

REGIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to rethink fundamentally the identities, interests, and institutions in which dimensions of international leadership occur in order to reveal how leadership is accorded, managed, and transformed. I attempt to answer this question through an examination of what I term "recognition-based leadership," in which regional powers seek the concessions of neighbors in an effort to drive foreign policy preferences and behavior within their respective regions. I rely on three empirical cases to reflect varying contexts in which the level of leadership recognition attained by the regional power predicts specific regional power behavior, as well as particular outcomes within the region. I argue that different levels of leadership recognition can be categorized into three stages: the establishment stage, the management stage, and the delegation stage. All of these stages are examined with the context of regional counterterrorism processes.

The overall contribution of this study furthers our understanding of how regional powers might behave depending upon the leadership stage their RSC finds itself in with regards to the issue-area under focus. By concentrating on the differentiation between interest consideration, external competition, and internal mechanisms to drive state behavior throughout these stages, I am able not only to draw insights out of these recognition-based processes, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to assess the direction in which the regional order as a whole is headed.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Margaret Alford Hutto, 1923-2016.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACS	Association of Caribbean States
AFSJ	Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEES	Central and Eastern European States
CEI	Central European Initiative
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EC	European Community
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ENP	European Neighborhood Project
EP	European Parliament

GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
GUUAM	Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEP	Member of European Parliament
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PWGOT	Police Working Group on Terrorism
SAFTA	South American Free Trade Agreement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIS	Schengen Information System
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SitCen	Situation Centre
TWG	Terrorism Working Group

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: RECOGNITION-BASED LEADERSHIP

Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals... In both spheres, the desire for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions. The individual seeks confirmation, on the part of his fellows, of the evaluation he puts upon himself. It is only in the tribute others pay to his goodness, intelligence, and power that he becomes fully aware of, and can fully enjoy, what he deems to be his superior qualities. It is only through his reputation for excellence that he can gain the measure of security, wealth, and power he regards to be his due. Thus, in the struggle for existence and power – which is, as it were, the raw material of the social world – what others think about us is as important as what we actually are.

Hans J. Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations

1.1 Introduction

Despite a rich history of conceptual development, scholars of international relations and foreign policy have failed to generate a comprehensible and objective understanding of international leadership (Hayes 2015). Not only is much of the literature on leadership in international relations applied strictly to the United States (see Nye 2005; Nye 2008), but it seems to be in part either remnants of the US role during the Cold War, or discourse on how the US might maintain that role in the 21st century. Importantly, US leadership during the Cold War was easily discernable. It maintained the most powerful military, the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the Western world, and the recognition of its Western European partners as the undisputed principal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the external threat of the

Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of the bipolar system, however, attended the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact allowing sovereign states to pursue their own security interests, largely independent of US influence. With the global threat of communism eliminated, the regionalization of security processes became more apparent (see Lake and Morgan 1997), and in turn responsibility was accorded to regional powers as managers of conflict and cooperation within their own spheres (see Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). In a global system that in comparison with the intense bipolarity of the Cold War is largely decentralized, the opportunities for state leadership at the regional level have risen substantially. With these new circumstances comes the need to adapt scholarly practices on leadership to accommodate variations across both state and region. The charge that scholars have failed to do this appears to be primarily a response to a number of news outlets referring to the recent actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia's involvement in the Syrian Civil War as acts of leadership. The faultiness in these references is the underlying assumption that leadership in the international system is absolutely predicated on material action, or "doing something" through the use of military power.

Concentrating on material action by powers in the international system is not necessarily wrong, but it is only half of the social interaction that takes place between states when leadership is delegated. The larger question then, is how might scholars of international relations and foreign policy understand the processes and mechanisms underlying this interaction between states that ends in a delegation of leadership? This project requires a fundamental rethinking of the identities, interests, and institutions in which dimensions of international leadership occur in order to reveal how leadership is accorded, how it might be lost to competing powers, and the process by which its allocation might shift from states to other entities. This dissertation seeks to

establish a recognition-based concept of leadership, in which regional powers seek the concessions of neighbors in an effort to drive foreign policy behavior within their spheres of influence, stabilize their regional security complexes (RSCs), and create a geopolitical space in which they might wield their regional influence on a global stage. Understanding processes of recognition is vital to understanding the ways in which security orders, and the international system at large, change form. To observe these types of major shifts in the makeup of the system requires in part understanding the mechanisms by which leadership is accorded, challenged, and transformed, and how these processes are integrated with great power behavior and regional conflict dynamics.

1.2 Review of the Leadership Literature

Discussions of leadership in international relations naturally gravitate towards the foundational question of agency in political science. As Wendt argues, “all social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure’ problem” (1987: 337). This problem can be summarized simply as two contrasting characterizations of society: either “society is a people, or society is the circumstances within which people are formed” (Wight 2006: 62). In the context of this dissertation, the question can be posed in this way: “is the state leadership role ascribed by the structure of the system, or attained by the individual actions of the leader?” As Wight demonstrates, this is a distinction inherent in the structuralism-constructivism divide in IR. The most famous systematic structural theory is provided by Kenneth Waltz (1979), in which he argues that the distribution of resources in the system is the key factor in explaining international outcomes. That is, the distribution of resources produces the *structure* of the system, which in turn is the main determinant of state action and international outcomes. Therefore, while states

certainly have agency in a structural world, that agency is severely constrained by the make-up of the system itself. Leadership in this sense would then be an outcome in which a structurally empowered state “does something.” This is primarily the issue addressed in the opening paragraph, the tendency of scholars to overlook social interactions between states that sanction certain types of behavior and prohibit others. Delegation is inherently an interaction, and as such requires that we consider the constructivist dimension. Constructivism in the sense that I use it emphasizes the endogenous relations of state action and international structure. The focus here is on Wendt’s claim that the world is “what states make of it” (1992). This notion gives priority to state agency and action in establishing the international structure and producing international outcomes. In essence, the meaning of material power is ascribed by states through their social interactions. Simultaneously, to be ascribed meaning an adequate level of material power must be present, pulling us back towards a structural based concept of leadership.

In terms of recognition-based leadership, the atomistic premises presented by both Realism and Constructivism and their discussion of the agent-structure problem address the possibility of leadership as a result of the isolated acts of individual states. There is no doubt that the roles played by communities of states impacting individual state action can later be added in an effort to amend and update this idea in theoretical terms, but in the context of recognizing the establishment of international leadership, we are trapped by these premises. In other words, we cannot observe the particular moment in which the subordinates and the leader meet on some common ground and leadership is both claimed and recognized. Certainly we can see elements of this through dialogue, cooperation, and other forms of communal action, but the moment in which these actions become effective mechanisms by which leadership is used to drive the behavior of subordinates will likely always be unclear, and this is one limitation of this study.

Nevertheless, in an effort to shed light on the constellations of states that affect the establishment and continuance of leadership processes, this dissertation argues that a conception of regional security orders must not necessarily proceed from the solitary acts of regional powers, but rather from an already existing structural framework consisting of potential subordinates, within which regional powers and those potential subordinates always already move.

The importance of recognition processes to leadership has not gone without notice in the literature. When justifying the use of coercive force by an international leader, Lake emphasizes that it is the mutual recognition of the power relationship between a pair of states that justifies the interference (2009, 18). This type of conception, however, primarily relies on dyadic descriptions of power relations (see Young 1991), as well as elements of coercion and attraction that might prompt norm changes in order to achieve recognition of authority (see Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Nye 2004). In Mitzen's (2006) view, the actions of states in these types of relationships are outward manifestations of the leader-follower affiliation, and Destradi (2010) implies that these actions manifest on a spectrum between hard and soft power. All of these dispositions return us to our original dilemma, however. International leadership must be conceptualized as something containing not only material actions – in this case the projection or manifestation of military power – but also the socio-political foundations for an understanding of how recognition within communities of states and the allocation of leadership occurs.

Scholars that exclude coercion and cooptation in the leadership role instead see leadership primarily as an outcome of adept diplomacy cooperating and guiding followers toward common goals and preferences. It naturally follows from this that institutions, as platforms for dialogue and frameworks for cooperation, should be placed on a level of higher import. As an example, Nabers (2010) argues that institutions serve as a platform for “discursive

hegemony,” a hierarchical process by which power relationships are embedded in discourse. Incentives for leaders in using institutions vary in the literature. Pedersen’s (2002) theory of cooperative hegemony only takes place as hierarchical relationships begin to flounder, at which point the leader should increasingly look to institutions for cost-sharing practices, while Omelicheva’s (2011) work on a reference group theory of international politics points towards institutions as bearers of standardization in group behavior and norms, and as a reference for followers when making policy decisions.¹ Again, all of these conceptions fail to demonstrate how leadership processes take shape, but rather focus on the behavior of leaders seeking to maintain influence over their followers.

The regional security complex (mentioned above) is the framework in which I analyze these types of interactions between potential leaders, leaders, and their subordinates. It is not the intention of this dissertation to explain the origins of RSCs, but rather to examine and explore aspects of their reconstruction and reorganization influenced by the actions of regional powers on one side and the responses by their regional communities on the other. Wendt and Friedheim come as close as anyone to this conception of the relationship between leaders and their complexes, arguing that the community’s relations with its authority are sustained through the production and reproduction of identities “every day by practices of mutual recognition among states” (1995, 688-9). This conceptualization merits attention, and it is amply addressed in the first chapter, but it also eschews explanations incorporating recognition as a transactional relationship. Hedley Bull, for example, argues that recognition of authority is allocated based on

¹ As an aside, in terms of regional power behavior, while this dissertation does not use the concept of international leadership to justify the use of force, it cannot be denied that the qualities that come to mind when discussing leadership systematically, naturally lend themselves to hierarchical ascent. In turn, what we observe in the international sphere is the establishment and management of hierarchies by leaders through the use of both coercion and guidance, both cooptation and cooperation. Accordingly, these interactions take place both within and outside of institutional contexts.

“the disproportionately large contribution, which the great power is able to make to the achievement of common purposes” (1977, 215). This dissertation endorses the viewpoints of both Wendt and Friedheim and Bull, contending that the material transactions within security relations in regional security complexes are co-constitutive with processes of identity formation that can lead to the establishment of regional leadership, as well as regional reorganization and reorientation. Ordinarily (and in this dissertation) this takes place through varying levels of formal institutionalization. Having said that, it might first be necessary to explain why the regional level might be best in exploring questions of recognition-based leadership.

1.3 Looking to Regions

Recent efforts to explain international security dynamics have utilized regional approaches, with many scholars arguing that the perceptions and interests of international actors most affect those of their neighbors and vice versa (see, for instance, Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake and Morgan 1997). Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, for example, put forth the Regional Powers and Security Order Framework (RPSF) as a theoretical tool to help understand security interactions at the regional level (2012). Specifically, they identify regional powers and explore the ways in which these powers influence their respective regional security environment.

Not unlike most international relations literature (see Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981), Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier assume that those states with greater capabilities will play a disproportionately critical role in international politics. In their case, it is regional powers' influence on the creation and maintenance of security orders in their neighborhoods, or their RSCs that matter most. The RPSF therefore uses regional powers to analyze the security processes within RSCs and does so by bridging the Realism-Constructivism divide using two

regional level characteristics: regional structure (e.g. capabilities and polarity) and regional power behavior (e.g. roles and foreign policy orientations).




Figure 1.1. A depiction of Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s framework (2012).

Figure 1 illustrates a summarized version of the RPSF, with an emphasis on the leadership role. With respect to regional structure, adequate capabilities stipulate which states stand out as potential regional powers. While Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier do not provide a measure of what adequate means, they do suggest that there is some threshold of capabilities for states to consider engaging in the roles of regional powers. Particularly important is that regional powers stand out in capabilities relative to other states in the region. In Central Eurasia for example (Chapter

Three), this is certainly the case for Russia as measured by a range of indicators such as military capabilities, military expenditures or GDP per capita.²

Given its systematic approach to identifying regional powers and their impact within their respective security complexes, the RPSF is broadly applicable to IR, but is a particularly important instrument in the area of regional security studies. “Securitization processes can define threats as coming from the global level, but the referent objects to be made secure may be either at the global level or at other levels” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 12). This securitization at the level of the region as a response to threats at the international level is indicative of two things implied by the RPSF; first, states close in geographical proximity tend to recognize the security interdependence that exists within their neighborhoods and secondly, as these states continue to interact with those closest in proximity, collective identities manifest and develop (Wendt 1994). In this way, even nascent regional security complexes act as frameworks constraining and facilitating the interaction between regional powers and their potential followers. It is the substance of these interactions that establishes and sustains regional leadership and authority, to which the majority of this dissertation will direct its attention. But before that, it might be useful to consider the concept of leadership in international relations, and how we might distinguish it from other regional power roles. This will allow us to classify regional power actions and compare them across cases.

1.4 Identifying Regional Leadership

Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier identify five facets of regional leadership: process-initiation, issue framing, interest consideration, institution development, and deployment of power (2012, 74).

² For instance, Russia ranked 8th in the world in terms of military expenditures, committing 4.47% of its USD 2.52 trillion on military and defense budgets in 2012 (Central Intelligence Agency 2015).

Process-initiation on a regional level is a fairly obvious necessity in forming and maintaining a leadership role amongst one's neighbors. Showing initiative in launching region-wide projects is vital to demonstrating effective regional leadership. The intent involved seems almost secondary to recognizing and identifying process-initiation in the real world. Whether the leader wishes to mitigate the fears of lesser powers to prevent bandwagoning (see Ikenberry 1996; Pedersen 2002), provide public goods in exchange for regional subordination (Lake 2009), or simply create formal and informal institutions in order to improve its control over the region (Nye 2004; Nabers 2010), the intent behind process-initiation can take a number of forms.

Issue framing is normally referred to when discussing the process of securitization. Actors create frames according to their own preferences in an effort to draw attention within the community to certain issues they deem as threatening. This occurs when states set agendas for discussion within international organizations, using their organizational platform to engender their preferences within the member states (Pedersen 2002). Issue framing however, should not be relegated to a multilateral space, as powers sometimes attempt to “articulate systems of thought,” or elaborate on hegemonic ideas within the bilateral bargaining framework (Young 1991, 298; Wendt and Friedheim 1995). Some scholars have limited issue framing to discursive speech acts. This is in error since security as a speech act “overlooks the external context, the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience, and neglects the differential power between the speaker and the listener” (Balzacq 2005, 174).

Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier seem to maintain that issue framing is primarily a speech act, suggesting that efforts by the regional leader to communicate and articulate securitizing frames must be made, but the authors are not explicit as to whether this communication must be discursive (2012, 75-6). My conception of leadership will emphasize both discursive and non-

discursive speech acts, following Balzacq and others' suggestions that there are certain lines of communication that are connected through elements that are categorically not speech (see, for example, Ayyash 2010).

A third facet of regional leadership identified by the RPSF is interest-consideration. This dimension brings attention to a power's willingness to make certain concessions to its lesser counterparts in order to both at once appease its subordinates and achieve its policy objectives, perhaps by other means or paths. An entrepreneurial leader, for example, invents attractive options for its subordinates in order to sway them to adopt certain agendas or policies (Young 1991, 295). Destradi's concept of leader follows a similar line of logic, using interest consideration to "facilitate the realization of common objectives" (2010, 921). Perceiving interest-consideration as a safety net in times of contracting power, Pedersen's cooperative hegemon shares power in order to recruit subordinates to share the costs of regional public goods (2002, 684). Other scholars however, envision interest-consideration as leading to only the realization of mutual goals (Nabers 2010, 935; see also Omelicheva 2011). Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier move away from this perspective, asserting that regional interest consideration is not concomitant with altruist endeavors, but as most of these approaches do, it certainly involves a give-and-take mechanism in order to pull subordinates towards the leader's policy preferences (2012: 76).

Institution development is not something many of these authors mention explicitly as a dimension of leadership. Pedersen reaches this dimension only tangentially in discussing the cooperative hegemon's "commitment to a long-term regionalist policy strategy" (2002, 684), and at best, institutions and policies are the only primary observable implications of Nye's "soft power" (2004). The RPSF however, deems a certain level of institution development vital to the

effectiveness of the regional leadership role. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier describe this dimension as “illustrative of the essentially generative quality of leadership” (2012, 77). I look to institutions in visualizing this element of regional leadership because they are the most obvious and thus most used path of cultivating relationships to manage collective security issues.

The final dimension of regional leadership identified by the framework is the deployment of power. In most scholarship, this dimension translates directly into bargaining leverage and coercive capability (Young 1991). It is represented in both the realist and constructivist paradigms, seen in some circles simply as coercing other states to do things they otherwise would not (see Lake 2009), and in others as forcefully creating consenting identities (Wendt and Freidheim 1995; also see Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier again attempt to bridge the divide between these two paradigms, not limiting the deployment of power dimension to coercion or cooptation, but suggesting that it is composed of both (2012, 77). We may understand leadership that requires the coercive side of this dimension as a weaker form of leadership than that that co-opts subordinates’ cooperation through soft power and the incorporation of all members’ preferences. It remains in my conception however, because of the inevitability of unintegrated RSCs to contain recalcitrant states. This limits a leaders authority, but should not lead us to discount that authority entirely.

These five dimensions of regional leadership permeate the literature. Regional powers who are able to utilize all dimensions will drive the nature of their security orders towards stability and – depending on the preferences of the power and the leadership accorded to it – either hegemony or security community. It is important to note that these are the expectations of

effective regional leadership, and the perspective of this dissertation is one in which leadership is conceptualized as a foreign policy role; one that is actively played by regional powers.³

With its ability to allow scholars to emphasize the co-constitutive nature of agency and structure, role theory is becoming more and more attractive as a way to bridge the divide between the fields of international relations and foreign policy analysis (Thies 2012). While it is expected that all states participating in the international system play some role, I consider the roles played by regional powers to resound more heavily on the international stage. Certainly, as one foundational scholar in the early role theory literature makes clear, “terms such as ‘great power’ ... do not necessarily indicate how much diplomatic influence states wield within any set of relationships” (Holsti 1970, 242). I would suggest an addendum to this statement: when “great powers” do attempt to wield diplomatic influence, their efforts echo more loudly than their lesser counterparts.

We must, however, place these dimensions and their consolidation into this particular role in terms of recognition-based leadership. Indeed, roles are not seen as fixed objects, they are not occupied, but rather a classification of behavior that is generated through social interactions and routines (see Holsti 1970). Harnisch views roles as emergent objects, grounded in a process of individuation in which “the ‘self’ becomes an object to itself only when an actor learns ‘to take the role of other’ and examines oneself from this other’s perspective” (2012, 53). This Hegelian ideal of intersubjective recognition is hardly within the purview of this dissertation, but the mechanisms by which this recognition takes place are very much appropriate here, since “the movement of recognition guarantees the complementary agreement and thus the necessary

³ A more ambitious dissertation perhaps would have looked at a number of regional powers across each leadership dimension to draw contrasts between them. No doubt, a dissertation of this sort would be valuable as a tool to operationalize the five dimensions of leadership, limiting the utility of the present study. At the same time, however, this project would have required a much heavier reliance on the RPSF for theoretical guidance, and therefore, it is debatable how much it would have contributed to the regional security literature as a whole.

mutuality of opposed subjects” (Honneth 2005, 16). Simply put, foreign policy roles (and their various dimensions) are objects embedded in social interaction and action, and the designation of such roles onto an individual state is contingent on both the actions of the regional power, and the attitudes and responses by its neighbors within the security complex.

1.5 Counterterrorism as a Means for Exploring Leadership Recognition Processes

The application of the RPSF to the specific issue of transnational terrorism is of particular theoretical importance to this dissertation and the regional security literature at large. As international cooperation and conflict have become more complex in the wake of the Cold War, the importance of issue-specific foreign policy analysis is elevated. Even neorealist theories of balancing are no longer analyzed as comprehensive strategic decisions, but rather decisions relegated to some issue areas and not others (see, for example, Hansen 2011; Crawford 2011). In terms of regional leadership then, it is possible for regional powers to maintain varying levels of leadership in certain issue areas, while lacking recognition in others. This is certainly the case for China, which maintains an economic leadership role in Southeast Asia, but as we see in Chapter Two, lacks considerably the recognition necessary for a regional security leadership role. Narrowing the scope further, China does play a significant military role in Southeast Asian waters, only rivaled in the region by the external US power. This, however, is not reflective of the role accorded it in Southeast Asian counterterrorism practices. In this sense, saying that China’s role in Southeast Asia is lacking tends to miss stark variations within the security dimension. Therefore, this dissertation analyzes regional leadership recognition-processes in the counterterrorism issue dimension.

Terrorism represents a most-likely case for the recognition-based leadership framework laid out in this dissertation, simply because of the nature of the threat (Beck 2003). Terrorism is inherently threatening to all state apparatuses by seizing the legitimate use of force from the authority of the government, so that states should be primed to cooperate on a regional level. Thus the opportunity arises for the strongest states, those regional powers, to step forward and gain recognition to lead in regional counterterrorism efforts. If terrorism truly threatens all states, we should expect in many instances for the threat of terrorism to act exogenously on the interactions of states within an RSC, so that rather than being concerned completely with the military or police actions of each other, counterterrorism cooperation pits the states against non-state entities. Indeed, “the ability to overcome collective action problems depends in part on whether actors’ social identities generate self-interests or collective interests” (Wendt 1994: 386).

The fact that the terrorist event acts as a mechanism for priming interstate cooperation in certain neighborhoods makes it an ideal avenue for exploring regional power leadership. Regional leadership relies first and foremost on the cooperation of member states, and while the UN has attempted to encourage counterterrorism cooperation on an international level (UNSCR 1373; 1610), even threats global in scale yield unique regional responses (see Buzan and Waever 2003; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012; Lake and Morgan 1997). Thus, when terrorism primes regional orders for cooperation, we should witness effective regional powers at the fore of the threat behaving as leaders.

Variations in regional experience lead me to select three regions with similar problems of terrorism: Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia, and Europe. All of these regional security orders have experienced significant rises in terrorist activity over the last several decades. Islamic

fundamentalism has primarily been the focus of the terrorist threat in these regions, but their counterterrorism efforts have not been limited to this type of extremism. Of note then is the difficulty of identifying and classifying the contested definition of terrorism. This dissertation largely sidesteps this issue by concerning itself with primarily the security practices of states. In this way, I am able to use regularized counterterrorism practices to describe the terrorism phenomenon, rather than focusing on the ambiguous and ever-changing characteristics of the phenomenon itself. In some instances this is problematic, allowing regional powers to determine what are and are not terrorist organizations is an easily abused privilege. As the third chapter demonstrates, this is certainly the case in Central Eurasia.

Loosening the definition however, does not inhibit our ability to identify abuses of the concept of terrorism. This is primarily due to the nature of the analysis and its emphasis on social interaction and recognition. Instances in which leadership is accorded in counterterrorism processes are thus identified within their own particular contexts, from which legitimizations for the use of force may be pulled and evaluated. While unsatisfactory in terms of the prevention of human rights abuses, this method importantly does not detract from the ability to identify the regions that must be carefully monitored to ensure that naming and shaming takes place after future occurrences. The benefits of sidestepping the debate over the definition of terrorism then, outweigh the pitfalls, as it allows us to discuss regional cooperation broadly without becoming mired in an enervated academic deliberation.

1.6 Roadmap: Three Stages of Regional Leadership

The case studies making up the bulk of this dissertation provide an in depth description of recognition-based leadership in Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia, and Europe. While each RSC

has faced similar challenges with terrorism, there exist wide variations in the regional counterterrorism experiences. This is explained through a three-pronged framework of leadership recognition stages: the establishment of recognition, the management of recognition, and the delegation of recognition.

Chapter Two focuses on Chinese attempts to establish recognition of its leadership role in Southeast Asian counterterrorism processes. The research questions asked at this stage are “why has China been unable to attain the recognition of its neighbors,” and “in what issue-specific contexts has it been able to do so?” In assessing the establishment stage of leadership recognition in the Southeast Asian RSC, I consider four points. First, I discuss the unordered nature of the internal Southeast Asian counterterrorism process. With emphasis on the ‘internal’ sphere, I draw focus to China’s inability to realize itself as an insider in Southeast Asian relations, especially through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Out of this discussion, I identify from the RPSF a Chinese failure to consider the interests of its neighbors as one reason that this might be the case. I then examine why China might be unable to perform the regional leadership dimension of interest consideration adequately, arguing that the regional identity of China is reliant on contested territorial boundaries in the South China Sea, creating a conflict between Chinese social and corporate identities. Finally, I demonstrate the effect this has on the United States’ external penetration into the region in the counterterrorism issue-area.

Chapter Three assesses Russia’s management of its leadership role in the Central Eurasian RSC. The term “management” implies that this stage of leadership is naturally more stable than the establishment stage, as the regional power has achieved some level of recognition from its regional counterparts. Challenges may arise, however, in the form of internal recalcitrant states aligning themselves with inside or outside challengers to the established regional leader. I

describe the Central Eurasian management stage in terms of a relational-networks/institutions approach, which considers social processes of interaction as co-constituting the regional order in combination with the embedded hierarchy that results from the material distribution of capabilities. Importantly, the realignment of regional recalcitrant states sparks institutional competition with extra-regional powers, which have established inter-regional social and political ties using formal institutions as “conversion points” to pull in and influence the behavior of subordinate followers. Which socio-political ties states commit to and how regional powers respond has the ability to alter fundamentally the make-up of the respective institutions, and perhaps more importantly, the regional security order itself. Parallel to Chapter Two, we might expect recalcitrant states to develop out of a lack of recourse for regional subordinates to lodge protest against the regional leader when their interests have not been considered.

In this vein, one might consider Chapter Four as an exploration of the development of institutional guarantees for subordinate states to have their interests considered. This is what I term the delegation stage of leadership, and it is distinct from the establishment and management stages primarily because it occurs within a process of regional democratization. In short, regional democratic governance changes the shape of leadership processes in which the political community is afforded the ability to define the situation for the regional powers. The overarching research question in this chapter is, “how can we talk about the processes of recognition that accord regional power leadership to specific states in a security order that is arranged to such an extent that the five dimensions of leadership (according to the RPSF) are afforded to all states residing within the egalitarian framework?” Secondarily, “in an institution whose legitimacy is derived from this egalitarian framework, how might we observe instances in which individual/groups of states take the reins on regional policy preferences?” I seek to answer these

questions in two stages. In the first, I outline the development of the European Union as the security actor of Europe, highlighting efforts by European regional powers to drive security processes (counterterrorism practices in particular), noting their relative failure at doing so. Second, the hyper-institutionalization of the European Union makes observing recognition processes quite difficult. To try and work around this challenge, I develop an argument concerning the role of the rapporteur in the European Parliament, contending that since nationality has been found to have a substantial affect on the position of the rapporteur as the guide of proposals through the institution, some states fair better than others in their rapporteurs ushering proposals through the legislative process on account of a regional recognition of their leadership role.

It may be argued that in social science terms, the cases in this study lack external validity. This point is not easily disputed, but the methods by which I estimate regional leadership recognition, as well as examine the processes of its accordance, maintenance, and durability are universally applicable. Competing corporate and social identities between states will always harm their leadership capacity, external challenges linked to internal disunity will always inhibit leadership effectiveness, and egalitarian regional frameworks will always partition recognition processes, so that historically embedded hierarchies will reorient and reassert themselves by legitimate institutional means. Of course, regional powers will respond to these internal and external challenges in different ways, so that the generalizability of the project remains difficult to extrapolate.

Another criticism that this dissertation will surely come up against is that I have presented neither an inductive search for the causes of leadership recognition nor a deductive test for effective leadership in RSCs. Certainly, further research on this topic would necessitate these

two types of scientific research. It has been shown in the past however, that “conducting case studies on the dependent variable can provide important and theoretically useful information” (Vasquez and Gibler 2001, 3-4). This study meets this threshold first and foremost by providing a novel approach to cross-comparing RSCs based on the level of their integration afforded by the leadership role accorded to the regional power by its subordinate states. As a result, this is the first step in a much broader research project.

The final chapter addresses this issue by presenting a summary of the arguments put forth throughout the dissertation, as well as noting specific trends that span each stage and their possibility for generating future research in the areas of recognition-based leadership and regional security. Focusing on these more-or-less transcendent trends allows me to draw out the theoretical aspects of the stages of leadership theory, and to pull the pieces developed through each case application back into a coherent whole. At the same time, these cases are useful in demonstrating how we might expect regional powers to behave depending upon the leadership stage their respective RSC finds itself in with regards to the issue area under focus. By concentrating on the differentiation between interest consideration, external competition, and internal mechanisms to drive state behavior throughout the stages of leadership, I am able not only to draw insights out of these recognition-based processes, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to assess the direction in which the regional order as a whole is headed.

CHAPTER 2

THE ESTABLISHMENT STAGE: CHINA'S IDENTITY CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

2.1 Introduction

Chinese efforts to develop Southeast Asian security processes in order to reflect its own interests are consistent with the establishment stage of regional leadership. While China is geographically apart and security interdependent with the regional complex, it has faltered in establishing itself as the regional leader, unable to consider the interests of its regional neighbors as evidenced by its territorial pursuits in the South China Sea. This failure of interest consideration has made it difficult for the power to garner regional recognition toward its initiatives, issue frames, and institution development efforts, prompting China to resort to deploying its military power in efforts to establish a dominant position of authority. Obviously, this dominance does not necessarily translate into leadership establishment.

The leadership establishment stage is the first stage in recognition processes of regional leadership considered by this dissertation. That is, in identifying RSCs in their establishment stage, the researcher is looking for regional complexes that are relatively unordered in certain issue areas. As such, the research questions asked at this stage are “whether or not the regional power has been successful in attaining the recognition of its neighbors,” and “in what issue-specific contexts has it been able to do so?” Follow up questions address the how and why aspects of the answers to these questions. It is important to note here that the establishment stage is not a “beginning” per se, but rather marks the initiation of the recognition-based regional

leadership process. This is in line with the idea that states socially (re)constitute their relations and roles through constant interactions with one another (see, for instance, Wendt 1999).

This chapter explains China's relative absence from Southeast Asian counterterrorism processes, as a result of its own failure to garner recognition of its role as leader of the RSC. I illustrate this crisis in terms of a conflict between China's corporate identity (defined by territorial boundaries), and its social identity (defined in terms of its institutional relationships), underlined by a tension between two historical Chinese foreign policy maxims, one implying that regional justifications emerges from power, the other supporting joint development with its neighbors. This internal contestation generates specific divergence between Chinese discourse and action in the regional sphere, extending historical distrust within Southeast Asia of Chinese intentions, and ultimately leading the Southeast Asian states to hedge toward the United States, consenting to and actively participating in its counterterrorism agenda in Southeast Asia.

First and foremost, it is necessary to present the Southeast Asian RSC in its socio-historical context, and demonstrate both how China is and is not involved in its regional security processes. This introduction treats the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the backbone of the Southeast Asian RSC, and so I provide a brief history of the institution's founding and development relative to the international politics of Southeast Asia. Following ASEAN's success, it is only natural that Chinese security discourse and action – that is, its attempts to establish itself as regional leader - occur in relation to the institutional body. Thus, I continue with a discussion of the low level of Chinese cooperation in Southeast Asian security processes. This discussion then leads in to the main argument of the chapter, that China's obsession with territorial security and state-building conflicts with its interests in multilateral leadership establishment, highlighting an existing identity crisis within the state. This crisis is

illustrated most clearly through an analysis of regional counterterrorism processes, and the absence of Chinese involvement in them.

2.2 Southeast Asia in Context: Varying Models of ASEAN's Regional Development

There are by-and-large three ways to conceptualize the development of ASEAN as a dependable Southeast Asian institution, a constant balance and re-balance of power and influence between the United States, China, and the rest of the RSC (Percival 2007; Emmers 2001); an emerging security community in its own right (Acharya 2001); and a regional security complex coming increasingly within the purview of a Chinese regional power (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). Each of these conceptual approaches is due in part to both Southeast Asian members' interactions with one another, and their interactions as a collective unit (through ASEAN) with powers external to the security complex. Being that each is informed by particularities within these interactions, not one is mutually exclusive to the other. In fact, all have a considerable amount of explanatory power when placed in certain historical contexts.

The legacy of the Southeast Asian balancing act within the security complex emerged first and foremost out of the consolidation of ASEAN in 1967 by Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in an effort to curb the aggressive Indonesian foreign policy of "konfratasi." The inclusion of Indonesia in ASEAN served to satisfy its ambitions for regional dominance while constraining the state to act in accordance with the ASEAN Way principles that emphasize sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.

While the group succeeded in preventing war between its members, the height of the Cold War demonstrated to the ASEAN states that none maintained adequate capabilities to remove the possibility of great power involvement with their RSC security processes. Soviet

involvement in Indochina from 1975 for the next decade and a half pushed Thailand and ASEAN alignment towards China, albeit hesitantly. In 1980, the leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia issued a joint statement asserting that a recognition of Vietnam by ASEAN could be used as a device for the containment of their great neighbor to the north (Narine 2002, 48).

On its surface, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the game completely. Losing its Soviet backing, Vietnam finally withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 and communist insurgencies were no longer perceived as the eminent security threat to the developing RSC. Underneath the surface, however, the same balancing act continued to play out between Southeast Asia and external powers. Throughout the 1990s, there was a growing recognition of the quick progression of China's power status. This was disconcerting to both Southeast Asia and the United States, the only global superpower. In 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created as an instrument to ensure continued US involvement in the region and engage in dialogue and cooperation with China (Emmers 2001, 279).

As ASEAN developed as an institution throughout the Cold War, it became clear that the institution served as a means for the small Southeast Asian states to protect their autonomy and sovereignty, collectively balancing against any state seeming to infringe on the "ASEAN Way." In the Post-Cold War years, Southeast Asian states continually hedge and counter-hedge between the US and China, balancing towards the United States during territorial contestations with China (Ba 2003), and then back towards China as a response to the US War on Terror (Percival 2007). Even skeptics of the ARF – the security forum of ASEAN - agree that the smaller Southeast Asian nations will eventually be forced to choose whether to place their trust in a rising China, or the US superpower (Acharya 2001).

The preceding narrative repudiates any suggestion of a nascent Southeast Asian security community (see Acharya 2001). Of note here is that Southeast Asian narratives typically exclude China from inclusion in the region. While understandable in the context of a region defined by ASEAN institutionalization, this is a mistake as it is obvious security interdependence in Southeast Asia is directly tied to China and its behavior. While there is much value to the ARF as a cooperative security mechanism, instituting “trust-enhancing measures” (cited in Garofano 2002, 517), it and ASEAN’s soft mechanisms have largely failed to socialize and temper Chinese territorial ambitions. Overall, the institutions foundational ethics of sovereignty, non-interference, and dialogue allow it to express “concern” rather than condemn Chinese actions in the South China Sea (“Asia faces challenge of contemptuous China,” 1996, 11), but drive individual states or small pockets of members to perform balancing acts between its regional power and external actors.

Certainly, proponents of the security community model are not wrong in suggesting that neorealist balancing models somewhat miss dynamics of interaction internal to the regional security complex. The necessity to address both the interdependence of the RSC and the influence of the external powers requires the use of both the security community and balancing perspectives. Utilizing a focus on China as a regional power, the RPSF approaches Southeast Asia as a security interdependent complex coming increasingly within China’s sphere of influence. Shared interests do not always mark interdependence between regional powers and the rest of their RSCs; there are many cases in which the interdependence rises as a result of shared rivalry (see Buzan and Waever 2003). This is especially the case in Southeast Asia, in which internal geopolitical rivalries between Indonesia and China, as well as China and other territorial claimants to the Spratly and Paracel Island chains in the South China Sea persist. Each

aggressive measure taken by China, benign or not, reverberates through the security domain of the Southeast Asian RSC.

Considering this in association with the fact that no Southeast Asian state has gone to war with another since 1967, the possibility of an ASEAN-based security community in the RSC should not be written off. This possibility however, remains distant and reliant on the successful socialization of China, as the smaller/weaker states of ASEAN on the whole lack the capacity to ensure regional order and cooperation. It is in this realization that the RPSF becomes most useful. Recognizing the role that material capabilities must play in providing regional capacity for cooperation, we might use the RPSF to provide an explanation for why Southeast Asia has failed to move towards the security community envisioned by the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, or ZOPFAN (ASEAN 1971).

The preceding discussion is meant to demonstrate a need for strong regional leadership in Southeast Asia. Because leadership in ASEAN and the ARF has been a contentious issue over the years, these organizations are seen as rather peripheral in more divisive security issues (see Caballero-Anthony 2002). To move to the forefront of international crises – such as the 1999 massacre in East Timor – ASEAN will need to evolve from a forum focused primarily on dialogues to one that engenders cooperative action. Several Indonesian proposals to invigorate the security wing of the institution lack adequate support from the rest of the membership, even while ASEAN states fail to suppress insurgency groups taking refuge within their borders (see Simon 2007).

As seen most recently in 2011 with the Filipino proposal for a “Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation,” without the geopolitical support of China, proposals for ASEAN action on divisive issues are doomed (see Cronin 2012). Chinese leadership is a necessary tool

for the evolution of the Southeast Asian security complex, but the region continues to lack substance in this area. While the establishment stage provides an opportunity to attain leadership recognition from other RSC members, it requires calculated and strategic action on the part of the regional power to do so. As I will demonstrate, China's internal conflict between its corporate and social identities inhibit its ability to consider Southeast Asian interests at large, undercutting its amiable discourse at the institutional level in order to serve its state-building agenda through territorial security. In turn, this inhibits China's leadership in regional counterterrorism practices.

2.2.1 China as a Southeast Asian Regional Power: Dominance or Dialogue?

China's foreign policy approach to Southeast Asia can appropriately be underlined by two competing Chinese maxims formulated by past leaders. The first, adapted by Zhou Enlai, reflects the idea that "all diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means" (cited in Snow 1954, 24). This play on Clausewitz's famous quote implies that social orders are created and justified through the outcomes of war, that every privileged group that exists can be directly results from past conflict, and that every right emerges from the successful use of power. The China that endorses this maxim is one attempting to reassert its dominance throughout Southeast Asia and the world by means of territorial aggregation and regional insulation. This quotation reflects the ambitions of a newly unified China in the throws of a polarized world, reasserting itself back into regional and international politics by inciting and/or funding communist insurgencies across Southeast Asia, as well as playing an important part in balancing Vietnam and the Soviet Union's influence in the RSC during the Cold War.

Post-Cold War Chinese discourse, on the other hand, has shifted dramatically towards a guideline endorsed by Deng Xiaoping, “sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint development” (cited in Fravel 2012, 45). Issued at a time when ASEAN’s role in the RSC was solidifying, this declaration may have loosened Southeast Asian skepticism of Chinese intentions, as it preceded a marked increase in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation between China and its smaller neighbors. There remains serious doubt, however, that China has left behind completely Enlai’s “might is right” diplomacy and endorsed the principles of the ASEAN Way (defined above) and joint development. This doubt stems primarily from Chinese military capability aggregation in combination with its recent naval exploitation of islands in the contested Spratlys. Actions such as these have prompted many analysts and security officials to suggest that China is “engaged in a drive to regain its ‘rightful place’” in the world (Vaughn and Morrison 2006, 2).

This process necessarily begins at the regional level (see Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012), and understandably, Southeast Asian states are concerned about the region becoming to China what Central America was for the emergence of the United States, or Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union (see Acharya 2001, 52). The establishment phase of the leadership recognition process dictates that leaders at once need both power and recognition to gain a base of regional support and affect process initiation, change, and development. To successfully take on the role of regional leader, it is necessary that China exert its influence as a regional power, while constraining its power projection in consideration of the interests of its regional neighbors. These claims require a discussion of Southeast Asian security interests and Chinese actions in the region to draw attention to the tension of the Enlai and Xiaoping maxims in play, as well as the

irony of a China that tends to discursively allay Southeast Asian suspicions, while simultaneously fulfilling them.

It has been clear for some time that Chinese dominance over Southeast Asia is inevitable. Some attribute this to China's "demographic heft" and geographic centrality to the region (Cronin and Kaplan 2012, 13), or to the sheer size of the country and its growing wealth (e.g. De Santis 2005). Others focus on what might necessarily follow from that growth, whether it be military buildups with an end goal of hegemony (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001), or simply as a necessity to obtain resources and energy imports for its domestic population (e.g. Vaughn and Morrison 2006). Either way, the rise of China has been recognized by the smaller Southeast Asian states themselves, and resulted in these states offering concessions to the regional power. For instance in 2004, during a diplomatic visit to Beijing, the prime minister of Australia, noted that the ANZUS Treaty did not require it to join the United States to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. This statement is particularly surprising given the historical alliance of Australia with the United States. Furthermore, even in the midst of outstanding territorial disputes, Philippines President Arroyo cited a need to expand and redefine its relationship with China in light of its growing importance to the region (Vaughn and Morrison 2006, 25).⁴ Even when concessions are not given, securitizing actions by Southeast Asian RSC members revolve around the principle position of China within the region. That is, there is an implicit recognition of China's rising regional influence in the hedging and counter-hedging performed by the Southeast Asian states between it and the US.

For China to consolidate the Southeast Asian RSC as its regional stronghold, the US role in the region would need to fade considerably. Recognizing this fact, China has begun efforts to

⁴ Redefinition of this relationship has been further complicated by China's challenge of the recent Hague decision that rejected China's territorial claims to the South China Sea (Perlez 2016).

undermine perceptions of US policy, engaging in a discursive “charm offensive” across Southeast Asia, as well as increasing its security cooperation with the region through new bilateral military relationships, multinational military exercises with Vietnam, and joint border patrols with Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. Chinese rhetoric consistently portrays US bilateral relations within the complex as antiquated relics of the Cold War (Percival 2007, 17). Specifically since 2001, China has attempted to regulate US military exercises in the South China Sea, has virulently criticized the US campaign in Iraq, and publicly questioned US military intentions in Vietnam and the Philippines (Percival 2007, Ch. 1). In 2005, a Chinese naval vessel went so far as to attempt to cut an unarmed US naval vessel’s towed cable in international waters (Shanker 2009, A8).

Despite Chinese efforts, US presence continues to be prevalent in the region – especially in a few key areas. Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines all have considerably close diplomatic and military relations with the United States. The annual US-Thai Cobra Gold military exercises have been held since 1982, and are the largest in the Asia-Pacific, expanding to 7 participants in 2013 (Hutto and Frazier 2016). The Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) naval exercises are led by the United States and include several members from ASEAN, including Indonesia and Malaysia. There is little doubt that this military presence by the US is in direct response to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. For example, the CARAT 2014 exercises between the US and the Philippines, took place south of the Scarborough Shoal – the location of a naval standoff between the Philippines and China in 2012 (Hutto and Frazier 2016).

The Spratly Islands dispute is a multilateral conflict consisting of 230 fixtures over which China, Vietnam, and Taiwan all claim complete sovereignty. Additionally, the Philippines claims

53 islands, and Malaysia claims 12. While disputes between these states have not escalated to levels of violence since 1988 (Southerland 1988), a rise in tensions is not difficult to ignite with sudden buildups or loaded diplomatic language. When China cited the South China Sea as a “core interest” in 2010, the July meeting of the ARF erupted with protest. Notably, since the incident no top Chinese official has used this terminology (Fravel 2012, 42). This does not mean however, that China does not continue to push its claims to the Spratlys. Between 2014 and 2015, the regional power has reclaimed more than 2,000 acres in the island chain, as well as shifted its military strategy to include air offensives in an announcement tied directly to the unveiling of two new lighthouses on the disputed territory (“Beijing rejects US demands” 2015). Additionally, China’s continued refusal to clarify the meaning of the ambiguous nine-dashed line on official Chinese maps is a constant hindrance to Southeast Asian security cooperation (see, for example, Storey 2012).

Juxtaposed with recent Chinese efforts to “pursue joint development,” a confusing picture begins to appear, as Chinese actions in the South China Sea largely drown out identifiable efforts made by China to involve itself in Southeast Asian affairs and attain recognition from its RSC peers as a responsible leader of security processes in the region. To establish leadership in Southeast Asia, China has utilized a strategy of walking the line between assertive dominance and involved dialogue. In a sense, China remains stuck in a constant transition between the perspective of Zhou that diplomacy is war by other means, and the guideline set by Deng, emphasizing joint development.

Xiaoping’s maxim can be seen primarily in new Chinese efforts to create bilateral security ties with Southeast Asian nations, particularly with its main rival over claims to the Spratly Islands, the Philippines. The Sino-Philippines Framework for Bilateral Cooperation in

the 21st Century contained a specific agreement by the signatories to coordinate their efforts to prevent and prosecute transnational crime through stepping up defense and information exchanges. In the same year, China signed a similar plan with Thailand on mutual cooperation in security and defense. Both states recognized explicitly in the agreement the need for a multipolar security order in Southeast Asia. Shortly thereafter, Thailand began referring to China as a “strategic partner” in the region, and by 2004, the agreed upon defense exchanges and discussions had greatly expanded (Tow 2004, 451).

Aside from signed agreements, China has increased its day-to-day military cooperation with its neighbors to the south. The mountainous borders shared with Burma, Laos, and Vietnam are vital to the Southeast Asian drug trade, and have at times been used by local insurgencies to quietly cross into China for safe haven. These states have agreed to joint border patrols with China in attempts to combat these nontraditional security threats. Additionally, China provides ample military support by way of training and weapons to these ASEAN members in efforts to further increase its security ties (see Chung 2004). Additionally between 2005 and 2012, China had increased its confidence building measures with Vietnam to such an extent that the two navies were conducting joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin (Fravel 2012, 46).

Multilaterally, China has increased its participation within ASEAN and the ARF, specifically the ASEAN+3 forum it hosts with Japan and South Korea. Developed in the midst of the late 1990s financial crisis, China quickly moved to shape the forum into one concerning primarily regional security cooperation (De Santis 2005, 25).⁵ On the issue of its outstanding territorial disputes, China signed a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. This declaration echoes the maxim of joint development, calling for cooperation in

⁵ This might seem counterintuitive to what most scholars think about Chinese behavior. There is however, quite a large divide between Chinese cooperation with regional actors in the face of non-traditional security threats (terrorism), and Chinese action concerning more traditional security threats, which remains primarily unilateral.

search and rescue missions, and cooperation in combating transnational crime, piracy, and terrorism, as well as non-security related issues (“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” 2002). Nearly a decade later in 2011 and again in 2013, China and ASEAN reaffirmed their commitment to a more cooperative South China Sea environment, signing an agreement on the guidelines for implementing the 2002 declaration (Chang 2015). Also in 2002, China signed a declaration with ASEAN on non-traditional security cooperation, which it reaffirmed again in 2012 (“Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues” 2012). These declarations emphasize intelligence sharing, joint military training, and other forms of interstate security cooperation.

China was certainly not the creator of the 2002 Declaration or the 2011 reaffirmation. In fact, it was pushed and pulled to sign these agreements by ASEAN’s hedging and a need to rectify certain actions in the South China Sea that had generated uneasiness in the region. Specifically, this speaks to the role of regional subordinates being harbingers of leadership recognition, and their ability to – in some ways – socialize regional powers. That said, China has been the author of numerous multilateral security initiatives within ASEAN and the ARF, as well as organizing and hosting the first ASEAN Security Policy Conference in 2004 (“China to host ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy meeting 4-6 November” 2004, 1). The conference was intended to establish a new forum in which China could be a key player, presenting “an alternative to an Asian security architecture that has traditionally been dominated by US bilateral alliances” (cited in Vaughn and Morrison 2006, 8). The continuance of this conference under the auspices of the ARF has opened it to other external actors, downplaying the importance of China’s role. Nonetheless, efforts to create a more intimate relationship with the RSC and the member states of ASEAN have not ceased. As recently as 2014, China expressed wishes to hold

an informal China-ASEAN defense ministers meeting to further promote intraregional security cooperation (“China, ASEAN reach consensus to further deepen strategic partnership” 2014).

The difficulty with each effort made by China towards achieving the regional recognition that it needs to be an effective leader, is that each concession is accompanied by counterproductive Chinese actions that hinder any chance of cooperative progress. As Ian Storey points out, “while China openly boasts Xiaoping’s philosophy of dealing with South China Sea claimants, it has never demonstrated an actual willingness to put aside its territorial claims nor has it ever proposed a framework for such joint development” (2012, 56). Indeed, even in the midst of increased cooperation with Vietnam in patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, China and Vietnam exchanged harsh words over a Vietnamese live-fire drill in the South China Sea (Branigan 2011). Additionally, exactly one month after signing the agreement on implementation guidelines of the Declaration on Conduct, China’s defense ministry announced the launch of its first aircraft carrier. This announcement incited much concern across the region as states became worried that this new development might increase its ability to reach further into disputed areas (“Launch of Country’s First Aircraft Carrier” 2011, 50605).

2.2.2 ASEAN and China: The Inside-Outsider

Because of these instances, many scholars see China’s dialogue in the ASEAN forum as disingenuous. Southeast Asian officials have come to refer to this seemingly dual-track policy as a strategy of “talk and take” (cited in Storey 2012, 56). These accusations of duplicity are only partly accurate, as Chinese intentions in the region are much more complex. In the context of ASEAN, China is not an inside actor in Southeast Asia, and instead finds itself on the periphery of institutional security processes. The China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership

for Peace and Prosperity, and the Chinese proposal for ASEAN-wide security and defense cooperation (see Percival 2007) – subsequently turned down by the members of ASEAN – was not simply an effort to minimize the role of the US in the region, but to increase the role of China, making it a key player in Southeast Asian politics.

ASEAN and the Southeast Asian RSC are intimately bound together, and China needs institutional membership before it can be accorded a leadership role that is effective. More than this, China wants institutional membership. This becomes clear when we consider the failure of a Joint Working Group initiated to implement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct that met only three times after its establishment in 2004. The group’s shortcomings are primarily attributed to a clause in the guidelines asserting that the ASEAN members would confer with one another *prior to* meeting with Chinese officials. China vehemently objected to this clause, as well as its origination in the ASEAN Charter of 2007:

“In the conduct of external relations of ASEAN, Member States shall, on the basis of unity and solidarity, coordinate and endeavor to develop common positions and pursue joint actions” (ASEAN Secretariat 2007, 31).

Of note in this clause is the reference to “external relations.” While recognizing China’s growing importance and the need for its involvement in the region, ASEAN continues to perceive the regional power as an outside actor in the region. This is first and foremost the fault of China. While initiating security processes such as its region-wide “New Security Concept” and attempting to develop ASEAN and the ARF through these initiatives (see Roy 2005), as well as making efforts to frame Southeast Asian interests in contrast to US foreign policy measures, China has failed considerably in recognizing the interests of its Southeast Asian neighbors. In turn, this failure is directly attributable to Beijing’s obsession with classical state-building processes through territorial aggregation.

The South China Sea dispute to China amounts to domestic territorial reconsolidation. Indeed, China's disposition to the South China Sea has been referred to as "blue national soil" (Will 2011). This domestic focus is nothing new. Even prior to the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy toward Southeast Asia was based primarily on "crucial national interests" (Tilman 1987, 89). As the Chinese economy has expanded and the state further industrialized, shipping lanes in the South China Sea have been deemed to be an essential national interest of China's, and in turn a vital security concern of all interested parties. The 2002 Declaration on Conduct took two years of negotiations between ASEAN and China, and was only signed when member states agreed to drop a clause banning any upgrades to existing structures on the islands, islets, and atolls (Storey 2012, 62). Even in 2012 during a time of heightened tension among claimants, China refused to recognize key elements of the declaration until it felt that conditions had "matured" ("Meeting with foreign ministers" 2012, 42123). This level of ambiguity – much like the nine-dashed line – serves China's interests directly, allowing it to maximize its bargaining leverage and justify assertive actions in the area. This also explains why China prefers bilateral negotiations on the South China Sea – much to ASEAN's consternation - as opposed to an internationalization of the dispute (see Chung 2004), as this allows for increased Chinese leverage in negotiations.

The ASEAN member states are not blind to this arrogance. China has always been forthcoming about the way in which it views the Spratlys and the South China Sea. Most recently, responding to criticism by ASEAN members and the United States over reclaimed territory, a defense ministry spokesperson compared construction in the Spratlys with developing infrastructure on the mainland, "from the perspective of sovereignty, there is absolutely no difference" ("Beijing steps up defense of disputed South China Sea" 2015). In the past, Southeast

Asian officials have reacted to this type of Chinese pressure as “trying to make us define our core interests subordinate to their core interests” (cited in Vaughn and Morrison 2006, 28).

China’s path to establishing recognition of its leadership within the Southeast Asian RSC is through ASEAN. The difficulty lies in its inability to at once become both an intimate member of the institution *and* adopt a regional leadership role over the complex. This task requires that China take its Southeast Asian neighbors interests into account, which perhaps requires more trust than China or its Southeast Asian neighbors are willing to give at the moment. Repeatedly, ASEAN members have requested that China clarify its ambiguous claims in the South China Sea to no avail (“Disputes with China over maritime boundaries” 2011, 50511). China cannot realize attempts to convince Southeast Asia that its immediate interests are in regional leadership, rather than hegemony, without making real concessions to the RSC’s members. That would curtail any further hegemonic ambitions that China might harbor. Until China is able to quell Southeast Asian concerns over its hegemonic enterprise, or alleviate ASEAN worries about being drawn into a strategic contest between it and the United States, it will falter in the successful establishment of its regional leadership role.

In light of this discussion on trust, it is important to note that leadership establishment in this stage is not dependent on the level of trust by members of the RSC (in this case the small Southeast Asian nations), but rather on the regional power’s (in)ability to consider the security interests of its regional neighbors and respond accordingly. In China’s case, this highlights its need to resolve its own identity issues, evident in the contrast between its dialogue on the international stage, and its present territorial claims and military buildups at the state level. China has yet to be able to reconcile its dual identity as a rising global power - solidifying its nation-statehood - with its identity as a strong regional leader in Southeast Asia. The next section argues

that this identity crisis is the key causal factor for China's failed leadership in Southeast Asian counterterrorism practices.

2.3 China's Identity Crisis in the Establishment Stage

When scholars approach the state as a black box in terms of identity, there are two common types adopted by states, social identity and corporate identity. Social identity is generally understood as how the state relates to others in the system. Is the state a great power, a democracy, Western, etc. (Cederman and Daase 2003)? Essentially, the social identity of the state refers to how the state relates to all others. This provides foreign policy makers with a useful guideline to how they might expect State A to act towards their state at any given time, in any given situation (see Hayes 2013). In contrast to social identity, a state's corporate identity is constituted by those attributes and characteristics that make up the state itself. These attributes and characteristics are internal to the state, such as legal frames, institutions, and especially territory (e.g. Cederman and Daase 2003). Much like the divisions created by territorial borders, the corporate identity places boundaries around the state to allow it to define itself in juxtaposition to the 'Other' (see Hayes 2013).

It has followed from this in the past that the nature of states' social and corporate identities will determine their interests and preferences in the international sphere (Wendt 1994, 385). The reality may not be as clear-cut as this suggests. McSweeney argues that interests can play "the decisive role in triggering the process of identity transformation" (1999, 127). This argument ventures away from traditional notions of state identity in the security studies field, reflected in the suggestion by Waeber et al. (1993) that identities are containers in which states exist. Bringing in interests as a competing mechanism is an expansion of our understanding of

the process of state identity formation. Indeed, the inclusion of interests gives unprecedented agency to states throughout this process. While state actors may not choose their inherited identity, they may choose different interests that can play a role in reshaping their identity, as well as the sociopolitical context in which the actor operates (e.g. McSweeney 1999; Krolkowski 2008; Hayes 2013). Simply put, a decisive shift in the interests of a state may cause a sequence of events in which a state's identity shifts in accordance with those interests. As McSweeney states, "we can be led to perceive ourselves differently...by the opportunities which may be offered to satisfy new interests" (1999, 167).

It is my contention that the contradictory nature in Chinese action and discourse encountered over the first half of this chapter can be explained in terms of the divergent interests (re)shaping Chinese identity. On a fundamental level, China's social identity and corporate identity are continually at odds with each other as a result of competing Chinese interests between its domestic (territorial aggregation and state-building) and its international spheres (institutional recognition and leadership). As outlined above, China's cooperative shift is a relatively recent development. Johnston argues that this shift to multilateral discourse occurred at a meeting of the ARF Intersessional Support Group in 1997, in which it presented an endorsement of the concept of "mutual security" (2008, 172). Up to this point, China's approach to the RSC had primarily reflected the realpolitik of Zhou Enlai, locked in a zero-sum game viewing war as a continuation of politics, and regarding bilateral negotiations as the preferable format that would serve the interests of the dominant party. As a result, its multilateral discourse in Southeast Asia up to then had been incredibly sparse.

After the 1997 meeting of the ARF however, Chinese multilateral discourse increased dramatically, following the Xiaoping foreign policy guideline of joint development. It was

shortly after this that China initiated its “new security concept” for the region, emphasizing its move away from Cold War-era security postures. Over the next several years, China proposed a host of CBMs and began participating directly and as an observer state in Southeast Asian multinational military exercises. It is in this context as well that China began its cooperative diplomacy with ASEAN; signing security frameworks for the 21st century with both the Philippines and Thailand, later the multilateral Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea in 2002, and going on to discuss implementation of those guidelines in the following years. China participates in Southeast Asian multilateralism primarily to solidify itself as a rising global power and to establish itself as the regional leader in Southeast Asia. China over the past two decades has visibly moved from a “hardheaded” diplomacy “devoid of sentimentality” (Tilman 1987, 89), to a “charm offensive” that as Chung argues, is “to make [states] come to terms with China’s leadership in Southeast Asia” (2004, 2).

As we have seen, however, this is only half of the story. It has no doubt, become clear over the course of this chapter that Chinese actions deviate from its discourse distinctly and quite regularly. Indeed, as described above, each Chinese concession to the multilateral agreement on the South China Sea dispute has been coupled with Chinese actions to undermine those concessions. Many scholars contend that China is simply comfortable with walking the tightrope of amiable discourse and aggressive action, comfortable with “mixing episodic assertiveness with more reassuring diplomacy and economic activity” (Cronin and Kaplan 2012, 17). In contrast to these assessments, I would suggest that this mixture of the regional power’s discourse and actions is a primary source of discomfort, as the tension between China’s corporate and social interests push and pull at the core of its international identity.

China has been suspected in the past of never truly discovering how to transition from civilization to state (see Pye 1990), and Shih argues that even the image of simply being a nation state is of incredible importance to China (2012, 79). As a result, China is constantly participating in a state-making enterprise (see Tilly 1990) by solidifying its territorial boundaries in an effort to strengthen its corporate identity. China's obsession with its domestic sphere is a part of this. China's claims to the Paracel and Spratly Island chains are wrapped up entirely in its corporate identity, and it cannot easily abandon these claims. This fundamental attachment requires more explanation.

“Boundaries both create identities and are created through identity” (Newman and Paasi 1994, 194). In this way, the study of boundaries and their territoriality is akin to the study of national identities, as that territory is as a matter of course patrolled by the state representing the interests of its citizens within those borders (Murphy 1996). This process becomes even more important in an era of globalization, which brings fragmentation as much as if not more than it generates the homogenization of identities (Agnew 1994). For authoritarian states like China, any fragmentation of people and cultures within its borders is a threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in turn the stability of the state. The collective identity process (re)initiated by China in asserting its claim over the Paracel and Spratly frontiers creates a new point of contact, a separation to delineate itself and its “Other.” Conflict has been shown “to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups” (Cosser 1956, 38)⁶, so that we might understand territory and identity as two sides of the same coin. Barth goes even further to suggest that boundaries surpass identity in significance, since it is the construction of boundaries on which identities develop (1969).

⁶ More recently, Mitzen has shown through discussions of ontological security that the identities of territorial rivals are embedded in the conflict itself (2006).

At the same time, the point of contact established by boundaries also serves a communication function between insiders and outsiders (Sack 1986, 32). This communication is not always mired in conflict. In fact, considerable attention has been paid in the literature to transborder cooperation and coexistence in spite of this separation (see, for example, Gallusser 1994). So why does this large gap exist between Chinese discourse and action? China's entrance into a strategic discourse in multilateral and cooperative forums in Southeast Asia has provoked a reshaping of its preferences (Lynch 2002). The quick rise of China at the end of the 20th century propelled it to a primary stage on the global platform, and the need for strong leadership in Southeast Asia to move ASEAN from the periphery to the center stage attracts China to cement its regional power standing. In an effort to do this, China has made an intentional decision to shift its social identity in order to ingratiate itself to the Southeast Asian RSC (see Krolkowski 2008) and establish region-wide recognition for its adoption of a leadership role. If a state's social identity describes how its neighbors might expect it to behave (see Hayes 2013), China's "charm offensive" and discursive concessions are attempts to reassure Southeast Asian states of its ability to trust Chinese intentions in the region. Though as I have shown, the discordance between its words and actions present a significant problem, dampening Chinese efforts to become a real member of the Southeast Asian RSC.

To understand why real membership is necessary for RSC leadership to take place requires a brief discussion of the social identity and self-categorization theory literatures coming out of the field of social psychology. These theories are summarized in Figure 3. Groups are said to have a social identity in an effort by the members to enhance themselves and reduce uncertainty in relations within the group (e.g. Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). The processes of uncertainty reduction accentuate ingroup similarities and outgroup differences.

Group images in this case are of particular importance since members are judged based on their “prototypicality” (see Hogg 2006). That is, how much each one conforms to the prototype of the group’s identity: the stronger the group-image, the “thicker” the prototype. Consequently, less prototypical members tend to be less popular (and less trusted) among the group.




Figure 2.1. A depiction of SIT with the opportunity to lead highlighted as the result of prototypical membership.

It is important to note here that none of this means that groups are homogenous entities. Rather “they’re structured into roles, subgroups, nested categories, crosscutting categories and so forth” (Hogg 2006, 117). So leadership within groups containing strong thick prototypes is possible, but a mutual recognition of insider membership is essential to becoming a group leader (Chemers 2003). Leadership within groups then becomes a tenuous balancing act in which “leaders are very much ‘one of us’ and yet are distanced from the rest of the group” (Hogg et al. 2003, 24). This intragroup dynamic drifts somewhat into the notion of hierarchy, and according to Hogg, creates group schisms when the leader must use force in a coercive manner (2001,

192). This use of force and the schism that follows creates a new intergroup dynamic, pushing the once leader to the periphery. Indeed, not only are less prototypical members less popular but also, groups most harshly react to deviant behavior, since they “threaten the integrity of group norms” (Hogg 2006, 126).⁷

It might be obvious after the early sections of this chapter that in terms of a Southeast Asian identity, the institutionalization of ASEAN and its social norms has developed a relatively strong and rigid identifying measure for in-group behavior (see Acharya 2001). Recognizing a member’s prototypicality in this sense hinges on that member’s adherence to the principles of the ASEAN Way, primarily a respect for state sovereignty, autonomy, and non-interference. China’s charm offensive served to align its dialogue and diplomatic agreements with these principles in a number of ways, but its behavior in the South China Sea has yet to see such alignment. As we have explored to this point, this has been a flash point for other members of the Southeast Asian RSC. Chinese assertiveness in the Spratlys is in direct contrast with the ASEAN Way principles of sovereignty. In line with the predictions of SIT, each time that China acts despotically - claiming islands and developing military infrastructure on them - it is pushing itself further into the periphery with respect to accepted group membership. Until China can reconcile its corporate identity, its boundaries and how it chooses to identify itself as a global power, with its social identity as a member and leader in Southeast Asia, it will continually falter in its regional aspirations and fail to establish a recognition-based leadership over Southeast Asian security processes.

How do we recognize failure in this regard? In the following section, I detail the events in Southeast Asia immediately following the September 11 attacks and the years after the

⁷ This should not be taken to override the interaction effect between leaders and subordinates in the context of group norms. Certainly, once leadership is established within a region, the leader contributes to redefinitions of prototypicality.

globalization of terrorism as a non-traditional security threat. The underlying assumption operating consistently throughout this dissertation is that terrorism is inherently threatening to all state apparatuses within the region in question, and in turn, we should see states cooperating with one another to eradicate this transnational threat. Indeed, “any threat perceived by the state is projected as potentially a threat to physical survival, as if this were the elemental condition of insecurity in relation to which our daily life is organized and against which the apparatus of the state must be mobilized” (McSweeney 1999, 153). This dissertation then reflects the contention that international cooperation is fundamentally different in the context of terrorism because of the nature of the threat (Beck 2003). In many instances, terrorism acts exogenously on the interactions of states within a regional security complex, so that rather than being concerned completely with the military or police actions of each other, counterterrorism cooperation pits the state apparatuses against non-state entities. Accepting this assumption allows a unique opportunity to explore regional leadership, or in China’s case, a lack of it. China’s inaction in this area of Southeast Asian security processes is reflective of an absence of recognition that member states hold toward the regional power, and its failure to establish leadership in the counterterrorism issue-area. This narrative demonstrates how China’s leadership failure allowed extensive external power penetration into Southeast Asia with regard to the US and its global counterterrorism agenda.

2.4 US Counterterrorism Penetration into Southeast Asia

As demonstrated in previous sections, China’s security dialogue in the Southeast Asian RSC is relatively extensive, and yet due to China’s inability to reconcile its domestic and international interests, it falls short of its ambition to establish its leadership role in Southeast Asia. Instead,

ASEAN states have positioned themselves within regional equilibrium between US preponderance and the incorporation of China in a position below that of United States counterterrorism leadership. Again, this is not as much to emphasize the role that the ASEAN states play in (re)shaping the region, as it is to demonstrate the ways in which the interplay of great powers set the parameters of ASEAN action (Weatherbee 2005, 24). In terms of RPSF, rather than providing mediation between the United States and Southeast Asia, the US has been given direct access to regional processes (see, for example, Goh 2008), most distinctively observed in regional counterterrorism behavior.

This does not mean that China does not have an interest in a terrorism-free Southeast Asia. As I have noted, the nature of terrorism and its eradication is typically a common interest of all states, and thus induces states to cooperate. The relatively weak governments of Southeast Asia have struggled to quell transnational criminal activity, drug trade, and prevent the ease in ability to acquire imported and locally produced weapons (see Tan and Ramakrishna 2004). Additionally, the porous borders and lax immigration control throughout the region cause considerable security difficulties for the Chinese, who share long land and maritime borders with several Southeast Asian states. These geographical connections - compounded with the fact that Southeast Asia has served as a networking location between Al Qaeda and regional groups - makes Southeast Asian terrorism a primary interest to China, as evidenced by its continued participation in forums discussing counterterrorism best practices. Its government officials are reportedly concerned with maintaining a “military that is capable of handling overseas non-traditional security issues” (cited in Arase 2010, 827).

This can be seen in China’s “new security concept,” as it recognizes the growing interdependence of countries “on one another for security” and the need to “place emphasis

on...combating terrorism and transnational crimes” (“China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept”). In spite of unilateral initiatives to fulfill this concept, such as efforts to establish intelligence sharing programs, combined police operations, law enforcement training, and improved border control, the NSC has yet to be adopted by ASEAN and the rest of Southeast Asia. In terms of counterterrorism specifically, while Beijing is concerned about the ability of Jemaah Islamiyah – and other terrorist groups - linking up with insurgencies in its western provinces, or targeting its rich coastal cities, it maintains more of an “anxious observer” role on the sidelines of US – Southeast Asian counterterrorism cooperation (Percival 2007, 88).

In part, this can be attributed to the United States’ role in its own global War on Terror, and the labeling of Southeast Asia as its “second front” (“Terror in Southeast Asia: The Elusive Enemy” 2002). While the US has always been involved in Southeast Asia, this involvement had declined considerably after the fall of the Soviet Union. With the rise of China however, US interests were being redirected back towards the East. The tragedy of September 11, 2001, and the US War on Terror that followed presented a new opportunity for American penetration into the region. Aside from obtaining a US-ASEAN antiterrorist agreement in August 2002, in the years between 2001 and 2004, the United States pledged approximately USD 15 million in aid to Indonesia for “counterterrorism capacity building” programs and USD 92 million to the Philippines (see Manyin et al. 2004). Additionally, the US government set up a Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center in Thailand, to which it provided USD 15 million in 2002, and signed Memorandums of Understanding and various other bilateral agreements with Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia (see Chambers 2004). This is merely the tip of the iceberg, as US and Thailand counterterrorism cooperation is heavily vested in military exercises, and the US has

succeeded in developing intricate channels for information sharing between it with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines (see Chambers 2004).

It would be a mistake to suggest that China is comfortable with any of these relationships. As has already been pointed out, China has attempted on many occasions to undermine the US presence in the region. There is an increasing skepticism in the Southeast Asian states, however, that any state's counterterrorism policies are not means in and of themselves, but rather means to pursue geopolitical interests. Indeed, as China-ASEAN cooperation expands to the non-traditional security arena, their military-to-military cooperation contributes to expanding China's naval role in Southeast Asian waters (Arase 2010, 809). In the same sense, US involvement in the ARF is in part an effort to fulfill and "legitimize [traditional] American security interests in the region" (Goh 2004, 48). In turn, we might view the agreement of the sale of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) by the US to Thailand in 2001, prior to a counterterrorism iteration of their annual Cobra Gold exercises as not simply an effort to counter the terrorist threat, but to pull Thailand back towards the US and away from Chinese influence (Chambers 2004, 461).

This geopolitical competition, the US and China vying for Southeast Asian leadership recognition has been a consistent mark on the RSCs counterterrorism processes in the 21st century. Just one example of this is the integration of counterterrorism discourse into the non-traditional security threat section of China's "new security concept," that as discussed above, also sought to implicitly criticize US relations in Southeast Asia as outmoded Cold War relics. China has rarely blocked US initiatives in the region, succeeding only when backed adamantly by smaller regional states seeking to protect their own sovereignty. One instance of this occurred after the US proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to lead anti-terrorist

patrols in the Strait of Malacca. When China intimated that this proposal was part of a strategy by the US to dominate the straits, Malaysia and Indonesia both rejected the proposal as an infringement on their sovereignty (Emmers and Sebastian 2005, 166). Even viewing this as a small victory for China is heavy handed at best. US penetration in the region in the context of counterterrorism is ubiquitous. Nevertheless, the geopolitical back and forth continues. Shortly after the ASEAN anti-terrorism agreement was signed with the US in August, China pressed ASEAN to sign a similar agreement with it on non-traditional security issues. This timing is not circumstantial, and China wanted a symbolic gesture from ASEAN to mimic that of the United States' (Emmers and Sebastian 2005, 167).

This competition veiled in the language of counterterrorism has reemerged more recently in advances with Chinese anti-drone technology in 2014. The state government news agency released photographs in November demonstrating a new laser weapon system shooting down low-flying drones. Along with the release of these photographs was a statement from Yi Jinsong, a manager of a national technology corporation heading the project, stating that drones could easily be obtained and used by terrorists ("China develops anti-drone laser" November 2, 2014). Regardless of whether unmanned drones are attractive for the purposes of terrorism, there is no denying that drone use by the United States abroad has intensified in the past decade, and that this intensification may be seen as a possible measure to contain a rising China. With the announcement of increasing drone sales to US allies in February 2015 ("Obama administration to allow sales of drones to allies" 2015) including South Korea and Japan, Chinese anti-drone programs are likely to increase.

The smaller nations of Southeast Asia are complicit in US penetration in the region. The actions of China toward its claims in the South China Sea are aggressive, lacking in multilateral

dialogue, and infringe on the sovereignty of other claimants. These states are unable to trust China to act in a manner prototypical with the ASEAN Way, and thus they seek to establish a balance of capabilities in the region, using the US to do so. ASEAN continues to urge China to be explicit with its intentions in the South China Sea to no avail (see Simon 2007). The full meaning of the nine-dashed line has yet to be disclosed, and the most recent evidence of this is a case brought to The Hague by the Philippines against the existence of the line (“Hague arguments” 2015). China continues to build infrastructure on contested territories, and yet maintains an over-all friendly discourse with the states of Southeast Asia. Specifically in the context of the South China Sea and security relationships within the region, China is being thrust into the periphery of Southeast Asia, having isolated itself as a ‘deviant’ with its use of force in the area (i.e. Hogg 2006, 126).

Because China does not act as a prototypical member of the Southeast Asian RSC, and abide by the ASEAN Way of sovereignty, autonomy, and dialogue in the South China Sea, it is unable to fully integrate itself into Southeast Asia, and remains untrustworthy as an ASEAN insider. In turn, since it cannot act within the dictates of the ASEAN Way as a Southeast Asian RSC member, it has yet to establish a regional recognition of itself as the regional leader, as evidenced in the high levels of external power penetration by the United States in the region, especially as we have seen in the context of counterterrorism.

2.5 Conclusion

While China has attempted to integrate its discourse into Southeast Asian multilateral security processes, it has not incited the necessary catalyst for a subsequent authorization of power by its Southeast Asian neighbors. As I have demonstrated over the course of this chapter, Chinese

failure in establishing the leadership role in Southeast Asian counterterrorism processes stems from an underlying tension between China's social and corporate identities. China continues to struggle to reconcile its interest in being socially recognized as an inside actor in ASEAN and Southeast Asia with its interest in consolidating its territorial claims to build its image and identity as a global power (see Shih 2012). The cavernous gap between Chinese discourse and actions in Southeast Asia facilitated by these competing interests problematizes China's internal identity. China may identify itself as an ASEAN insider and security leader of the Southeast Asian RSC, but it has yet to gain the recognition of its regional neighbors as such.

China's history in realpolitik practices contributes to its understanding of leadership dominance, but in no way has it prepared the state for the need by the leader to consider the interests of its neighbors. Without an effective mechanism for regional interest consideration, China will not establish recognition of its peers necessary to obtain a regional leadership role. The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia is too strong for China to violate without retribution or change through force. Thus as a result of failures of Chinese leadership, the Southeast Asian RSC is relatively porous and open to external power influence. In the context of U.S. penetration in the region, it is perhaps too late on China's part to gain regional hegemony. As we will see in the case of Russia, however, considerable bulwarks around areas of influence can be created with effective leadership by regional powers, and it is in the management stage of leadership in which geopolitical competition with regards to these bulwarks takes place.

CHAPTER 3

THE MANAGEMENT STAGE: GEOPOLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS IN CENTRAL EURASIA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to understand the leadership management stage as it occurs in Central Eurasia driven by the interactions between Russia and extra-regional challengers through a relational-networks institutions approach. This approach opens up this stage of regional leadership and draws attention not only to the process of great power competition for influence in regional spheres, but to the variety of mechanisms in which actors engage throughout this process. The management stage of regional leadership occurs in a context in which subordinates have clearly recognized the leadership capacity of their regional power, and – to some degree – there exists a general mutual recognition of legitimacy throughout the RSC. Often though not always, security institutions are established or institutionalized in order to give subordinates a “voice” in regional processes, thereby providing a platform through which the regional power might drive the behavior of its subordinates by means of legitimate paths.

The management stage of leadership is naturally more stable than the establishment stage, as the regional power has achieved some level of recognition from its regional counterparts as leader. The management stage, however, is not yet the delegation stage as a result of three factors. First, while RSC members are given petitioning rights within regional processes, there is no guarantee that their voiced interests will be considered. As outlined in the first

chapter, the leadership dimension of interest consideration is defined with respect to the “modification, tempering, or revising security management mechanism such that concerns and preferences of system members are represented” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 78). To put it another way, in the management stage, there exists no real or legitimate recourse for regional subordinates to lodge protest against the regional leader when their interests have not been considered.

Secondly, because there is no guarantee of interest consideration or supranational legal recourse, it is likely that some states within RSCs in the leadership management stage will be recalcitrant states. I refer to these regional subordinate states as recalcitrant rather than revisionist for two reasons. First, the concept of a revisionist state has an exhaustive literature behind it that accords this designation primarily to major powers. Offensive realists for example, suggest that revisionism points towards a state’s quest for hegemony. Likewise, structural realists attribute the revisionist characteristic to states that are rising in power (for further discussion, see Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 159). The concept of a recalcitrant state, on the other hand, has been most recently utilized in IR to refer strictly to minor states in contention with regional and global powers (see, for example, Monteiro 2014). Rather than changing the structure of the system, as revisionist states seek to do, we should expect recalcitrant states to oppose their regional leaders’ attempts to shift their position to a new or a different security environment.

In turn, these actions generate a third indicator of the management stage. Recalcitrant states may revoke their recognition of leadership to the regional power by aligning themselves with the members and regional powers of another RSC. This new alignment creates regional power competition between the regional power and extra-regional powers as the regional power struggles to manage its leadership role in the RSC. Thus, while leaders in the management stage

enjoy higher levels of stability and influence than nascent leaders in the establishment stage, they are still subject to regular competition and contestations to their leadership by extra-regional powers that are spurred by recalcitrant subordinates.⁸

As I argue over the course of the chapter, Russian management of its leadership role takes on distinct representations within the two Central Eurasian sub-systems (the Western Theatre and Central Asia), but is drawn together through a unified Russian method of securitization displayed through mechanisms of boundary activation and network based escalation. These mechanisms take place specifically within institutional frameworks, and thus the chapter naturally endorses the viewpoint that regions are the products of institutional processes (see Paasi 1991).

Importantly, the disparate geopolitical contexts of the two sub-systems require that Russia, with a single aim of regional integration, take divergent and conflicting actions toward the states within each sub-system. I demonstrate that Russian reconsolidation of the Central Eurasian RSC is also driven by outside institutional processes. The actions of external actors, such as the EU and NATO, have created problems for Russian leadership management, primarily in the Western Theatre. As a result, the management stage of leadership in which Russia operates is particularly evident in Central Eurasian counterterrorism processes that take unrecognizable forms between Central Asia and the Western Theatre. This is particularly important, since one unified Russian security strategy is taking entirely different paths of securitization in the counterterrorism domain.

⁸ It is also the case that recalcitrant states will sometimes bandwagon together to counterbalance the regional power. This has happened in GUAM and ASEAN to varying levels of success. These options are not mutually exclusive either. As we saw in the previous chapter, ASEAN presents the particular situation in which a group of small states bandwagon together in combination with a hedging strategy toward a large extra-regional power, the United States.

As with the previous chapter, it is necessary to set the socio-historical stage of Central Eurasian security processes. This introduction will characterize these security processes as occurring in two Central Eurasian sub-systems, Central Asia and the Western Theatre. As I will demonstrate, while the development of security interdependence occurred independently in the two sub-systems, development in both was driven and held together primarily by Russia, the regional power.

3.2 Central Eurasia in Context: One Order, Two Sub-systems

Central Eurasia is historically referred to as a large geographic land bridge stretching from Europe to South Asia. Commonly referred to as the 'Eurasian Steppe,' the scope of this grassy flatland has had important historical implications, facilitating cultural and economic linkages between the civilizations inhabiting these areas. While these linkages sustained Eurasian interdependencies over time, the enormous geographic divide between the western and eastern points of the steppe allowed for distinct development to take place within the region. More specifically, the maturation of the eastern steppe occurred within the Islamic world, while the western steppe developed on the periphery of Europe. While the exact means of cultural and economic development of these two Eurasian sub-systems is outside the purview of this study, the proximity of the western steppe to Europe is of particular importance to Central Eurasian securitization processes.

Traditional Central Eurasia in the security literature refers to three sub-regions, identified by Buzan and Waever (2003, 397-436) as the Western Theatre (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia), the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). The authors divided the sub-regions based on the distinct securitization practices and interdependencies within each one.

The authors make a similar argument when addressing distinctions between the South Caucasus and the Western Theatre. The distinctions in security practices between these two sub-regions, however, have appeared less and less distinctive since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Russia's assertiveness in Georgia does not seem to be an isolated incident either. Across the Black Sea, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 reportedly unleashed considerable anxiety in the Georgian leadership (Kashi 2014). Additionally, the Western allegiance held by several states within each sub-region (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia) downplays the distinctions in their various foreign policies. These commonalities alone demonstrate the growing security linkages between the Western Theatre and the South Caucasus, suggesting the need to consolidate the two, folding the South Caucasus into the Western Theatre.

This is the case especially when we consider in a later section the tie that holds the Western Theatre and Central Asia together: Russia, the Central Eurasian regional power. The divide between Central Asia and the Western Theatre makes it difficult to discuss the security dynamics of Central Eurasia without distinguishing between these two sub-regions. While these sub-regions are both intrinsically connected to Russia, their security dynamics exhibit distinct trends due to their history, geography, and political orientation.

3.2.1 Central Asia

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) have struggled to develop a regional identity, with most preferring one that is removed from a "Moscow-centered" orientation (Buzan and Waever

2003, 399). One key problem, however, is that most national identities within the region are fairly weak, not having been created until after the Cold War. Given this weakness in addition to rather weak state apparatuses, there have been relatively low levels of interaction between states other than Russia over the past two decades.⁹ Considering Central Asia as a sub-region containing five unitary actors, one might conclude the area to be relatively stable in terms of security. While Kyrgyzstan (2002, 2010) and Tajikistan (1992-97) have experienced periods of violent opposition, and Uzbekistan (2005) a flash of political turmoil, the stability of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has remained unhampered by violent opposition.

On the whole, however, the security of the states of Central Asia is heavily integrated, such that we cannot consider each Central Asian state existing in a vacuum. This deep-rooted security interdependence means that the relative instability of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan threatens the sub-region as a whole. For instance, while the Ferghana Valley remains an issue outstanding between only Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, violence between these states over the land, or within the area by Islamic militant groups such as the IMU or Hizb ut-Tahrir, can produce a destabilizing chain effect throughout the sub-region. As Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have been and are concerned about international drug-trafficking and other criminal activities throughout Central Asia originating in Afghanistan (Peimani 2009), it is likely accurate to assume that a destabilized Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan would arouse a similar concern. This is especially true when considering Central Asia's relative vulnerability to Islamic extremism. Indeed, the Kazakh leadership has in the past voiced concern over Uzbekistan's problem with fundamental Islam (Olcott 2002, 235).

⁹ Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out as exceptions in this regard. Nonetheless, even their relationship has not been terribly interactive since the earlier days of regional rivalry which existed prior to 1993 (see Diehl and Goertz 2001; Colaresi et al. 2008).

Their relatively porous borders, inextricably links these states to one another. In terms of ethnicity, the majority of Tajiks live not in Tajikistan, but in Uzbekistan. A predominant number of ethnic Uzbeks reside in southern Kyrgyzstan, and after the Andijan incident in 2005, even Kazakhstan saw a large influx of Uzbeks into its southern region (Hill 2005). Migration processes in Central Asia certainly have not been hindered by the remaining Soviet infrastructure, as highways and roads often cross international borders on domestic trips (Buzan and Waeber 2003). The porousness of their borders is of particular concern to many Central Asian states. On different occasions, Uzbekistan has accused Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan of providing training grounds and headquarters for anti-Uzbek militants (Hill 2005, 4), and Tajikistan of facilitating cross-border criminal activity (“Tajikistan Accuses Uzbekistan of ‘Distortion of Facts’ over Border Incident” 2011).

Actions, events, and policies in one state have reverberating effects across the Central Asian landscape. In analyzing the varied reaction by Central Asian states to the 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, Sally Cummings notes that the Central Asian leaders were responding to “the perception that what happened here might happen to them and then busied themselves with implementing policies for spill-over avoidance” (2012, 157-8). Principally, stabilization has become “the quintessence of Russia’s power games in Central Asia” (Omelicheva 2011, 38). In these terms, Central Asia has remained very much tied and associated with its Soviet, Moscow-centered past. It was not until the Soviet national territory delimitation process in the 1920s, for example, that the five “-stans” were even given state structures. Designed under the Soviet model as previously mentioned, these structures have had a profound impact on their development as states. In fact, prior to its disintegration, these five states all contained substantial majorities in

favor of remaining part of the USSR (Cummings 2012, 52). Tajikistan, as an extreme case, has been called effectively a Russian protectorate (Buzan and Waever 2003, 405).

Some scholars emphasize a greater focus on geographic and historically grounded identities, rather than identities linked by common security concerns (see Ciuta 2008 for a specific discussion on this distinction). This divide however, is not mutually exclusive. It has been regularly argued that geography in many cases precedes security interdependence (see Buzan and Waever 2003; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). For example, Russia's historic interest in extending geopolitically into Central Asia was in order to protect itself from nomadic raids, and then later as a forward position against Western colonial endeavors in the region (Trenin 2007, 77).

Today, as a part of its "near-abroad," a failed state in Central Asia is likely to produce a substantial threat to Russia, and not only because of its own long open borders with the sub-region. Shared history has caused a movement of many ethnic Russians beyond its borders into former Soviet states. According to 2007 estimates, Kazakhstan alone is home to over 4 million Russians, and Uzbekistan approximately 800 thousand (Peyrouse 2008). These geopolitical realities generate a heightened Russian interest in the stability of Central Asia, especially post-September 11, when all states in the sub-region were exposed to the possibility of terrorist infiltration. The fact that the Central Asian militaries are not well equipped to confront these issues comes as no surprise to Russia (Bailes et al. 2007), and few have hesitated to acknowledge this fact. The president of Kyrgyzstan in particular, "stated that only Russia could guarantee stability and security in the Central Asian region" (Omelicheva 2009, 900).

Out of all of the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan seems to be the most isolated from the regional power. While it participates as an observer in the Commonwealth of Independent

States (which will be discussed in further detail below), it no longer plays host to what was once a major Soviet garrison (Trenin 2007). At the same time, the nation consistently has rebuffed US attempts to initiate a Caspian Sea multilateral force through NATO by signing accords with Russia (Dettoni 2014). This neutrality on both sides seems to be the key to understanding Russia's tolerance of Turkmenistan's isolation. Trenin suggests that the Turkmen dictatorship is in fact less of an issue for Russia than "either an overtly Islamist or pro-Western regime" (Trenin 2007, 89). As long as Turkmenistan continues to deny the US access to its facilities or the Caspian Sea, its isolation from Moscow should remain secondary to other Russian foreign policy interests.

This last point is of particular importance. If Russian interest in Central Asia has historically been one not only of geopolitical dominance, but also an attempt to position itself against external powers, then we can interpret Russia's current activities in Central Asia (and Central Eurasia as a whole) at least in part as being directed against outside actors, primarily the United States and China (and to a certain extent, Turkey). In the environment directly following September 11, Central Asia received an uptick in attention by the United States and NATO due to its susceptibility to Islamic extremism and recruitment. Its strategic location with regard to the US invasion of Afghanistan has been a significant driver of this increase in interest as well. NATO expansion from the West has elicited in part, a visceral reaction from Russia. While Russia acquiesced to the newfound US presence in the region after September 11, this was largely the decision of President Putin, who recognized the necessity of the elimination of the Taliban and the importance of a stable Afghanistan. There was also substantial skepticism amongst Russia and the Central Asian states that the US would maintain a sustained military presence in the area (Swanstrom 2005, 574).

Russian buffering in Central Asia has occurred against a backdrop of developing links between China and its growing influence in the sub-region. China's Xinjiang province has long had separatist elements, but more recently concerns about porous borders of Xinjiang with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan has caused China to take a greater interest in the health and stability of these states. China's growing influence as a result of this interdependence, has raised concern about Chinese direct intervention in the region in the event of a cross-border terrorist attack on Xinjiang (Hill 2005, 3). On several occasions, China has applied pressure to Central Asian states to crack down on their Uighur populations (Omelicheva 2009, 899).

In effect, China's reach is limited but growing. The complexity of Russia's relationship with China in the Central Asian region should be noted here as well. While at some point in the future the two may be regional rivals, there currently exists much cooperation between the two states. This strategic alignment was closest when US penetration into Central Asia was at its peak. China's displeasure over the US military occupying bases in its Central Asian backyard is evident through the increased intensity of Russian-Chinese military cooperation through multinational military exercises. "Peace Mission 2005" for example, was held in both Russia and China, and had over 100,000 troops participating. At this point in time the US was increasing its number of troops by the thousands in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Belasco 2009), and although the MME bore the counterterrorism description, it also seems that Beijing and Moscow were intent to signal their concerns to the US.

2.2.2 The Western Theatre

Unlike their Central Asian counterparts, the states in the Western Theatre (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) had consistent national histories prior to the

formation of the Soviet Union. Considering the ethnic and territorial cleavages that national histories produce, it is unsurprising that with the union's dissolution, all but one of the states in this sub-region experienced and continues to be fraught with internal and external conflicts that undermine their stability. With Russia's annexation in 2014 from Ukraine, the Crimean peninsula has experienced the most volatility in recent years. This was in no way a new issue for Ukraine. After its declaration of independence in 1992, tension between Kiev and the Crimean legislature never settled entirely. Likewise, Moldova has continuously had issues with its breakaway region of Transnistria, which called for Russian annexation soon after the Crimea grab ("Anxiety Grows in Europe as Transnistria Asks for Russian Annexation" 2014). Tensions in the Georgian breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia came to a head in 2008, when Georgia launched an offensive military campaign in order to capture the capital of South Ossetia by force. As I will explore below, Russia's intervention on the part of the breakaway republics further destabilized the situation in Georgia. The Nagorno-Karabakh War, which took place between 1988 and 1994, incited conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory. Despite the Russian negotiated cease-fire, tensions still remain between the states and the situation is prone to flares of violence ("Defense Ministry: Armenian Sniper Kills Three and Wounds One Azerbaijani Soldier" 2010).

Belarus appears as the only Western Theatre state to maintain moderate governmental and territorial stability. This for the most part seems to be intrinsically connected to Belarus' energy, economic, and military dependence on Russia. Indeed, while relations between the state and regional power are rocky at times ("Belarus Cuts Off Russian Pipeline in Bitter Gas War" 2007), Russia prides itself on the relative stability of the relationship, and this level of stability is considered the standard for members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as

dictated by Russia's "near-abroad" policy, and Belarus the model for that standard (Özdamar 2010). The rest of the states in the Western Theatre, however, do not regularly meet this standard. The internal conflicts mentioned above all continue to persist at the time of this writing, and none do so in a vacuum. Each issue underlines an undeniable security interdependence existing within this Central Eurasian sub-region.

The manufactured ethnic diversity in the Soviet SSRs left each one of these states with a segment of their population that is ethnically native to neighboring states, creating a considerable amount of cultural interdependence in the region (Mankoff 2014).¹⁰ Borders drawn on maps do not determine the ethnic cleavages in this sub-region, and neither do stability issues relegate themselves within national borders. Spillover of conflicts, humanitarian issues, and natural disasters occur on a daily basis in this post-Soviet space (Baev 1996). Indeed, regional security in this sense is dependent on the stability of these conflicts. When these protracted conflicts inevitably bubble back to the surface as they did in Georgia and Ukraine (2003-05; 2008; 2013-15), the domestic political situations in the neighboring states of the sub-region devolve as well (see Hill 2005).

This does not go unaddressed at the level of the subordinate states, however. Ukraine and Moldova have been known to cooperate militarily on handling similar issues in their problem sectors. In 1998, the two states held their first multinational military exercise, "South 98," improving their militaries interoperability in facing terrorist insurgencies (Kuzio 2000). Georgia as well, has publicly recognized Ukraine for its assistance "at all levels," including training Georgian military officers in Ukrainian schools (92). Much of this lower level cooperation outside the regional power context is through the GUAM group, a regional organization

¹⁰ Cultural interdependence is actually one area in which it would be beneficial to separate the area back into two sub-regions, the Western Theatre and the South Caucasus. As I have argued, however, these two sub-regions demonstrate significant levels of security interdependence.

comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, created to enhance democratic values within the states, as well as provide collective security for its membership.

Geography and security interdependence are very nearly co-constitutive in these cases. Consistent with the argument being developed here, Schimmelfennig contends that interdependence increases with geographic proximity (2001). This assertion, if true on the regional level, must be true as well on an international one. That is, the closer in proximity external actors are to the region, the more likely interdependencies are to develop between those external actors and regional members. Linkages across the border between the Western Theatre of Central Eurasia and the European RSC are becoming more apparent, as tensions between Russia with Europe and the United States escalate based on competing interests in the stability and future of the sub-region.

Russian interest in the Western Theatre has been a relatively simple two-pronged approach. First, whether the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or the present Russian Federation, Russia seeks to have a major stake in European politics and to be a bloc-leader in global politics. Second, Russia's territorial integrity and security at least partially depends upon Eastern European ties to the Kremlin. As mentioned above, the relative length and openness of the Russian border has made it susceptible to invasion in the past, and it is acutely aware of this geographical reality. With this in mind, Russian involvement in the Western Theatre approaches a maximalist strategy. I am of course referring to Russia's direct involvement in all of the conflicts mentioned above.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred at the end of 1991, and by the end of the next year, Russia was intricately involved in four open-ended conflicts in the Western Theatre. This involvement reflects the concerted effort put forth by Russia over its near abroad. Yeltsin

confirmed this in a statement given in 1993, in which he requested that the UN grant Russia special powers “as guarantor of peace and stability in [Central Eurasia]” (Baev 1996, 38). The strategy of the Putin administration was analogous to this. The 2000 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation indicated the expectation that the international community view Russia as the sole party to conflict management, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and the enforcement of sanctions within the region (“Russia’s Military Doctrine” 2000). Russia has been consistent in acting out the provisions of this doctrine, but its interest in regional stability is less than accurate. Actually, it appears that Russia is perfectly fine with creating instability in the Western Theatre to profit from the dependence these states have on the Kremlin.

In the case of Crimea, Russian intervention “for the expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol” (“Direct Line with Vladimir Putin” 2014), culminated in the annexation of a region of Ukraine that possessed ample and strategic access to the Black Sea, as well as crowning the Russian navy as the new dominant force in that body of water (a title previously held by Turkey). Russia’s two-pronged approach to the Western Theatre is evident here. The strategic implications of a Russian Crimea are obvious, as well as Russia’s rebuff of Western ambitions in Ukraine. Tolstrup points out that the questioning by Moscow of Ukraine’s territorial integrity created the perception in the West that Ukraine has both internal and interstate problems, something that Western alliances and collective security organizations are hesitant to put on their plates (2014, 193-286). The 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict took a similar tone. From the very beginning, Russia has manipulated the South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, using them as a choke point for influence on Georgian-Western relations – which in 2007 seemed to be reaching new heights.¹¹ In terms of Russia’s domestic interests, Georgia

¹¹ Russia’s influence on Moldovan action through the Transnistria conflict should be obvious in this regard.

resides on the border of the separatist region of Chechnya as well, which has served as a flash point between the two states since Georgian independence.

Azerbaijan sits in a similar position, but it is its relationship with Armenia, and the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that interests the Kremlin. By maintaining a cease-fire between the states rather than finding a solution, Russia has been able to preserve the divide between the Nakhichevan province of Azerbaijan and the Azeri mainland. This division denies a contiguous relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and in turn direct land access for Turkey to the Caspian Sea. Additionally, Russia's ability to play both sides as mediator of the conflict allows it to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan from drifting too far into the Western sphere of influence. As Gültekin-Punsmen points out, since 2008, Azerbaijan has increased its cooperation with Russia considerably in order to gain Russian support over the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations (2011, 75-90). Maintaining the stable, open conflict between these states is desirable from the Russian position, as this draws both of them into Moscow's orbit.

This last point seems to be the fundamental principle underlying Russian foreign policy. Russia maintains influence in the near-abroad by creating a dependence on Moscow for domestic stability, and in turn, eschewing Western penetration and interference in the affairs of the near-abroad. This task is complex and Russia has encountered many difficulties in preserving its regional dominance. The fall of the Soviet Union, for example, saw an influx of applications for membership in the European Union (EU), with some former Soviet states viewing this period as a "return to Europe" (Tolstrup 2014, 64-65). The EU and its Western partner, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, were relatively uninterested in involving themselves in Central Eurasian politics at the time. Indeed, the West accepted almost entirely the actions Russia chose to take in the Caucasus in the early 1990s (Gordadze 2011), and when the violence

in Moldova escalated, as Moscow tried to force the government to join the CIS, the only comment made by the responsible institution, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was that it would “keep the situation under review” (cited in Tolstrup 2014, 90).

The change in Western interest in Central Eurasia occurred concomitantly with stabilization and democratization in the Balkan states, all of which were invited to begin negotiations to join the EU between 1997 and 2000. With the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Russia felt the Western presence on the outskirts of Central Eurasia. By 2004, when seven former Eastern Bloc countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) were admitted to the EU in the biggest enlargement since its beginning, the conflicts in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia were for all intents and purposes in the EU’s backyard. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO in 2004 had a similar effect when the establishment of NATO military facilities on the Black Sea took place almost immediately (Chitadze 2011).

With Western interests becoming more and more integrated along the outskirts of Central Eurasia’s Western Theatre, the ability of these states to internationalize their disputes, and relieve at least a portion of their dependency on Russia, continues to increase. More than anywhere, we are seeing this play out on an institutional level.

3.3 The Geopolitics of Institutions

While states are the primary units of interaction in the international system, the structure of the system itself is also influenced by the mechanisms through which states interact. The patterns of these interactions, in part, drive and are driven by the institutions created to regiment state interaction and the socio-political ties developed within them. When the boundaries of

supranational institutions collide, geopolitical competition for influence ensues. Indeed, when actors are positioned along these boundaries, these competing security orders might “give rise to sometimes complimentary and sometimes contradictory structural forces” (Nexon 2009, 44). In other words, when regional powers of two neighboring RSCs have historically been in relationships of enmity, contradictory structural forces (sometimes created by opposing regional powers) will push and pull their subordinates into and out of their orbit.¹² Considering this, discussions of the management stage of leadership in the Central Eurasian RSC can best be presented through a relational-networks/institutions approach. This approach considers social processes of interaction as co-constituting the regional order along with the embedded hierarchy that results from the material distribution of capabilities. Necessarily, through the lens of relational-networks and institutions we raise these formalized interactions between states to the forefront of regional politics, in which the importance in the actions of regional powers is found in the responses of their subordinates, and whether these actions are accepted as legitimate or not. If these actions are deemed illegitimate, we might anticipate a drive toward changing the substance of the regional order, as recalcitrant states attempt to change their alignment and regional security environment.

The EU and NATO are the primary extra-regional actors that partner with recalcitrant states to challenge Russian leadership in Central Eurasia. In recent years, China too has posed a problem to leadership management in Central Asia, and these challenges will be discussed at length in the following sections. Particularly, the fragmentation of Russian control following the

¹² This notion reflects Peter Katzenstein’s claim that “regions are not simply physical constants or ideological constructs; they express changing human practices” (2005, 12). This conception of “porous regions” can only go so far in explaining the activity of regional orders and their powers, however, making these orders subject to ever-changing processes. As I demonstrate, the recognition-based leadership stages do a much better job at predicting regional stability and durability than does the fluid concept of regionalization. In this case, the management stage of leadership aligns nicely with the idea of porous regions, while the discussion in Chapter Four of the European Union and the delegation stage predicts relative internal stability on the part of regional powers.

dissolution of the Soviet Union opened a political vacuum for extra-regional power penetration into Russia's sphere of influence. As a result, the EU and NATO, as well as China, have all presented themselves as alternatives to Russian leadership in the Central Eurasian RSC. On the other side, Russian leadership is bolstered in the Western Theatre through participation in the CIS as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In Central Asia this process occurs through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and again, the CSTO. The mechanisms by which these regional institutions compete for subordinate recognition is the subject of the following sections, and an interaction that I term, "institutional geopolitics."

The concept of institutional geopolitics approaches institutions as "composite polities." Historians have used this term primarily to describe political communities prior to the Treaty of Westphalia and the formation of the state-system. These political communities were without the structured systems of governance and territoriality of the modern state system. Localities maintained relatively high levels of independence and identity. In turn, rather than seeking to eliminate this autonomy and self-governance, actors at the top of the hierarchy sought to exert political control by subordinating actors at the local level through a system of patronage (for further discussion, see Nexon 2009, 70-73). Much like lords over the composite states of dynastic Europe, great powers utilize international institutions to drive the behavior of the smaller, sovereign states within them, molding and manipulating policy processes to their advantage. This indirect rule is managed through regional security orders (representing modern day composite polities) and their institutions. In a sense, the process of indirect control has not necessarily changed since the dynastic period. Rather, the patronage system of old has merely transformed into a route by which certain policy preferences are ceded by subordinates to their regional powers.

The advantage of identifying regional systems and institutions as composite polities is found in the flexibility of the concept. The independence with which these subordinates are left facilitates the generation of distinct identities and interests within them, sometimes in contrast to the identities and interests imposed by the regional power. This flexibility allows the composite state aperture to be opened up for a systematic examination of the mechanisms underlying shifts in institutional geopolitics. In other words, identifying regions as composite polities allows me to analyze the mechanisms utilized by regional powers and their competitors to either shore up influence within an RSC, or snipe the influence of competing regional powers from outside that polity. Importantly, the existence of recalcitrant states within the RSC is necessary for shifts in institutional and regional make-up to occur, but this condition is not sufficient and does not guarantee subsequent extra-regional power competition.

Another condition that may need to be present for competitive institutional geopolitics to arise is geographic proximity. As discussed in the previous section, the closer in proximity external actors are to the region, the more likely interdependencies are to develop between those external actors and regional members (Schimmelfennig 2001). The malleability of composite political communities allows for identities and interests to develop not just within them, but across the polities as well. Put simply, if any durable interaction creates social and political ties (Nexon 2009, 40) and we can understand formal institutions in the international system as mechanisms that provide a regularized means of interaction and thus the development and sustainment of these socio-political ties, then institutions themselves can be utilized by regional powers as avenues by which methods for geopolitical regional leadership, influence, and even control are exercised. In this sense, recalcitrant states may be inclined to develop ties with neighbors external to their respective RSC, and in some cases even develop similar interests and

identities with those neighbors through involvement with or ties to external institutions. Rather than driving this behavior on their own, the institution operates as a conversion point that facilitates political action and outcomes. In this context, states residing along the boundary of this institutional competition can be both the result of prior outcomes of institutional rivalries, as well as brokers for future competition. Which socio-political ties these states commit to, and how regional powers respond has the ability to alter fundamentally the make-up of the respective institutions, and perhaps more importantly, the regional security order within which the institution resides.¹³

One purpose of this chapter is to try and unravel the mechanisms by which this process occurs. These mechanisms are brokerage, network based escalation, and boundary activation as well as its opposing force, boundary deactivation. These mechanisms will be addressed in turn, and each is parsed out in the context of Russian counterterrorism strategy in Central Eurasia. It is important to note once again that aspects of the stages of leadership recognition reverberate throughout the security order, affecting the order's security processes. That is, the particular stage in which an RSC finds itself sets the tone for interstate interaction within that RSC, especially with the regional power. As with the case of China in Chapter Two, different issues within security processes are affected at varying degrees. For this reason, it is possible to break down issue-specific security strategies and use them to isolate interactions into comparative categories in order to depict the means by which the process of institutional geopolitics plays out.

Keeping this in mind, the following sections are organized by first briefly introducing and outlining the specific mechanisms with which each section deals, and then proceeding to tie

¹³ This language is somewhat misleading. As we will see, regional institutions have the flexibility to stretch outside of regional security complexes, and therefore are able to reside both inside and outside these orders. In this sense, regional security institutions can move fluidly across regional boundaries, creating social ties as they do so. This can over time facilitate the movement of states out of one RSC and into another.

these mechanisms into narratives of Central Eurasian institutional geopolitics in the context of counterterrorism. Specifically, I first outline the concepts of brokerage and network based escalation as mechanisms by which extra-regional powers might penetrate regional security orders to wield influence. I then present evidence of these mechanisms as they are performed by the West and China in the Central Asian sub-complex, followed by a narrative that mirrors these mechanisms in the Western Theatre. Finally, I recount Russian actions through its counterterrorism processes made to thwart these outside advances, primarily through the use of the boundary activation mechanism.

3.4 Regional Order Alternatives and Challenges to Leadership Recognition

Not to stray too far from the overall point, the purpose of these narratives is to demonstrate the ways in which regional power leadership might be challenged in the leadership management stage. The existence of recalcitrant regional members does not presuppose extra-regional penetration and challenges to regional power leadership. When extra-regional powers do choose to compete for leadership recognition among recalcitrant states, however, the process by which this challenge might take place, as well as the response we might expect from the regional power becomes particularly important.

I argue that this process is structurally akin to other processes of collective mobilization, in which “actors engage in, seek to achieve, or orient joint action” for the purposes of wielding influence in global politics (Goddard and Nexon 2016, 4). In the context of this section, the actors in primary focus are those extra-regional powers seeking to gain the recognition of neighboring recalcitrant states by means of mobilizing their own subordinates to create or strengthen ties with those recalcitrant states. No doubt these ties can be strengthened through

bilateral diplomatic relations, but where we see trends of new interactions increasing the most is at the institutional level. Institutions create forums for the development of regularized interaction. This interaction can serve to create and strengthen ties, and in the context of Chapter Two, change interests and alter identities. The primary institutional mechanisms that anchor this process are brokerage and network based escalation.

Brokerage can be understood both in terms of mechanisms and processes depending on the level of generality being analyzed. As a mechanism, a broker agent – in this case a broker state – is utilized by an extra-regional power in an effort to generate a specific and newfound connection between two previously disparate actors. Essentially, extra-regional powers that are geographically, socially, and perhaps even historically removed from the targeted RSC can tap into these historical and social associations by using subordinate states bordering the targeted RSC. In some instances these bordering states possess histories intrinsically linked with their neighbors outside the RSC. This relationship occurs most often in this context between subordinate states in Eastern Europe that were once politically located in Central Eurasia due to their membership in the Soviet Union. This historical umbrella actually aids this brokerage process as a result of easily unearthed shared identities. Brokerage as a process then, is simply the formation of an entire category of actors that attempt to generate new links across institutional boundaries.

An examination of the brokerage process by regional powers through institutions presages the mechanism referred to as network-based escalation. Network-based escalation occurs when “networks of mutual aid segregate on either side of a boundary” and this “pits [states] on the two sides against each other and then leads them to seek support from their fellows” (Tilly 2003, 84). On an inter-regional level, network-based escalation occurs when

extra-regional power brokerage causes neighboring recalcitrant states to recognize cross-boundary security interdependencies with the broker states along the outside of its security order as of greater importance than those shared within its own RSC. To clarify, network based escalation is not only the result of the brokerage process, it is a mechanism in and of itself that is utilized in crisis-type situations in which states are obliged to literally “choose a side.” In circumstances in which broker states have properly laid a foundation, this choice is influenced by the provision of institutional knowledge across RSC boundaries. By institutional knowledge, I am referring to demands placed on and assistance provided to recalcitrant states by outside states or institutions that meet the threshold for shifting its alignment toward that outside power.

Analyzing the effects of terrorism and counterterrorism practices is useful in uncovering instances of network based escalation, since a state’s security is necessarily contingent on the security of its neighbors, and its response is in turn contingent on the responses of those states with which it most closely identifies. When states geographically located in Central Eurasia then seek the assistance of regional powers outside of their security order, it can be understood that these states are reconstructing their identities through their aligned interests with the outside power. This identity reconstruction is also broached in the following section as one result of boundary deactivation, creating links across security order boundaries that were previously distinct. A deactivated boundary as a result of the brokerage and network-based escalation processes creates porous borders between RSCs and stifles regional integration processes. These mechanisms greatly affect the ability of the regional power to manage its leadership role.

It cannot go without being said that the success of brokerage and network-based escalation mechanisms depends substantially on historical and geographic realities. In terms of Central Eurasia, the rivalry engendered by the Cold War between the Soviet Union with the US

and Western Europe, continues to impact interaction between Russia's CIS and the West's EU and NATO. Of course, geographic proximity and historicity are not alone responsible for the development of security interdependence. As I will demonstrate, brokerage activities by NATO and the EU with states of Eastern Europe have led to the enlargement of both organizations, as well as the establishment of new socio-political ties between European states and the Western Theatre of Central Eurasia.

The geopolitical competition that is playing out in Central Eurasia between the institutions of the West and those of Russia poses a critical challenge to Russian leadership management. Generally, this discussion confirms the suspicions of much scholarship that Russia frames its counterterrorism practices differently in particular situations to further its foreign policy goals. More than this however, I demonstrate how the management stage of leadership recognition predicts the responses of regional powers in the face of extra-regional challenges to their sphere of influence.

3.4.1 Western Brokerage and Network Based Escalation in Central Asia

Central Asia has been dealing with the regional threat of terrorism since the early 1990s. One such threat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) gained attention in 1998 as the biggest insurgent threat to the Uzbek government. The main directive of the IMU was the overthrow of the present regime and the implementation of Sharia law in its place. While the focus of the IMU in its beginnings was primarily local to Uzbekistan (Omelicheva 2010), its threat at the regional level was felt almost immediately. The porous borders of the relatively weak Central Asian governments created conditions ripe for anti-government militants to conduct cross border operations and attacks.

States in the region had discussed on several occasions the need for interstate cooperation on the matters of domestic and transnational terrorism. For example, the Central Asian Economic Union's (CAEC) Council of Defense Ministers was originally established in 1995 for the specific purpose of combating regional threats. To this day however, it has never been utilized. Prior to September 11, 2001, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all signed agreements to cooperate in fighting terrorism, extremism, and trans-border organized crime (Allison 2004b, 474).¹⁴ As soon as agreements moved towards militarized action however, suspicions between the states (particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) escalated rapidly to accusations of neighbors harboring militants, followed by institutional breakdown and the dissolution in practice of most agreements.

It was in this context that the Central Asian states, in August 2000, requested that the Russian government co-sign the agreements with them under the framework of the CIS (Allison 2004b, 474). While the threat of spillover from the terrorist activity in Uzbekistan existed throughout Central Asia, the states themselves were materially ill equipped to deal with the problem, and unprepared to cooperate with one another to resolve it. As discussed, this inability can be attributed to two related factors, the “Moscow-centered” history of the Central Asian region as a whole, and the relative newness of the Central Asian states, specifically.

Russian responses to the IMU in 1999 and 2000 were largely multilateral. Under Russian leadership in 2000, the CIS anti-terrorist center in Moscow was established and became increasingly useful in terms of intelligence cooperation (Cummings 2013, 115). In 2001, Russian resources and support in coordination with China helped create the SCO, formally designated to

¹⁴ It should be noted that Allison (2004a) is skeptical of any cooperative regional security processes in Central Asia. It is clear from this chapter, however, that since the publication of the aforementioned study, Russia has put forth concerted effort as a strength-based regional power to bring Central Asian security interdependencies to the forefront of regional discourse.

facilitate “cooperation against terrorism, drugs trafficking, fundamentalism, and separatism” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 431).

Russia’s ability to mount a concerted Central Asian response to the threat of the IMU and reestablish itself as the undisputed leader of Central Asia was inhibited by the events subsequent to September 11, when the United States began plans to use Central Asia as a staging point for its invasion of Afghanistan. There followed much internal debate within the Kremlin, with military and political officials cautioning Russian President Vladimir Putin against allowing US troops to base in Central Asia. Putin’s response was a strategic one, noting that victory over the Taliban was only possible with US involvement, and furthermore, the stability of the region was of primary short-term concern (Oldberg 2005, 41). Following the US and NATO invasion of Afghanistan the IMU was largely destroyed, a victory for Central Asian counterterrorism. The acquiescence by Russia to US and NATO penetration into Central Asia, however, incited a new geopolitical competition with the US and NATO on one side, and the Russian-led CSTO, and SCO on the other.

The opportunity for NATO brokerage in Central Asia can be thought to have established itself long before the Afghan invasion. Subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of five new states in Central Asia, all but one were brought into the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, including Russia itself (Tajikistan joined in 2002). The overarching purpose of the PfP is “to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries” (“The Partnership for Peace Program” 2014). On a practical level, the day-to-day workings of the PfP are an effort to foster trust and increase military interoperability between NATO members and outside partners. Specifically, the Framework

Document establishing the PfP “confers the intent for Partner states to cooperate with NATO in ensuring democratic control of defense forces, transparency in defense planning, and the development of compatible military forces able to undertake NATO missions in search and rescue, peacekeeping and humanitarian activities” (Penner 1996).

In the context of Central Asia, NATO's Euro-Atlantic locality posed initial obstacles for successful penetration into the post-Soviet space. Its response was to increase the geographic scope of its partnerships in order to encourage brokerage activity with the establishment of the PfP. Two examples of NATO and US brokerage in Central Asia that directly relate to regional counterterrorism practices are the cases of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Clearly, Uzbekistan felt the Islamic terrorist threat more intensely than other Central Asian states, evidenced by the presence of the IMU and its willingness to receive direct US and NATO support to fight the organization. This shift away from its alignment with Russia paid off in abundance. Between 2001 and 2003, Uzbekistan received from the United States ten times the amount budgeted for other Central Asian states (Dittmer 2007, 18). It is likely that the possibility of a NATO brokerage state existing in Central Asia played a part in Russia seeking to further consolidate its leadership in the RSC pulling states like Uzbekistan back towards the Russian sphere of influence. Perhaps Russia's cooperation with the US now made a relationship that seemed to be mutually exclusive, appear able to coexist. It is also likely, however, that Uzbekistan recognized the finite involvement of the United States within the region in comparison with a long shadow of the future under Russia.

Uzbekistan has proven time and again to be fickle with its alignment in this way. For instance in 2004, Uzbek officials noted that Russia would be less likely than Western powers to question national policies that might infringe on human rights (Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2011,

878). This statement was made less than a year before a treaty was signed between Uzbekistan and Russia, giving Moscow access to ten Uzbek airfields (Trenin 2001, 101). Following this, an Uzbek institutional re-orientation occurred, in which it left the GUUAM¹⁵ group (a Western-focused Central Asian organization) and joined the CSTO. Considering that Putin had earlier referred to the GUUAM group as a “Trojan horse for the projection of US and NATO influence” in the region (Allison 2004b, 477), this re-orientation is of particular interest, in that for Uzbekistan, leaving GUAM seemed to naturally precede joining the CSTO and Russia. This natural precession occurred again in 2012 upon the Uzbek pull out of the CSTO, citing its expectation to benefit from the NATO and US withdrawal from the region by acting as a transit nation (“Withdrawal from Regional Organization” 2012). It again should be noted that the simple fact that Uzbekistan felt it necessary to pull out of the CSTO to make itself available for US and NATO use is evidence of pervasive Russian influence throughout the institution. In essence, Uzbekistan felt the need to free itself from high levels of Russian pressure to honor CSTO commitments in order to shift towards a Western alignment.

Kyrgyzstan is a similar case, and possibly a more natural brokerage state in the eyes of the US than Uzbekistan, inasmuch as its dependence on Russia for security could be coopted by NATO's presence in the region. As Omelicheva points out, Kyrgyzstan “has been more vulnerable to the influence of its social environment” on account of “its landlocked position and low strategic importance” (2011, 20). US efforts to transform Kyrgyzstan into a brokerage state are clear when we consider the progression of NATO's use of the Manas airbase between 2001 and 2009. Kyrgyzstan leased the Manas airbase to the US coalition forces in 2001, for the purposes of staging the Afghan invasion. While recognizing that its acquiescence to US presence

¹⁵ GUAM and GUUAM will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter according to the period under discussion.

in the region after September 11 was inevitable, Russia sought simultaneously to bolster defensive mechanisms to limit US influence in the region as much as possible. The same year, Moscow initiated a bilateral security arrangement with Kyrgyzstan including provisions for joint military planning and operations (Trenin 2007, 101).

Russia began the following year by conducting the largest military exercise since the fall of the Soviet Union. Significantly, while the “Sea of Peace 2002 anti-terrorist” exercises contained the appropriate terms in the title, some observers were unconvinced of their counterterrorism purpose, as they were reminiscent of conventional balancing practices. Additionally, the CSTO “Collective Rapid Reaction Forces” (CRRF) exercises in the same year were perceived largely not to be practices in fighting “bandit formations” as claimed, but rather a direct response to the recent buildup of Western forces in Kyrgyzstan (“Commonwealth of Independent States” 2002). It was then in late 2002 that Russia announced the establishment of a new air base in relatively close proximity to a US garrison at Manas.

When the US’ lease came up for renewal in 2005, Kyrgyzstan withstood considerable pressure from Moscow to deny the renewal. Increasingly however, Kyrgyzstan and the US came into conflict, as authorities began to clamp down on human rights organizations within its borders that were critical of its counterterrorism practices (Omelicheva 2011, 68). This was coupled with the increasing role Kyrgyzstan’s military was afforded to play in the both the SCO and NATO and its ability to walk the tightrope of competing allegiances, participating in both counterterrorism exercises with Russia and China, as well as NATO-led training exercises in counterterrorism in 2007.

By 2009, when again the US lease in Manas was up for renewal, Kyrgyzstan’s indecision over continuing to move “westward” or entrenching itself in its historical Russian

sphere was unmistakable. First, Kyrgyzstan agreed to renew the US lease; later, the government reneged on the agreement, ostensibly folding to Russian pressure. Then, again Kyrgyzstan changed course, agreeing to renew the lease, but requiring that the US transform the base into a transit center, and exacting a heavy price for the renewal (Omeliicheva 2010, 77). It is not coincidental that in this same year, Kyrgyzstan empowered the Russian dominated CSTO to intervene domestically in its affairs, “suppressing attacks by terrorist groups and protecting Kyrgyz sovereignty” (78). By the time civil unrest threatened to tear the country apart in 2010, it was clear which power would take the initiative and bear the responsibility of managing the conflict (see Blank 2011). It should again be noted that this was due as much to the geopolitical realities of Central Asian institutional dynamics as it was to Russian process initiation during this period. The CSTO and SCO are locally grounded institutions in Central Asia, and the shadow of the future in the region favored these institutions over NATO specifically for that reason. As we will see in the next section, this played a large role in Russia’s successful boundary activation in opposition to the Western presence.

3.4.2 Chinese Brokerage and Boundary Deactivation in Central Asia

Russia’s recognition of a growing Chinese interdependence with its Central Asian neighbors (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) became evident in the decade before September 11 as well, as Central Asia began dealing with growing Islamic fundamentalism. While the organization was not formed to combat terrorism specifically, this growing threat and Chinese concern over separatists in its Xinjiang province quickly shifted the focus of the organization toward an anti-terrorist agenda. The Uighur population in Xinjiang, while not necessarily considered “terrorists,” finds itself subject to Chinese and Central Asian counterterrorism

practices, as separatism and terrorism are regarded by the SCO charter as co-constitutive (Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Article 1). In turn, “the 300,000 Uighurs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan creates, for China and the Central Asian governments, a disturbing base for political mobilization in Central Asia” (Swanstrom 2005, 575).

Not surprisingly, with regard to long-term interests, the historical and geopolitical ties between China and the Central Asian region are likely to be more threatening to Russia than NATO intervention. Whereas Western forces lacked natural brokerage mechanisms in Central Asia, China’s border security interdependence with half of the region generates natural cross-regional linkages, evidenced by the establishment of the SCO. In effect, China has grounded itself as the broker state within the SCO, ushering its influence and expanding its role in Central Asia. Indeed, the secretariat of the SCO (established in 2004) is headquartered in Beijing. In addition to its work on data analysis, this body coordinates information exchange on security issues between all SCO members (see Bailes et al. 2007). Through these routes, China has been rather successful at pressuring its neighboring states and fellow SCO members to crack down on their Uighur populations and return Uighur émigrés to China (see Omelicheva 2009).

Chinese brokerage processes have been relatively successful, especially in providing the Central Asian states with a present alternative when faced with unpopular Russian demands. One example of this occurred shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, when Russia noted its expectations for the Central Asian republics to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia. Many Central Asian states have a portion of their domestic populations that wish to secede, and thus, these states sought refuge in China through the SCO in order to defy Russian requests to acknowledge the independence of the breakaway republics (see Frost 2009). This type of Central Asian boundary deactivation on the part of China is a clear

nuisance to Russia, which it offsets through the institutionalization of the CSTO as the primary security actor in the region.

In the same way that the Southeast Asian RSC members of the previous chapter hedged and counterhedged to ensure that no one state claims a hegemonic regional role (Chung 2004), the Central Asian members seem to be using China's institutional penetration into the region to extract economic concessions and security guarantees from both China and Russia. As the hedging of ASEAN showed in Chapter Two, this again highlights the importance of taking subordinate recognition processes into account when analyzing regional power behavior. Through its brokerage and network-based escalation in Central Asia, China appears to have shifted – at least in part – leadership recognition by the regional states from Russia to itself, potentially transforming the RSC into one which includes China. Its success, however, pails in comparison to EU and NATO penetrative success into the Western Theatre, in which mechanisms of brokerage and network-based escalation are constantly in play.

3.4.3 Western Brokerage and Network Based Escalation in the Western Theatre

As it did in Central Asia, the NATO-PfP plays a considerable role in the onset of brokerage processes between Western Europe and Central Eurasia's Western Theatre. In the wake of the Soviet Union, the PfP network in Central and Eastern Europe allowed NATO and the West to signal a commitment to these states, primarily as a stabilizing force in the region. It is no doubt that the stability of Western Europe, as well as the economic prosperity of many European states attracted those now free from the oppression of Soviet Russia. While the West was able (at the time) to successfully quell Russian concern over encroachment, the training and routinized

cooperation engendered by the PfP allowed ease in the replication of “stability projection” in the region (Laursen et al. 2005, 55-56).

More than this, the PfP gave Central and Eastern European States (CEES) the agency to cooperate with one another as a prerequisite for full NATO membership. This was arguably a major incentive for the formation of the GUUAM grouping by Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (who would later withdraw), Azerbaijan and Moldova in 1997, who recognized the importance of signaling cooperative practices to the EU and NATO (see Kuzio 2000). While GUAM has been largely impotent in collectively mobilizing its members, the active outside participation of EU and NATO members (especially Lithuania, Poland, and Romania in a 2007 summit) demonstrates the resolve of the two Western institutions to further expand into the Russian sphere of influence. This resolve plays out through these CEES brokers, primarily Romania, the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), Poland, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey.

It has been noted that the EU’s security initiatives in the 1990s were always channeled through other international actors, primarily NATO and its member states (Delcour 2011). This trend carries over into the 21st century, as the workings of the European Neighborhood Project (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EP) depend to a large extent on the actions of individual European states. The EU bears little onus to adequately incentivize the states of the Western Theatre to make the reforms necessary for accession. When we consider the European project on the whole as a brokerage process, we observe that much of these linkages and pressures come from individual CEES. As Kasekamp notes, the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU not only changed the geopolitical landscape of Europe, it made the Baltic states a natural next step in the EU’s expansion (2005, 137). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all submitted applications for EU accession in 1995, but Estonia was the only Baltic state to receive an invitation to begin

negotiations for accession in 1997. That Estonia received an invitation to negotiate more quickly than Lithuania or Latvia is attributed to its speed in market reforms (138), but certainly the fact that these market reforms were taking place in a former SSR was not coincidental to this decision. The process of geopolitical competition interprets this as a strategic move. At once the EU was both expanding its scope into Eastern Europe, seeking to stabilize the states bordering its RSC, and challenging any future Russian threat to Europe. In turn, Estonia's success galvanized Latvia and Lithuania to step up their domestic reform efforts as a means for EU accession (Kasecamp 2005).

The connection between Estonia's accession negotiations and renewed Latvian and Lithuanian efforts to receive an invitation for that process directs us to consider inadvertent brokerage mechanisms. Geopolitical competition does not require that brokering be intentional, although in most cases it seems to be. For example, the language shift from referring to themselves and their neighbors as "Eastern European," to a more neutral "Central European," was purposeful in framing the CEES in the context of Western Europe and not the former-Soviet Union (see Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Tolstrup 2014). In the case of Ukraine specifically, the CEES were its main connection with the West, the change in language occurred concomitantly with a push by the CEES for it to join the Central European Initiative (CEI). It is noteworthy that the overlap between the CEI and the EU and NATO is considerable. The accession of Poland and the Baltic States to the EU and NATO placed considerable pressure on Belarus to determine its geographical and allegiances. Less friendly with the CEES than Ukraine, but in need of stable relations with its neighbors, Belarus opted for the middle road, "We choose...neither east nor west – we choose Belarus" (cited in White et al. 2010, 348).

Arguably, the accession of the Baltic States has been the most beneficial for European brokerage mechanisms along the Central Eurasian boundaries. As Kasekamp recounts, “the Baltic States have striven to find opportunities to...carve out a niche for themselves by exporting their experience of transition and reforms to countries of the CIS” (2005, 140). These efforts have been most noticeable in Georgia, and the creation of the “New Group of Georgia’s Friends” in 2005 by the Baltic states, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. The stated goals of this group include among others, “assisting in the implementation of the Georgia-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)” and “working within the EU to initiate the drafting...of an EU-Georgia Action Plan as part of the EU’s recently adopted European Neighborhood Policy” (Socor 2005). The aid of the CEES to Georgia has not gone unnoticed. In its 2012 National Security Concept, it noted the importance of deepening “political and economic cooperation with the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and to secure their support for the reforms proceeding in Georgia” (“Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia” 2012, 12).

The release of the EU’s “Wider Europe” communication in 2003 marked the beginning of the ENP, an initiative dedicated to addressing the challenges of the increased interdependence of Europe and the external states closest in proximity to it. This communication was prepared in expectation of the EU’s 2004 enlargement, in which there was a simultaneous accession of ten states. While the purpose of the ENP is to prepare states on the immediate outside of the EU’s borders for “a stake in the EU’s Internal Market” (Wider Europe 2003, 4), there is a security element to the project. The communication puts forth a plan to invigorate cooperation and coordination between the EU and those on its outer borders. Additionally, the communication

proposes developing a model out of the plan on Justice and Home Affairs in Ukraine that would be applied to other outsider states.¹⁶

The EP instrument developed out of the Wider Europe concept in 2008 and is one of the most recent examples of the success of Western brokerage along its boundary with Central Eurasia. Primarily an economic endeavor on the part of Poland and Sweden with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the EP became securitized by means of Russia's response to the proposed expansion. For now, what the PfP, ENP, and EP represent are the institutional linkages that precede and follow growing trans-regional interdependencies, which can often be the result of network-based escalation strategies. The likelihood that the Central Eurasian disputes will become internationalized increases with each EU enlargement, which in turn creates new brokers along the European-Central Eurasian boundary. The accession of Romania in 2004 put the Moldovan conflict in the EU's backyard, and it and the OSCE have made moves to take over the peacekeeping operations in Transnistria to the chagrin of Russia (Tolstrup 2014). Echoing the Baltic notion of cooperation before accession, Georgia emphasizes the importance of its military alliance with neighboring NATO member, Turkey (Chitadze 2011, 114). This is no doubt an attempt to bring NATO into the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts.

This wish by Georgia is not beyond recall, as NATO consistently expresses intentions to expand into the East, with Georgia listed as a possible aspirant. The foreshadowing of NATO operations along the EU-CIS boundary becomes even clearer when we consider General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Philip Breedlove's comments when speaking of stationed forces in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, "there is simply no substitute for our

¹⁶ The EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs in Ukraine, approved by the EC in 2001, puts forth a framework for enhancing Europe-Ukraine border and security cooperation, and the commission meets regularly to score the performance of the outsider state.

forward presence in Europe. It is the bedrock of our ability to assure our allies and to deter real and potential adversaries...” (US, DoD 2015). In other words, Western efforts to encourage or shift the “relational positionality” (see Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Pouliot 2010) of CIS states away from the Russian sphere of influence is the key mechanism in the minds of security officials at once to both promote regional stability and deter Russia. As these brokerage and network based escalation processes unfold along the regional boundary, Western boundary deactivation materializes.

3.4.4 Western Boundary Deactivation in the Western Theatre

For Russia, the early establishment of the PfP was of little concern because of its inclusiveness. Yeltsin’s worry in 1994 about the possible dismemberment of the CIS bloc through piecemeal NATO enlargement was disconnected from Russia’s joining of the PfP because of its cooperative framework and the stated “special partnership” between Russia and NATO (Pouliot 2010, 166). As NATO’s campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo unfolded, however, and the EU enlargement process began, the tone of Russia’s discourse toward the West shifted as well. Russia saw its leadership position in Central Eurasia slipping away.

Early Russian attempts to regain regional influence came through the resources provided by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which it had assumed would become the preeminent collective security organization in Europe, as well as the Western Theatre of Central Eurasia. Granting peacekeeping authority in the region to the CSCE would make NATO enlargement a non-issue, allowing Russia to work politically through its membership in the organization to halt Western advances into the RSC. With this in mind, the Russian foreign ministers pursued this avenue in earnest. It should come as no surprise that by

this time Western brokerage and network based escalation processes, compounded with the historical contingencies involved had effectively deactivated the regional boundaries, and the Russian initiative to empower the CSCE was blocked primarily by Central and Eastern European states formerly within its sphere of influence (Baev 1996, 153). It is of primary importance that Ukraine was a member of the group that blocked Russia's initiative, as Russia places emphasis on it (and Georgia) as a key target for extra-regional penetration into Central Eurasian security matters (see Kariagannis 2014).

As I have discussed, the events of September 11 changed fundamentally the geopolitical landscape between Europe and the Western Theatre. New discourse on the shrinking effects of globalization and internationalization pushed the regional security boundaries closer together than ever before. Brokers and their neighbors were involved no longer in casual democratization projects and the creation of potential buffer states, but rather they became partners in the fight against terrorism. Within institutions like NATO, the war on terror effectively de-territorialized the geography, driving the interests of states together through a recognized mutual vulnerability to existential terrorist threats. Naturally, the continuation of NATO enlargement and the deactivation of the Central Eurasian boundary increased along with these global perceptions, and the invocation of Article 5 for the first time in the alliance's history signaled a working safety mechanism to vulnerable Western Theatre states.

The formation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 was of little assurance to Russia, as NATO continued its expansion towards Central Eurasia. Empowering itself with unprecedented power at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO explicated its authority to intervene military anywhere in the world in response to terrorist threats (Pouliot 2010, 217).¹⁷ Individual

¹⁷ It should be noted that on the heels of this announcement came regional recognition of the authority of the CSTO as the preeminent security organization in Central Eurasia.

Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) and Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs (IPCP) were launched in the Western Theatre beginning in 2004 with Georgia, followed in 2005 with the involvement of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. These IPAPs and IPCPs followed loosely the model of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan formalized in 2002, which was in turn expanded into a Joint Action Plan in 2005, and at the same time connected to its priority partnership in the ENP (see White et al. 2010).

This connection between EU and NATO endeavors in Central Eurasia has become routine since the initiation of the ENP. NATO's 2004 enlargement occurred concomitantly with the largest expansion of the EU, making the growth of these institutions almost unrecognizable as anything other than a threat to Russian influence and interests (see Mearsheimer 2014). The bulk of Russian actions (inside and outside the CIS) to activate the Central Eurasian boundary and escalate network ties among its members thus come in response to these enlargements. Indeed, the initiation of the Eastern Partnership policy, encompassing Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan is linked to (albeit indirectly) both the Russian incursions into Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014. The following section addresses these actions by Russia to activate the boundaries of the Central Eurasian RSC, and thwart Western penetration. These strategies are discussed first in Central Asia and then in the Western Theatre.

3.5 Regional Power Responses to Extra-regional Challengers

Russian actions in the decade prior to September 11 were constrained by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent “change in the rules of the game” from an outside mode “toward the internal mode of pursuing security” (Pouliot 2010, 153). Pouliot adopts this conception of competing modes from Gheciu, who uses them to explain the shift from NATO

balancing behavior during the Cold War, to democracy and economic stability promotion afterward (2005). Malik provides the means to expand this concept of the internal mode of security from the state to the regional level. The “threat-oriented” alliances that dominated interactions during the Cold War are now “order oriented” relationships between states. According to Malik, “order oriented pacts promote active engagement of and with perceived sources of threats; they try not to isolate but enmesh them in the region” (1998, 168). In its cooperation with NATO through the NRC and the PfP, Russia necessarily shifted its security behavior towards “order oriented” relationships with its subordinates as well. This shift had profound impacts on the ability of Russia to activate the Central Eurasian boundaries in the face of Western penetration.

As I have discussed, the boundary activation mechanism when properly applied results in “a shift in social interactions such that they increasingly (a) organize around a single ‘us-them’ boundary, and (b) differentiate between within-boundary and cross-boundary interactions” (Tilly 2003, 14). In essence, this describes an identity formation process by which group identification hardens, creating stark and readily noticeable boundaries between insiders and outsiders. The internal mode of security, and the order-oriented pacts that are born from it, stifle the ability for this process to take place. This might explain why it took almost a decade for Russia to reassert its power back into security processes within the region, and as NATO and the EU move further into Central Eurasia, this assertion of power as a method of boundary activation has become increasingly aggressive. In other words, for Russia, boundary activation and network-based escalation practices become mechanisms to protect its position of regional power and its role of leader in Central Eurasia.

3.5.1 Russia Boundary Activation in Central Asia

The secondary intent of the US War on Terror may have been to penetrate the Central Asian security order and assert its global prowess, but rather than weakening Russian influence and strengthening its own, it seems to have accomplished quite the opposite. Russia has inadvertently benefited from this difficulty and is emerging as a stronger and more influential actor in the region. External penetration in the region has pushed Moscow into a corner in which it has been forced to react and reassert its regional dominance. Where Russia's soft power has failed to restrain states from moving towards the West, its reversion to using force to protect its sphere of influence has raised its power status on a regional and global level. One aspect of Russia's reassertion of power in the region has been the empowerment of the CSTO. Its consolidation of Central Asian leadership under a Russian-centric umbrella took place through Russia's institutional presence, hierarchy, and mediation. Russia's institutional presence, and the geographic foundation of the institution plays an important role not only in the fight against terrorism in Central Asia, but also in engendering dependencies in Central Asian governments on Russia.

In the wake of the US and NATO arrival in Central Asia, the CSTO began its transition, forming "a joint air defense, three integrated army formations, horizontally integrated military systems, and collective peacekeeping forces" (Nikitin 2007, 35). This transition towards a more cohesive military-bloc relationship between the members in terms of boundary activation was intended to create a hardened Central Asian security identity, set in juxtaposition to the NATO and US forces residing on leased bases and airfields. Weinstein goes so far to make the distinction between a collective security organization and a collective defense organization, dubbing the CSTO as the latter (2007, 170). This security identity had Russia at its head. The

CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) is considered to be “under de facto Russian command” (Frost 2009, 86). Not only is the CSTO Secretary General a former Russian general, the troop counts in the CRRF are dominated by Russians, and the organization itself is financed primarily by Russia (Weinstein 2007).

Having established this NATO-like structure, Russia and the CSTO initiated formal talks with NATO on collaboration and cooperation between the two organizations. This move by the CSTO has not been interpreted as amiable, but rather as an effort to situate itself between NATO and the Central Asian states in order to have more control over US and NATO activities in the region (Blank 2006). By 2007, the Russia-NATO document on “Shared Principles of Joint Peacekeeping Operations” had been in the drafting stages for over two years with no end in sight (Nikitin 2007). This indecisiveness on the part of the committee was most likely due to the NATO preference of establishing bilateral cooperative practices with its PfP members in the region, as formal cooperation with the CSTO would be a tacit recognition of its central importance to Central Asian security.

It is impossible to know whether or not these boundary activation mechanisms on the part of Russia would have been effective without the controversial US invasion of Iraq in 2003. What we can say however, is that American belligerence in the Middle East cemented the Central Asian relations firmly under the aegis of the CSTO. While these Central Asian states are not Russian satellites, or dependent on Russia to the extent that they were during the Soviet era, their reliance on the CSTO for their security needs today, is largely driven by identities and interests developed through their social ties with one another and Russia as a result in part of the reinvigorated CSTO. These identities are decidedly authoritarian in nature, limiting the scope of NATO's effectiveness as a promoter of democratic change in the region.

The SCO also requires mention in this boundary activation narrative. While not directly attributing to Russian boundary activation, the regional balancing maneuvers performed with cooperation by Russia and China lent validity to the “us-them” distinction generated between Central Asian institutions and the US and NATO. The SCO Peace Mission exercises alone demonstrate this balancing in action. As mentioned in an earlier section, while operating under the designation of a counterterrorism exercise, Peace Mission 2005 involved only Russia and China, hosting 100,000 troops and performing maneuvers based more in traditional security practices than counterterrorism. “Peace Mission 2007” opened itself to Central Asian participation at large, and again appears more as a traditional security signal than an exercise devoted primarily to counterterrorism.

China’s participation in buffering the US and NATO’s presence in its backyard through the SCO was most likely influenced by their presence on its eastern and southeastern shores as described in the second chapter. Indeed, the opposition to NATO operations in Central Asia by both Russia and China held great weight in the 2005 SCO Astana summit, in which a call was made to the US and NATO to set a concrete timeline for the withdrawal of its forces (see Frost 2009). As we have seen, however, the coexistence of the CSTO and the SCO and their overlapping security functions in Central Asia is extremely problematic for Russian leadership management. At the same time China was cooperating with Russia to balance this Western presence, it was also creating socio-political ties with Central Asian states through the use of the SCO. How Russia effectively neutralized these ties and regimented them strictly to the economic sphere is the subject of the next section.

3.5.2 Russian Network Based Escalation against China in Central Asia

It should be clear at this point that China's boundary deactivation in Central Asia occurred through its establishment of and participation in the SCO. Through the process of institutionalizing the SCO, China has contributed to creating stability and developing cooperative regional practices. Not only were the Shanghai Five (led by China and Russia) the "earliest international community to call for cooperative action against terrorism in Central Asia" (Guang 2007, 50), but also the urging along of the counterterrorism mechanisms contained in the SCO Charter was largely a Chinese enterprise following September 11. This included, but was not limited to, increased security cooperation in 2005 in response to unrest in the Ferghana Valley, and giving a high priority to developing the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) component of the SCO.

The terrorist threat in Central Asia in part prompted China to pursue further institutionalization of the Shanghai Five, and increased Chinese security ties in the region. This occurred specifically with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as these states acquiesced to Chinese pressures to cooperate in fighting the Xinjiang separatists in any way (Swanstrom 2005). This increased interdependence is also in part due to Russia's participation in the SCO. Russia's cooperation with China's rising influence within the organization tacitly gives consent to the growing relationships and linkages between Central Asia and the Chinese power. As mentioned above, Russia's willingness to concede to China's regional security penetration was in large part a necessary reaction to US and NATO presence in the region. This was strategic on the part of Russia, as its simultaneous activities in the SCO and the CSTO during this time demonstrate that it was at once utilizing China to balance the Western presence in the region, while buffering Chinese security influence in the region by increasing the security role of the Russian-backed

CSTO. It was through mechanisms of network-based escalation in the CSTO that Moscow maintained security dominance in Central Asia, which continues to be directed through a Russian framework and according to Russian preferences. As can easily be surmised, the importance of the CSTO for Moscow is that it is of a very similar makeup as the SCO, only absent any Chinese presence and influence.

The Russian development of the CRRF within the framework of the CSTO in 2004 and its dominant position within the forces marked the beginning of the institution's search for recognition from the regional and international community as the predominant Central Asian security organization. These efforts continued with requests (as noted above) to NATO for inter-organizational cooperation in Central Asia. Additionally, the CSTO established its own peacekeeping force to maintain local Central Asian stability. Notably, in these discussions, CSTO leaders drew a parallel between the new peacekeeping component and the forces of NATO (Frost 2009, 94).

Russian initiatives within the CSTO allowed the organization to develop material security assets with which it would be the clear alternative to counterterrorism and other security practices in the RSC upon the withdrawal of US and NATO forces. As Frost points out, "unlike the CSTO, the SCO has few practical means, such as airbases or ground forces" (2009, 95). That security became the default role of the CSTO and not of the SCO was of incredible importance to Russia, which in the past had been excluded from SCO bilateral military exercises (Peyrouse 2010). While the security interactions under the auspices of the SCO legitimate Chinese military cooperation with Central Asian states, Russia has been clear in noting that the issue of security is reserved to the CSTO and therefore within Russia's domain (see Frost 2009).

This network based escalation narrative also explains why Russia would suggest that the CSTO and SCO cooperate in terms of security and MMEs. Upon the commencement of the “Peace Mission 2007,” Russia proposed making the exercise a joint endeavor by the two organizations, a proposal which China refused. The inclusion of the CSTO in SCO security maneuvers would also be the inclusion of two states sympathetic to Russia, Armenia and Belarus, giving it considerable leverage. While this one instance of proposed cooperation was denied, China did relent in signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the organizations in the same year (Frost 2009). In light of this, Russian officials still deem the Peace Mission exercises to be “a test of communication and information support” by a China suspicious of Russian capabilities and intentions (cited in Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2011, 885).

This trope of keeping “your friends close and your enemies closer” is not outplayed in Russian foreign policy. By cooperating militarily through the SCO with China, Russia can not only prepare for the potentiality of a rivalry with China, but it can limit Chinese maneuverability in the region with regard to these exercises. All of this notwithstanding, Russia has succeeded in its quest to make the CSTO the premier security organization in Central Asia. This is evident when we consider the fact that as US coalition forces continue to pull out of the RSC, CSTO-CRRF divisions move in to take their place (see Frost 2009).

Summarily, China has used the SCO as a mechanism for boundary deactivation between it and Central Asia, but its efforts at network-based escalation have largely fallen short of its intentions. This failure can be primarily attributed to Russian success in its efforts to bolster the role of the CSTO as the default security organization in Central Asia, leading to a regional recognition of Russia as the primary security actor. As a result, China’s role in Central Asia

continues to be primarily an economic one,¹⁸ as security in Central Asia continues to be directed through a Russian framework and according to Russian preferences.

3.5.3 Russia Boundary Activation in the Western Theatre

Western forces may have – early on – successfully shifted the tone of security cooperation from an outside to an internal mode, but Russian efforts to undermine this collective security narrative are prevalent. The shift of “near abroad” responsibilities and authority from the Soviet Union to the CIS after its fall yielded little fruit with regards to individual state sovereignty. As Deyermond shows, Central Eurasian conceptions of state sovereignty are vastly distinct from Western understandings (2008). The use of the term itself, “near abroad” has always tended to cloud the demarcation between the borders of Russia and its neighbors. Russia’s continued use of that term, along with another term, “external borders,” suggests that it continues to regard the boundaries states of the CIS as porous, and Russia as their unifying sovereign (see Deyermond 2008, Ch. 6). Both of these linguistic terms present the most fundamental Russian frame through which to activate the Central Eurasian RSC boundary.

Prior to September 11, Russian efforts towards boundary activation and network based escalation were primarily based in conflict management processes. The model for CIS brokerage and boundary activation is the Russian-Belarus relationship that developed in the mid-1990s. The states both share a strategic radar station and operate a shared air defense system (Giragosian 2011). Belarus’ reliance on Russia for security and military support through bilateral relations, as well as through the multilateral forums of the CIS and CSTO is the standard of

¹⁸ For example, during the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1998, China demonstrated a sense of loyalty and faithfulness to its partners in the region by giving aid to Thailand and Indonesia, as well as refusing to devalue its currency (De Santis 2005, 24).

regional integration that Russia wishes to set for the rest of the RSC. When Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine rejected this standard after the creation of the CIS, Russia began strong-arming the Belarusian model onto these states through various conflict management strategies.

In the early months of 1992, Russian attempts to create a council of defense ministers within the CIS, effectively forming a military alliance, were thwarted first and foremost by the refusal of Moldova to sign the initiative. This move was bold on the part of Moldova, as it is almost an objective fact that in these years, the state's territorial integrity relied on the support and assistance of Moscow (Trenin 2001). This is true for Georgia as well, which has had a tumultuous history with Russia, being brought under Soviet rule by force after declaring independence, and struggling with its breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ever since. Its fragility and lack of military might has made Georgia relatively susceptible to Russian influence, and while its discourse in the early 1990s was marked by its Western aspirations, its policy and actions were very much dependent on support from Russia (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 13). Russia's condemnation of the porous borders between it and Georgia that allowed Chechen rebels to find safe space in the Pankisi Gorge, were paired with its recognition that the same southern borders serve as a corridor for Western penetration into the region. This is true as well for Ukraine, a state that is ostensibly the key to halting Western encroachment into Central Eurasia (Tolstrup 2014, 153). A state whose "Crimea question" has come to a head in recent years, and begun by Russia not simply as a strategy to maintain warm water ports, but also as an effort to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity, and prevent it from full integration with the West (see Baev 1996).

The context of each of these Central Eurasian conflicts remain the same, but the discourse and approach taken towards them by Russia, the CIS, and the CSTO has changed

substantially. No longer does Russia assert its might in terms of conflict management. It now asserts its power through particular frames of terrorism and counterterrorism. As we saw in the previous section, the US War on Terror had profound implications on Russia's counterterrorism processes in Central Asia. In that vein, the increased security interdependence between Western Europe and the bordering states of Central Eurasia, caused in part by the enlargements of NATO and the EU had an equally large impact on the way Russia framed its behavior in the Western Theatre. Rather than propping up the authoritarian governments (as it had done in Central Asia), Russia continued its efforts to halt NATO and EU integration processes in the Western Theatre by undermining the stability of those states, but in this era, shifting its discourse towards state sponsored and/or state sanctioned terrorism, and utilizing the CIS and CSTO to drive counterterrorism processes in the sub-region. Specifically, Putin combined these destabilization efforts with network based activation and boundary activation mechanisms, attempting to create a Russian "coalition of the willing" through the CIS (see Tolstrup 2014). As I will demonstrate, this shift towards counterterrorism discourse allowed Moscow to continue its destabilization efforts in the sub-region, while offering a widely legitimated frame for its actions.¹⁹

While early Russian efforts to integrate Moldova more heavily into the CIS framework through the creation of military consultations and other CIS military structures proved unsuccessful throughout the 1990s, the age of the global war on terror combined with the increased Russian pressure finally gave way to Moldovan acquiescence. On September 28, 2001, Moldova joined the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center. While this victory was short lived (Moldova later backed out of a 20 year agreement allowing Russian troops on its soil), Russia has used its

¹⁹ It is no doubt that the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were not legitimate, nor were they seen as justifiable by the international community when presented through this frame. However, there is something to be said for the effectiveness of Russia's adaptation of Western counterterrorism discourse that at the same time undermined the ambitions of Western foreign policy.

station in Transnistria to carry out “anti-terrorist” exercises along the border with Ukraine. Like the Peace Mission exercises in Central Asia, these exercises are only veiled in counterterrorism discourse. For instance, one of these was coordinated by Russian troops as a direct response to Ukraine after the state restricted passage across the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border (Allison 2014, 1277).

The cases of Georgia and Ukraine are more clear-cut in terms of boundary activation and network based escalation. Unlike Moldova, Georgia’s military strength had increased substantially after the turn of the century, and continued to grow leading up to the Russian invasion in 2008 (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 65). Georgia’s discourse and action, under the direction of GUAM and the CEES broker states, began again to drift Westward, evidenced by its withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty in 1999. Unlike the early years of independence, this time Georgia’s aspirations were met with Western interest. Russia began to take action to activate Central Eurasian boundaries and establish itself through the CIS and the CSTO as the primary security actor in the RSC. Exactly one year after September 11, 2001, Russia placed demands on the Georgian government to move into the Pankisi Gorge and take measures against Chechen “terrorists” seeking refuge (see Hedenskog et al. 2005). Russia was able to conscript cooperation from Georgia on this front, using vitriolic language. Defining its war on Chechnya as a war on global terrorism, Russia accused Georgia of tacitly sponsoring international terrorism by allowing Islamic extremists to use its territory to transfer aid and supplies to the Chechens (see Gordadze 2011).

As the United States and NATO became increasingly involved in Central Eurasia, the US began training Georgian forces in an effort to equip the state with the means to respond to local terrorist organizations and events. Aside from a brief period in 2003, in which the new Georgian

president exchanged friendly diplomatic dialogue with Russia and implemented policies suppressing the Chechens within Georgia, the state steadily moved toward Western institutions, setting itself up for NATO accession. The 2008 Georgian attack on the South Ossetian capital and the Russian invasion that followed had geopolitical overtones. While the proximate causes for the war are complex, the underlying motivations for Russia were almost certainly to decimate the Georgian military (which had recently reached its NATO standards as dictated by the PfP) and force the West to recognize Russian “zones” of interest (Kendall 2008).

This was not the only frame used to present the Russian perspective, however. Then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referenced the watershed events on September 11, comparing the impact that the attacks on South Ossetia had on Moscow to the attack on New York City’s World Trade Center (cited in Mouritzon and Wivel 2012, 84). The framing tactics used by Russia were not necessarily useful in fending off international criticism of the invasion, but in this instance and others there is a deep critique of Western foreign policy practices involved in Russian language that the West cannot fully respond to without affirming the critique itself. At the very least, acknowledging the Russian frames as a matter of dispute between the two cross-regional poles would be a simultaneous affirmation of Russia as the leader of the Central Eurasian RSC. In terms of geopolitical competition, this tacit recognition would effectively activate the RSC boundary from the outside.

As with both Moldova and Georgia, increases in terrorist activity in Central Eurasia preceding 2001, and in the immediate post-September 11 environment saw an increase in counterterrorism cooperation between the state and its regional power. Ukraine signed on to the CIS-Antiterrorism Centre in June 2000, and began a process to enhance coordination with its Russian leader (see Tolstrup 2014). In essence, the Ukrainian case is similar in nature, but the

annexation of Crimea was a more overt and sustained move than any Russia took in Georgia. This is best explained in considering that Ukraine is ground zero for halting Western brokerage processes (see Tolstrup 2014). The Russian actions that would lead to the annexation of Crimea began during a time of heightened geopolitical competition and tension between Russia and the EU. As a response to the Eastern Partnership launch, then President Medvedev made it clear in 2010 that the CSTO could play little role in the Western Theatre without the involvement of Ukraine (see Allison 2014). As Russia accused the EU and its programs for undermining “natural” processes of Central Eurasian integration through the CIS and the potential for a Eurasian Union, it was convinced that the coup in February 2014 – in the wake of Ukraine coming out in support of a Russian-led Eurasian Union - had been a Western plot to oust Russian friendly Ukrainian leadership (see Allison 2014).

Russian legal rhetoric to justify its intervention in Ukraine was coupled with a counterterrorism frame in the context of both protecting Russian nationals in Ukraine from extremist Ukrainian nationals and protecting Russian military infrastructure from attack. For instance, as President Putin responded to questions on the Ukrainian crisis by highlighting Russia’s involvement to create conditions “for the free expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol” (Putin 2014), his defense ministry justified reinforcing Russian forces in the area, arguing that troops already present were in danger of being attacked by “extremist organizations” (cited in Allison 2014, 1262). As Tolstrup argues, this two-pronged approach was intended to make Ukraine seem unready to join NATO, since the alliance has historically avoided importing states with outstanding internal and interstate conflict (2014, 202).

These specific boundary activations took place in the larger context of Central Eurasian boundary activation processes. Namely, Russia’s vision to establish a Eurasian Union (signed

onto by Belarus and Kazakhstan; shown interest in by Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), overlapping much of the CIS and most likely engendering supranational powers into the Union that the CIS seriously lacked (see Mankoff 2014). The importance of Ukraine to the relative health of Central Eurasian institutions is just as evident in the proposed Eurasian Union as it is in the CSTO (Brooke 2014). Additionally, the scope of Russia's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine can be considered boundary activation signaling mechanisms towards other Central Eurasian states. Chitadze contends that the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia can also be considered a warning to Azerbaijan, demonstrating the consequences of internationalizing its territorial dispute with Armenia, or even unilaterally using force to take back the Nagorno-Karabakh region (2011, 109).

Russian boundary activation mechanisms in the Western Theatre of Central Eurasia have largely hindered NATO and EU expansion into the RSC's security processes. In this respect, Russia has been successful at maintaining its regional power position. This however, has come at the cost of Russia undermining its own leadership capacity in Central Eurasia. For any regional power to maintain a position of leadership, there must be recognition by the subordinates of the regional power's authority to enact that role. Russian leadership practices in the Western Theatre are extensive in its efforts to develop regional security institutions (such as the CIS, CSTO, and the EEU), and its efforts to securitize counterterrorism in order to serve its interests (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). What Russia lacks, however, is the recognition of this leadership role by key subordinates in the Western Theatre. In terms of the geopolitical competition playing out between Russian and European institutions, while Russia was able to successfully activate the boundary between Central Eurasia and Europe through an aggressive use of force, it failed in its efforts at reinvigorate a Central Eurasian identity through the mechanism of network-based

escalation. That is, the Western ties felt by Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine - engendered by European brokerage processes – remain present. Until this perspective dissipates, or is replaced by an increase in interest to join a Russian-backed Central Eurasian institution, the geopolitical tension between Russia and the West will continue. In turn, without a resolution to this tension, or these cross-regional ties, Russia will struggle to realize Central Eurasian integration, and maintain its role as the leader of the RSC.

3.6 Conclusion

At this point, it is clear to see that the regional security order stage of leadership management is subject to relative levels of instability. As a result of their lack of legitimate voice in regional security processes, recalcitrant states pose potential threats for regional powers by inviting external penetration. This extra-regional power interference can occur in a number of ways, through alliance building, conflict management, trade relations, etc. Even in terms of these varied paths, external penetration primarily occurs through the use of institutional mechanisms. Institutions serve as conversion points for relational processes that may shift the alignment of recalcitrants to outside powers through brokerage and network-based escalation mechanisms.

Regional power responses to these leadership challenges vary widely as well, and take place in issue-specific contexts.²⁰ This chapter has examined how Russia as a regional power responds to outside powers challenging its leadership in Central Eurasian counterterrorism practices. Importantly, the Russian approach to counterterrorism is distinct between Central Asia

²⁰ For instance, Russian network based escalation may succeed in venues outside of Central Eurasian counterterrorism processes. It is quite possible that economic integration through the EEU, conflict management processes, nuclear proliferation practices, or even climate policy might better be able to draw together the Central Eurasian subordinates and their recognition of Russia as a leader in the RSC. In this regard, this chapter is the first of many necessary case applications to investigate Central Eurasian integration processes, and their relation to institutional geopolitics with Western organizations.

and the Western Theatre, propping up governments in one sub-region, while in the other undermining governments and condemning state sanctioned terror. The disparate methods clearly serve one constant interest: the preservation of Russian leadership in the Central Eurasian security order. Russia maintains a strength-based hold on the RSC, and this creates a recognition problem that (especially in the Western Theatre) prevents it from transitioning towards heavier forms of integration, whether they are concert-based, hegemonic, or institutional. As I have demonstrated, this problem stems in part from the Western Theatre sub-region's geographic and historical orientation with Europe, but also from Russia's inability to effectively frame issues and develop its institutions in ways that consider the interests of its subordinate neighbors, vis-à-vis network based escalation practices.

For Russia to regain the recognition of its Central Eurasian neighbors and move the integration processes of the RSC forward, threat oriented and order oriented modes of security cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive. While the regional power requires the threat-oriented alliances with its regional subordinates in order to harden the boundaries of the Central Eurasian RSC, Russia at the same time must accept that without the cooperative dialogue and internal interest consideration spurred from order oriented alignments, it cannot achieve the complete recognition of its subordinates that is needed to stabilize the security order and move it towards higher levels of integration. In order to do this, concessions must be made to recalcitrant states within the order.

In effect, this comes in concomitance with more democratic behavior at the regional level. With Russia's eye towards regional hegemony, regional democratization seems unlikely. Effective hegemonic integration might very well be the end of regional power problems in maintaining recognition-based leadership, and most likely the end of the leadership role in the

region altogether, as hegemonic integration necessitates the absorption of neighboring states into the regional power. An analysis of recognition-based leadership would end at this point. As this chapter demonstrates, with the intervening capabilities of the United States and NATO, this is unlikely in and of itself. In this sense, the direction of regional integration matters, as well as the methods used by the regional powers and neighboring states to precipitate it.

Democratic and institutional means, such as those used by the European Union to perpetuate European supranationalism is currently the best and only example of high levels of regional integration. But as the next chapter demonstrates, effective supranational integration still presents new sets issues for the European regional powers, and even more challenges for regional researchers. Rather than interest consideration and institution development by regional powers spurring the recognition of their smaller European counterparts, the unprecedented use of these leadership dimensions has essentially resulted in the delegation of leadership to the supranational institution and its components such that it masks the influence of individual states.

CHAPTER 4

THE DELEGATION STAGE: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF LEADERSHIP

4.1 Introduction

The delegation stage of leadership is distinct from the establishment and management stages as it occurs within a process of regional democratization. Naturally, the progression of regional orders in the stages of leadership identified by this dissertation endorses the suggestion that democratization is embedded in hierarchies centered on great powers (see McDonald 2015). This chapter presents an examination of the delegation stage of leadership based on counterterrorism processes within the European Union.

The democratic nature of the European Union as an institution, propagated by the European security community and unprecedented levels of cooperation and coordination by the state actors within it makes discussing regional power leadership in the European RSC somewhat enigmatic. In terms of the RPSF, there is a distinct possibility that regional power leadership in Europe is undermined in issue-specific contexts by the very democratic norms that appear to stabilize it. Certainly, there are still issue-areas in which the European regional powers (United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy) play a lead role and set the policy agenda for the rest of the RSC, such as banking and other aspects of the European political economy. Elements of European security, however, like counterterrorism policy, have been to a large part initiated by small regional states and independent institutions, primarily the European Council and the

European Commission. As a result, it is tempting to conclude that the European Union has become its own unitary actor on the international sphere, and its own regional leader in terms of the RSC. This however, is problematic considering that the implementation process of the security measures proposed by the Commission and agreed upon by the Member States is left entirely to the devices of the states themselves, and ordinarily requires amending national laws to adhere to the supranational policy. The question then becomes, how can we talk about the processes of recognition that accord regional power leadership to specific states in a security order that is arranged to such an extent that the five dimensions of leadership (process-initiation, issue framing, interest consideration, institution development, and deployment of power) are afforded to all states residing within that egalitarian framework? More to the point, in an institution whose legitimacy is derived from this egalitarian framework, how might we observe instances in which an individual state or groups of states take the reigns on regional policy preferences?

The delegation stage of leadership then, presents a new complication to the study of regional security orders, as a space has been opened up in which the states are simultaneously sovereign entities, but have also ceded (at least partially) sovereignty to a supranational institution, in this case the EU. A discussion of sovereignty and supranational collective security is necessary therefore in order to disentangle how recognition of regional power leadership might occur in the delegation stage.

4.1.1 Sovereignty, Collective Security, and the Delegation Stage

Sovereignty is traditionally defined as the “expectation that states have legal and political supremacy – or ultimate authority – within their territorial boundaries” (Frieden, Lake, and

Schultz 2016, 8). This definition highlights two important aspects of sovereignty. First, in order to maintain political supremacy and ultimate authority, the government of a state that is sovereign must hold a monopoly on the use of force. Second, the limits of this authority are finite, being restricted to the state's territoriality. Indeed, the individuality of the modern state is recognized not in law or politics but in its territoriality (Herz 1957). The authority of the modern state thus rests on the impenetrability of its territorial boundaries.

Up to this point, the issue of sovereignty has crept into the discussion whenever regional powers have stretched their interests too far, resulting in conflict with their regional subordinates, or when subordinates feel their interests are not being taken into account appropriate to their existence as sovereign states. These interactions – albeit in distinct forms - pervade the stages of leadership establishment and leadership management. Additionally, implicit claims of sovereignty are relatively easy to identify as a result of the limited integration of most RSCs around the world. The security processes within the European RSC, institutionalized by the European Union, operate much differently than Southeast Asia and Central Eurasia. We have seen that collective security processes in Southeast Asia and Central Eurasia have broken down in various forms as a result of the failure of certain, select, or all RSC members to recognize their regional power in a leadership role. In both cases, this failure has left room for the rise of regional counterbalancing coalitions with external forces to offset the regional powers' influence and capabilities. This has primarily occurred when the regional power disregards the interests of its subordinates, and fails to develop properly the institutions in which they participate.

In contrast, the delegation stage of leadership marks a turning point in explanations of regional power and subordinate behavior. In the specific case of the EU, strides in interstate cooperation over the last half century have generated intergovernmental and supranational

policies and frameworks that muddy the territorial waters (see, for example, Zaiotti 2011). Additionally, institutional processes have been put in place to generate policy initiatives put forward by private institutional bodies, as opposed to individual states. At the very least, in terms of regional agenda setting and framing, democratic governance changes the shape of leadership processes in which the political community is afforded the ability to define the situation for the regional powers. In his comprehensive study on political leadership, Tucker describes democracies as encompassing aspects of both constituted leadership and nonconstituted leadership. “Nonconstituted leaders flourish best in conditions of political freedom that afford them the opportunity to put forward their definitions of the situation and their policy prescriptions in public and seek to mobilize followings” (1981, 73). In this sense, recognition-based leadership shifts from a state or group of states soliciting recognition of their role towards a region-wide mutual recognition of the potentiality for any state to assert itself as a leader in any context.

Tucker’s discussion of political leadership is restricted to the domestic sphere, so there is a need to stretch his conclusions to apply broadly to international relations. In the delegation stage of regional leadership, it is not the case that smaller states are non-constituted leaders, but rather that *every state within the complex is a constituted leader*. The larger question then, is can the power politics that have been attributed to regional security processes throughout this dissertation apply to the leadership delegation stage in general, and to the European RSC in particular? The short answer is yes. While all states within an RSC that has reached the delegation stage might be constituted leaders, this does not mean that all are able to exert the same level of influence on security processes, only that all states have the legitimate opportunity to do so. This is especially the case in the European RSC, through which the EU has delegated

leadership roles to each member, able to be carried out through various institutional frameworks within the Union and translated into supranational legislation.

It is in this context that the tension between sovereignty and supranationality becomes an important narrative and explanatory tool for state behavior in the delegation stage. The following section seeks to place the leadership delegation stage in the historical context of European counterterrorism processes. I then move on to describing the most recent changes in the institutional structure of the European Union with regards to counterterrorism, how this has decreased the individual sovereignty of Europe's members, and how the European regional powers have sought to reassert their influence back into supranational policymaking through the use of institutional and legal loopholes – specifically through the use of the rapporteur in the European Parliament.

4.2 The European Union in Context

There is little agreement among scholars about the causes for European integration that occurred throughout the second half of the 20th century. With this in mind, I am not attempting here to put forth a novel narrative of integration, nor am I seeking to generate new causal explanations for how and through what logics integration took place. Instead, what follows is an account of how we might understand European counterterrorism processes to have developed within the context of gradual European integration. I demonstrate that counterterrorism processes parallel quite closely with the pockets of technical cooperation that expanded over time to form the EU.

Concessions made by EU members in security processes in this sense may even have provided the space for an expansion in the responsibility of the supranational institution, as traditional security processes are coveted by the nation-state, making sovereignty the sine quo non of state

security. The unraveling of this entanglement is one important aspect of the narrative that follows.

4.2.1 The European Community: 1975-1991

Though European integration arguably began with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, followed by the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958, this cooperation was relegated primarily to the economic sphere, and it took the better part of two decades to reach the realm of “high politics” (see Gowa 1995; Moravcsik 1998). It should make sense then, that counterterrorism cooperation in the period prior to the formalized creation of the European Union was sparse. Historically, European terrorism had been national in nature, with groups like the IRA in Britain, the ETA in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Red Army Faction in West Germany demanding and fighting for concessions at the state level. This fact seemingly propagated the assumption that the national character of terrorism left transnational cooperation on the issue unnecessary. As European cooperation increased, however, and terrorism took on an increasingly transnational quality (i.e. the Black September attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics), the need for cross-border cooperation between states within the European Community (EC) became evident. Immediate state responses primarily took the form of small pockets of cooperation around the EC, especially through bilateral agreements.

Initiated by Great Britain and West Germany in 1975, the intergovernmental group, TREVI (standing for terrorism, radicalism, extremism, violence, and international, respectively), was modeled to have no direct connection to the European Community or the European Parliament (EP). Its primary purpose was to coordinate national counterterrorism policies around the EC, placing an emphasis on informal, lower-level police and secret service cooperation

through information sharing practices. TREVI was non-binding as no state was required to share any information, reflecting generally the “persistent national preference for bilateral relationships and the parallel participation in informal, practitioner-led networks” (Coolsaet 2010, 864).

Much like the greater European integration process, however, this bottom level practitioner-led cooperation motivated some states to seek higher levels of counterterrorism coordination. As Great Britain organized a training course for police entitled “Exercise Europa” in concomitance with an EC counterterrorism conference for police officials in 1977, France put forth an initiative (backed by West Germany) that would create a European-wide platform for a more formalized type of European judicial cooperation (Friedrichs 2008, 95).

The rest of the EC largely ignored this French initiative for a judicial area, and TREVI was never completely successful in driving counterterrorism cooperation. The best example of this lack of regard for the importance of TREVI was the Italian government’s response to the kidnapping of their former prime minister, Aldo Moro, in 1978 by the Red Brigades. Rather than turning to TREVI or another one of the various horizontal governance systems in Europe, such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT), for information on the recent activities of Red Brigades members, Italy instead approached the terrorist-affiliated PLO, the communist governments of Yugoslavia and Cuba, and the authoritarian controlled Libya and Algeria for information (Friedrichs 2008, 73). Why Italy turned to these states for help is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that faith in European counterterrorism processes and groups such as TREVI was relatively limited among the states, as well as the regional powers.

In terms of the RPSF, regional powers were embracing the leadership role by putting forth region-wide initiatives to deal with the problem of terrorism, but the regional power multipolarity of the RSC rendered these initiatives disjointed. Additionally, as the above account

of the Italian response to Moro's kidnapping and murder indicates, there remained a serious lack of institutional development within EU counterterrorism processes even after the establishment of TREVI, PWGOT, and other horizontal governance arrangements. Nonetheless, as the march toward European integration continued, so too did cooperation on transnational counterterrorism. The 1980s witnessed incredible strides in both arenas, as the evolution of the "Schengenland" began.

Much like the establishment of TREVI, the Schengen initiative made no explicit mention of creating a larger European Community. It mentioned no European institution or framework and it survived as such by advertising itself as a "laboratory of the EC." The Schengen initiative was put forward by five of the ten EC member states at the time, Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Its primary purpose was to "abolish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders" (General Secretariat 2000, 24). This meant heavy coordination between these states in terms of visas, police and customs cooperation, as well as the harmonization of various policies concerning passports, drugs, and arms trafficking.

More so than Southeast Asia and Central Eurasia, counterterrorism in Europe is intrinsically linked to transnational crime. Primarily, this nexus is most reflective in European border control. It had become clear in the early part of the decade that in addition to bringing the whole of Europe under a single common market, the ministers of the Community were looking for better ways to secure the borders in Europe, noting in a progress report put out by the EC that "the problems presented by the need to find alternative and preferably more efficient means to deal with arms, terrorism and drugs are substantial," but the report continues by highlighting the unwillingness of some states to cede the necessary powers to the EC to perform this task:

“Unfortunately Ministers dealing with these problems still seem to be wedded to their present inefficient frontier controls rather than actively seeking out new and better ways of confronting these issues” (quoted in Zaiotti 2011, 65). Indeed, there was outright defiance on the part of Great Britain, whose prime minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher said, “I did not join Europe to have free movement of terrorists...” (quoted in Zaiotti 2011, 63).

The Schengen initiative was not implemented until the early 1990s as a result of the opposition imbued by other European states, such as that of Great Britain, along with (in some cases) opposition by its own members – especially France and the Netherlands (see Zaiotti 2011, 93-94). When Schengen was finally implemented in 1993 (after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht), it marked the creation of an important security institution, the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS made available an information-sharing platform between the Schengen member states, in which information would be contributed through a network of national databases into one central database. This data ranges from information shared on persons “wanted for arrest or extradition; third country nationals to be refused entry” to “persons wanted for discreet surveillance or specific checks” (Balzacq 2008, 84). It should be noted however that at the time of implementation, the security externalities offered by the SIS were quite limited, as the only states sharing information through this centralized channel were its five members.

As I have demonstrated, the tension in European security processes between state sovereignty and supranationality was stark in this period, with many European Community members wary of any form of vertical governance or centralization. As hinted at in the previous paragraph, common interests over the creation of a single common market, as well as pockets of intense cooperation and integration such as the Schengen community pushed EC states toward further integration. The creation of the European Union through the Treaty of Maastricht does

not drastically change the nature of this tension in terms of security processes. It does however, become clear that this push and pull has resulted in an incremental cession of sovereignty by many EU members as a result of the deepening security interdependence between them.

4.2.2 The Treaty of Maastricht: 1992-1996

The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht formally established the European Union.²¹ The European Community had been moderately successful at framing the common interests of the states involved on the regional level, but had ultimately lacked success in implementation at the state and national level. One aspect of the transition from Community to Union was to shore up influence at the supranational level in order to create more discipline in the national implementation of EU policies (Marsh and Rees 2012, 43). It aimed to accomplish this by grounding EU policymaking in one of three institutions – or pillars – each one striking a balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Each pillar along with their dominant form of governance is displayed in Table 1.

The Three Pillars

First Pillar	European Community	Supranational
Second Pillar	Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	Intergovernmental
Third Pillar	Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)	Intergovernmental

Table 4.1. The three pillars created by the Treaty of Maastricht, their names, and their mode of cooperation.

The issue of terrorism was mentioned only once in the Treaty of Maastricht (Article K1.9), as one of several reasons to justify advancing police cooperation within the EU. This

²¹ Maastricht is sometimes referred to as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).

Article would lay the groundwork for five years of debate surrounding the establishment of Europol. In the meantime, TREVI was dissolved and its responsibilities were subsumed into the Third Pillar. The EU's counterterrorism approach however, was not completely enshrined in the JHA. As Utterström points out, "there is formally no independent counterterrorism policy area within the EU but instead a number of policies and arrangements linked to different policy areas, sectors, and pillars" (2009, 153). In light of this, EU counterterrorism processes in the three pillar system are difficult to disentangle. What follows is an assessment of two aspects of counterterrorism most important for our purposes, information sharing and border protection.

Though the primary form of cooperation under the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar was intergovernmental and states were not bound to provide information to the institution, the incorporation of TREVI into the JHA is noteworthy, considering that this provided a credible recognition of the use of the database and its resources. As Friedrichs notes, "over the 1990s, the EU had probably become the geographical and institutional framework in which the exchange of antiterrorist intelligence had reached the highest level of interstate and interagency cooperation" (2008, 75). Though this is undoubtedly the case, the EU continued to struggle with issues of sovereignty, threatened by these informal advances in information exchange.²²

Establishing a formal mechanism for the carrying out of TREVI's responsibilities, however, proved difficult. While Germany remained a staunch supporter for the formation of Europol as a clearinghouse for police information exchange, the rest of Europe remained wary of giving the organization too many responsibilities. Indeed, "even the range of issues that Europol should deal with remained highly contentious" (Bossong 2013, 29). Upon its formal

²² This makes sense when we consider that of the four strands of EU policies on counterterrorism (prevention of radicalization, information sharing, border management, and critical infrastructure protection) information sharing is of the highest importance to member states (Balzacq 2008). Information sharing is of particular importance during the Maastricht period, since the doctrines supporting the prevention of radicalization and critical infrastructure protection had yet to be created.

establishment in 1998 Europol had created some tentative links with the Terrorism Working Group (TWG), but would remain on the periphery of European counterterrorism processes until the turn of the century. In fact, until the Treaty of Amsterdam (discussed in the next section), the use of information exchange would remain relegated to small pockets of cooperation between EU member states. Even Spain's 1995 initiative fell flat with the La Gomera decision that should not have been controversial, as it only attempted to emphasize items that had been on the European counterterrorism agenda since the 1970s.

Real inroads in counterterrorism throughout the 1990s were made in the area of border cooperation, sparked by the signing and ratification of the Schengen area. As Deflem makes clear, "the Europeanization of international counterterrorism policing is not surprising as the disappearance of Europe's internal borders with European unification was the primary motivating factor in developing enhanced police cooperation" (2006, 354). The creation of the European internal frontiers through the Schengen process also is of particular importance to this sovereignty-supranational tension in the evolution of the EU. The external borders of the EU were no longer purely national, as they had been before Schengen. In order to monitor these external borders and internal frontiers, the Schengen Commission created the Schengen Information System (SIS), a centralized database for the exchange of information on persons and property of interest moving between the member states. Zaiotti notes that "the security field is not shaped by a master plan, but rather defined by the unintended consequences of these actors' practices" (2011, 12). This is especially true in terms of EU counterterrorism processes. It has even been argued that the relative independence provided to policing units by their national governments made it possible to advance cross-border cooperation, breaking down national barriers that were previously in place (Deflem 2006, 338).

While Schengen was not initiated to deal specifically with terrorism (and as noted above was opposed by the United Kingdom who accused the system of encouraging terrorism), its method of information exchange proved to be effective in its use among its members. Its importance to counterterrorism processes in Europe became readily apparent in the years following the events of September 11, but it could not be ignored that the JHA's mission of "fostering common internal security measures and the free movement of people within EU borders" (Archick 2002, 1) was suspiciously well-prepared for the integration of Schengen once it expanded to encompass the entirety of the European member states.

The early and mid-1990s marked a slow and steady movement toward European integration and the supranational delegation of counterterrorism responsibility. Never completely realizing these ideal points, it was not the processes themselves that shifted, but rather the foundation on which they stood that was transformed. This is of primary importance in considering that what happened next was a rapid expansion of the EUs involvement in counterterrorism within the RSC. This supranational expansion occurs in fits and starts during times of international and European crises, and is ordinarily met later with backlash, culminating in state attempts to regain sovereignty and national counterterrorism responsibility.

4.2.3 The Treaty of Amsterdam: 1997-2006

The Treaty of Amsterdam was the first significant move to amend the European Union and pushed member states to cede national powers to the institution, including legislation on criminal matters, immigration, and foreign and security policies. Indeed, "the integration processes in matters of internal security took full shape with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1998" (Bossong 2013, 36). One specific development that took place within the treaty was the transformation of the

European Commission into an agenda-setter in internal security processes, and in turn aspects of European counterterrorism laws and practices. It is important to mention here that prior to Amsterdam, member states of the European Union possessed the sole authority for agenda setting in security processes. As shown in previous sections, TREVI began as an initiative put forward by West Germany and Great Britain, the Schengen area the brainchild of Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and the La Gomera decision driven by Spain. The Commission had little, if anything, to do with these initiatives.

In terms of the RPSF, prior to Amsterdam, the multipolar structure of the European RSC generated pockets of cooperation among regional powers and specific groups of followers (TREVI, Schengen, PWGOT, the Vienna Group, etc.). This is consistent with Waever's conclusion that "Europeaness" is contingent on particular national contexts, which serve as a lens by which the concept is defined (2000, 263). As Neal echoes, it is "problematic to assume there is a unified 'public sphere' in national discursive contexts" (2009, 337). The introduction of the European Commission as a regional "actor," however, initiated a shift in these contexts by introducing a point of convergence. From here on, the European Commission would serve as a consensus-based "European voice" in the supranational policymaking process, one in which the interests of each member state ostensibly maintain equal consideration. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to identify the exact date and time at which point the European RSC moved into the delegation stage, but certainly a good argument can be made for the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The Tampere Program in 1999 took advantage of the new EU responsibilities adopted through Amsterdam. While Maastricht was intended to utilize the Community to push states to implement European policy at the national level, it was relatively ineffective at doing so. One

aspect of the Tampere Program was to carry forward this ambition by setting policy guidelines, as well as helping states improve domestic security through technical and legal assistance (Marsh and Rees 2012, 22). More importantly, the Tampere agenda created the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), a collection of policies spanning the areas of police and judicial cooperation, criminal intelligence, and border control (Utterström 2009, 141). This advancement marked the most significant push to create a European judicial area since the unpopular French initiative in the late-1970s, laying the foundation for the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).

The creation of the AFSJ targeted a wide variety of security issues, but September 11 (followed later by the attack on Madrid and the bombings in London) elevated terrorism to priority number one in the European Union. As intimated above, possibly the most significant development that arose in the wake of September 11 was the signing of the EAW, which required “the quasi-automatic acceptance of judicial rulings passed by other states” (Bossong 2013, 47) through the principle of mutual recognition. Officially released in June of 2002, it would be misleading to suggest that the EAW was entirely a supranational project that could not have been implemented without the Treaty of Amsterdam. In fact, three of Europe’s regional powers (with the exception of France and Italy) were committed to enacting the EAW, and the United Kingdom in particular was adamant about expanding the boundaries of the mechanism far beyond the borders of the EU and the Schengen area (this expansion of course, did not take place; see Friedrichs 2008; also Van de Linde et al. 2002). It should also be noted that not all states implemented the EAW immediately, and some placed “scrutiny reserves” on it within less than three months after its passage (Bossong 2008, 39). In the end, it took until 2005 for all member states to fully implement the mechanism. One caveat to this slow implementation however, is the widespread usage of the EAW throughout the EU. “By September 2004, 2,603

warrants were already issued, 653 persons arrested and 104 persons surrendered” (Lavenex 2007, 773).

Around the turn of the century, it became evident that European expansion was inevitable. The EU had courted ten states over the course of the 1990s, eight of them already considered European, and a plan for the incorporation of these states into EU internal border policy was needed. The Copenhagen European Council in 2002 provided this opportunity, and it was agreed that free movement would be provided for the citizens of the future EU members. There was considerable contention over whether or not this internal incorporation should be immediate, or whether there should be a probationary period (Zaiotti 2011, 170). No consensus was ever reached, with France and Germany on one side in favor of a transition period, and the United Kingdom and Spain joining the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland in supporting immediate liberalization.

At any rate, the members agreed upon accession and there arose the contingent need to ensure the protection of the new EU borders and internal frontiers. This need had been addressed specifically in the Tampere Program agenda, which called for an effective approach to manage Europe’s external borders (see Zaiotti 2011, 163). The border agency, Frontex was established for such a task. The general purpose of Frontex is to facilitate cooperation along borders between member states. It assists in training border guards, establishing common training standards, and provides support to member states in organizing joint operations (see Lugna 2006). Although the extent to which Frontex has been implemented is unclear (Bigo et al. 2012, 13), the organization of the agency is primarily one that emphasizes sovereignty over supranationalism. In this way it is tied closely to Europol, the European police organization that remained during this time effectively impotent without either voluntary information provided by member states or an

invitation by member states to participate in criminal investigations within and across borders. As Neal makes clear, Frontex “is frequently at the behest of the member states, enmeshed in a discourse that aims to signify the drawing of dividing lines” rather than the dissipation of territorial boundaries (2009, 350).

Frontex was actually a compromise coming out of a 2001 dispute between the member states that wished to create a “European Border Police” (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), and the United Kingdom and others that wished to retain state sovereignty over border police operations (see Neal 2009). It should be noted, however, that the United Kingdom was not consistently opposed to all European police and security cooperation and coordination.²³ Throughout the Amsterdam period, the United Kingdom was consistently at the forefront of the development of the EU’s counterterrorism measures. In fact, the UK was instrumental in developing the European Counterterrorism Strategy, which emerged shortly after the London bombings in 2005 (see Coolsaet 2010).

The EU Counterterrorism Strategy is comprehensive, employing the four pillars of prevent, protect, pursue and respond, but its concrete policy proposals were lacking. This was most likely due to the many national initiatives submitted at the request of the United Kingdom in the wake of the London attacks that lacked substance, as well as the increasingly confrontational relationship between the member states and the European Commission (Bossong 2013, 99-100). At its heart, this confrontation emanated from proposals by the UK to be enacted through the JHA and its intergovernmental mode of cooperation, while the Commission

²³ And it had every reason to be invested in effective European counterterrorism measures. During this period two-thirds of UK criminal organizations had connections with terrorist groups (Ridley 2008). The UK’s investment was evident at the national level as well. Between 1997 and 2007, the MI5 budget increased almost 300% (Friedrichs 2009, 81).

supported carrying out similar proposals through the European Community pillar and its supranational orientation.

In this vein, it may be easier to understand why Europol and Frontex operate most regularly on a bilateral basis (Keohane 2005). Not only is this bilateral cooperation a product of national context driving small pockets of cooperation, but it is also because even with the inclusion of the European Commission as an agenda-setting power in Europe, there remains to be any effective constraint that can pull European counterterrorism processes together. In this period we continue to see regional powers competing over policy processes in the counterterrorism arena. For example, Europol did not have a director between June 2004 and February 2005 due to a dispute between France and Germany over which state's national appointee should assume the role (see Keohane 2005).

Division between the powers such as this might attribute to a lack of cohesion in European counterterrorism policy, displayed through failures to implement certain policies during this period. An internal report issued in March 2004 by the EU's foreign and security policy chief noted two other shortfalls in addition to implementation issues, so the institution lacked the resources to play a meaningful role in counterterrorism processes, and EU officials working on law enforcement and defense policies were not adequately coordinating with one another (cited in Keohane 2005, 18).

In 2004, the Hague Program replaced the Tampere Program as the dominant policy framework on internal security. While Hague attempted to deepen Europe-wide cooperation on counterterrorism, it nonetheless continued to emphasize the importance of taking action at the national level (Schroeder 2008, 43). This, in addition to the failures mentioned above, meant that member states were falling back on historic and geographic pockets of counterterrorism

cooperation. This becomes evident in considering the popularity of the G6 and the Situation Centre (SitCen) among larger EU member states.

The G6 arose amid a frustration among the European powers with lengthy bureaucratic processes (Lavenex and Wallace 2005, 466). Originally composed of the five European regional powers (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), the G5²⁴ was initiated in part by French President Sarkozy as a forum for the interior ministers of the member states to hold regular meetings. This was by and large an effort to increase the influence of the major states in the security policymaking environment (Bossong 2013, 68). This pocket of cooperation was moderately productive in its early stages, setting up a common watch list of suspected terrorists (Dittrich 2005) as well as standardizing two biometric indicators in the members' passports (Liberatore 2005). Additionally, European counterterrorism experts are not shy about attributing an overwhelming influence to the G6 in terms of driving cooperation between national intelligence services (see Keohane 2008).

As with the G6, not all member states are allowed to participate in SitCen.²⁵ Continuing to endorse the principles espoused under Schengen, SitCen takes on an air of functionalism in its membership determining the states with which it chooses to cooperate, painting its cooperative decisions as pragmatically based on the approval of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Indeed, the department began “as an insiders’ club that influenced the choice of which other services should be invited to participate” (Muller-Wille 2008, 62). In light of this, the department in relation to the EU begins to look almost like a gated community within a gated community. Certainly, effectiveness of the department likely depends on the ability of the members within it

²⁴ The group was renamed the G6 with the addition of Poland.

²⁵ SitCen is composed of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary.

to trust one another in providing sensitive information on security matters. It is also the case however, that forums such as this one serve as mechanisms used by the regional powers to maintain sovereignty within the supranational umbrella of the EU, and with it drive the security processes of the larger institution in the direction of the interests of those particular member states.²⁶

While the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced new supranational measures into the EU, such as the institutionalization of the European Commission this period nevertheless saw member states falling back on small pockets of cooperation, as well as the regional powers asserting their influence through their own cooperative mechanisms. The European Commission does not seem to be considered for membership in these pockets or mechanisms, and thus is rendered relatively ineffective at pooling European counterterrorism cooperation at the supranational level. Nevertheless, the newfound responsibilities of the Commission provided a European-wide lens through which to view counterterrorism processes, as well as the future possibility of the European Union taking on a certain “actor-ness.” This is of particular importance as we move into the present period of European integration marked by the Treaty of Lisbon and the dissolution of the three-pillar system.

4.2.4 The Treaty of Lisbon: 2007-

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU members in December 2007, and became effective in December 2009.²⁷ Lisbon amended both the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Maastricht by changing the structure of the EU in three significant ways with regards to

²⁶ The caveat here is that these interests do not always overlap, and often compete in other forums.

²⁷ December 2009 marked the beginning of the transitional period of Lisbon, which would be finalized in December 2014.

counterterrorism policy. First, the Solidarity Clause initiated after the Madrid bombings in 2004 was formally adopted, as EU member states committed to mutual assistance during and in the aftermath of serious attacks. Second, Lisbon abolished the three-pillar system of EU policymaking. Finally, the treaty created COSI, an integrated internal security committee to address implementation issues in counterterrorism policies across the European landscape (Bossong 2013, 116).

The formalization of the Solidarity Clause through Lisbon reflected the institutionalization of security interdependence in the EU. Prior to this, it would have been difficult to refer to the EU as a collective security organization in terms of non-traditional security threats, as states eschewed the mirroring of each other's policies. Somewhat surprisingly, the states one might expect to have adopted similar counterterrorism policies upon their accession to the EU over the past decade are the ones that possess the widest variety policy measures and tools (Norstehdt and Hansén 2010, 205). Nonetheless, a formal European-wide recognition of the web of security interdependence across the RSC is important in and of itself, as it places an impetus on the EU as the primary organization to deal with negative security externalities created by member states.

In the counterterrorism arena, the abolition of the three-pillar system is of particular importance, encapsulated by the decision to subsume the JHA under the European Community model. This move shifted the JHA from the intergovernmental mode to the supranational mode of policymaking and governance. The importance of this becomes clear when we consider it in light of the third development, the creation of COSI, an integrated internal security community that effectively "standardized the decision-making procedure" for EU legislation (Argomaniz 2010, 87). Frisell argues that the Treaty of Lisbon was a direct response to the lack of movement

by member states in implementing EU agreements on counterterrorism (2009, 34). Not only was police and judicial cooperation now within the purview of both member states as well as the larger EU body, but by subsuming JHA under the Community model, Lisbon granted the European Commission the right of initiative directly concerning police and judicial affairs (see Marsh and Rees 2012). This, coupled with the transfer of the JHA to the supranational level of policymaking provided an enforcement power to the Commission, taking the Treaty of Amsterdam a step further in limiting state sovereignty over EU policy implementation and thus reducing member states' ability to block Commission proposals (Bigo et al. 2015). The end of the transitional period in 2014 marked the "shifting of supervision on compliance and faithful implementation of EU law...from domestic authorities to EU institutional instances" (Mitsilegas, Carrera and Eisele 2014, 5).

The European Commission went right to work, initiating the second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) that began operation in 2013. The purpose of the SIS II was to integrate the EAW into its processes, as well as to increase the functionalities of the system. This included allowing for added biometric identifications, and new types of alerts to be shared between member states (European Commission 2013). More recently, the Commission has called for an update to the Passenger Name Record (PNR) system, and is currently working on a number of new aviation-security proposals (see Bigo et al. 2015). This is not to mention less formalized initiatives the Commission has taken up, including a call for member states to improve coordination with Europol and Eurojust in cross-border investigations, and proposing updates to the EU's "smart border" package (see Bigo et al. 2015). Part of this influx of new policy measures was in response to the Paris attacks in November 2015, and the fact that a vast majority of them came from this supranational body is significant.

This liberalization of the enforcement powers of the EU, however, was not a total and complete coup for proponents of European supranationalism. European counterterrorism policy lacked its own unitary arm within the EU, and thus remained scattered throughout various policy measures and instruments. The Lisbon Treaty addresses the nature of this directly, stating that “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks...all of these may contribute to the fight against terrorism” (cited in Marsh and Rees 2012, 43). It is arguably the case as well that Lisbon never would have been signed and ratified by EU member states without the inclusion of a sovereignty clause in the document. This clause stresses the importance of national identities to the EU and its duty to preserve them and “their essential state functions” (Frisell 2009, 24).

Additionally, the newfound role of the European Commission in internal security matters did not deter regional powers from seeking influence in this area of interest. Following a foiled counterterrorism plot in Germany, several member states were designated as “leaders” on different aspects of the counterterrorism agenda. Germany became the lead European country on internet monitoring with its “check-the-web” program. The United Kingdom along with the Netherlands set up an informal committee to tackle the problem of radicalization in Europe. Spain and France disseminated a handbook on the public training of Imams, which as of 2013 was still classified (Bossong 2013, 113-114). In terms of the RPSF and the leadership role, these programs highlighted the initiatives of the European regional powers as well as other member states, but lacked institution development, as the German “check-the-web” program was the only initiative that persisted into recent years (115).

Could the exception of the German program and the persistence of its role as a lead country in internet monitoring for the prevention of terrorism highlight its concomitant role as

the primary leader in European counterterrorism processes? It is possible, but this one instance obviously is not an overabundance of evidence. And what of the European Commission, and its responsibility as the supranational body that designated these projects to these lead countries? The progression from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty of Lisbon underlines the transformation of EU counterterrorism processes from an intergovernmental mode of cooperation to an increasingly supranational mode. The transference of the third pillar under the European Community complicates leadership identification through the use of the RPSF in terms of recognition processes. This requires that we dig deeper into European institutional processes.

I label this move from intergovernmental to supranational governance as the democratization of leadership – generating the delegation stage of regional leadership. There are two possibilities for leadership designation within this final stage. First, the EU as an institution may take on the role of a policy actor, effectively driving policy within the RSC as a supranational body, independent of any high levels of state influence. Given the sustained importance of sovereignty in the EU, this seems unlikely. Thus, one is led to expect a second possibility, that states are utilizing institutional loopholes through which they might guide and influence European security policy. As I demonstrate in the following sections, the reality is most likely somewhere in between. I first discuss how traditional conceptions of state leadership have failed in the European Council. I then discuss whether or not this means that the EU has arisen as the primary actor in the European RSC. Finally, I demonstrate of how member states influence and guide policy in the EU through the use of the rapporteur in the European Parliament.

4.3 The Democratization of Leadership

This dissertation uses the RPSF to demonstrate the role that regional powers play in creating and maintaining regional security orders. The Central Eurasian case application (Chapter Three) complicates this framework by highlighting the role of institutions in both creating and challenging recognizable regional boundaries. The all-encompassing role of the EU in shaping the European security order further complicates the purpose of the RPSF. The Lisbon Treaty did not wholly complete the move in the EU from intergovernmentalism toward supranational policymaking. While there is some want in the literature to describe the EU as its own policy actor (see, for example, Soetendorp 1994; Larsen 2002; Hettne and Soderbaum 2005; Seeberg 2009), empirical evidence to the contrary is abundant.

Mackenzie et al. (2013) establish useful criteria for observing “actorness” in governing units as being composed of: capacity, initiative, legitimacy, autonomy, cohesion, and recognition. While the EU has attained the capacity to set agendas, the initiative to propose policies, as well as the legitimacy to do so, it lacks the key components of autonomy, cohesion, and recognition. As the EU becomes a more cohesive unit in enacting and implementing security measures and policy, however, scholars using the RPSF as an explanatory tool will be required to shift their understanding of the role of regional powers in the delegation stage of leadership. Primarily, the EU has “difficulties of speaking with a common voice...not only due to the integration of new member states” but as we have seen, a problem affecting the core of Europe and evident in security policy rifts between the regional powers as well (Beyer 2008, 302). As integration progresses and these rifts become less apparent, treating RSCs as composite polities (as in Chapter Three), rather than collections of sovereign states might yield better understandings of security processes and interactions within them.

This last point is of particular importance, as it highlights the nature of states as the primary units of organization in the EU by which policy is proposed, enacted, and implemented. Certainly, the role of the European Commission hinders our ability to directly observe this at the level of the Parliament. In the post-Lisbon era, state initiatives and proposals have been more easily observed at the level of the European Council, where the member states meet, discuss, and deliberate over the EU agenda (see, for example, Bossong 2013). As the following section suggests, even the European Council provides an inadequate forum to assess regional power influence, as its open process reflects egalitarian elements of the delegation stage.²⁸

4.3.1 An Ineffective European Council

The title of this section may be a little misleading, since the European Council has seen many policy successes since its conception. The Tampere, Hague, and Stockholm internal security frameworks discussed above all were initiated and formed in the Council. The fact that the principle of mutual recognition in the judicial area within the Tampere Program came out of Council meetings in 1999 is in and of itself a success for the body (see Lavenex 2007). The EU Action Plan on Terrorism, as well as the Terrorism Roadmap following the terrorist attacks on September 11 were also generated through discussions within European Council meetings (see Bossong 2013).

These multilateral successes are consistent with the expectations of the RPSF, which anticipates a certain level of institutional integration to be present for a successful, goal-oriented multilateral process to take place. Simultaneously, this process is internally (that is, domestically) driven (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 183), and for regional powers looking

²⁸ This is not to say that regional power influence may not still play a factor at the level of the European Council. It is rather the parliamentary procedure of the Council that impedes outside observation of that influence.

to shore up and exert influence on security processes throughout the RSC, this creates difficulties. Ironically, if on any national level European security policy implementation fails, regional powers may be “less likely to view multilateral options as viable alternatives” (183) and “might have an additional incentive to pursue initiatives unilaterally with the notion that their neighbors will follow their lead” (190).

Here we see why the tension between intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism in the EU is critical to understanding regional power behavior in the organization. While regional powers may use intergovernmental multilateralism to achieve their ends through co-opting other RSC members, it becomes much more difficult to do so under the auspices of a supranational body. Since sovereignty is the primary mechanism by which states exercise security policy, national boundaries are hardened in discussions of security. We see this play out in the shortcomings of dialogue bodies such as the European Council.

Such shortcomings are potentially due to the “gated communities within gated communities” phenomenon mentioned earlier. One reason for the G5 (later the G6), for example, was to create a platform for the larger European countries to meet and organize a unified message and policy position prior to Council meetings. Over time, it became evident as well that bilateral agreements initiated in the G6 were made with the intention of expanding them to the level of the EU (Lavenex and Wallace 2005, 466). This is not to say that these “minilateral” forums always successful, often being thwarted by the precedence of national counterterrorism policy or intensifying bilateral cooperation in Europe’s fight against terrorism (see Bossong 2013, 85).

Suffice it to say, securitization around the terrorism issue-area is relatively disjointed throughout Europe. Larger states, especially those with a history of terrorism – the United

Kingdom, Spain, and France - were quicker to highlight the necessity for a European-wide counterterrorism framework than others. Prior to Lisbon this was certainly the case, as states unlike those mentioned above, and relatively unfamiliar with extremism, could not develop proposals that garnered Europe-wide support. Even in the wake of Maastricht, Germany's proposal to strengthen the role of Europol in fighting terrorism faced considerable skepticism. This level of skepticism declined over time specifically related to Europol, but as mentioned, contestation between Spain, Italy, Germany, and France over who's national should serve as director in 2004, left the position unfilled until the following year (Deflem 2006, 348).

There is a question whether or not the interests of the regional powers can be translated to the whole (see Toje 2005), and the disunity from which this question arises follows Europe into the Lisbon era. In terms of framing the European terrorist threat, Monar notes that there is "clearly a divide between the definition of the common threat that the EU has arrived at and the threat perceptions behind it, which remain largely national in character" (2007, 302). And while the pragmatism of the Terrorism Roadmap might explain why the smaller, newly accessioned states did not immediately converge with the larger core of Europe on counterterrorism policy measures between 2001 and 2006 (see Bossong 2008), it is likely due just as much to the incoherence throughout the EU with regards to this security threat (see Norstehdt and Hansén 2010).

Largely, the success of the European Council adopting cohesive counterterrorism frameworks and measures has been one very much tied to crisis exploitation. Boin, Hart, and McConnell explain that terrorist events and crises "open up political space for actors inside and outside government to redefine issues, propose policy innovations and organizational reforms" (2008, 82). While the authors also note that crises are not a sufficient condition for

counterterrorism policy change, Bossong's comprehensive study of the evolution of European counterterrorism processes reveals that much of the counterterrorism policy work was accomplished in the aftermath of major attacks and crises (2013). Outside of this context, we continually see that when comprehensive counterterrorism policy proposals face off with more moderate ones, it is the latter that receives the most broad-based support (73-91). These conservative watered down policies have largely had the effect of member states breaking toward "a lowest common denominator approach" to counterterrorism in Europe (Schroeder 2012, 52), and the supranational governance mode enacted in this area by the Lisbon Treaty will not self-correct this tendency.

What it has done by granting the Commission the power of the initiative and repealing the state unanimity voting requirement is make it more difficult for states to block legislation and agendas outside of their interests. Frisell predicts that in response to this we will see members becoming "more proactive" in order to "influence proposals already in the initiative phase" (2009, 34). Indeed, this is exactly the trend that we see in observing the influence of the nationality of rapporteurs in the European legislative process. The rapporteur allocation process presents a unique avenue for exploring regional power recognition processes in the European Union. Furthermore, I argue that these trends might indicate that regional powers push the RSC as a whole to internalize their national security agendas through the use of the institutional influence carried by the rapporteur in guiding proposals through the legislative process.

4.4 Rapporteurs and the Delegation of Leadership in the EU

4.4.1 The EU Legislative Process and the Role of the Rapporteur

The evolution of the EU legislative process – specifically the bargaining power of the European Parliament - follows a similar trajectory as the development of the institution in its entirety, so that it need only be briefly addressed here.²⁹ Prior to Maastricht, the EP was sidelined to a peripheral role, serving only as a consultative body, with no real power over the agenda or specific EU measure. While the Council and Commission were required to wait for the EP to put forward its commentary on measures moving through the institution, these proposals held no weight past simple recommendations. The ability of the EP to accept, reject, or amend the Council's common position on legislative measures in a "second reading" was given through the Single European Act in 1987. The act greatly increased the influence of the EP over legislation, but allowed the Council to overrule any rejection or amendment by unanimous action.

The Treaty of Maastricht granted further influence to the EP by adding a third reading to measures moving through the institution. If no agreement between the Parliament and the Council is reached after the second reading, a conciliation committee is formed to reconcile the positions of the bodies and reach an agreement on the measure. After this third reading, the Parliament loses much of its power in that no further amendments are allowed. Many scholars argue, however, that the Maastricht era was one in which the EP had its highest influence over measures moving through the EU (Häge 2011b), since Amsterdam repealed the ability of the Parliament to accept a second position presented by the Council in the event of a failed conciliation committee. Either way, there exists a general consensus among scholars that the

²⁹ Häge (2011b) provides a much better narrative of these developments.

developments charted by Maastrich and Amsterdam greatly enhanced the influence of the Parliament on the EU policymaking process.

The passage of the Lisbon Treaty preceded an increase in the number of informal trilogues allowed by the co-decision procedure of Amsterdam, in which representatives from the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council negotiate privately to try and find an early agreement between all parties on certain measures. The EP representative, the rapporteur, plays an important part in outlining the position of the parliament on the policy proposal under review, and selling that position to the Council and Commission in the first reading. When the two bodies approve of the EP's amendments in this reading, an early agreement is reached. The co-decision procedure and granting of early agreements demonstrate in part the importance of the rapporteur in pushing the policy positions adopted by the EP and framed by the rapporteur.

As one Irish member of the European Parliament put it bluntly, “the most influen[tial] member on legislation is the rapporteur” (cited in Yoshinaka et al. 2010: 457). While debatable, many scholars consider the role of the rapporteur as the most important leadership role held by any member of the European Parliament (MEP) in their respective committee (Benedetto 2005; Farrell and Heritier 2004; Hausemer 2006; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; Lindberg et al. 2008; Costello and Thompson 2010, 2011). When the European Commission or Council initiates a proposal, it is then referred to a committee of the Parliament, which in turn appoints a rapporteur to usher the bill through the European legislative process. The rapporteur then sits down with the proposal to prepare a report on it, detailing the stance of the Parliament in regards to the proposal. The first reading then involves the presentation of that report to the Parliament (which has the opportunity to amend the report), Commission, and Council. The Council then has the opportunity to either approve the EP's version of the proposal, ending in an early agreement, or

reject the proposal, sending it back to the Parliament for appropriate changes. A second reading takes place after the proposal has again made its way through the EP, and the same process is revisited. If no agreement is made between the bodies after the third reading, then as mentioned above, a conciliation committee is formed, of which the rapporteur is always apart (Kaeding 2005). Effectively, if no agreement is made in the conciliation committee, this is where the involvement and influence of the rapporteur comes to an end.

The rise of informal trilogues after the Lisbon Treaty seem to have affected the influence of the rapporteur to some extent, although it is difficult to determine whether, in what direction, and to what extent this is the case (Brandsma 2015). Either way, the rapporteur continues to maintain an agenda setting and framing power that is unrivaled in the European Parliament, due to its role in constructing the position of the Parliament on individual pieces of legislation. As Benedetto explains, “rapporteurs are the most powerful of parliamentarians in terms of influencing the content of legislative outcomes” (2005, 85). Keeping this in mind, a brief discussion of how rapporteurships are allocated is in order before proceeding.

There exists no procedural rule for how EP committees are to assign members to rapporteurships to legislation and measures referred to the committee. What does exist is a complex bidding system that allocates points to European parties based on member size in either the Parliament or the committee. These points are then used in an auction-like manner in which various party members on the committee, tender points to have their party member granted the rapporteur assignment. Once spent, all political groups are allocated more points according to the formula above (see Benedetto 2005).

A host of theories about the black box of this process have been put forward. Yoshinaka et al. (2010) contends that rapporteurships are allocated based on the relevant policy experience

and specialization of the MEP involved. Hoyland (2006) on the other hand, argues that rapporteur assignment is influenced primarily by whether or not the MEP is a member of his or her governing national party, since these MEPs are better connected to their own national assembly's power structure (see also, Kreppel 2002). The contrasting nature of these trends may give the appearance that the allocation process is either random or effectively egalitarian. This is not necessarily the case. As one study in particular demonstrates, rapporteur appointments are highly disproportional across EU member states, and this disproportionality is linked to the relative interest of those states in specific legislation issue-types (Kaeding 2005). Given the argument of this dissertation, we should expect that European regional leaders would take the helm of security processes within the EU. The data below supports this suggestion, as rapporteurs from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain make up over half of those appointed to usher proposals dealing directly with security issues through the policymaking process. Rapporteurs from Germany alone make up over 16% of that number (see Figure 3).

Such a pattern of behavior presents an opportunity to empirically test the validity of a few claims about the importance of rapporteurs to the policy making process. In particular, one can evaluate the idea of rapporteurs as agents of national preferences, particularly for regional powers in driving supranational agendas. I continue then with the development of a few hypotheses on rapporteur impact, followed by a discussion on how I test for these impacts through data taken from the European Policy Making Dataset (Häge 2011). I look specifically at the effect of rapporteurs of German, French, and English nationality on the likelihood of obtaining the co-decision procedure for their assigned proposal, that proposal being granted approval by the Council, and whether or not amendments are made to the proposal in the Parliament.

Given the high percentage of rapporteur appointments coming from the larger countries, Costello and Thompson indicate that rapporteur nationality may have a substantial affect on early agreements between the EP, Commission, and Council (2010, 230). This suggestion reflects the position of this study that nationality matters in determining rapporteur success after appointment. This might be explained by the close contact that rapporteurs have with their nation-state, as “national representations hold regular high-level meetings with their MEPs and provide written briefings on current issues” (citing Corbett et al. 2003, 280; Costello and Thompson 2010, 224). If this is the case, then rapporteurs are more likely to be seen as agents of their state than of their party. In turn, whether or not the Council and Commission grant the co-decision procedure, allowing for the possibility of reaching an early agreement, might depend on their esteem for the state being represented by the rapporteur.

Hypothesis 1. *Rapporteur nationality will have a direct impact on whether or not a proposal follows the co-decision procedure.*

One vital aspect of the co-decision procedure is the ability of rapporteurs to hold influence over the Council’s decision of approval in the first reading. That is, if rapporteur nationality is of any importance to the EU legislative process, it should have direct influence over whether or not an early agreement is reached by the rapporteur with select members of the Council and Commission.

Hypothesis 2. *Rapporteur nationality will have a direct impact on whether or not a proposal is approved by the Council in the first reading.*

Opposite of the co-decision procedure, the consultation procedure greatly restricts the power of the EP, only allowing it to present non-binding opinions coinciding with the Council’s adoption or rejection of the proposal. Co-decision allows for more than a single reading of the

proposal, and grants both amendment and veto rights to the Parliament. In these terms, through a co-decision process, states (regional powers in particular) might maintain more control over the EU policymaking process, and the rapporteur direct control over the language used in the legislative proposals. In this sense, we might expect that when the co-decision procedure is followed, rapporteurs of certain nationalities should be more successful at ushering their assigned security legislation through the EP with no amendments.

Hypothesis 3. *Rapporteur nationality will have a direct impact over whether or not amendments to the proposal are advanced.*

Again, I argue that this trend might reflect leadership recognition processes in the delegation stage, which are ostensibly channeled through legitimate institutional processes that allow regional powers to maintain sovereignty in a supranational area, and in turn drive the RSC's security processes, and thus the behavior of their neighbors. If there is any time in which processes of recognition-based leadership come into play in EU security policymaking, the adjudication of which procedure should be used – consultation or co-decision – is likely a key stage. If security is the paramount concern for states, then we should expect that security proposals within the EU are highly salient.

Simultaneously, however, in light of this chapter's discussion on European sovereignty and autonomy over national security processes, we might expect that the salience of EU security proposals cause them to have the opposite effect, detracting from the influence over policy held by the rapporteur, and decreasing the likelihood of any agreement between the Council, Commission, and Parliament. In fact, there could even be an effect present in the use of the rapporteur by certain states to kill proposals that may detract from their national security autonomy. This suggests two competing possibilities for the effect of rapporteurs' success over security legislation.

Hypothesis 4. *Rapporteur nationality will have a positive impact on the likelihood that security proposals are approved in the Council's first reading.*

Hypothesis 5. *Rapporteur nationality will have a negative impact on the likelihood that security proposals are approved in the Council's first reading.*

4.4.2 Data Collection and Variable Description

The large proportion of the data utilized for this analysis was taken from Häge's European Union Policy-Making dataset, or EUPOL (2011b). The EUPOL dataset is a compilation of the European Commission's online Prelex database, set up to monitor the EU decision making process along with the interactions between the Council, Commission, and Parliament. From the larger dataset, 3,930 observations of EU proposals taking place between 1990 and 2014 were extracted. All observations follow either the co-decision or consultation procedure, as these are the two most popular routes that proposals take. The hypotheses outlined above call for three dependent variables, all taken directly from the EUPOL dataset. They are (1) whether or not the proposal is determined to follow the co-decision procedure upon its introduction, (2) the success of the proposal in obtaining Council approval upon the first reading, and (3) whether or not the EP amended each proposal. The extracted data also contain relevant variables describing the year in which the proposal underwent review, the title of each proposal, and to which committee each proposal was assigned, as well as rapporteurs appointed to usher each proposal through the process.

After extracting these data, I cross-referenced the primary rapporteurs on each proposal with the online directory for the European Parliament, recording the nationality and European party represented by each listed rapporteur. In the interest of efficiency, when rapporteurs had been members of multiple parties over the past three decades, the most recent of the parties was

assigned. While offering less precise information about specific party interests over particular proposals, a large amount of variation in European parties remains in the dataset. It is likely, therefore, that inferred trends in party influence over proposals success in the policy process would remain with the inclusion of more precise party assignments.

Outside of the nationality of the rapporteur, the other key variable involved in explaining procedural routes and amendment outcomes in the EU policy process is the nature of the proposal assigned to the rapporteur. This chapter has focused on counterterrorism practices within the EU but unfortunately, concentrating on EU proposals dealing with counterterrorism greatly limited the number of observations and explanatory power of the data. As an incomplete remedy, I focus on security proposals in general. Because there is no single EU committee to deal with security issues, the creation of the security variable required a combination of two procedures. I first conducted searches within proposal titles possessing certain keywords related to security. Of course, this was not a comprehensive method, and in the number of proposals remaining I addressed each title, determining on a case-by-case basis whether or not the proposal dealt directly with security issues in the European Union.

It is also important to keep in mind that the salience of security issues to states and regions is directly connected to events in the international system. For this reason I created a dummy variable to control for security policy proposals put forward in the years of 2001, 2004, 2005, and 2011. The latter three are years in which significant terrorist events occurred in Europe: the Madrid bombing in 2004, the 7/7 bombing in London in 2005, and the Oslo bombing in 2011. The attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. in 2001 - while not occurring in Europe - are particularly relevant to EU policy proposals. It was after this that the United States began to push its Western partners to cooperate in its fight against terrorism, and in many ways

the EU obliged. The dichotomous variable *Terror Year* was created by noting proposals that were initiated in the months of the year following the month of the attack. Additionally, as the co-decision procedure greatly increased in popularity following the passage of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, a dummy variable, *Lisbon*, was created identifying proposals that took place during the years of the Lisbon period.

It remains my contention that rapporteur nationality will hold influence over what route a proposal takes through the European Parliament, and the decision of the Council in the first reading upon a co-decision procedure, as well as in terms of whether the Parliament decided to make revisions to the proposal (H₁₋₃). If regional leadership recognition processes have shifted toward the rapporteur procedure, then this shift should be most evident when the proposal is directly tied to European security processes. Security is the paramount concern for states, and so rapporteur nationality on security proposals in the EU should have an overwhelming influence on the procedural route of a proposal. As mentioned above however, the continued supremacy of state sovereignty in Europe might suggest that rapporteurs as ambassadors of their nations would sabotage proposals providing security responsibilities to the supranational body (H₄₋₅).

4.4.3 Trends in Rapporteur Influence Over EU Proposals and Security Measures

As intimated above, the sample taken from the EUPOL data supports the finding of Kaeding that rapporteur appointments are not assigned proportionately across the membership of the EU (2005). Some nationalities fair better in the appointment process than others, even though the formal appointment process is supposedly contingent first and foremost on the size of the European party. Figure 3 displays the five states with consistently the highest percentage of rapporteur appointments in each of the three periods of the EU described above. Not

surprisingly, as the importance of the role of the rapporteur became apparent with the passage of Lisbon, the proportion of appointments obtained by the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy declined. There are a number of explanations for this, and I would suggest that in part, another explanation is that rapporteur appointments have become more attractive to states as a result of the empowerment of Parliament through the co-decision procedure.




Figure 4.1. An overwhelming number of rapporteur appointments have been obtained in all three EU periods consistently by the four regional powers identified by the RPSF, and Spain.

Estimating the attractiveness of rapporteur appointments, however, is not my intention here. Rather I am merely trying to demonstrate the disproportionate role of the regional powers (identified by the RPSF) along with Spain in this EU policymaking process.

Logistic regression are run to test the hypotheses and examine the relationship between rapporteur nationality and outcomes of EU policymaking. The results of the analysis are

presented in Table 2. Positive relationships identified in the table indicate a relationship in which the independent variable increases the probability of the occurrence of the dependent variable. Models 1, 2, and 3 address the first three hypotheses dealing with the effect of rapporteur nationality on general policy outcomes of co-decision, Council approval in the first reading, and EP amendments to proposals. Models 4 and 5 introduce a security dimension to the dependent variables to determine whether the influence of rapporteur nationality is particular to security policy proposed in the EU.

The results of the significance tests provide mixed results, suggesting that the relationship is perhaps more complicated than EU policies being the simple outcome of leadership perceptions designated to rapporteurs of particular nationalities, especially regarding proposals on European security issues. Of note in particular is the overwhelming influence of the Lisbon period in not only the granting of the co-decision procedure and Council approval, but also on the likelihood of an EP amendment being made to modify the proposal. It is possible to infer from this that the involvement of the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission in EU policymaking has increased since the passage of Lisbon, as similar Maastricht and Amsterdam variables do not achieve the same consistent statistical significance (not shown). This might mark a further move toward regional institutionalization and democratization in Europe. Nevertheless, the limited findings of these models in terms of security should serve as a warning not to overestimate the explanatory value of the support the rapporteur nationality hypotheses do receive in Models 1, 2, and 3.

Model 1 lends support for the first hypothesis, displaying a statistically significant, positive relationship with the likelihood of a policy proposal being granted the co-decision procedure, even when controlling for the importance of security proposals, which has a

statistically significant negative relationship with the likelihood of a co-decision procedure. This suggests that the rapporteur’s nationality holds persuasive power in early meetings with members of the Commission and Council in his or her efforts to achieve the co-decision procedure and place more power with the Parliament (and in turn, the rapporteur) over the final outcome of the legislation.

Table 4.2. Determinants of EU policy-making outcomes: Logistic regression results.

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
	Co- decision	Council Approval	EP Amendment	Co-decision (Security)	Council Approval (Security)
Rapp. Nation	0.271*** (3.61)	0.286** (3.09)	-0.086 (1.18)	-0.224 (0.84)	-0.313 (0.92)
Rapp. Party	-0.004 (0.64)	0.006 (0.87)	0.018** (3.27)	-0.019 (1.04)	-0.031 (1.30)
Terror Year	0.941*** (8.59)	1.093*** (8.89)	-0.838*** (7.30)	0.821** (2.78)	0.641 (1.67)
Lisbon	1.854*** (22.32)	2.252*** (24.19)	-2.078*** (21.11)	1.40*** (5.44)	1.52*** (4.62)
Security Proposal	-0.600*** (3.61)	-0.287 (1.45)	0.205 (1.34)		
X^2	641.72	716.07	688.70	41.48	29.09
PCP	70.76	78.40	65.93	93.94	94.53

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, N = 3,756. Dependent variables are indicated at the top of each column, all are dichotomous. PCP is “percent correctly predicted.”

Likewise, Model 2 shows rapporteur nationality to have a statistically significant positive relationship with Council approval on the first reading of the proposal. This relationship provides support for the second hypothesis. This might support the claim that rapporteurs of certain nationalities are more likely to have a persuading influence over the Council and Commissions

decision of whether to approve of the EP's changes as presented by the rapporteur. Though not a statistically significant relationship, Model 3 continues to support the idea that rapporteur nationality has an influence over the success of proposals, displaying an inverse relationship between the nationality of the rapporteur and the probability of an amendment being placed on the proposal at any point in the legislative process. This is in line with the idea that MEPs are likely to recognize and accord responsibility for proposals to rapporteurs of certain nationalities, lending credit to the idea that regional powers may use institutional loopholes to drive regional policy behavior. Particularly interesting is the positive relationship that a rapporteur's party has on the probability of amendments being proposed to the legislation. Even against the statistical significance of this relationship the impact of a rapporteur's nationality on limiting the probability of an amendment stands among proposals of all issues.

Depicted in Table 2, the introduction of the security dimension to the dependent variables detracts from the rapporteur's influence over the co-decision procedure, and approval in the Council's first reading (Models 4 and 5). The null finding in Model 4 does not permit any support or confirmation of the fourth hypothesis. Model 5 is similar, as it shows no statistically significant relationship between rapporteur nationality and the Council's approval of security proposals in the first reading. Of note, the relationship between rapporteur nationality and the two dependent variables remains positive, allowing us to discount at least partially the likelihood of being able to confirm the fifth hypothesis. There are potentially two explanations for the null results in Models 4 and 5. The first possibility is that the number of observations of security proposals that achieved co-decision is a mere 66 observations, and the number of security proposals approved by the Council in first reading is an even smaller, 40 observations.

Importantly, this limited number of observable implications hampers the usefulness of the results in these cases.

Of course, there is also the potential that security issues are deemed by decision-making parties as too salient to defer to leadership. This second possibility suggests that the proliferation of constituted leaders increases democratic stagnation around highly salient issues in the EU. As mentioned earlier, all states within an RSC that has reached the delegation stage are constituted leaders. For Tucker, constituted leadership is akin to institutional authority (1981, 85), and recognition of the equality of states in the EU policy making process accords each state the ability and opportunity to take a leadership role. While this does not mean that all are able to exert the same level of influence on security processes, it increases the difficulty for states to wield levels of influence that they might otherwise, in a strength-based or hegemonic order. Notably, this is precisely what the EU was designed to do.

Overall, this preliminary test of recognition-based leadership in the European RSC outlines a positive path forward. The significance of rapporteur nationality on the success of policy proposals of varying issues points toward the need for scholars of regional and international security to move towards issue-based studies of regional power influence. While the influence of rapporteur nationality over security issues in the EU policymaking process is revealed as limited by this study, this should not deter further investigations of this process. It is probable that much of the influence by EU members is wielded in the European Council meetings prior to the initiation of security proposals. This requires opening that aperture through a systematic content analysis of documents from Council meetings, ministerial statements, and national statements of support and dissent for proposals dealing directly with European security matters. This empirical analysis presents a first step in that direction.

4.5 Conclusion

Clearly, analyzing regional leadership dimensions at the delegation stage presents several problems for the researcher that are also reflective of the difficulties that the stage presents for regional powers. First, the necessary level of supranational democratization for an RSC to be considered in this stage in turn causes a proliferation of constituted leaders within an RSC. This means that the material capabilities of RSC members are aggregated in such a way as to support European agendas, rather than the agendas of individual states. As we have seen in more salient policy proposals – such as security issues – the delegation of leadership in an RSC reflects the perennial political difficulty of democratic decision-making: stagnation. In addition, the privatization of European policy agendas through institutional initiating bodies such as the European Commission masks the level of influence that individual states hold over policy proposals begun in European Council meetings behind closed doors. In short, regional democratization broadly, and Europeanization specifically, both disrupts regional power influence over security policy behavior in an RSC, as well as masks the role that statism continues to play in regional politics.

We should expect that in attempts to bypass these difficulties, regional powers in the delegation stage seek out and utilize institutional loopholes through which to wield policy influence. Furthermore, I suspect that further investigation will reveal the role of the rapporteur in the EU policymaking process as relatively vulnerable to state exploitation and manipulation, as rapporteurs are likely to be beholden to their country of origin over their European political party (see Costello and Thompson 2010). While further research is necessary to confirm or disconfirm whether national trends in the EU policymaking process are purposefully carried out by certain states, it remains that rapporteurs representing specific states are more likely to

achieve early agreements, as well as obtaining Council approval in the first reading, and finally, ushering a proposal through the Parliament without amendments being introduced to it. This trend points toward certain states being granted a recognized institutional leadership status (although this recognition may be less conscious in these stages or issue areas that permit higher levels of regional democratization) by their peers.

Like the other cases in this study, this chapter has pointed towards a more holistic approach to regional security processes, in which identities, interests, and institutions are analyzed in appropriate historical and relational contexts. The delegation stage of leadership reveals that regional powers in some issue-areas may not always be identified by a simple combination of behavior and capabilities, as the RPSF suggests (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 10). This is important in providing further means of understanding regional transitions from negative to positive peace (see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Perhaps the preservation of institutional loopholes for states to exert political influence over region-wide policy is what keeps the delegation stage from breaking down into traditional great power tactics in strength-based orders with high levels of policy autonomy for regional powers. Indeed, the attainment of such loopholes in regional institutions might not only ensure peaceful conflict management mechanisms will be utilized, but also entice the regional power to participate, furthering rather than threatening the cooperative relationships in place (see Goertz and Powers 2014). Certainly these suggestions overstate the value and attractiveness of institutional loopholes to regional cooperation, but more research is necessary before anything definitive can be confirmed or ruled out.

As evident in the preceding paragraph, this discussion has primarily raised more questions than it has answered. This is particularly the case since the above empirical analysis

did not include the policy stances of states on each piece of legislation. Further investigation of the ability of states to affect EU policy through rapporteurs would need to include the positions that states take on the proposals *before* they exit the Council as initiatives in the EP. Still, the results shown here indicate that the nationality of rapporteurs has a marked effect on the success of policy proposals going through the EU policymaking process. This should be of interest in terms of regional leadership outside of security processes, emphasizing the need to focus on leadership in specific issue areas.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

A recognition-based concept of leadership provides a comprehensive way in which to analyze and explain the interaction that takes place between regional powers and their neighbors within an RSC. It further provides an avenue by which to engage in cross-regional comparisons of the behavior and influence regional powers possess depending on the specific stage of leadership current to their RSC. In this chapter I recount the main argument put forth by the dissertation, as well as some of its key themes and findings. In an attempt to synthesize the moving pieces explored in each chapter of the study, I focus on their connection to the dependent variable – the regional security order. Further, I rely on the three empirical cases within this dissertation to reflect varying contexts in which the level of leadership recognition granted to a regional power predicts specific regional power behavior, as well as leading to particular outcomes.

In these terms, I reiterate the value of appraising the five dimensions of leadership - put forward by the RPSF - through a lens of regional recognition based on specific issues. I start by briefly discussing the contribution that a recognition-based definition of regional leadership makes to the RPSF in general, I then note the importance of approaching regional leadership based on particular issue areas, which taken together over time can be used to analyze the effectiveness of certain regional powers across the board, as well as the extensiveness of their

influence. Finally, I recap the three stages of leadership, and their usefulness for making predictions about regional power behavior and the interactions between states within and outside regional contexts.

5.2 Recognition-based Leadership, the RPSF, and Global Politics at the Regional Level

The RPSF places the onus of the leadership role on the regional power's ability to utilize its five dimensions effectively. Concurrently, Buzan and Waever describe regional powers by their ability to "define the polarity of any given RSC" (2003, 37). Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier go one step further than this, combining regional power behavior and orientation to drive the security order toward particular outcomes: hegemony-based, strength-based, concert-based, integration-based and unordered (2012, 9). There is certainly truth to this, but it is the contention of this dissertation that regional power roles must always be played out in the context of the perspectives of its regional neighbors. That is, this dissertation argues that a conception of regional security orders must not necessarily proceed from the solitary acts of regional powers, but rather from a regional framework consisting of potential subordinates, within which regional powers and those potential subordinates always already move. Not only must a state in order to be a regional leader "behave as one" (69), but also the designation of such roles onto an individual state is contingent on the attitudes and responses by its neighbors within the security complex. As the case of China in Southeast Asia demonstrates, without the recognition by the ASEAN core of China as an "insider," Chinese leadership over security processes in Southeast Asia is prone to falter and remain ineffective.

This can be the case even when regional leadership has been historically effective by the regional power, such as in Central Eurasia. While Russia primarily dominates over security

processes in the strength-based order, its effectiveness in realizing its own security interests in the region is just as contingent on regional recognition. Without the cooperation of Georgia in eliminating Chechen rebels within its territory, Russian unilateral action necessarily opens it to criticisms of illegitimacy in the region, and spurs further dissent and concern across the RSC membership. Furthermore, nowhere is a recognition-based leadership as important as it is in a region undergoing democratization processes and the delegation of authority to and throughout a supranational body. For regional powers to externalize their national policy preferences on the rest of the RSC when leadership roles are dissipated through institutional components, their only avenue by which to do so is through gaining the recognition of their neighbors. Any attempt to do so through outside channels could trigger serious consequences to the supranational infrastructure, the legitimacy of the institution, and the stability of the order.

Additionally, Buzan and Waever together with Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier readily acknowledge that regional powers can be either brought into global politics by great powers (Buzan and Waever 2003, 37), or have their level of influence affected by great power penetration into their regional order (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 222-225). What each author misses in this regional power interaction, however, is the significance of the disposition of smaller states within the regional power's purview toward either that regional power, or an alternative great power external to the region. The US' heavy penetration into the counterterrorism processes of Southeast Asia is largely contingent not on the approval of China, but rather the approval of the core states of ASEAN. In contrast, when the US does not have the approval of these states, it does not act effectively, as with the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in the Straits of Malacca (Chapter Two, 51).

Obviously, this insider approval and recognition of external great power involvement varies given the context of the specific RSC and member state. In the context of Central Eurasia, recalcitrant member states developed out of an historical process in which their interests were consistently ignored by Russia, and the unwillingness of their regional power to develop Central Eurasian institutions that would provide recourse for the lodging of their concerns. This should not discount, however, the development of relations by Western institutions such as NATO and the PfP with Central Eurasian insiders to build a base of support for the involvement of these outside actors. This development was necessary not only to further cultivate alternatives for recalcitrant states in their security processes, but also to utilize those relationships to create thicker networks between the West and Central Eurasian nations, further undercutting Russia's influence over the RSC.

While global power influence was not discussed to the same extent in the case of Europe as it was elsewhere, this should not be mistaken for an ignorance or denial of its presence in the region. After September 11, the United States placed several demands on Europe with regards to security processes, to which the EU acquiesced – in some instances, begrudgingly. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is one example of a contentious debate in which the US extra-regional power pressured European policymakers bilaterally to allow the stationing of US Customs agents in their ports to “identify and examine maritime containers before the containers were shipped to the United States” (Zaiotti 2011, 210). After heated exchange and the initiation of infringement proceedings by the European Commission, the EU relented in November of 2003, and expanded a previous 1997 agreement to encompass the CSI provisions (212). Simply put, the bilateral agreements that were made between the US and individual states to push forward the CSI established a European recognition of an outside US leadership on this

particular issue. Interestingly, the United States does not necessarily have the same amount of leverage in other issue-areas in Europe, such as monetary or internal border policies. It is this type of variation that necessitates analyses of regional power behavior and effectiveness (and thus outcomes in regional orders) on the basis of specific issue-areas.

5.3 An Argument for Issue-based Regional Analyses

I have demonstrated that the increasing complexity of the international system in the wake of the Cold War is reflected in the proliferation of competing allegiances within RSCs between regional powers and extra-regional great powers. The allegiances are disparate not only regionally, but at the state level as well, and we can only observe this disparity by concentrating on regional power effectiveness in the context of specific issues. The veracity of this argument can be demonstrated succinctly through evidence presented by each chapter case here.

While China, for example, is not able to mount a concerted leadership role in the counterterrorism processes of Southeast Asia, its involvement in the hedging strategy of the smaller Southeast Asian states as a security policy to balance the influence of the US in the region demonstrates that it has leadership capacity in certain security arenas (Percival 2007, 27-30). In turn, China's economic prowess in the region grants it the opportunity for regional leadership recognition in non-security related issue areas. During the Southeast Asian economic crisis in 1998, when for example, austerity measures were instituted by the West, China leapt at the opportunity to extend considerable financial resources to Thailand and Indonesia (De Santis 2005, 24-25). The regional power then furthered its economic leadership position in Southeast Asia by initiating at an ASEAN-plus-three meeting in 2000, a proposal for a free-trade zone in the larger East Asia region. "China had not only stolen the show at the summit, it had begun to

define an agenda of intra-Asian cooperation that assuaged regional anxiety...” (25). The free-trade agreement won overwhelming approval by Southeast Asian nations at a ten-plus-one summit the following year.

The Central Eurasian situation with Russia in terms of economic leadership, is in stark contrast to the Chinese-Southeast Asian rapport. Moscow has thus far only been able to gain the support of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia for its Eurasian Economic Union, with the rest of the RSC members either opting to remain outside of the union, or joining the “competing” European Union. Most recently the Central Eurasian recalcitrant states, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have begun the long process of integration with the EU by signing association agreements (European Commission 2014). In light of this, researchers may anticipate not only the Western Theatre’s reliance on NATO and the EU for geopolitical security, but economic security as well. As I suggested in Chapter Three, this would mean in essence a disintegration of the Western Theatre as a Central Eurasian sub-system, and a reconstruction of the sub-system under a European identity and power. Obviously, further research into Russia’s effective leadership in various issue-areas would need to be conducted to get a better sense of this possibility and its likelihood.

In the European Single Market, the economic landscape is overwhelmingly controlled by its major national economies. This automatically defers economic influence in Europe to its largest economies, Germany in particular. As I demonstrated, however, realizing individual state agendas is becoming increasingly difficult through the complex European bureaucracy. The European Commission has adopted the primary responsibility for proposing policy initiatives in the Union that displays a united European front. The facilitation of EU member state action through institutional processes makes regional leadership identification seemingly impossible.

As such, future studies may begin to consider the EU as a unified international actor, but in circumstances in which there are clear internal policy divisions and the possible exploitation of the role of the rapporteur by more involved nations, we may more easily identify European regional leadership. The present European refugee crisis is a good example of this.

One recent European Council decision to put in place a refugee relocation system throughout Europe was vehemently rejected by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, splintering the EU on the issue (Carerra and Guild 2015). With the United Kingdom making bilateral agreements to take in a number of refugees outside of the EU framework, pressure from the majority of RSC members on the Central European states has been relatively absent. Germany and France, however, have led the charge in not only proposing and pushing this initiative through the Council, but also in placing a considerable amount of pressure on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia by accepting double the amount of refugees Central European countries are expected to split between them (Traynor and Kingsley 2015). In separating the refugee issue from other security and non-security issue-areas we are able to see important derivations in recognition processes. That Poland joined France and Germany in supporting the relocation decision (even after the 2015 Paris attacks) is an important distinction from its Central European neighbors, who might be thought not to recognize German and French leadership on this issue (“Poland to Accept No More than 400 Refugees this Year” 2016).

If the balance, structure, and the processes of regional security orders are dependent on the extent and varying effectiveness of the roles that regional powers play within the order (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 229), then it is important for researchers to acquire adequate measures of the extent and level of effectiveness that regional powers possess over policy processes within their RSCs. As I have demonstrated in this section, these measures are not equal

across the board of issues for regional powers. Subordinates recognize regional power leadership in varying capacities across different issue areas, and thus in order to get an accurate sense of the influence regional powers hold on aggregate, scholars must dig into the influence powers have over individual issues.

This dissertation has laid the groundwork for this practice through the development of three case applications in which regional powers attempt to establish themselves as leaders over counterterrorism processes in their regions, maintain that role, and utilize it through institutional mechanisms. In order to generate aggregate measures of leadership extent and effectiveness in issue-areas, researchers must first establish baseline categories for regional orders by which the leadership role of their powers is then categorized and cross-compared with similar orders. I term these categories the establishment, management, and delegation stages of leadership. While regional security processes and the behavior of regional powers in orders existing in different stages of the leadership are distinct, there are three recurring themes within each stage that should be briefly explored before concluding. These are the themes of territoriality, state sovereignty, and institutional control. Both the specific distinctions and overarching themes are discussed briefly in turn.

5.4 Recurring Themes in the Three Stages of Leadership

The three case applications throughout this dissertation were intended to accent specific and unique characteristics of broadly applicable regional conditions. These conditions are explicated in terms of the structure of the regional order, as well as the extent and effectiveness of the leadership role adopted by the regional power. As I have reiterated throughout these pages, the extent and effectiveness of regional power leadership is in large part contingent on the level of

recognition afforded to the regional power by its peers. Each stage of leadership identified by this dissertation represents a baseline by which regions might be cross-compared to detect trends in regional power behavior and security processes based upon the level of recognition provided to the leadership role of the regional power.

Having said this, the specific circumstances surrounding each leadership recognition context will sometimes be distinct. Nigeria's struggle to establish itself as the West African leader in counterterrorism processes will likely have less to do with a conflict of its identity than it will have to do with the struggle of the regional power to first and foremost eradicate Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations from within its own borders. Simultaneously, however, India's inability to establish itself as a leader in South Asia is almost certainly connected to an issue of identity, spurred by its ongoing territorial rivalry with Pakistan, and its eschewing of multilateral dialogue and cooperation as a result (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 89-92). Likewise, Brazil's management of its leadership role is directly comparable to that of Russia's in Chapter Three. Unlike Russia, though, Brazil has successfully disconnected itself and the South American RSC from US global power dominance through the use of institutional means such as the South American Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and MERCOSUR (88). While historical trends are of course obvious between South American and Central Eurasian relations with the United States, Brazil was able to quell recalcitrant states and historic regional rivals in ways that Russia is not. A fundamental comparison between these orders and their regional power's behavior in the management stage is needed to further understand these distinctions.

Unfortunately, the European RSC, a security community developed under the auspices of the EU is without equal, making it impossible to cross-compare RSCs to better grasp characteristics of the delegation stage. Efforts have been made in the past, however, to utilize the

policy processes of the European security community to draw predictions concerning the future of the North American security order (see, for example, Zaiotti 2011, 193-209).

Correspondingly, the characteristics of the delegation stage - identified through the case of the EU - may be used to infer future processes for the North American RSC in which NAFTA, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) hasten institutional integration. Under the right conditions, the US could (albeit unlikely) find it increasingly difficult to realize its intra-regional security interests, as leadership is delegated through bureaucratic processes.

Future efforts to cross-compare RSCs and their regional powers operating within each of these stages – at times varying by issue-area alone – will find three recurring variables that assist in explaining the variance in the outcomes of security processes in regional orders. I discuss each one of these in turn now.

5.4.1 Territoriality

Always either on or just underneath the surface, the importance of territory to states is apparent in each case application addressed in this dissertation. “Territorial conflict controls...foreign policy” (Gibler 2012, 4), and this fact of international politics is glaring in the cases of Chinese and Russian leadership in Southeast Asia and Central Eurasia respectively. Specifically, I ground the Chinese failure to establish a leadership role in Southeast Asian counterterrorism practices in its ongoing territorial disputes. While recent escalations in these disputes harden Chinese elites and invigorate support for the CCP’s leadership within the country, they further embolden in-group/out-group dynamics (see, for example, Vasquez 2009) and thus push China to the periphery of Southeast Asian diplomatic relations. China is still able to play a role in developing

the RSC, since as Gibler notes, extra-territorial disputes “will not carry the same weight with the public as recurrent threats to territorial homelands” (2012, 18). As I have demonstrated, this role is simply – especially in the case of security issues – not a central position of recognized leadership.

To an even greater degree in Central Eurasia, Russian counterterrorism efforts are intricately bound to its foreign policy interests in the region, which are in turn bound to territorial integrity. Buffer states may be Cold War relics, but it seems clear from Chapter Three that Russia continues to value its historic sphere of interest and the cushion it provides against Western pressure. As the US War on Terror continued to de-territorialize global and regional spaces, Russia can be seen instigating boundary activation mechanisms through its counterterrorism practices in an effort to harden its RSC borders with the outside world. In turn, Russia has met EU efforts to extend its geographic reach into the Western Theatre of Central Eurasia with an iron fist in both Georgia and Ukraine over the past decade. The institutional competition playing out between NATO and the EU on one side, and the Russian-led CSTO and SCO on the other is bigger than a counterterrorism narrative, it is first and foremost a competition for institutional influence over a very particular terrain and the governments inhabiting it.

The territorial dimension in the case of Europe may be less glaring, but it is present, nonetheless. The strides made in European cooperation over the last half century have generated intergovernmental and supranational policies and frameworks that muddy the territorial waters (see, for example, Zaiotti 2011). There is of course pushback to this notion, as the European border agency has been said to draw “dividing lines” rather than the dissipation of territorial boundaries (Neal 2009, 350). In general, reassertions of territorial autonomy have occurred in the

immediate wake of terrorist attacks (see Bigo et al. 2015). These actions are taken more often than not by newly acceding states, and the delegation stage suggests that as Europe extends its borders its regional powers may face increasing challenges in asserting their security interests upon the Union as a whole.

5.4.2 State Sovereignty

Sovereignty and territory are intricately bound, so that one can only be maintained with great difficulty without the other. It should come as no surprise then that professions of state sovereignty are strewn throughout the literature regarding these cases. This is not only because transnational terrorism is by definition territorially unbound, but also because leadership recognition on any issue requires some minimal cession of state sovereignty. This is what we observe from stage to stage: progressive cessions of sovereignty by subordinates to regional powers, until finally, regional powers begin to cede autonomy to democratic institutions.

The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia has taken hold to such an extent that its principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs have at times been detrimental to certain Southeast Asian populations (see, for example, Simon 2007). The strength of this norm in the RSC is a good predictor for regional balancing behavior, and the hedging that Southeast Asian states take between China and the United States. Fundamental interests in absolute sovereignty are one key element that precludes China from taking a leadership role in the RSC, and violations of regional sovereignty committed by China as it becomes more frustrated with Southeast Asian non-recognition of its own perceived regional role pushes it even further into the periphery of Southeast Asian affairs. It is out of this interplay of regional structure and power

behavior that the sovereignty element arises, and the role that it plays in all stages is vital to our understanding of leadership processes in each security order.

In the management stage of leadership, and in Central Eurasia in particular, the issue of sovereignty emerges when RSC subordinates attempt to assert their foreign policy autonomy in extra-regional relations. As addressed in Chapter Three, the stability of the management stage is contingent on the regional power further developing institutions, as well as considering the interests of its subordinates in its moves to drive regional security processes. When the power fails to perform these actions effectively, the extent of their leadership capabilities wane as recalcitrant subordinates reassert their sovereignty over issues of national security. Managing leadership then is predicated on tempering subordinates' willingness to raise sovereignty claims against the regional power in mild cases, and preventing subordinates from attempting to exit the regional order in severe ones.

Sovereignty in Europe is akin to territoriality in Europe in that the institutionalization of region-wide policy processes in the EU muddies the sovereignty waters, only to be reasserted through dialogue in the European Council. Keohane refers to the sovereignty existing in the European Union today as a "pooled sovereignty" (2002, 744), separate from the classical conceptions of sovereignty discussed throughout this study. Classical conceptions of sovereignty effectively prevent the delegation of authority to supranational institutions (Krasner 1999), and thus the European move from classical sovereignty to pooled sovereignty is an important one. Essentially, it is this move from one conception to the other that inaugurates the delegation stage of regional leadership. It is at this stage that reassertions of classical state sovereignty occur through institutional processes such as dialogue in the Council, or action through the use of the rapporteur.

5.4.3 Institutional Control

Institutions are the most obvious and thus the most used path for exercising regional leadership. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier note that institutions are “illustrative of the essentially generative quality of leadership” (2012, 77). Naturally then, we should see regional powers gravitating toward the use of institutions to both establish and further entrench their leadership position within their RSC. Each of the cases making up this dissertation has shown institutions as central to organizing regional security complexes, identifying the relevant actors, and granting leadership through recognition-based processes.

To start, China’s lack of leadership in Southeast Asian security processes should reveal that recognition of the regional power as an institutional “inside-actor” is vital to the establishment of leadership in specific issue-areas, such as counterterrorism. Regional powers might conduct “charm offensives” to ingratiate themselves to the institutional actors that determine group insiders and outsiders, or they may attempt to act outside of the institution, and coerce their leadership upon other regional actors through the use of force. In terms of counterterrorism, this second method appears ineffective in the establishment stage, especially for regional powers that are not at the same time super powers. This is because smaller states can defer to alternative great powers, such as the United States, who have an interest in limiting certain types of transnational terrorism to maintain global stability. When regional powers have already established their positions as leaders in the RSC, however, the actions of smaller powers in certain issue-areas have greater geopolitical effects, as is the case in Central Eurasia.

The geopolitical competition between the EU and NATO with the Russian-led CSTO highlights the interests of smaller regional actors, such as Georgia and Ukraine, drawing attention to their ability to reject the leadership role of their regional power in certain

circumstances, and open a space in which outside powers might penetrate the RSC. In the management stage, regional powers often use institutions to control their base of support. This stage can come into contention when the regional power does not take the interests of its subordinates into proper consideration, not effectively fulfilling the leadership dimension of interest consideration outlined in the RPSF (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 76). That is, when regional subordinates find no recourse to lodge protest against the regional leader in situations in which their interests have not been considered, they may attempt to shift their position to a new security environment, inciting institutional competition for geopolitical influence. In this stage generally and the case of Russia specifically, counterterrorism is used not as a goal in and of itself, but as a means to realize larger foreign policy goals and geopolitical interests. This should make sense, as formalized institutions encompass multiple issue-areas so that issue-linkage should predominate discussion and action by regional powers.

Finally, the formalization of institutions can sometimes serve in a democratizing capacity, making the realization of regional leadership quite difficult, and observing it even harder for researchers. This is especially the case for the delegation stage of leadership, and the European Union, which consists of sovereign entities that have simultaneously ceded (at least partially) autonomy to a supranational body. In essence, the leadership dimension of interest consideration is utilized to the extent that leadership opportunities allow a proliferation of constituted leaders (Tucker 1981). Additionally, we might expect that democratized institutions, such as the EU, will create private bodies to help drive initiatives and policy measures across the region. This is certainly the case with the EU and the European Commission. We should not expect that traditional conceptions of regional leadership roles are absent in the delegation stage, however. They have simply shifted to adapt to the democratic circumstances, working to identify

institutional loopholes through which a passive influence might be exercised. In the case of the EU, this is demonstrated through the role of the rapporteur in the European policymaking process.

5.5 Concluding Comments

The focus of this dissertation has been on providing a deeper understanding of regional power behavior and regional security processes. Often, scholars get wrapped up in regional power and global power actions and interests, forgetting that it is their subordinates that draw the parameters in which these actions and interests take place. This is increasingly paramount to understanding international security today. The nature of the unipolar moment and the US position in world hierarchy is such that smaller states have been empowered to pursue their own national security interests and goals, and are doing so increasingly through strategies of hedging powers against one another, altering their allegiances in order to gain concessions from their regional powers, and pushing their regions toward more democratic security processes. By categorizing these stages in the regional leadership process, we might understand not only the strategies that smaller powers will adopt, but also be able to narrow the plausible responses of regional and global powers. To this end, this study has served its purpose.

Secondly, I believe that this study holds value for academics and policymakers alike. By understanding the trajectories of regional leadership processes in particular issue areas, policymakers might be better able to construct and carry out effective foreign and security policy strategies. If the responsibility of maintaining international security and stability is increasingly falling to regional powers and the regional context as this study suggests, then regional leadership processes is a beneficial area for policymakers to turn their attention.

Finally, this dissertation has been constructed on a foundation provided by the new regionalism literature, and the regional powers and security order framework in particular. I build on this literature by presenting an opening argument that scholar's conceptions of regional power roles and behavior should be analyzed in the context of specific issue-areas with a focus in particular on the recognition accorded to regional powers by their subordinates. The international system is growing increasingly complex and in turn, the ability of states to dispute over some issues and cooperate in the context of others is becoming routine. One way in which to do this is to use the stages of leadership as baselines for comparing regional power recognition over specific issues. This in no sense is the only appropriate method. Further investigation of these stages, as well as analyses of their viability when applied to other RSCs is necessary to test the validity of the overall argument. Additionally, utilizing the stages of leadership to test regional power recognition in other issue-areas will also provide useful knowledge through conversations that I have been unable to engage in here. Much more work can be done to understand the relationship between regional powers and their subordinates. It is my intention to pursue this line of research, and my hope that other scholars will join me in doing so.

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