the nineteenth century, the experience of madness in the Western world was very polymorphic; and its confiscation in our own period in the concept of illness must not deceive us as to its original exuberance. (p. 110)

According to Foucault, before 1650, Western culture was hospitable to those who were deemed mad; they were allowed to roam freely and not considered a threat; they were not confined. Foucault (1954) asserted that around the middle of the seventeenth century, a sudden change took place. Freedom was revoked in the name of confinement in accord with the sovereign. The sovereign, according to Foucault, exercised the old rights by way of determining the lives to take and the lives to let live. Foucault suggested a shift of the sovereign to a “new opposite right,” one that possessed the power to “make” live and the power to “let” die. According to Foucault, this was a new technology of discipline, one that dovetailed into the old. This was non-disciplinary power applied, not to the body of man, but to the life of man as a living being. Past discipline met the multiplicity of man and worked to dissolve man from membership in the collective into an individual through the body that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used and punished.

New technologies of discipline attempted to address the multiplicity not to individualize but to form a global mass of uniformity controlled by processes, which Foucault (2003) referenced as biopolitics.

The “psychologization” of madness, as Foucault (1954) referred to it, gave madness a psychological status, but it also inserted madness into the system of moral values and repressions that were biopolitical, which were actually detrimental to madness. Once inside this system, the guilt and wrongdoing associated with madness became embedded into the ideology of madness, but because madness had been confined with those of difference for a period of time through biopolitical processes of control, those same embedded processes became attached to those who were different. There was an identified shift from crisis to deviation. Foucault (1954) wrote, “It might be said that all knowledge is lined to the essential forms of cruelty. The knowledge of madness was no exception” (p. 122). Exclusion was rooted in the heterotopic, and there is documented evidence of punishment moving in that direction as well. In the educational pursuit to the natural truth of man, madness was considered a barrier. Foucault (1954) wrote:

It is understandable, then, that this mode of access should be so ambiguous and that, at the same time, it invites objective reductions (on the side of exclusion) and constantly solicits the recall to self (on the side of moral assignment). (p. 123)

Foucault referenced that those movements in which a culture comes to express itself positively will produce those that are counter to the positive, which, in turn, will be, rejected, whether they are positive or negative.

The idea of madness, in regard to power, was one that was rejected due to the shift in power structures and to the connotations attached to it. Madness was caught in a counter power

shift. The references to the term “shift” are references to the role of heterotopic space inside discipline structures.

Power and Punishment

Foucault (1977) posited that it was a generally accepted proposition that systems of punishment were situated in a political economy of the body, whether it be punishment of the body or punishment of the soul as representative of the body. The issue of punishment was one initially aimed at the body. And, it was the body, according to Foucault, that was directly involved in the political field because power relations had an immediate hold on it.

As punishment shifted from the physical to the cognitive, madness was a necessary ingredient for punishment to move into the cognitive realm. Foucault (1977) presented power initially as that which was exercised rather than possessed; it was not privileged, acquired or preserved. It was manifested and extended by the position of those who were being dominated. Power as physical punishment exerted pressure on the body, and the body, as it always does, tried to resist, which was futile, thus adding more power to existing power. This was the essence of physical punishment. Foucault suggested that these “power” relations go “right down into the depths of society,” and are not merely between state and citizen but even deeper and even more specific. Foucault was referencing a transfer of sovereign power to what he termed as biopolitics. Biopolitics, indicated earlier, presented two poles of power: the first pole was a focus on the individual and the physical body as a means of control. The second was a focus on biopolitics or the collective. Foucault (2003) referred to biopolitics as a set of processes such as birth rate, death rate, rate of reproduction and the like, combined with economic and political problems which become the means of controlling the collective. In reference to this, Foucault (2003) wrote, “We also see the beginnings of a natalist policy, plans to intervene in all phenomena

relating to the birth rate” (p. 243). It was micro-relational processes like these that were responsible for the building of power, especially after the move away from physical individual punishment. These micro-relations became rooted in spatial constructs that no longer focused on the individual, but instead, aimed at the masses (the collective). As an educator, the issue of surprise for me was that inside these power relations, Foucault suggested, knowledge was produced.

Foucault asserted that, inside these power relations, power produced knowledge and *vice versa*. Foucault suggested that there would be no power relations without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, and there would be no knowledge that would not presuppose and constitute, at the same time, power. This was an important point in regard to discipline in educational settings. Foucault (1977) wrote regarding this:

In short, it is not the activity of the subject of the knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, that processes and struggles that traverse it and of which is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. (p. 28)

The issue of discipline in educational settings must be examined in light of Foucault’s assertion regarding knowledge. Foucault was suggesting that no knowledge can be found or produced without the very struggle created by the experience of power or discipline. Does discipline have the same relationship with knowledge that Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983) suggested earlier? Do discipline and knowledge need to co-exist in order to live? Foucault (1977) was suggesting that the struggle in power relations was a contributing factor to the production of knowledge. The issue was where did this struggle take place? The initial answer is “in space.” Foucault suggested

that the struggling reciprocal process of back-and-forth tension was necessary to produce a corpus of knowledge while also producing power.

Foucault was asserting that power and knowledge were relational in ways that were reciprocal, implying that power would always be a part of the educational process because it was necessary for knowledge production. Foucault was suggesting that you could not have one without the other, justifying the presence of discipline in education. The implication would suggest that power was always going to be part of the educational process because without power, according to Foucault, knowledge would cease to exist? This is, in essence, a starting point for Foucault's biopolitics and some of its practices.

As punishment shifted from the physical individual body to the soul of the body and thence to the collective whole, Foucault (1977) suggested that what was emerging was not a new respect for humanity, but instead, punishment manifesting as a better justice system ordered around a newly organized judicial power, one centered on control over "relations between the human race, or human beings" as perceived as species. The shift from the body to the soul was a shift to the living part of the being. Foucault suggested that the shift moved the "power to judge" away from the privileges reserved by sovereignty, to the distributed effects of the public power through biopolitics. This new system of biopolitics presumed that all citizens had accepted the laws of society and the breaking of any of those laws positioned offenders as "paradoxical beings" breaking a pact with all other beings. Foucault (1977) wrote, "The right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defense of society" (p. 90). This justified the right to punish collectively.

Foucault (1977) asserted that the proportion between the penalty and the quality of offense should be determined by the influence of the violation on the social order. Foucault

suggested that punishment also looked to the future existing as a means of preventing future crimes by current punishment. One can find a similar mindset inside schools with discipline systems rooted in zero tolerance policies (that is with consequences determined according to the severity of the offense, with an eye to the future, and little to no consideration of the current offender). In educational settings consequences are handed out more in conjunction with community perceptions and future prevention than with a concern for the student. Foucault (1977) wrote, “One must punish exactly enough to prevent future repetition” (p. 93). This statement could casually live inside a penal system or within an educational setting.

Foucault (1977) suggested that through a technique of punitive signs, the power to punish, guiding penal action, rested inside six major rules that are reminiscent of some current discipline policies in education settings. First, there was the rule of minimum quantity, which required the punishment to exceed the advantage of the initial crime. Second, there was the rule of sufficient ideality, which required that the object of the representation of the memory of the punishment be such that it prevented a repeat of the crime. Third, there was the rule of lateral effects, which stipulated that the consequences must have their most intense effects on those who were associated with the offender but who did not commit the crime, in order that the offender would not repeat the crime. Fourth, there was the rule of perfect certainty which presented that each crime had a clear and particular punishment with perceived consequences, a certainty that everyone understood and observed. Fifth, there was the rule of common truth which ensured that all evidence and verification of the crime became a task of first importance. The offender was considered innocent until the judge provided proof through common reason familiar to everyone regarding guilt or innocence. And finally, there was the rule of optimal specification, which stated that the silence of the law does not harbor the hope of impunity. The punishment must take

into account the offender, his degree of wickedness and the severity of the crime. There is evidence to suggest that these guidelines of penal action have crept into policies or philosophies governing the discipline we use in our schools with our students.

Foucault (1977) used these six techniques to point to the changing and emerging idea of punishment as one including modulation. Foucault asserted that modulation considered the defendant, his nature, his way of life and his attitude of mind. The life lived before the offense was considered in conjunction to the offense and the intentionality behind it. Foucault pointed to a humanization of penalties emerging that demanded a leniency while at the same time provoked a shift in the point of application of power from the body to the mind, which was a move away from corporal punishment. Foucault wondered if we had really made a move away from corporal punishment in the penal system, which is similar to the point made in the literature review regarding corporal punishment in schools. Foucault referenced that when punishment moved from the physical body to the soul, a new technology of representation would be required to find suitable punishments for crimes. Foucault (1977) wrote, “The idea of a uniform penalty, modulated only according to the gravity of the crime is banished” (p. 114). Confinement (imprisonment) became the uniform penalty of the penal system.

The idea of imprisonment, as a general form of punishment, was never presented in any penal reform as such; instead, imprisonment was presented as a punishment for specific crimes. The issue was not imprisonment; the issue was a uniformed means of punishment covering a wide degree of crimes. Imprisonment was considered disqualified for the role of general punishment because in the past it was an expression was of sovereign royal power; its perception was an abuse of power. Power, for Foucault (1977), manifested in spatial terms as punishment through imprisonment for several reasons. First, imprisonment was incapable of responding

specifically to certain crimes; it was the general method for many crimes, which allowed it to be easily accepted by the public. Second, imprisonment had no real effect on the public and was therefore, forgotten once the sentence was given. Third, many prison reformers considered the prison useless because of its inability to reform prisoners, but this mattered little while the offender was imprisoned. And, finally, the prison was the perfect technique to punish collectively through spatial constructs inside biopolitics. The issue was removing the offender from society, and the prison did that by way of incarceration. Because of these issues and an assortment of others, imprisonment (detention) became a preferred method of punishment. Imprisonment in the school system manifested as detention, suspension and expulsion. All three are forms of spatial confinement rooted in biopolitical ideas:

Power always manifested as punishment in the penal system (Foucault, 1977). How, in such a short time, did imprisonment (detention) become the most general form of punishment? Foucault (1977) wrote, “The explanation most usually given is the formation, during the classical age of a number of great models of punitive punishment” (p. 120). Foucault cited several reasons for the rise of prisons and each suggested that reform was present when there was no reform. Foucault (1977) suggested that isolation was thought to provide a shock to the prisoner motivating him to reconsider the life he had and could get back. Spiritually, the prisons were considered opportunities for spiritual conversion. The prison also symbolically represented the purgatorial space between the two worlds: heaven and earth. The prison would provide a means (a space) for the prisoner to correct and then re-establish with life. But, for Foucault, the most important reason for the rise of imprisonment (detention) was control. Foucault (1977) wrote, “But no doubt the most important things as that this control and transformation of behavior was accompanied – both as a condition and as a consequence – by the development of a knowledge

of the individuals” (p. 125). Even the ever-growing desire to know the individual, according to Foucault (1977) was a manifestation of power as control. And, thus we see power manifesting as control also dwelling in spatial structures.

Power as Confinement (Spatial)

In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault (1965) called confinement a “massive phenomenon” of which signs could be found across eighteenth-century Europe. Foucault called it a “police” matter and quoted Voltaire and Colbert in support of the use of the term. Confinement has a spatial structure and heterotopic tendencies, since, of course, it acts on space. Foucault (1965) asserted that before confinement became associated with a medical semantic, it was an imperative of labor. Foucault referred to the “Confinement” edict of April 27, 1656 that led to the creation of the Hopital General. Foucault (1965) wrote regarding the institution, “From the beginning, the institution set itself the task of preventing ‘mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders’” (p. 47). It was created in response to exclusion, as exclusion was the primary response to those who were different. Exclusion is yet another heterotopia associated with discipline. Examples of exclusion include 1534 when the “poor scholars and indigents” were ordered to leave Paris (Foucault, 1965). Also, in 1606 a decree ordered the beggars of Paris whipped in the public square, branded and driven from the city (Foucault, 1965).

Exclusion was the response for years to those unwanted and different, that is until the creation of the Hospital General (Paris). This was the elimination of space. Foucault (1965) posited that, for the first time, negative measures of exclusion were replaced with confinement. Confinement was the creation of space. The unemployed and the poor were no longer banished or punished and driven from space; instead they were cared for by the state by placing them in their own created space; the cost was their liberty and access to the space they previously

occupied. They had the right to be taken care of, but they had to accept the physical, moral and spatial constraints associated with confinement (Deacon, 2006; Foucault, 1965). This trend of confinement spread; houses of confinement could be found throughout Europe containing the unemployed, the idle and the poor. Each time a crisis arose these houses would grow more. Thus, confinement became as Foucault (1965) wrote, "... no longer merely a question of confining those out of work, but of giving work to those who had been confined and thus making them contribute to the prosperity of all" (p. 51). As these Houses became prevalent in the most industrialized parts of the country, Foucault suggested that they had as much to do with cheap labor as anything else.

Foucault (1965) asserted that labor was tied to confinement and quickly became an accepted and an assumed part of confinement; all those confined in the state's sponsored space must work for the state. They would only be paid a fourth of what others made, but that was a small price to pay for the space that the state provided them (Foucault, 1965). This changed the semantics associated with confinement and changed the semantics of labor as well. Foucault (1965) wrote regarding this change, "For work was not only occupation; it must be productive" (p. 51). Houses of confinement in Germany became associated with certain tasks accomplished by the members of the house. According to Foucault, what began as a moral action had moved to an economic action. The classical age, according to Foucault (1965), used confinement in "an equivocal manner;" it attempted to play a double role: reabsorption of the unemployed and the control of costs. But, because of the use of the unemployed in the workforce, it rarely covered both roles well. Deacon (2006) suggested that there also came a realization that confinement (space) alone could not address all the difficulties currently in society. Deacon also asserted that there was lack of regulation as well as crumbling church support, pushing most houses of

confinement to the brink of failure. The spaces were not large enough to accommodate the growing number of those who needed the space and no other space was to be given. The answer was not added space, but better and more efficient use of current space. Space became a commodity associated with power.

Foucault (1965) referenced that most houses of confinement throughout Europe either disappeared or were recommissioned as prisons by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The recommissioning of the houses of confinement to prisons was a reinstatement of the current space. The state was not willing to provide more space. The movement resulted in placing labor and poverty in opposition, as an “inversely proportional” to each other, manifesting as power. The idea was that labor did not abolish poverty by its productive capacity, but rather by its moral enchantment. Foucault (1965) wrote, “Labor’s effectiveness was acknowledged because it was based on an ethical transcendence” (p. 55). The illusion was that man would redeem the land (space) by force and continue to labor but only if God intervened on his behalf. This labor to which requires God’s intervention was obligatory in all of its torment to all men. According to the Protestant work ethic, labor became defined and idleness was viewed not only as idleness but as rebellion against God and society. The connection was important one. According to Deacon (2006) the Protestant work ethic abhorred wastefulness and idleness. According to Foucault, labor in houses of confinement assumed an ethical meaning and was presented as that which would redeem the confined. Labor would be the price to be paid for the occupied space. Labor became more than action; it became a moral solution. Soon, madness also became associated with idleness and confinement, as referenced earlier, because from the beginning, the mad had been confined along with the poor in the same space.

Confinement, to Foucault (1965) was an institutional creation of space that acquired an air of importance. Confinement had the value of “inventiveness” and was marked, as a space, as a decisive event, but it was also the moment when madness was perceived in the same construct as poverty because both would occupy the same space. Both were linked to idleness by confinement (space) and therefore associated with the incapacity to work and the inability to integrate with the community, thereby associating madness as a problem. That which began as a medical construct moved to a deviant construct through the occupation of space. The same can be said of the misbehaved student. The misbehaved student was often considered idle with an incapacity to work and inability to integrate into the school or class. The answer was similar; confinement by way of space manifesting as detention, suspension and expulsion creating, by space, an unfortunate construct.

Power as Training

The idea of discipline as correct training was an idea formulated at the beginning of the seventeenth century, according to Foucault (1977). Foucault suggested that the expressed idea of discipline as training was cloaked in the desire to control, levy and select. Foucault (1977) wrote regarding discipline as training, “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (p. 170). Foucault called this training a “modest, suspicious power” that functioned as an economy that was calculated but permanent, which expressed the paradox of tension consistent with Foucault’s perspective of power. Surveillance and observation were one and the same in regard to power; observation was always surveillance, especially in regard to power as training, and both were part of the spatial construct of power.

Inside training, observation lived, according to Foucault (1977), through the use of space. Foucault referenced the military camp as the ideal model. It was a short-lived, artificial city built on command in a specific space. In the perfect military camp, according to Foucault, all power would be exercised through observation with each observation serving as a means of adjustment, contributing to the function of power through the military camp by way of space. The military camp functioned in a set space as many things, but one of those functions was in the production of corrective training. Foucault described the camp structure in great detail with geometry of paths, number and distribution of tents, orientation of entrances and exits and disposition of files and ranks as exactly defined for the supervision and observation of those inside the camp space. Foucault (1977) wrote, “The camp is a diagram of a power that acts by means of general visibility” (p. 171). The camp, for better or worse, was a space of cloaked surveillance. The idea of training was rooted in the idea of observation which was made possible by the use of space. Foucault asserted that the old means of confinement and enclosure were being replaced by a new use of space; the calculated openings and the filling and emptying spaces and passages to create observational opportunities. The military camp was an example of the transition from the old technique of discipline, centered on the individual and the individual’s body, to the new technology of discipline centered upon life. Foucault (2003) suggested that this new technology brought together population while trying to control events that occur in a “living mass.” Foucault (2003) wrote:

Both technologies are obviously technologies of the body but one is a technology in which the body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes. (p. 249)

Foucault (2003) suggested that this adjustment was one towards a “phenomena of population” and center more on collective processes more characteristic of human masses than human individuals. The military camp was organized in its space so most individuals could be observed in a natural collective way so that control naturally occur as a means of normalization.

Foucault (1977) suggested that even hospital buildings were organized as instruments of medical action more than medical care, and that they also were used as a means of normalization. Observation of patients was considered to contribute to better care, which was a means of control through space. Foucault suggested that the school building was no different, being built for the purpose of the observation of space. Foucault (1977) wrote, “Similarly, the school building was to be the mechanism for training” (p. 172). The school building, like the hospital and military camp, were now machines of observation. The idea was to train vigorous bodies via exercise, health care and education in ways that contributed to the desired norm. Spatial structures were instrumental in each instance and contributory to observation. Foucault asserted that these disciplinary institutions were created as machines of control, functioning like microscopes of observation; everything created was for the purposes of observation and control leading to establishing norms through the means of space.

Foucault (1977) suggested that the perfect institution was one that would make it possible (or at least likely) to constantly see everything at a glance. Foucault (1977) wrote, “Surveillance thus becomes a decisive economic operator both as an internal part of the production of machinery and as a specific mechanism in the disciplinary power” (p. 175). His reference was to Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. The Panopticon was a prison built around the idea that a single gaze would keep everyone under observation; it was the perfect use of space and the ideal heterotopia. However, Foucault does not miss the connection with education. He referenced that

the same idea was found in the reorganization of elementary teaching. The details of surveillance became hierarchical, being integrated into the structure of the classroom and the teaching method through surveillance and disciplinary power. This hierarchical surveillance was presented as power in space; it was not a thing to be possessed or transferred, but instead, it functioned like a machine, functioning best as a whole in a space which it controlled.

Foucault (1977) recognized that this machine-like organization enabled disciplinary power to be both absolute and indiscreet; it was everywhere and always alert, leaving no zone free; it was always supervising every individual. Discipline, according to Foucault, made this possible through the operation of power that was relational. It was relational power that sustained itself by its own mechanism through implied constant observation (Foucault, 1977). It was through the “technique of surveillance” that the “physics of power” now had a hold over the individual body once again by way of controlling the population through the control of the individual in space. Foucault (1977) wrote, “It is a power that seems all the less ‘corporal’ in that it is more subtly physical” (p. 177). Yet, power by way of surveillance had come full circle back to the physical body by way of observation in space. The body was no longer controlled physically; instead, the control was over the entire being by way of space.

Foucault referenced education as that which rooted itself in correct training. But as it rooted itself in corrective training, it also embraced punishment, although a different and less abrasive form. Foucault wrote that the word, punishment, was brought back into common language through education by way of educative corrective training. With the word, came a variety of forms of punishment, all in the name of corrective training and all referenced as disciplinary punishment. Disciplinary punishment was not so much vengeance of an outraged sovereign, law or citizenry, but rather an effective use of space reserved for corrective training

aimed at conformity. Foucault also referenced the role of exercise; it, too, was rolled into the corrective training, as most who were subjected to it understood exercise in terms of punishment. Educational institutions originally incorporated exercise for this purpose.

Punishment, inside corrective training, was only one element of a double system, according to Foucault (1977). This system was a gratification-punishment system operating as a process of training and correction, and all of this took place in a specifically designed space. The teacher's role was rooted in this dichotomy, which only worked in confined space. To use punishment effectively, a teacher had to make sure rewards were more plentiful than punishment in the classroom, i.e., space. Merit and behavior became two elements that decided the place [space] of the pupil while reinforcing the power of the teacher. Foucault suggested that the art of punishing was aimed at neither "expiation" nor was it aimed at "repression." Instead, punishing students brought five operations into play in education, and all five had, as their foundation, spatial structures. First, student actions were referred to as a whole, functioning as field of comparison. Foucault referred to it as a "space of differentiation" and the "principle of a rule to be followed;" both are references to spatial structures. Second, students were differentiated from other students through obedience of school rules. The rules represented the norms of the school, and students were to strive to meet those norms. Third, students were measured in terms of quantity, hierarchy, value, ability, level and nature for the purpose of placement. This was another example of identification and segmentation of students. Fourth, the constraint of conformity was introduced to students in subtle ways. And finally, student limits were traced to the differences that defined students. These five operations normalized students, according to Foucault, through the control of student spatial structures. Foucault asserted that these disciplinary mechanisms "secreted a penalty of the norm" in schools. Foucault (1977) wrote,

“The power of the Norm appears through the disciplines” (p. 184). This statement is profound in regard to the power of discipline in schools.

The Norm was established in education via corrective training by introducing standardized education. Foucault suggested that normalization, like surveillance, became one of the great instruments of power, especially in educational spaces. Normalization served as the standards of space. Standardization, inside education, presented normalization as a means to an end, imposing a homogeneity on space as the means of correction. Foucault posited that it individualized students in the name of measurement and correction in ways that removed them from the group in order to conform to the culture norm. Through corrective training, the power of the norm functioned systematically in the form of equality, making all spaces similar. Inside a system rooted in homogeneity, equality was the rule that led to the Norm. The Norm provided a path via measurement thus measurement reduced individual differences. The means of identifying those differences manifested itself in the examination (Foucault, 1977).

Foucault (1977) presented the examination combining techniques of observation with those of normalization. The examination was a function of space. Foucault identified the examination as the means of justification in regard to mechanisms of punishment. Inside the examination, the ceremony of power, the form of experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth were all found. Foucault (1977) wrote regarding the power the examination gave to discipline: “At the heart of the procedure of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (p. 185). The examination removed any doubt regarding who was in power and who was in control of the educational space; all power was all on display in a very public venue.

The examination, for Foucault, became a technique of power that held its signs of potency in a mechanism of objectification; disciplinary power manifested its potency through the arrangement of objects [students] in space. The examination also placed individuals [students] in a field of surveillance that engaged them, captured them and fixed them in a defined space. Students were easier to observe when they were engaged in action that came with intense pressure. The examination turned individuals into cases, allowing the individual to be described, judged, measured and compared with others in the name of corrective training. And finally, the examination subtly placed the individual at the center of a locus of procedures that reduced the individual to an effect and an object of disciplinary power in the name of corrective training.

Foucault suggested that corrective training and all its components created an environment that made power more anonymous and functional; this type of power tended to become more powerful on individualized once they were in a confined space. Foucault suggested that the individual was a reality fabricated by a specific technology of power referenced as discipline, and that reality was dependent on the management of space. Foucault (1977) wrote regarding power, “We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceal’s” (p 194). For Foucault, power continues to produce reality through the control of space. Foucault suggested that power went beyond the production of knowledge all the way to the point of being knowledge. The issue, when it came to space and movement, was not just confinement and restriction but production by way of relationships. It produces “domains of objects and rituals of truths.” Power is continuous and relational; it does not cease because we do; power needs space in order to exist.

Closing Comments

One of the ways power, for Foucault, manifested itself was in spatial constructs. Areas of madness, power and punishment, confinement and training were all addressed, and in each, spatial constructs played a role in the manifestation of power. Foucault (1967) suggested that spaces were either utopic or heterotopic spaces with utopic spaces being perfect and illusionary while heterotopic spaces were real and divided into those of crisis and deviation. The idea of spatial structures, as referenced by Foucault (1967), was important in regard to the manifestation of power (discipline) in educational settings. The shift in power was a shift recognized inside Foucaultian heterotopic structures; the shift from crisis to deviant was a shift in culture that transferred to education. Heterotopic spaces of crisis, according to Foucault (1938) are rare, and yet, the people groups who were part of those are still with us. The issue is that these groups are no longer seen as in crisis; they are now seen as deviants, a perception that has ties to the spaces they occupied.

Active power, according to Foucault (1977), began as torture of the physical individual body in public space in full display of society, as a notice that the sovereign was indeed sovereign and not to be questioned (Foucault, 1977). With the elimination of individual physical torture, the sovereign moved on to the soul, a broad representative of the human body, and to confinement. Issues of space became more powerful and prominent. Confinement and imprisonment grew in importance, use and influence. Eventually, another a movement from the individual to the collective took place, pulling biopolitics into play (Foucault, 2003). Foucault (2003) suggested that power used collectively was still used in manifestations of space.

CHAPTER 5

A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF DISCIPLINE

After examining discipline in literature and through various conceptualizations and unstated meanings, particularly those of progressivism and power, two conditions regarding discipline in educational settings were discovered. First, discipline in the literature was presented primarily as a tangible objective which was often used as a tool of influence to present something new. And second, discipline in educational settings was primarily about space structures. The literature presented discipline through various conceptualizations and unstated meanings. While most conceptualizations rooted discipline into the objective, two unstated meanings were dominant due to their nature and present in culture and education. The unstated meanings of power and progressivism were found to be impacting, and more explored through the ideas of Dewey and Foucault; each presented discipline through a different idea: one rooted in spatial structures. For Dewey, discipline, conceptualized through his progressivism, was social and experience that was the ultimate freedom of space and movement; for Foucault, discipline conceptualized as power that was active which manifested in confinement and the reduction of space and movement. My philosophical statement regarding discipline is rooted in both Dewey and Foucault and in their findings regarding manifestations of discipline. Read together in regard to discipline both expose the issues with current discipline while leading to a new philosophy of discipline in educational settings.

My first statement regarding discipline is not as much statement as it is a rejection of current discipline in educational settings. My rejection is grounded in the idea that current

discipline is nothing more than current conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline as found in the literature review. Discipline in educational settings, much like experience to Dewey (1938), struggles with a multiple-barreled semantical problem. The conceptualizations and unstated meanings attached to discipline have created ambiguity due to each entering a symbiotic relationship with discipline. Discipline has adopted the semantical undercurrents of each new conceptualization and unstated meaning, which adds to the ambiguity instead of creating clarity. Discipline, in a parasitic way, becomes a little more of its new context each time, changing slightly to something newer and different while moving away from its original intent. Discipline is many things... control, power, training, positive and negative, and each one has further reduced discipline to the point of minimal contribution to school and student.

The current ideology of discipline in educational settings was found to exist inside an educative domain of paradoxes, with its most impacting conceptualization being that of safety, which is a production of a pragmatic culture. School safety is and has been a concern for the general public. It has been addressed by schools, by government, by think tanks, by student groups and by grass-root movements, and each time each movement addresses safety they do it through discipline, as if discipline equals safety. Sprague, Walker, Golly, White, Myers & Shannon (2000) addressed discipline through their created universal intervention package that challenged safety and social behavior in schools. Stansfield (2011) also highlighted that most schools address discipline only in regard to the violation of rules meant to be enforced for student safety. The conceptualization of safety continues to be consistently associated with discipline, and in many instances it is linked with punishment. The word, “punishment” has primarily negative connotations attached to it and has fallen out of favor in educational settings.

However, it is alive and well and often presented through the conceptualization of safety, which allows it to live. Butchart & McEwan (1996) presented discipline out of the domain of education and through the conceptualization of punishment. Butchart & McEwan do not present discipline as punishment positively, but in their address of discipline, they often highlighted punishment and its detriments, which continued to reinforce punishment as negative. The idea of discipline as punishment, despite its negativity, was a strong presence in the literature. Elements of punishment were often found beyond the literature, in actual discipline policies of schools addressed in terms of safety.

The most accurate semantic associated with discipline was control, which presented in the literature as a strong conceptualization but less impacting than that of safety. Control has always been part of discipline. Wlodkowski (1982) presented discipline as control and did in a negative manner when he referenced that most teachers presented discipline as control to students; students when encountering discipline as control often perceived it as a threat. Butchart (1996) presented the history of school discipline as one rooted in an environment that was authoritarian, strict and pragmatic. The teacher held all the power with the students holding no power. As educational views changed, the issue of discipline did not change at the same rate or in union with education or culture. Discipline is still rooted in these same conceptualizations and unstated meanings.

The issue of discipline, while considered important by most, has been given little attention theoretically and even less practically. Discipline, in educational settings, has often been presented theoretically as a vehicle of promotion, as something tangible, as safety and punishment, and as control and negativity; practically, it has been and still is perceived by educators as tangible, as a tool to possess and use and as an element of power. Because of this

semantical ambiguity, it often appears as all of these and more when, in reality, it is actually none of these. Educators spend time trying to possess something that is not tangible; theorists spend time creating theories for an illusion, and the issue of discipline is never actually addressed accurately. Discipline, however, is a real issue that must be addressed. How, then, should discipline be conceptualized?

To avoid adding this idea to the list of conceptualizations already associated with discipline, and before any real philosophy can be offered regarding discipline, two important corrective measures must be addressed to avoid adding this idea to the list of conceptualizations already associated with discipline. The first corrective measure is to secure a more precise semantic narrative of discipline in educational settings, one that is collectively accepted. Before any resolution associated with discipline can take place, an analytical process must be conducted to determine the collective agreed-upon semantics of discipline in educational settings. This process must be an all-encompassing process, one that permeates K-12 education as well as higher education. Both must come to greater clarity regarding what discipline is. The confusion and ambiguity associated with the term has positioned discipline as a non-contributor to education. It is not perceived as a positive contributor to education, and often discipline itself, is used as a scapegoat for the problems in education.

The second corrective measure was referenced by Skiba & Peterson (2000) as a “gap” between research and practice. Skiba & Peterson (2000) wrote, “That gap appears to be especially acute in the areas of school discipline and behavior, leaving schools with insufficient resources to cope with current serious problems of disruption and violence” (p. 336). The gap is both quantitative and qualitative as evidenced by the literature review associated with this project. There is much speculation associated with discipline presented as valid and accurate;

most current literature uses discipline as a tool towards a more prominent end. There are many speculations regarding solutions to the gap, but I posit that solving the first corrective measure will resolve the second.

Current Discipline

Developing a philosophy of discipline is not an easy task. The first step, subtly referenced in the introduction, is to address what discipline is not. In sum, today's discipline is not discipline. Discipline in educational settings is not contributory, positive or beneficial to the educational process. It is an arbitrary add-on and an after-thought to the educational process. It is perceived as tangible and objective, as something to be used to obtain or possess something. Conceptualizations of safety, punishment, control and management all present discipline in objective ways with a cadre of proposed solutions. This is the stimulus-response behaviorism that Dewey rejected. It is also presented as tangible, a Trojan horse, used to present other issues not related to discipline. Weinstein, Tomlinson-Clarke & Curran (2004) suggested that teachers who are interested in being successful in classroom management must make diversity a part of their conversations. This presents diversity as the missing objective needed in classroom discipline. Allen (2010) addressed bullying through discipline. Caner & Tertemiz (2014) addressed English Language Teaching Programs (ELT) through discipline. The issue is that discipline is rarely addressed directly and too often used as a means to other ends. In these situations, discipline is never addressed and become entangled in more conceptualizations and unstated meanings, created thicker and deeper ambiguity. Some will read this and think that statement a bit harsh. My intention is not to be harsh, but to be assertive and efficient in presenting discipline as it should be. I will do this through both Dewey and Foucault - who can be fruitfully read together toward a philosophy of discipline.

As presented earlier, Dewey (1958) wrote about the union of experience and nature. Discipline, to Dewey, would be seen through the lens of experience, i.e., empiricism, and the union which he referenced as interaction (transaction). Discipline presented in the literature was heavily rooted in objectivity and presented in conjunction with the standard stimulus - response model. This was classic behaviorism, which Dewey rejected in favor of interaction (transaction). Discipline was experience, but it was experience as behavior and not as interaction (transaction). Experience, to Dewey, was multi-faceted in all the right ways. Experience was what we do, and how we suffer. It was that for which we strive, love, believe and endure. It was how we act, and how we are acted upon. It was active action in coordination with environment constructing. Dewey (1958) wrote that experience denoted all that encompassed change. Discipline, seen as experience that is interactive (transaction), presents a contrary idea. What, then was discipline according to Dewey?

Dewey (1958) wrote of the non-experience and its failure. He stated that the non-empirical method started with the product and assumed the rest. The non-empirical method assumed the product was primary and originally given when, in reality, it was not. The non-empirical method was all product and no process, and it was dualism and behaviorism rolled into one. Dewey stated that the non-empirical was non-verifiable with little to no effort to test or check viability; the non-empirical had no enlargement or enrichment as part of it. It was that which was assumed dominant and was expected to dominate. And, finally, Dewey stated that the non-empirical becomes arbitrary, aloof and ambiguous over time. The non-empirical, for Dewey, becomes separate and isolated; solutions become reduced to hopeless random tasks. Current discipline in educational settings would not qualify as interactive (transaction) experience for

Dewey. He would see it as an individualized and non-empirical - as a product with no process, which, for Dewey, was mechanical and static, a dead end.

Foucault (1977) would view discipline through power as seen through the penal system. Foucault identified a push for individualization in the history of penal law, which would be classified by Dewey as stimulus-response dualism. The idea of punishment, for Foucault, has always been rooted in a separation of the criminal from society. This separation took on many forms, physical torture, banishment and even death. The criminal was to be isolated as an individual, communicating to society that this person was not normal and not to be part of society. The individual was to be removed from any and all interaction with his/her environment. There would be no opportunity for interaction, as Dewey would wish; and for Foucault, there would be no opportunity for tension and struggle. Initially, this separation was primarily accomplished by the public torture of the physical body so all could see the full display of the power of the sovereign. Public torture isolated the criminal from the rest of society (environment) and then inflicted force, permanently branding the criminal as an outcast. This branding severed the individual's ties to environment. The issue of individualization is a precursor to the larger issue of discipline, but this issue of individualization, referenced by both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) in different ways, is also an issue in current educational discipline. Discipline, in educational settings, does isolate students and use them as a means of displaying the control and power of the school, which could be considered in the same light as the power displays of the sovereign of old. This isolation of students presents the school (environment) as the entity in control and dominant.

In his *The School and Society* Dewey (2009) suggested traditional education was structured for one purpose: so students could listen to their instructors. This is again another

example of the lack of interaction (transaction) between student (organism) and school (environment). Dewey (2009) wrote, “There is very little place in the traditional school room for the child to work [space]” (p.36). His issue was space and the interaction inside that space; he found very few schools where the “activity on the part of the children preceded the giving of information by the teacher.” Schools were designed to give students the opportunity to listen, but very little else. Students were to be passive and compliant; they were to become what the school wanted them to be. Dewey even saw the physical school structure built to accommodate large numbers of children with little to no room for them to move. Movement was a large issue for both Dewey and Foucault. Its presence suggested the possibility of interaction for Dewey and the possibility of struggle for Foucault. Dewey was very critical of the way schools were designed; he saw them built for the collective, which he felt was treating students passively and eliminating them from being active, social and engaged with the school (environment). Both Dewey and Foucault saw this as important. (Foucault, 1977, Dewey, 2009).

Foucault (1977) posited similar thoughts; he believed that discipline “proceeds from a distribution of the individual in space.” He identified discipline as the “anatomy of distribution” which he defined by four important traits. The first was enclosures and confinement; discipline, especially in educational settings, was often composed of both. Second, discipline had a principle of elementary location; each individual was given a space, but it was not theirs. Third, there was the rule of functional sites which required creating useful space for the collective whole only. And, finally, elements had to be interchangeable. This required individuals to become similar, to be measured by rank and not by unit or place. This emphasized the whole over the parts, with a focus on the making the parts similar. There was no struggle and no tension which Foucault saw as creative and vital. Dewey would see this focus on similarity as a focus on environment over

organism, behaviorism and dualism, rolled into one. Foucault (1977) wrote, “Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangement” (p. 146). For Foucault, discipline focused only on space will be individualizing according to general location without assigning fixed locations. There would be no interaction, no struggle and no tension, which both Dewey and Foucault required, for construction and creation. Space was given, but it was made clear that the space was loaned and never to be owned. The space was a collective space, perceived as a part of the whole and owned by the whole. It was not individual, owned or unique to the individual; it was to be similar and belong to the environment.

Discipline, in educational settings, is not what it appears to be. The literature suggested that discipline is perceived and presented as tangible, objective and as a tool to be possessed. Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) suggested-a new view of discipline, one with a focus on space and movement and not control. Both looked at the issue from their own unique angle, and both have put their own mark on discipline... as space and movement. Foucault (1977) would address discipline generally as that which proceeds out of power and from the distribution of individual space. He would look at it from the negative, and as a postmodern detriment. Dewey (1938) would describe discipline as that which is social and of experience which allows freedom of movement. He would see it as a positive part of the postmodern mindset and necessary. Both would agree that it should be social, fluid and not static. Dewey (1938) would suggest that discipline should be interactive with its environment in a balanced way. Foucault (1977) would suggest similar ideas in regard to discipline because struggle and tension were creative and constructive. For both, the issues of space and movement resonated and informed the ideology of discipline. Discipline was not a commodity or a policy. Discipline was not power or training. Discipline was not external control or self-control. Discipline was not safety or rules. Discipline

was all of these, and it was none of these. Current discipline is designed, in most instances, as a thing to be used and possessed and in ways that restrict movement and manipulate space in order to isolate and individualize those that interact with it. It is not a commodity that can imposed or inflicted. It is active space and movement. It is struggle and tension. It is interaction (transaction) between organism and environment.

Both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) recognized discipline for what it was. In the midst of its tangible objectivity and its foundation in spatial structures, the many conceptualizations and unstated meanings associated with discipline all contribute to one general thing: conformity. The goal of discipline was to ensure that individuals had a means of conforming, that is, of coming back to the greater goal, the cultural norm. Discipline was the means to ensure that the educational process would be neither too creative nor too constructive, especially in regard to student interaction. Discipline, through its two dominant traits of tangible objectivity and spatial structuralism, ensured that students, teachers and families conformed to the dominant culture norms as presented by the school. Both Dewey and Foucault recognized this. Dewey (1958) suggested that the education of his day was not to be centered on the child. He posited that the center of educational gravity was not the child. It was the book, the teacher... even curriculum, but it was not the child. Dewey saw the educational process as lacking interactivity; he saw it as out of balance and void of anything close to interactivity. Foucault (1977) posited similar thoughts, suggesting that educational space functions more like a machine because its space was architectural, functional and hierarchical. Foucault stated that discipline, in an educational setting, was rooted in the idea of individual order needed to produce an efficient machine. Discipline, for Foucault, functioned and presented more like a utopia than like the

heterotopia that it was. Discipline, in educational settings, was void of the traits of heterotopias; instead, it was a function that was more like the power-wielding sovereign of old.

Both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) have presented a compelling argument regarding discipline and what it currently is not. Before determining a philosophy of discipline, three micro-traits of current discipline must be identified first. These three micro-traits flow straight out of the two main characteristics discovered in current discipline in educational settings: tangible objectivity and spatial structuralism. These three micro-traits stand in the way of understanding discipline as it is. Conceptualizations, unstated meanings... even the ideology of discipline presented discipline as, first, a means of conformity towards uniformity. This is the goal: to take individuals and mold and shape them into similar parts of a greater whole. Both conformity and uniformity suggest a void of interactivity and struggle. That is the product. How is this done? Discipline is the means to this process by first ensuring that the school (environment) is dominant, and then by controlling space and movement through observation of that control, ensuring the overall product conforms to presented norms, leading to normalization. Those entering into discipline enter into a process that will confine space and restrict movement in ways that will impose control over them. The process is observed to ensure that there is normalization taking place; once that is done, assimilation back into the general population occurs.

Dewey sought an education that allowed participation and interaction on the part of the student with the school (environment). Current discipline offers no opportunity for student participation. Individuals, according to Foucault (1977), are seen through a lens of rank in order to avoid an identity that is individualized. Current discipline is about objectivity and the restriction of space and movement. Control, training, safety and all conceptualizations and

unstated meanings are forms of space and movement. Freedom, for both Dewey and Foucault, defined who we are; discipline that restricts freedom through space and movement redefines who we are, moving away from self and towards the environment. Students are defined against the environment: school, class, rank, gender and test scores, just to name a few, are all examples of this. All of these take control of the individual and root that individual identity into a greater whole, i.e., the school (environment). Foucault identified the same issue in his studies of the penal system and power. Confinement houses took the poor and the mad and assigned them a collective identity (environment) through the restriction of space and movement, redefining both.

The second trait was a push from an individual identity to a collective identity (environment), initiated by a shift from active to passive. Reflective of this issue, Foucault (1977) traced a shift in punishment through the penal system. Foucault suggested that, when punishment softened from torture and death to imprisonment, it was a shift in space and movement and a shift from the active to the passive. Foucault (1977) wrote, “The right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defense of society” (p. 90). This was a clear shift from active aggression to passive confinement. Torture of the physical body was active and aggressive. Confinement of the individual is passive and non-aggressive. Dewey (1958) identified the same passivity in traditional education. Foucault suggested that the principle of moderation applied to punishment was a “discourse of the heart” and an orientation that was to be humane. The return effects of punishment became enticing, according to Foucault, to those initiating the punishment. The enticement was rooted in power and it might be used beyond the moment of punishment. The issue was how to use power beyond compelling individual conformity in ways that pull others into conformity for the purposes of uniformity. The environment replaced the sovereign and was to be dominant and unchallenged. Foucault

(1977) suggested that punishment “will be an art of effects” that looked into the future. The softening of punishment towards space and movement allowed the shift from active participation to passive non-participation to go unnoticed. This shift was a shift away from any kind of interaction, struggle or tension, which both Dewey and Foucault saw as part of the process of the creation and construction of knowledge.

And, finally, discipline was observation in order to assure normalization. Dewey (1958) wrote regarding values, “Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are” (p. 396). Values, according to Dewey, lend themselves to thought and discourse. These values Dewey referenced are simply a means of normalization. They are standards, posts in the ground, for the rest of society to reference. They are the Norm and the standard upon which we determine what is normal. Dewey stated that they either are or are not; they are either enjoyed or not enjoyed. Dewey’s views on morality were equally focused on interaction (transaction). It was interaction that produced morality, according to Dewey, and ethics was a production of interactivity. Discipline is the power to serve notice regarding the required societal norms, and it serves the school in the same manner. Discipline is the means of assurance that normalization is proceeding as planned. Foucault referenced the presence of observation as that which ensured normalization in the penal system; the same can be said of the educational system. Foucault (1977) presented Bentham (1843) and his Panopticon as a metaphoric reference of modern discipline and its dependence on observation to ensure normalization. The Panopticon was rooted in the threat of observation, and the observation was rooted in the assumed observation of all the criminals as one collective group. The Panopticon was not built for interaction between the prisoners and the prison; it was not built for tension or struggle. It was built to isolate one group from the other and to ensure that the dominant group remained dominant. In the

Panopticon, observation's power came from uniformity resulting from what Foucault called the "anatomy of distribution." Punishment was reserved for those who attempted to individualize themselves away from the group or interact, struggle or create tension with those dominant. Foucault (1977) saw imprisonment as setting a clear objective... conform or be imprisoned and removed from the environment. Imprisonment ended interaction, eliminated struggle, confined space and restricted movement in the name of normalization. Imprisonment allowed observation to determine normalization, but observation only worked when uniformity was achieved. Imprisonment and subsequent observation revealed compliance, and detrimental when the individual was ready for placement back into the general environment. Imprisonment granted the right of observation to assure normalization. Imprisonment was and continues to be the standard form of punishment because of its ability to possess all traits referenced. Educational discipline is the same. Detention, suspension and expulsion are all forms of "imprisonment" presented in educational settings as discipline. All three send a clear message: conform to the rules of the school (environment) or be removed from and punished by the environment. All three eliminate interaction, avoid struggle, confine space and restrict movement in accordance with power afforded to the school. This is what discipline is. What should it be?

A NEW DISCIPLINE

What Should Discipline Be? The issue of discipline should not be not confined to speaking of discipline alone. It is a collective issue more than it is a specific issue. Any philosophical statement on discipline in educational settings must begin with knowledge. Dewey (1958) saw knowledge as he saw everything else: as social, as experience and as interactive. Dewey saw knowledge "wholistically." His battle was how to reconcile the object of science (realm one), which he described as physics, with the object of inferred and logically constructed

real objects (realm two) for the purpose of bring mind and body together, while avoiding the dualism that he rejected. Dewey wrote, “If knowledge is *possession or grasp* then there are two incompatible kinds of knowledge, one sensible, the other rational” (p. 139). Dewey sought to resolve this dualism through his epistemological studies. He saw “practically” all epistemological discussions involving a shift “to and fro” from the “universe of having to the universe of discourse.” The idea of discipline to Dewey would need to allow for the possibility of this shift “to and fro”, for it to be intractive experience having the possibility of possession and grasp.

Foucault (1977) saw knowledge through power. Foucault suggested a break from the traditional idea of knowledge: that it could only exist where power relations were suspended. He suggested that we abandon the belief that the “renunciation of power” was one of the conditions of knowledge. Instead, he strongly suggested that power produced knowledge through reciprocal struggle and tension. Foucault (1977) suggested that power and knowledge directly imply each other; he said that there was no power relation without the correlative field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not, at the same time, constitute power relations. Foucault (1977) wrote:

In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the form and possible domains of knowledge. (p. 28)

Foucault suggested that the dualism of power be discarded in favor of this struggle. It is the processes and struggles of power-knowledge that reveal something new in regard to discipline, especially discipline in educational settings where knowledge foundational.

Both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) provided a different view of knowledge. Current discipline is rigid and drowning in the dualism of right and wrong. It was Dewey's fluidity and interactivity (transaction) as applied to experience that suggested something new. It was Foucault's processes and struggles associated with power that suggested something different. Discipline has been a static dualism of rules and policies designed to conform individuals toward a large uniformity, designed to reinforce the dominant position of the school. Discipline has been rooted in the stimulus-response model that Dewey rejects. It has been rooted in the idea that power replaces knowledge, which Foucault despises. What would discipline look like if it were interactive (transaction) and built to allow for struggle? What would it look like if it were able to go "to and fro" in order to be grasped and possessed? What would it look like if it were an interactive experience as Dewey would see it? What would it look like if it were processes and struggles that traverse power-knowledge?

Foucault (1977) was a postmodern and, in many ways, Dewey (1958) was as well. Both opposed the purely rational and the interference when it came to epistemology in favor of spontaneity and freedom. Each approached epistemology in different ways. Dewey believed that knowledge cannot explain itself. Dewey saw knowledge as an inward interactive turn toward man to find understanding. For Dewey (1958) knowledge falls along the lines of his ideal, as something to be possibly done but never done as complete. Experience and, in this case, knowledge was stable but moving and changing, and open to modification. It was fluid and free, which made it true and real. It could never be static, mechanical or a commodity such as a dualistic list of rights and wrongs. Dewey would see knowledge inside an educational process that was participatory and a co-constructive process (Vanderstraeten, 2002). Vanderstraeten suggested that Dewey would see the educational process as "inherently creative." Vanderstraeten

(2002) wrote, “It [the educational process] creates a new reality for everyone who is participating” (p.241). Dewey would see things through this interaction (transaction); things gain meaning to Dewey by being used (Vanderstraeten, 2002).

Foucault (1977) was an historicist who saw truth as that which was free and fluid as well. He rejected any truth determined by any relation to a fixed reality. Foucault understood ideas through historicity; he saw them through the functions they played and in the changes of these functions over time. Knowledge, for Foucault, was seen in the same manner, through the functions and through the changes to those functions. The processes and struggles were a state of tension seen by Foucault inside the educational setting. Foucault (1977) suggested that this tension was against space and movement, and actually produced knowledge. Jackson & Mazzei (2012) wrote that for Foucault power and knowledge has a paradoxical relationship; they posit that Foucault believed that power and knowledge merge because knowledge was actually formed by action that was power while power was “exercised” by knowledge that opposed power. Jackson & Mazzei posited that Foucault was thinking in terms of innovation and creation regarding power and knowledge. Jackson & Mazzei (2012) wrote, “The idea of ‘total innovation’ points to Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge as *practice* and how this practice produces subjectivity” (p. 62). Foucault implies, as does Dewey, that the struggle to move and to gain space is an educational struggle because of the reciprocal relationships of power and knowledge. Something new must begin with the end of something old.

Both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977) would say that discipline should be freed from the past and from its isolated arbitrary and primarily negative condition. Both would agree that discipline must interact and struggle with its environment. Both Dewey and Foucault would move away from current discipline that constricts the student, away from true “new” knowledge

which contributes little to educational purposes. Jackson & Mazzei (2012) suggested that power, for Foucault, was a network of relations which it was embedded in relations and not existing merely as a commodity meant that it was constantly in a state of tension. Discipline in educational settings cannot exist as a commodity to be possessed and used for the purposes of control and management. Processes of education were processes of interaction with students, teachers and knowledge. The idea of knowledge has been referenced by both Dewey and Foucault and linked with discipline through processes of creation and construction. Jackson & Mazzei believed that Foucault saw knowledge as two halves to a whole; first, as constructed knowledge, which tended to be about oneself, and then, as empirical-like knowledge, which was produced in experience, and tended to be about relations with others. It was this knowledge, both constructed and empirical-like, that Foucault saw as related to power, and it was this view of knowledge that melded into Dewey's views regarding interaction (transaction).

Foucault (1977) did not believe that knowledge and power existed in opposition to each other; he believed rather that they created each other. Jackson & Mazzei (2012) wrote, "They [power and knowledge] merge and become visible as forms of power/knowledge in cultural and material practices within specific conditions" (p. 60). Foucault suggested that, in each practice, power and knowledge merged through the struggles and processes, and that these struggles and processes formed (created and constructed) knowledge. Dewey (1927) linked freedom to knowledge and believed that students should be free to act in harmony with the knowledge that they possessed. True freedom, for Dewey, was that freedom which actually produced true knowledge. Knowledge, for Dewey, was primarily about the acquisition of habits of the mind, and anything that restricted that ability would be rejected. Dewey would reject any discipline that was a barrier to freedom of acquisition. Foucault would do the same in regard to any discipline

process void of struggle and tension. Discipline in educational settings, like all other educational processes, worked best when it interacted with knowledge by default due to its location inside education. This interaction must possess the same freedom and the same struggle that exists between teachers and students, students and knowledge, and school and community. Discipline cannot be the isolated exception; it must be like all other educational processes.

What does this interaction look like? It is interaction that welcomes the struggle and tension of Foucault between all involved in order to arrive at the right decision for the student. It is interaction that is able to go to and fro' and back and forth as Dewey suggested. It is interaction involving all parties in equal ways. It has the ability to be grasped; to be grasped by all parties equally and requires that no one party dominates the process of creation. It is interactive, changing and evolving. Discipline that possesses these characteristics would be classified as interactive experience by Dewey and struggle and tension by Foucault, but this is only the beginning of a philosophy of discipline.

What should discipline be? First, both Dewey and Foucault would suggest the discipline, as I have referenced, should have interactivity, and it should have freedom of movement in space. What does this look like? Discipline, in educational settings, should be production; it can no longer be isolated and out of relation with any part of the educational process. It must be possessed and grasped; it must be in a reciprocal relationship of struggle and tension. It must be interactive (transaction). Both Dewey and Foucault strongly suggest that discipline [power] is a part of the production of knowledge, which means that discipline is essentially part of the educational process. Foucault suggested that if power were to produce anything the process of production would have to involve a process of destroying what is current in order to create something completely new (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). Foucault presented this as "*total*

innovation,” presenting the concept of power/knowledge as *practice*; it is this *practice*, according to Foucault, that produces (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). Discipline, as production, must have this element of practice. Foucault’s element of practice includes therefore the interactivity (transaction) of Dewey as its foundation.

Discipline as production presented discipline as an active, ongoing interaction (transaction) that possess freedom of space. It is interaction (transaction), tension and struggle must have an ability to go back and forth in order to move forward. It is interaction with those that interact with it in ways that impact in order to produce. It would not quantify as an adjective modifying a noun; it would look more like an adverb describing a verb. On-going action is an integral part of its being. Adverbs are always action, with some play and tension in them; their modification depends of the verb and *vice versa*. Discipline as production looks more like a philosophical theory than a rule or a policy. Discipline as production is a transactional constructivist struggle.

Normative Claims and Implications

What does discipline as production look like? It is not just interaction but transaction. It is not just production but creation, construction and constructivism. It is not static but fluid in the sense of an equal balanced struggle. What does this look like? Could the creation of this picture begins with moral imagination? Fesmire (2003) asserted that Dewey felt strongly that imagination was an internal process that captured that which was external in an internal manner. Moral imagination is the context that would possess the traits both Dewey and Foucault value - interaction (transaction), functionality, evolutionary change, tension and struggle - all tied up internally in the individual. For Dewey, there was also freedom, but it was constrained to the individual imagination which was influenced by many things internally and externally. No two

people imagine in the same manner no matter their relation. Imagination is built by interactive experience, freedom and struggle. Discipline, conceptualized as production and seen as moral imagination, manifests itself in very different ways than current discipline, but the important element of the process is the moral aspect, which must be part of the process because imagination must have morality to govern it in a way that is not absolute freedom but nevertheless free. Without morality, revealed in an empathy and concern for others, imagination becomes egocentric with an unbalanced focus on self. With morality, imagination becomes what both Dewey and Foucault need. Imagination has freedom and ultimate space, but it also has parameters, which are not confining nor restraining yet still functioning in space. The notion of imagination presents two ideas that I feel are missing in current discipline but are important and vital to the future philosophy of discipline.

Fesmire (2003) referenced two “imaginings” that are recurring themes for Dewey inside his moral imagination. The first, Dewey referred to as *empathetic projection*. Fesmire asserted that, for Dewey, empathy was the animating mold of moral judgement, which only worked when we take on the attitudes of others in our own way, moving us beyond ourselves to a place of consideration for others feelings, interests, worries, treating them as equal to our own. To Dewey, empathy required a good bit of imagination, and both Dewey and Foucault, would welcome empathy to discipline. Empathy required morality and a relationship with others without discounting individualization. Empathy was interaction (transaction) with self and with others; it was struggle and tension. Discipline without empathy is oppressive, static and harmful, and dominated by one over all others. Discipline with empathy is active, moving, changing and impacting to both sides equally of those engaged in the process. Discipline marked by empathy impacts students and teachers as relational processes do. This is unlike current disciplinary

processes which are designed to only impact those being disciplined. If discipline is relational and social, according to both Dewey and Foucault, it should impact and change all those in relation with it.

The second theme, according to Fesmire (2003), Dewey referenced as *creativity tapping a situation's possibility*. This theme was Dewey's central meaning behind imagination. Here, according to Fesmire, was where Dewey stated that imagination was the chief instrument of the good by way of the inertia of habits overriding adjustments of past and even present, while yielding to that which was in response to others. The good, here, depended on the inertia of habits, which was produced through interaction (transaction). The possibilities of imagination are not bound by any space, but one still bound by self. Discipline that is tangible, objective and used as a tool would become that which acted on others and not with others. Discipline that restricted movement and confined space would, again, be a process that acted on others and not with others. Discipline must be conceptualized as that which interacts with others and not on others.-This brings us to what I believe is an almost perfect presentation of what Dewey meant by transaction namely, improvisation.

Fesmire (2003) presented improvisation as the action of moral imagination. Fesmire suggested that Deweyan ethical action was best understood through the idea of jazz music, and the improvisation found in jazz music. Improvisation was composed of several factors: selfless individuality, harmony of life and continuity of the music (Fesmire, 2003). Fesmire (2003) wrote regarding this, "A jazz combo spotlights and illustrates the empathetic, impromptu and inherently social dimensions of moral compositions" (p. 93). This metaphor, according to Fesmire, called attention to the habits we cultivated through our social actions, habits that enabled the construction of innovative improvisational ideas moving forward in response to

problematic situations. The idea of improvisation as discipline is an idea that presents discipline as a process, that must act **with** students and not **on** them. Improvisation is transaction revealed in its best form. This fits the social aspects of education presented earlier and aligns with both Dewey and Foucault in regard to discipline as an active, innovative, interactive, relational struggle.

Lozenski (2016) presented yet another aspect of improvisation in jazz music that brings this idea into focus. Lozenski suggested that jazz musicians are created not one way, but in many different ways. Some come to jazz from technical training, others identify with the sound and pick up an instrument while others come from a passion for the music itself. Jazz does not discriminate; all are welcome and all contribute different “but” equally value. According to Lozenski, the equalizer is dissonance. Lozenski (2016) wrote, “These musicians all need to reconcile, at some point, how they will deal with dissonance” (p. 273). What will each do with dissonance? Lozenski suggested that jazz music entails dissonance as space, a pathway of learning, presented as something different. One of those presented forms is crisis. Lozenski’s article examines the Uhuru Youth Scholars program in which crisis is a recurring element in the context of the program.

This issue of crisis is important in understanding discipline as production. I have said that discipline as production is transactional constructivist struggle, but a better word may be “crisis” as referenced by Lozenski (2016). Lozenski was careful to address the negative connotations associated with crisis; he is not talking about those. He is talking about crisis understood as opportunity and as “a necessary precondition for transformation.” Crisis is concerned with active discomfort with the status quo, according to Lozenski (2016). Lozenski discourages crisis in isolation as that is not what he is referencing, nor is it what crisis is to the Uhuru Youth Scholars

program. Crisis is collective teaching, learning and commitment. It is learning something new that disrupts something old, and that process will always involve discomfort and this type of crisis. Discipline in educational settings is in crisis, and yet it is built and addressed to discomfort the students without disrupting the school.

Improvisation inside jazz music is crisis. Jazz musicians work collectively yet some individuals allow the music to take them beyond the group, pushing the bounds of the initial established structure through improvisation (Lozenski, 2016). This improvisation causes others to listen and adapt in order to maintain the song. There is struggle and tension as the others attempt to adapt and interact with the new direction. Lozenski (2016) wrote, “Every improvisational shift has the potential to open new opportunities for crisis and resist predictability” (p. 274). The collective structure of jazz music allows these crises to take place because inside of the structure is space that allows for this struggle and tension. Lozenski addresses this tension, calling it an attempt to reconcile the “I” with the “we.” There will be interaction between the individual and the collective. It cannot be one of uniformity or unanimity, according to Lozenski. Instead, it must be one that understands both are needed. Lozenski (2016) wrote, “The “I” can only operate inside of the “we,” yet the “we” will perish without the “I” (p. 283). This mutuality is Dewey’s transaction and Foucault’s tension and struggle in summary form. This is discipline that is a transactional constructivist struggle.

What does this discipline look like? Discipline as production will root itself in every relationship of education. Discipline as production is seen as active, innovative improvisation, presenting discipline as social and as experience, evolving and having a balance of freedom and control. As production seen as improvisation, discipline is active and moving in tension with an evolving process that ebbs and flows. It modifies itself according to all involved in the process. It

is transaction and struggle. It is improvisation in response to dissonance. It is space providing opportunity. Discipline as production looks remarkably different from today's discipline.

First, discipline as production must re-constitute current disciplinary space to combat the organism (subject)-environment dichotomy. Both Foucault (1977) and Dewey (1958) suggested that the current discipline model pushed the subject into a position of neutrality or of non-existence. Discipline as production must ensure that space is constituted in ways that grant the subject freedom, giving the subject equality with the environment (space) and other organisms occupying the environment (space). The subject must exist equally within the space and with other organisms in that space. For that to take place, the space (environment) cannot be confining in ways that restrict movement. Subjects must have the ability to interact with other subjects and with the environment in what Dewey would call, "the process all the way around" (Dewey & Bentley, 1975). The issue of environment (space) must be an issue of intersection, according to Foucault (1984) and not restriction. Foucault (1977) would label current disciplinary space as utopic, but in reality, it must become heterotopic.

Current discipline, and the general school environment, is a great example of the shift from heterotopias of crisis to heterotopias of deviation (Foucault (1984). Discipline is no longer a manager of crisis; instead, discipline in educational settings seeks to simply avoid crises. Lozenski (2016) suggested that it was the crisis that was necessary to create new opportunities. Current discipline is now a labeler of deviation, which pushes stimulus-response behaviorism back into prominence. Dewey (1925) would agree, positioning himself against this stimulus-response behaviorism that restricted, and suggesting instead coordination, which is, in essence, intersection. Current discipline offers restriction and exclusion, and little to no freedom. Space is built specifically to confine and isolated the subject (student) away from normal space and to

other spaces built especially for punishment. Discipline as production does not isolate or exclude, but it instead, includes students in normal space that allows equal access to students, teachers and administrators. Discipline space is not specific or specially designed space or even reserved only for discipline. It is any space that is educative, and it is not the same space each time. It differs according to the situation and the circumstance. The point is that space used for discipline must be like all other spaces... open, accessible and free.

Second, discipline must move beyond its dualistic dimensional structure. Current discipline places objects (students) into a dualistic dimensional of right and wrong. Students invoking a discipline system are wrong and stay wrong until they fulfill the consequences deemed necessary for the specific discipline infraction in order to become right again. Current discipline suggests that students are either discipline problems or they are not. There is no middle area or holding pattern for students; they either are or they are not. This dualism turns discipline into, as was referenced earlier in this project, discipline as tangible and mechanical with a school orientation. Both Dewey and Foucault would reject this. Dewey would strongly suggest that discipline is a social process of coordination and construction. Foucault would do the same through tension and struggle. Discipline must not, according to both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977), avoid struggle or tension; instead it must move toward it. Dewey (1925) suggested that the conflict of coordination was doubt, which actually produced the next action (construction) which, in an organism (student), leads that organism toward engaging in coordinating-seeking activities with the environment and other organisms. Dewey (1925) and Foucault (1977) were suggesting that the best thing for the organism (student) was not to be isolated, excluded or removed, but to be ushered back into relationships with other organisms and the environment. Dewey and Foucault referenced interaction as ongoing and never ending. Discipline that is

dualistic, tangible and objective will dominate and abort any process or action of interaction or coordination. Discipline as production must push forward with the process and interact with others and the environment continuously. Unless they are a threat of violence, students do not need to be removed from the school community; students need to be ushered deeper into the school community. They do not need to be isolated so as to get less of the school community; they must be pulled deeper into more of the school community; students who are disciplined must be given greater access to the school community, not cut off from it.

Third, current discipline is power and would be considered a form of biopower by both Dewey (1958) and Foucault (1977). Discipline, in a school setting, has the power to “make” and to “let,” which positions it as dominant, eliminating any and all interaction. Detention, suspension and expulsion are all decision-making biopower actions that “make” decisions regarding the students and what they are allowed to do in regard to the school. This positions the school as dominant over the student, crushing any chance of interaction due to the disruption of balanced and equal interaction. Dewey’s transaction, true transaction, would be an answer to this dilemma. Dewey suggested that interaction that was truly balanced between organism and environment was actually trans-action, which is pure interaction that was balanced, equal and constantly being recreated (new) through interactions of struggle and tension. This is the new philosophy of discipline and it is found in Dewey’s transaction interacting with his thoughts on imagination and improvisation. Imagination is the foundation of this new philosophy. It is the balanced blend of concern for self and others. Dewey (1938) addresses this in his book, *Experience and Education*, when he takes up the issue of social control during games at recess. Dewey speaks about how games like kickball, tag and hide-and-go-seek do not go on haphazardly. There are rule and there is control. For the game to be a game, everyone must agree

to both. The control of each player is affected by the entire game and the desire to play the game, but the game evolves in ways that are akin to improvisation. Players must adjust to the game as they adjust not only to their own teammates but also to those on the opposing team. This is control with freedom.

Foucault seems to be saying the same thing in his discussion regarding discursive formations. In his discussions regarding explanatory power, he contends that discursive practices, viewed with external neutrality, provide meaningless space of “ruled-governed transformations” in which that which is in the space takes on some sort of meaning. This meaning is not balanced meaning between organism and environment, but unbalanced meaning affected by one over the other. According to Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983), Foucault rejects both sides of all the pairs possible in the formulation of the subject/object dichotomy. Foucault referred to them as static forms, “imposed” from the outside, destroying any context of interaction or coordination between organism and environment, i.e., unbalanced meaning. Foucault would state that there are no constraints originating in human thoughts or actions, but he would also say that there are also no determinations formed by institutions or social relations imposed by force. Foucault, according to Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983), offered little clarity as to what he would suggest, but he does offer some insight through his views on the “formalist illusion.” For Foucault, this was “imagining” that the laws of construction are also the conditions of existence. Discipline must be imagination, including improvisation and dissonance in order to avoid the dominant position of power. Students must be given access to their own discipline in interactive ways that incorporate themselves as well as all others. They must be allowed to struggle and experience the tension of the discipline decision that will actually affect them; but they also must understand how their own actions have affected others. The idea of improvisation

applies here in a very similar manner as it applies in Dewey's (1938) reference to games.

Students must create and guide their own discipline in ways that are interactive with the school and the administration.

Discipline as production presents discipline in a transactional constructivist manner that addresses the issues of both Dewey and Foucault. It is a new philosophy that presents space as an equal interaction between organism and organism, and within environment. It addresses interaction from the standpoint of the student, ushering the student into a truly interactive relationship with all of the school. It addresses the empathy and creativity of improvisation by providing access for students to be part of their own discipline decision in much the same way that jazz musicians interact to create something new from something already rooted in them. Discipline as production is a process of education that is equal and interactive with every other process of education. This is what discipline as production looks like.

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