

COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA'S PEACE EXPERIMENT
ON THE FRONTIER, 1631-1786

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the maintenance of peace in Pennsylvania during the colonial era. When other colonies along the Atlantic seaboard experienced warfare in the early decades of settlement, Pennsylvania presents an anomaly for experiencing 120 years of relative peace with Indians before becoming a center point for two major conflicts in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The existing scholarly literature has examined the Long Peace and two conflicts, the French and Indian War and the War for American Independence, as distinct periods in the colony's history. When considering these periods through a lens of military violence, scholars point to the lack of military tradition and culture under the Quaker-led government during the Long Peace as an explanation for Pennsylvania's poor military reaction when at war and have used racial, religious, and political interpretations to discuss violence in the colony. In contrast, I argue that the inhabitants of Pennsylvania did have an effective approach for securing the safety of their settlement. I demonstrate that a security culture of restraint developed between Indians and European settlers, marked by dialogue, not war, in the fifty years prior to the formal establishment of Pennsylvania. When they arrived, William Penn and Quaker leaders recognized this understanding to be already in place and they infused into this preexisting structure their own ideals of community and brotherhood of man while continuing the practices of the culture of restraint. I explore how restraint and these Quaker ideals eroded during the eighteenth century, but argue that the culture of restraint ultimately had a lasting legacy through its outward symbols, language, and shared memories assisting in reestablishing peace along the frontier following war. My dissertation thus revises our understanding of Colonial Pennsylvania's long period of peace

and how Quakers approached the issue of security in the colony, while also demonstrating the value in considering the role of peace in military history and security affairs.

DEDICATION

To my Heavenly Father, Savior, and Helper

“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God.” – Matthew 5:9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- APS American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA
- Andros, 1674-1676* *The Andros Papers, 1674-1676: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Sir Edmund Andros 1674-1680*, eds. Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, trans. Charles T. Gehring (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989)
- Andros, 1677-1678* *The Andros Papers, 1677-1678: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Sir Edmund Andros 1674-1680*, eds. Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, trans. Charles T. Gehring (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990)
- Andros, 1679-1680* *The Andros Papers, 1679-1680: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Sir Edmund Andros 1674-1680* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991)
- Delaware Papers (Dutch)* *Delaware Papers (Dutch Period): A Collection of Documents Pertaining to the Regulation of Affairs on the South River of New Netherland, 1648-1664*, vol. 18-19, trans. and ed. Charles T. Gehring (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1981)
- Delaware Papers (English)* *Delaware Papers (English Period): A Collection of Documents Pertaining to the Regulation of Affairs on the Delaware, 1664-1682*, vol. 20-21, ed. Charles T. Gehring (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1977)
- Entries, 1664-1673* *Books of General Entries of the Colony of New York, 1664-1673: Orders, Warrants, Letters, Commissions, Passes and Licenses by Governors Richard Nicolls and Francis Lovelace*, eds. Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1982)

<i>Entries, 1674-1688</i>	<i>Books of General Entries of the Colony of New York, 1674-1688: Orders, Warrants, Letters, Commissions, Passes and Licenses by Governors Sir Edmund Andros and Thomas Dongan, and Deputy Governor Anthony Brockholls</i> , eds. Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1982)
FHL	Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA
HCL	Haverford College Library, Special Collections, Quaker Collection, Haverford, PA
HSP	Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
<i>Johan Printz</i>	<i>The Instruction for Johan Printz, Governor of New Sweden</i> , trans. and ed. Amandus Johnson (Port Washington, NY: Ira J. Friedman, Inc., 1969)
<i>MPC</i>	<i>Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania</i>
<i>MSEC</i>	<i>Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania</i>
PA	<i>Pennsylvania Archives</i>
<i>Penn Papers, Vol. 1</i>	<i>The Papers of William Penn</i> , vol. 1, ed. Mary Maples Dunn and Richard S. Dunn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981)
<i>Penn Papers, Vol. 2</i>	<i>The Papers of William Penn</i> , vol. 2, ed. Mary Maples Dunn and Richard S. Dunn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982)
<i>Penn Papers, Vol. 3</i>	<i>The Papers of William Penn</i> , vol. 3, ed. Marianne S. Wokeck and others (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986)
<i>Penn Papers, Vol. 4</i>	<i>The Papers of William Penn</i> , vol. 4, ed. Marianne S. Wokeck and others (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987)
TLC	The Library Company, Philadelphia, PA

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: THE BIRTH OF RESTRAINT	22
CHAPTER TWO: THE MATURATION OF RESTRAINT	71
CHAPTER THREE: THE EROSION OF RESTRAINT	123
CHAPTER FOUR: THE RUPTURE OF RESTRAINT	178
CHAPTER FIVE: THE LEGACY OF RESTRAINT	235
EPILOGUE.....	291
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	302

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: THE DELAWARE RIVER VALLEY	21
FIGURE 2: THE DELAWARE RIVER VALLEY, 1685-1700	70
FIGURE 3: THE WALKING PURCHASE, 1737	122
FIGURE 4: WESTWARD SETTLEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA	177
FIGURE 5: KING WAMPUM.....	224
FIGURE 6: ANTI-QUAKER PROPAGANDA	225
FIGURE 7: DEPICTION OF QUAKER FELLOWSHIP WITH INDIANS	226

INTRODUCTION

The disposition of surrounding Indians, cases of military conflict, and cultural understandings shaped from both previous experiences in Europe and new circumstances in North America all informed how colonial societies approached matters relating to the security of settlements. Security methods changed based on the conditions present in an area and on the perceptions of the parties involved. In shifting back and forth between peace and war, a society came to view security matters based on how settlers understood their interests and those of neighboring Indians, how settlers perceived threats, and the steps required in order to sufficiently address those concerns and risks. With time and regular invocation, this view of security became embedded culturally and influenced how colonial societies reacted to threats. Settlers retained memories from Europe on how to approach war in the New World. Conflict undoubtedly molded views on security, but so did its absence.

Such was the case in the Delaware River Valley and Pennsylvania from the early 1630s up until the outbreak of the French and Indian War along Pennsylvania's frontier in the mid-1750s. European settlers and Indians did not fight a general war for 120 years as the frontier shifted westward from the Delaware River, past the Susquehanna River Valley, beyond the Appalachian Mountains, and into the Ohio River Valley. Other settlement areas, ranging from New England, New York, the Chesapeake, and the Carolinas, experienced major war with native tribes in the first decades of settlement and growth. Colonial Pennsylvania did not. Scholars have investigated this anomaly presented by Pennsylvania, particularly in how society reacted to war

when it had no military culture to fall back upon.¹ But why did relative peace between settlers and Indians endure for so long? Rather than looking at the instances of conflict to inform us how settlers and Indian tribes in Pennsylvania approached security, it is peace itself and its maintenance that is the source for understanding how both sides maintained the Long Peace of 120 years, itself an oddity in comparison to other colonies. Yes, when war broke out with Indians along the frontier, government leaders did not have a developed military culture to fall back upon while frontier settlers relied upon cultural memories and practices from having lived on borderlands in Europe. That is not to say, however, that a security culture did not exist. On the contrary, Indians and Europeans developed and practiced a shared security culture of restraint in which both sought to avoid war and maintain relative peace. Following the outbreak of conflict, this shared culture of restraint remained a useful mechanism to reestablish peace.

An investigation of peace maintenance, as opposed to focusing on military violence, offers a new contribution to a growing historiography regarding colonial Pennsylvania's security affairs and Indian relations. The project's 150-year scope brings together multiple subject matters under one common theme: a security culture of restraint. Because colonial Pennsylvania has two distinct eras in its history, a long period without war and being a theatre of conflict in two wars, its military history and security affairs have been analyzed in a black and white approach. The long period of peace as well as the colony's later involvement in war have each

¹For important scholarship on Pennsylvania's lack of military culture and its reaction to the French and Indian War and the War for American Independence, see Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, colonies, and tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988); Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000); Matthew Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003); Gregory Knouff, *The Soldiers' Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American Identity* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Joseph Seymour, *The Pennsylvania Associators, 1747-1777* (Yardley: Westholme, 2012).

been covered extensively, but often separately. When studied together, the extended peace is viewed as evidence for a lack of military culture and thus helps to explain the events that transpired during war in the colony. Scholars have used racial hatred, political deadlock, religious confession, social class, or military ineptitude to explain the colony's reaction following a long peace.²

A middle ground interpretation transcends the seeming incompatibility between peace and warfare by arguing that the inhabitants of Pennsylvania did in fact have an effective approach for securing the safety of their settlement. Neither the lack of military forces and military culture nor heightened racial violence along the frontier can explain the entire course of the anomaly that is this colony's security history. Rather, the maintenance of peace, accomplished through the development of a security culture of restraint with origins in the European and surrounding Indian settlements of the Delaware River Valley that predate Quaker Pennsylvania, serves to explain how amity endured for so long. Furthermore, this active practice and understanding of the culture of restraint, though it suffered in the face of military violence, remained a recognized mechanism by which both sides could reestablish peace.

In addition to the project's scope and contribution in identifying a security culture present throughout colonial Pennsylvania's Long Peace and its participation in two major conflicts, the project also brings attention to a variety of subject matters. Fifty years of European-Indian

² For discussions of heightened racial violence in Pennsylvania's reaction to war, see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008) and Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost* (2009). For social interpretations, including ethnicity and class, see R. S. Stephenson, "Pennsylvania Soldiers in the Seven Years' War," *Pennsylvania History* 62, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 196-212; Matthew C. Ward, "An Army of Servants: The Pennsylvania Regiment during the Seven Years' War," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 119, no. 1/2 (Jan. – Apr. 1995): 75-93; John B. Frantz and William Pencak, ed., *Beyond Philadelphia: The American Revolution in the Pennsylvania Hinterland* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). On political deadlock, see Robert L. D. Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania, 1682-1756* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). For more traditional military history interpretations, see Jeffrey M. Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection: Security, Defense, and War in the Delaware Valley, 1621-1815* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008) and Seymour, *The Pennsylvania Associators* (2012). Throughout these works, the Quaker peace testimony is also identified regularly as a factor for Pennsylvania's poor military reaction, political strife, and heightened racial and ethnic awareness.

interaction between Dutch, Swedes, Delawares, and Susquehannocks established the precedent and laid the groundwork of a growing culture of restraint instead of a just-minded William Penn and the pacifist Quakers finding well-disposed Indians upon arrival in Pennsylvania, thus enabling peace to endure. Penn infused the Quaker ideals of community and brotherhood of man into this growing culture of restraint between Indians and Europeans along the frontier. Having recognized that a relatively peaceful ethos already existed between those present, Penn built on this foundation and gave the culture of restraint new dimensions. This recognition by Penn and continued practice by Quaker leadership raises questions about the exact role of Quaker pacifism in Pennsylvania's early history and the traditional characterization of Quakers as offering no participation in nor support for military matters. While they maintained no outward symbols of defense such as a standing militia, this is not to say that the Quakers did not give careful consideration to the security of their colony. Quaker leadership recognized that a successful mechanism – the culture of restraint between Indians and settlers – was already in place, and they promoted and fostered it to the best of their ability until events and movements beyond their control brought about conflict. By tracing this security culture of restraint that extended through a long peace and two military conflicts, this project also brings attention to the methods of restoring peace used by settlers and Indians. This approach allows us to move beyond the narrative of military violence in colonial Pennsylvania.

The concept of a “security culture of restraint” requires clarification and definition. Security is taken here to describe peace and stability in the absence of war. A military connotes institutions of organized, armed force and may assume such forms as militias, fortifications, systems of recruitment and drill, taxation to support all of these things, and armed conflict itself. A military culture therefore builds upon these institutions of armed force to where a society has a

method, developed over time, for defending itself and projecting power through armed means. Colonial Pennsylvania lacked a visible military and military culture for much of its history. As a broader term, “security” can involve the use of a military as a form of achieving defense, stability, and permanence for a settlement, especially in its budding years. Yet security can also expand beyond an armed, military option. In this argument, diplomacy, cultural understandings, and a recognition of shared purpose between potential adversaries are taken as other methods by which a society can achieve security and peace, and thus ensure that it will not face threats to its existence and way of life.³

Culture is a set of understandings and practices that provide a context in which a society’s behavior and processes can be described. It is not a power to which events can be attributed or that dictates a person’s actions. Rather, culture is where a society places a sense of meaning on symbols and actions, which in turn generates an ethos that is valued as significant.

³ Scholarship concerning military culture, the relationship between warfare and society, and conflict with Indians in Colonial America is extensive. For scholarship on New England, see Fred Anderson, *A People’s Army* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Harold Selesky, *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996); Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). For scholarship on the southern colonies, see Larry Ivers, *British Drums on the Southern Frontier: the Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Steven Oatis, *A Colonial Complex: South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of Yamasee War, 1680-1730* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005); William Ramsey, *The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); David La Vere, *The Tuscarora War: Indians, Settlers, and the Fight for the Carolina Colonies* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013). For the Mid-Atlantic, including Pennsylvania, see Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania* (1957); Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984); Jennings, *Empire of Fortune* (1988); Anderson, *Crucible of War* (2000); Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry* (2003); Gregory Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Knouff, *The Soldiers’ Revolution* (2004); David Dixon, *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005); Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection* (2008); Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008); Michael Laramie, *The European Invasion of North America: Colonial Conflict Along the Hudson-Champlain Corridor, 1609-1760* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012); Seymour, *Pennsylvania Associators* (2012); James Rice, *Tales from a Revolution: Bacon’s Rebellion and the Transformation of Early America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Scholarship on Pennsylvania has largely focused on the French and Indian War and the War for American Independence. These conflicts are at the end of the colony’s history. This work’s contribution to the historiography considers the entirety of European settlement in Pennsylvania and their interaction with Indians. It bridges the Long Peace with these latter conflicts and demonstrates an identifiable security culture of restraint throughout the colonial period.

This ethos, what we identify as culture, assists in discussing how a society reacts to issues, such as security. The security culture along Pennsylvania's frontier did not dictate people's actions. It did, however, influence both Indian and Euro-American officials on how to react to moments of violence in order to establish and maintain peace. This development remained a continual process where ideas consolidated into a template that informed society while also allowing for new influences to bring refinement and alteration to the core belief.⁴

Cultural behavior and ways of thinking require time to form as well as alter in meaning and composition. The work's large scope shows the development of a security understanding between Indians and Europeans. The culture of restraint grew and formed under Dutch and Swedish settlers as well as during the first decades of Quaker settlement, and then suffered exposure to outside influences that corroded the cultural understanding between Indians and settlers. Coupled with colonial leaders' steadfast adherence to the security culture, thus limiting alternative modes of action, this deterioration allowed for violence to erupt along the frontier on two occasions, the French and Indian War and the War for American Independence. Corrosion did not lead to the complete breakdown and forsaking of the security culture of restraint, however, as endeavors to restore peace according to the symbols and actions established by earlier generations of Indians and Europeans continued. Warfare had affected the shared cultural understanding between Indians and Europeans, as the interests of both sides had shifted. Yet the culture's outer shell, fashioned over decades and still visible in its symbolism and modes of action, continued to be relied upon for establishing peace.

Restraint acted as the focal point in this cultural understanding that allowed for the societies along colonial Pennsylvania's frontier to remain stable for so long and avoid warfare

⁴ For discussion on culture and cultural theory, see Clifford Geertz' seminal work *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

that threatened disruption or destruction. It is defined as a willingness to check anger and desire for violent redress, and to replace anger and violence with a diplomatic approach to resolving sources of tension that if allowed to simmer and build, pressure could boil over into a general war. Endemic or localized violence is present in every society, let alone along a frontier where differences in racial makeup, cultures, and interests can bring almost inevitable clashes. To explain how and why Indians and European settlers avoided allowing such cases of localized violence from snowballing into a much larger and deadlier conflict, restraint describes how both sides came to an understanding that benefitted each in order to keep a relative peace.

The motives and interests for seeking peace changed across place and time and included trade, securing allies, religious motivation, and pragmatic reasoning. Yet all contributed to the growth and formation of a cultural understanding where Indian and colonial leaders discussed grievances and took measures to avoid escalation that could bring about war. When war arrived, restraint as a part of the shared culture did not go away. Rather, diplomacy became an identifiable mechanism which leaders on either end utilized to reestablish peace. As time progressed, the specific interests of the parties involved and even the purpose of the culture itself may have changed, but restraint as a mechanism endured and acted as a diplomatic road in which Indians and Euro-Americans found common ground to bring about peace on the frontier.

The emphasis on community and brotherhood as promoted by Quaker and Indian leadership within this security culture of restraint also merits explanation. While factors such as the fur trade, the need to acquire allies, and the limited extent of European settlement contributed to developing a culture of restraint prior to the formal establishment of Pennsylvania, the influx of large numbers of pacifist Quakers led by William Penn injected a new ethical component. Quaker beliefs in the brotherhood of man and emphasis on maintaining a sense of community

amongst members carried over into how Penn and the colonial leadership treated their Indian counterparts across the frontier in the early years of Pennsylvania. Believing in a brotherhood of man, Quakers treated Indians with respect and justice in early Pennsylvania policy. With many of the first settlers subscribing to Quaker principles, large amounts of land being available, and fair land purchases being made, Indians and Europeans developed a sense of community where they could live side by side without sources of tension before the large waves of immigrant arrivals began in the 1720s. If localized violence did occur, the understanding present from earlier generations and Quaker willingness to engage with Indians through dialogue, not force of arms, allowed for differences to be resolved. Adherence to restraint between Indians and Europeans in Pennsylvania only grew stronger in the early decades of the colony, as Indians viewed Penn and his settlers as just newcomers while the Quakers viewed Indians as deserving nothing less than to be treated as fellow inhabitants of the land. Penn's death, the surge in the colony's population, growing demand for land, and Pennsylvania's neglect for its old Indian allies withered away the sense of community, eventually spilling over into war and altering the culture of restraint's ethical component. The outer framework of language, symbolism, and memory that came to symbolize the friendship and community once enjoyed by Indians and Pennsylvania still remained present, however, and allowed both sides to more readily return to peace.

Across colonial Pennsylvania, and along the frontier in particular, the security culture of restraint came to encapsulate how settlers and Indians maintained stable relations and minimized sources of tension in order to protect their societies from war and aggression. Infused with an ethical component of community and brotherhood of man, this culture of restraint took decades to develop and achieve adherence by both Indians and Europeans in practice. At its height under

William Penn and early Quaker leadership, both sides established practices that made deep impressions upon memory. In subsequent decades, however, this cultural understanding faced a host of factors that changed interests and circumstances of both Indians and settlers, weakening adherence to the shared cultural understanding to the point that it could not withstand pressures and tensions from spilling over into a general war. Pennsylvania's poor military reaction in the French and Indian War was to be expected from a colony without a military culture, and has been criticized and subject to much interpretation. But peace did return. It is the lasting endurance of the security culture of restraint, weakened but not gone, that enabled the establishment of peace on the frontier. As Pennsylvania moved toward revolution, outside influences and war again altered the culture and stripped it of its ethical focus on community and brotherhood between Indians and Americans. Peace between Britain and America, Indians facing American willingness to pursue heightened racial violence, and American desire to bring order to the frontier in the face of a grueling war had replaced the original intent and desires behind the cultural understanding forged during the establishment of Quaker Pennsylvania. Yet memory and references to a shared past had not gone away. With both sides wanting peace and order after years of war, they found an old diplomatic road that their ancestors had traveled. Their own reasoning for traveling along this path may have changed, yet the road still bridged the frontier.

Indians and Europeans blazed a diplomatic pathway across Pennsylvania's frontier through the security culture of restraint. This project retraced the route in which they traveled over 150 years, considering the culture of restraint's growth, prominence, erosion, and legacy. Few works have attempted to investigate the entire colonial period from the first settlements through the War for American Independence. Robert Davidson's *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania* attempted to consider the long period of peace beginning with the formal

establishment of Pennsylvania.⁵ Davidson discusses the evasions, procrastinations, and political devices used by the Quaker Assembly to avoid military measures, and offers a traditional military history interpretation. Recently Jeffrey Dorwart's *Invasion and Insurrection* covers the Delaware River Valley from the first European explorers in the seventeenth century through the end of the War of 1812.⁶ Dorwart provides another traditional military history interpretation, as he discusses how settlers secured themselves from outside invasion and suppressed insurrection. Daniel Richter's *Trade, Land, Power*, like Dorwart, provides comprehensive coverage of the colonial era.⁷ Many of his essays give consideration to Pennsylvania's Indian relations along the frontier. He argues that trade acted as a source of power in sealing relationships with Indians, and that the focus on land acted as a centerpiece in the struggle for eastern North America. Richter's lengthy coverage through a lens of power and how Indians and Europeans sought to achieve it offers valuable guidance for this work. It progresses through the colonial era through a lens of peace maintenance, and how this understanding, adopted by both Indians and Euro-Americans along Pennsylvania's frontier, more readily allowed for combatants to stop fighting and return to dialogue and peace.

Chapter One, "The Birth of Restraint," considers the fifty years of Indian and European interaction in the Delaware River Valley prior to the establishment of Pennsylvania. This period has received increased interest and discussion amongst scholars since the early studies of the Dutch, Swedish, and English settlements along the Delaware River conducted by Christopher Ward and C. A. Weslager.⁸ Building upon these formal political histories of settlement and

⁵ Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania* (1957).

⁶ Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection* (2008).

⁷ Daniel Richter, *Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

⁸ Christopher Ward, *The Dutch and Swedes on the Delaware, 1609-64* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1930); C. A. Weslager, *Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware River Valley, 1609-1664*

struggle between European competitors and their relationships with Delaware and Susquehannock Indians, *New Sweden in America* offers a collection of essays considering topics such as mercantile and government interests in forming the New Sweden Company, Swedish-Dutch relations, and the Indian-European fur trade and its centrality in their diplomatic relations.⁹ These essays indicate a deeper examination of the Delaware River Valley during the seventeenth century, particularly in giving greater attention to Native American history and how they viewed alliance building. Amy Schutt discusses how alliance formation helped to identify and shape the Delawares as a people from pre-Columbian contact through the War for American Independence, while Gunlög Fur has analyzed Delaware alliance building and inter-tribal diplomacy through the lens of gender.¹⁰ Works by Nancy Shoemaker, Cynthia Van Zandt, and Daniel Richter, while not completely focused on the tribes in the Delaware River Valley, have furthered the discussion on alliances, trade, and power between Indians and European settlers in contact frontiers.¹¹

Today, scholars continue to explore early European settlements and their relationships with local Indians from different vantage points. Mark Thompson considers the shift of Swedish settlers' national identity to an ethnic identity following the capture of New Sweden.¹² Just released in the course of research for this work, Jean Soderlund's social and political history of the Delaware River Valley prior to the arrival of William Penn is very much in line with this

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961) and *The English on the Delaware: 1610-1682* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

⁹ Carol E. Hoffecker and others, eds., *New Sweden in America* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995).

¹⁰ Amy C. Schutt, *Peoples of the River Valley: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Gunlög Fur, *A Nation of Women: Gender and Colonial Encounters Among the Delaware Indians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

¹¹ Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Cynthia J. Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Richter, *Trade, Land, Power* (2013). See also Daniel Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

¹² Mark L. Thompson, *The Contest for the Delaware Valley: Allegiance, Identity, and Empire in the Seventeenth Century* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013).

project's approach to Indian-European relations along the Delaware during the seventeenth century.¹³ Soderlund correctly asserts that the Delaware Indians stood as the dominant power in the region, and cultivated an alliance and understanding with Swedish settlers where both sides promoted trade, peace, and mutual respect. Soderlund establishes the cultural platform upon which Quaker Pennsylvania sprung and peace endured, yet her focus is overwhelmingly on the period prior to Penn. She engages with the Quaker proprietor for a single chapter, noting how Swedish and Dutch settlers became a part of the new colony and uses several examples to question intergroup harmony between Quakers and Indians.

This dissertation's consideration of the initial European settlements and their interactions with Indians in the Delaware River Valley prior to the arrival of William Penn and the Quakers builds on this trajectory of giving more attention to a contact frontier area that until recently has been overlooked in colonial scholarship. The project does, however, seek to move beyond this foundational period of fifty years that explains why the colony of Pennsylvania enjoyed the Long Peace that it is noted for. Following the destruction of the Dutch settlement at Swanendael in 1631, Indians tolerated small influxes of Europeans and viewed the newcomers as subordinate allies who could be incorporated into native networks and provide Indians with access to trade goods. Europeans found profits in the fur trade, but they never invested heavily in the Delaware River Valley, nor did they seek to conquer surrounding tribes.

Indians and Europeans saw value in each other, and rather than risk losing trade and allies, they engaged in dialogue to smooth over cases of localized violence to avoid warfare. This practice developed into an understanding over the years. Soderlund correctly identifies this understanding, but she does not take the next step in demonstrating how it carried over through

¹³ Jean R. Soderlund, *Lenape Country: Delaware Valley Society Before William Penn* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

William Penn and beyond into the conflicts of the eighteenth century. These early decades of understanding are the birth of a culture of restraint between Indians and Europeans that acted as the basis for community to develop under William Penn and the Quakers.

Chapter Two, “The Maturation of Restraint,” explores the blossoming of the culture of restraint with the infusion of ethical ideals of community and brotherhood under William Penn and Quaker leadership from the establishment of Pennsylvania through his death in 1718.

Scholars considering William Penn have given great attention to his political and religious beliefs, but attention to his views on security in his role as proprietor of Pennsylvania has been less developed.¹⁴ Edwin Bronner discusses the political turmoil and breakdown of the holy experiment among settlers in Pennsylvania from 1681-1701, yet he does not give satisfactory attention to Indian relations.¹⁵ Edward Beatty’s analysis of Penn’s ideas begins to give a greater discussion of how the proprietor approached security with Indians by relying on a pragmatic approach of treating Indians with justice. However, similar to Bronner, the Indian voice is lacking in Beatty’s account.¹⁶ Francis Jennings’ essay on Penn’s Indian relations in Richard and Mary Dunn’s *The World of William Penn* does well to consider both Penn’s and Indian points of

¹⁴ For scholarship discussing William Penn with regards to politics and religion, as well as general biographies, see William I. Hull, *William Penn: A Topical Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937); Joseph E. Illick, *William Penn the Politician: His Relations with the English Government* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); Mary Maples Dunn, *William Penn: Politics and Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Mabel Richmond Brailsford, *The Making of William Penn* (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970); Melvin B. Endy, Jr., *William Penn and Early Quakerism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Hans Fantel, *William Penn: Apostle of Dissent* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1974); Harry Emerson Wildes, *William Penn* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974); Mary K. Geiter, *William Penn* (Harlow: Parson Education Limited, 2000); John A. Moretta, *William Penn and the Quaker Legacy* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007).

¹⁵ Edwin B. Bronner, *William Penn’s “Holy Experiment”: The Founding of Pennsylvania, 1681-1701* (New York: Temple University Publications, 1962). See also Gary B. Nash, *Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681-1726* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

¹⁶ Edward C. O. Beatty, *William Penn as Social Philosopher* (New York: Octagon Books, 1975).

view with regards to land purchases. Jennings sees sincerity in Penn's dealings with Indians, as well as pragmatic considerations over trade and boundary disputes.¹⁷

Most recently, Daniel Richter examines a letter from Penn to Indians in *Trade, Land, Power*, again addressing Penn's just approach with Indians as well as the importance that Indians placed on diplomacy with Pennsylvania authorities into the eighteenth century.¹⁸ The early pages of Chapter Two build upon the ideas forwarded by Jennings and Richter, and offer a discussion of Penn's early career in Ireland, the struggle for religious toleration, and early exposure to colonization so as to understand Penn's approach to maintaining peace in society.

The trait of community in Pennsylvania's culture of restraint develops from Penn's approach to security as well as from the Quaker emphasis on collectivism. Jack Marietta, in discussing Quakerism in the mid-eighteenth century, argues that Quakers retreated from encroaching secularism and sought reform in order to protect their sense of community.¹⁹ Barry Levy analyzes Quaker promotion of community through families and child rearing, while Andrew Murphy considers the Keithian Schism and its threat to the Quaker sense of community.²⁰ Alan Tully, Sally Schwartz, and John Smolenski have all offered discussions of toleration in Pennsylvania society, the colony's multiplicity of ethnic and religious identifications, and the relative harmony the colony enjoyed amongst its European inhabitants during the eighteenth century.²¹ Community in this project centers on Indian relations along the

¹⁷ Francis Jennings, "Brother Miquon: Good Lord!" in *The World of William Penn*, ed. Richard S. Dunn and Mary Maples Dunn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 195-214.

¹⁸ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power* (2013).

¹⁹ Jack Marietta, *The Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984).

²⁰ Barry Levy, *Quakers and the American Family* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Andrew Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern English America* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

²¹ Alan Tully, *William Penn's Legacy: Politics and Social Structures in Provincial Pennsylvania, 1726-1755* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Sally Schwartz, *"A Mixed Multitude": The Struggle for Toleration in Colonial Pennsylvania* (New York: New York University Press, 1987); John Smolenski, *Friends and*

frontier. Penn's background and his approach of achieving peace through the promotion of community in society builds upon the understanding already present between Indians and Europeans to seek dialogue rather than to resort to war. Penn spent only a short time in Pennsylvania, but Quaker leadership continued to adhere to maintaining community and peace with Indians, while natives came to value the friendship of Penn and the Quakers, thus giving a new ethical component to the culture of restraint.

Chapter Three, "The Erosion of Restraint," shows the multiple outside forces acting against the culture of restraint and weakening the sense of community between Indians and settlers prior to the eruption of conflict in the French and Indian War. Extending over a period of roughly thirty years from the early 1720s to the early 1750s, Pennsylvania's road to war has been analyzed by historians largely through lenses of empire and immigration. Francis Jennings' political histories treat in detail Pennsylvania's relationships with Indians and the pressures of empire upon colonial governments and tribes in the Ohio River Valley.²² Building off this work, Michael McConnell views the Ohio River Valley as a cultural borderland, where conglomerating Indian tribes and competing empires clashed, while Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall discuss empire in the Ohio River Valley from the perspectives of trade and pressures of encroachment.²³

With Pennsylvania's frontier adjacent to this source of competition for empire, James Merrell looks at events on the ground and the work performed by negotiators who acted as cultural brokers along the frontier. He finds that negotiators failed to provide a middle ground between disparate groups, and thus ultimately aided in the breakdown of Indian-settler

Strangers: The Making of a Creole Culture in Colonial Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

²² Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (1984) and *Empire of Fortune* (1988).

²³ Michael McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

relations.²⁴ This breakdown in relations has also been studied from the perspectives of immigration and the desire for land. Aaron Fogleman examines German immigrants, their settlement in Pennsylvania, and their political behavior, while Patrick Griffin discusses the Scot-Irish immigration, their people's sense of individualism, and assertion of their rights.²⁵ This sense of individualism in the backcountry, as Matthew Ward demonstrates, created tension along the frontier and helped to alter the sense of community with Indians.²⁶ With an increasing population, demand for land also rose. Scholars have identified fraudulent land deals, most notably the infamous Walking Purchase, as a source of Indian resentment in the build-up to conflict.²⁷

This work considers the erosion of restraint as a spatial issue. Not one single instance was the source for resentment, such as the Walking Purchase. Rather, like the time required to develop an understanding, so too did time take its course to reduce the harmony and sense of community between Indians and settlers. A variety of factors, such as immigration, empire, and the Great Awakening, forced colonial and Indian leaders to make decisions for their respective interests. With immigrants flooding the frontier, Indians migrated westward, resulting in a shift in Indian diplomacy. Leaders in Philadelphia, unable to effectively manage smaller tribes to the west, looked to the Iroquois to exercise influence. With unruly frontier settlers, other invasion

²⁴ James Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).

²⁵ Aaron Spencer Fogleman, *Hopeful Journeys: German Immigration, Settlement, and Political Culture in Colonial America, 1717-1775* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Patrick Griffin, *The People with No Name: Ireland's Ulster Scots, America's Scots Irish and the Creation of a British Atlantic World, 1689-1764* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On German and Irish migration to Pennsylvania and their establishment of trade networks, see Marianne S. Wokeck, *Trade in Strangers: The Beginnings of Mass Migration to North America* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999). Other studies discussing immigration within the larger framework of their work include Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008); Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost* (2009); Seymour, *The Pennsylvania Associators* (2012).

²⁶ Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry* (2003).

²⁷ In addition to Jennings and Ward, see Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania* (1957); Steven C. Harper, "Delawares and Pennsylvanians After the Walking Purchase," in *Friends and Enemies in Penn's Woods*, ed. William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 167-179.

scares, and a revival in pacifism that hardened belief in the practice of restraint as opposed to military force, Quaker leaders in Philadelphia could neither nurture a sense of community nor provide military and economic backing to distant tribes in the Ohio River Valley. The small tribes of Delawares and Shawnee, having migrated to reduce tensions with Pennsylvania's settlers, found themselves under pressure from French interests. With the sense of community deteriorated and their allies seemingly ignoring their requests for assistance, these tribes faced a decision on which European side to gravitate towards.

Chapter Four, "The Rupture of Restraint," addresses the French and Indian War, a topic covered extensively by historians. Because of the lack of a military tradition, Pennsylvania's military reaction to violence on the frontier appears like a boxer trying to regain balance after being hit and dazed. Scholars such as William Hunter have given consideration to the hastily built system of forts and blockhouses along the frontier that attempted to protect settlements from Indian raids.²⁸ The military campaigns into the Pennsylvania hinterland by British and provincial troops have also garnered attention by traditional military historians.²⁹ The changing trend in military history to look beyond military campaigns has yielded social histories of Pennsylvania soldiers, as R. S. Stephenson breaks down Pennsylvania soldiers by ethnicities while Matthew Ward finds that military service provided economic opportunity for former servants and landless laborers.³⁰ Fred Anderson's *Crucible of War* has provided the most complete account of the French and Indian War, and recently Joseph Seymour's *The*

²⁸ William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1960). See also Charles J. Stillé, "The Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania" *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 20, no. 2 (1896): 257-264; Hubertis Cummings, "The Frontier Forts of Provincial Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History* 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1947): 41-43; Leonard W. Labaree, "Benjamin Franklin and the Defense of Pennsylvania, 1754-1757," *Pennsylvania History* 29, no. 1 (Jan. 1962): 7-23; Louis M. Waddell, "Defending the Long Perimeter: Forts on the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Frontier, 1755-1765," *Pennsylvania History* 62, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 171-195.

²⁹ Alfred Proctor James and Charles Morse Stotz, *Drums in the Forest: Decision at the Forks, Defense of the Wilderness* (Pittsburgh: The Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, 1958).

³⁰ Stephenson, "Pennsylvania Soldiers," (Spring 1995); Ward, "An Army of Servants," (1995).

Pennsylvania Associators, 1747-1777 offers the first in-depth history of the all-volunteer, grassroots military establishment that acted as Pennsylvania's de facto military force in the absence of a militia law.³¹

Recent scholarship has continued to offer fresh interpretations of the French and Indian War, incorporating race into military history to show how violence against Indians brought unification among local white settlers on the frontier. Peter Silver's *Our Savage Neighbors* argues that frontier settlers fearing and fighting Indians created a notion of "white people," where others could be excluded from a group through violence.³² Kevin Kenny's *Peaceable Kingdom Lost* tracks the growth in Indian hating and shows that violence against Indians became a sign of patriotism, as demonstrated by the Paxton Boys.³³

This work adds a new angle to this growing scholarship by considering how peace was established along the frontier through the culture of restraint. The culture of restraint and its language and memory enabled peace to return with spatially closer Indians east of the Appalachian Mountains when the application of military force appeared to be ineffective in the early years of conflict. As Chapter Three demonstrates, however, the spatial issue of not nurturing friendship and trade with distant Indians in the Ohio River Valley limited the effectiveness of the culture of restraint, as tribes receiving French backing continued to raid frontier settlements. Dual application of British military force to evict French power, followed by diplomatic efforts to bring Ohio Indians back into Britain's and Pennsylvania's orbit, show that the culture of restraint had deteriorated and that a culture of violence had become a viable option to secure settlements. After the formal end of the Seven Years' War, Pontiac's War and the

³¹ Anderson, *Crucible of War* (2000); Seymour, *Pennsylvania Associators* (2012).

³² Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008).

³³ Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost* (2009). See also Krista Camenzind, "Violence, Race, and the Paxton Boys," in *Friends and Enemies* (2004), 201-220.

Paxton Boys Rebellion demonstrated again how the dual application of military force and diplomacy established peace on the frontier while also showing that not all groups adhered to a culture of restraint that had begun to lose its ethical component but maintained its symbolism and language.

During the War for American Independence the practices and understanding of restraint continued to be modified as the humanitarian impulse receded with the Quaker withdrawal from the public sphere. Chapter Five, “The Legacy of Restraint,” argues that despite this alteration, the culture’s language and symbolism remained effective and familiar between Americans and Indians to establish peace along Pennsylvania’s frontier. Monographs considering the Pennsylvania frontier and the colony’s military experience, particularly with Indians, during the War for Independence are limited. Colin Calloway treats the Indian voice by discussing the early stages of the conflict along Pennsylvania’s frontier and the Ohio Country, while Eric Hinderaker considers settler land hunger, racial hatred, and disregard for Indian interests in settling the Ohio River Valley.³⁴ The collection of essays in John Frantz’ and William Pencak’s *Beyond Philadelphia* offer valuable studies in the ethnic makeup, perspective, and reaction of Pennsylvania’s settlers to the war, as well as how radicals stemming from the western counties pushed the colony toward independence and silenced Quaker opposition.³⁵ Gregory Knouff offers a similar study, examining Pennsylvania soldiers through lenses of class, race, religion, and their home regions.³⁶

Chapter Five does not provide a traditional military history interpretation, but focuses instead on how peace was maintained and established when violence reached the frontier. This


³⁴ Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires* (1997).

³⁵ Frantz and Pencak, ed., *Beyond Philadelphia* (1998).

³⁶ Knouff, *The Soldiers’ Revolution* (2004).

chapter argues that Quakers were increasingly removed from the public sphere, to the point where Quaker leaders were marched off to an internment camp. As a result the managers of the humanitarian aspect of the culture of restraint did not have any say on frontier policy. Leadership in Congress and Pennsylvania's government used violence when necessary along the frontier, as had been the case in the French and Indian War. Yet when wanting to secure peace with Indians, they invoked the language, memory, and symbolism of the culture of restraint. Though its purpose and the interests of its adherents may have changed, the legacy of this cultural understanding lay in its ability to act as a familiar diplomatic road that reached across Pennsylvania's frontier in order for Americans and Indians to reach a peace following the end of the War for Independence.

FIGURE 1: THE DELAWARE RIVER VALLEY ¹



¹ "Area occupied by the Lenape, 1600" from Marshall Joseph Becker, "Lenape Maize Sales to the Swedish Colonists: Cultural Stability during the Early Colonial Period," in *New Sweden in America*, 129.

CHAPTER ONE: THE BIRTH OF RESTRAINT

Gillis Hossitt stood at the trading house, his fellow Dutchmen out in the fields tending to crops. Standing next to a large mastiff chained to a post, with a sick man laid up on a cot inside, he could see three Indians approaching and carrying beaver skins. Opportunity knocked for trade and profits for his employers. Hossitt invited the Indians inside as he went upstairs to the loft to gather items for bartering. As Hossitt came down the Indians sprung their trap, crashing an ax into his skull, killing him. After dispensing with the helpless sick man, the Indians shot twenty-five arrows into the mastiff, ensuring the war dog would not attack them. With the house cleared, they joined other Indians in the fields. The remaining Dutch suspected nothing as they worked. The ‘friendly’ Indians approached and slayed them all, wiping out the settlement.²

On a warm summer day in 1631, a group of Delaware Indians known as the Big Siconese destroyed the infant Dutch colony at Swanendael following a cultural and diplomatic misunderstanding involving material goods, honor, attempted appeasement, and revulsion to excessive violence. Like other initial European settlements and early conflicts, such as the Dutch in the Hudson River Valley (Kieft’s War) or the English in the Chesapeake (Anglo-Powhatan Wars) and along the Connecticut River (Pequot War), the Delaware River Valley received an early baptism in blood. Yet the attack at Swanendael stands apart in that it remained extremely short, occurring in one day. More importantly, violence of the same intensity did not reoccur in

² David Pietersz. de Vries, “Korte Historiael ende Journaels Aenteyckeninge,” 1655, in *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware, 1630-1707*, ed. Albert Cook Myers (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1959), 17; C. A. Weslager, *Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609-1664* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961), 92, 96-97. For discussion of war dogs in intercultural exchanges and alliances, see Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 49-50.

the subsequent interactions between Indians and Europeans, as both perceived their interests and the state of affairs in such a way that they avoided allowing differences in cultures and local incidents of violence from catching fire and turning into a general war. For the surrounding Indians, especially the Delawares, Swanendael had been a victory and a message stating that they controlled the land. They tolerated future traders as a kind of auxiliary and subordinate alliance partner in order to gain European goods. With a slow and small influx of Europeans thereafter, Indians grew accustomed to the presence of European traders and farmers and coped with it. For those first returning Europeans who had to react to the attack, they viewed Swanendael with shock. Having to rely upon local Indians for information concerning what they viewed as a bloodbath, Europeans remained cautious toward the dangerous unknown that lay farther inland. New to the area, Europeans also sought out trading partners and allies. While they understood the attack at Swanendael in different manners, both Indians and Europeans tolerated one another and engaged in dialogue over cases of endemic violence that resulted from the exchange between differing cultures. Rather than risk losing access to trade and an ally, or endure violence and possibly be evicted from the area, both Indians and Europeans saw value in each other and developed an understanding that kept warfare from breaking out along this early contact frontier, giving birth to a culture of restraint.³

³ Ives Goddard, "Delaware," in vol. 15 of *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. Bruce Trigger (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 215. Jean Soderlund's political and social history, recently released, of the Delaware River Valley prior to William Penn's arrival acknowledges how the attack at Swanendael established Delaware primacy. She explores the ignored narrative of the Delaware River Valley prior to Penn, and argues against the mythology that Indians were easily dominated and Europeans could take up land. This dissertation concurs with Soderlund's argument. Her focus, however, is limited to the Delaware River Valley and early European settlement, with some consideration to Penn's arrival and the Delaware River Valley later into the eighteenth century. This project addresses the security culture of restraint, the lack of a major conflict in Colonial Pennsylvania for much of its history, and the legacy of peace and the culture of restraint when war did break out. Chapter One stresses how Europeans viewed the Delaware River Valley as an economic backwater, and discusses the formation of the security culture of restraint, which then matured with the arrival of the Quakers. See Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 4-8. For discussion of how alliance formation helped to identify and shape the Delawares as a people from pre-Columbian contact through the War for American Independence, see Schutt, *River Valley*, (2007). While Schutt focuses primarily on the Delawares' use of alliances and diplomacy, this dissertation examines the growth, prominence,

In addition to both Europeans and Indians keeping a safe distance in their interactions, the environment that Europeans entered contained the necessary factors for nurturing a restrained security approach with their already established neighbors. Whereas Europeans entering the regions along the Atlantic coast noted above dealt with consolidated and identifiable Indian polities, thus making it easier to exploit them economically or fight them, colonists entering the Delaware River Valley stumbled into a fracture zone where inter-tribal warfare, disease, and the natural dispersion of Delaware bands allowed for small groups of Europeans to establish permanent settlements without being overwhelmed or needing to use military force to remove Indian threats. The multiplicity of Delaware bands, however, inhibited European colonial endeavors in a region that they came to view as an economic backwater. Trading did occur in the Delaware River Valley, but development in an English colonial model, marked by the sense of a secure permanent settlement, expansion of land holdings, and population and economic growth, did not proceed in the early years of European settlement in the Delaware River Valley. Development on this scale brought expected conflict with Indians, and when faced against a dispersed opponent, conjured up undesirable military and financial commitments. Such investment against the scattered Delawares, combined with either lack of attention shown by a home country (Swedes) or already having established, and profitable, settlement areas elsewhere along the Atlantic seaboard (Dutch and English), limited European presence in the Delaware. For the Delaware Indians, who faced the formidable Susquehannock Indians, Iroquois Confederacy, and a growing European presence in the Hudson River Valley and the Chesapeake, they could not afford to turn away potential allies and trading partners. Swanendael had acted as a first

deterioration, and legacy of a shared culture between Indians and European settlers, identified by reliance on diplomacy in order to maintain peace. On alliances between Indians and Europeans in several contact frontiers, see Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness* (2004); Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations* (2008).

blow, demonstrating for the Delawares that they had subjugated the newcomers. With strong opponents all around them, the conquered could now be enrolled as allies.⁴

Swanendael's violence offered the reminder for the New Netherland, New Sweden, and New York governments along the Delaware River and Delaware Bay that security remained paramount for settlers once they stepped off the boat. In the first fifty years of European settlement in the Delaware River Valley, dialogue, not force of arms, became the recognized form by which Europeans, Indians, and their leaders resolved disputes and soothed over local violence. The fur trade proved critical not just for each side to have an economic stake, but also in promoting military alliance and political understanding. Trade, not geographic expansion, came to characterize European interests and interaction in the Delaware Valley. Europeans faced dispersed Indian polities, making it sensible to enjoy trading profits and approach native inhabitants in a restrained manner rather than waste manpower and investment in trying to conquer small, multiple targets. The limited investment by Europeans assisted the possibility for peace in the region by removing the antagonizing force of large-scale settlement. Indians for their part allowed the foreign presence to remain, yet kept it in check to ensure a continued understanding that they stood as the more powerful force in the area. As a result, European settlement in the economic backwater of the Delaware River Valley remained sparse, allowing this fracture zone to foster fifty years of diplomatic and trade interaction and avoid the outbreak of conflict between Indians and Europeans.⁵

⁴ For discussion of fracture zones among Indian communities and how various factors, such as the growth of European settlements, disease, commercial trade, intensified violence, and slavery contributed to Indian instability, see Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Suck-Hall, ed., *Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

⁵ For recent scholarship on the theme of subjugation, alliances, and inter-tribal diplomacy, done through the lens of gender, see Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the Mississippi," *Ethnohistory* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 239-263; Fur, *A Nation of Women*, (2009); Ethan A. Schmidt, "Cockacoeske, Weroansqua of the Pamunkeys, and Indian Resistance in Seventeenth-Century Virginia," *American Indian Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 288-317. Brett Rushforth addresses

The Native Inhabitants of the Delaware River Valley

Indian relations along the Delaware River in New Netherland, New Sweden, and New York revolved around two groups: the Delaware and the Susquehannock. The Algonquian-speaking Delaware Indians lived along the Delaware River and its various tributary waters through modern New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. Rather than a single, unified people, the Delawares during the seventeenth century lived in about forty bands of a few hundred members each, bringing the total population for the tribe to about 8,000-12,000 persons. Thomas Holm, in describing New Sweden, noted the division among the Delawares, as each cohesive village identified itself along a tributary that fed the Delaware River as well as having its own sachem, or chief, over the people.⁶ Though loosely allied for hunts, mutual defense, or diplomatic efforts, the lack of centralized leadership among the Delawares inhibited their ability to both offer strong resistance as Dutch, Swedish, and English settlements began to increase, as well as to carve out a secure place in the early fur trade against Susquehannock competition. By the 1620s, the Delaware Indian population in eastern Pennsylvania had dwindled in the face of hostile Susquehannock incursions, just as the first permanent European settlers began to arrive in the Delaware River Valley. This forced the Delawares to seek allies. It would not be until the

subjugation and the Indian perspective through the lens of slavery in *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slavery in New France* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012). Notable scholarship looking outward from the Indian perspective has been provided by Daniel Richter. See Richter's *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), his provocative work *Facing East from Indian Country* (2003), and *Trade, Land, Power* (2013). Recent scholarship fusing Indian diplomacy and the Indian voice can be seen in Joshua Piker, "Lying Together: The Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural Untruths," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 4 (October 2011): 964-986. Broader discussion of colonial history and American Indians has been provided by James Merrell. For his early thoughts on the state of scholarship of Native Indians in colonial history, see "Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 46, no. 1 (January 1989): 94-119. For his recent consideration, see "Second Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (July 2012): 451-512.

⁶ Thomas Campanius Holm, *Description of the Province of New Sweden: Now Called by the English Pennsylvania in America* (Stockholm, 1702), trans. Peter S. Du Ponceau (Philadelphia: McCarty & Davis, 1834), 46. For additional European observation of Delaware political fragmentation, see the Dutch-Delaware meeting at Printzhoff on 17 June 1654, in Peter Lindeström, *Geographia Americae, with An Account of the Delaware Indians: Based on Surveys and Notes Made in 1654-1656* (1691), trans. Amandus Johnson (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 126-129.

1650s, as Susquehannock power began to wane as a result of the Beaver Wars that the Delawares commanded a greater authority in the fur trade.⁷ From the European perspective, they had entered into a fracture zone and economic backwater. To dominate the river, remove the native threat, and develop economically against the scattered Delawares, Europeans would have to undertake an expensive effort to overcome what appeared to be an insurmountable foe. As a result, Europeans kept sparsely populated settlements along the river and played into the Delawares' desire for tributary allies and economic trading partners.⁸

The Iroquoian-speaking Susquehannock Indians lived along the Susquehanna River and its tributaries, stretching from what is now New York, through central Pennsylvania, and into Maryland. They utilized the river system for transporting goods and conducting trade, notably furs, and as a path for the movement of warriors. Known to the Europeans as the White Minquas, or Minquas (translated as “treacherous”) by their Delaware enemies, the Susquehannocks dominated the fur trade prior to the arrival of Europeans in the Delaware River Valley, exchanging peltry with the Dutch in New Amsterdam and the English in the Chesapeake.⁹ With the arrival of Dutch and Swedish settlers, Susquehannock trading outlets on the Delaware River expanded, bringing them into increasing conflict with Delaware Indians. Like the Delawares, the Susquehannocks sought to gain allies among the European settlers. As both groups sought to bring Europeans closer into their orbit and kinship systems, beaver populations became depleted in the coastal areas, arms and ammunition rose in demand, and the two groups steadily came into conflict over the fur trade along inland waterways. The Susquehannocks came to identify

⁷ During the Beaver Wars, the Iroquois Confederacy sought to expand its position as an intermediary for European market access to furs.

⁸ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 7, 15; Goddard, “Delaware,” 213, 215-216; Marshall Joseph Becker, “Lenape Maize Sales to the Swedish Colonists: Cultural Stability during the Early Colonial Period,” in *New Sweden in America*, 123; Schutt, *River Valleys*, 7-30.

⁹ Amandus Johnson, *The Swedish settlements on the Delaware: their history and relation to the Indians, Dutch and English, 1638-1664: with an account of the South, the New Sweden, and the American companies*, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1911), 188.

themselves as protectors of the Swedes, even attacking New Netherland alongside the Delawares when the Dutch captured New Sweden. Over the course of the seventeenth century, disease, migration, disruption of the wampum trade, and warfare took their toll on the Susquehannocks. By 1698 their numbers had declined from the thousands to an estimated 200-250 people.¹⁰

Warfare and trade competition between Delawares and Susquehannocks did not go unnoticed by Europeans. In July 1634, Englishman Captain Thomas Yong related his conversation with a Delaware Indian along the river:

He told me further that the people of that River were at warre with a certaine Nation called the Minquaos, who had killed many of them, destroyed their corne, and burned their houses; insomuch as that the Inhabitants had wholly left that side of the River, which was next to their enimies, and had retired themselves on the other side farre up into the woods, the better to secure themselves from their enimies.¹¹

European settlements along the banks of Delaware Bay and the Delaware River offered lucrative markets for the Susquehannocks and Delawares to gain European goods. Furthermore, trade solidified alliances between Indians and European traders as well as enhanced the standing of tribal leaders as they distributed gifts. The prizes of European goods and alliance building brought conflict between the Delawares and Susquehannocks in the first years of European settlement in the Delaware River Valley.¹² In this warfare to establish alliances and control the fur trade, the status of “allies” and “clients” among Indians and Europeans shifted. As Susquehannock strength lessened, the Delawares grew to stand as equals and allies with their

¹⁰ Francis Jennings, “Susquehannock,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, 363; Becker, “Lenape Maize Sales,” 123; Goddard, “Delaware,” 220; Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 85-90; Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 44, 119-120, 171-175; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 102-105, 112. Nomenclature for the Minquas varies. Europeans distinguished White and Black Minquas. The White Minquas are held to be the historic Susquehannock group, while Black Minquas are identified as the Erie from the Great Lakes region. When noted as just Minquas, very often primary sources are referencing the Susquehannocks as enemies to the Delaware Indians. See Jennings, “Susquehannock,” 363.

¹¹ Thomas Yong, “Relation of Captain Thomas Yong,” 1634, *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 38.

¹² Lorraine Williams finds that this warfare between natives over the fur trade became a trait for the Delaware River Valley. See Lorraine E. Williams, “Indians and Europeans in the Delaware Valley, 1620-1655,” *New Sweden in America*, 114.

former competitors. While Indian conflict and strength shifted, it did not spill over into Indian-European conflict. Despite Indians fighting each other or Europeans jockeying for position and having small engagements among themselves, the fur trade prevented a general war between Indians and Europeans in the Delaware River Valley because it allowed the opportunity to bridge across cultural differences, obtain allies, and offer assurances of strength and security. The host of players along the Delaware River made it feasible that groups could shift their trading and political loyalties to whomever they perceived as more advantageous. As a result, Dutch, Swedish, and English settlements had the opportunity to establish themselves permanently in an environment that promoted trade and alliance building between Indians and Europeans, rather than hostile removal.¹³

Dutch Arrival in the Delaware River Valley

The Englishman Henry Hudson, under Dutch employ, arrived in Delaware Bay in August 1609, marking the beginning of Dutch exploration of the river valley. For the next decade, Dutch navigators continued to explore the river. Mercantile interests in Holland formed the West India Company on 3 June 1621 to exploit the fur trade within the Hudson and Delaware River Valleys. For the Dutch, their primary purpose in overseas colonies centered on trading profits, rather than permanent and expansive settlement. Violence with native groups varied based on circumstances, but focus remained on trade. Whether in the Hudson and Delaware River Valleys, the Brazilian and Caribbean coast, or the East Indies such as Formosa, the Dutch came to rely

¹³ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 10; Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 85-90; Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 170, 182-183. See also Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection*, 20-21, for discussion on warfare between Indian groups in the Delaware River Valley.

upon native trading networks and reciprocal relationships to ensure relative peace and prosperity.¹⁴

The first attempted European settlements along the Delaware River and Bay occurred in 1624 when Cornelis Jacobsz May planted a short-lived colony of Walloons on modern Burlington island within the river. By 1626, attempts to expand the colony failed, and the settlers withdrew to Manhattan Island under the direction of Peter Minuit. Further to the south, Gillis Hossitt purchased land from a Delaware Indian group, the Big Siconese, on 1 June 1629, receiving a tract of land known as the “South Hook” in exchange for cloth, axes, beads, and other European goods.¹⁵ Hossitt and the first settlers returned in the spring of 1631 to establish Swanendael, a whaling colony along the southeast bank of Delaware Bay at modern day Lewes, Delaware. At some point during the summer of 1631, the attack noted above took place. Dutch authorities in New Amsterdam became aware of the incident and sent word back to Holland, for just before his departure from the Texel in May 1632, Dutch explorer David de Vries noted that their “little fort had been destroyed by the Indians, the people killed—two and thirty men—who were outside the fort working the land.”¹⁶

When de Vries arrived at Swanendael in December, he found a destroyed house, burned palisades, and the skulls and bones of thirty-two men, their cattle, and horses. Well armed, he and his party approached the local Indians cautiously and relied upon their account of what had

¹⁴ Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 11-13, 48. In many ways the West India Company conducted its own policies, as it could appoint administrators, exercise military action by capturing Spanish ships and attacking their colonies, and for the Delaware Valley, conduct diplomacy with natives as well as establish settlements. For literature on Dutch colonies and their interaction with native populations, see the following: Mark Meuwese, “The Opportunities and Limits of Ethnic Soldiering: The Tupis and the Dutch-Portuguese Struggle for the Southern Atlantic, 1630-1657,” and Marjoleine Kars, ““Cleansing the Land”: Dutch-Amerindian Cooperation in the Suppression of the 1763 Slave Rebellion in Dutch Guiana,” in *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World*, ed. Wayne Lee (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Laurence M. Hauptman and Ronald G. Knapp, “Dutch-Aboriginal Interaction in New Netherland and Formosa: An Historical Journal of Empire,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 121, no. 2 (April 1977): 166-182.

¹⁵ Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 84-87.

¹⁶ de Vries, “Journaels,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 8-9; Soderlund, Lenape Country, 36.

occurred. To symbolize Dutch ownership of the land and national honor, Hossitt had the arms of Holland painted onto a piece of metal, and then attached to a post. A Delaware sachem removed the metal with the intent of making tobacco pipes from the sturdy material. The removal of the metal served multiple purposes. From a practical standpoint, the sachem saw an opportunity to make a tobacco pipe that could withstand wear and tear. But from a trading and alliance standpoint, the taking of the metal demonstrated Delaware ownership of the area, and that they viewed the Dutch as a client ally. Furthermore, to share a Delaware fashioned tobacco pipe made from Dutch material offered an opportunity to solidify the Dutch as allies and bring them within the Delaware community. The sachem's intent, however, did not pan out. The Dutch grew angry out of differences in culture and understanding when they witnessed the arms of Holland taken down. Having angered their potential allies, the Delawares killed the sachem in an attempt to appease them, and brought them the severed head. The Dutch viewed the execution as unnecessarily rash behavior, with the severed head as a token of peace being repulsive. The Indians grew angry and confused when the foreigners rejected their peace offering. Indian traditions of diplomacy and reciprocity had been rejected by the potential allies, who were now viewed as a truly foreign and perhaps dangerous newcomer. The Delawares understood they needed to send a message of strength. With the Dutch out in the fields away from the palisades, they attacked.¹⁷

¹⁷ de Vries, "Journaels," *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 15-17; Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 90-97; Lindeström, *Geographia Americae*, 205. Regarding the Swanendael attack, Jean Soderlund argues the Delawares recognized the Dutch planned to establish a large plantation colony. Having gained knowledge from Chesapeake Bay Indians about the impact of European livestock and tobacco economy, the Delawares feared they too would suffer from warfare, seizure of corn, and loss of land. Dutch sources do indicate the intent to plant crops. The extent to which thirty-men had developed a large plantation in a matter of months, however, is unclear. Soderlund finds future Indian-European interaction following Swanendael to be centered on a trade economy. This relationship allows for practices and an understanding to take shape and allow restraint to grow. See de Vries, "Journaels," *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 8; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 35-54; Helen C. Rountree, "Summary and Implications," in *Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1722*, ed. Helen C. Rountree (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 213-214.

Though Hossitt and the Dutch at Swanendael met their fate in blood, the Dutch response, as exemplified by de Vries, the political fragmentation of the Delaware Indians, and Indian willingness to tolerate the return of small groups who brought goods as symbols of deference, all worked to plant the seeds toward bridging over differences in culture and developing a common understanding. For the Dutch, they could not have had a better representative than de Vries in the first interaction with the Delawares. An experienced colonizer, soldier, and merchant, de Vries had sailed to the Dutch East Indies in 1627, and managed posts on Ceylon and the Coromandel Coast before sailing for Holland in December 1629.¹⁸ When he arrived off the Delaware coast in December 1632, de Vries helped to immediately reduce tension between Indians and Europeans. He recorded in his journal that “the Indians came to us with their chiefs, and sitting in a ring, made peace. Gave them some presents of duffels, bullets, hatchets, and various Nuremberg trinkets. They promised to make a present to us, as they had been out a-hunting. They then departed again with great joy of us, that we had not remembered what they had done to us.”¹⁹ For the Delawares, they had concluded peace with a subservient new group and potential ally. Dutch gifts had paid homage to the Indians. This is not to say de Vries held no resentment or did not consider avenging the dead. He continued to note in his journal that the Dutch had to suffer the lack of remorse shown by the Indians “because we saw no chance of revenging it, as they dwelt in no fixed place.”²⁰ De Vries had observed the natural dispersion of the Delawares and could not identify a single Indian community or type of fortification upon which he could focus his

¹⁸ James Homer Williams, “de Vries, David Peitersen,” *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00211.html> (accessed October 8, 2012); Albert Cook Myers, ed., *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware, 1630-1707* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1959), 5.

¹⁹ de Vries, “Journaels,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 17.

²⁰ de Vries, “Journaels,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 17-18.

energies. With only a small party, de Vries saw no option for retaliation without risking becoming cut off and overwhelmed numerically.²¹

The Delawares' lack of centralization presented de Vries with a potentially dispersed opponent in an unknown territory. De Vries recognized the situation and understood that if he pursued a policy of avenging the attack, he could not be guaranteed success. Furthermore, as an experienced trader, to pursue violence would only antagonize the other end of the trading relationship, and limit Dutch access to furs and hurt profits. De Vries' judgment of wanting to secure access to furs and offering tokens of peace, rather than choosing retaliatory violence, acted as the first steps by Europeans, however unbeknownst to them, toward building and accepting a method of interaction with Indians in this region. Though the Dutch remained wary of the Indians and the West India Company did not immediately re-settle the area, an uneasy peace had been achieved, and Dutch traders continued to visit the area to barter.²²

De Vries continued his journey by sailing upriver to the Dutch trading outpost at Ft. Nassau, the installation in the Delaware River Valley that symbolized Dutch presence, Delaware Indian facilitation of the fur trade, and a venue for cultural interaction. Built on the east bank of the Delaware River in present day Gloucester, New Jersey, Ft. Nassau stood well upriver and in

²¹ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 43.

²² Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 58, 66, 75-81, 98-100. Collections held in the Library of Congress' Geography and Map Division offer two maps, written in Dutch and probably created in 1639. Both are dedicated to New Netherland and offer details about the Delaware River's coastline and water depth, as well as surrounding Indian tribes. According to Weslager, Burlington Island where the Walloons settled used to be known as Schoon, and is identified on the maps. No marking of European settlement is indicated aside from Ft. Nassau. With such detail given to navigating the river, and no other noted European settlements despite the arrival of the Swedes in 1638, it is apparent that the Dutch still claimed the Delaware River and stood prepared to return to the area if necessary or if economic opportunity arose. See Joan Vinckeboons, *Caert vande Svydt Rivier in Nieuw Nederland*, (1639?), Call Number: G3291.S12 coll. .H3 Vault : Harr Vol. 3, map 14, and *Pascaert van Nieuw Nederlandt Virginia, ende Nieuw-Engelandt verthonendt alles wat van die landin by See, oft by land is ondeckt oft Bekent*, (1639?), Call Number: G3291.S12 coll. .H3 Vault : Harr Vol. 2, map 7, Library of Congress Geography and Map Division, Washington, DC.

the interior of the Delaware River Valley.²³ The Dutch did not garrison Ft. Nassau year-round; rather, it forsook its title of a “fort” and having a permanent garrison, and remained a trading post temporarily occupied by the Dutch and where Indians could gather and trade skins. De Vries highlighted Ft. Nassau’s function following his visit to Swanendael, recording on 5 January 1633 in his journal, “we weighed anchor in the morning, and sailed before the little fort named Fort Nassau, where formerly some families of the West India Company had dwelt. Some Indians had begun to gather there and wished to barter furs.” De Vries also reported inter-tribal violence while at Ft. Nassau when he came across three Delaware survivors of a Minqua attack. They “had been plundered of all their corn, their houses had been burnt, and they had escaped in great want, compelled to be content with what they could find in the woods, and came to spy out in what way the Minquas had gone away [...] They told us also, that the Minquas had killed about ninety men of the Sankiekans.”²⁴ With failed Walloon and Swanendael settlements, a scattered trading partner in the Delaware Indians, and inter-tribal violence that could potentially spill over and endanger a settlement, the Delaware River Valley came to be seen as a backwater of failed investments and limited profits. This resulted in the Dutch placing their attention at Ft. Orange and New Amsterdam. The Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy presented a trading partner whose centralization could bring forth substantial furs. The Dutch also had to focus their attention and investments along the Hudson to defend themselves against such a powerful Indian polity. With the Dutch focus on the Hudson River, Ft. Nassau’s limited trade over time allowed

²³ Isaack de Rasière, the first secretary of New Netherland, wrote to the Amsterdam Chamber on 23 September 1626, advising that the fort be built on the Delaware for the following reasons: “First, to keep possession of the river, in order that others may not precede us there and erect a fort themselves. Secondly, because, having a fort there, one could control all the trade in the river. Thirdly, because the natives say that they are afraid to hunt in winter, being constantly harassed by war with the Minquaes, whereas if a fort were there, an effort could be made to reconcile them.” As quoted in Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 58-59. De Rasière’s third point demonstrates the Dutch saw an opportunity not only for trade, but to gain an ally. Based on the wording and date of the letter, C. A. Weslager dates Ft. Nassau’s construction in 1626. See Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 122.

²⁴ de Vries, “Journaels,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 24.

for local Delawares to grow accustomed to a small Dutch presence and allow a culture of restraint to develop.

Early Dutch presence in the Delaware River Valley remained limited, as officials focused attention farther north to New Amsterdam and Ft. Orange in the Hudson River Valley. David de Vries' investigation of the loss of Swanendael and Delaware willingness to tolerate new traders as possible allies began a process of Indian and European interaction that developed into an understanding of promoting trade and dialogue, rather than military force. The beginnings of the culture of restraint found a nurturing outpost at Ft. Nassau, where seasonal Dutch trading limited their presence and allowed for local Indians to grow accustomed to having trading partners. South of Ft. Nassau, the arrival of a weak European colonizer brought another player into the economic and political relationships in the region, allowing restraint to develop amidst the need to engage in dialogue and trade with potential allies.

New Sweden

Sweden's colonizing efforts in the New World developed out of royal support and mercantile influence. Gustavus Adolphus came to see trade as a critical source of wealth for Sweden. In the mercantilist theory dominating European trading efforts at the time, alongside the formation of trading companies, any proposal for a Swedish company would find ready support in Gustavus as a matter of national prestige. Following Gustavus' death in 1632, Count Axel Oxenstierna, the Royal Chancellor of Sweden who essentially administered the nation until the young Queen Christina came of age, kept Sweden on the mercantilist path and encouraged noblemen to invest in the New Sweden Company, which formed in 1637. For the company's

overseas director, Oxenstierna and company officials hired Peter Minuit, a man quite experienced with colonization and trade in North America.²⁵

Peter Minuit, probably of French or Walloon ancestry, is most known for his role in solidifying the Dutch presence on Manhattan Island in what is known as New Netherland. As director in the late 1620s, he had reversed the mismanaged colony and saved the Dutch settlement. He organized Dutch participation in the fur trade around New Amsterdam and oversaw the establishment of Ft. Nassau in 1626 for controlling trade on the Delaware River. It was probably through Minuit that de Vries and authorities in Holland learned of the Swanendael attack, for Minuit stopped in Plymouth on 3 April 1632 on his way to Holland, just before de Vries left the Texel in May.²⁶ Having gained notoriety for solidifying Dutch presence at New Amsterdam as well as having a familiarity with the Delaware River, Minuit became a valuable commodity for the establishment of New Sweden and its reliance upon the fur trade for growth. His choice of Minquas Kill for settlement, known later as Christina Kill, reflected his knowledge of the fur trade, for it acted as a highway and terminal point for furs coming from the interior. And with the Dutch having only seasonal attendance at Ft. Nassau, Minuit understood the light presence and weak claims of his former employer. When settlers set sail in August 1637, the

²⁵ Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632*, vol. 2, 1626-1632 (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1958), 123-125; Israel Acrelius, *A History of New Sweden; or, The Settlements on the River Delaware*, trans. William M. Reynolds (Philadelphia: The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1874), 22; James William Homer, "Minuit, Peter," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00612.html> (accessed October 8, 2012). Regarding the link between trade and national wealth, Gustavus frequently remarked, "the welfare of the nation depends on trade and navigation." As quoted in Roberts, *Gustavus*, 120. The Dutchman William Usselinex had promoted the ideals of trade, along with missionary activities, in the formation of a trading company, but was not fully accepted by his countrymen. In passing through the port city of Göteborg, he met with Gustavus for six hours, convincing him of the project. Gustavus authorized Usselinex to form a "General Company for Commerce and Navigation with the Lands of Africa, Asia, America and Magellanica," complete with the abilities to make treaties and alliances, yet only offer self-resistance. Gustavus' campaigns in Germany during the Thirty Years War and his death in 1632, however, hampered momentum for the Company to get off the ground. For discussion of the relationship between mercantilism, Swedish royal policy and support, and Dutch mercantile interests, see Margareta Revera, "The Making of a Civilized Nation: Nation-Building, Aristocratic Culture, and Social Change," and Stellan Dahlgren, "The Crown of Sweden and the New Sweden Company," in *New Sweden in America*. See also Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 58.

²⁶ Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 95.

holds of the *Key of Calmar* and *Bird Griffin* held plants and tools for getting the colony off the ground. Focus centered on the fur trade, however, as ships carried cargoes stuffed with European-made goods to attract Indian interest.²⁷

Arriving in mid-April 1638, the new settlers made their first landing at Paradise Point near Cape Henlopen. Though perhaps unbeknownst to the Swedish and Finnish colonists that they had landed near the site of the Swanendael massacre, they found the location to be pleasant, thus giving its name.²⁸ Minuit directed the party farther up river, choosing Christina Kill as the site for the center of New Sweden. New Sweden's success relied on initial contact and dealings with Indians. In an effort "to maintain peace and amity with the native Indians," the Swedes offered presents to Indian sachems and purchased land from Cape Henlopen to the falls of the Delaware River.²⁹ Minuit and Indian leaders kept peaceful diplomatic relations during land transactions. Minuit's previous experience in New Netherland offered priceless knowledge in Indian relations as the Swedish settlers moved forward in acquiring land and keeping peace with natives. For the Indians, their various identities during the transactions demonstrate a shared knowledge and approval of gaining new trading partners and allies. According to an affidavit given by four crewmen from the *Key of Calmar*, the Delawares had several sachems present, including the prominent Mattahorn. The Swedes also treated with the Susquehannocks, whose aggressiveness and success over the Delawares allowed them to be present at the deliberations as

²⁷ Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Scandinavian Colonists Confront the New World," *New Sweden in America*, 89, 94-95; Charles T. Gehring, "Hodie Mihi, Cras Tibi: Swedish-Dutch Relations in the Delaware Valley," *New Sweden in America*, 94-95.

²⁸ Holm, *New Sweden*, 40.

²⁹ Holm, *New Sweden*, 68.

the stronger Indian party.³⁰ Both groups understood that the arrival of the Swedes offered potential trade as well as a subordinate ally who could further their own interests.

Though initial dealings with Indians had been peaceful, Minuit understood the necessity for achieving physical security in addition to diplomatic security. He had Ft. Christina, named after the present Queen Christina, built on the west side of the Delaware River, near the mouth of Christina Kill at what is present Wilmington, Delaware.³¹ The site remained at some distance from the weak Dutch presence at Ft. Nassau farther upriver, but its critical location along a trade avenue from the interior of Pennsylvania that brought beaver pelt supplies gave the Swedes the upper hand and preferred bargaining status in trade, especially with the Susquehannocks who came to view themselves as the protectors of the Swedes.³² The Dutch gave a weak response to the Swedish incursion into what they viewed as their territory. Despite the reputation that he would develop in inciting war with the Delaware Indians around Manhattan in a conflict that bears his name, William Kieft, Director-General of New Netherland, sent only a protest to the Swedes on 6 May 1638, claiming “that the whole South river of the New Netherlands, both above and below, hath already, for many years, been our property, occupied by our forts, and sealed with our blood.”³³ Kieft’s reference to Ft. Nassau and the incident at Swanendael illustrates that for the Dutch, their efforts and losses made them believe that they had a sense of ownership and entitlement to the river and to its profitable fur trade. In facing a new European

³⁰ Mattahorn remained a key Delaware leader, conducting diplomacy and land purchases with the Europeans, including Peter Stuyvesant in 1651. See “Affidavit of Four Men from the *Key of Calmar*,” (1638), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 86-88; Acrelius, *History*, 23-24.

³¹ Acrelius, *History*, 24.

³² Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 102-105; Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 120.

³³ As quoted in Acrelius, *History*, 26; Samuel Willard Crompton, “Kieft, Willem,” *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00479.html> (accessed October 8, 2012). David de Vries’ knowledge, understanding, and value in Indian relations continued to be displayed in his council offered on the eve of Kieft’s War. Prior to the massacre of Weckquaskee Indians at Pavonia on the night of 25-26 February 1643, de Vries warned Kieft, “Let this be your work alone. You wish to break the mouths of the Indians, but you will also murder our own nation.” As quoted in Laramie, *The European Invasion of North America*, 61.

competitor, the Dutch did not want the Swedes to cut into their profits. With the establishment of Ft. Christina in relation to Ft. Nassau, the jockeying for position and control for the river and trade had begun between the Swedes and Dutch. It gained momentum with the arrival of Johan Printz, a military man whose desire for redemption, following a court-martial after he surrendered the city of Chemnitz during the Thirty Years' War, rivaled that of his own girth.³⁴

After his arrival on 15 February 1643 and beginning the construction of a series of fortifications, Johan Printz focused on trade and diplomacy to achieve security.³⁵ For the Swedes, if they could bring the Indians within their trading orbit through favorable prices in comparison to the Dutch, then they could better assure their security because Indians would want to keep this market available. This became easier said than done. Indians understood that the lack of ship arrivals meant little cargoes for the fur trade, and thus gifts being withheld. As rulers over the river and commanding diplomatic weight over the recently arrived Swedes, the Indians viewed

³⁴ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 58. Acknowledged as a lieutenant-colonel from the Thirty Years War, Printz had served in the French and Austrian armies before joining the Swedish army in 1625. He lost his command after he surrendered at Chemnitz in 1640. Similar to John Smith in Jamestown, Printz ruled as a kind of dictator, using an iron fist to maintain the colony in the face of external threats and with little support from the home country. Known as "Big Belly" by natives, Printz is believed to have weighed 400 pounds, a feature no doubt adding to his commanding presence. See Amandus Johnson, ed., "Johan Björnsson Printz, A Biography," *Johan Printz*, 47; "The Instruction to Johan Printz," *Johan Printz*, 62; Dorothy Rowlett Colburn, "Printz, Johan Bjornsson," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00760.html> (accessed October 8, 2012).

³⁵ Instructed by Swedish officials to maintain peace and exercise restraint with Indians, bring the Indians into the Swedish orbit through a secure fur trade, control the river and trade traffic, and keep cordial relations with Dutch and English parties, Printz immediately began a program of fort construction throughout New Sweden to secure Swedish presence. Ft. Elfsborg broke ground on 1 March 1643, and by 6 May, ships were forced to strike their colors before the fort's cannon. The fort had achieved its purpose for keeping watch over the English settlers along a little stream known as Varkens Kill in modern New Jersey, while also securing and closing off the Delaware River. Ft. Elfsborg would eventually be abandoned following an infestation of mosquitoes that proved too much to bear for the Swedes. Within the river on Tinicum Island, Printz built a fort called New Göteborg, as well as his residence, appropriately named the Printzhoff. To protect settlers from possible Indian attack, a blockhouse was built at Upland, in what is present Chester, Pennsylvania. And along the Schuylkill River at present day Philadelphia, the Swedes built Nya Korsholm, a secure post built of logs, filled up with sand and stones, and surrounded by sharp palisades. Located at the termination of a Susquehannock Indian trail, Nya Korsholm provided the Swedes with another position to be the first market for beaver pelts, outmaneuvering the Dutch at Ft. Nassau. See Johnson, "Printz, A Biography," *Johan Printz*, 24-25; Acrelius, *History*, 45-46; Holm, *New Sweden*, 79-80; "Report to the Right Honorable West India Company in Old Sweden, sent from New Sweden on February 20, 1647," *Johan Printz*, 131; Colburn, "Printz". Additional discussion of Printz's fortification projects can be found in Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection*, 29-31. For Printz's instructions from Swedish officials concerning his governance of New Sweden, see "Instruction to Johan Printz," *Johan Printz*, 66-86; Acrelius, *History*, xiv-xv, 35.

themselves as the stronger ally and believed that the Swedes had not provided due homage and support after being allowed to settle. Under the reign of Queen Christina, royal support for New Sweden tapered off. Similar to the Dutch perception of the Delaware being an economic backwater not worth the investment, Sweden did not regularly sustain its colony. The financial pressures from the era of the Thirty Years' War and war with Denmark made investment in New Sweden seem to be an unsustainable burden.³⁶ This lack of attention and investment caused Printz to constantly fret about security. Ten years after his arrival, Printz still found that peace necessitated a trading relationship with Indians, writing, "the country may be relieved with a ship of supplies, so that we might keep the peace with the Savages, for if the Savages are compelled to seek elsewhere for cargoes, then the peace will have an end between them and us."³⁷ Sparsely populated, New Sweden had nothing else to offer the Indians aside from European goods. If the flow of trading supplies into New Sweden slackened, then the Dutch rose in higher favor with the ruling surrounding Indians, leaving the Swedes to live in fear.³⁸

Despite having built a system of fortifications, Printz and the Swedish colonists remained wary of their security. The governor viewed numbers as a sign of strength. His first observations after his arrival noted the colony's stretched population, "And above all things it is exceedingly necessary that people be sent here, together with other means through which we may be secure in case of hostile attacks and be able to maintain and retain our positions."³⁹ New Sweden hung on precariously, for within Printz's first year as governor, twenty of the colony's one hundred men died.⁴⁰ Local Delawares reasserted their authority in the area, hoping to maintain their stronger position and keep the Swedes within their sphere of influence as allies and trading partners. In

³⁶ Colburn, "Printz".

³⁷ "Printz to Brahe, December 1, 1653," *Johan Printz*, 193.

³⁸ "Printz to Brahe, August 1, 1650," *Johan Printz*, 178; Acrelius, *History*, 54.

³⁹ "Printz to Oxenstierna, April 14, 1643," *Johan Printz*, 154.

⁴⁰ Colburn, "Printz".

his report dated 11 June 1644, Printz commented that Indians along the river, namely the Delawares, murdered a man and wife in their bed and several days later killed two soldiers and a workman. Based on Printz's report, he had offered assurances to the Indians that more people, goods, and ships would arrive. Yet when only one ship arrived and offered no surplus of people, the Indians grew "proud" at Printz's broken promise and punished the Swedes. In addition to the broken promise, the Indians understood the lack of ships as not bolstering the strength of the Swedes, who thus remained a weak ally for the Delawares in their struggle against the Susquehannocks. The Delawares, however, allowed the Swedes to remain with Printz's assurances, for the Indians would gain nothing from removing a trading partner. If anything, removing the Swedes would be costly for the Delawares, who would have to attack fortifications. For his part, Printz wanted to break "the necks of all of them in this River" if only a couple hundred soldiers were sent to him. He wanted to remove the perceived Indian threat with military force in order to secure New Sweden, and felt it prudent to take care of the business now before they inflicted harm. With the Delawares checking the degree to which they punished the Swedes, and Printz constrained from removing the Indian threat, a sense of restraint continued to grow.⁴¹

War had not broken out, but the Swedes understood they had few options to ensure their viability along the Delaware River. They relied on shipments to continue the fur trade, and with a small population, they could not afford to offend the neighboring Indians. Despite wanting to remove the Indians through military means, Printz understood the same numerical situation that faced de Vries. With limited manpower, he could not venture far beyond his forts against a

⁴¹ Holm, *New Sweden*, 137; "Relation to the Noble West Indian Company in Old Sweden, despatched from New Sweden on June 11, Anno 1644," *Johan Printz*, 116-118; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 70. Printz offers small clues to differentiating between the Susquehannocks, or Minquas, and the Delawares. Minquas are specifically designated and are discussed as having conflict with Maryland and being better warriors over the Indians in the Delaware River Valley. The dispersed nature of the Delawares in the river valley supports why Printz fails to offer a name or title like he did for the Susquehannocks or Minquas. See *Johan Printz*, 116-118, 131, 152-153.

scattered opponent, lest he be cut to pieces. Just as Delaware division and wanting to keep allies for support against the Susquehannocks restrained the natives, on the other end the perception by Swedish officials of the Delaware River Valley as an economic backwater restrained the Swedes. Rather than risk the loss of manpower and treasure in the New World when war in Europe demanded attention, investment in New Sweden remained light. With limited options, the colonists ironically came to rely on the Dutch for goods to remain secure in the fur trade and with the Indians. In a letter to Axel Oxenstierna, Printz wrote, "With the Savages we have hitherto practiced peace, as long as our cargoes lasted, but when they run out there is no friendship any longer with the Savages either, and for this reason as well as for the support of the people we have been obliged to purchase a small cargo through a draft to be paid in Holland."⁴² Cooperation between the small Dutch and Swedish presence in the Delaware River Valley helped keep both settlements secure and avoided a conflict with Indians, thus allowing restraint to continue to grow in this contact frontier.

Swedish-Dutch relations during the 1640s maintained an official sense of protest and defiance, but underneath the surface both sides relied upon each other for their security, particularly in the face of a common English opponent. Prior to Printz's arrival and subsequent fortification building project, Jan Jansen Van Ilpendam, the Dutch commissary at Ft. Nassau, received orders on 22 May 1642 to drive out, either peaceably or with force, the English from a fortified post they had constructed on the Schuylkill and to demolish the installation. Printz's arrival in 1643 and the construction of Ft. Elfsborg assisted the Dutch in closing off the Delaware to the English. In June of that year George Lamberton and John Thickpenny sailed up the Christina River and traded with Indians. Printz had the men arrested and tried before sending them back to New Haven. According to the court proceedings of 10 July 1643, Jansen acted as a

⁴² "Printz to Oxenstierna, April 26, 1643," *Johan Printz*, 188.

member of the jury, linking the Dutch to the case. Jansen's participation in the courtroom is important in considering how local Europeans, Printz and Jansen, cooperated together to ensure they remained viable players in the fur trade and at the same time keep them as worthwhile allies for Indian groups.⁴³

However, the fur trade remained the main prize for the Dutch and Swedes, and the good times between them did not last forever. Both sides jockeyed continually for position and to gain favorable trading terms. Printz commented that the Dutch threatened Swedish trade and the integrity of Swedish settlement, while Andries Hudde, having replaced the agreeable and cooperative Jan Jansen as the Dutch Commissary on the Delaware in 1644, observed that Swedish fortifications closed off the Delaware and acted as termination points for trade. As it stood New Sweden held control of the river under the guidance of Johan Printz and the forts built under his watch.⁴⁴

Warfare between the Swedes and Indians did not break out due to New Sweden's limited development and Indian desires to incorporate the Swedes as allies. Peter Minuit made good first impressions with Indians. Though he constructed a string of fortifications, Johan Printz identified

⁴³ Acrelius, *History*, 58; Harry M. Ward, "Van Ilpendam, Jan Jansen," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00915.html> (accessed October 8, 2012); "Proceedings of Court at Fort Christina on July 10, 1643," *Johan Printz*, 229-243. In a letter received from English Governor John Winthrop dated 22 April 1644, Printz made a note demonstrating Swedish-Dutch cooperation in stopping another incident involving the English. Winthrop wrote that he had sent William Aspenwald to define the western boundaries of the English claims as well as to trade with the natives. Printz stated that the Dutch, under the command of Jansen, had stopped the English at Ft. Nassau, and noted that he had secretly discussed the matter with the Dutch, "in order that all the blame should not fall on me. And the idea of the Puritans was this: to erect a fort above our post at Zanchikan and [equip and] garrison it with people and cannon and then to strengthen their position there, so as to draw themselves the entire profit of the River here. They brought with them 14 well armed fellows [as well as muskets], bullets and powder enough." See Printz's notes on "Winthrop to Printz, April 22, 1644," *Johan Printz*, 220-222.

⁴⁴ Beauchamp Plantagenet, "A Description of the Province of New Albion," (1648), vol. 2 in *Tracts and Other Papers, Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the Colonies in North America, from the Discovery of the Country to the Year 1776*, ed. Peter Force (New York: Peter Smith, 1947), 19; "Report to the Right Honorable West India Company," *Johan Printz*, 131-134. Andries Hudde noted that the Swedish fortification along the Schuylkill River, Nya Korsholm, "cannot, in any manner whatever, control the River, but it has command over the whole Kill, while this Kill is the only remaining avenue for trade with the Minquas, without which trade the River is of little value." See "Report of Andries Hudde, Commissary on the Delaware, November 7, 1645," *Instruction for Johan Printz*, 255-257; Harry M. Ward, "Hudde, Andries," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00429.html> (accessed October 8, 2012).

the fur trade as critical for keeping the Swedish settlement viable, even to the point where he worked with the friendly Dutch official Jan Jansen to secure Swedish and Dutch presence in the Delaware River Valley. Isolated violence remained present, however. The Delawares killed settlers as a punishment when ships failed to arrive. Yet warfare did not break out. Indians did not want to completely remove a trade source and ally who they viewed as within their sphere of influence, while Printz had no military options against a dispersed and more numerous Indian opponents. As a result, a willingness to trade and engage in dialogue continued to materialize and contributed to a growing mutual understanding of restraint. The circumstances changed, however, as the Europeans increased their competition for control of the Delaware River Valley when the Dutch welcomed their own military-minded man.

Dutch Control of the Delaware River

Peter Stuyvesant reinvigorated the Dutch presence on the Delaware River. An experienced soldier who had lost his leg in battle, Stuyvesant imposed authoritarian rule upon his arrival as governor of New Netherland in 1647, and the era of cooperation between the Swedes and Dutch waned quickly.⁴⁵ In 1651, Stuyvesant moved to challenge Swedish control and gain the upper hand in the fur trade on the Delaware. Upon purchasing land south of Minquas Kill from the Delawares, Stuyvesant had Ft. Casimir constructed at present-day New Castle, its position along the Delaware lying between the Swedish posts of Ft. Christina on the west bank and Ft. Elfsborg on the east bank. The jockeying for position along the Delaware and for the fur trade had resumed, this time with the Dutch gaining the lead. Printz found himself outflanked, writing to Oxenstierna that Ft. Casimir had taken control of the river, prevented commerce and

⁴⁵ Peter Stuyvesant came from a military background and had previous administrative experience, serving as director general of Curaçao and adjacent islands. While leading an assault against the Spanish fort on St. Martin in April 1644, Stuyvesant suffered a severe wound to his right leg, requiring an amputation and a resulting peg leg. See Paul Otto, "Stuyvesant, Peter," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00866.html> (accessed October 8, 2012).

the collection of tolls, and invited Swedish settlers to declare loyalty to the Dutch. Furthermore, Printz believed that Stuyvesant's actions had drawn the Susquehannocks away from the Swedes in the fur trade. Printz viewed the Susquehannocks as more powerful than the Delawares. To lose the Susquehannocks as a trading partner brought the risk that they could also turn against the Swedes. Perhaps unbeknownst to Printz, the Susquehannocks had grown weaker, which had allowed the Delawares to view themselves as equals to their once superior neighbors. The Susquehannocks, having grown weaker, saw the Dutch resurgence as offering more trade and alliance opportunities, not necessarily abandonment of the Swedes. Despite Printz's protest, Stuyvesant and the Dutch could not be uprooted.⁴⁶

A change in Swedish leadership turned the growing tension between the Swedes and Dutch into a larger conflict between the Europeans along the Delaware. Printz departed New Sweden in the fall of 1653. His replacement, Johan Rising, arrived as governor in May 1654. Having no prior military training, Rising's first actions as governor initiated the course of events that removed Swedish governance from the Delaware River.⁴⁷ On 21 May, Rising landed about thirty soldiers under the command of Swen Schute, who stormed and captured Ft. Casimir against a weak Dutch garrison.⁴⁸ Rising's action removed the Dutch from the Delaware River Valley, but it came with a price. While the presence of military men such as Printz and Stuyvesant would theoretically increase the likelihood of violence along the Delaware, their

⁴⁶ Acrelius, *History*, 44-45; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 102; Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 167-183. Printz's evidence for Swedish claims included letters from Queen Christina of Sweden, copies of Indian deeds, verbal confession from Indians, and testimony of three Christian Indians. See "Printz to Oxenstierna, August 1, 1651," *Johan Printz*, 181-182. In 1648 the Dutch built Ft. Beversreed, known as "beaver road," farther inland along the Schuylkill River to be the first contact point with Susquehannock traders. Printz had countered the move with placing Nya Korsholm right in front of the Dutch installation, negating its position. Ft. Beversreed, along with Ft. Nassau, would be abandoned in favor of Ft. Casimir. See Philip S. Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, *A History of Pennsylvania*, 2nd ed. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), 11.

⁴⁷ Dorothy Rowlett Colburn, "Rising, Johan Classon," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00781.html> (accessed October 8, 2012).

⁴⁸ Lindeström, *Geographia Americae*, 87-88.

experiences had taught them the great energies and possible ramifications involved in a military venture, especially against dispersed Delaware Indians, and contributed to their restraint along the Delaware. Rising, having no military background, approached the military situation on the Delaware with unchecked confidence. Printz had left, but in New Amsterdam a brooding Stuyvesant began gathering resources and prepared to launch an expedition against the reckless Rising and Swedish authority.⁴⁹

As Stuyvesant prepared his retaliation against the taking of Ft. Casimir, now Ft. Trinity, Rising consolidated his position with both the Delawares and the Susquehannocks, who had grown to become equals and allies. The Delawares maintained their patience with the Swedes despite murmurings and occasional violent prods. Ten Delaware sachems met with Rising at the Printzhoff on Tinicum Island on 17 June 1654, where they renewed their league of friendship and sense of alliance with a trading partner of the previous fifteen years. Though they complained of evils that had fallen upon them since the Swedes' arrival (perhaps disease), the sachems accepted the gifts presented by the Swedes, and recognized them as being a good people offering friendship. Both sides agreed to warn each other of pending violence and threats.⁵⁰ Trade with the Susquehannocks also remained critical, as Rising reported on 13 July 1654, "Concerning the trade, it can be said, that it would be the most important thing in the country, if we only had enough cargo to draw the beaver trade to us from the Minquas and from the Black Minquas, which buy up both our ordinary cargo and also silk and satin cloth, hats and other things."⁵¹ He continued to note that the English, notably Maryland, had not gained favor with the Susquehannocks, and that the Swedes had the best credit. With the Dutch presence removed, the

⁴⁹ Acrelius, *History*, 63; Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 11-13.

⁵⁰ Acrelius, *History*, 54; Holm, *New Sweden*, 74-77; Lindeström, *Geographia Americae*, 126-129; Colburn, "Rising".

⁵¹ Johan Rising, "Report of Governor Johan Rising," (1654), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 143.

Swedes commanded the fur trade along the Delaware River Valley and provided a market, as well as the role of an ally, that ensured peace.

Relations with the Delawares deteriorated within one year of Rising's arrival. The Delaware River Valley continued to be viewed as an economic backwater and investment in New Sweden remained minimal. With the lack of growth and limited goods to act as a reminder of the alliance, the Delawares turned to the Dutch in New Amsterdam who offered better prices.⁵² As a result, the Delawares could afford to shop around and appear more abrupt with the Swedes. Rising relied on the Susquehannocks to counteract the more immediate Delaware threats. Despite good relations with the Susquehannocks, who called themselves protectors of the Swedes along the South River, the Scandinavians could not persuade their allies to relieve Delaware Indian pressures on Swedish settlements. Susquehannock strength had deteriorated and they could not flex their muscle to influence the Delawares as they once did.⁵³ With the Delawares remaining in close proximity to the Swedish settlements, Rising commented on Swedish fears in his report dated 14 June 1655:

Our neighbors the Renappi threaten not only to kill our people in the land and ruin them, before we can become stronger and prevent such things, but also to destroy even the trade, both with the Minques and the other savage nations, as well as with the Christians. We must daily buy their friendship with presents, for they are and continue to be hostile, and worse than they have been hitherto.⁵⁴

While he may not have known actual comparisons of strength, Rising's report spoke of rough equality between the Delawares and Susquehannocks, and that the Delawares no longer felt as subordinates to their neighbors to the west. The lack of Susquehannock influence, combined with the limited investment made by Europeans up to this point, meant the Delawares could lean on

⁵² Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 71, 81; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 65.

⁵³ Johan Rising, "Report of Governor Johan Rising," (1655), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 159; Jennings, "Susquehannock," 365.

⁵⁴ Rising, "Report," (1655), 156-157.

the Swedes and trade with Dutch prices. Rising understood the peril of his situation. Despite having good trade relations with the Susquehannocks, he felt uneasy with the immediate surrounding Delawares because he understood the need for more goods to keep New Sweden as a worthwhile trading partner and ally. He implored the home country for assistance, “If succor now is long delayed, then our affairs will have a short end and we shall all be ruined among so many jealous people and persecutors, for we sit here already as though we had hands and feet tied.”⁵⁵ Restraint continued despite Swedish fears and deterioration of Delaware relations. Rising had no platform from which to dictate terms and the Delawares could keep the Swedes present to help drive down costs with the competing Dutch.

Fifteen months after Rising’s swift removal of the Dutch from the Delaware, the consequences of his actions appeared off the horizon. On 30 August 1655 seven Dutch ships sailed from Manhattan Island, while 600-700 soldiers marched overland to the Delaware River Valley. Stuyvesant’s impressive expedition had one goal in mind: to remove Swedish governance from the river. Ft. Trinity surrendered on 1 September, and after a short siege, Ft. Christina lowered its colors on 15 September. The surrender terms allowed all settlers to depart if they wished, and offered Swedish forces to sail away with military honors. Those who stayed had to declare their allegiance before Stuyvesant, as Director-General of New Netherland, and could “remain as freemen at this South River of New Netherland and to gain their livelihood as good and free inhabitants.”⁵⁶ Swedish authority had been removed, and the Dutch began to consolidate their gains, both in territory and now as the sole market in the fur trade along the Delaware River.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Rising, “Report,” (1655), 160.

⁵⁶ “The Oath of Allegiance for those Swedes Deciding to Stay at the South River,” *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 46.

⁵⁷ The good relations between the Susquehannocks and their Swedish trading partners remained true, as the Indians warned the Swedes of the Dutch expedition, allowing them to reinforce Ft. Trinity. Stuyvesant first landed his

Restraint continued to mark Indian relations with Dutch authorities in the Delaware River Valley from 1655 until the English conquest of New Netherland in 1664. When isolated violence in the area of New Amstel threatened to unravel peace, the circumstances faced by Indians limited their reaction and ultimately showed that restraint and maintenance of both the fur trade and allies to be the favorable option.⁵⁸ Letters from William Beekman, Vice-Director along the Delaware River, to Peter Stuyvesant, now back in New Amsterdam, in January and February of 1660 related events where Europeans murdered two Delawares and a Susquehannock Indian, causing anger among the Indians who threatened the settlers of New Amstel.⁵⁹ He warned

soldiers at the abandoned Ft. Elfsborg, where he arrayed and organized his forces. He then landed his troops on the west bank at Strand Point just north of Ft. Trinity, cutting off communication and reinforcements from Ft. Christina. The Swedish commander at Ft. Trinity, Swen Schute, offered no resistance and surrendered. Stuyvesant then turned his attention to Ft. Christina and prepared for a siege. As Dutch soldiers and engineers advanced their siege lines and cannon toward the fort, Stuyvesant plundered the surrounding area, including the Printzhoff, and imprisoned messengers, sent by Rising, for acting as spies. Lacking powder after reinforcing Ft. Trinity, Rising surrendered. See Johan Rising, "Relation of the Surrender of New Sweden, By Governor Johan Clason Rising," (1655), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 170-176; Acrelius, *History*, 72-73; Holm, *New Sweden*, 85-86, 116-117; Lindström, *Geographia Americae*, 259-273; Kupperman, "Scandinavian Colonists," 105. Days after the fall of New Sweden, the Susquehannocks demonstrated their alliance and claim as protectors of the Swedes by attacking New Netherland, in what is known as the Peach War. The Delawares, as equal allies and also because they had lost a trading market to gain favorable prices, also participated in the attacks. Indian attacks centered on the Hudson River Valley because it symbolized the seat of Dutch power and because Dutch strength had temporarily shifted to the Delaware River Valley in conquering New Sweden. See Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 104-105; Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 167-183. On the shift of the Swedish national identity to an ethnic identity, associated with customary rights and privileges of their community, following the capture of New Sweden, see Thompson, *The Contest for the Delaware Valley* (2013).

⁵⁸ A note on the names and changing ownership of Ft. Casimir, Ft. Trinity, and New Amstel: In 1651, Stuyvesant established Ft. Casimir at present day New Castle, under the control of the West India Company. Rising's capture of Ft. Casimir in 1654 brought the temporary name change to Ft. Trinity, only to return to Ft. Casimir with the Dutch recapture in 1655. The name Ft. Casimir remained until 1656, when the name New Amstel began to supplant it. Because of financial losses, the Company sold Ft. Casimir/New Amstel and lands between the Christina River and Bombay Hook to the city of Amsterdam in 1656. The city continued to expand its land titles along the Delaware in 1663, when it purchased the Company's remaining titles along the river. The Director-General maintained control over the Delaware's security, yet answered to the burgomasters of the city of Amsterdam. The English capture of New Netherland in 1664 brought another name change to Ft. Casimir/New Amstel, now known as New Castle. Despite a brief resurgence of the name New Amstel under Dutch reoccupation from 1673-1674, New Castle has remained the name of the settlement area. Regarding Ft. Christina, Dutch conquest in 1655 brought the name Ft. Altena. Often shortened to just Altena, the name remained until the English conquest in 1664, and would take on the name Wilmington in 1739 when the city was chartered by the Crown. See A. R. Dunlap, *Dutch and Swedish Place-Names in Delaware* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1956), 23-24, 28, 44; Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 102-103; City of Wilmington, Delaware, "City History," <http://www.ci.wilmington.de.us/visitors/cityhistory> (accessed November 8, 2012).

⁵⁹ "Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant," (January 21, 1660), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 186; "Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant," (February 3, 1660), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 188.

Stuyvesant, “This affair will certainly cause us some trouble here because it is said that the Indians intend to take vengeance on the people of New Amstel. I was there yesterday and found that the people who were living outside of town had fled to houses near the fort.”⁶⁰ While these murders could have incited Indian retaliation and perhaps unleashed violence on a par with the Swanendael attack, Indian warfare and politics required toleration of Dutch governance in the Delaware River Valley. Former Swedish allies still remained, though the Dutch administered the region. Furthermore, the Susquehannocks and Delawares had allied in the Beaver Wars against the Iroquois. In fighting a common foe and having a market of goods and allies in the Delaware River Valley, the Susquehannocks and Delawares bridled their anger and did not pursue a greater conflict in response to local violence.⁶¹

Though the Dutch and the Swedes, now living under Dutch jurisdiction, feared the neighboring Indians, a sense of dependency grew between Indians and non-English Europeans in opposition to the common English threat, similar to how Swedish and Dutch officials worked together to thwart English advances. While the Dutch and Swedes preferred restraint through diplomacy and trade, Maryland pursued an aggressive policy with the Delawares and Susquehannocks. Beeckman’s letter from 10 June 1661 stated that “these River chiefs do not trust the English; they do not want to go there as they have told Andries Hudde and Jacob Swens; saying: “the English have killed some of us and we some of them,” thus pithing [sic] one against

⁶⁰ “Beeckman to Stuyvesant,” (February 3, 1660), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 188.

⁶¹ Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations*, 167; Jennings, “Susquehannock,” 365; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 104. Neither the Dutch nor the Swedes attempted to resettle the southeast bank of Delaware Bay following the Swanendael attack. The name Swanendael fell into disuse, replaced by Hoerenkil, or “Harlot’s Creek.” Attention returned to the area in 1657, when two ships carrying Englishmen wrecked off Hoerenkil, who were then captured by local Indians. Though the Dutch ransomed fourteen Englishmen, the boldness of the Indians, combined with a growing threat of English incursions, moved the Dutch to purchase the area between Cape Henlopen and Bombay Hook and extend the boundary to the west for thirty miles. This area encompasses much of the Delaware coastal region on the western bank of the bay. Stuyvesant ordered a fort be built to secure Hoerenkil, and in 1659 “the Company’s fort” was built. See Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 100-102; Acrelius, *History*, 92-94.

the other.”⁶² English pressure and abrasiveness caused the Delawares and the Susquehannocks to look increasingly to their Dutch and Swedish allies, who through Swanendael and years of trading and providing gifts, however infrequent, had appeared as subordinate allies to the Indians. The Indians found a sense of security and readily dealt with the Europeans along the Delaware, rather than those in northern Chesapeake Bay.⁶³

During the last years of Dutch authority along the Delaware River prior to the English conquest in 1664, the Dutch observed continued inter-tribal warfare, now between the Susquehannocks and the Iroquois, and fretted about the fur trade as the lifeline to their security. Beekman wrote to Stuyvesant on 10 July 1661 acknowledging that “the Minquas and Sinnecus

⁶² “Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (June 10, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 235.

⁶³ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 110-111. Maryland’s ties to the early security culture along the Delaware River Valley are linked by its territorial claims and its relations with the Susquehannocks. When chartered in 1632 and first settled in 1634, Maryland’s officials appeared unaware of the earlier Dutch presence at Ft. Nassau or Swanendael. As a result, the proprietary Calvert family maintained that present-day Delaware fell within its chartered territory, but would not seek to make good on it until 1659. Meanwhile, Maryland declared war against the Susquehannocks in 1642 and launched a campaign in 1643. Two expeditions launched by Maryland had mixed results. The first frightened the Susquehannocks who fled at European firearms, but the second resulted in the Marylanders being routed with two cannons and fifteen men captured. During this relatively inactive war, the English grew in suspicion of the Europeans along the Delaware for instigating and arming the Indians through the fur trade. The Susquehannocks sued for peace with Maryland in 1652 due to the pressure faced by the Iroquois in the Beaver Wars. Francis Jennings argues that in return for arms and a secure southern flank, the Susquehannocks ceded territory around Chesapeake Bay. Maryland, at peace with the Susquehannocks, could now turn its attention to the Dutch, and looked to use their new, uneasy, and supposed allies to put pressure on the Delaware Indians and Dutch authority. For the Susquehannocks, while they had made peace with the English in Maryland, it did not necessarily mean they had become fast allies, for the Susquehannocks still had to consider pressure emanating from the Iroquois to the north and the value in maintaining good relations and trade with the Dutch along the Delaware.

In May and June of 1661, the Delawares’ ties to the Dutch government grew stronger following the murder of three Englishmen and a Dutchman. Though a Dutchman had been killed, Director d’Hinoyossa released the culprits, resulting in protest from Maryland for the lack of justice shown in regards to the dead Englishmen. D’Hinoyossa understood that a single murder of a Dutchman was not worth a larger retaliation and most likely made gestures of reconciliation with the Indians. Vice-Director Beekman, in writing to Stuyvesant on 27 May, found that d’Hinoyossa saw little danger in the English coming for revenge, as it would risk war over the “malicious supposition” that the Dutch were encouraging Indian aggression. Several days later, another Beekman letter stated that “the Indians here are very fearful of the coming of the English.”

For documentation concerning Maryland’s earliest ties to the Delaware River Valley, see the following: “Protest of Officials on the South River against Nathaniel Utie,” (September 9, 1659), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 150-152; “Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (September 21, 1659), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 157; “Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (May 27, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 233; “Letter from Willem Beekman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (May 31, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 234; “Letter from Petrus Stuyvesant to Willem Beekman and Jacob Alrichs,” (September 23, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 158; Plantagenet, “New Albion,” 19; Acrelius, *History*, 94-95; Weslager, *Dutch Explorers*, 233-236; Jennings, “Susquehannock,” 364-365.

are at war,” and that Maryland had “assisted the Minquas with 50 men in their fort.”⁶⁴ War brought fear to the outlying European settlements, damaged the fur trade, and, coupled with disease, had a devastating effect on Susquehannock power. Beeckman wrote on 26 October 1661, “There is great mortality among the Minquaes from chickenpox; also, they are hard-pressed by the Sinnecus which results in a very bad trade. It has been reported to me that the Sinnecus have killed 12 River Indians here on the river above the Swedish settlement. The Swedes fear that they will suffer injury to their livestock from the Sinnecus.”⁶⁵ The inter-tribal conflict affected the Delaware Indians as well, who restricted their hunts to avoid entanglement and caused poor trade with the Europeans.⁶⁶ Yet the Susquehannocks remained determined to turn back the Iroquois. They affirmed their friendship to the Dutch, hoping that their Christian allies would not disappoint them with furnishing the tools of war in exchange for payment, and in 1663 they withstood a siege on their fort by a reported Iroquois force of 1,600 men. Having endured the siege, the Susquehannocks counterattacked and drove the Iroquois back, taking some of them prisoner.⁶⁷ A sense of calm returned, and good trading and diplomatic relations continued between Europeans and natives in the Delaware River Valley.

Jockeying for primacy in the fur trade in the Delaware River Valley resulted in the Dutch conquest of New Sweden. European warfare had arrived in the form of a formal siege. Yet this military action did not result in a wider conflict between Indians and Europeans along the Delaware. The Susquehannocks and Delawares did attack New Amsterdam in retaliation for the Dutch action against the allied Swedes. Having undergone a shift in hierarchy, where the

⁶⁴ “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (July 10, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 236.

⁶⁵ “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (October 26, 1661), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 243.

⁶⁶ “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (February 20, 1662), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 264.

⁶⁷ “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (December 23, 1662), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 314; “Letter from Andries Hudde to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (May 29, 1663), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 320-321; “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (June 6, 1663), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 321; “Letter from Willem Beeckman to Petrus Stuyvesant,” (June 24, 1663), *Delaware Papers (Dutch)*, 323; Acrelius, *History*, 99.

Delawares found themselves as equals and allies to a weaker Susquehannock tribe, the Indian groups did not retaliate in the Delaware River Valley. With the Susquehannocks fighting the Iroquois in the Beaver Wars and the Swedes still present, despite Dutch governance, the Indians wanted to keep a market for goods and allies. English aggressiveness only bonded the allies closer in order to resist the encroachment of a common opponent. Events in 1664, however, tested the good times of tranquility.

Solidifying English Control of the Delaware River

In late August 1664 an English naval force arrived in New Amsterdam's harbor. By 8 September, Stuyvesant had surrendered Dutch authority in New Amsterdam to Richard Nicolls, the first governor of what became the colony of New York.⁶⁸ Along the Delaware River and Delaware Bay, Alexander d'Hinjossa, the City of Amsterdam's director in New Amstel, and a force of less than fifty men surrendered in early October after offering resistance and suffering thirteen casualties.⁶⁹ The English centered their attention on gaining control over a potentially profitable fur trade and removing an irritable foreign power(s) that had frustrated English colonizing ventures along the Delaware River and Delaware Bay. With English banners flying above the Delaware River Valley, English authority, stemming from New York, had to secure

⁶⁸ This act of aggression and conquest, a step toward the Second Anglo-Dutch War, had begun in secrecy earlier in March 1664, when Charles II granted to his brother James, Duke of York, a vast expanse of territory that included nearly all of New Netherland and the east side of the Delaware River. See Charles T. Gehring, ed., *Delaware Papers (English)*, xi-xii; C. A. Weslager, *The English on the Delaware: 1610-1682* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 176-185.

⁶⁹ Because Alexander d'Hinjossa offered resistance, it opened further English retaliation, as Sir Robert Carr's troops plundered houses and stores within New Amstel's stockade. The last remaining outpost at Hoerenkil, a Mennonite colony under Pieter Cornelisz Plockoy, suffered as Carr's troops plundered all possessions "to the very naile." See "[Receipt for Supply of Ammunition]", (October 26, 1664), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 58; Gehring, ed., *Delaware Papers (English)*, xii; Weslager, *English on the Delaware*, 188-193.

and consolidate its gains and maintain security against not just one native population, but rather two.⁷⁰

Aside from the local Delaware and outlying Susquehannock Indians, the English faced a European mixture of Dutch and Swedes who had lived along the Delaware on a permanent basis for over twenty-five years and who had worked to thwart English colonizing ventures that endangered their ties to the fur trade and thus their security. English authorities understood the need to appease the Dutch and Swedes in order to avoid unnecessary tension as well as maintain political, economic, and social stability. Based on the terms agreed upon by Sir Robert Carr and Dutch governing officials at the surrender, local magistrates kept their offices and the necessary powers to exercise their civic posts. In these earliest years, English authority, political control, law, and security maintained a more Dutch and Swedish characterization than English, as local officials did not change and English law did not extend to the Delaware until the 1670s.⁷¹

With a European population already present that required delicate handling, rather than forced coercion, early English investment in the Delaware River Valley remained light and dependent on Dutch and Swedish settlers. From the English perspective, the Delaware appeared as a backwater, best secured by those already present and familiar with security practices. The Delaware also remained between profitable economic areas: the tobacco rich Chesapeake and the Hudson River Valley's fur trade. As a result, English investment remained light and New York

⁷⁰ Sir Robert Carr received instructions to offer the local European inhabitants along the Delaware assurances for the safekeeping of their property in exchange for complying with English authority without resorting to arms. The English hoped to entice the Swedes with a monarchical government and the good relations held between England and Sweden. Regarding Maryland's claims, Carr was to hold the Delaware in the name of the Duke of York until otherwise noted. See "[Order by the Commissioners that Two Frigates and Available Troops Shall Serve under Sir Robert Carr to Reduce Delaware Bay]," *Entries, 1664-1673*, 43; "Instructions to Sir Robert Carr for the Reducing of Delaware Bay, and Settling the People there under his Majesties Obedience," *Delaware Papers (English)*, 1-2.

⁷¹ "Instructions to Sir Robert Carr for the Reducing of Delaware Bay, and Settling the People there, under his Majesties obedience," *Entries, 1664-1673*, 60; "Articles of Agreement between the Honourable Sir Robert Carr Knight on the Behalf of his Majesty of Great Britain, And the Burgomasters on the Behalf of themselves, and all the Dutch and Swedes Inhabiting in Delaware Bay and Delaware River," (October 1, 1664), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 2; Gehring, ed., *Delaware Papers (English)*, xiii.

relied upon Dutch and Swedish settlers as voices of council in local affairs and in Indian relations. In April 1668, three and a half years after Carr's subjugation of New Amstel, now New Castle, government resolutions incorporated the skills, knowledge, and repute of non-English Europeans. In an example of English reliance upon the Dutch and Swedes, Hans Block, Israel Helme, Peter Rambo, Peter Cocke, and Peter Aldrick are specifically named as potential counselors in cases involving abuses or disagreements in civil affairs, "to advise heare and determyn, by the Major vote what is just Equitable and necessary in the case or cases in Question."⁷² Regarding Indian affairs and security, these same men are identified as settlers who may "be called to Advise and direct what is best to be done in all cases of difficulty which may arise from the Indians and to give their Councill and orders for the arming of the severall plantacons and Planters who must obey and attend their summons upon such occasion."⁷³ The English newcomer relied on the experience, transfer of knowledge, and inroads forged within Indian diplomacy and trading by the first European settlers who had begun to develop a method of understanding and interaction in the Delaware River Valley fracture zone.⁷⁴

As it had been with the Dutch and Swedes, English authority recognized that security and peace with Indians rested on positive trade dealings. Relations with Indians along the Delaware

⁷² "[Resolutions and Directions for the Settlement of the Government in Delaware]," (April 21, 1668), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 158. The same resolutions provided that local civil government continue as it had before, that a supplied military garrison of twenty soldiers and one officer be lodged in the fort, and that no offensive war be made against any Indians, both in order to avoid trade disruption and because the thin colonial population could not effectively fight against a scattered Indian opponent.

⁷³ "Resolutions and Directions," (April 21, 1668), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 158.

⁷⁴ "Resolutions and Directions," (April 21, 1668), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 158-159. The ethnic makeup of the Delaware River Valley continued to reflect a non-English European population who remained an integral part of local government into the 1670s. In the fall of 1674, justices at New Castle included Hans Block, Jno Moll, Foppe Outhout, Joseph Chew, and Dirck Alberts, while justices for the River included Peter Cock, Peter Rambo, Israel Helme, Lars Andriesen, and Woolle Swain. One year later, the locally appointed magistrates at New Castle included Pieter Aldericks, Johannes de Haes, Pieter Cock, and Lars Andriessen. See the following: "[A Commission to Capt. Cantwell and Mr. William Tom to Receive New-Castle in Delaware River and Dependencies]," (November 6, 1674), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 3; "[Order to Construct Dikes at New Castle]," (June 4, 1675), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 85. For further discussion of the English view of the Delaware River Valley as a backwater, see Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection*, 35.

suffered from wariness, however, as Indians had grown accustomed to the Dutch and Swedes and remained cautious of those who followed the English banner. The English had a violent reputation, exhibited in the early battles between Susquehannocks and Maryland. In a letter to Governor Francis Lovelace in New York, William Tom and Peter Alrichs commented on the Delaware understanding of English diplomacy: “The Sachems of the Indians give for reason of there warre that they threaten to make upon the Christians is they say where the English come they drive them from there lands and bring for instance the North Virginia and Maryland and feare if not timely prevent[] shall doe so here.”⁷⁵ Furthermore, Tom and Alrichs requested earnestly that New York make peace with Delaware sachems to ensure security, as “wee are in a sad condicon is most certain being under the power of the Heathen and no power to defend by reason a number of out plantacions are not able to secure them selves and wee make a great question if wee in the place can well secure ourselves and to bring them into the Towne wilbe there utter ruine and losse of the river.”⁷⁶ Indian security remained delicate for the English, and required careful attention and controlled trade. This control, however, contributed to the early English perception of the Delaware River Valley as an economic backwater.⁷⁷

English security along the Delaware River and its relation to trade evolved over time. Early policies centered on appeasing the local population and tying the region to New York, as the English removed customs on goods, liquors, and peltry going through the ports along the Delaware and Hudson Rivers.⁷⁸ With this liberal policy, however, came the risk of uncontrolled

⁷⁵ “[William Tom and Peter Alrichs to Gov. Lovelace about Indian Affairs],” (March 9, 1670), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 11.

⁷⁶ “[Indian Affairs],” (March 9, 1670), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 11.

⁷⁷ Eighteenth century New Sweden historian Israel Acrelius supports the wariness shown by Indians to the English, writing that English authority along the Delaware, following the brief Dutch re-conquest from 1673-1674, resulted in few English families coming in, and that “the Indians looked upon them as another race of people, showed less friendship for them, as they were less acquainted with them, which often produced great disorders.” See Acrelius, *History*, 107.

⁷⁸ “Some priviledges graunted to Delaware to promote Trade,” (March 20, 1666/7), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 146.

trade. A bad business deal gone violent, improper gestures, failing to follow tradition and respect: these were some of the risks that an inexperienced trader may commit that could incite a violent Indian response that might snowball into a larger conflict. In addition, trading with the fractured Delaware Indians carried with it an increased and dangerous likelihood that an individual group could be insulted in how it viewed the traditionally subjugated Europeans along the Delaware. Furthermore, the English had inherited the trading relationship between the Dutch and Iroquois at Ft. Orange, now Albany. Dutch traders remained despite the English conquest, and with a trading relationship already in place with the powerful Five Nations, English attention remained fixed on how best to use the Iroquois in the designs for empire.⁷⁹ The English did not view the Delaware River Valley as a meaningful investment or risk should war break out with local Indians. As a result, New Castle's civic and military leaders restricted trade to achieve English security on the Delaware, and recommended "That noe Sloope or Vessell from this or any other place comeing to traffick or trade there be permitted to goe up the River above the Towne (which hath of late been only tol[]ated, for that it will probably be the ruine of the place (if continued) all Trade deserting them."⁸⁰ New York continued to manipulate trade along the Delaware as it saw fit, as sloops were granted liberty on 6 April 1677 to travel upriver to trade and help clear debts, only to be restricted again one year later on 1 May 1678.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 82-83, 105-106; Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, 431. See also Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (1984), Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse* (1992).

⁸⁰ "[William Tom to Gov. Lovelace about Newcastle Affairs]," (1670), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 23; "[Proposals of Capt. John Carr Concerning Delaware with Orders Thereon]," (1671), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 25. For additional evidence concerning Carr's proposals of trade control and how liberal trading could bring ruin to settlements along the Delaware, see "[Proposals of Capt. John Carr Concerning Delaware]," *Entries, 1664-1673*, 422.

⁸¹ "[Extracts from Gov. Andros' Letters Concerning Sloop Traffic above New Castle]," (November 23, 1676), (April 6, 1677), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 171; "[Extracts from Council Minutes Concerning Affairs in Delaware]," (May 1, 1678), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 176. Further evidence of controlled trade along the Delaware include the issuing of hunting permits, as seen in August 1676 when Jean Turcoat, a Frenchman living under English authority, was allowed to pass without hindrance with several of his comrades in order to hunt in the Delaware River Valley. See "A Passe graunted to some Frenchmen, to go [to] Delaware, and Parts adjacent, to

Alcohol proved to be a problematic ingredient in the recipe of restraint exhibited by Europeans and Indians. Often left to the discretion of officers along the Delaware as to whether it could be traded, alcohol offered economic opportunity for Europeans and improvement in trade. For Indians, alcohol offered the opportunity to become empowered and travel to different states of consciousness. While drunkenness brought the risk that Indians may become reckless, destroy property, or inflict bodily harm, this spiritual state linked with alcohol became revered and at times Indians excused violent, drunken acts.⁸² Indians recognized the negative consequences of drinking alcohol and how it affected the relationship with their allies living along the river. According to Peter Rambo following the murders of William Tom's servants, "the Indyans in those parts, have desired that there should bee an absolute Prohibicon upon the whole River of Selling Strong Liquors to the Indyans."⁸³ These murders in the summer of 1668 likely resulted from the excessive intake of alcohol by Indians. For two years, Governor Lovelace allowed discretion and autonomy to be left with Delaware officials and asked that the Dutch and Swedes help resolve the incident, "Summon the Commissioners and with [them] consult the best way to discover the Assasin[es] and then to proceed to a demaund or forc[ing] the Indians to deliver up

Hunt," (August 1676), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 125. An example demonstrating English attempts to keep trade controlled at the important post of Albany is seen in late June 1678, as "No one, whosoever it may be, shall trade or sell by the small measure, nor trade with the Indians in any way whatsoever, unless they are burghers or free[men]; nor anyone [trade with the Indians] in more than one house or place, and [then] on their own account." See "[Regulations Made in 1676 for Albany, Concerning a Monopoly in the Indian Trade, The Opening of Streets and Erecting of Buildings. Translation]," *Andros, 1677-1678*, 419.

⁸² "[Resolutions Concerning the Above Proposals]," (June 14, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 425. For discussion of alcohol and Indians, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Peter C. Mancall, *Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

⁸³ "[A Letter sent unto Capt. Carr from the Governor and Coll. Lovelace]," (June 8, 1668), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 156; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 125.

the parties that so they may be brought to Condigne punishment.”⁸⁴ Lovelace and the English had exercised restraint early on in these murders, but Lovelace’s patience became a pivot point.⁸⁵

Dutch and Swedish commissioners attempted to bring a peaceful and restrained conclusion to the murders of William Tom’s servants. Governor Lovelace, however, became more aggressive when the Delawares killed two servants of Peter Alrichs in 1671 in what appears to be a case of mourning war to avenge the loss a family member.⁸⁶ Despite the Delawares offering white wampum belts in a gesture of peace, and stating they did not seek hostility but rather to continue in their traditional relationship with their perceived allies through hunting and trading, Lovelace wrote to William Tom to prepare for war, stating, “I would have you to pretermitt noe time, but to bethink how a Warr may be prosecuted on those Villaines.”⁸⁷ Measures included that outlying settlements care for their crops and cattle in order to avoid excessive loss as a result of expected violence, and that all inhabitants refrain from selling powder, shot, and alcohol to Indians on pain of death. To avoid alerting the Indians of a possible attack, Lovelace wanted Delaware authorities to “carry (if practicable) a seeming Complacency with that Nation by either Treaty or Traffick, that soe they may have the less mistrust of our Intended Designes.”⁸⁸ Lovelace wished to catch the Indians off guard and restrict their resources as best as possible in order to maximize the initial advancement against the Delawares. He conferred with New Jersey officials about prosecuting the war, ensuring that both sides agreed

⁸⁴ “[Letter Concerning the Murder of Settlers by Indians],” (August 24, 1670), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 366-367.

⁸⁵ Despite the attempts to curtail alcohol drinking, Indians could not stop trade traffic from including spirits, whose influence produced violence and tension. The inhabitants of Crewcorne petitioned that alcohol sales be suppressed in order to live peaceably, for they found themselves “agreived by the Indians when drunck, Insomuch that we be and have been in great danger of our Lives, of houses burning of our goods Stealeing and of our Wives and children a Frighting.” See “[Petition of the Inhabitants of Crewcorne against the Sale of Liquor to the Indians],” (April 12, 1680), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 311.

⁸⁶ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 127-128.

⁸⁷ “Lettre from the Governor to Mr. Tom at Delaware. Septem: 26th. 1671.,” (September 26, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 444-445. For the Indian peace offering, see “[Report of a Meeting with Indians on the Delaware about a Murder],” (October 6, 1670), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 18.

⁸⁸ “Governor to Mr. Tom at Delaware,” (September 26, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 445.

upon the same course of action and policy. Even before the Indians had been captured, Lovelace had sped up the judicial process by authorizing their execution following a trial. With Lovelace's aggressiveness and seemingly unchecked pursuit of justice, it appeared that the growing and acceptable understanding between Europeans and Indians on the Delaware would be exchanged for violence.⁸⁹

Despite war preparations and language issued by Lovelace, those who had developed an understanding with Indians since the earliest days of Indian-European contact in the Delaware River Valley continued to exercise restraint. Governor Lovelace instructed Delaware authorities in late September to prosecute a war against the Indians if the opportunity presented itself. By November, however, Lovelace's instruction had turned to chastisement. Noting that the younger colony of New Jersey had made more advancement in war preparations than Delaware, Lovelace stated he felt "ashamed" and questioned Captain Carr why soldiers' appearances and the fort at New Castle had deteriorated to a state of decay. Delaware authorities had checked Lovelace's pursuit of war. Having been given the authorization to pursue offensive operations, Delaware authorities dragged their feet and had let their tangible elements of defense, namely soldiers and the fort, decay to a state of unpreparedness. Delaware authorities understood that other means, based on years of tradition and understanding, remained at work in bringing a resolution and that preparing for war against multiple Delaware groups would only undermine negotiations and possibly spark conflict. Such a war throughout the valley would also require huge investment in manpower and treasure. The Dutch and Swedish commissioners understood this, and remained at

⁸⁹ "Some Resolved about the late Murther of 2 Christians at Matiniconck by the Indyans," (September 25, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 446-447; "Commission given to the Officers at Delaware to try and putt to Death the Indyan Murtherers if to be taken or apprehended" (November 9, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 452; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 127.

work in bringing a sense of justice with Indian leaders. As it had been since the early stages of developing a shared understanding of restraint, Indian perception played a part in avoiding war.⁹⁰

Delaware Indian efforts to bring a resolution to the murders and avoid any rise in tension remained an ongoing effort despite Governor Lovelace's pursuit of war. They offered white wampum belts of peace in October 1670, and as word leaked out of Lovelace's intent to pursue hostilities, reports came into New York that Delaware Indians stood "in great Apprehension" of the English, "and looke on themselves as lost."⁹¹ Apprehension turned to desperation, as the Delawares sought help from other Indian nations to assist them, only to be refused.⁹² The Delawares recalled Maryland's earlier aggression against the Susquehannocks, and how the Swedes and Dutch had worked in earnest to prevent English settlement, only to be defeated in the end. Logic now held that the same English aggression would befall them. Cooperation between Indian sachems and their old allies, the Dutch and Swedes, however, paid off in December 1671. In speaking with a Mr. Alryck and Peter Rambers (likely Peter Alrichs and Peter Rambo), Delaware leaders promised to bring in the murderers dead or alive. According to William Tom's letter to Lovelace on 15 December, Indian sachems made the decision to execute two Indians found to be guilty of the murders. Upon hearing their sentence, one asked to be killed and the other fled. Alrichs, in maintaining good and just relations with Indian sachems, offered them five coats as a token of thanks for bringing in the dead culprit.⁹³ Indians had performed justice, and thereafter they "promised before them and us, That if any other Murder were committed by the Indyans upon Christians, That They would bring the Murderers to us;

⁹⁰ "[Letter to Captain Carr Concerning the Murders on Matiniconck Island]" (September 28, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 448; "Lettre from the Governor to Capt. Carr at Delaware, Dated November 9th 1671.," (November 9, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 453; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 7.

⁹¹ "Captain Carr Concerning the Murders," (September 28, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 448.

⁹² "Captain Carr Concerning the Murders," (September 28, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 448.

⁹³ "Copy of the Lettre from Mr. Tom of Dellaware to his Honor the Governor," (December 15, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 455-456.

How to believe this wee know not, but the Sachems seem to desire no Warr.”⁹⁴ The actions on the part of the Indians seem to have satisfied Lovelace. In his March 1672 proposal to visit the Delaware River Valley, he intended to “conclude a Peace amongst the mutinous Indyans in those Parts,” and instructed that the Indians were to be assured “that the Intention of my Comeing amongst them is out of Love and Friendship to them.”⁹⁵ The war scare had been averted, and seemed to indicate a change in the English perception of the Delaware River Valley and its importance.⁹⁶

The Sir Edmund Andros’ administration sought to extend New York’s influence over native tribes, including the Delawares and Susquehannocks in the Delaware River Valley. Regarding the fragmented Delawares, a conference between Andros and four sachems in May 1675 demonstrated peaceful relations. Andros declared “his desire to continue in friendship with them, and his readines to protect them,” while the Indians reciprocated, and through the interpreter Israel Helme, expressed “their readiness to continue in good friendship, and returne their thanks to the [Governor].”⁹⁷ With the outbreak of King Philip’s War in June, however, Andros found a conflict east of New York, and attempted to impress the Delawares in a

⁹⁴ “Mr. Tom of Dellaware to his Honor the Governor,” (December 15, 1671), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 456.

⁹⁵ “An Order for Capt. Nicolls to summon a Part of his Troop to attend the Governor to Delaware,” (March 8, 1671/2), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 471; “Instructions for Mr. Garland about making preparacions for his Honors Voyage to Delaware,” (March 12, 1671/2), *Entries, 1664-1673*, 473.

⁹⁶ Amy Schutt focuses on the 1671 murders of two servants and claims that this acted as an example of Delaware Indian resentment and a threat to all-out war. Jean Soderlund suggests that the murders reflect the close alliance between the Delawares and Swedes, and that the Delawares targeted those who they viewed as outsiders or enemies. Past experience with the English in Maryland indeed offered reason to feel bitterness and be aware of English aggressiveness. However, further investigation indicates the Delawares expressed hope to avoid war following the 1668 and 1671 murders. Having interacted with the Dutch and Swedes for so long and avoided warfare, Delaware sachems worked with non-English officials to bring about a resolution. Dutch and Swedish officials still held significant influence in Indian relations along the Delaware River, as noted above by their appointment and retention by English officials. The threat of war stemming from the English in New York, where past conflict in the Hudson River Valley had occurred, lends support to the Delaware River Valley Indians seeking to avoid conflict and work with familiar officials to ensure peace, thus supporting the development of a culture of restraint. See Schutt, *River Valleys*, 31-59; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 125-130.

⁹⁷ “[Conference between Gov. Andros and Four Indian Chiefs],” (May 13, 1675), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 71. The four Indian chiefs at the conference were Renowewan of Sawkin, Ihakickan and Manichty of Rancokes Kill, and Ketmarcas of Soupnapka.

September meeting, acknowledging the “warrs to the Eastward” and that he had ensured “to keepe matters well and quiet and they are so, and that hee is in a Condicion to keepe them so.”⁹⁸

While Andros displayed his leadership and strength to deflate any thoughts of agitation among the individual Delaware groups and demonstrate a strong English position, he also encouraged each side to maintain justice and punish those who do wrong, in order to avoid crimes getting out of hand “and then the rest will be well.”⁹⁹ The Delawares, having witnessed a brief restitution of Dutch governance with the capture of New York in 1673 and the English regaining their control the following year with Andros, pursued peace and an alliance with what appeared to them as the stronger European power. English aggression had been noted with Maryland. With the fortitude in which the English reclaimed New York and Andros’ willingness to engage in peace, though his reasoning had ulterior motives, the Delawares took advantage of the opportunity to establish a positive relationship with the new governor in order to benefit themselves. Peace and restraint with the immediate Delaware bands in the Delaware River Valley remained important to security. Further in the interior, the Susquehannocks remained an attractive, yet complicated, prize to gain influence over.¹⁰⁰

New York’s attempts to bring the Susquehannocks under its influence became linked with a multitude of players and events beyond the Delaware River Valley, such as Bacon’s Rebellion. Utilizing its strong ties to the Five Nations, particularly the Mohawk, New York

⁹⁸ “[Minutes of a Meeting with Indians from Delaware],” (September 22, 1675), *Andros, 1674-1676*, 203.

⁹⁹ “[Meeting with Indians from Delaware],” (September 22, 1675), *Andros, 1674-1676*, 203. With King Philip’s War requiring New York’s attention, Andros reminded Delaware authorities that peace with the fragmented Delaware Indians remained critical, writing in December 1675, “I am sorry that you finde the Indyans in your parts wavering but being fore-warned, and I hope fittly prepared, hope wee need no[t] feare them However I pray bee just to them on all occasions.” The following year in March, Andros continued to comment on the peaceful relations with the Delawares, “I tanke god wee are as well and our indyans as Civell as ever I Know them to be and as wee Can perseave no ill intent for They follow theire planting and honting as They use to Do other years.” See “[Letter to Maryland Discussing Indian Affairs],” (December 10, 1675), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 93; “[Capt. Cantwell to Gov. Andros Concerning Affairs on the Delaware],” (May 11, 1676), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 103.

¹⁰⁰ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 148.

offered protection to the Susquehannocks to draw them away from Maryland's influence.¹⁰¹ Courtesies continued to be extended to the Susquehannocks, or Minquas, by Andros' administration, but they also became increasingly complicated as the events surrounding Bacon's Rebellion began to unfold. In the fall of 1675 Indian troubles had forced Maryland to raise forces, prompting Andros to offer his services as a mediator to restore peace.¹⁰² With English-Indian relations deteriorating in New England and the Chesapeake, and with his foot already in the door, Andros continued to entice the Susquehannocks to come under his wing and bring some order.¹⁰³ From the Susquehannocks' perception, aggression from their old enemy to the south made New York's reassurances appear enticing, as Andros in June 1676 told sachems they would be protected if they lived under New York's influence, and received pledges that if they suffered as a result of Maryland's incursions, "they shall bee welcome and protected from their Ennemys."¹⁰⁴ In this attempt to establish order and incorporate Indian groups under a growing English influence, Andros claimed he could control foreign relations to such an extent as to be able to ensure that the Mohawks, Senecas, Maryland, and Virginia would make peace with the Susquehannocks.¹⁰⁵

Andros' ability to make good on his promises did not lie solely in his hands. Virginia and Maryland coveted Susquehannock territory. The western Iroquois, namely the Senecas, sought to subjugate the Susquehannocks, while the Mohawks and Andros also wanted to extend control over the weakening tribe. King Philip's War also presented Andros with a conflict near New York's eastern boundaries. In addressing the situation in New England, Andros appeared to have

¹⁰¹ "[Minutes of a Meeting with Neversink Sachems]," (April 20, 1675), *Andros, 1674-1676*, 132. Note: Maques is another term found in the sources for the Mohawks.

¹⁰² "[Letter from Gov Andros Offering to Mediate with Indians to Restore Peace in Maryland]," (October 21, 1675), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 84.

¹⁰³ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 106.

¹⁰⁴ "[Minutes of a Meeting with Susquehanna Sachems]," (June 2, 1676), *Andros, 1674-1676*, 377-378.

¹⁰⁵ "[Meeting with Susquehanna Sachems]," (June 2, 1676), *Andros, 1674-1676*, 378.

tempered his offer of protection for the Susquehannocks when saying, “you are to lett them know, that [though] they shall receive no harme from the Government, I will not now [un]dertake to Secure them from others where they are; And ther[e]fore such as shall not come in, will do well to bee vigilant on their [guard] till they can bee well assured.”¹⁰⁶ Neither one man nor one colony could dictate or control diplomacy between colonists and natives. Rather, the multitude of players and their respective interests required dialogue and agreement through treaty. The 1677 treaties signed in Albany that established the Covenant Chain brought peace between the colonies of Virginia and Maryland and Susquehannock and Iroquois warriors. Andros had accomplished his mission in placing New York in an influential position of Indian-European relations, and while the Iroquois rose in prominence as well, they also became tools for English imperial designs. For the Susquehannock tribe, it dispersed as some members returned to the Susquehanna River while others came to live among the Delawares under Andros’ jurisdiction at Delaware Bay.¹⁰⁷

Despite the peace established in the Covenant Chain, Indian raids stemming from the Five Nations traveled through what became Pennsylvania and continued to plague Virginia and Maryland, requiring consistent explanation and attention. Soon after the ink dried and smoke from peace pipes cleared in Albany in 1677, the Oneida tribe of the Five Nations warned Lord Baltimore’s representative, Henry Coursey, that despite approval of the Covenant, “there are Twenty of our Indians gone out to fight against the Indians of Your Nation, We desire that if

¹⁰⁶ “[Letter to Maryland Concerning Indian Affairs],” (September 25, 1676), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 132; “[Instructions for Capt. John Collier, for the Management of his affairs in Delaware.],” (September 23, 1676), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 131.

¹⁰⁷ Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, eds., *Andros, 1677-1678*, xiii; Jennings, “Susquehannock,” 366; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 82-83, 113-117; Schutt, *River Valleys*, 67. For additional scholarship on the Covenant Chain, see Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (1984), Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse* (1992).

they do any harm, that it may be excused this time, because it is Unknown to them.”¹⁰⁸ Raids did not cease, and despite Andros clearing the Mohawks and Senecas from responsibility, Virginia sent two delegates, Southley Littleton and William Kendall, to meet with the Iroquois in 1679. Andros and New York authorities encouraged the Mohawks, Senecas, and Oneidas to meet with the Virginia commissioners that September, with Andros himself traveling to Albany to assess the situation. Kendall renewed peace with the Iroquois for a brief period.¹⁰⁹ The events and diplomacy that occurred in Maryland, Virginia, and New York, though beyond the Delaware River Valley, influenced a growing practice of restraint.

In 1681 and 1682 Iroquois warriors had once again resumed their raids into the Chesapeake to replenish their warrior ranks according to the mourning war tradition. At this time, however, the Delaware River Valley had begun to experience another change in governing authority. The transition between the Duke of York and William Penn, coupled with Iroquois raiding parties traveling through the newly established province of Pennsylvania, threatened to upset the peace.¹¹⁰ Captain Anthony Brockholls, Deputy Governor of New York, wrote to the

¹⁰⁸ “[Response of the Oneidas to Henry Coursey, Representing Lord Baltimore],” (July 21, 1677), *Andros, 1677-1678*, 77. For more reporting of violence following the establishment of the Covenant Chain and the apparent ignorance of Iroquois warrior bands, see “[Propositions Made by the Oneida Indians],” (December 20, 1677), *Andros, 1677-1678*, 182-184; “[Order of Council Concerning Negotiations with Oneida Indians About a Mahican Boy and Mentioning an Attack on the Susquehanna Nation By Seneca and Oneida Indians],” (January 15, 1677/8), *Andros, 1677-1678*, 244.

¹⁰⁹ Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, eds., *Andros, 1679-1680*, xiv; “[Minutes of a Meeting with Commissioners from Virginia Concerning the Iroquois],” (July 31, 1679), *Andros, 1679-1680*, 134-135; “[Council Minutes About a Proposed Trip by the Governor to Albany],” (September 28, 1679), *Andros, 1679-1680*, 143.

¹¹⁰ By June 1681 letters from the Duke and William Penn, through his agent and deputy governor William Markham, had been received, recorded, and indicated the change of government along the Delaware from the Duke and New York authorities to Penn. Delaware officials were no longer under New York’s control, as it was announced that they “Readily Submitt and yeald all Due Obedience to the said Letters Pattents according to the true Intent and meaneing thereof in the Performance and Injoyment of which wee wish you all Happinesse.” Markham, in representing the new proprietor, worked with the already present Delaware officials for the laying out of Philadelphia, confirming Penn’s possessions of the lower Delaware counties, and confirmed the expected arrival of more ships and settlers from England, including Penn himself, the following spring. See “[Proclamation Releasing the Officials Residing in the New Province of Pennsylvania from Their Allegiance to the Duke of York],” (June 21, 1681), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 220; “[Ephraim Herman to Capt. Brockholls About Affairs in Delaware],” (December 16, 1681), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 353-354; “[Ephraim Herman to Capt. Brockholls About Affairs in

Indian commissioners at Albany in March 1682, urging that the Mohawks and Senecas be reminded of the peace and friendship between Maryland and the Iroquois.¹¹¹ Mohawk and Seneca leaders denied making war or killing Christians in Maryland, and sought to live in peace. By June, both Maryland and New York officials learned that several troops of Oneida warriors had ventured south to the Chesapeake, but without authorization. Discussions between the Five Nations and Maryland officials found that spatial differences in time and geography had contributed to the misunderstanding. The patience between both sides allowed the confusion and delays in disseminating information to be resolved, as Brockholls wrote to Lord Baltimore that negotiators “accomplished A Happy Issue and in this their Treaty and Negotiacion Acted and Done as much as Possible and which I hope will Prove and Continue for the Peace and Quiett of all his Majesties Subjects Especially those of your Lordshipps Province and Virginia.”¹¹² Peace had been secured between New York Indians and Maryland. Though aggression had not reached the Delaware River Valley, the threat of violence had been removed from the paths and streams within Pennsylvania that Iroquois warriors used to reach the Chesapeake.¹¹³

Conclusion

In the fifty years of Dutch, Swedish, and early English control in the Delaware River Valley, a culture of restraint had developed around the maintenance of the fur trade between Delaware and Susquehannock native groups and European settlers, and in how each group

Delaware],” (December 27, 1681), *Delaware Papers (English)*, 354-355. William Penn arrived in October 1682, a little delayed from the expected spring arrival.

¹¹¹ “A Letter From Capt. Brockholls to the Commisaries att Albany etc. on the relations between the New York Indians and Maryland,” (March 29, 1682), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 228.

¹¹² “[Letter Concerning Peace Between Maryland and New York Indians],” (August 14, 1682), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 240.

¹¹³ “[Letter from the Commissioners of Maryland at Albany to Commander Brockholls.],” (June 24, 1682), *Andros, 1679-1680*, 547-548; “[Letters from Albany, Colonel Coursey and Colonel Lloyd to Commander Brockholls on the Above Matters.],” (June 25, 1682), *Andros, 1679-1680*, 548-549; “A Letter From Capt. Brockholls to my Lord Baltimore att Maryland,” (June 30, 1682), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 232; “A Letter From Capt. Brockholls to the Commysaries att Albany,” (June 30, 1682), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 232-233; “A Letter From Capt. Brockholls to Colonell Coursey and Colonell Loyd at Albany,” (June 30, 1682), *Entries, 1674-1688*, 233; “[Letter Concerning Iroquois Incursions into Maryland],” *Entries, 1674-1688*, 249.

perceived the other based on changing circumstances. Within this trade dynamic, however, lies a web of relationships between cultures, a host of political entities, and individuals, all of whom contributed to or perhaps endangered the birth and early development of restraint along the Delaware. Initiated in blood at Swanendael, European settlement approached the Delaware River Valley with caution and a sense of the unknown in the interior. Having displayed military superiority and that they could remove unwanted groups, the Delawares at Swanendael perceived further settlement by Europeans as an opportunity to acquire allies and have access to European goods. Europeans benefited from the fact that there existed no unified tribe when they settled the region. Their immediate neighbors, the Delawares, were dispersed politically along the various tributaries that flowed into the river. Yet Delaware dispersion made the prospect of expansion against multiple tribal bands undesirable. Despite the presence of trade, Europeans viewed the fracture zone of the Delaware River Valley as an economic backwater, and limited their investment to small communities and a few fortifications.

As the new settlers jockeyed for the best trading position to keep their small presence secure, Delaware, Susquehannock, and European played off one another and grew accustomed to each other's presence. A culture of restraint grew in these early decades. Despite the influx of English authority from distant New York and the perception among native groups that English banners equated to aggression, peace and stability continued as both sides recognized the precedent that had been established. Andros' administration began a new phase of increased attention toward to the Delaware River Valley and its inhabitants, and even then, New York's ability to dictate policy unilaterally remained curbed due to outstanding conflicts requiring its attention and the various players who made claims to this fracture zone.

Early explorers such as David de Vries and Peter Minuit, administrators such as Johan Printz and Edmund Andros, and critical and often unknown middle men such as Jan Jansen and Peter Alrichs all played a critical role in fostering a culture of restraint, as they avoided violence and bloodshed so as not to risk the loss of profits or destruction of settlements. Their voices have been documented. Yet on the other end, the sachems of the Delawares and Susquehannocks, such as Mattahorn, played the complementary side in fostering restraint, as they perceived the earliest Europeans as trading partners and potential allies who could be absorbed into their spheres of influence for their benefit. After decades of relative peace and trading, both had grown accustomed to viewing and working with the other in a restrained manner rather than resorting to violence. As Europeans began another transfer of power and governance, the culture of restraint present among Indians and Europeans in the Delaware River Valley found support in the new Quaker proprietor and settlers.

FIGURE 2: THE DELAWARE RIVER VALLEY, 1685-1700¹



¹ "The Delaware River Valley, 1685-1700," in *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 301.

CHAPTER TWO: THE MATURATION OF RESTRAINT

By the early 1680s a security culture of restraint had taken root in the interactions between Indians and European settlers in the Delaware River Valley. Limited European growth, Indian desires for allies, and the inter-cultural facilitator of the fur trade allowed each side to become familiar with the other's presence. Though interests remained different, Indian hierarchies shifted, and European governance along the river changed hands several times, Indians and Europeans grew accustomed to working with their perceived trading partners and allies in a restrained manner of trade and dialogue rather than resorting to violence. With yet another change in European governance between the Duke of York and William Penn in 1681, the cultural formation around restraint that had taken shape for fifty years became subject to an injection of compatible ideals held by the Quaker proprietor and settlers.

The security culture of restraint underwent a maturation process with the arrival of William Penn and the Quakers. Building on the stable relations and good terms between Indians and European settlers already established in the Delaware River Valley, the proprietor, administrators, and new settlers exposed the culture of restraint and Indian relations to the Quaker ideals of the brotherhood of man and community. A dissenting Christian group that emerged during the upheaval of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century, the Religious Society of Friends, or Quakers, believed that God spoke directly to each person and revealed His will. This "inner light" concept promoted that men and women stood as spiritual equals before God. The belief in human equality extended to Indians, as Quakers emphasized community and downplayed differences in background and belief. Such an outlook,

complemented by the Quaker peace testimony that combated evil with spiritual weapons consistent with the Holy Spirit (as opposed to man-made military arms), ushered in a new settler population who did not seek to violently remove Indians, but preferred to live side by side in harmony. The presence of an established culture of restraint between European settlers and Indians acted as a foundation upon which Quakers could build a better Pennsylvania.²

Pennsylvania's ability to maintain the peace among earlier inhabitants in the Delaware River Valley derived from William Penn's communal outlook on security before he received his colonial charter. Exposed to military life and business dealings in Ireland, Penn acquired practical experiences as a young man. Following his conversion to Quakerism, his advocacy for religious toleration promoted community between peoples of differing faiths. Knowledge of

² Moretta, *Penn and the Quaker Legacy*, xv-xvi, 15-17, 128. John Moretta provides a synopsis of Quaker theology, noting the "inner light," but also discusses how Quakers met together as spiritual equals. For further discussion of Quaker theology and the peace testimony, see Peter Brock, *Pioneers of the Peaceable Kingdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). For discussion of Quaker theology and William Penn's religious thought, see Melvin Endy, Jr., *Penn and Early Quakerism* (1973). In considering the historiography on Quaker collectivism and community, Alan Tully's *William Penn's Legacy* (1977) comments on community in the mid-eighteenth century, arguing that Pennsylvania's political stability resulted from an accommodating society. Jack Marietta's *Reformation of American Quakerism* (1984) observes how Quakers perceived an encroaching secularism in the mid-eighteenth century, causing Quakers to retract and seek reform in order to protect their sense of community. Similar to Tully, Sally Schwartz' "*A Mixed Multitude*" (1987) contends that Pennsylvania stands apart from other colonies as being one where settlers adopted the ideology of tolerance. As new immigrating groups arrived, Schwartz finds that older settlers overcame prejudicial challenges in favor of pragmatic tolerance in order to protect one's interests, resulting in multiple European ethnic heritages living harmoniously together. Barry Levy's *Quakers and the American Family* (1988) examines the maintenance of Quaker community through close childrearing and family love. A more recent work, Andrew Murphy's *Conscience and Community* (2001), considers how the Keithian Schism fractured Quaker community, and that the greater Quaker community withdrew toleration toward George Keith and his followers in order to remove the troublesome element. This project's approach to the Quaker ideal of community is to place it in the context of Pennsylvania's security and how it promoted peace along the frontier. It concurs with the strategy of accommodation in the middle colonies as discussed by Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (1984). On cultural adaptation and early community formation in what is labeled as creolization, see John Smolenski, *Friends and Strangers* (2010).

The Quaker peace testimony is often used in traditional military histories as a blanket reason for Pennsylvania's lack of a militia and fortifications. In considering Pennsylvania's broader security culture, there is scholarship demonstrating a degree of interpretation and molding to the peace testimony. Peter Brock finds that pacifism is a communal testimony but is also expressed at the personal level, arguing that by the end of King William's War Quaker adherence to pacifism in relation to war had a sense of elasticity. Recent scholarship seen with Meredith Weddle argues that pacifism remained a developing idea among early Quakers. See Peter Brock's *Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and *Pioneers of the Peaceable Kingdom* (1968) as well as Meredith Baldwin Weddle's *Walking in the Way of Peace: Quaker Pacifism in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

North America gained from his ties as a trustee for West New Jersey and the travels of other Quakers in the Delaware River Valley provided Penn with an understanding of the political situation in the area that came to be part of his colony. These factors all influenced Penn in determining how best to keep peace in society. In his two visits to the New World, Penn applied this communal approach with Indians as well as those Europeans already present. Recognizing as the colony's proprietor that he needed to achieve the physical integrity of Quaker settlements, as well as protect financial interests related to land and the fur trade, Penn added a new element to the culture of restraint by infusing Quaker ideals into the relationship between Europeans and Indians.

Altering the culture of restraint with a sense of community and brotherhood could not have occurred without both Quaker administrators, established Dutch and Swedish settlers, and Indian recognition of the good intent held by Penn and the Quakers. Penn interacted with Indians and exercised personal oversight of the colony's security for only brief periods, as he spent much of his latter life defending his proprietary interests in England. In his absence, governing officials in the newly established colony walked a tight rope in defining Pennsylvania's relationship with other colonies in the growing contest for empire in North America with France. With Penn's land claims including the three Lower Counties of modern Delaware, Pennsylvania officials had to ward off claims from Maryland while also addressing frontier concerns stemming from the sea and pirate raids. All the while, with such an extensive frontier to the west, Quaker, Dutch, and Swedish administrators remained focused on their principal security issue: keeping peace with Indians. With a security culture and understanding in place, enhanced by the peaceful disposition of Penn and the Quakers, administrators strove to cultivate peace and friendship.

From the Indian perspective, they found Brother Miquon, as Penn became known in the Delaware tongue, and the Quakers as just neighbors with whom they could share the land and live side by side. The communal emphasis brought by Penn and the Quakers gained the trust of Indians, and with the new government upholding the culture of restraint and offering no outward symbols of military aggression, they came to value the friendship of the Quakers. Though Penn did not stay long amongst the Indians, he did not stray far from their thoughts, as they lamented his death in 1718. In these first decades of Pennsylvania's formal establishment, the culture of restraint matured. Just as an understanding of restraint took a period to become accepted along the frontier, so too did the practice and belief in the ideals of community and brotherhood by Indians and Europeans require time to where both recognized and retained memories and language from their friendship and the presence of good, peaceful relations.

Penn's Formative Years

William Penn's foundation for his approach to Pennsylvania's security developed throughout his early career. As a young man Penn worked alongside his father, Admiral Sir William Penn, by acting as a dispatcher with the fleet. In the spring of 1665 Penn went aboard ship with his father, taking in the fleet's preparation for the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Charged with presenting Charles II with a verbal account of the fleet and relaying messages from the Duke of York, Lord High Admiral, Penn traveled to Whitehall Palace at the end of April. He wrote his father describing his interaction with the king and reporting on the state of the fleet:

[The king] was Inform'd that there was an express from the duke, at which earnestly sciping out of his bed, came only in his gown and slippers. who when he saw me, said Oh ist you, how does Sr Will: he askt how you did at severall times: he was glad to heare your Message about the Ka: after Interrogating off me above halfe an hour bid me goe now about your business, and mine too.³

³ William Penn, "To Sir William Penn," (May 6, 1665), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 34.

By witnessing the fleet's organization alongside his father's watch and instruction, and discussing his observations of the fleet's condition with the king, Penn gained exposure and understanding of military and naval organization and affairs.

William Penn's time in Ireland offered a variety of experiences that helped form his view on security matters and how to develop relationships with peoples whose interests intersected those of Penn. One year after he had worked alongside his father and reported to Charles II on the state of the fleet, Penn arrived in Ireland to care for family estates and to be exposed to the Irish Court. Opportunity for recognition soon arose when in May 1666 the English garrison at the seaport of Carrickfergus, short on food and awaiting nine months of backpay, mutinied and seized the town and its castle. Loyal troops under the Earl of Arran, son of the Viceroy of Ireland, the Duke of Ormonde, responded and marched toward the town. Having developed a friendship with Arran since his arrival several months prior, Penn marched in the ranks and took part in the action that squelched the mutiny. In the course of just over a year, he had been exposed to military and naval organization, battle, and, most importantly for developing a sense of community, disgruntled soldiers who had reacted violently when their interests had been overlooked.⁴

⁴ Sir William Penn gained lands in southern Ireland for his services to both Parliament and the Stuarts, and on 30 August 1660, the admiral received appointments as Governor and Captain of Kinsale. Unable to leave England because of his role with the navy, Admiral Penn decided to send his son to Ireland not only to manage the affairs of family lands, but to also expose him to the Irish Court. Sir William Penn, "Sir William Penn to Sir George Lane," (February 8, 1666), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 39-40; Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 157-161. According to Brailsford, Admiral Penn approached the Irish without sympathy, writing, "But Admiral Penn, whose sole intercourse with the original owners of the country had been through the mouth of a musket, and who knew them only as "rogues" and "merciless rebels," could be troubled by no misgivings as to his right of possession." See Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 63.

The aftermath at Carrickfergus demonstrates that Penn appeared to be excited at the prospect of a military career. Having acquitted himself well in the battle, the Duke of Ormonde wrote to Sir William Penn regarding the admiral's position as commander of the company of Kinsale, suggesting that the elder Penn transfer the position to his son, "observing his forwardnesse on the occasion of repressing the late Mutiny among the Souldiers in this Garrison, I have thought fitt to lett you know that I am wishing to place the Command of that Company in him, and desire you to send a resignation to that purpose." Sir William did not respond immediately, prompting the younger Penn to write on 4 July 1666 about the proposed commission and ask his father that he acknowledge Ormonde's and

Penn's most important hands-on experience during his youth occurred while managing family estates in Ireland. In conducting business with a native Irish population who stood in the English perception as a lesser people because of their ethnicity and Catholic beliefs, Penn acquired inter-personal lessons that aided him in his relationships with not only the Europeans already present in the Delaware River Valley, but the native Indian tribes as well. Letters from Sir William Penn in the spring of 1667 demonstrate that his son gained experience with managing estates and tenants while also having a degree of autonomy to pursue the best policy with his father in England.⁵ During his travels through Ireland in 1669 and 1670, Penn kept a journal detailing his meetings. On 25 November, he ended his business with "the Inhabitants of Corke," and on 5 December he "stop'd at Capt Boles farm he holds of my Fa[ther]. well Improv'd." In an entry on 23 December he states, "we went about admeasuring C[apt. John]. W[akeham's]. land; Fr[ancis]. Smith. & Sr. P. Smith came to us; Articles were sign'd seal'd & deliver'd for 42^l per An^o the first yeare, & 40^l per An^o afterward."⁶ Penn's experiences in Ireland provided him with invaluable lessons in organizing land and negotiating with tenants, critical skills for when treating with Indians in Pennsylvania.

Arran's kindness and consideration. With such enthusiasm, it appears Penn wanted to embark on the career of a soldier. Admiral Penn stopped these aspirations when he responded on 17 July, "As to the tender made by his grace my lord lieutenant, concerning the fort of Kinsale, I wish your youthful desires mayn't outrun your discretion." The Admiral followed up in a letter to Ormonde dated 7 August, thanking him for the kindness shown to his son. Regarding the question of the command at Kinsale, the elder Penn stated that he intended to settle back in Ireland when the war with the Dutch ended, whereby the salary of £400 per year would be very beneficial, and asked Ormonde to postpone favors toward his son. The younger Penn gained a post as victualler of ships in the port of Kinsale. See Granville Penn, *Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, Knt.* (London: James Duncan, Paternoster Row, 1833), 2:429-433; Brailsford, *The Making of William Penn* (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 157, 163-165; Footnotes in *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 41-42; Sir William Penn, "From Sir William Penn," (July 17, 1667), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 42. Mabel Brailsford suggests that Admiral Penn was grooming his son for a career as a lawyer or a statesman, based on a letter sent by Admiral Penn to young William in October 1666, stating, "I am as much concerned for your honour (it being the first of your appearance in the world) as for the bone that's contended for: and yet, I judge it to be a bone very full of marrow." See Penn, *Memorials*, 2:433-434; Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 157, 166.

⁵ Sir William Penn, "From Sir William Penn," (April 1667), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 44; Sir William Penn, "From Sir William Penn," (May 21, 1667), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 46.

⁶ William Penn, "My Irish journall," (September 1669 – July 1670), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 108, 110, 112.

Penn's travels in Ireland brought him into communication with numerous military minded men, no doubt offering him a wealth of knowledge regarding military and naval affairs as well as sharpening his understanding of security. One of the first meetings noted in his Irish Journal included a visit from Sir George Ascue, a colleague of Penn's father and former rear-admiral who served under Charles I, Cromwell, and Charles II. On 20 November he met with Robert Sandys, a colonel of a company of foot at Kinsale, and on 19 May, Penn noted "wth old R[obert]. S[outhwell].—disputed wth him. ended wth C[ousin Ensign William]. Penn. Din'd wth my C[ousin Richard]. Disputed much at table. return'd to Cork."⁷ While Penn's time in Ireland had the primary purpose of conducting business on family lands, his father's goal of exposing his son to the Irish court and cultivating relationships gained fulfillment. These relationships are often characterized by references to discussions and dinners with influential men with military backgrounds. One of his last significant meetings occurred on 4 June 1670 when "the Ld. Arran, Ld. shannon, Ld. Kingston, Maj. Fairfax, Buckly, Lesson, Sheifeild, &c. din'd with [Penn]."⁸ This dinner brought numerous military connections to the table. Not only did Penn have a friend in the Earl of Arran, but Major Thomas Fairfax held a commission in the King's company in the Dublin regiment of guards, Henry Bulkeley held an ensign position in the Irish Guards, Colonel Hugh Leeson had gone to Ireland as an officer of Charles I, and Edmund Sheffield served the Duke of Ormonde as a cornet in Ormonde's own troop of horse. Under Arran's command, both Leeson and Sheffield served alongside Penn in suppressing the mutiny at Carrickfergus in 1666, a story no doubt revisited in the discussions held over dinner.⁹

⁷ Penn, "Irish journall," 127.

⁸ Penn, "Irish journall," 129.

⁹ Penn, "Irish journall," 106, 108, 127, 129. See footnotes for bibliographical information on those whom Penn met in his Irish travels in Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 131-143.

While personal experience through business and relationship building in Ireland offered valuable inter-personal skills, Penn's ties to the Quakers and imprisonment for his newly acquired religious faith provided impetus for his support of religious toleration. In the fall of 1667, shortly after his conversion, Penn observed a soldier causing a disturbance at a Quaker meeting in Cork. Still coming to terms with Quaker beliefs, Penn seized him by the collar and forcibly removed him from the meeting, and would have thrown him down the stairs had he not been stopped by the congregation. The soldier returned with reinforcements, and hauled Penn and the Quakers before the magistrate.¹⁰ It would not be his last run in with the law, as Penn found himself in the Tower of London for blasphemy in December 1668, arrested and put on trial in London in August and September 1670, and again imprisoned at Newgate for preaching from February to July 1671.¹¹ Having witnessed Quakers persecuted in his youth, Penn now faced the same assault regarding his newfound beliefs.

Spurred by his own suffering and that of others, Penn began a long campaign to secure religious toleration alongside the rights of Englishmen. Writing to Henry Bennet, the Lord Arlington, in June 1669, Penn offered a basic summary of the argument for liberty of conscience: "it's not the property of Religion [...] to persecute & compel Religion; which should be embrac'd freely for her selfe, not by force."¹² The following year he published *The great case. Of liberty of conscience once more debated & defended* which argued that inhibiting and

¹⁰ Geiter, *William Penn*, 18-19; Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 175-176.

¹¹ Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 24-26. Penn also assisted George Fox in getting out of Worcester prison in 1674. George Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends, had already offered advice to Penn regarding his individualism and its relation to Quakerism. When Penn did not want to give up wearing his sword, the sign of a gentleman and for Penn a special token because it had saved his life in a duel in Paris, Fox trusted that the "inner light" would work its own revelation for Penn, and told Penn to wear it as long as he could. The next time Penn and Fox met, the sword had disappeared, as Penn could wear it no longer. See Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 207.

¹² William Penn, "To Lord Arlington," (June 19, 1669), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 93.

persecuting a person's religious beliefs was destructive to the Christian religion.¹³ Moreover, writing on the sufferings of Quakers at the Isle of Ely, Penn argued that continued persecution "hatches & brings forth Warrs, as in England, Scotland, France, Holland, Swizerland & Germany; to say nothing of antient times, whose happiness or Infelicity hath stood upon a toleration, each being the natural Consequences of each."¹⁴ Imprisoned for his religious beliefs, Penn sought to shame his persecutors by pointing to religious strife as bringing about war and claimed that to persecute others in the name of Christ only served to undermine Christianity. In addition to illustrating the hypocrisy of religious persecution, Penn also began to offer discussion of government and toleration of the rights of citizens in an effort to secure liberty of conscience.

Community and toleration among governments and their citizens became reoccurring themes in Penn's writings prior to the establishment of Pennsylvania. In *England's present interest* in 1675, he discussed the historical precedent of the rights of Englishmen, particularly the role of the Great Charter, with the contemporary ideas of John Locke and the natural rights of man. Penn advised that toleration avoided aggravating opposition groups and fostered peace, resulting in a stronger community:

Beware of Exasperating any Factions, by the Crossness and Asperity of some Mens Passions, Honours [?], or Private Opinions, imployed by You, grounded only upon their Differences in Lesser Matters, which are but the Skirts and Suburbs of Religion, wherein a Charitable Connivance and Christian Toleration often Dissipates their Strength, whom Rougher Opposition Fortifieth, and puts the Despised and Oppressed Party into such Combinations as may most Enable them to get a Full Revenge upon Those they count their Persecutors; who are commonly Assisted with that Vulgar Commiseration, which attends all that are said to Suffer under the Common Notion of Religion.¹⁵

¹³ William Penn, *The great case. Of liberty of conscience once more debated & defended*, (1670), *Early English Books Online*, http://eebo.chadwyck.com.libdata.lib.ua.edu/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgimages.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=V33078 (accessed February 13, 2013).

¹⁴ William Penn, "Narrative of the Sufferings of Quakers in the Isle of Ely," (November? 1671), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 226.

¹⁵ William Penn, *England's present interest discover'd with honour to the prince, and safety to the people*, (1675), *Early English Books Online*,

Penn continued his growing theme of community and toleration under the pseudonym “Phil’ Anglus” in writing *One project for the good of England* in 1679. He argued that “where People are sure of their own, and are Protected from Violence or Injury, they chearfully yield their Obedience, and pay their Contribution to the support of that Government.”¹⁶ When rights and prosperity are endangered, people retract their support of the government. Locke’s ideas of social contract theory are evident in the writings of Penn, pointing to a dialogue or familiarity of some manner that existed between the two acquaintances.¹⁷ In championing liberty of conscience and the rights of Englishmen, Penn argued that offering toleration for differing beliefs helped to remove seeds of discord from society, thus bolstering the prospect for peace in a community. This theoretical approach, combined with his skills acquired from working in Ireland, helped him manage a contact frontier in the New World located on the east bank of the Delaware.

William Penn’s first venture into colonization in North America occurred not with Pennsylvania, but with West New Jersey. During January and February 1675, while arbitrating a dispute between two Quakers over lands in West New Jersey, Penn became one of three trustees for the colony.¹⁸ As a growing figure among the Quakers, Penn’s connections and friendships

http://eebo.chadwyck.com/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgimages.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=V93329 (accessed February 17, 2013), 49-50.

¹⁶ William Penn, *One project for the good of England*, (1679), *Early English Books Online*, http://eebo.chadwyck.com/libdata.lib.ua.edu/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgimages.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=V60052 (accessed February 17, 2013), 2.

¹⁷ Penn began studying at Christ Church College at Oxford in 1660 before being expelled in 1662 for publicly criticizing the Church of England. While there he met John Locke, twelve years his senior. See Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 95. There appears to be no surviving correspondence between Penn and Locke.

¹⁸ In 1664 the Duke of York granted proprietorship of New Jersey to Sir John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret. Berkeley offered to sell his half interest (West New Jersey) in March 1674 to his friend Edward Byllynge, a Quaker, for £1,000 so that Byllynge could sell off the land in order to recoup his finances. Because of his poor economic stance, Byllynge had fellow Quaker John Fenwick purchase Berkeley’s share in trust. An argument between Byllynge and Fenwick developed when Fenwick demanded a share of the land and a cash payment of the £1,000 he spent. Byllynge did not want to surrender the land, nor could he repay the debt. Quaker leaders feared that the dispute would go to court and discredit the Society, and persuaded the two to submit to arbitration under William Penn. Utilizing his experience from Ireland, Penn negotiated an agreement that was formalized in a legal indenture, where Byllynge transferred ten of his one hundred shares in West New Jersey to Fenwick, as well as pay £400. The

with Friends who had visited the New World made it highly probable that he acquired knowledge of the Susquehanna and Delaware Rivers, both native and European inhabitants, and the political environment. George Fox interacted with Indians while traveling through the Delaware River Valley and the hinterland of Pennsylvania along the Susquehanna River from 1672-1673. Josiah Coale, one of Penn's close Quaker friends, visited North America in 1657. Banished from Virginia in 1658, Coale traveled north toward New England and stayed among the Susquehannock Indians. In a letter to George Bishop, a friend to both Sir William Penn and Penn the younger, Coale related the courtesy and good will shown by the Susquehannocks: "these Indians shewed very much respect to us, for they gave us freely of the best they could get. Being something recovered after this stay, we passed on towards the Dutch plantation, to which one of them accompanied us, which was about one hundred miles further."¹⁹ Penn's friendship with Fox, Coale, and Bishop helped to inform Penn's approach to West New Jersey's political structure and security.²⁰

The trustees' consideration of West New Jersey's security and its relationship with local Indians in the Delaware River Valley reflects both an acknowledgment of instances of tension,

remaining ninety shares were placed in trust with three Quaker trustees, who were empowered to sell Byllynge's shares to pay off his debts, and then return the remaining shares when he was solvent. Two of the three were Gawen Lawrie and Nicholas Lucas, creditors of Byllynge, with the third being William Penn. See Gawen Lawrie, Nicholas Lucas, and William Penn, "The Epistle of Penn, Lawrie, and Lucas, Respecting West Jersey," (1676), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 182-185; Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 383; Geiter, *William Penn*, 105.

¹⁹ As quoted in James Bowden, *The History of the Society of Friends in America* (London: Charles Gilpin, Bishopsgate Street Without, 1850), 1:123-124.

²⁰ George Bishop and Admiral Penn both shared parliamentary military service in the 1640s and 1650s before Bishop converted to Quakerism in 1654. Following William Penn's release from his Cork imprisonment in late 1667, the younger Penn visited Bishop on his way to see his father. Utilizing the younger Penn as a messenger, Bishop wrote to his old friend and appealed to the admiral to be open to his son's religious experience. For Bishop, see Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 50, 55. For Penn lamenting the loss of his friend Josiah Coale, see William Penn, "To Lodowick Muggleton," (February 11, 1669), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 87-88. Mabel Brailsford notes of a grander vision for Quaker colonization, "As far back as 1660, a project had been in the minds of English Friends to purchase land from the Indians of the Susquehanna, a purchase which Josiah Coale, friendly though their attitude was, had in vain tried to negotiate. It was improbable, now that the dream of a Quaker colony had come true, that Penn would neglect to consult George Fox upon its constitution." See Brailsford, *Making of William Penn*, 347-348.

distrust, and localized violence between Indians and those Europeans already present, as well as implementation of the belief that developing a sense of community can nurture peace in society. Signed in 1676, the West New Jersey Concessions addressed Indian relations in the first chapter, stating, “And the Comissionrs for the time being are to take care for [se]tting forth and dividing all the Lands of the said Province as be allready taken up or by themselves shall be taken up and contracted for with the Natives.”²¹ As would be the case in Pennsylvania, Penn believed that charters entitled him and Europeans to the land over the native people. But in following the tradition of previous Europeans as well as out of a sense of human brotherhood with Indians, Penn maintained that native lands had to be purchased in order to maintain justice and allow European goodwill to be reciprocated by Indians and promote peace.²² Penn and the trustees did not remain naïve to past tension and violence along the Delaware River. Aware of the political situation, they sought to maintain good understanding and friendly correspondence with Indians, essentially keeping the lines of communication open to deal with any problems. Should an incident occur where Indians complained or were wronged, commissioners were “to give notice to the Sachum or other chiefe person or persons that hath authority over the said Indian native or natives that Justice may be done and satisfaction made to the Person or persons offended according to Law and Equitie and the nature and quallitie of the offence and injury done or committed.”²³ In an effort to create community among settlers and natives as well as a sense of reliance upon one another, the trustees maintained “that in all tryalls wherein any of the said Indiann Natives are concerned the tryall to be by six of their neighbourhood and six of the said

²¹ “The West New Jersey Concessions,” (c. August 1676), *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 389.

²² Beatty, *Penn as Social Philosopher*, 266-267, 275-277, 281; Geiter, *William Penn*, 165. Francis Jennings, in discussing William Penn’s dealings with Indian tribes while organizing Pennsylvania, points to the fact that Europeans had not conquered the local Indians and that “no one was very eager to make the attempt.” Jennings places Penn within this mindset. Rather than approach Indians with weapons, Penn sought to formally purchase Indian lands and gain title. See Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 197.

²³ “West New Jersey Concessions,” *Penn Papers, Vol. 1*, 401.

Indian Natives to be indifferently and impartially Chosen.”²⁴ While it is highly unlikely that Indians served on juries, the ideal set by Penn was present. Like the Indian perception that land transactions and exchanging goods brought Europeans within Indian networks as allies, so too did Penn’s promotion of community and human brotherhood, through dialogue and justice, seek to bring Indians closer to Europeans and foster peace.

William Penn’s early career and experiences as a young man form the foundation for his approach to Indian relations along Pennsylvania’s frontier and his infusion of community as a promoter of peace into the culture of restraint. Ireland acted as a teaching ground. He gained valuable inter-personal skills by interacting with tenants in a land and culture foreign to his native England. Outside of conducting business, Ireland also exposed Penn to military affairs through his participation in suppressing a mutiny and in his friendships with military men. Beyond practical lessons, Ireland provided the beginnings of Penn’s theoretical endeavors. Following his conversion to Quakerism in Ireland he suffered religious persecution, leading him to champion liberty of conscience and the rights of Englishmen, and to argue that toleration reduced discord and helped to promote peace in society. These two factors, one practical and the other theoretical, formed a foundation upon which Penn approached the maintenance of peace in a society. Aware of the restrained political situation in the Delaware River Valley and having explored his concept of promoting community alongside Indians in a settler society of West New Jersey, Penn turned to a grander and holier experiment.

Preparing for Pennsylvania

In May 1680, William Penn petitioned Charles II for land in America to establish a colony. His reasoning for such a venture stemmed from his past experiences in securing religious toleration for dissenting groups, especially his fellow Quakers, and in his involvement in West

²⁴ “West New Jersey Concessions,” *Penn Papers*, Vol. 1, 401.

New Jersey. Penn viewed the New World as an opportunity for dissenting groups to live and worship without persecution. Subscribing himself to God's "Kind providence" and seeking to serve Him and fellow believers, Penn followed John Winthrop's example of a city upon a hill in the New World, stating his intent "that an example may be Sett up to the nations. There may be room there, tho not here, for such an holy experiment."²⁵ From the Crown's point of view, Penn's petition served as an opportunity to cheaply clear a long standing debt to Sir William Penn and honor the late admiral, as a Minute of the Committee of Trade indicated that the son "is willing in lieu of such a Grant to remit his debt due to him from His Ma^{ty} shall bee in a better condition to satisfy it."²⁶ In the fragmented remains of Penn's petition, one can confidently suggest that his proposed boundaries for his colony placed it north of Maryland and west of the Delaware River. This proposed location in what is today's Pennsylvania reflects that Penn held knowledge of the level of land settlement (or lack thereof), the inhabitants, and the political environment, all gained from the travels of George Fox and Josiah Coale along the Delaware and Susquehanna River Valleys and Penn's involvement with West New Jersey.²⁷ Both Penn and the Crown stood to gain from the proposed colony, but securing the legal title to what became Pennsylvania and the Lower Counties of modern Delaware required approval from the owner, the Duke of York. The Penn family's close relations with the Stuarts enabled this process, as the Duke of York approved the transaction by October that year. By the end of February 1681, a

²⁵ William Penn, "To James Harrison," (August 25, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 108.

²⁶ "Minute of the Committee of Trade," (June 14, 1680), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 35. The Crown's debt to Sir William Penn originated when the admiral lent £11,000 for supplying the Navy in 1667. By the time his son inherited and petitioned for land in North America in 1680, Sir William Penn's debt, with interest accrued, had grown to an estimated £16,000. See Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 21-23, 30-32.

²⁷ William Penn, "Petition to Charles II," (May?, 1680), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 32-33.

warrant had been sent to the Privy Seal Office, and on 4 March, Penn received his charter to Pennsylvania, named in honor of his late father.²⁸

As Penn prepared for his journey to Pennsylvania, he sent advance agents to make his claims known, make introductions with local inhabitants, and begin development of his capital city, Philadelphia. He commissioned his cousin and former army officer, William Markham, to act as his deputy and settle boundaries. Recognizing the importance of the local populace for their wisdom and standing in the community, Markham chose a council of nine from among the local Swedes and Quakers in West New Jersey to assist in getting the new colony off the ground. Other commissioners sent ahead by Penn for settling the colony included William Crispin, John Bezer, and Nathaniel Allen. Writing to them in late September 1681, Penn addressed the establishment of good relations with Indians:

soften [the natives] to mee and the people, lett them know that you are come to sit downe Lovingly among them. Let my Letter and Conditions wth our own Interest, and after reading my Letter and the said Conditions, then present their Kings wth what I send them, and make a Frien{d}ship and League wth them according to those Conditions, w^{ch} carefully observe, and get them to comply wth you; be Grave they love not to be smiled on.²⁹

²⁸ “Minute of the Committee of Trade,” (June 25, 1680), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 39; Sir John Werden, “Sir John Werden to William Blathwayt,” (October 16, 1680), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 44; “Warrant to the Privy Seal Office,” (February 28, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 77-78. Regarding his southern border, Penn understood that access to the Delaware River and its bay held the key to his colony’s prosperity. Sir John Werden, serving as the Duke’s secretary and writing to William Blathwayt, commented that Penn sought to have his southern border twelve miles north of New Castle in order to have greater access to the Delaware River. Furthermore, it would fall below the fortieth parallel, the original northern border of Maryland’s charter, and strengthen Penn’s claims toward accessing the Delaware. For men like Werden, they could not understand why such measures were of critical importance, as he confessed, “I doe not understand why 'tis precisely Necessary to insist on Just such a Number of Miles more or lesse, in a Country of which we know soe little, & where All the benefits are intended to this Pattentee.” The Delaware River Valley still held the reputation of being an economic backwater that had yet to be fully developed, let alone explored along the tributaries into the interior. See Sir John Werden, “Sir John Werden to William Blathwayt,” (November 23, 1680), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 49. Securing the Lower Counties remained a separate issue. Through Robert Barclay in Edinburgh, Penn appealed to the Duke of York for deeds to New Castle and to the lands south of it in the spring and summer of 1681. It would not be until August 1682, just before sailing for Pennsylvania, that Penn secured the deeds for both New Castle and the Lower Counties. See Robert Barclay, “From Robert Barclay,” (June 25, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 95-96; Sir John Werden, “From Sir John Werden,” (July 16, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 103-104; “Deed for New Castle,” (August 24, 1682), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 281-284.

²⁹ William Penn, “Initial Plan for Philadelphia,” (September 30, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 120.

Penn understood the reality that in not being physically present to treat with the Indians, he had to rely on advance agents to establish proactive relationships with Indians through the identified method of gift-giving. Also evident within these early instructions was Penn's humanitarian and peaceable intent with Indians. Having been involved as a trustee of West New Jersey, where by 1682 some 1,700 Quakers had immigrated, as well as being friends with Fox and Coale who had traveled to the area, Penn was very likely informed of the political situation and state of local Indians when he sent out his agents. Coupled with a perspective that sought to achieve peace and security through communal efforts, Penn wanted to approach Indians in a restrained manner and promote a sense of brotherhood and friendship.³⁰

Penn wrote directly to the Delaware and Iroquois Indians, introducing himself and seeking to establish a friendly relationship with them, despite his absence, to enable settlements to get off the ground and achieve security. Aware of Delaware fragmentation and the multiple sachems who represented them, he wrote to the "Kings of the Indians" on 18 October 1681 and sought common ground with them from the very beginning by showing congruence with his Christian belief and the Delawares' belief in an omnipotent and omniscient Creator.³¹ He made his intentions clear, that despite being given a great province by God, he desired "to enjoy it with your Love and Consent, that we may always live together as Neighbours and freinds, else what would the great God say to us, who hath made us not to devoure and destroy one an other but

³⁰ William Penn, "Commission to William Markham," (April 10, 1681), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 86; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 142-143. Probably the son of one of Admiral Penn's sisters, William Markham (c. 1635-1704) received his commission to be lieutenant-governor on 10 April 1681, serving until Penn arrived in late 1682. He also held the posts of Provincial Secretary (1685-1691), Lieutenant-Governor of the Lower Counties (1691-1699), and Lieutenant-Governor of Pennsylvania (1693-1699). See footnote in Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 85. The nine councilors under Markham included Robert Wade, Morgan Drewet, William Woodmanson, William Warner, Thomas Fairman, James Sandelands, William Clayton, Otto Ernest Cock, Lasse Cock. See footnote in Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 86.

³¹ Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 21-22.

live Soberly and kindly together in the world.”³² Demonstrating his grasp of the recent history in the Delaware Valley, Penn acknowledged that other Europeans had been unkind and unjust in the past, causing animosity and sometimes bloodshed. Penn also understood that the recent record between settlers and Indians had not been positive, as news surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion and King Philip’s War likely gave him reason to approach Indians cautiously and in a subservient, friendly manner. He offered reassurance that he would come shortly, and in the meantime, asked the Delawares to make peace with his commissioners “and receive the Presents and Tokens which I have sent to you, as a Testimony of my Good will to you, and my resolution to live Justly peaceably and friendly with you, I am your Freind.”³³ Penn used a similar approach when addressing the consolidated Iroquois, or “Emperor of Canada.” Again referencing a great God who provided men with hearts of love, peace, and justice, Penn stated that he sought friendly terms with the Iroquois, and that “the people who comes with me are a just plain and honest people that neither make war upon others nor fear war from others because they will be just.”³⁴ Exchanging presents, as it had been during the previous fifty years along the Delaware, became the mechanism for security, as Penn had gifts sent to the Iroquois “to testify our Willingness to have a fair Correspondence with thee.”³⁵ Still in England, Penn had to rely on established precedence in making introductions and establishing alliances with local Indians

³² William Penn, “To the Kings of the Indians,” (October 28, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 128. Daniel Richter’s analysis of this letter finds that Penn placed emphasis on voluntary negotiation in a language of friendship, rather than native submission. See Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 141.

³³ Penn, “Kings of the Indians,” 129.

³⁴ William Penn, “To the Emperor of Canada,” (June 21, 1682), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 261.

³⁵ Penn, “Emperor of Canada,” 261. Similar to Penn’s letters to the Delawares and Iroquois, the Free Society of Traders wrote to the “Emperor of Canada” in June 1682. Invoking the Great God of peace, love, and justice, the Society sought to join “into a perpetual friendship” and offered presents in an effort to entice Iroquois trade, stating that “if you will bring in your goods in our society for a free trade, you shall greatly enrich yourselves by it, for we will improve it for you, as well as for us.” See *Records of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Indian Committee, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, 79-81, Coll. No. AB24, HCL. *Records of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Indian Committee, Indian Records, 1502-1800* will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, HCL.

through his commissioners before he could actually conduct negotiations in person and treat with Indian sachems as the leader of the Quaker settlers.

While Penn did what he could from England to achieve peace with natives, events on the ground dictated whether Pennsylvania would enjoy a continued culture of restraint. Markham received instructions from Penn in late October 1681 to begin buying land from the true native owners, “To treat Speedily wth the Indians for Land before they are Furnisht by others wth things that Please them take advice in this.”³⁶ Penn stressed that his representatives needed to tap into the fur trade and gain good standing with the Indians to achieve security, lest they be undercut by another group. In a demonstration of Markham’s reliance on the European colonial population, Markham leaned on the council members, namely Lasse Cock, for assistance in maintaining relations with natives. Acting as interpreter and messenger for Markham to the Delaware, Cock in 1682 rendered services ranging from providing Indians with meat and drink during land negotiations, journeying to the Susquehanna River to inquire about a murder, and presenting natives with powder, guns, and rum.³⁷ Cock’s services and the hospitality shown to the Delawares paid off, as negotiations for the first land purchase began in April 1682, with goods paid at the end of June and the deed formally signed by twelve sachems on 15 July. Estimated to be worth £21,644, the Delawares received wampum, blankets, guns, powder, ammunition, kettles, fishhooks, needles, rum, and other European goods. Aside from physical goods, the agreement allowed for Europeans to pass freely through native lands without molestation, as the Delawares already enjoyed the reciprocal privilege. Furthermore, the Delawares agreed to avoid

³⁶ William Penn, “Additional Instructions to William Markham,” (October 28, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 129. Penn mistakenly identified the true owners as being the Susquehannocks. In another letter to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, Penn again acknowledged Indians as rightful owners, writing, “We buy nothing of the Duke, if not the right of an undisturbed colonizing, for the soil is none of his, ‘tis the natives by the laws of the nations, and it would be an ill argument to convert to Christianity, to expel, instead of purchasing them out of those countries.” See *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, HCL, 72.

³⁷ “Bill for Lasse Cock’s Services,” (1682), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 242-243.

violence and bring complaints to officials if a Christian mistakenly took possession of Indian land. As the stronger power present in the Delaware River Valley, the Delawares dealt with Penn's agents as a subservient newcomer. Having received gifts, friendly language and assurances, the Delawares treated the Pennsylvania officials as allies and trading partners, as had been the case with the Dutch, Swedes, and English groups over the previous fifty years.³⁸

Like his English predecessors in 1664 Penn made efforts to establish a relationship with the already present European settlers in Pennsylvania. Shortly after receiving his charter, Penn assured the Dutch, Swedes, English, and other Europeans that he did not come to exploit them, and that they "shall be govern'd by laws of y^r own makeing, & live a free & if you will, a sober & industrious People. I shall not usurp the right of any, or oppress his person."³⁹ In this introductory letter, Penn not only allowed for the inhabitants to be represented and make laws, but also understood that their manner of achieving security had been working. Not wanting to impose a different approach to maintaining peace, Penn declared, "w^tever sober & free men can reasonably desire for the security & improvem^t of their own happiness I shall heartely Comply wth."⁴⁰ For Penn, achieving security required efforts at establishing relationships before he even arrived in the New World.

³⁸ "Deed from the Delaware Indians," (July 15, 1682), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 261-269; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 169-170.

³⁹ William Penn, "To the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania," (April 8, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 84.

⁴⁰ Penn, "Inhabitants of Pennsylvania," 84. Penn understood that not all inhabitants spoke or understood English, and forwarded Markham a letter of introduction written in Swedish to be given to the Swedish clergy and read to the Swedish community. For Penn's letter to the Swedish community, see the following, where he notes the enclosure: William Penn, "To William Markham," (April 8, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 126-127. In his writings to those who had begun to make the first purchases of land tracts, which were designed to provide Penn much of his income, Penn maintained that transactions should be done in public places, whether between Europeans or Indians, in order to avoid cheating. Regarding justice in cases between Europeans and Indians, Penn stated that aggrieved parties should not take matters into their own hands, that cases be brought before officials, and that arguments between the two would be decided by joint juries, similar to his proposal for West New Jersey. Penn also refused to grant a monopoly in trade with natives, in order to avoid fraud and thus help achieve security. By doing this, he hoped "a standard may be Sett up to the nations." For Penn's views on these subjects, see the following: William Penn, "Conditions or Concessions to the First Purchasers," (July 11, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 98-101; William Penn, "To Robert Turner," (August 25, 1681), *Penn Papers, Vol. 2*, 110.

Upon securing the patent to his colony of Pennsylvania, William Penn understood the need to establish a foundation of friendly relations with local Delaware Indians as well as the European colonial population. Having to organize his affairs in England and promote settlement in the New World, Penn could not immediately set out for an Atlantic crossing and relied on advance agents, most notably his cousin William Markham, to initiate diplomacy and agreements with the Indians. Aware of the political situation in the Delaware River Valley and recent violence with Indians elsewhere along the Atlantic seaboard, Penn understood the necessity of finding a common ground and approaching Indians in a friendly manner with declarations of peace. Regarding the European colonial population, Markham and Penn demonstrated pragmatism in relying upon the established relationships made by the Dutch and Swedes with the Delawares and in offering assurances to uphold laws and established practices, rather than upset the day-to-day lives of European colonials. With his cousin and other agents acting on his behalf, Penn began to establish a groundwork from which Indian-settler relations could continue to grow in peace. Upon arrival, he took the opportunity to foster the friendly relationship established, and begin to exemplify brotherhood and a sense of community in Pennsylvania, allowing the culture of restraint to grow and mature.

Making First Impressions in Pennsylvania

In the first years of Pennsylvania's existence relations between the proprietor and European colonials began to foster a sense of community, as Penn provided European colonials a sense of having a stake in the colony. Days after his arrival, Penn demonstrated his just approach to those already with lands and property, as he assured Augustine Herrman, a well-known Maryland planter, that his property in the Lower Counties would not be disturbed, "I come a man of peace yet fear noe warr [...] I Know my Judge & who is Lord Cheif Justice of the parts of

America, & hope to act suitable to my duty & not unworthy of his Just favour.”⁴¹ Regarding the local commissioners themselves, particularly the Dutch and Swedes, Penn described them as “a plain & Industrious people” who kindly received Penn and the English.⁴² When Penn presented his deeds of ownership to the Lower Counties, given to him by the Duke of York, the officials complied and surrendered “in the Name of his Royall Highness Unto him the said W^m Penn Esq^r Actuall & peaceable Possission of the Fort at New Castle, by Givinge him the key there of, to Lock upon him selfe along the dore, which beinge opened by Him againe.”⁴³ For the previous fifty years, Dutch, Swedes, and early English settlers had experienced multiple changes in authority and governance. Those exchanges had looked down the barrel of a gun. Penn now came in peace, fostering community and friendship with the European colonials. As he participated in the symbolic ceremony, he assumed the responsibility for Pennsylvania’s and the Lower Counties’ security by gaining control of the fort at New Castle. Yet he demonstrated his intent to maintain the present peace by keeping the fort’s doors open. His approach to inhabitants in the Lower Counties paid off, for in early December the freeholders in the three counties petitioned for an act of union with Pennsylvania, that they may enjoy the rights and privileges of those in Penn’s colony.⁴⁴

⁴¹ William Penn, “To Augustine Herrman,” (November 2, 1682), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 309.

⁴² Penn, “Free Society of Traders,” 454. The following inhabitants, some of whom played key roles in maintaining security because of their knowledge and experience in Indian relations, were naturalized and declared their allegiance to the king: “Lasey Cock, Peter Rambo, Swan Swanson, Andr: Swanson, Wollis: Swanson, Lasey Anderson, Mounts Cock, Erick Cock, Gunner Rambo, Peter Nelson, Christin Thomas, Erick Mulleker, Peter Cock Jun^r, John Bowles, Andrew Salem, John Stiller, Lasey Dalbo.” See “Naturalization of Swedish Inhabitants,” (January 11, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 337-339.

⁴³ “John Moll’s Account of the Surrender of the Three Lower Counties to William Penn,” (1682), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 306.

⁴⁴ “Petition for an Act of Union,” (December 6, 1682), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 318. On the other side of Delaware Bay, Penn controlled the Salem area in West New Jersey through his land agent, James Nevill. Along with the Lower Counties, Penn’s influence over Salem effectively gave him control over the mouth of the Delaware River. See Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 300; William Penn, “William Penn’s Account of His Title to Land in West New Jersey,” (December 4, 1682), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 316-318.

Penn extended this spirit of community and brotherhood to newly arrived immigrant groups, as they found a welcoming land where they could keep their identity while also feeling part of greater Pennsylvania. In October 1683, Penn granted 6,000 acres north of Philadelphia to be set aside for German and Dutch settlers. One of Germantown's earliest local leaders, Francis Daniel Pastorius, commented on how Penn encouraged the Germans to build up their settlement, as Penn ensured that "no one shall be disturbed on account of his belief, but freedom of conscience shall be granted to all inhabitants of the province, so that every nation may build and conduct churches and schools according to their desires."⁴⁵ Penn extended this same spirit of brotherhood to the Welsh, whose language and customs made them distinct despite their shared Quakerism with many English settlers. Penn agreed in June 1684 to survey a tract of some 40,000 acres on the "West side of the Skulkill River," where the Welsh sought to create a self-contained "barony" with its own administrative and court systems.⁴⁶ Penn's first impressions with Europeans, both old and new, had been positive as he offered them a sense of worth and acceptance in the new colony, treated them as equals, and promoted a peaceful co-existence. In a letter to Lord North, Penn commented on the growing sense of community, as the people enjoyed fair and weekly markets to sell produce. This fostering of community brought security to Pennsylvania, as various groups all felt at home in the colony.⁴⁷

While Penn promoted peaceful co-existence with those European colonials already present, he understood the need to build a sense of community with the Delawares. He understood that the Delawares constituted the major player in the region, yet appeared optimistic

⁴⁵ William Penn, "The Surveying of Germantown," (October 12, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 490; Francis Daniel Pastorius, "Circumstantial Geographical Description of Pennsylvania," 1700, *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 375-381.

⁴⁶ Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. II, 526-527; William Penn, "Warrant to Survey a Welsh Barony," (March 13, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 527.

⁴⁷ William Penn, "To Lord North," (July 24, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 414-415.

in promoting brotherhood and living in harmony next with them. He described the Delawares as “a kind as community among themselves” and noted their wisdom and caution, unmatched to what he had witnessed in Europe.⁴⁸ Penn built upon the foundations of diplomacy and trade practiced by the Dutch, Swedish, and early English settlers. The German immigrant Francis Pastorius reflected on Penn’s early dealings with the Indians: “It is to be remarked that William Penn did not drive forth the naked native inhabitants of the land with military authority, but brought with him upon his arrival especial clothing and hats for the principal Indians, and thereby secured their goodwill, and purchased their land.”⁴⁹ Like the Dutch and Swedes before him, Penn offered gifts as a type of homage to the Delawares to secure an alliance and build a Chain of Friendship with the local Indians in order that new settlers could live peaceably alongside them.⁵⁰

Penn feared that alcohol posed a violent risk to promoting community between Indians and settlers, and thus endangered peaceful relations. His letter to the Earl of Sunderland notes that the Dutch, Swedes, and English had “learn’d them drunkenness,” and Penn assisted the Assembly in drafting legislation to restrict alcohol sales by fining £5 for selling strong spirits and liquors to Indians, compared to the lesser fine of five shillings given to settlers for being drunk.⁵¹ Writing to the Free Society of Traders, he commented on how Indian drunkenness disrupted community, that when drunk they were “one of the most wretched spectacles in the world often Burning & sometimes killing one another,” causing settlers to be in possible danger and live in

⁴⁸ Penn, “Lord North,” 414-415. Penn admired and respected the diplomatic skill of the Delawares, as well as notions of community in their deliberations before selling Penn land, writing that when they sit in council, they “speak seldom, interspaces of silence, Short, elegant fervent; The old {sitt} in half moon upon the Ground, the middle aged in a like figure at a little distance behind them, & the young fry in the same manner behind them. None Speak but the Aged, they haveing Consulted the rest before; thus is selling me their land they order’d them selves; I must Say, that their obscurity consider’d, wanting tradition, example & instruction; they are an extreordinary people. See William Penn, “To the Earl of Sunderland,” (July 28, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 417.

⁴⁹ Pastorius, “Description of Pennsylvania,” 374.

⁵⁰ Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 197.

⁵¹ Penn, “Earl of Sunderland,” 417; “Tavern Regulations,” (c. March 23, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 367-369.

fear.⁵² Keeping peace in the first years of Penn's government required diplomacy and understanding along a frontier that still remained in the Delaware River Valley and one that intermixed European colonials, the immediate Delaware Indians, and the influx of Quakers and other Europeans under Penn's government. Penn also looked beyond the Delaware River and the local sachems, understanding that for his colony to expand peacefully, he would need to engage with the surrounding tribes.⁵³

In keeping with his policy of purchasing Indian lands to give credence to European settlements and expansion, as well as gain access to the fur trade, William Penn sought to secure lands in the interior of Pennsylvania along the Susquehanna River and its mouth at the Chesapeake. Because the Susquehannocks had become tributaries to the Iroquois, Penn commissioned James Graham and William Haige to engage with Seneca and Mohawk leaders about purchasing lands along the upper Susquehanna River. He instructed them on how to present the proposal to the Iroquois, "hearing they had some Claime by Conquest, or at least that the remainder of the Susquehannahs, who are right Owners thereof, are amongst them I was willing to send you, to treat wth them, that so I might lay a foundation {for} a friendly Correspondence."⁵⁴ Penn again displayed his knowledge of Indian diplomacy and politics, noting

⁵² Penn, "Free Society of Traders," 451.

⁵³ Alcohol continued to be a topic addressed by Penn and the Provincial Council in the early years of Pennsylvania. Penn appeared to waffle on the topic, most likely due to the perceived links of alcohol with tension and violence among Indians. On 10 May 1684 he informed the Council "that he had Called the Indians together, and proposed to them to Let them have rum if they would be Contented to be punished as y^e English were; which they did agree to, provided that y^e Law of not Selling them Rum be abolished," while on 25 July, on the eve of his departure, he proposed "to Issue forth an Act of State to Suppress selling rum to the Indians in such Quantities." See *MPC*, 1:105, 116.

⁵⁴ William Penn, "Commission and Instructions to James Graham and William Haige," (August 2, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 423. On 27 August 1683 William Haige arrived in New York en route to Albany to negotiate with the Five Nations. New York Governor Thomas Dongan appeared to have agreed to the purchase, but on 8 September, Albany commissioners wrote to Dongan to stop the purchase, fearing that the fur trade would be diverted from Albany. Dongan ordered the commissioners to stop the proceedings on 14 September. Penn met with Dongan on 24 September, where it is believed they agreed that the land would be sold to Pennsylvania eventually. Negotiations between the Iroquois and Penn seemed to fall through, and acquiring the area of the northern Susquehanna River would be delayed until 1697. See Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 466-468; William

that the Iroquois had gained influence over the Susquehannocks, and in not wanting to estrange the powerful Five Nations, he sought to establish positive relations by giving gifts and recognizing their power.

While Penn displayed prudence in gaining title to Indians lands, he benefited from a dwindling native population. Delaware and Susquehannock numbers had been reduced from war, disease, and migration, and Francis Pastorius observed, “The Indians [...] grow less numerous here daily, retiring some hundred miles farther into the country.”⁵⁵ Suffering from disease and witnessing large influxes of settlers, though peaceful, Delawares sold land and acquired an ally and trading partner in William Penn’s government while moving north and west away from the European settlement area. Indian migration helped to remove possible overcrowding and tension from a small contact settlement experiencing a population increase, while Penn cultivated a continued understanding of restraint through knowledge of past relations, prudence, and approaching Indians in a spirit of brotherhood.⁵⁶ With a background in working with other peoples and cultures, as well as having witnessed and been on the receiving end of persecution, Penn worked on developing a sense of community and living side by side with European colonials and Indians in his newly established province. He also came to rely on his experiences in Ireland when arguing with Lord Baltimore over his southern border and the Lower Counties.

Penn utilized his experience of handling business transactions in Ireland during the drawn-out argument between Maryland and Pennsylvania over their mutual border and rights to the modern area of Delaware. Writing to Markham about the title to the Lower Counties, Penn

Haige, “From William Haige,” (August 20, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 469; William Haige, “From William Haige,” (September 4, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 479; “The Mohawk Indians’ Answer to William Haige and James Graham,” (September 7, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 481-482; Thomas Dongan, “Thomas Dongan to the Commissioners of Albany,” (September 14, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 487-488.

⁵⁵ Francis Daniel Pastorius, “Positive Information from America, concerning the Country of Pennsylvania, from a German who has migrated thither; dated Philadelphia, March 7, 1684,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 409-410.

⁵⁶ Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 201.

displayed his knowledge of the transactions between Indians and Europeans, noting that the Dutch had held title with the Swanendael settlement before Maryland gained its charter, “Remember, that tis not Cape Lopen, nor Cape Inlopen, but Cape Henlopen, which is Eight Leagues to the Southward of the Cape by the whorekills (which is called of the Dutch, in their Maps, Cape Cornelius) for it was at the most Southerne Cape, the Dutch Sett up their Armes in Brass, fifty Years agoe which I now call, in Respect to the Duke, Cape James.”⁵⁷ As a fellow Englishman, gentleman, and dissenter, Penn did not believe that Baltimore would use force in his drive for the Lower Counties, and that the issue would be settled by legal means. Working through the commissioners James Harrison, William Clarke, and Markham, Penn warned the presidents and sheriffs to stop any surveyor commissioned by Baltimore to exercise their office, but not to use military force against fellow subjects of Charles II, who Penn believed would make the final decision.⁵⁸ However idealistic Penn’s beliefs may have been, Baltimore did not share the same views. He stirred the pot in May 1683 when he announced to settlers in Kent County that they would have to pay him only a quarter of their quitrents due to Penn, and again sent agents in February 1684 with the offer of lower rents in exchange for oaths of fidelity. These moves by Baltimore served as opening salvos for a security threat in the early years of Penn’s colony.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ William Penn, “To William Markham,” (September 1, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 476. For more evidence of Penn’s knowledge of the Dutch possession of the Lower Countries and its link to Maryland’s charter, see William Penn, “To William Clarke,” (c. February, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 344-345.

⁵⁸ For Penn’s instructions and warning concerning Baltimore’s claims, see William Penn, “To William Markham, James Harrison, and William Clarke,” (July 2, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 410-411. In a letter to James Walliam and John White, both local officials in New Castle County, Penn expressed his view that Baltimore would not use violence, stating, “If you learn [Baltimore] cometh to invade my Right, protest most openly & solemnly in the King’s Name ag^t his Proceedings, & warn the Inhabitants to keep their Faith & solemn Engagements, & not fear, for he dare not use violence.” See William Penn, “To James Walliam and John White,” (September 9, 1683), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 486.

⁵⁹ John Richardson, “From John Richardson,” (February 10, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 521-522.

In March 1684 Baltimore invaded the Lower Counties when he directed George Talbot to build a fort near Christina Bridge in central New Castle County. Amid reports that residents and even councilors were on the brink of revolt, Penn and the Provincial Council sent representatives to calm the inhabitants and to arrest the leaders under the brands of treachery, cowardice, and rebellion.⁶⁰ In April Penn received reports that Talbot and his party had indeed constructed a fort, claiming the area for Baltimore, and that Baltimore's emissary, James Murphy, went "up and downe the County to seduce the peopl from their obedience & fidility to the Govern^r whoe is the Kings Leautenant and soe Consequently Rebellion Against the Kings Authority."⁶¹ The fomenting of rebellion inhibited the promotion of community and a sense of brotherhood in the Lower Counties, as residents witnessed invasions by outside forces, just as they had done over the previous fifty years. By May it became evident that the confrontation required the involvement of higher powers in resolving security matters on this southern frontier. Baltimore had set sail that month for England to present his case, forcing Penn to leave the colony to take up the fight in England. He commissioned Thomas Lloyd as president of the Provincial Council, and directed that the members care for the welfare of the colony in his absence. Upon expressing his hope that the settlers would remain an example for others to emulate, and that Christianity and just relations would not only repel enemies but also convict others, Penn set sail from Lewes on 18 August.⁶²

⁶⁰ William Penn, "To John Simcock and Others," (April 2, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 543-545. On 1 April 1684, Charles Pickerin related to the Provincial Council that most of the people of Kent County are "resolved to revolt, because Govr Penn hath broken his Promise, by nit Entring and Clearing y^e Vessells at New Castle; Also, if they doe it Baltimore will Stand by them." See *MPC*, 1:101.

⁶¹ William Welch, "From William Welch," (April 5, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 547-549; William Clarke, "From William Clarke," (April 18, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 552. William Welch, a London Quaker merchant and associate of Penn before Pennsylvania's founding, moved to New Castle County where he acted as a provincial councilor and briefly as a judge. See footnote in Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 523.

⁶² For the crisis with Baltimore and Talbot in the spring and summer of 1684 in official government records, see *MPC*, 1:101-117. Penn's initial government plan during his absence held no lieutenant-governor, but rather distributed responsibility and power among eleven colonists. Of the eleven, ten were Quakers and seven had been

During his first sojourn to the New World to organize his colony, William Penn found that he did not have to manage security issues from scratch. With European colonials already present who had blazed diplomatic trails and understandings with Delaware Indians, Penn only had to recognize and promote practices already in place. Having fashioned an outlook that peace and security resulted from society enjoying a sense of community and brotherhood, Penn fostered the culture of restraint in his peaceful and just approaches to both settlers and Indians. Europeans found their new proprietor approaching them with open arms and offering them a sense of maintaining identity while being part of a greater society in Pennsylvania. Delawares witnessed a newcomer approaching them in a just and subservient manner, offering gifts as homage for land access and to promote a friendly alliance. Arguments and threats to the integrity of his colony's borders, however, forced Penn to return to England. With the exception of his brief return at the turn of the century, Penn exercised little direct influence in Pennsylvania's security after 1684. The continued promotion of a culture of restraint and developing a sense of brotherhood and community with Indians rested in hands of the Quaker leaders, Penn's appointed lieutenant-governors, the Europeans who acted as interpreters and go-betweens with Indian groups, and the Indians themselves.

Community and Security without Penn

In the first years of Penn's absence, Pennsylvania faced security threats in different forms, including random, sea-faring robberies by pirates along the Lower Counties' coast as well as distant New France and calls for war. Yet community with Indians remained the central focus.

first purchasers of land in the colony, acquiring 5,000 or more acres. Penn's design kept in league with Quaker consensus and community, rather than be dominated by an individual. As Mary and Richard Dunn note, however, "the colonists quickly developed a fractious and insular spirit that challenged [Penn's] authority and undermined the tenets of his holy experiment." See Dunn and Dunn, ed., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 581-582; William Penn, "Commission to President Thomas Lloyd and the Provincial Council," (August 6, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 583; William Penn, "Farewell to Pennsylvania," (August 12, 1684), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 2, 590-591.

As it had been with the Dutch, Swedes, and Penn's first stay in Pennsylvania, the effects of intoxication threatened to bring about violence and possibly snowball into something larger. The Quaker community addressed alcohol at its Yearly Meetings, agreeing not to sell strong liquors to Indians to avoid tension.⁶³ The same perspective on alcohol came to be reflected at the provincial government level, where officials had to manage Indian relations and tensions in an effort to avoid a rise in violence. On 21 July 1685, Indians complained to the Council "y^e Secre of abuses they received from y^e servants of Jesper ffarmer, at y^e said Jesper ffarmer's Plantation, Vizt: their making y^e Indians drunk, then Lying with their Wives, and of their beeting both men and their wives." Utilizing Lasse Cock as an interpreter, the Council gave reassurances and sought discussion to resolve the issue.⁶⁴ Later that year when the inhabitants of Concord, Hertford, and the Welsh Tract complained of Indians killing hogs and other abuses, the Council, as per the treaty agreed upon with Markham and Delaware leaders, sought Indian sachems to discuss the issue and answer the grievances.⁶⁵ Faced with a large influx of Europeans, the Delawares attempted to use isolated cases of violence and threats to maintain a sense of supremacy in the area. However, an established culture with allies and trading partners as well as Penn's commitment to treating the Delawares justly and in a manner of promoting brotherhood restricted the extent to which Indians pursued violence. Furthermore, the peaceful approach of the Quakers and their promotion of equality and unity offered no further provocation of aggression beyond localized violence.⁶⁶ Outside of these isolated occurrences, as they appear in the settlers' perspective in the records of the Provincial Council, no instances of hostility

⁶³ *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes, 1681-1746*, (September 15, 1685), (September 8, 1686), (September 7, 1687), Coll. No. A1.2, HCL. *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes, 1681-1746*, will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYM-MJM*, (Date), A1.2, HCL. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting shifted the location site each year, back and forth between Philadelphia and Burlington, NJ.

⁶⁴ *MPC*, 1:147.

⁶⁵ *MPC*, 1:162-163.

⁶⁶ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 142; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 173-176.

occurred on par with Swanendael or that could snowball into a general war. With no substantial discussion of conflict or security fears immediately following Penn's departure, it can be assumed that relations with Indians remained peaceful and observant of the culture of restraint.⁶⁷

Already facing possible security threats from surrounding Indians in the hinterland, the young colony found itself in the dialogue of defense and empire when King William's War broke out 1688. By April 1689, rumors began trickling into Philadelphia and demonstrated how Pennsylvania's officials viewed security as relying upon the culture of restraint and promoting community. Governor John Blackwell provided the Council with letters from the justices and sheriff of Sussex County of a rumored invasion against Maryland "by 9000 Sennekers & ffrench, &c. But y^e board having received advertissem^t That it was groundless, It was thought fitt That y^e Govern should returne thanks to y^e Gent. for their care, but withal to caution them that they do not hereafter presume to ralse the Contrey without more manifest cause; and directions for that purpose."⁶⁸ The outrageous numbers and reported invasion received no substantiation, and with the province enjoying peace, the Council viewed the rumor as threatening the sense of community with Indians. When Blackwell revisited the same issue in August, the Council again dismissed it on the same grounds. Pieter Alrichs related a 1665 account involving the Mohawks,

⁶⁷ Other security matters threatened to distract Pennsylvania's focus on Indian affairs and undermine the colony's integrity in the eyes of British officials. The first cracks in the relationship between the Upper and Lower Counties surfaced soon after Penn left, when in February 1685 he began to note the difference in perception between the two regions. Fears of invasion from Maryland pushed settlers into a defensive posture and made the promotion of restraint and community in the Lower Counties increasingly difficult. Having a military tradition against fellow Europeans as seen in the rivalry between New Netherland and New Sweden, Dutch and Swedish descendants stood willing to defend themselves against any intrusions, whether from land or sea. When the New England Puritan and military-minded Governor John Blackwell arrived in December 1688, he published the King's proclamation for the suppression of pirates, an issue that, along with illegal trade, plagued Pennsylvania's relationship with the Lower Counties and its security from the sea. In late August 1689 two ships landed fifty French pirates in the area of Lewes, whereupon the well armed group plundered homes and forced local inhabitants to help load goods onto the ships. Just as fast as they appeared, the pirates left, as the justices of the peace noted that the "rogues" did not want to stay long, lest a man-o-war from New York would take notice. Like an annoying fly landing every so often, these unpredictable pirate raids did not merit considerable attention from Philadelphia, yet for those living in the Lower Counties, this remained their frontier as opposed to Philadelphia's focus on surrounding Indians. See William Penn, "To Stephen Crisp," (February 28, 1685), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 29; *MPC*, 1:228-229, 539-541.

⁶⁸ *MPC*, 1:277.

concluding that such reported numbers were inaccurate and no cause for concern. Griffith Jones, John Bristow, Bartholomew Coppock, and John Curtis all provided similar responses, arguing that they perceived no danger and that security resided in keeping “quiet among ourselves” and that “for y^e Indians, they are quiet.”⁶⁹ Peace for the young colony rested on not becoming entangled unnecessarily with military concerns. Penn and Quaker leadership had approached the Indians in a peaceable manner, presenting gifts to build a relationship and offering assurances that they intended no ill will. To react militarily to rumors would go against the understanding in place and upset the Quaker ideal of brotherhood of man. With no immediate perceived threat stemming from the French or their allied Indians, officials adhered to the culture of restraint and focused on keeping peace and security along the western frontier.

Pennsylvania received official word to make preparations for war against the French in November 1689. In the contest with France for empire in North America, England’s distant position created the expectation that all the colonies would help defend English interests against New France. Proximity to New France and violence suffered on the frontier explain New York’s and New England’s participation, but reaction by Pennsylvania offered a diversity of opinions. Military-minded men of the council perceived military preparedness as being an appropriate and advantageous action. Johannes de Haes argued that settlers should get powder and shot and Luke Watson promoted a militia, while William Markham asserted that he always kept his arms prepared, whether in war or peace. With an identifiable European opponent, these councilors encouraged military activity, at least minimal defensive preparations. The distant French threat, however, swayed some councilors in a different direction. John Simcock perceived “no danger but from the Bears & wolves. We are well, & in peace & quiet: Let us Keep ourselves so. I know not but a peaceable spirit, & that will do well.” John Hill supported Simcock’s position, and

⁶⁹ *MPC*, 1:299-300.

provided a statement that encapsulated Pennsylvania's focus on achieving security and its communal relationship with Indians, "if we should put ourselves into Armes, The Indians would rise against us, suspecting we intended harm to them. I desire, therefore, we may forbear till we heare out of England." Enough councilors placed primacy on the western frontier and maintaining friendly Indian relations so as to secure the colony, rather than support English designs for empire. With differing perceptions among members on what constituted a real threat and where attention should be focused, Blackwell faced a tough task in generating support for military action.⁷⁰

By the spring of 1690 the division among officials remained. On 24 April, military-minded inhabitants, including Markham and the Swede Lasse Cock, petitioned the Council to offer some kind of defense against the French. The European threat of the French may have roused the militancy of the Swede, but as a holdover from previous European settlement and an experienced Indian go-between, Cock also observed a restrained security approach with Indians. In an example of the tension that pulled at officials in their perception of security, Cock received instruction to visit French settlers in the province and care for the friendship with the Indians:

and further, that such of y^e sd ffrench who may be justly suspected of vnfaithfffulness to this province, may be by y^e must sutable means, perswaded downe here; and that y^e Chief Sachem of our Indians may be assured of our good Intention towards them and their people, and that wee desire a meeting with their Chief men as soon as they Cann Conveniently, giving us notice of the time nine or ten days before, and if he sees occation to Imploy four or six Likely and trusty persons of Them to Range along the most likely parts ffor y^e Discovering of any Designs of y^e ffrench, or their Indians, against the peace, who shall have Competent satisfaction at their Return to vs. And our desire is that Capt. Markham, Rob. Turner, with such Credible persons as may be perswaded vpon this service, goe along with y^e advice & Concurrence of y^e said persons; And in y^e meantime, Care be taken for sutable presents ffor them at their meeting with vs.⁷¹

⁷⁰ *MPC*, 1:306.

⁷¹ *MPC*, 1:334-335.

Rather than create a militia force and place the colony in a stronger state of formal and visible military preparedness against the seemingly distant French, the Council adhered to mechanisms that would promote harmony in living alongside Indians instead of creating possible tension. Pennsylvania's officials promoted community by giving presents to the Indians, just as the Dutch and Swedes had done, and used rangers to gather intelligence along the frontier instead of scaring their friendly Indians with military force.

The attempt by Pennsylvania officials to remain focused on keeping peace with the Indians on the western frontier, despite calls to assist in the struggle for empire, became complicated when internal dissension brought increased royal oversight over the colony's external affairs. In 1690 George Keith, a Quaker residing in Pennsylvania, called for reform over issues of church discipline and government, especially on the question of whether Quakers should exercise magistracy. Thomas Lloyd and orthodox Quakers rejected Keith's calls and accused him of heresy. By 1692, the ongoing schism brought reports from Quarterly Meetings on the spirit of separation and disunity. Viewing Keith as a bad seed to the spirit of community, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting disowned him.⁷² Yet Lloyd proved to be a polarizing figure as well. In writing to a friend in England, Penn noted that the Lower Counties met Lloyd's appointment as lieutenant-governor with such resistance that the proprietor actually split the government, selecting Lloyd as governor for the Upper Counties and the more military-minded Markham as governor for the Lower Counties. Penn lamented this division and further deterioration of harmony amongst Europeans, "this has greived & wounded me & myne, I fear to the hazard of all. W^tever the morals of the lower Countys are, It was embraced, as a Mercy that we got & united them to the Prov. and a great charter tyes them, & this perticuler ambition has broken

⁷² Murphy, *Conscience and Community*, 192; Wokeck et al., eds., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 347-349; *PYM-MJM*, (September 7, 1692), A1.2, HCL.

it.”⁷³ In the eyes of officials back in England, this Quaker factionalism coupled with Pennsylvania’s apparent lack of military preparedness painted the colony as weak and one that could easily fall to the French threat that could strike at any time. As a result, Penn lost his colony to a period of royal control. On 21 October 1692, the co-ruling monarchs William and Mary commissioned Benjamin Fletcher, the governor of New York, to also administer Pennsylvania and empowered him to raise military force and secure the colony in the face of the proprietor’s great neglect.⁷⁴

As English colonies fought against their French competitors in North America during King William’s War, Indian groups held mixed feelings in their willingness to participate in the conflict, thus contributing to Pennsylvania’s restrained security culture. While in Philadelphia in May 1693, Governor Fletcher hosted a group of Indians from the upper regions of the Delaware River in and around New York. While this party of Delawares expressed pleasure at being informed that the familiar William Markham would act as lieutenant-governor upon Fletcher’s return to New York, the Indians complained about the Quaker government:

when the Quakers governed sometimes one man & sometimes another pretended to be Governor, & when wee were in feare of the French and their Indians, and inclined to make warr with them, they would not encourage us, nor make anie preparations themselves, nor give us assistance; although wee are a small number of Indians, yet wee are men & know fighting. Wee hope yor Excell. will encourage us in it; & gave some raccoons.⁷⁵

This Delaware group, based on its reported location along the northern parts of the Delaware River, wanted to fight because of its fear and closer proximity to the French. Fletcher encouraged this Delaware group to send warriors to Albany. He gave assurances to their safety, for the French and their Indian allies had to pass through him and New York. This incident demonstrates

⁷³ William Penn, “To a Weighty Friend in England,” (June 29, 1692), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 350. The Upper and Lower Counties would be brought back together under a single governor during Benjamin Fletcher’s tenure.

⁷⁴ *MPC*, 1:352-364.

⁷⁵ *MPC*, 1:372-373.

the spatial security that Pennsylvania enjoyed, protected by New York and the Five Nations and thus not necessitating the raising of military forces. Furthermore, the described location of the Delaware band, being in closer proximity to New York, suggests they did not regularly interact with the Dutch and Swedes farther south in the Delaware River Valley, and thus had not grown accustomed to a culture of restraint as other bands who now dealt with Pennsylvania's government.

While Delaware bands closer to danger complained of not receiving support, Pennsylvania benefitted from the fragmented nature of the Delawares, as officials could focus on keeping peace and promoting community with more immediate groups. This restraint became when Lt. Governor Markham hosted a number of Delaware sachems in July 1694. Hithquoquean, speaking on behalf of the Delawares, reflected their contentment with peace. He reported that the Onondages and Senecas called the Delawares women who stayed at home rather than fight, and that the "Senekaes wold have us delaware Indians to be ptners wt ym to fight agt y^e french, But we having alwayes been a peaceable people, & resolving to live so, & being but week and verie few in number, cannot assist ym." While colonists may have taken the designation of "women" as a sign of weakness and submission, the reality is that the Delawares acted more as intermediaries and peace advocates, as reflected in their approach to gaining allies among European colonials.⁷⁶ Hithquoquean recalled the continued "friendship with all the Christians & old Inhabitants of this river, since I was a young man, & are desirous to Continou the same soe long as wee live." Tamanee also offered his experiences and thoughts of the settlers, stating, "Wee and the Christians of this river Have always had a free rode way to one another, & tho' sometimes a tree has fallen across the rode yet wee have still removed it again, &

⁷⁶ Jennings, "Brother Miquon," 198; Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 109-112; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 163; Soderlund, *Lenape Country*, 168. See especially Gunlög Fur, *A Nation of Women* (2009).

kept the path clean, and wee design to Continou the old friendship that has been between us and you.”⁷⁷ This analogy of the tree falling in the road between Indians and settlers shows that despite occasional tension, both parties had sought dialogue to avoid excessive violence. The recording of this analogy, given by Tamanee, gives further credence to the presence of an understanding of restraint, and that in the dozen years of Quaker governance the culture had continued to mature with the fostering of community. By removing the obstacles, symbolized by the tree, that inhibited the friendship between Indians and settlers, both could live side by side and respect each other in the spirit of brotherhood.

Fletcher faced a difficult task in acquiring Pennsylvania’s support for New York’s defenses. In addition to struggling against the Quaker peace testimony that called Friends to combat evil in the world with spiritual weapons and strength, he had to convince Pennsylvania officials that such a move would benefit the colony’s security. In May 1694 Fletcher approached the matter by attempting to offer an interpretation to the culture of restraint, arguing that assistance from Pennsylvania would support Indian relations and not make war, “Gentl., I consider yor principles that you will not Carie arms nor Levie monie to make warr, though for your own defence, Yet I hope you will not refuse to feed the Hungrie and Cloath the Naked. My meaning is to supply those Indian nations which such necessaries as may influence them to a Continuance of their friendship to those provinces.”⁷⁸ By supporting the well being of the Five Nations, Pennsylvania could support the Indian barrier that shielded it from French and Indian

⁷⁷ *MPC*, 1:447. In his July 1694 meeting with Delaware sachems, Markham also sought to calm fears of the neighboring Indians. He acknowledged that the English had indeed taken up arms, but assured the Delawares that “it’s not or design yrby to make warr upon you, nor upon any others; but thereby to be in a Capacitie and readiness to defend orselves and you from or & yor Comon enemie the French, if they should happen to assault us or you.” See *MPC*, 1:449. The local leader of Germantown, Francis Pastorius, commented on Indian relations after his first ten years in Pennsylvania, stating in 1693, “I have never heard that they have attempted to do violence to anyone, far less murdered anyone, although they have not only had frequent opportunity to do so, but also to conceal themselves in the thick and extensive forest.” See Francis Daniel Pastorius, “Further News from Germantown, June 1, 1693,” *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania*, 419.

⁷⁸ *MPC*, 1:459-460.

attacks. He found willingness in the Assembly to provide funds to maintain the friendship between the Iroquois and English, with the condition that Pennsylvania would gain better representation at Albany and could dispense with the funds. Fletcher's strategy had enticed the Assembly with the opportunity to solidify alliance with the Iroquois. But it came with a cost, as officials in Philadelphia smelled economic opportunity and expansion of trade. Fletcher balked at the terms, as it undermined his executive authority and challenged New York's trade and alliance with the Iroquois.⁷⁹

The restoration of Pennsylvania to the proprietor brought with it continued adherence by the Assembly to promote a sense of community with Indians to maintain peace and friendship. When Penn regained his title to the colony in August 1694, he had to agree to conditions that he would restore order and provide a quota of soldiers to assist with New York's defenses. Still in England and in the midst of King William's War, he accepted the terms to sooth the fears of English officials. Markham, however, on assuming the lieutenant-governor position, continued to tangle with the Council's and Assembly's perspective on security.⁸⁰ Over the course of 1695-1697, Pennsylvania officials continually avoided raising troops, citing the infancy and poverty of the colony as well as the religious persuasions against violence for many government members. Yet within these evasion tactics, Pennsylvania continued to adhere to its communal approach to security. While the Assembly would not vote for the raising of troops, it sent £300 of Pennsylvania currency to New York in order to feed and clothe Indians. Set in an insulated position where New England and New York acted as a defensive barrier, to make inroads with

⁷⁹ *MPC*, 1:463, 470-472. Fletcher also received £760 in Pennsylvania currency in 1693 after stating that the money would not be dipped in blood. See *MPC*, 1:492.

⁸⁰ "Minute of Lords of Trade and Plantations" (August 1-3, 1694), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies*, ed. J. W. Fortescue, Vol. 14, January 1693 – May 14, 1696 (London: Mackie and Co. LD., 1903), 316; "Minute of Lords of Trade and Plantations" (August 3, 1694), *State Papers, Vol. 14*, 317; "Order of the Queen in Council" (August 9, 1694), *State Papers, Vol. 14*, 321.

the Five Nations and gain their friendship served to only benefit Pennsylvania's focus on the frontier and demonstrated that its security rested on good relations with Indians.⁸¹

When Penn departed for England to defend his colony and interests, continued observance of the culture of restraint and adherence to a spirit of community fell to Pennsylvania's Quaker-led government and Indian leaders. Localized violence appeared shortly after Penn left, as Delaware Indians tried to maintain hegemony in the face of large influxes of settlers. Colonial officials, recognizing the understanding and practices of restraint already in place, sought out dialogue to resolve differences. Small cases of violence and threats became controlled, yet demonstrated for colonial officials that their primary security concern remained with maintaining friendly relations with Indians. When called upon to assist in the contest for empire, officials resisted, choosing instead to foster community alongside Indians and not risk raising tensions and alienating allies. Delaware leaders, such as Hithquoquean and Tamanee, reciprocated the growing sense of community and brotherhood as they sought to remove obstacles from the path of friendship that had developed. Penn's restoration as proprietor brought increased expectations that Pennsylvania would offer military contributions in the fight against

⁸¹ *MPC*, 1:518-519. Congruent with the fostering of community with neighboring Indians and discussion on assisting New York, Pennsylvania gave greater attention to security threats from the sea. In June 1695 officials responded to Markham's discussion of French pirates possibly raiding the Lower Counties by proposing "that a watch on Cape Inlopen to be kept, might be of Service, to give notice if anie suspicious vessels should appeare wtin sight of sd Cape," which carried in the affirmative. When representatives from Sussex County made a petition about defense in May 1697, officials resorted back to funding a watch. Penn himself attempted to address water-borne security issues from England. In September 1697, he described the sense of disgrace brought by illegal trade, stating that Pennsylvania's government winked at illegal trade with Scotland and the Dutch and embraced piracy. Despite these steps and awareness, Pennsylvania and the Lower Counties could not stop random raids from occurring. Eighty pirates raided Lewes in August 1698 and in June 1699 pirates overtook a brigantine. New Castle residents, growing increasingly restless after these incidents, offered their perspective on security in August 1699 when they complained that with no investment in visible and traditional military defenses, Philadelphia had ignored their concerns, "so yt both our Lives, Liberties and estates, have hitherto Lyn open, & still do remain defenceless & void of protection, & ever exposed to y^e wills [of such] mercieless wretches, who are a plague to all honest endeavours & a Continual terror to our peace & tranquillitie." See *MPC*, 1:479, 524, 527-528, 563-564; William Penn, "To William Markham and the Council," (September 5, 1697), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 517-518. In May 1693 the military-minded Governor Fletcher proposed that a fort be built on the Delaware River to command the channel and defend trade. When voted upon, it carried in the affirmative. There is no further development in the Council Minutes of this proposed fort. See *MPC*, 1:372.

France. Yet when he returned fifteen years after his first visit, Penn understood that practices existed between Indians and settlers along the frontier, and he continued to promote community with Indians as a way to ensure peace.

Penn's Second Visit and Community and Security

William Penn returned to Pennsylvania in December 1699, ushering in a brief period where he could personally address the multiple security issues facing his colony and further his view of achieving security through community. Required by the Board of Trade to suppress and punish pirates in order to maintain ownership of his colony, he helped push through two laws against illegal trade and piracy, declaring to the Council on 1 April 1700 that he hoped “these two Laws will in some degree wash us clean.”⁸² Indian relations, however, remained the centerpiece for Penn’s security approach. In a letter to the Governor of New York in July 1700, Penn considered the importance of keeping the Five Nations on friendly terms with the English, writing, “But I hope yet that [the Five Nations] will See it to be their Interest to keep friendship wth their Neighbours and the fear of Warr as farr off as they can. If thy Indian Officers be true to thee, & that Seasonable presents be made them I should be under no apprehensions of Danger.”⁸³ Penn, as he had done earlier, continued in the tradition of using presents in Indian diplomacy, as it had been with the Dutch and Swedes before him and European colonials elsewhere. Penn demonstrated his wisdom and restraint the following month. When vessels near Philadelphia fired their guns, some Senecas departed the city because they feared that the guns symbolized intended hostilities. Concerned with his colony’s image and relationship with Indians, Penn

⁸² *MPC*, 1:596. Of particular note regarding ties to illegal trade and piracy, some inhabitants of Lewes, with several being suspected as former pirates, had been reported as being complicit in illegally trading with the infamous Captain Kidd. For documentation on illegal trade between Lewes, Sussex County and Captain Kidd, see William Penn, “To the Board of Trade,” (April 28, 1700), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 592-594; *MPC*, 1:579.

⁸³ William Penn, “To the Earl of Bellomont,” (July 4, 1700), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 3, 604. Penn continued to note that he prayed for wisdom, patience, and justice in dealing with Indians, so as to show that he had no intention of conquering them.

“Informed y^e 3 Senecar Indians yt stayed behind the rest, that itt was the Custom of y^e English to fire guns as a sign of joy & kinf entertainment of yr friends coming on board; & was in no manner of ways intended to frighten or disoblige ym.”⁸⁴ To demonstrate his friendship, Penn offered a wampum belt and had Council members and an interpreter escort the Senecas on board a ship in order to demonstrate English mannerisms at sea. The Indians expressed their satisfaction and left confident they had nothing to fear from Penn’s government.

Penn brought greater security to Pennsylvania in April 1701 with his continued commitment to establishing communal relations with neighboring Indians. On the eve of meeting hundreds of Susquehannock, Shawnee, Conoy, and Iroquois Indians, the proprietor hoped “to settle a lasting friendship with them,” and retrieve them from the vices introduced by the Europeans.⁸⁵ In addition, he wished to secure the Susquehanna River Valley for future settlement and trade expansion. On 23 April, Connodaghtoh, King of the Susquehannocks, Wopaththa, King of the Shawnees, Weewhinjough, Chief of the Ganawese, and Ahoakassongh, brother to the Emperor of the Onondagas and representative of the Five Nations, met with Penn and committed themselves and their people to a firm and lasting peace with Brother Onas. This Iroquois designation for Penn, along with Brother Miquon from the Delawares, translates as feather, demonstrating Penn’s diplomatic efforts in establishing friendship and peace with Indians.⁸⁶ The Indian groups concluded with Penn “that they shall forever hereafter be as one head & one heart & live in true Friendship & Amity as one people.”⁸⁷ In developing this sense of community, the European settlers and the various tribes would work in the spirit of brotherhood to promote justice and goodwill in case of hostility or wrongdoing. Furthermore, Penn helped to

⁸⁴ *MPC*, 1:586.

⁸⁵ William Penn, “To Robert Harley,” (c. April 1701), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 45.

⁸⁶ Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 198. Brother Onas will hereafter be used throughout the rest of the dissertation.

⁸⁷ “Articles of Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians,” (April 23, 1701), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 51.

secure his colony from outside threats, as none of the Indian groups would “at any time be Aiding Assisting or Abetting to any other Nation whether of Indians or Others that shall not at such time be in Amity with the Crown of England & with this Government.”⁸⁸

Brother Onas gave assurances as well. The Susquehannocks and Shawnees could continue to live in peace at Conestoga with the same rights as settlers, while the Conoy, if forced to leave Maryland, could settle in Pennsylvania. The Iroquois, having a strained relationship with New York as a result of King William’s War, began to forge an alliance and Chain of Friendship with Pennsylvania.⁸⁹ Penn had reaffirmed his vision of community and security with surrounding tribes, just as he had done some eighteen years before. As the conference ended, Brother Onas promised “for himself his heirs & successors that he and they will at all times shew themselves True Friends and Brothers to all and every of the said Indians by assisting them with the best of their Advices Directions & Councils.”⁹⁰ In this language of friendship and community, Penn continued to demonstrate his outlook on achieving peace in society. With his fellow Quakers having upheld restraint in his absence, Indians found little reason to discount the intentions of Brother Onas and his brethren.

Having addressed Pennsylvania’s most immediate security issue and strengthening the sense of community with Indian groups, Penn’s attention returned to the troublesome issue of security and community with the Lower Counties. Pirate raids had plagued settlers along the

⁸⁸ “Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians,” 52.

⁸⁹ Wokeck et al., eds., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 50-51.

⁹⁰ “Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians,” 53. For documentation for the 1701 meeting, see “Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians,” 49-53 and *MPC*, 2:15-17. By the turn of the century, Pennsylvanian officials perceived the smaller bands of Delawares, Susquehannocks, Shawnees, and others as ‘their’ Indians. When an embassy from the Five Nations sought aid from their perceived allies in the Susquehanna River Valley, the Council labeled the local Indians as “our Indians on Delaware.” See *MPC*, 2:19. In the Grand Settlement of 1701, the Iroquois made peace with the French and their allied Indians to the north and west. Daniel Richter sees this treaty as a shift among the Iroquois from warfare to neutrality between empires, and allowed the Iroquois to shift attention toward Indian groups in Virginia and the Carolinas. With the Pennsylvania hinterland as a pathway for warriors, and Penn eager to access to trade in the Susquehanna River Valley, the 1701 treaty between Pennsylvania, the Iroquois, and other tribes assisted in preventing possible conflict from breaking out along the frontier. See Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 90, 95; Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 203-205; Beatty, *Penn as Social Philosopher*, 273.

coast, resulting in demands for aid and defense while also contributing to a more militaristic attitude. Penn attempted to satisfy the concerns of the Lower Counties by ordering in June 1701 that the magistrates of Sussex County appoint and care for a constant watch near Lewes. He also entertained their request that he inform William III of their position as a frontier against sea-borne invasions. Yet the rift between the Upper and Lower Counties could not be bridged. The history of raids along the Lower Counties coastline, despite their infrequency, left an unsettling impression with settlers. The random occurrence of these pirate raids brought fear to merchants, and watches could only do so much. The Lower Counties required a different approach to security. In October 1701, Penn reluctantly allowed the Lower Counties to form a separate government. He signed a new frame of government that month, known as the Charter of Privileges. In addition to shifting legislative power into the hands of the Assembly and relegating the Council to an administrative body, a clause allowed the Lower Counties to meet in a separate assembly. With this new sense of autonomy, the Lower Counties on the Delaware could address their perceived security threat from the sea, while Philadelphia could keep its attention on the frontier to the west.⁹¹

Continued threats to his proprietorship forced Penn to leave Pennsylvania, this time for good, in late 1701. Despite the break with the Lower Counties, he could only feel optimistic that Pennsylvania remained secured in its communal relationships with neighboring Indians. This spirit and legacy of community became evident to Penn when Susquehannock and Shawnee sachems, along with some of their people, came to take leave of Brother Onas before his departure. The sachems reflected on their dealings with Penn, stating that Brother Onas had always been just and kind to sachems already deceased, that he suffered them no wrongs, and

⁹¹ *MPC*, 2:22, 31; “The Charter of Privileges,” (October 28, 1701), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 109. See also Marianne S. Wokeck et al., eds., *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 85-86.

had provided entertainment, gifts, and payment for lands. Brother Onas stood out as a benevolent and brotherly figure to the sachems, as his communal perspective and management of relationships with surrounding tribes had profited in the continued promotion of a peaceful and restrained environment.⁹²

During his brief return to Pennsylvania, William Penn's most notable accomplishment centered on enabling his colony to prosper both in size and trade by gaining access to the Susquehanna River Valley. In doing so, he continued to promote the ideals of community and brotherhood with Indians who had come to trust Brother Onas, their designation for the proprietor's use of diplomacy instead of violence. In the language exchanged between Penn and Indian leaders, they gave assurances of friendship and living side by side as one people. While this diplomacy is not unique to British North America, the exchange stands apart in that it built upon decades of understanding already in place between Europeans and Indians as well as in that Quaker leadership had affirmed Penn's intent during his absence. Focus remained on Indian relations along the western frontier after the Lower Counties gained autonomy. With Queen Anne's War breaking out in 1702, Pennsylvania's leaders effectively managed the colony's security by promoting trade, community, and avoiding unnecessary tension with Indians.

Community and Security in William Penn's Final Years

Space played a key role in securing Pennsylvania and promoting community with Indians in the culture of restraint. Both proprietor and legislators recognized that the colony had geographical and political barriers that did not necessitate formal military defenses. As a result, they continued to focus on the primary security concern of Indians and pursued policy in line with the methods practiced along the frontier. Responding to Robert Quarry's attacks before the Board of Trade in April 1702 regarding the lack of a militia, Penn offered his views on how

⁹² "From the Susquehannock and Shawnee Indians," (c. October 7, 1701), *Penn Papers, Vol. 4*, 98-99.

space acted as the best method for securing his colony, “Since by Land, there’s None to annoy it, and by Sea, the Position of the Countrey & the manner of our Settlements considered (our Distance from the Capes being 160 Miles, New-Castle 120, and the Shoals & Narrows so many, that a small Vessel of War would, under God’s Providence, be the best Security.”⁹³ Instead of following the norm as other colonies did and build fortifications and raise troops, Penn gave a geographic and practical explanation for choosing a different course. With practices in place that kept peace with Indians, Penn viewed military expenditures, without a viable threat from a declared enemy, as unnecessary and could alienate friendly Indians.

Pennsylvania’s officials concurred with Penn’s perspective, a notable viewpoint considering their closer geographic proximity to possible threats. Governor John Evans sent a message to the Assembly in May 1704, acknowledging Pennsylvania’s insulated location: “It is undoubtly true, that y^e Govrmt of New York lies much exposed to the attacks of the enemy, that their strength & Defence tends to our security, and that the Govmts to y^e Eastwd are very deeply engaged in Defences of their own, which also makes for the common safety.”⁹⁴ While Evans acknowledged that Pennsylvania had enjoyed a happy state of peace and tranquility, he argued a year later that to maintain this, England expected support from her colonies. The Assembly agreed on the long peace, humbly owing it to Divine Providence, and stated its willingness to offer support according to its circumstances, religious persuasions, and care of trade.⁹⁵ While pacifism is traditionally read into this as the cover all excuse for the lack of a militia, circumstances and care for trade speak to another perspective, one based on maintaining peace

⁹³ “Dispute with Robert Quarry before the Board of Trade,” (c. April 16, 1702), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 162. Robert Davidson acknowledges that during the early contests for the continent, Pennsylvania remained unmolested because it did not occupy a strategic geographic spot until the mid-eighteenth century. See Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania*, vi.

⁹⁴ *MPC*, 2:142.

⁹⁵ *MPC*, 2:188, 192-193.

and security through established practices, such as positive trade relations, and promoting a sense of community by living side by side with Indians.⁹⁶

In the midst of Queen Anne's War and French threats to undermine Indian relations, and thus affect Pennsylvania's security, the Governor and Provincial Council sought to control and even police the fur trade. They targeted French traders for their critical positions as mediators between Indians and Europeans. In August 1703 James Le Tort, having served as an interpreter with Indians for the Pennsylvania government, along with Peter Bezalio, had to give a security deposit of £500 sterling to ensure good behavior as a subject residing in Pennsylvania and not provide any information to enemy forces that could be detrimental to Pennsylvania. Le Tort kept his word, for in May the following year, he acted as interpreter for a group of Onondaga of the Five Nations, relaying that the Indians sought to trade with Pennsylvania, to not be abused in the pricing of goods, and to maintain regular trade and friendly correspondence. Evans' response welcomed the Indians, but noted a scarcity of trade goods because ships had not arrived yet, a situation reminiscent in the early days of settlement along the Delaware River. Pennsylvanians did not have to worry about being driven into the sea as the Dutch and Swedes had feared some sixty years earlier, but Evans gave the Indian messengers wampum as confirmation of good

⁹⁶ In the early years of Queen Anne's War, both Governor Andrew Hamilton and Governor John Evans argued for traditional militia forces and fortifications, as they believed that such features were fundamentally necessary for a province's security. Yet their position, coupled with the known stance of Quakers on military force, seemed to limit their perception. Pennsylvania maintained its security through a more unique approach of community and management of relationships, rather than the forceful, well known, and widely practiced approach of military organizations. See *MPC*, 2:79, 162. In 1709, the Assembly continued to perceive space as instrumental to Pennsylvania's security. Responding to Governor Charles Gookin, the Assembly stated: "We don't conceive our selves more Lyable to danger, by the ill neighbourhood of the french at Canada, than our nieghbours of Maryland, Virginia, and the three Lower Counties, which makes us apprehensive that some disaffected to this province have misrepresented us to the Queen." While acknowledging that religious principles, namely the peace testimony, also inhibited their willingness to contribute to defenses, they argued that Pennsylvania's geographic location did not require it to support unnecessary measures. Nevertheless, they offered a present of £500 to Queen Anne as a token of thanks for the favors bestowed on the Quaker colony and the efforts made in the current conflict for securing it. See *MPC*, 2:460.

intentions.⁹⁷ Further demonstration of Pennsylvania's management of the fur trade, French traders, and Indian relations occurred in July 1707. Upon reports that the Frenchman Nicole Godin has been inciting Indians against the province, Evans moved to apprehend and imprison him. Evans nipped the threat in the bud, rather than leaving it to fester and possibly stir up Indian trouble.⁹⁸ Pennsylvania appeared more than willing to act on the security front that in their view mattered the most: maintaining community with Indians.

Pennsylvania could afford to give additional attention to its more significant western frontier and Indian relations because its southeastern flank along the Delaware River and Delaware Bay had become increasingly secured by the defensive efforts of the Lower Counties. By July 1705, the assembly representing the Lower Counties had agreed on a Militia Act.⁹⁹ In the summer of 1709, *HMS Garland* regularly patrolled the waters between the Delaware Capes and Cape Hatteras. This followed another French pirate raid on Lewes and reports from James Logan, Secretary for Pennsylvania and Penn's representative in the colony, about how ships refused to set sail because of pirate mischief on the capes, and that they would only sail if offered protection by a man-o-war.¹⁰⁰ With an increase in military activity from the Lower Counties along their perceived seaward frontier to the east, Governor Gookin reported in June 1709 that "I find them Ready & Willing to Defend the Countrey, for they look on themselves as a frontier to you tho' a weak one, and if they perish your Destruction in all probability will not be far of."¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ *MPC*, 2:140-141. Jacques Le Tort reported on the state of the Susquehannocks in 1702, writing to William Penn: "I know indeed that there are twelve or fifteen Indian cabins at Susquehanna, which are the remains of the Indians which the Iroquois destroyed thirty-five to forty years ago and as they are so few and unable to make war either on the Iroquois or on other nations they were given permission to live there and required to pay tribute like bondsmen." See Jacques Le Tort, "From Jacques Le Tort," (March 4, 1702), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 156.

⁹⁸ *MPC*, 2:385.

⁹⁹ James Logan, "From James Logan," (July 4, 1705), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 363.

¹⁰⁰ *MPC*, 2:447-448, 475; James Logan, "From James Logan," (June 14, 1709), *Penn Papers*, Vol. 4, 647; *Gulielma M. Howland Collection, James Logan Letters*, "Letter from Logan to William Penn," (July 19, 1708), Coll. No. 1000, HCL. Hereafter: *Howland Collection, Logan Letters*, "Title," (Date), HCL.

¹⁰¹ *MPC*, 2:452.

The separation of the Lower Counties actually served to secure Pennsylvania. With a more traditional military presence now taking shape in Delaware Bay, Pennsylvania became even more insulated, as the mouth of the Delaware River in a sense became closed off. The Lower Counties could now guard the entrance to the Delaware, and thus protect Pennsylvania. Furthermore, with Indians largely removed from the Lower Counties, militarization did not pose a threat to antagonizing Indian groups or undermining the culture of restraint. With its southeastern flank secured, Pennsylvania could focus on cultivating community with natives to the west.¹⁰²

Indians and Pennsylvania settlers continued to practice restraint into the final years of the founding proprietor. Penniless to the point where he attempted to sell the colony, and rendered incapacitated by three strokes over the course of three years, Penn increasingly became detached from his ability to remain involved in Pennsylvania's affairs, both physically and mentally. Yet the views on achieving peace and security through community that he had sown had been harvested by both Indians and Europeans. When officials sought approval from Indians to allow Palatine Germans to settle along the branches of the Potomac River in 1711, Indians advised restraint, urging the Christians not to settle because Indian violence made it unsafe, and they feared "if any Damage should happen to these the blame will be laid upon them."¹⁰³ Further solidarity with the Delawares became evident the following year when they exchanged wampum

¹⁰² In July 1709 Passakassy, a Delaware sachem, spoke to the Council concerning his view that French raids on the coast appeared to be a precursor to invasion, and that as a result he would not travel far from home in case his people needed assistance. Governor Gookin sought to soothe Passakassy's spatial fears, cautioning him against listening to these "flying reports" and telling him that the French had no forces in these parts that could injure his people. He explained the concept of piracy, and that these rumors were actually "Robberies, that some of their small vessels fitted out only for this purpose to plunder and way lay honest traders had Committed," and that "what had happened was not the effect of any superior force in war, but such Robberies as were common at sea." See *MPC*, 2:245. In 1706 Governor John Evans, playing off reports of a powerful French fleet in the Caribbean, issued a proclamation requiring persons to bear arms upon news that several French ships were in the Delaware River. These reports from New Castle turned out to be false, diminishing the governor's credibility in the 'cry wolf' episode, and only affirmed the perception among Pennsylvanian officials on their insulated and secured position. See James Logan, "From James Logan," (May 28, 1706), *Penn Papers, Vol. 4*, 534-535, 540; *MPC*, 2:250.

¹⁰³ *MPC*, 2:533.

belts as symbols of peace, rejoiced over the British victory over the French, and affirmed the harmony between the Delawares and Pennsylvania. Regarding the Five Nations, they exchanged bundles of furs and wampum belts in October 1712, as the Iroquois sought to maintain open and fair trade. By exchanging presents, furs, and wampum belts, the parties involved used symbols to recall memories of friendship and past treaties establishing trade and alliances, all in concordance to a culture of restraint observed along the frontier.¹⁰⁴

Officials recognized that promoting a sense of community had brought peace and continued to take proactive steps. Governor Gookin addressed the Assembly in 1713, reminding them of the pending expiration of a law for cultivating friendship with Indians, and that in his opinion it remained critically “necessary to keep up a friendship with them after the usual manner, tho’ in time of Peace, since upon the foot we have always acted with them.”¹⁰⁵ Fostering community within the practices and understanding of restraint alongside the most immediate Indians remained the centerpiece of Pennsylvania’s security since the Quaker arrival some thirty years prior. In 1715 the government passed laws maintaining good correspondence, preventing abuse, and securing trade with Indians. Alcohol continued to be regulated as the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting reasserted the decision not to sell rum, brandy, and other strong liquors to Indians while government officials encouraged Indians to stave casks and destroy liquor.¹⁰⁶

As Penn’s health deteriorated, both Indians and settlers reaffirmed the bonds of peace and community that he had promoted. In June 1715 Delaware sachems gathered in Philadelphia. Sassoonan spoke on their behalf, stating “that the Calamett, the bond of peace, which they had carried to all the nations round they had now brought hither; that it was a sure bond and seal of

¹⁰⁴ *MPC*, 2:547-548, 557-560; Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 71, 81.

¹⁰⁵ *MPC*, 2:568.

¹⁰⁶ *MPC*, 2:581, 604; *PYM-MJM*, (September 21-26, 1719), A1.2, HCL. See also *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, HCL, 115.

Peace amongst them and between them and us,” and that they desired “there might be a firm peace between them and us forever.”¹⁰⁷ Within the Quaker Yearly Meeting, members understood Penn’s legacy and the communal relationship he had promoted. Writing to Friends in London in September 1717, they attributed their “godly and prudent Carriage” toward Indians as the result of Penn’s example, who “when here always set a noble and good example by his love, Justice, and tenderness towards the Indians, so that his memory is dear to them, and they love to speak and hear his name.”¹⁰⁸ Penn had left his mark with regards to Pennsylvania’s security.

Community between settlers and Indians had kept and enhanced the culture of restraint already established. When Penn died on 30 July 1718, his vision for security remained.

Conclusion

The security culture of restraint between Indians and European settlers in the Delaware River Valley underwent a maturation process in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, where the outlook provided by William Penn and his Quaker counterparts promoted ideals of the brotherhood of man and community in order to live side by side with Indians in harmony. Prior to Penn’s arrival, relations between Indians and colonials had relied on trade and acquiring allies. At times the frontier grew tense and local incidents of violence occurred, but an understanding grew between both sides to avoid war and maintain trade and dialogue. These practices and understanding matured with the arrival of Penn, as the culture of restraint acquired an ethical component where Indians and settlers expressed and believed in the ability for both to live in friendship and grow as allies. By Penn’s death, Indians and Europeans had taken the language and symbolism of frontier diplomacy, as well as over eight decades of relative peace

¹⁰⁷ *MPC*, 2:599.

¹⁰⁸ *PYM-MJM*, (September 14-18, 1717), A1.2.

and harmony, and nurtured it in Quaker ideals of brotherhood to create a sense of community on the frontier.


As proprietor of Pennsylvania, William Penn held a vision for the security of his colony based on experience, a theoretical outlook, and knowledge of the Delaware River Valley itself. Military life and business transactions in Ireland gave Penn a practical side, while his fight for religious toleration for Quakers and dissenters fashioned ideas of promoting community between different peoples to maintain peace. A leader among Quakers, Penn's networking with Friends who traveled to the New World and his role as a trustee of West New Jersey makes it very likely that he acquired knowledge of the political situation and relative peace that existed between Indians and Europeans in the Delaware River Valley. Understanding this, Penn treated the Indians with justice and relied on customs of gift-giving and paying for land to establish friendship and alliance. So effective did Penn set an example of brotherhood and community that when Brother Onas, as Penn became known for his use of diplomacy instead of force, prepared to depart the New World, he received a sendoff from Indians.

Penn may have held a vision for security, but Pennsylvania's government and Indian leaders adopted it when the proprietor remained largely absent. Seeing that Pennsylvania's insulated location offered protection, government leaders avoided traditional military force in order to avoid aggravating the surrounding Indians. On the other end, the various Indian polities that had begun to migrate west and settle in the Susquehanna River Valley recognized the peaceable and just disposition of Quaker settlers. Having fifty years of restraint and understanding with Europeans along the Delaware River, the Delawares, Susquehannocks, Iroquois, and other groups came to value their friendship, treaties, and trade with Pennsylvania and felt secure that the Quaker-led government had no intentions of persecuting them,

demonstrated by Moales Patterson's account of a conversation with Papunahoal, an Indian sachem. While journeying from Philadelphia toward Bethlehem, Patterson listened to Papunahoal's disdain for war, his yearning for peace, and his views on Christian hypocrisy regarding warfare and peace. When Patterson took leave of his friend, he asked the wise sachem for advice. Papunahoal noted how Europeans, including Quakers, offered him their various forms of religion, and that he found the Quakers' good words as leaving a lasting impression. As he left Patterson, Papunahoal offered him this outlook on relations with the Quakers and Pennsylvania officials: "if the good which I feel in my heart remains with me I shall come again to see the Quakers and if I continue to grow strong, I hope the time will come that I shall be joined in close fellowship with them."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Moales Patterson, "Account of conversation with Papunahoal..." (17--?) in Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Box 11 (1680-1714), FHL.

FIGURE 3: THE WALKING PURCHASE, 1737 ¹



¹ "The Walking Purchase," in Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 47.

CHAPTER THREE: THE EROSION OF RESTRAINT

In the roughly thirty-five years of Pennsylvania's formal existence, the security culture of restraint had matured with the infusion of Quaker ideals of brotherhood of man and community as promoted by William Penn and the Quaker-led government. Recognizing the understanding and practices present between Indians and Europeans in the Delaware River Valley, Penn built upon restraint with his outlook of promoting peace in society by treating other peoples with respect and justice. The maturation process, like the establishment of restraint, took time as Indians observed the government's preference for diplomacy and trade and came to value the friendship and treatment they experienced with the Quakers. Penn himself made an impression among Indian groups as the Delawares and Iroquois designated him Brother Miquon and Brother Onas, respectively, a reflection of his diplomatic method to achieve peace and harmony along the frontier.² During Penn's final years, Indians had found much more than trading partners and allies. The language and symbolism used by Indians and Europeans, in conjunction with decades of peace, demonstrated a friendship and sense of community. Penn's death in 1718, however, marked a transition in the culture of restraint.

Just as a friendship can be nurtured and grow in time, so too can it deteriorate with neglect and attention being focused elsewhere. Similar to how young childhood friends can grow apart as they age, the small tribes along Pennsylvania's western frontier, including the Delawares and Shawnee, and Pennsylvania's governing officials grew increasingly distant over time. From the early 1720s into the early 1750s, differences between Indians and European colonials eroded

² See Chapter Two for discussion of the titles Onas and Miquon given to William Penn by Indians. Because Onas is used regularly in the records, it will be used hereafter.

community and thus undermined the security culture of restraint. Dependent upon mutual adherence by both Indians and European colonials, the negation of cultivating friendship and alliance by one party and imperial pressures faced by the other placed new strains on the culture of restraint.

Growing spatial differences, both physical distance as well as interest alignment, over the span of several decades withered away the sense of community that had peaked under the guidance of William Penn and early Pennsylvania officials. Rather than pointing to a single instance of land fraud or a single idea such as pacifism as reason for the weakening sense of community between western Indian tribes and Pennsylvania, gradual erosion over time and exposure to multiple elements affected the culture of restraint. Penn's promotion of Pennsylvania as a holy experiment and its open door policy to different ethnic and religious groups brought an influx of settlers during the eighteenth century, most notably Germans and Scots-Irish. With an abundance of cheap land available along the frontier, these settlers established their homes in close proximity to Indian groups in the Susquehanna River Valley. Faced with this pressure, Indians migrated westward and made it increasingly difficult for Indian leaders and Pennsylvania officials to treat with one another on a regular basis. Challenged with unruly settlers in the western counties who did not adhere to an established culture of restraint and brought their own sense of how to secure their settlements, leaders in Philadelphia looked to the Six Nations to exercise a measure of control and influence over increasingly distant and smaller Indian tribes so as to maintain peace along the frontier.³ This increasing spatial distance and reorientation in Indian diplomacy became compounded during a period of diverted attention, where leaders in Philadelphia gave little to no consideration to their allies and friends, the Delawares, and other

³ In 1722 the Iroquois Confederacy, or Five Nations, accepted the Tuscaroras following their migration north from the Carolinas after their defeat in the Tuscarora War (1711-1715). The "Six Nations" will be used hereafter to reflect this change.

Indian groups who had come to settle along the western frontier. Having become limited in options on how to treat with distant tribes along the frontier, Pennsylvania officials grew steadily out of touch in the friendship with their old Indian allies. For those tribes who had migrated to the Ohio River Valley with just cause, they had moved away from living side by side with Pennsylvania settlers in a spirit of brotherhood. Faced with increasing imperial pressure, they became courted by a new potential ally and trading partner. Shared adherence to a culture of restraint between Indians and Pennsylvania colonials gradually eroded as it attempted to bridge over an increasingly distant frontier.⁴

Security, Community, and Penn's Memory

William Penn's memory promoted the sense of community between Indians and settlers into his waning years as well as in the decade following his death, thus assisting Pennsylvania in keeping peace with tribes along its western frontier. Before Pennsylvania's Council and Assembly officially noted Penn's death in November 1718, Quakers and Delawares alike reflected on what the proprietor and Brother Onas meant to the colony. In the 1717 Yearly Meeting, Quakers in Philadelphia wrote their brethren in London that they treated the "heathen" in the communal example set by Penn, and reflected on the great and remarkable blessing of peace and safeguarding enjoyed by the Quaker settlements.⁵ Sassoonan, a Delaware sachem, told the Council in 1718 that Indians "hope and expect that the Governn' will always prove to them the same friend that they ever found W^m Penn to be to them and will preserve the same peace and friendship and brotherhood that has always hitherto been between them and us."⁶ Though he

⁴ For a succinct account of the backcountry in British North America, the pressures of trade and population expansion, and their role in Britain's ability to manage an empire, see Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire* (2003).

⁵ *PYM-MJM*, (September 14-18, 1717), A1.2, HCL.

⁶ Series 1: Logan and Dickinson family papers, Volume XI: Indian Affairs, *Logan family papers, 1638-1964* (bulk 1670-1872), Coll. No. 0379, HSP. Hereafter: *Logan and Indian Affairs*, HSP.

acknowledged that the bond between Indians and Pennsylvania had experienced tension and had been rattled by persons acting in opposition to the practices and understanding acknowledged by the culture of restraint, Sassoonan wanted to enjoy the sunshine and peace without interruption, so that Indians could hunt, labor, and lie down at night in peace. He harkened back to Brother Onas who “when he first came amongst them told them they and the English should be as one people and one heart joyn’d together.”⁷ Penn’s memory continued to be employed after his death, as it assisted in soothing over violence and keeping peace and community along the frontier.⁸

On 28 April 1719, officials learned that southern Indians, likely the Cherokee and Catawbas seeking to fight the Six Nations, had attacked Pennsylvania’s allied Indians living along the Susquehanna River at Conestogoe. Pennsylvania officials responded by urging restraint when in June Colonel John French urged the Indians to remember Penn’s philosophy concerning peace in society, “This is a plain mark that He and We are your true Friends, for if we were not then We should encourage you to destroy one another. For Friends save People from Ruin and Destruction, but Enemies destroy them [...] for Love and Friendship makes People multiply, but malice and strife ruins and destroys.”⁹ Tagotolessa of Conestogoe (also known as Captain Civility), representing the Mingo, Shawnee, Delaware, and Canawages, responded that the various groups returned their thanks to Brother Onas “with one heart and mind,” and desired that Governor William Keith be assured “that they will be obedient to his Words, and that they ever have and ever will advise their young people to be mindful of his good advice. They

⁷ *Logan and Indian Affairs*, HSP.

⁸ Francis Jennings notes that the memory of William Penn helped to bond the sense of community between Indians and Pennsylvanians, arguing that even as Pennsylvanians began to mistreat Indians, colonists were unknowingly “thankful that their client Indians remembered William Penn’s benevolence” and did not retaliate. See Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 273.

⁹ *MPC*, 3:78.

acknowledge themselves so much obliged to the Governour for his care and concern for them.”¹⁰ Young, aggressive warriors could have retaliated, yet Indian leaders invoked Penn’s memory and the friendship established with Brother Onas, the designation inherited by Pennsylvania governors following Penn’s death. Rather than risk allowing inter-tribal violence from spilling over and involving Pennsylvania settlers, whose government stood as an ally, Indian leaders chose the practice of dialogue.¹¹

Addressing the inter-tribal violence between the Six Nations and tribes to the south reflected differing approaches to attaining security. It also demonstrated Pennsylvania’s adherence to restraint through dialogue, both to affirm good relations and community with Indians and to avoid violence along the frontier. Governor Alexander Spotswood of Virginia expressed fear in January 1720 that the Indian violence would spill over into a frontier war and result in civil unrest in his colony. He lamented the difficult position he faced:

a Governour of Virginia has to steer between Scylla and Charybdis, either an Indian or a Civil War, for the famous Insurrection in this Colony called Bacon’s Rebellion, was occasioned purely by the Governour and Council refusing to let the People go out against the Indians, who at that time annoyed the Frontiers, and it seems as if the same Humour was again arising in Virginia.¹²

Virginia’s recent history and violence showed that it could not prohibit its frontiersmen from acting violently against Indians. Aware of the potential for violence, Governor Keith, Secretary James Logan, and Pennsylvania officials focused on maintaining the understanding of restraint

¹⁰ *MPC*, 3:80-81. Colonel John French and Tagotolessa acted as successors to Lasse Cock and William Penn as the critical mediators, agents, and interpreters between Pennsylvania and Indian communities. James Merrell’s *Into the American Woods* (1999) argues these negotiators acted as cultural brokers who attempted to interpret the languages, symbolism, and customs of Indians and European colonials. Merrell argues that despite negotiators trying to provide understanding along the frontier, they did not establish a no middle ground. Even with their knowledge and role at conferences and treaties, negotiators came to symbolize broken promises, done through their interpretations and affirmations of agreements, as well as the break-down in the peace they tried to maintain. Whereas Merrell stops his account in the final French and Indian War, the dissertation extends the coverage through the War for American Independence in order to show that the language and symbolism used by negotiators still existed and acted as a familiar mode of understanding between Indians and Euro-Americans in order to establish peace. See also Richard White, *The Middle Ground* (1991).

¹¹ *MPC*, 3:58, 66-67.

¹² *MPC*, 3:89.

and affirming friendship with allied Indians along the frontier. Logan met with Indians at Conestogoe in July 1720 where tribal leaders, including the Delawares, Shawnee, and Mingoes, affirmed the peace and league established with Brother Onas. With the memory of Penn still fresh in their minds and goodwill being displayed by Pennsylvania officials, the Indians at Conestogoe viewed their allies as continuing to adhere to the understanding of peace and dialogue established through a culture of restraint. Logan affirmed Penn's memory in fostering community and friendship with the various tribes "at this time upon the Decease of your great Friend, with us who remain alive, is so affectionate and kind that I shall not fail to represent it duly to the Governour and your good Friends in Philadelphia."¹³

Despite Logan's assurances to western tribes at Conestogoe, the 1720 conference also marked the beginnings of a shift in focus toward the Six Nations. Logan noted that the Iroquois held some grudges against British encroachment on Indian settlements along the Susquehanna River, and believed that French agents helped foment these feelings. Having been urged by Pennsylvania to resist calls for war, the Indians at Conestogoe noted that this restrained policy would place them at odds with the Six Nations: "They will be enraged against us when they know that we are willing to be [at] Peace with those Nations, that they resolve to maintain War against, and will certainly cut us off as well as the back Christian Inhabitants; for they, we are sure, do not bear true affection to your Government."¹⁴ Since the Grand Settlement of 1701 and peace with New France and its allied Indians, the Iroquois had targeted Indians in Virginia and the Carolinas. With strength rebuilding slowly the Iroquois began to gain ascendancy, though not command, over fragmented tribes along Pennsylvania's western frontier.¹⁵ Furthermore, Iroquois warfare against southern tribes increased the number of warriors traveling through

¹³ *MPC*, 3:95.

¹⁴ *MPC*, 3:103.

¹⁵ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 90, 95; Jennings, "Brother Miquon," 206.

Pennsylvania's hinterland. With an increased presence of Iroquois warriors, Pennsylvania leaders prudently considered the need to maintain positive relations with the Six Nations. For the Iroquois, the opportunity for trade and alliance building with Pennsylvania presented the chance to find counterbalance from the pressures of New France and New York.¹⁶ Also, closer relations with a government disposed toward peace would offer less likelihood of European military interference with Iroquois warriors traveling south. Peace, community, and Penn's memory had been affirmed with the western tribes. Pennsylvania's leaders could now entertain the idea of strengthening ties with the Six Nations.¹⁷

Governor Keith met with leaders of the Six Nations at Conestogoe in the summer of 1721 to reaffirm their Chain of Friendship. Keith invoked William Penn's love and wisdom, stating that he did not approve of wars among the Indians because it only wasted and destroyed them. Ghesaont, speaking on behalf of the Six Nations, reassured Keith that the Iroquois would not forget the treaties with Penn or his advice. They sought to clean the Chain of the rust it had collected from infrequent attention and affirmation of previous dealings so it might shine brighter than ever. Playing upon the memory of Penn and believing himself to be the personification of the Chain of Friendship, Keith urged community not only between the Six Nations and Pennsylvania, but also with other British colonies and allied Indians, for to attack Indians in league with Virginia only served to weaken ties with the British overall. The benefits of nurturing a relationship with the Six Nations paid off for Pennsylvania in the winter of 1721-1722, when a quarrel broke out in the hinterlands along the Potomac River between two Pennsylvania traders and an Iroquois hunter. With both sides likely inebriated, the traders defended themselves against threats of violence, delivering multiple blows to the Indian before

¹⁶ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 162.

¹⁷ *MPC*, 3:98.

they left. Exposed to the elements and sustaining multiple internal injuries, the Iroquois hunter is believed to have died the next day. When word of the incident trickled into Philadelphia by late summer 1722, Keith responded by taking £100 worth of presents in a visit to Albany, where he apologized emphatically. The Six Nations, seeking to strengthen trade ties with Pennsylvania, offered reassurance to Keith that they wanted to move on from the incident and that Brother Onas' memory and spirit continued to bind them.¹⁸

The focus on the Six Nations in 1722 marked the early stages of attention and care becoming diverted from smaller tribes. Returning from Albany in October 1722, Keith notified the Conestogoe, Delaware, Shawnee, and Ganawese Indians that Pennsylvania had “entered into a more firm & solemn league than ever before” with the Six Nations.¹⁹ Though the smaller tribes most likely displayed an outward sense of approval, one may question how they truly felt. Jealousy and grumblings at the lack of attention given to smaller tribes became evident in May 1723 when Whiwhinjac, King of the Ganawese, told the Pennsylvanians that “The Shawannoes, Ganawese, Conestogoes & Delawares, shall never forget the words of William Penn, but since that Treaty was made between Him & Them, they do not find that we have been so careful to come as often to renew it with them at Conestogoe, as they have been to come to us at Philadelphia.”²⁰ By September 1727, members of the Council acknowledged the lack of attention and its ramifications, “But that now for six years past, vizt: the five last years of the late Administration, & one Year since the present Governours arrival, we have had no manner of Treaty with our own Indians, upon which they think themselves slighted, & have complained of it on divers occasions.”²¹ Despite these cracks, Indian and colonial leaders continued to hold fast

¹⁸ *MPC*, 3:122-127; 194-201.

¹⁹ *MPC*, 3:209.

²⁰ *MPC*, 3:218; Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 205-206.

²¹ *MPC*, 3:286. Note: Patrick Gordon had assumed the duties of Governor in 1726.

the sense of community. While leaders engaged in dialogue and practices of the culture of restraint, a skirmish between a foreign Indian party and settlers reflected a changing population dynamic where self-defense exercised by newly arrived immigrants aided in eroding the sense of community and restraint along the frontier.

In the spring of 1728 a skirmish between Indians and settlers brought reactions and decisions that demonstrated the impact of a changing population dynamic along the frontier, how restraint still had a powerful hold on Pennsylvania and Indian leaders, and how Penn's memory continued to be the touchstone of the meaning of community. As large numbers of immigrants, notably Germans and Scots-Irish, arrived daily into Pennsylvania's ports, frontier settlers had no sense of the culture of restraint already present. When well-armed Shawnee Indians fell in with the local Palatine Germans near the iron works along Mahanatawny Creek in Berks County, the locals approached them to find out their business. A fight broke out and both sides suffered casualties. In the aftermath frontier settlers sent petitions to the new governor, Patrick Gordon, and assembled themselves into companies. Not caring which tribe the Indians belonged to or if they were in league with Pennsylvania, the incensed Germans believed it lawful to kill any Indian in retribution. Seeking to protect themselves and their property, they fell back upon past experiences in Germany of invading armies and accompanying devastation to solve security issues, as demonstrated by their initiative to organize themselves into military defense. Only with great effort were officials able to advise and convince the settlers from doing anything rash that could bring about more fatal results.²²

²² *MPC*, 3:302-305, 307-308; I. Daniel Rupp, *History of the Counties of Berks and Lebanon* (Lancaster: G. Hills, 1844), 95-97. For discussion of German migrants, their Old World backgrounds, settlement and community formation in Pennsylvania, and affects on their political behavior, see Fogleman, *Hopeful Journeys* (1996). Regarding the Scots-Irish, the sense of individualism on the frontier, and assertion of their rights, see Griffin, *The People with No Name* (2001). For dual discussion of both German and Irish migration to Colonial Pennsylvania, and how they established trade networks, see Wokeck, *Trade in Strangers* (1999). See also A. G. Roeber's "'The Origin of Whatever Is Not English among Us': The Dutch-speaking and the German-speaking People of Colonial British

Pennsylvania government officials and Indian leaders at Conestogoe reacted to the violence according to the practices and understanding present in the culture of restraint to maintain community and peace along the frontier. Governor Gordon, seeking to nip any more violence or tension in the bud, hastened to prepare for a treaty at Conestogoe and asked that Tagotolessa inform the various tribes of the meeting. Gordon also took pragmatic approaches. Commissioners were sent to the frontier to help put the settlers in a defensive posture. The governor, having previously served in the regular army, followed what common sense would dictate and declared that all subjects furnish themselves with arms and ammunition. While Gordon offered frontier settlers a sense of reassurance through rhetoric, he understood the sense of community present and restrained practices in keeping peace with Indians. He ordered Pennsylvania settlers that “on no Pretence they abuse any Indian Native of the Nations around us, vizt: the Delawares, Conestogoes, Ganawese, Shawanese, Mingoes or those of the Five Nations.”²³ In meeting with Indians at Conestogoe in May 1728, Gordon sought to renew the ancient friendship with the small tribes, and inquired if the Indians held any cause for grief that would weaken a link in the Chain of Friendship. Tawenna, a Conestogoe Indian and representing all the tribes, responded that the incident must be buried and forgotten, for they remembered Brother Onas’ kindness and justice. Tawenna continued, noting how glad they were at Gordon’s speech, for they had not heard such words since the time of William Penn, an indication that

America” and Maldwyn A. Jones’ “The Scotch-Irish in British Christmas” in *Strangers within the Realm* (1991). Scholars have demonstrated that the new immigrants, coming from borderland areas in Europe, brought cultural baggage that promoted individualism and a willingness to defend themselves through violent means. With this influx of new ideas and approaches to security, it increasingly challenged and helped to erode the culture of restraint along the frontier.

²³ MPC, 3:308.

officials had begun to neglect their allied Indians from regular intercourse and gifts, and that the settlers now living along the frontier did not share Penn's vision.²⁴

Tawenna's speech to Gordon reflected new factors influencing the culture of restraint and sense of community between Pennsylvania and its allied Indians. His note that the various tribes at Conestogoe had not heard such words issued by Gordon since Penn indicates that Pennsylvania had begun to let its relationship with its original allies wither. As the skirmish in the spring 1728 demonstrates, government officials faced difficulties in engaging in dialogue, making agreements, and keeping peace with Delaware and Shawnee bands as they moved west in reaction to the Scots-Irish and German frontier settlers who stood willing to use violence. Gordon described the shifting frontier when he spoke with the Six Nations in July 1727: "We have not hitherto allowed any Settlement to be made above Pexton, but as the young People grow up they will spread of Course, yet it will not be very speedily."²⁵ The attempted offering of assurance that the population growth would remain limited indicates that Pennsylvania's government knew it could not control its frontier settlers. It also signifies Pennsylvania beginning to reach out toward the Six Nations to help manage smaller tribes and inhibit tensions from developing into a larger and more violent problem.

A dialogue between Gordon and the Delaware leader Sassoonan shortly after the proceedings at Conestogoe also demonstrates new influences eroding the culture of restraint. In his conversation with Sassoonan in June 1728, Gordon indicated that the frontier settlers had become increasingly difficult to control and that they did not follow the restrained practices and understanding observed by Indians and Europeans up until this point. "You now see we carefully

²⁴ MPC, 3:302-304, 308, 310-314; William Crawford Armor, *Lives of the Governor of Pennsylvania: With the Incidental History of the State, from 1609-1872* (Philadelphia: James K. Simon, 1872), 132; Series 3: General Thomas Cadwalader Papers, *Cadwalader Family papers*, Coll. No. 1454, HSP. Hereafter: *Thomas Cadwalader Papers*, HSP.

²⁵ MPC, 3:275.

observe our Treaties on our Parts, but you are to consider this Country is full of people, we have many weak & some wicked People amongst us, these last must be punished by the Law.”²⁶

Sassoonan responded by acknowledging the tension resulting from Europeans settling on lands either too close to Indians or that had not been purchased. Yet Sassoonan reiterated restraint, that the small tribes and Pennsylvania must unite in the love and community that resulted from being one people. The Delawares, having developed an alliance and relationship in the spirit of community and brotherhood with Penn and the Quakers, sought to shore up what they viewed as a weakening friendship and guard against other parties, such as the Iroquois, from replacing them as Pennsylvania’s prominent ally.²⁷ He enjoyed hearing “his Great Friend & Father William Penn so much spoke of yesterday; we had always lived in Love, & hope all things will be made up in Love; his heart is for Love & Peace, and he desires there may never by any Misunderstanding between us.”²⁸ Penn’s memory continued to be cited to maintain friendship and peace, though it had become apparent to both sides that new factors had affected the sense of community and practice of restraint.

Both Indian and Pennsylvania leaders invoked William Penn’s memory in the decade following the proprietor’s death. As an established memory and symbol, Penn’s example of friendship assisted in smoothing over instances of tension and reaffirmed the sense of community between Indians and European settlers along the frontier. The need to use Penn’s name, however, demonstrated a changing set of circumstances affecting the culture of restraint. As Scots-Irish and German settlers established themselves along the frontier, they brought a

²⁶ *MPC*, 3:318.

²⁷ Jennings, “Brother Miquon,” 205-206.

²⁸ *MPC*, 3:318-319; *Thomas Cadwalader Papers*, HSP. See also Charles Thomson, “An inquiry into the causes of the alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British interest,” (1759) in *Materials Pertaining to Pennsylvania Indian Affairs*, Coll. No. 970.4 M415, APS. Hereafter: “Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese,” APS.

willingness to use violence. Furthermore, they caused tribes such as the Delawares and Shawnee to migrate farther west, making it difficult for officials to treat with sachems. Faced with these circumstances, Pennsylvania shifted Indian policy toward the Iroquois to ensure peace on the frontier.

Gravitating toward the Six Nations

As small tribes, most notably the Delawares and Shawnee, moved west to the Ohio country during the 1730s, Pennsylvania increasingly relied on the Six Nations to manage Indian relations as land settlement pushed the frontier farther west into Indian country. The first European settlements along the Delaware River Valley enjoyed a close proximity to Indian groups and thus enabled a positive and focused relationship, symbolized in the fur trade. Yet Pennsylvania officials found themselves unable to maintain consistent dialogue and trade with their old Indian allies across such vast distances. Aware of French officials and traders attempting to garner influence with Indian groups, Pennsylvania's leaders relied upon native alliances and hierarchy in their shift toward the Six Nations. The Iroquois not only offered a defensive barrier but also influence over smaller tribes that would assist Pennsylvania in maintaining the Shawnee and Delawares in its sphere of influence. In exchange, the Six Nations gained a closer alliance with Pennsylvania and recognition of their ascendancy over the migrating tribes.²⁹ On 4 August 1731 James Logan produced a map at a Council meeting, whereupon he represented how the French sought to gain influence over the Shawnee in the Ohio country and the threat it posed to Pennsylvania. He argued that to prevent and stop these designs, Pennsylvania must look to the Six Nations, "who have an absolute authority as well over the Shawanese as all our Indians, that by their means the Shawanese may not only be kept firm to

²⁹ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 162-163; Jennings, "Brother Miquon," 205-206.

the English Interest, but likewise be induced to remove from Allegheny nearer to the English Settlements.”³⁰ Following Logan’s presentation, the Council moved to treat with the Six Nations.

Pennsylvania’s shift to the Six Nations became more apparent with the arrival of the proprietor Thomas Penn in 1732. Instead of meeting first with smaller tribes, such as the old allies the Delawares, Penn met with the Six Nations, thereby demonstrating his assessment of which natives were most important to Pennsylvania’s security. His message on 23 August spoke of making stronger and closer ties with the Iroquois and becoming one body, “we would now enter into a close Discourse with you on Affairs that nearly concern your own Peace and Safety; for as true Brothers that are as one Body, & have the same Interest, we lay to our harts whatever may affect and touch you.”³¹ Over the next several days of conference, Pennsylvania delegates tried to get a sense of the Six Nations’ strength and their relationships with surrounding Indians, for this in turn affected Pennsylvania’s security. Iroquois representatives affirmed their perceived authority over smaller tribes, and concurred in wanting to bring the Shawnee back from the Ohio. Having gained assurances from the Six Nations that their interests and position regarding smaller tribes fell within Pennsylvania’s strategy to maintain peace along the frontier, officials continued to gravitate toward the Iroquois.³²

Managing Shawnee relations in the early 1730s demonstrated Pennsylvania’s reliance on the Six Nations and foreshadowed the difficult task in keeping smaller tribes in a close diplomatic orbit when they ranged beyond the Allegheny Mountains. Following up on reports that Shawnee leaders had visited the French in Montreal, Governor Gordon in September 1732 asked two Shawnee chiefs why they had gone to Canada. They said they had met a French trader who told them that their French Father wished to see them, but assured Gordon they had no

³⁰ *MPC*, 3:403.

³¹ *MPC*, 3:436-437. Penn arrived on 11 August. See *MPC*, 3:431, 433.

³² *MPC*, 3:440-443.

intention of leaving their English Brothers. Gordon's question offered a sense of insult, for the Shawnee leaders felt that they had done nothing wrong. Instead of coming to see their friends in Philadelphia, the Shawnee received accusations of distrust from their ally, a feeling not conducive to the spirit of community. The following August a Six Nations representative labeled Shawnee warriors as culprits in recent abuses at Paxton. Pennsylvania officials felt confident that the Six Nations could manage the restive Shawnee, "as the Six Nations have the Command over all the Indians, it is in their Power to prevent abuses of this Sort, and we hope they give Orders accordingly."³³ Two months later in October 1733, the Iroquois envoy reported with apprehension that the Shawnee had sent a wampum belt to the Delawares, urging them to join up in seeking out a new country. Despite Sassoonan forbidding the Delawares to join the Shawnee, both the Six Nations and the proprietors remained concerned of the possibility of losing ties with the western tribes, thus undercutting Iroquois influence and giving doubt to the observance of restraint and goodwill along the Pennsylvania frontier.³⁴

The underlying reason for Shawnee, as well as Delaware, desires to relocate centered on the migration of other peoples. Immigrants poured into Pennsylvania, principally from Germany and the British Isles, and moved to where land stood readily available: the frontier. Attracted by Pennsylvania's rich and abundant farmland and tradition of liberty of conscience, Scots-Irish settlers came from a different experience in the British Isles, where violence became associated with security and dealing with 'inferior' peoples. Whereas Quakers believed in a brotherhood of man, newly arrived immigrants viewed Indians through a racial lens, deemed them less civilized, and assisted in undermining the sense of community along the frontier. Tagotolessa spoke of how the Shawnee had sent him a large present of skins to give to the proprietors, "to engage

³³ *MPC*, 3:514.

³⁴ *MPC*, 3:459-461, 514, 579-580.

them to assist in composing any Differences that may arise between the Irish People, who are come into those parts, and these Indians, who intend to live & dye where they are now settled.”³⁵

The tension and violence at Paxton in August 1733 between Shawnee and frontier settlers, likely Scots-Irish, resulted from frontier settlers understanding that they needed to defend their perceived right to inhabit land and if necessary use violence against the less civilized Indians.³⁶

While Pennsylvania increasingly leaned on the Six Nations to exert influence with the ever distant Delawares and Shawnee, the culture of restraint endured, even to the point where Pennsylvania began to have an influence on the Iroquois. In September 1735 Six Nations representatives reported that the Shawnee killed an allied leader of the Tsanandowas Indians after he pressed the Shawnee too hard to return from the Ohio country. The Six Nations sought to avenge the death, yet Pennsylvania prevailed in the model of restraint, as officials offered six handkerchiefs to wipe away the mourning tears of each of the Six Nations. In seeking closer ties with Pennsylvania and unable to exert effective pressure on the Shawnee, the Iroquois accepted the symbolism of being comforted according to the restrained practices of their allies.³⁷

With Iroquois warriors continuing to make war on tribes linked to Virginia, notably the Cherokee and Catawba, Virginia leaders asked that Pennsylvania act as a mediator to help reach peace. Officials selected the German farmer and magistrate Conrad Weiser to bring the message to the Iroquois, “as there is no person more proper to be Sent to treat with those People.”³⁸ These groundless and unprofitable wars, Weiser argued, only lessened Iroquois numbers, and would serve to make the Six Nations prey to other powers which would result not only in Iroquois

³⁵ *MPC*, 3:599.

³⁶ *Cope-Evans Family Papers, 1732-1911*, “William Pim to Thomas Pim and Joshua Pim,” (April 6, 1732), Coll. No. 1170, HCL. The Delawares complained loudly as their lands in the area of the forks of the Delaware River were settled by newly arrived migrants. See “Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese,” APS.

³⁷ *MPC*, 3:608.

³⁸ James Logan, “James Logan to Conrad Weiser,” (January 22, 1736/37) in *Miscellaneous Manuscripts*, Coll. No. 200, APS. Material from the *Miscellaneous Manuscript* collection will hereafter be abbreviated as “Letter,” (Date), *Miscellaneous*, APS.

destruction, but also Pennsylvania's. Pennsylvania officials continued to view the Iroquois as a defensive barrier and an influential power against other possible security concerns, namely small tribes under French influence.

During the early 1730s, Pennsylvania shifted focus in its Indian policy. Unable to inhibit newly arrived immigrants from exercising violence to defend their interests against Indians along the frontier, and finding their ability to treat with Delaware and Shawnee sachems complicated by increasing distances of space, officials such as James Logan and Thomas Penn observed that continued peace along the frontier relied upon keeping their old allies within Pennsylvania's orbit, as opposed to French influence. They believed the Iroquois to be the solution and nurtured an alliance with the Six Nations marked by practices of restraint and diplomacy. By the mid 1730s, Pennsylvania's leaders had shifted their attention from the small tribes and fixed it on the Six Nations. Believing this leverage to be in place, they considered other matters, keeping attention diverted from the western frontier.

A Period of Diverted Attention, 1736 – 1748

With Pennsylvania officials shifting their diplomatic and security efforts onto the Six Nations, the colony entered into a critical period where its concentration became diverted from nurturing its diplomatic and trading relationships with the ever-more distant Delaware and Shawnee. Warfare, fraudulent land purchases and increasing settlement, and Indian diplomacy pulled Pennsylvania's attention in multiple directions. These issues, coupled with the religious revival sweeping the colonies known as the Great Awakening that resulted in a growing resiliency among Quaker Assemblymen who sought to return to Quaker tenets such as pacifism, contributed to the erosion of community as Indian and settler interests no longer remained in league. With efforts in managing Indian tribes and security having shifted to the Six Nations

since Penn's death, this critical period of diversion saw Pennsylvania officials recognize that the frontier had grown beyond control, both in terms of distance and in the population makeup who stood willing to use violence against Indians. Unable to cultivate friendship with smaller tribes in the manner done under Penn, officials turned to the Six Nations to exercise influence and manage smaller tribes if tension arose. Believing the Iroquois leverage to be in place, officials focused on areas requiring attention, such as Maryland or the Delaware River and Bay. To the west Delaware and Shawnee settlements moved farther away, weakening their ties to Brother Onas. When these tribes did join in conference with Pennsylvania officials, they found the friendship that marked their relationship with their old ally replaced by sternness and disinterest in maintaining community.³⁹

In September 1736 the dormant issue of Pennsylvania's and Maryland's border dispute flared up when justices of Lancaster County informed James Logan that a Maryland militia force had crossed the border to pressure newly arrived settlers to pay taxes over disputed lands. Unanimous in wanting to protect the German settlers who were turned out of their homes, the Council Board condemned the violation of peace and rights of both the proprietors and people of Pennsylvania. It directed Pennsylvania's sheriffs, particularly of Lancaster and Chester counties, to hold themselves in readiness with a posse to order to preserve peace and prevent riots and tumults. By late November, James Logan estimated that fifty or sixty families lacked shelter from the nearing ferocity of winter as a result of the invasion.⁴⁰

³⁹ For discussion of the growing resilience of the Quaker Party in the Assembly during this period of distraction, and the investment in values such as restraint, liberty of conscience, and pacifism, see Alan Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

⁴⁰ *MPC*, 4:70-71, 74, 175; *Letters of James Logan to the Proprietors, etc., 1736-44*, (November 28, 1736), Coll. No. 974.8 L82, APS. Hereafter: *Logan to the Proprietors*, (Date), APS.

Prompted by this invasion, recent immigrants in Chester County created a grassroots and unlawful Association. The way in which Pennsylvania officials reacted to this development demonstrates a growing divergence in the perception of security between frontier settlements and older communities close to Philadelphia. As migrants from Germany and Ireland encountered invasion from Maryland, they leaned on their past experiences and took upon themselves to organize an Association to resist any threat that might come their way, even from Pennsylvania officials. The Council Board offered a mixed reaction, condemning the illegal formation and its leaders while also avoiding prosecuting the rank and file. Believing the majority of the participants had been misled, the Council focused its efforts on apprehending ringleaders and informed Chester County magistrates to remain on guard to stop acts of violence stemming from the grassroots organization. Understanding that the unlawful Association stood willing to use violence in counties that at the time constituted the frontier and that the government lacked strength, namely a formal military body, to address a large and armed organization, Pennsylvania officials sought to cut off the leadership for fear that violence could entangle Maryland parties, or worse, friendly Indians.⁴¹

The religious revival beginning to sweep the colonies known as the Great Awakening provided a backdrop for the differing reactions at the official government and grassroots levels. For many Protestant groups, especially the Presbyterian Scots-Irish who inhabited the frontier, the Great Awakening highlighted and promoted individualism. On 10 January 1740, several years after the Maryland invasion, Pennsylvania's Assembly commented on the changing population dynamic, noting to Governor George Thomas that although large numbers of Quakers

⁴¹ *MPC*, 4:112-113, 151; *Howland Collection, Logan Letters*, "James Logan to John Penn," (1737), HCL. Concerning migration and Pennsylvania's growing population, especially of Irish and Scots-Irish, James Logan wrote to the proprietors that "Chester Co. is now so filled with the vast crowds that yearly flow in upon us from Germany and Ireland especially the latter that there is not the Quantity of 100 acres Tillable Land to be formed." See *Logan to the Proprietors*, (November 29, 1737), APS.

and others inclined toward restraint and pacifism remained in the colony, “many others are since come amongst us under no such restraints, some of whom have been disciplined in the Art of Warr, and may, for ought we know, think it their Duty to fight in defence of their County, their Wives, their Famillys, and Estates.”⁴² New Protestant migrants, originating from a culture of tension and violence that promoted self-defense, arming one’s self, and protecting one’s property, did not adhere to the practice of restraint in Pennsylvania, and fell back on old habits in what they perceived to be a violent and dangerous frontier.

Quakers reacted to the assertiveness of other denominations by looking inside their faith and renewing adherence to older Quaker tenets. In September 1739 the Quaker Yearly Meeting told quarterly and monthly meetings “to exhort Friends that they be vigilant in keeping up to the peaceable Principles professed by us as a people; and in no manner to joyn with such as may be for making warlike preparations offensive or defensive, but upon all occasions to demean themselves in a Christian and peaceable manner.”⁴³ During this time of spiritual revivalism, other Protestant groups placed themselves in direct contrast to Quakers by promoting warlike principles and defending oneself. Quakers reacted by falling back onto their ancient peace testimony. Over the course of the 1730s and 1740s and in concordance to the timeframe of the Great Awakening, there is an increasing frequency in the citation of the peace testimony in the Philadelphia Yearly Minutes. Spiritual revivalism had promoted incompatible stances: established and pacifist Quakers, and the newly arrived and militant settlers on the frontier.⁴⁴

⁴² *MPC*, 4:367.

⁴³ *PYM-MJM*, (September 15-19, 1739), A1.2, HCL.

⁴⁴ In *Breaking the Backcountry* (2003), Matthew Ward discusses the effects of the Seven Years’ War in the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry. He begins by considering backcountry society and comments on the roles of individualism and lack of community. Ward argues that ethnic and religious division, mobility, and the lack of elites promoted individualism rather than community. This sense of individualism, heightened among those who lived in the backcountry and who were in closest proximity to Indian groups, could only create tension and test the culture of restraint and the ideals of community laid down by Penn.

The Walking Purchase of 1737 is a notorious example of land fraud involving small Indian tribes during the late 1730s. While often discussed as the most significant and symbolic event to disaffect the Delawares from their close relationship with Pennsylvania, the Walking Purchase is part of a longer process where the sense of community eroded along the frontier. With settlers pushing the limits of Indian patience by settling on Delaware lands at the Forks of the Delaware River and in the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania officials and the proprietors schemed to gain control of the land with minimal cost. Letters from Thomas Penn in May and July 1735 indicate that before the 1737 walk, a preliminary survey was conducted to get a sense of how much land could be secured from the Delawares. Officials then met with four Delaware sachems and stated that their forefathers had granted William Penn a tract of land that could be walked in a day and a half. The Indian leaders accepted the old agreement, as elders verified the account presented by Penn's descendants. Yet the natural political decentralization of the Delawares seems to have played a role here. Pennsylvania's government had elevated Sassoonan as King of the Delawares to better conduct public business, but he was not present at this meeting. Officials took advantage of Delaware dispersion by treating with these four chiefs. Having conducted a preliminary survey, the intent of proprietors and government officials is apparent and not in league with maintaining community with their Delaware friends.⁴⁵

The actual walk on 19 September 1737 brought immediate objection from the Delawares, and acted as a fallen tree in the communal road and friendship between Philadelphia and its old allies. John Watson, a surveyor living in the early nineteenth century who developed an account

⁴⁵ James Watson, *Narrative of the Indian Walk* (1822) Coll. No. 974.8 W32, APS; *Walking Purchase of Pennsylvania*, Coll. No. 950, HCL. Hereafter: *Walking Purchase*, HCL.; "Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese," APS; Weslager, *The Delaware Indians*, 176-178. For discussion of the Walking Purchase, its controversy, and role as a powerful issue for Indian resentment, see Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania*, 77-78; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 25-26, 278-280; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 25, 212-215; Steven C. Harper, "Delawares and Pennsylvanians After the Walking Purchase," in *Friends and Enemies in Penn's Woods*, ed. William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 167-179. See especially Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 45-49, 71, 89-90.

of the walk based on original treaties and oral tradition from those living at the time, including his father, highlighted the significance in how William Penn made purchases. Penn had walked in a distinct manner with his friends and Indian chiefs in order to measure out lands, as “they walked leisurely, after the Indian manner, Sitting down Sometimes to Smoke their pipes, to eat Biscuit & Cheese, and drink a bottle of wine.”⁴⁶ As a result, Penn’s walk measured less than thirty miles. For the walk in 1737, officials had recruited three trained walkers, who were to be accompanied and observed by Pennsylvania and Delaware agents. The three men walked moderately at first, then quickened their pace. The Indians called out to them to walk, not to run, for they did not walk in the same manner as Brother Onas. The Delawares soon grew sullen, for by the end of the day and a half, the walk had extended beyond previous agreements and Indian estimates, and Pennsylvania secured some 1,200 square miles (see Figure 3). Over the next several years, as surveyors sought to carve out tracts from the Walking Purchase, the cheated Delawares remained fixed to the land and sent threats to Pennsylvania officials that they would take up the hatchet against the settlers. The disregard for the Delaware memory of how Brother Onas conducted land purchases, as well as the practices of his descendants, aided in the erosion of community with the Delawares. As attention became diverted to war with Spain and Delaware resentment did not cool, Pennsylvania’s reliance upon the Six Nations for exerting leverage over smaller tribes demonstrated that Philadelphia did not nurture its relationship with its Delaware allies.⁴⁷

When Great Britain declared war on Spain in October 1739, known as the War of Jenkins’ Ear, reaction by Pennsylvania’s government demonstrated increasing division in security perspectives. In January 1740 Governor George Thomas implored the Assembly, as

⁴⁶ Watson, *Indian Walk*.

⁴⁷ *Walking Purchase*, HCL; Watson, *Indian Walk*; “Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese,” APS.

representatives of the province and as Protestants, to consider Pennsylvania's defenseless state and to prove themselves loyal subjects and lovers of their religious freedom. He blamed members' adherence to pacifism as the cause for Pennsylvania's vulnerable state:

[Pennsylvania], populous indeed, extensive in its Trade, bless'd with many natural advantages, and capable of defending itself, but from a religious Principle of its Representatives against bearing Arms, subject to become the Prey of the first Invader, and more particularly of its powerfull Neighbours, who are known to be well armed, regular in Discipline, inured in Fatigue, and from thence capable of making long Marches, in Alliance with many Nations of Indians, and of a boundless ambition.⁴⁸

Arguing that the world held no purity of heart, he declared that "no set of religious Principles, will protect us from an Enemy," and that Pennsylvania must secure itself.⁴⁹

The Assembly's response demonstrated observance to a security culture of restraint as well as parsimony. Members referred to Pennsylvania's advantageous geographic position. With substantial settlement areas to the north and south, Pennsylvania stood at a safe distance from the French and Spanish. Discounting naval threats because of the Delaware River's difficult navigation, distance from the sea, and the Bay's central location along the Atlantic seaboard of the British colonies, they argued the unlikelihood of Pennsylvania suffering an attack. The Assembly also gave a practical fiscal argument, stating "Some of whom not of our Religious Persuasion, we presume, think as we do, That if the Measures proposed were fallen into, it would be a certain Expence, the Benefit small and uncertain."⁵⁰ In response to Governor Thomas' calls for fortifications and a militia, the Assembly argued against such measures because they would provide nothing in return and only create unnecessary financial burdens. Quaker fears of abuses of power bristled at the thought of raising troops, as it would offer the possibility of executive authority abusing its power as well as disturb the sense of restraint in place with Indians. In being

⁴⁸ *MPC*, 4:369.

⁴⁹ *MPC*, 4:369.

⁵⁰ *MPC*, 4:372.

at peace with France and unlikely to suffer a Spanish attack, to raise troops went against the successful practices developed over the past century.⁵¹

In the spring of 1740, Governor Thomas sought support for the campaign against Cartagena the following year. Despite the hardening religious persuasions of Quaker members who resisted warfare, Thomas addressed the Assembly as “Representatives and the Watchman of the whole People of this Province,” and earnestly invited “Majesty’s Subjects within my Government cheerfully to enlist in this Service.”⁵² Following this proclamation, gunners on Society Hill discharged their cannon in a demonstration that caused some portions of the population to forego the culture of restraint and join the expedition. The Quaker-led Assembly understood the differing perspectives among Pennsylvania’s population regarding war: “We are now become a numerous People of different religious Perswasions, many of whom are well armed and principled to defend their Possessions against an Enemy, and as such it became to us to leave all Men to act freely in this respect, as from the Dictates of their own Hearts they should think was consistent with their Duty to God and themselves.”⁵³ Despite this acknowledgement, the spiritual revivalism of the Great Awakening obscured the Assembly’s vision. When Thomas continued his push for Pennsylvania’s participation in early July and stated the crown expected the colony to provide victuals, transports, and other necessities for troops, the Assembly

⁵¹ *MPC*, 4:372-373. On the specific issue of raising a militia, the dialogue between Thomas and the Assembly shows differing perspectives and fears. The Assembly and its Quaker majority illustrated their hesitancy toward an established militia, fearing it would complicate their views on achieving communal security. While still referencing the war with Spain and that a militia would be of no real service to the country, despite “a pretty piece of Pageantry for a Time,” the Assembly noted abuses in power in other colonies, as governors used a militia to bestow favors and extra powers onto military officers. In adhering to a sense of community within society, the Assembly sought to restrain its own governor in order to secure the colony. Thomas offered reassurance: “Religion itself has been made a Pretence for the most unworthy Actions; and tho’ a Militia be absolutely necessary for the Defence of a Country, bad Governors may have abused their Power; but I hope when [a militia] shall be thought necessary to be established here, your Foresight of these Inconveniences will guard you against giving any such Powers as may be made an ill use of.” He vaguely argued that the Assembly itself could control militia power, likely through officer commissions, thus guarding against any abuses by military officers. See *MPC*, 4:373-374, 382. On the issue of Quaker fears of executive authority, see Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 86.

⁵² *MPC*, 4:397, 401.

⁵³ *MPC*, 4:387.

responded with an overt peace testimony: “we cannot preserve good Consciences and come into the Levying of money and appropriating it to the uses recommended to us in the Governor’s Speech, because it is repugnant to the religious Principles professed by the greater Number of the present Assembly, who are of the People called Quakers.”⁵⁴ The revival in pacifism informed the decisions of Assembly members and offered new influences to the practice of restraint. Pacifism had resurged, but leaders also used other delaying tactics and arguments as volunteers came forward to participate in the expedition.

On 29 July 1740 Governor Thomas informed the Assembly of the organization of seven companies of volunteers. Britain centered its war effort against Spain in the Caribbean. Keeping much of its fleet in home waters to guard against France entering the conflict, Britain placed the burden on West Indies squadrons and the colonies. Cartagena stood as the primary target, having been attacked twice in the first half of the year. In gathering volunteers for the massive expedition planned the following year, Thomas put the burden on the Assembly for financial support. When the Assembly delayed, Thomas called their bluff:

Altho’ your Principles will not allow you to raise Men, or even it seems to support them when raised, you are ready enough to censure the Conduct of others who have been more Zealous in the Execution of his Majestie’s Commands. When you want an Addition of Paper-Money Your Province is represented as very Populous and your Trade very Great; But when you are called upon for Men or Money your Numbers and your Abilities are very much Diminished.⁵⁵

For Assembly members, while pacifism had become an additional component in their resistance to supporting an organized military body, they also pursued a fiscal tactic. Of the seven companies formed, the Assembly estimated that at least 300 servants had joined, amounting to

⁵⁴ *MPC*, 4:425. Quaker adherence to the peace testimony is evident at the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. John Kinsey, the speaker of the Assembly, also acted as clerk in the Yearly Meeting. When a letter from James Logan arrived for the September 1741 meeting, it was not read because the contents contained civil and military issues. See *PYM-MJM*, (September 19-23, 1741), A1.2, HCL.

⁵⁵ *MPC*, 4:440.

roughly £3,000 in their labor worth. The Assembly retorted: “Does the Governor think it reasonable, and that it will be no burthen on the Inhabitants of this Province, to pay that Sum of Money to their Masters, besides raising as much as will be necessary for Victualling and Transporting seven whole Companies?”⁵⁶ Thomas defended the inclusion of servants, for to disperse them and affect the integrity of the seven companies would invite a mutiny. With an identifiable target in pacifism, Thomas posed the question that if the Assembly could not provide for Pennsylvania’s defense, “is it a Calumny to say That your Principles are inconsistent with the Ends of Government at a Time when His Majesty is obliged to have Recourse to Arms, not only to protect the Trade of Great Britain and its Dominions, but likewise to obtain Redress for the Injuries done to His Subjects?”⁵⁷ In addition, he hinted at division amongst Quakers themselves in their observance of pacifism, an indication that during the Great Awakening, people reacted differently in their own personal beliefs.⁵⁸

Staying in line with their communal views on security, Quakers sought to be in league as a group in their religious meetings. Individuals diverging from the consensus gathered at Quaker meetings risked being disowned. The case of Samuel Chew, Chief Justice of the Lower Counties, illustrates that while the Great Awakening strengthened observance of the peace testimony amongst Quakers as a whole, individuals still made their own decisions based on their perspectives regarding religion as well as, in this case, security. Speaking before the Grand Jury of New Castle County on 21 November 1741 concerning the lawfulness of defensive war against an armed enemy, Chew supported armed resistance, “for there is no Way to resist an Army but by an Army, nor to repel Force but by Force,” and argued that Christians had misinterpreted

⁵⁶ *MPC*, 4:451.

⁵⁷ *MPC*, 4:465-466.

⁵⁸ *MPC*, 4:431-432, 465. See also *Logan to the Proprietors*, (November 10, 1740), *APS*.

Scripture in order to make the argument for war's unlawfulness.⁵⁹ When asked why he supported such a position when he identified with the Quakers, Chew responded that "I would have such to believe, that the Love of my Country, the Love of Mankind in general, but above all, the Love of Truth, is of greater Concernment to me, that what is called Uniformity, or the being so attached to any particular Party in Religion, as to espouse, or seem to espouse, any of the Errors of it."⁶⁰ Chew returned to testify on 20 August 1742, noting the prospect of being expelled from the Society if he did not recant. He remained adamant in his beliefs, declaring that he knew a great number of Quakers who entertained similar ideas, "who reject the Tenet which condemns the Lawfulness of defensive War to Christians as an idle untenable Whim; and who are not only worthy of all Favour and Toleration, but also a Right to be ranked in the Number of his Majesty's best Subjects, and to share in all Civil Employments."⁶¹ Chew's firm belief led to his disownment by the fall of 1742. Residing in the Lower Counties, Chew's perspective over security kept in line with the shift that had occurred in the Lower Counties when they separated from Pennsylvania proper to better address their security concerns of lying more exposed to attacks from the sea. Living in this time of religious revival, Chew had made an individual choice based on his perspective, rather than remain in league with an increasingly uncompromising community.

With officials focused on these early years of war with Spain and the growing impasse between the Governor and Assembly, Indian relations took a back seat, both with the Six Nations and Delawares. On 1 August 1740 Chicalamy, speaking on behalf of the Six Nations, told Pennsylvania leaders that they had heard the Great King of England was making war

⁵⁹ Series 1: Samuel Chew, *Chew Family Papers Collection*, Coll. No. 2050, HSP. Hereafter: *Samuel Chew Correspondence*, HSP.

⁶⁰ *Samuel Chew Correspondence*, HSP.

⁶¹ *Samuel Chew Correspondence*, HSP.

preparations, and wondered why they had said nothing. The Six Nations remained focused on whether the British would declare war on the French, and by October 1741 Governor Thomas reiterated his intention to inform his friends of the Six Nations if war broke out. Tension and complaints continued to deteriorate Pennsylvania's relationship and sense of community with the Delawares. The same day that Chicalamy spoke of war rumors, Sassoonan met with Thomas Penn and Governor Thomas on the issue of young settlers killing so many deer, beavers, bears, and other game, and desired "that your people would abstain from Hunting, that we may have the benefit of it to support our selves, for God had made us Hunters, and the white people have other Ways of living without that."⁶² Penn and Thomas responded to Sassoonan's speech several days later saying they could not restrain inhabitants from killing wild animals. They encouraged the Delawares to help decrease tension by dealing with licensed and honest traders. Increasingly unable to manage its own people and traders along a vast and ever distant frontier, or to cultivate and manage relations with the Delawares and Shawnee, Pennsylvania's government looked to the Six Nations to help settle unrest, particularly over the Walking Purchase.⁶³

With immediate attention fixed on the war with Spain and calls for military preparations, Delaware threats following the Walking Purchase were discounted and essentially ignored. Officials finally acted in 1741. Lacking the diplomatic muscle to mend the wounds with detached Delawares who felt cheated, the proprietors and James Logan looked to the Six Nations, whom they viewed as spokesmen for all tribes allied with Pennsylvania, to regulate fragmented tribes if they grew restive.⁶⁴ About 100 members of the Six Nations, Shawnee, Conestogoe, and Delawares, including Sassoonan and those residing at the Forks, met in Philadelphia in June 1742. In addition to encouraging the Iroquois to side with the British in the

⁶² *MPC*, 4:434.

⁶³ *MPC*, 4:434, 445, 502.

⁶⁴ Jennings, "Brother Miquon," 206-207.

expected war with France, Pennsylvania's leaders presented to them several deeds and writings concerning the Delawares' conduct. Having examined the evidence, the Six Nations found the Delawares to be unruly and who needed to move from the Delaware River as a result of the Walking Purchase. "Determined to chastise and humble their dependants," Canassatego of the Six Nations spoke to Pennsylvania officials, "The other day you informed us of the misbehavior of our Brethren the Delawares, with respect to their continuing to claim and refusing to remove from some land on the river Delaware, notwithstanding their ancestors had sold it by a Deed under their homes and Seals to the proprietaries, for a valuable consideration upwards of fifty years ago."⁶⁵ He continued his speech: "We have concluded to remove them, and Oblige them to go over the River Delaware, and to quit all Claim to any Lands on this side for the future, since they have received Pay for them and it is gone through their Guts long ago."⁶⁶ Having affirmed ties with Pennsylvania, the Six Nations prepared to rebuke the Delawares, which only validated Logan's, Penn's, and others' belief in the shift in attention toward the Iroquois.⁶⁷

The Six Nations' decision against the Delawares signified that the sense of community on the frontier continued to weaken. As the proprietors and Logan sought to acquire lands and make profits with the colony's growing population, they did so at the expense of their allies and relied on the Six Nations to provide leverage. Laying down a wampum belt to serve as a symbol of the forthcoming rebuke, Canassatego spoke with an air of superiority to his juvenile cousins: "You ought to be taken by the hair of the head, and shaken severely till you recover your senses and become sober. You don't know what ground you stand on, nor what you are doing."⁶⁸ Defending Brother Onas, he questioned how the Delawares could sell land at all when they were labeled as

⁶⁵ Watson, *Indian Walk*. See also *MPC*, 4:578.

⁶⁶ *MPC*, 4:579.

⁶⁷ "Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese," APS; Watson, *Indian Walk*; *Timothy Horsfield Papers*, Coll. No. 974.8 H78, APS.

⁶⁸ Watson, *Indian Walk*.

women: “We conquer’d You, we made Women of you, you know you are Women, and can no more sell Land than Women.”⁶⁹ The designation of women proved to be a critical misinterpretation that assisted in the erosion of restraint and community. Colonial officials interpreted it as a gender metaphor demonstrating Iroquois strength and superiority over the Delawares. However, for the Delawares “woman” indicated their practice as peace advocate, demonstrated over the course of their interaction with Europeans. The misinterpretation gave validation to Pennsylvania officials for their cultivation of closer relations with the Six Nations to assist in managing annoyed tribes and a frontier that grew increasingly difficult to control.⁷⁰

With the recap of events and guilt read, the hammer came crashing down. The wampum took on a binding role, forbidding the Delawares, their children, and their “Grand Children, to the latest Posterity, for ever meddling in Land Affairs, neither you nor any who shall descend from You are ever hereafter to presume to sell any land.”⁷¹ Assigned to reside either at Wyoming or Shamokin, the Delawares are said to have left in silent grief and went “directly home, collected their families and goods & burn[ed] their cabins, to signify they were never to return.”⁷² Moving away from the Forks, the Delawares left with a bitter taste of resentment and a degree of betrayal by the descendants of their old friend Brother Onas. The memory and culture of restraint remained strong enough to avoid immediate conflict, but the bonds of friendship and community that kept peace along the frontier grew increasingly frail.⁷³

Continued evidence of the erosion of restraint is seen in the winter of 1742-1743, as Pennsylvania leaders became concerned over the safety of frontier settlers after receiving reports

⁶⁹ MPC, 4:579.

⁷⁰ Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 109-112; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 163.

⁷¹ MPC, 4:580.

⁷² Watson, *Indian Walk*.

⁷³ MPC, 4:578-580; “Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese,” APS; Watson, *Indian Walk*. James Logan also noted in a letter to the proprietors the Six Nations’ chastisement and order to the Delawares to relocate. See *Logan to the Proprietors*, (July 12, 1742), APS.

of violence between Iroquois warriors and inhabitants in the upper part of Virginia. Traveling to Shamokin to express Pennsylvania's sorrow over the violence and to argue against retaliation, Conrad Weiser met in April with the Six Nations, Shawnee, Delaware, and other allied Indians. Shikellimo, a Six Nations chief residing at Shamokin for Pennsylvania affairs, assured Weiser and Brother Onas that they had ordered their young warriors in strong words to refrain from revenge. Yet the meeting took on a harsh tone. When Sachsidowa, a Tuscarora chief, spoke to the Delawares and Shawnee, he warned them against spreading lies, that their tongues be tied, and ordered that their warriors remain seated like the Six Nations. Even Weiser could not escape, as Sachsidowa took the opportunity to both chastise and advise Brother Onas to stop backcountry settlers from spreading false stories that endangered the Chain of Friendship. While restraint endured in keeping the various parties from escalating conflict, and Pennsylvania sought to act as a mediator between Virginia and the Six Nations, the tone and overall dynamic of this meeting indicates that the good relations, community, and sense of brotherhood that had once characterized relations between Indians and settlers in Pennsylvania continued to recede. Leadership in Philadelphia could not manage Indian relations along the frontier with the degree of close oversight that their forebears had practiced. Unable to control forces beyond the colony's borders or reign in belligerent frontier settlers, officials relied on the Six Nations to keep a lid on disaffected tribes. Only the past practice of a peaceful co-existence appears to have tempered thoughts of violent retaliation by western tribes against Pennsylvania.⁷⁴

Relations between the Delaware and Pennsylvania continued to deteriorate in the spring of 1744 with the murder of the Indian trader John Armstrong and his men. According to Conrad

⁷⁴ *MPC*, 4:634-637, 641, 647-657. In discussions with Weiser, the Six Nations understood land encroachment to be the cause for discontent among the Delawares and Shawnee and requested that Pennsylvania's government remove settlers from the Juniata River, "given the River Juniata for a Hunting Place to our Cousins the Delaware Indians, and our Brethren the Shawanese; and we ourselves hunt there sometimes." See "Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese," APS.

Weiser's report from his journey to Shamokin to investigate the matter and attempt to maintain restraint, the murder arose from an argument between Armstrong and the Delaware Indian Mussemeelin. When Armstrong confiscated Mussemeelin's horse over the issue of a debt, the Delaware confronted the trader and demanded his horse back. Armstrong sought to delay the issue, but with Mussemeelin insisting on the point, Armstrong approached a fire to continue discussion and was shot in the back. Weiser learned from Olumapies, a Delaware chief, that indeed the Delaware tribe had killed Armstrong and his men. Olumapies sought restraint and forgiveness, acknowledging the Delawares' shame and their efforts to deliver the culprit. The Delawares disassociated themselves from Mussemeelin, fearing that the murder would cut the remaining strands of friendship. While the murders further broke down the sense of community along the frontier, the reliance and willingness by colonial officials and Delaware sachems to seek dialogue as well as forgiveness indicates that the culture of restraint remained present. Neither side wanted to break the alliance, but troubles on the frontier did nothing to nurture community. When Governor Thomas provided a case update to the Assembly on 25 May, he also received notification that war had been declared against France. The Assembly, having been involved in the investigation of the Armstrong murder by exchanging messages with Thomas and his Council, foresaw another security issue. Attention became diverted again, as the Assembly recommended that the murder investigation be completed and that Thomas shore up Indian relations, not with the western tribes, but by meeting with the Six Nations to renew friendship and inform them about both the murder and war declaration.⁷⁵

In June 1744 Governor Thomas met with commissioners from Maryland, Virginia, the Six Nations, and smaller tribes to establish agreements under the yoke of King George's War. In

⁷⁵ *MPC*, 4:675-688.

what became known as the Treaty of Lancaster, Thomas acted as mediator and set the tone amongst the colonial commissioners in how they needed to approach the Six Nations:

Every advantage you gain over [allied tribes] in War will be a Weakening of the Barrier of those Colonies, and Consequently will be in Effect Victories over yourselves and your Fellow-Subjects. Some allowances for their Prejudices and Passions, and a Present now and then for the Relief of their Necessities, which have in some measure been brought upon them by their Intercourse with Us, and by our yearly extending our Settlements, will probably tie them more closely to the British Interest. This has been the Method of Newyork and Pennsylvania, and will not put you to so much Expence in Twenty Years as the carrying on a War against them will do in One.⁷⁶

Thomas' message is clear. With the French seeking to gain influence over the most important Indian allies in the theater, the Iroquois, Pennsylvania could ill afford to have quarrels between Virginia, Maryland, and its defensive barrier, the Six Nations. Virginia and Maryland needed to avoid making war and adopt Pennsylvania's time tested method of securing alliance through gift-giving and allow dialogue to take its course rather than reacting immediately to incidents of violence. Over the course of the deliberations, Brother Tocarry-ho-gan (Maryland) and Brother Assaraquoa (Virginia) made agreements and signed treaties with the Six Nations to avoid conflict and misunderstandings with the impending conflict with France. Having practiced decades of dialogue and gift-giving to strengthen Indian alliance, and with no military tradition, Brother Onas knew no other option to secure its frontiers and successfully leaned on its neighbors to reduce tensions with tribes in order that the concentration and military resources of other colonies could be focused on the French threat.

While Pennsylvania promoted dialogue, gift-giving, and peace between neighboring colonies and the Iroquois for security on the frontier, relations between the Shawnee and Six Nations continued to deteriorate. The Iroquois very much acted as a critical lynchpin, a middle-man between the competing French and British empires in North America while also trying to

⁷⁶ MPC, 4:700-701.

exercise authority over fragmented tribes. With the Shawnee seeking to draw the Delawares into the Ohio, thus farther away from the influence of the Six Nations and Pennsylvania and closer to the French, the Iroquois feared that if they had to enter into war against the French, they would possibly have to fight the Shawnee and Delaware as well. Governor Thomas stayed optimistic that old ties and influence with the Delawares could avert this possibility. However, Pennsylvania's diplomatic shift in Indian affairs presented a problem, "And indeed it is observable that the Closer our Union has been with the Six Nations the greater distance they have kept from us."⁷⁷ Restraint and community could no longer assure peace and continued friendship with the Delawares. Thomas understood the need to secure the smaller tribes to British interests, for their location on the frontier and frequent intercourse with the French made him "almost despair of it."⁷⁸

On 21 August 1744 Quidahickqunt, a Delaware Indian, spoke to Pennsylvania officials about the Armstrong murder and state of relations with their old ally and friend. Using the familiar tree in the road analogy, Quidahickqunt recalled the road having always been open, but that the murder had blocked the road, and that he and his party sought to clear the obstacle to good relations. Governor Thomas responded three days later, stating that Armstrong's murder had broken the treaties between the two. Thomas offered forgiveness to the Delawares in the spirit of brotherhood and community: "we are willing to be reconciled to you—we expect you will make good these Professions, and take care to prevent such outrages for the future, and in token of our Willingness to admit you again into Friendship."⁷⁹ However, Thomas' tone and use of words suggested an air of superiority on the part of Brother Onas. Despite his awareness that ties with the western tribes had deteriorated as a result from Pennsylvania choosing to court the

⁷⁷ *MPC*, 4:740

⁷⁸ "Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese," *APS*; *MPC*, 4:740.

⁷⁹ *MPC*, 4:745.

Six Nations, Thomas' words indicated that the two no longer stood as equal allies. Believing that Pennsylvania held leverage over the Delawares by virtue of Iroquois claims to have conquered the Delaware "women," Thomas' response indicates that Brother Onas now felt it stood as the weightier partner in the alliance.

The capture of Louisbourg in late June 1745, however distant it may have been, resulted in Pennsylvania's government having to address its relationship with now its most significant ally, the Six Nations. Governor Thomas feared that success at Louisbourg could drive the Six Nations to the French, as he reminded the Assembly of an Indian sage warning that the Iroquois "were not unacquainted with their own true Interests, and therefore would not join with either Nation in the War unless compelled to it for their own preservation."⁸⁰ With the Six Nations concerned in maintaining balance and preservation between the two Christian powers, he recommended to the Assembly in September that "there is but one probable Method of Securing them in our Interest, and that is to persuade them by out bidding the Enemy, to an Open Declaration for us."⁸¹ The Assembly concurred that it was prudent to ensure that the Six Nations remain loyal, and pointed to £4,000 recently authorized to help purchase goods to entice the Iroquois. In his discussions with commissioners on dealing with the Six Nations, Thomas instructed them in the diplomatic history of the Iroquois. In trying to paint the choice in black and white terms, Thomas hoped to entice the Six Nations to declare war against the French, or at least remind them of the Covenant Chain and Chain of Friendship developed with New York and Pennsylvania, respectively, to ensure their neutrality.⁸²

War against France brought mixed a reaction among Pennsylvanians on whether to support a military response. Governor Thomas, not unexpectedly, supported the raising of a

⁸⁰ *MPC*, 4:772.

⁸¹ *MPC*, 4:773.

⁸² *MPC*, 4:772-777.

militia. In October 1744 he appointed William Moore to be colonel of the militia regiment to be raised in Chester County. Moore thanked Thomas for the commission and anticipated that volunteers would come forward, yet with no militia law and funding, he noted he could not supply them and that volunteers would not be obliged to obey officer commands. In December 1745 Thomas received a letter from Governor Lewis Morris of New Jersey that relayed a trail of messages stating Indians along a branch of the Mississippi River had learned the French and their Indian allies were preparing a large quantity of snowshoes in an effort to reach Pennsylvania's frontiers and Albany. Thomas did not discount the report. Despite the multiple channels it traveled and the lack of detail, particularly on where the attack would originate, he noted a raid on Saratoga, New York the previous month and the Indian trader Peter Chartier causing mischief in the backcountry. The report generated a variety of responses that reflected the various factors influencing the culture of restraint. Militia captains in Lancaster County kept their companies of recent German and Scots-Irish immigrants on guard and gathered intelligence. Thomas matched the frontier's willingness to exercise a defensive posture by offering instruction to be very careful not to offer injury or violence to friendly Indians so as not to provoke them to join the enemy. This admonition, rooted in the culture of restraint, supported by the Assembly, and largely successful in its practice over previous decades, appeared successful as there is no indication of violence or tension with friendly Indians during this incident. In fact, Pennsylvania employed Delaware Indians to help keep watch. In addition to considering a military response or deploying traditional methods of restraint in the war against France, Pennsylvania leaders also had to be aware that the spectrum of reaction included pacifist responses. Quakers affirmed their testimony against bearing arms in their 1745 and 1746 yearly meetings, and in a reflection of a resurgence of pacifism among Quakers, an anonymous tract

published in the late 1740s, *War Unlawful to Christians*, argued that Christians could not morally wage war.⁸³

Despite Pennsylvania's adherence to practices of restraint, it had failed to keep pace with French encroachments on cultivating diplomatic and trading relationships with Indians in the Ohio River Valley. On 12 October 1747, Conrad Weiser concurred with the sentiment that a "handsome Present shou'd ve made to the Indians on Ohio & on lake Erie, who, by their Situation, were capable of doing this Province abundance of mischief if they shou'd turn to the French."⁸⁴ Indians along the Ohio included a mixture of young warriors of the Six Nations and members of the Delaware and Shawnee tribes. In a meeting with Pennsylvania officials in November, Ohio Indians noted their desire to attack the French, but older leaders of the Six Nations at Onondago had refused, seeking neutrality instead. These older leaders, having nurtured the sense of community and restraint alongside William Penn, were out of touch in the eyes of the younger warriors along the Ohio.⁸⁵ Resolved to go to war against the will of their elders, they offered Pennsylvania a belt of wampum in hope of securing supplies to fight the French. Anthony Palmer, the non-Quaker President of the Council who had made his fortune as a merchant in Barbados, recognized the importance in cultivating a relationship with these younger Ohio Indians who were more inclined to war. Rather than alienate aggressive Indian warriors and

⁸³ Series 5: Phineas Bond Papers, *Cadwalader Family papers*, Coll. No. 1454, HSP; *MPC*, 5:1-5, 27; Anonymous, *War Unlawful to Christians* (174-) Coll. No. 975B, HSP; *PYM-MJM*, (September 14-18, 1745), (September 20-24, 1746), A1.2, HCL. Among Indian reactions to King George's War, a 1743 account of an old, veteran warrior of the Delawares in Bethlehem points to Indian conversion and the growth of Christian Indian communities. Scarred and having tattoos demonstrating his exploits in battle, he converted to Christianity and avoided discussion of his warlike feats, "That being now taken by Jesus Christ it did not become him to relate the deeds done while in the service of the evil spirit but [...] was willing to give an account of the manner in which he was converted." See *Records of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Indian Committee, Indian Records, 1668-1838*, 79-81, Coll. No. AB34, HCL. *Records of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Indian Committee, Indian Records, 1668-1838* will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1668-1838*, HCL.

⁸⁴ *MPC*, 5:121.

⁸⁵ Richard White notes that Iroquois warriors in the Ohio, known as Mingos, declared their independence from Onondago during King George's War. He also discusses how young warriors acted thoughtless and heedless in councils, that in troubled times (war) "block the paths and darken the sky," meaning they would inhibit the peace making process. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 201-202.

risk the appearance that Pennsylvania and the British did not support them, Palmer expressed Pennsylvania's happiness that they had taken up the hatchet against the French and presented them with goods, at which the Indian representatives gave marks of approbation and went into a war dance. Palmer and the Council encouraged the Assembly to make a treaty with the Ohio Indians. Labeling these Ohio Indians as capable of causing mischief for Pennsylvania, Palmer argued that "there is reason to apprehend that without Encouragement from this Province they may be seduced by the French to go over to their side, whereby the Lives of the back Inhabitants will be in the utmost Danger."⁸⁶ Pennsylvania officials understood the necessity of supporting the Indians in the Ohio, yet failed to follow through when attention became diverted from the frontier.⁸⁷

During the summer of 1747, rumors had swirled about the threat of privateers gaining access to the Delaware River, potentially wreaking havoc on Pennsylvania's trade, and attacking Philadelphia itself. Anthony Palmer issued a proclamation on 4 July 1747 restricting river pilots from conducting foreign vessels up the river. In August, he informed the Assembly that he did not believe the Delaware River or its bay could afford protection, as the enemy in all probability had become well acquainted with both. Having cited foreign vessels coming into the bay under flags of truce and causing mischief, and with no substantial defenses along the Delaware River to deter privateers, Palmer and the Council reiterated in October that the spring of 1748 would

⁸⁶ *MPC*, 5:156.

⁸⁷ *MPC*, 5:122, 137-138, 146-151, 156; C. A. Harris and Rev. Philip Carter, "Palmer, Anthony (c.1675-1749)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/21173> (accessed December 4, 2014). Francis Jennings describes that the space and hunting grounds enjoyed by the Ohio Indians also proved to be their misfortune, for their rich land and strategic location proved they could not be left alone. Richard White concurs, stating that abundant game figured strongly in migrants' decisions to move to the upper Ohio River Valley. See Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 19; White, *The Middle Ground*, 187. For further discussion of the upper Ohio River Valley and its role as a cultural borderland where conglomerating Indian groups and competing empires clashed, see McConnell, *A Country Between* (1992). Eric Hinderaker's *Elusive Empires* (1997) discusses the Ohio River Valley from various perspectives of "empire": trade and commerce, territorial rivalry between Britain and France, and the expansion of the United States and white settlements at the expense of Indian tribes. He emphasizes settler land hunger, racial hatred, and disregard for Indian interests.

bring more depredations and block up Pennsylvania's trade and attack the capital. The Assembly's perspective emphasized the traditional argument of geographic insularity. It blamed pilots from the Lower Counties and New Jersey for assisting foreign vessels and those flying flags of truce navigate the approaches. In knowing the water ways and routes for successful navigation, these pilots in effect guarded Delaware Bay and thus access to Philadelphia. The Assembly believed that if these governments enacted regulations that restricted pilots from assisting foreign vessels or those carrying flags of truce, then Pennsylvania and Philadelphia had no reason to fear an attack. In seeing little benefit in providing funds for outfitting ships of war or building river defenses against occasional privateers, the Assembly showed its thriftiness and passed the responsibility to the governments who guarded the entrance to Delaware Bay. Despite this stingy stance, other members of society took a more proactive approach in response to these fears.⁸⁸

The 260 Philadelphia inhabitants who petitioned the Assembly in November 1747 to take measures to put the city and province in a better defensive posture were part of a new grassroots movement that was offering new influences to Pennsylvania's security culture. Veterans who survived the disastrous expedition against Cartagena in 1740 helped to enhance awareness that the world was a dangerous place, a trend toward increased militancy seen again in 1746 when men flocked to sign up for what proved to be the abortive expedition against Canada.⁸⁹ Benjamin Franklin became embroiled in this discussion in November 1747, when in the pamphlet *Plain Truth* he argued that the best way to secure peace came through proactive preparation for war. He acknowledged the long peace that Pennsylvania had enjoyed in its interactions with Indians, but broke down the argument of geographic insularity and used Scripture as a way to validate

⁸⁸ *MPC*, 4:494-495, 5:82, 98-99, 103-104, 125-126.

⁸⁹ Seymour, *The Pennsylvania Associators*, 32, 36-40.

defensive measures. He emphasized the need to act as one body and community, regardless of differences, and carefully argued how a man could reconcile duty and conscience. If a man believed in a natural duty to defend his family and country, then to sit idly while his family and country were exposed to possible dangers was contrary to a man's duty. Franklin's appeal to individualism and conscience, combined with rumors of war and raids and veterans' stories, encouraged citizens to look beyond the insularity they enjoyed in Philadelphia and consider their city's and colony's place in the struggle for empire. As a result, volunteers, many of them recent immigrants, entered into an Association to learn military discipline, form themselves into companies, and acquire arms and cannons to remedy what they perceived to be the defenseless condition of their city.⁹⁰

The Council Board, from the beginning, recognized and encouraged Association membership. With the Association "being the only Method thought on [sic] likely to preserve the Lives & Properties of their Fellow-Citizens," the Council drafted a letter to the proprietors notifying them of the grassroots movement with the expectation they would encourage the measure for Pennsylvania's welfare.⁹¹ With no cannon available to furnish the batteries that were being erected along Delaware River, the Council petitioned New York, Massachusetts, and even the commander at Cape Breton, Lieutenant Colonel Peregrine Hopson, for supplies.⁹² Having supported Indian warriors in the Ohio, President Palmer did not shy away from involvement in

⁹⁰ *MPC*, 5:158-161; Benjamin Franklin, "Plain Truth: or, Serious Considerations On the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania," (1747), in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree and Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 3:180-204. Hereafter *Franklin Papers*, Vol. 3. Benjamin Franklin, "Form of Association," *Franklin Papers*, Vol. 3, 205-212. Joseph Seymour's *The Pennsylvania Associators* (2012) provides the first comprehensive account of the Pennsylvania Associators. He argues the Association served as a defensive force for Pennsylvania while also providing a political mechanism for concerned citizens to address defense and gain political influence. By February 1748 the Associators had officers in Philadelphia, Chester, Bucks, Lancaster, and New Castle counties. See *MPC*, 5:181, 185, 193-194. See also Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection*, 70-72.

⁹¹ *MPC*, 5:158, 161-162.

⁹² Wendy Cameron, "Hopson, Peregrine Thomas," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 3, University of Toronto/Université Laval, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/hopson_peregrine_thomas_3E.html (accessed December 6, 2014).

military matters. Unlikely to sway the Quaker-led Assembly, he attempted to invoke the imperial struggle against France in order to gain military assistance for Pennsylvania. On 31 March 1748 Governor George Clinton of New York wrote that he could assist Pennsylvania's defenses by supplying cannon.⁹³ Having reviewed the Philadelphia Associators alongside other Council members in April, President Palmer expressed "great Satisfaction to see so large a number of the Inhabitants under Arms; and as none can doubt of their Zeal & readiness to do their utmost for the preservation of the City & Province," and hoped these actions would ease fears.⁹⁴

Attention remained fixed on the Associators and the Delaware River in May 1748, as the proprietors expressed fears over the Association while actual privateers made an appearance along the Delaware. On 19 May, Palmer and the Council informed the Assembly of news from New Castle that a French privateer had been sighted off the coast. No immediate action occurred, but Pennsylvania defenses received a boost with the arrival of the sloop *HMS Otter* under the command of Captain Ballet. The *Otter* had been sent by the Admiralty to protect trade in Delaware Bay. However, concurrent with *Otter's* arrival, Thomas Penn wrote of his disapproval of the Association giving officer commissions. He argued for a formal law to support a militia and fixed batteries, and that the Associators should have applied to the legal government. Yet the proprietors' (Thomas and his brother Richard) perspective remained out of touch with those who wanted to secure what they saw as a defenseless province. Their fears proved to be justified, for on 26 May a Spanish privateer fired upon the defenses at New Castle. Having heard reports of the enemy's presence, the Association and other officials swung into action. With the *Otter*

⁹³ Palmer had previously asked Clinton in late December 1747 for cannon. Clinton delayed his decision, citing in January 1748 that his colony had to wait on an engineer to advise New York's government on defenses. Clinton's compliance with Palmer's request in March appears to show that he felt secure enough in his colony's defenses to assist Palmer and Pennsylvania. See *MPC*, 5:172-173, 187.

⁹⁴ *MPC*, 5:172-173, 187, 198-208, 215, 223, 231. In addition to cannon, requests were made to the Admiralty for ships to cruise off the Delaware Capes for trade protection. See *MPC*, 5:158. Officers had to give an oath to the government during the formation of the Association. Lieutenant Richard Renshaw, a Quaker, affirmed his loyalty and duty as an officer. See *MPC*, 5:183-184.

undergoing repairs in a Philadelphia shipyard after suffering damage in an engagement with the enemy, Captain Ballet used his men and cannon to construct a battery. Colonel Abraham Taylor of the Associators' regiment in Philadelphia sent his men to guard the powder house and every battery. The Council Board placed an embargo on all vessels, sent messages to other colonies, and ordered pilot boats to cruise the river and bay for intelligence. Restraint continued to be undermined, as recently immigrated groups comprising the Association willingly took part in military activity against European threats. Palmer bragged to Governor William Gooch of Virginia "that this City is in a tolerable posture of defence by the Industry & Management of the Associators, two or three good Batteries being already erected & Cannon mounted on them."⁹⁵ Yet the privateer scare continued to garner attention away from the deteriorating relationship with Indians in the Ohio.⁹⁶

Alliance and preference for the Six Nations in Indian relations provided Pennsylvania with a false hope that it could effectively manage tensions with the western tribes. With a changing frontier population that could not be controlled and tribes such as the Delaware and Shawnee moving farther west, governing officials understood they could not maintain the friendship and alliance with their old allies with the same intensity as William Penn. With limited options and convinced that the Iroquois held leverage and hierarchy over western tribes, Pennsylvania's government allowed the spirit of community to deteriorate with its old allies along the frontier. Attention and policy became diverted elsewhere and focused on war scares, land purchases, and Iroquois interests instead of cultivating the spirit of community, friendship,

⁹⁵ *MPC*, 5:255.

⁹⁶ *MPC*, 5:234, 240-242, 249-251, 252-255. Immediately following the privateer scare, the Council on 31 May commissioned three men, including Colonel Taylor, "to consider how to form an Artillery Company, & to confer with the Associators on this Subject, and it is recommended to them to give this Affair all the Expedition possible." See *MPC*, 5:264. For detailed discussion of the Associator's constructing defenses in the Delaware River Valley, see Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection*, 73-77.

and brotherhood with its first allies. Growing imperial pressures in the Ohio River Valley reverted attention back to the western frontier, but the practice of relying on the Six Nations as well as not addressing smaller tribes in the spirit of community altered how Pennsylvania's government practiced the culture of restraint.

Continued Mismanagement in the Ohio

Pennsylvania's attention began to revert back to the frontier in the summer of 1748, as officials addressed the growing issue of Indian groups in the Ohio and the pressure they felt from French intrusions. Conrad Weiser, the respected Indian agent, received instructions to journey to the Ohio to gain knowledge on the strength and disposition of Indian groups located there, both friendly and unfriendly. In trying to reaffirm strong ties and keep tribes in Pennsylvania's orbit, officials reminded Weiser to highlight the French inability to support Indians, the ancient friendship with Pennsylvania, and to urge Indians to avoid seeking out war. The Assembly combined the practices of restraint with the reinvigorated peace testimony to resist calls to fund military enterprises, believing that funds could be saved and that if Indians on the frontier could be discouraged from war, then the likelihood of major violence along the frontier could be reduced. Following Weiser's departure to the Ohio, four commissioners met at Lancaster in July with Iroquois, Delaware, and Shawnee chiefs who lived along the Ohio. In addition to the commendations given to the Six Nations for remaining true to their friendship to Pennsylvania and telling them of the rumored peace to end King George's War, the Lancaster meeting signified that the sense of community with the Shawnee had reached a low point. Shawnee chiefs addressed the Delawares and Six Nations, acknowledging they had secretly visited the French in Canada. They apologized and sought to be restored to the Chain of Friendship. Rather than bury the tension and accept the Shawnee in the spirit of brotherhood, the commissioners asked the

Iroquois to use their leverage and “Chastize” the “delinquent Shawonese.”⁹⁷ Pennsylvania’s government again acted with an air of superiority over allied tribes, and informed the Shawnee that they would have to prove their good intention before being fully admitted back into friendship. Attention had returned to the western frontier and President Palmer believed that the Lancaster treaty would strengthen British interests, enlarge Pennsylvania’s trade, and secure the colony’s frontier. However, the manner in which consideration returned to the frontier had shown that the culture of restraint and focus on community had been altered.⁹⁸

Even after Pennsylvania returned its attention to Indian affairs to the west, leaders were slow to realize the full ramifications of their negligence. This process of understanding and realization began with Conrad Weiser’s return to Philadelphia in October 1748 from his journey to the Ohio. Despite Europeans moving toward peace, Weiser reported that the Iroquois remained independent and concerned with their own security. Following the imprisonment of some of their deputies, the Six Nations considered declaring war against the French in August. Weiser also commented on Indian strength. Using bundles of sticks that indicated the number of fighting men in each tribe, he showed that some 800 warriors lived along the Ohio, with the Delaware, Shawnee, and migrated portions of the Senecas having 165, 162, and 163 fighting men, respectively. Peace may have been settled with France, but Indian interests and the presence of substantial numbers of warriors in the Ohio indicated that peace along Pennsylvania’s frontier had to be cultivated and not taken for granted.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ *MPC*, 5:314.

⁹⁸ *MPC*, 5:276, 291-292, 299-319, 329-330; *Logan and Indian Affairs*, HSP. During the Lancaster Treaty of 1748, Pennsylvania’s government established ties with the Twightwees, or Miami, tribe based on Iroquois intercession and the fact that the Twightwees had 400 able bodied men, a factor that prompted representatives to ensure the tribe be brought into Pennsylvania’s diplomatic and security orbit.

⁹⁹ *MPC*, 5:349-358.

In August 1749 Canassatego of the Six Nations affirmed diplomatic sore spots that had gone unnoticed or unmanaged over the period of diversion. With the late war, he commented that the road of affirming alliance and peace between the Six Nations and Pennsylvania received less traffic as a result of both sides being distracted. Nevertheless, he reminded Pennsylvania leaders that the Iroquois still held a stake in Pennsylvania's security by acting as a barrier against the French in Canada. From this point of strength he addressed the issue of settler encroachment onto lands not purchased from Indians. Despite agreements that settlers would be hindered from taking up lands not sold to them, the Iroquois remained skeptical as to whether Pennsylvania could actually keep Indian hunting grounds clear of settlements. In stating "that white People are no more obedient to you than our young Indians are to us," Canassatego also pointed to an eroding observance of community, as frontier settlers placed pressure upon Indian lands not seen in William Penn's time.¹⁰⁰

Governor James Hamilton understood how the changing population dynamics of both Indians and Christians affected diplomacy. Responding to Canassatego and noting an increase in isolated incidents in violence, he provided a large gift to the Six Nations and offered wampum for the Six Nations to "Chastise your unruly Indians, and admonish them to behave better for the future," cautioning them that to not discipline young Indians risked drawing resentment of the "Country People," whom the Iroquois had observed Pennsylvania's difficulty in managing.¹⁰¹ With old leaders among Indians and Christians passing away, and the rise of youthful Indian warriors and European immigrants, the ideals of community increasingly became forgotten, or rather not learned and observed. Lack of regular alliance affirmation, settler encroachment, and a youthful generation who did not always observe elders or practices of the past were major issues

¹⁰⁰ *MPC*, 5:400.

¹⁰¹ *MPC*, 5:409-410.

that altered the culture of restraint. With attention diverted elsewhere, these forces had taken their toll on Indian relations. As government officials slowly began to realize the tenuous state of Indian diplomacy, they also recognized that French encroachments into the Ohio posed another risk to the practices of restraint and Indian diplomacy.¹⁰²

In spite of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748, New France continued to mount pressure and seek trade with Indian groups living in the Ohio country, thus endangering Pennsylvania's security and challenging its culture of restraint. Rumors in 1749 of French troop incursions became hard evidence in 1750, with Governor Hamilton declaring he had come into possession of letters signed by the French officer Pierre Joseph Céloron de Blainville, who had been sent to the Ohio with 300 Canadians and allied Indians to reprimand Indian groups along the Ohio for their friendship with the British. Indians complained that the peace negotiations between the British and French had not included them, therefore leaving them subject to French intimidations. Governor Hamilton understood that French threats against the Ohio Indians threatened Pennsylvania as well. He wrote to Governor Clinton of New York that the Ohio Indians "make a Body of Fifteen Hundred if not Two Thousand Men, and in my Opinion these different Nations are now upon the Balance. If a prudent Management and seasonable Liberalty be exercised they may be retained in our Interest."¹⁰³ Arguing that his colony could not manage these Indians by itself, as had been apparent since the shift toward the Six Nations, Hamilton leaned on New York, Maryland, and Virginia to provide assistance. He urged the Assembly in

¹⁰² *MPC*, 5:399-401, 409-410. Conrad Weiser also commented on the lack of care shown toward the Six Nations in the late war while visiting Onondago in 1750. He noted how the British appeared to have not pursued the redemption of Iroquois warriors in captivity with the same intensity as the French, thus causing the warriors to lose their martial status and producing seeds of animosity toward the British. See *Logan and Indian Affairs*, HSP. For continued discussion of the change occurring amongst Indian populations, including the Delaware and Shawnee, Gregory Dowd explores the role of prophet-led religious revivals and their influence in bolstering Indian resistance to settler encroachment and pressures. See Gregory Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

¹⁰³ *MPC*, 5:463.

October 1750 to take measures, namely gifts of alliance affirmation and military bolstering, to embolden the Ohio Indians against the corrupting presents or threatening arms of the French. The Assembly agreed according to the practices and tradition of the culture of restraint, signaling it would provide a present for the Indians along the Ohio in order to confirm their friendship with Pennsylvania. But as Hamilton had stated himself, the Indians along the Ohio were finding themselves having to balance between two orbits of influence.¹⁰⁴

In 1751 Pennsylvania's government faced a choice about whether to take a proactive step of making a physical presence in the Ohio River Valley and provide direct support to the Delaware, Shawnee, and Iroquois groups against French threats. Suggestions for a fort or strong trade house, more symbolic in nature because of the lack of a network of strong points extending deep into the interior, came first from the Irish fur trader and Indian agent George Croghan. Writing from Logstown on the Ohio to Governor Hamilton in the winter of 1750-1751, he reported that Indian chiefs believed "their Brothers the English ought *to have a Fort on this River* to secure the Trade, for they think it will be dangerous for the Traders to travel the Roads for fear of being surprised by some of the French and French Indians, as they expect nothing else but a War with the French next Spring [1751]."¹⁰⁵ With the French burying lead plates to mark their claim to the Ohio, the natives reasonably expected the French to continue their pressure. Another suggestion came from the proprietors, who perceived that a strong, fort-like trade house, manned by the principal Indian trader and several assistants in professional uniforms was critical to securing the Indian trade. With neither the French nor British having a substantial physical presence in the Ohio at this time, these suggestions for posts, strong houses, and traders served more symbolic purposes in demonstrating Pennsylvania's intent to support the Ohio Indians.

¹⁰⁴ MPC, 5:387, 425, 435-439, 455, 463-464, 485-487.

¹⁰⁵ MPC, 5:497.

Governor Hamilton followed up the proprietors' suggestion and issued instructions in April to Croghan and Andrew Montour, a métis interpreter, to deliver goods to the Ohio Indians and to inquire about Indian fears and the unsafe conditions in the Ohio for traders. He understood the importance of perception with regards to strength and support, hinting to the Assembly of the Six Nations' fear of the French, and told the Assembly that if it did not support the natives they would "be obliged to quit our Interest and depend on those who will afford them better Protection."¹⁰⁶

After their journey to the Ohio in May and June, Croghan and Montour reported to the Council (12 August) on the state of affairs in the Ohio. Arriving at Logstown on 18 May, Croghan and Montour met with a great number of Iroquois, Delaware, and Shawnee Indians. Their mission grew in importance and complexity with the arrival of two Frenchmen, including the interpreter Ioncoeur, several days later. The presence of two competing interest groups created a standoff between the traders. Ioncoeur made a faint threat to the Indians on 21 May to turn away the British, lest they incur the displeasure of the Governor of Canada. An Iroquois chief rebuked the French envoy, challenged Ioncoeur's masculinity, and stated the Indians' intent to trade with the British. Ioncoeur spoke to Croghan several days later. As fellow Indian agents, they held a respect for another and Ioncoeur confided that he did not believe the French could bring the Six Nations into their orbit without force, and even then the prospect appeared difficult. Emboldened by this admission, Croghan and Montour moved to make a treaty with the Ohio Indians on 28 May. Using the language and practices of the culture of restraint, they delivered gifts and told the Delawares that Brother Onas would wipe away their tears from the French threats. The traders also informed the Shawnee that Brother Onas had reconciled with them. From the Indian point of view, Croghan's and Montour's declarations demonstrated that

¹⁰⁶ *MPC*, 5:495-498, 510, 515, 519-521, 525.

Pennsylvania's government had reawakened, and that it appeared supportive and intent on standing with their allies, now living on the Ohio. To affirm this bond, the Iroquois chief questioned Ioncoeur regarding French pressures: "How comes it that you have broke the General Peace? Is it not three years since you as well as our Brothers the English told Us that there was a Peace between the English and French, and comes it that you have taken our Brothers as your Prisoners on our Lands?"¹⁰⁷ The Iroquois, in their hierarchical position over the smaller tribes and acting as a spokesperson, had demonstrated their intent to remain in league with the British and rejected the French through their accusations toward Ioncoeur.¹⁰⁸

The key decision had arrived. With Croghan and Montour having affirmed Pennsylvania's support and ties to the Iroquois, Delawares, and Shawnee, the Six Nations informed the traders of what they expected from Pennsylvania. On 29 May they stated:

Now, Brothers, we have been considering what the French mean by their Behaviour, and believe they want to cheat us out of our Country, but we will stop them, and Brother You must help us. We expect that you our Brother will built a strong House on the River Ohio, that if we should be obliged to engage in a War that we should have a Place to secure our Wives and Children, likewise to secure our Brothers that come to trade with us, for without our Brothers supply us with Goods we cannot live.¹⁰⁹

They clearly expected Pennsylvania to build some kind of fortification not only for physical support against the French and access to trade goods, but symbolically to reassure Indians that Brother Onas truly meant what he said. Governor Hamilton informed the Assembly on 12 August of the Indians' earnest request for Pennsylvania to build a trading house on the Ohio River to protect their wives, children, and trade. The Assembly rejected the project on 21 August, characterizing Croghan's journal, the request to build a fort, and the dangers faced by the Indians as having "been misunderstood or misrepresented by the Person in whom the

¹⁰⁷ *MPC*, 5:536.

¹⁰⁸ *MPC*, 5:530-538.

¹⁰⁹ *MPC*, 5:538.

Governor confided of the Management of that Treaty.”¹¹⁰ The Assembly had made its choice. By discounting Croghan’s and Montour’s account as well as the fears expressed by the Indians, Assembly members demonstrated the government’s disconnect from security realities along the frontier. The shift in focus toward the Six Nations in New York, rather than those groups migrating west to the Ohio, involvement in the contest for empire, and the breakdown of the sense of community through fraudulent land purchases and changing frontier populations had all contributed to keeping Pennsylvania’s government from nurturing its alliances with the fragmented tribes. For the Quaker-led Assembly, the resurgence in pacifism had further clouded members’ perception of the frontier. Pacifism had limited the Assembly’s options in responding to events in the Ohio, but it did not eliminate the practices and tradition of restraint and dialogue which had been practiced successfully for decades. It argued that “suitable Presents, have been the best means of securing their Friendship,” and that the effects of gift-giving to the Indians “have at all Times so manifestly advanced their Interest with the Security of our Frontier Settlements.”¹¹¹ Rather than build a fort, the Assembly chose gift giving to affirm its alliance and support for the Indians, a decision well in line with the culture of restraint that had provided Pennsylvania with its security.

The Assembly’s decision did not immediately endanger Pennsylvania’s security, but its ramifications were visible. Reports arrived over the next several years from Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario of French troops on their way to the Ohio. On 21 May 1753 Governor Hamilton informed the Assembly that the Alleghany country along the Ohio River “already is or will be in a very little Time invaded by an Army of French and Indians [...] And that the Indians inhabiting these, who are of the Six Nations with a Mixture of Shawonese and Delawares, Friends and

¹¹⁰ *MPC*, 5:547.

¹¹¹ *MPC*, 5:529-547.

Allies of Great Britain, will be obliged to retire and leave their Country for want of means to defend it against this armed Force.”¹¹² He beseeched the Assembly to consider building fortifications to offer protection to the Indians and keep them in the British orbit. Furthermore, he warned that settlers along the frontier had no protection in case of attack and of Indians drifting into the French orbit. With the Assembly not addressing the matter to his satisfaction, Hamilton reached out to Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, writing on 7 August that if the French built forts in the Ohio and expelled British traders, “the Indians in Our Alliance will no longer be able to maintain their Independancy, but all must fall into the Hands of the French; nor can the Governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, expect long to preserve Peace in the Parts bordering on these Indian Countries”¹¹³ As Hamilton and Dinwiddie explored the option of Virginia’s Ohio Company building a fort, the decision to shift Indian policy toward the Six Nations continued to reverberate and illustrate the altering of the security culture of restraint. While the Iroquois argued against both French and British settlements in the Ohio, Conrad Weiser observed during his 1753 journey to Mohawk country that the Iroquois were afraid of the French, “that the English had lost Ground among the Indians in the Time of the last War,” and “that the French were now about taking Possession of Ohio against the Will of the Six Nations, but they could not resist.”¹¹⁴ Iroquois strength and policy remained divided. Situated between competing Christian powers, the Iroquois sought to maintain a sense of neutrality and trade between the European empires. Furthermore, disconnect between the Six Nations of Onondago and Mingo groups in the Ohio kept the Iroquois from presenting a united front. For Pennsylvania’s government, the polity with whom it had invested its security increasingly

¹¹² *MPC*, 5:609.

¹¹³ *MPC*, 5:629.

¹¹⁴ *MPC*, 5:645.

became unable to resist French intrusions into the Ohio country and the door to Pennsylvania's backcountry.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

It takes a significant amount of time and sincere gestures to build a close relationship. Breaking it down requires less time, especially if negative actions are more memorable than the positive. As it had been during the formation and maturation of Pennsylvania's security culture over eighty-five years, perception and the choices made by settlers and Indians caused the culture of restraint to limp along during the 1720s through the 1750s. The infusion of community and brotherhood of man by William Penn and his fellow Quakers had enhanced the culture of restraint and strengthened the alliance between Pennsylvania and Indians, particularly the neighboring Delawares. This promotion of community, highlighted by liberty of conscience, however, provided the basis for which community along the frontier eroded. The mass immigration of Germans and Scots-Irish, attracted by Pennsylvania's toleration and fertile lands, brought with them their own cultural traditions and practices on security and how to react to threats, thus changing the character of frontier settlers. Not constrained by any tradition of restraint, these Protestant settlers found their sense of individualism enhanced by the Great Awakening, and stood willing to defend themselves and their property. Faced with the pressure of settler encroachment on the frontier, Delaware and Shawnee groups made the decision to migrate in order to distance themselves from settlers more prone to violence and to secure hunting grounds. In so doing these Indian groups in the Ohio River Valley placed themselves in a contested area between competing empires, exposing these adherents of the culture of restraint to a new, French trading partner who appeared set on a physical presence in the region.

¹¹⁵ PYMIC, *Indian Records, 1502-1800*, 123; MPC, 5:548-549, 599, 607-609, 622-635, 645; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 31-35, 52-54; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 90.

Migration by both natives and immigrants forced Pennsylvania officials to make critical decisions that resulted in their neglecting old native allies. Understanding that they could not effectively control the changing character of frontier settlers, and finding it increasingly difficult to regularly affirm the friendship with Delaware and Shawnee tribes with each mile the Indians migrated westward, government leaders shifted their attention and energies onto the Six Nations. James Logan and colonial officials viewed the Iroquois as a critical defensive barrier for Pennsylvania and believed they held diplomatic and military leverage over subjugated tribes. The Six Nations embraced Pennsylvania's entreaties as it provided them with a trading partner, a peaceful ally who did not pose a risk to Iroquois warriors traveling south to fight against southern tribes, and affirmation for the Iroquois that they stood as spokesman for all Indians in alliance with Pennsylvania.

The decision by Pennsylvania officials to align with the Six Nations, while perceived as practical and validated on different occasions where the Six Nations appeared to exercise authority over other tribes, endangered and eroded the culture of restraint. Believing the Six Nations to be in position to exercise leverage, leaders in Philadelphia focused on invasion scares, involvement in the contest for empire, and making fraudulent land purchases. When attention did fall on Indian diplomacy, the government's decision to align with the Six Nations resulted only in chastisement and increasing recognition by the Delawares and Shawnee of the deterioration in their relationship with Brother Onas. Concurrent with Pennsylvania leaders diverting their attention to other matters, the Great Awakening also touched Quakers. As other Protestant groups exercised greater individualism as a result of the spiritual revival, Quakers, particularly at the government level, reacted by falling back upon their religious tenets, especially the peace testimony.

The shift in policy toward the Six Nations, diverted attention from the western frontier, and renewed pacifism kept Pennsylvania's government from effectively managing its relationships with Indians in the Ohio River Valley who faced an increasing French menace. With smaller tribes increasing their calls for assistance and backing, they found their cries falling on deaf ears. This culminated with the Assembly's decision not to support 'their' Indians with a symbolic trading post or fortification. For tribes in the Ohio, Pennsylvania's government, and German and Scots-Irish frontier settlers, their interests no longer remained in league with each other. Nor did all the groups maintain a shared adherence to the culture of restraint marked by William Penn and early Quaker settlers. As these interests grew further apart, so too did the bonding element of community erode, weakening the culture of restraint.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE RUPTURE OF RESTRAINT

William Penn's death in 1718 symbolically marked the beginning of the erosion in the friendship and brotherhood between Pennsylvania and tribes along the western frontier, namely the Delawares and Shawnee. Over the course of the 1720s through the 1750s, the spatial distance and interests between Indians, Pennsylvania's government, and frontier settlers grew further apart. The frontier changed both in its population makeup and location. German and Scots-Irish frontier settlers pressured Indian groups to migrate west and had no inhibitions at using violence to defend their homesteads and interests. Government leaders, in recognizing the difficulty in maintaining ties with their old Indian allies and controlling frontier settlers, turned to the Six Nations to exercise leverage over the fragmented and migrating tribes should any sources of tension develop. And tensions did surface. Fraudulent land purchases and a lack of regular invocation of friendship and alliance, caused by the government's diverted attention that addressed Pennsylvania's ties to empire and invasion scares, eroded the community that had matured the culture of restraint. Not addressing the relationship and interests of the Delawares and Shawnee, along with many members of the Assembly finding a renewed sense in the Quaker tenet of pacifism during the Great Awakening, inhibited Pennsylvania's government from fully recognizing the significance of the encroaching French menace into the Ohio River Valley. More importantly, as Indian cries for assistance fell on deaf ears in Philadelphia, it had become apparent that mutual adherence to community as a bonding element in the culture of restraint had eroded and that both parties stood willing to pursue their own interests.

The French and Indian War witnessed the rupture of the culture of restraint between Pennsylvania and its old Delaware allies. Violence along the frontier broke the Long Peace, but the language and memory developed in the shared culture of restraint enabled the reestablishment of peace, albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness in its implementation, once more along the frontier. By the mid-1750s, community between Indians and Pennsylvania's settlers and government had eroded, weakening the mutual observance of the culture of restraint to a near breaking point. Already faced with pressures from French expansion and having witnessed their Pennsylvania trading partners make half-hearted efforts in the Ohio River Valley, Indians in the Ohio judged British arms to be inferior to the French following George Washington's and Edward Braddock's defeats in the vicinity of Ft. Duquesne. Spurned by their Pennsylvania allies and facing the victorious French, the Delawares and Shawnee swapped allies and struck at Pennsylvania frontiersmen. Beyond the hysteria and confusion resulting from these attacks, self-defense among Pennsylvanians resulted in defensive efforts including a grassroots movement to raise troops, the construction of a chain of forts, and the beginnings of formal government funding for defense. By the spring of 1756 Pennsylvania had steadied itself and stood ready to actively remove the threat of violence and to restore the peace that it had known for so long. Yet in having only known a culture of restraint and lacking in military tradition and practice, especially in frontier warfare, the use of military force by Pennsylvania authorities and volunteers remained ineffective. Diplomacy, in accordance with the culture of restraint, stood as a time-honored tool in Pennsylvania's arsenal to achieve security and took primacy in reducing the threat of violence stemming from Delaware Indians east of the Appalachian Mountains. Military force and diplomacy became intertwined and were practiced concurrently in

Pennsylvania's response. The language and memory of the culture of restraint, having been practiced for decades, helped to reestablish peace with neighboring Indians.

Regarding Indian groups in the Ohio River Valley, spatial differences restricted the effectiveness of diplomacy and placed primacy on military force as the means to bring about peace. Unable to traverse the vast distance across Indian country beyond the Appalachian Mountains and treat with Indians living along the Ohio with regularity, Pennsylvania's government could not rely upon the culture of restraint to dissuade Indians from their French backers and bring them back into Pennsylvania's sphere of influence. Dual application of military force and diplomacy resumed, but their relationship had been inverted. British military force stood as the primary mover in evicting French power from the region and allowing for diplomacy to run its course and bring Indians west of the Appalachians back into the British orbit. Despite the formal ending to the Seven Years' War between Britain and France in 1763, violence along the frontier resumed with Pontiac's War and the Paxton Boys Rebellion and served to demonstrate the dual application of military force and diplomatic tact to achieve peace. It also showed that a culture of violence had become a viable option to secure settlements and that the culture of restraint had been altered, as the ethical component of community had diminished severely while maintaining an outer framework of symbolism and memory.

Rupture of Restraint and Community

Virginia's attempt to address the French incursions and courting of Indians along the Ohio River demonstrates how tribes wavered in their allegiance to the British as well as Philadelphia's disconnect with the situation along the frontier. Letters from Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia in November 1753 and January 1754 to Governor James Hamilton indicate that he dispatched George Washington to assess French strength and relate Virginia's

demands. With Washington's report demonstrating that the French intended to stay, Hamilton reported to the Assembly of the provoking nature of French fortifications and troops and that Pennsylvania could expect its inhabitants to suffer the miseries and calamities of war. George Croghan's discussions with Ohio Indians exasperated Hamilton's pleas for the Assembly to act. He related an Indian speech to the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia: "we now, by these two Strings of black Wampum, desire You may directly send to our Assistance that You and We may secure the Lands of Ohio, for there is nobody but You our Brethren and ourselves have any Right to the Lands; but if you do not send immediately we shall surely be cut off by our Enemy the French."² With further reassurance being offered by Shingas, identified as King of the Delawares, of his intention to come closer to the British, Croghan's report encouraged Hamilton of the necessity of supporting their allied Indians and resisting the French. In the spring of 1754 Hamilton sought to know where exactly the Assembly's interests lay. What ensued demonstrated the hollowness exhibited by Pennsylvania's government in their claims of support for Indians in the face of French pressures and increasing spatial distance. He questioned that if the Assembly refused to act, how could it be said that Pennsylvania fulfilled its treaty obligations to offer assistance to Indian wants and needs, or how could Assembly members declare they acted dutifully and loyally in the face of enemy aggression? With a renewed sense of pacifism that entrenched their belief in the tradition of restraint for attaining security, the Assembly offered vague excuses of an undetermined border as reason not to aggravate the French. Avoiding aggravation had worked in the past and assisted in maintaining peace. The frontier had changed, however, as Delawares and Shawnee stood far away from the support of their supposed ally in Brother Onas and faced military and trading pressures from the French.³

² *MPC*, 5:735.

³ *MPC*, 5:712-714, 720, 735, 754-759.

George Washington's failed expedition against Ft. Duquesne in the spring and summer of 1754 provided no encouragement for Indians in the upper Ohio River Valley to side with the British. In the course of his march toward the French fort, Washington managed to alienate potential native allies. Thanachaishon, a Seneca chief, described Washington as "a good natured Man but had no Experience, he took upon him to Command the Indians as his Slaves and would have they every Day upon the Scout and to attack the Enemy by themselves, but would by no means take Advice from the Indians."⁴ Washington's discourtesy to local Indians helped to portray the British in a negative light and did not provide any encouragement for warriors to assist Washington in his defense and surrender at Great Meadows on 3 July 1754. For the Indians, Washington's defeat served to symbolize British military weakness as well as French strength. This factor placed pressure on the weakened culture of restraint. George Croghan, writing in mid-August from the frontier settlement of Aughwick near the confluence of Aughwick Creek with the Juniata River, related Delaware and Shawnee concerns following Washington's defeat. He noted that "the Indians are all very uneasy to see the Backwardness of the English, and say they fear what the French tell them of their Brethren is too true, that is that the English are afraid of the French, notwithstanding their superior Number."⁵ Pennsylvania's response following this defeat, as Croghan summarized Indian opinion, would go a long way in determining whether the Ohio Indians would follow the British or French. By the fall of 1754 the French had increased their influence in the Ohio River Valley. Conrad Weiser's report from his journey to Aughwick found the French making large presents to the Indians in exchange for their friendship or neutrality, and in a letter to Richard Peters, Croghan reported large troop movements by the French into the Ohio. All signs pointed to the need to support the Delaware

⁴ "Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese," APS.

⁵ *MPC*, 6:140-141.

and Shawnee in their frantic pleas for help in the face of perceived French strength. Yet Pennsylvania did not act. With the arrival of a new governor, Robert Hunter Morris, in October, Pennsylvania's government found itself in a period of transition as the Assembly cited the lack of direction from Britain on how to respond.⁶

Major General Edward Braddock's arrival in February 1755 resulted in the Assembly's adherence to restraint and a growing realization by British commanders that Pennsylvania did indeed have a unique security tradition. Governor Morris had tried encouraging the Assembly to raise forces to defend the province, but with the knowledge of the imminent arrival of British regulars, the Assembly entrenched its commitment to restraint. If regulars were set to defend the frontier and deal with the French threat, why should Pennsylvania raise troops when it had no experience or had seen no need to do so in the past? Previously, the Assembly had argued against raising troops, for fear of provoking the Indians. Having only known diplomacy and restraint, lacking in experience in raising troops, and influenced by a heightened sense of pacifism, Assembly members could not see the need on their part to raise troops when the British had sent troops to defend Pennsylvania's frontier. Furthermore, to raise troops in tandem with the arrival of British regulars appeared to be a financially reckless redundancy. When asked by Dinwiddie

⁶ *MPC*, 6:141, 159, 167; Series 4: George Croghan Papers, *Cadwalader Family papers*, Coll. No. 1454, HSP. Hereafter: George Croghan Papers, *Cadwalader*, HSP. For a thorough account of the Seven Years' War, where it is given primacy as the most important event in eighteenth century North America, and its immediate effect on British North America, see Fred Anderson's well written *Crucible of War* (2000). For more focus on Pennsylvania during the conflict, see Davidson, *War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania* (1957); Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (1960); Donald H. Kent, *The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1981); Jennings, *Empire of Fortune* (1988); Louis M. Waddell and Bruce D. Bomberger, *The French and Indian War in Pennsylvania, 1753-1763: Fortification and Struggle during the War for Empire* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1996).

In the scholarship regarding the Ohio River Valley in the struggle between Britain and France for North America, Richard White considers the interplay of Indian-European alliances, both politically and in trade agreements. See White, *The Middle Ground* (1991). Michael McConnell sees the Ohio River Valley as a cultural borderland and battleground of imperial rivalry, all at the expense of the Indian tribes living there. See McConnell, *A Country Between* (1992). Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall approach the competition for empire in the Ohio River Valley through the theme of trade and pressures of encroachment. See Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires* (1997); Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire* (2003). This dissertation incorporates these ideas of alliance, trade, and space, and focuses on the issue of how the culture of restraint succeeded, and failed, in restoring peace.

to assist in supplying Braddock's forces, Morris responded that the Assembly members "do not think themselves obliged to furnish any Provisions till the Troops come into this Province, and when they do I make no Doubt they will find out some Pretence for not doing it then, their Scheme being to avoid all Expence however necessary to their own Preservation."⁷ Brevet Major Sir John St. Clair, the British Army's deputy quartermaster general in America, wrote to Morris in a business-like manner about his superiors' expectations for Pennsylvania to supply the necessary transport and supplies for Braddock's expedition. He stood surprised at the governor's difficulties in dealing with a governing body "unacquainted with every kind of Military Service and extremely unwilling to part with Money upon any Terms."⁸ For British officers, this frustrating stubbornness became a lesson in Pennsylvania's security culture that they found difficult to accept. Braddock himself wrote to Morris, exclaiming that "I cannot help expressing the greatest Surprise to find such pusillanimous and improper Behaviour in your Assembly, and to hear of Faction and Opposition where Liberty and Property are invaded, and an absolute Refusal to supply either Men, Money, or Provision for their own Defence." He continued: "It is astonishing to see One of the principal Colonies preserving a Neutrality when his Majestie's Dominions are invaded, when the Enemy is upon the Frontier, nay, when it is undetermined if the Fort of Duquense is not in the Province of Pennsylvania."⁹ With a tradition of not raising troops in accordance to the culture of restraint that had kept peace along the frontier, Pennsylvania's government resisted calls to support British regulars. In resisting this symbol of the British Crown, the Quaker-dominated Assembly continued its resistance to executive authority.¹⁰

⁷ *MPC*, 6:296.

⁸ *MPC*, 6:300-303.

⁹ *MPC*, 6:307.

¹⁰ *MPC*, 6:185-186, 193, 200-203.

When Morris and Braddock urged Pennsylvania's Assembly to prepare and support war measures, the Assembly fell upon a memory of persecution. Quakers made up a majority of the Assembly. With the persecution of their religious forefathers in England the previous century a recent memory, Quaker Assemblymen balked at the idea of consolidating power in the hands of an executive authority, such as a governor. Quakers defended their political power, pointing to their consistent election success and that the management of public affairs could not possibly consider every opinion, for "some Allowance must therefore be made for human imperfections."¹¹ In a bill for £25,000 to support Braddock, the Assembly delegated only £5,000 for king's use through Braddock, the rest reserved for the Assembly's discretion to fund provisions or give gifts to Indians. Following Morris' urging in June 1755 for the Assembly to grant supplies and provide for a militia, the Assembly appeared willing to provide money. However, it would only do so if the governor gave up some of his power, "But if the Governor supposes that from the Nature of His Station he must be the sole & only Judge what Letters or Papers coming to him on his Majesty's Service are proper to be made public, we are under a Necessity of differing from him."¹² As Braddock's army and British authority marched into the wilderness to attack Ft. Duquesne, Pennsylvania's Assembly and its Quaker majority jockeyed to keep the executive power of the proprietors and their appointed governors limited, and avoid enlarging imperial control.¹³

¹¹ *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes*, (May 5, 1755), Coll. No. A1.3, HCL. *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes*, will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYM-MJM*, (Date), A1.3, HCL.

¹² *MPC*, 6:437, 442. While Quakers may have had election success, their political power also relied upon the majority of Assembly seats being centered in the older, more established eastern counties where Quakers lived. Western counties received sparse representation despite a growing population, particularly of recent Scots-Irish immigrants.

¹³ *MPC*, 6:386-389, 427. For scholarship on the political divide within Pennsylvania, the development of partisan interest-group politics, and changing nature of Quaker power in the Assembly, see Tully, *Forming American Politics* (1994), and Benjamin H. Newcomb, *Political Partisanship in the American Middle Colonies, 1700-1776* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995). For the Quaker Party's and Benjamin Franklin's push for

Braddock's death and the defeat of his army at the Battle of the Monongahela on 9 July 1755 constituted a significant setback for the culture of restraint that existed along Pennsylvania's frontier, for it both spurred military activity within Pennsylvania and provoked Indians to attack and declare war against their former allies. Like Washington, Braddock had alienated native allies, as the Iroquois delegate Scarrooyady represented:

We must let you know that it was the pride and ignorance of that great General that came from England. He is now dead; but he was a bad man when he was alive; he looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear any thing and to tell him of the danger he was in with his Soldiers; but he never appeared pleased with us, & that was the reason that a great many of our Warriors left him & would not be under his Command.¹⁴

As the army retreated and reports trickled in about the exact details of the defeat, Morris again warned the Assembly that Pennsylvania had no effective military means to counter French and Indian incursions. More importantly, he understood how such a victory would embolden Pennsylvania's enemies. Morris asserted that the loss of Braddock's war chest, containing some £25,000, could only give the enemy encouragement and that the French could use the funds to further engage numbers of Indians to their cause.¹⁵

Following Braddock's defeat, Pennsylvania began to take defensive military and diplomatic steps in an effort to maintain security. Regarding military activity, Morris wrote Thomas Penn on 31 July about how he had encouraged inhabitants to form into militia companies, despite the non-existence of a formal militia law, and that he had distributed powder and shot to bolster disheartened settlers.¹⁶ With multiple petitions for arms, ammunition, and approval of company formations coming into the capital, Morris again urged the Assembly on 9

royal government at the expense of the Penn proprietorship, see James H. Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

¹⁴ *MPC*, 6:589.

¹⁵ *MPC*, 6:478-479, 483, 486, 502, 512-514.

¹⁶ Men in Lurgan Township in Cumberland County, a frontier county, petitioned Morris for arms and ammunition after taking the initiative to form a company. See *MPC*, 6:533.

August to establish a militia. Concurrent with this martial activity, Pennsylvania pursued diplomatic channels. Yet instead of dealing with the Delawares and Shawnee, officials continued to rely upon supposed Six Nations' influence over the Indians in the Ohio. On 15 August Morris thanked the Six Nations for their assistance in fighting with the British at Braddock's defeat, and a week later Scarrooyady informed Morris that the Delawares were still willing allies. He stated, "One word of Yours will bring the Delawares to join You; and you are a strong Body and very able; if you will but Exert Yourselves we can beat and humble the French."¹⁷ Morris saw the necessity of taking the opportunity to fight the French and relieving the pressure against the Delawares. However, without a declaration of war he could not make such a direct move. Morris could still promote precautionary measures amongst settlers, but based on the hardened stance of the Assembly, the distance of the Ohio Indians and lack of infrastructure to provide assistance in a timely manner, and Morris' hesitation of engaging the French, Pennsylvania's government found itself restricted.¹⁸

While it took two parties to promote a culture of restraint, only one needed to break it. Pennsylvania's government and the mismanagement of the frontier had provided the lion's share in eroding community, weakening mutual adherence to restraint, and placing its old native allies in a position to use violence and attack Pennsylvania's frontier. With the spirit of community eroded, Brother Onas' unwillingness to assist Indians in the Ohio River Valley, and the two defeats of the British, Indian groups represented largely by the Delawares and Shawnee cast their lot with French military and trading power and struck at their former allies. Their interests no longer lay in attempting to maintain peace with Pennsylvania. Spurned by allies and facing military pressures and trading incentives of the seemingly more powerful French, Indians in

¹⁷ *MPC*, 6:590.

¹⁸ *MPC*, 6:517, 524, 533-534, 589-591. For more petitions on settlers forming into companies, see *MPC*, 6:590-591, 601.

October 1755 attacked frontier settlements on the west side of the Susquehanna River. John Harris of Paxton reported to Morris on 20 October that Indians had scalped settlers and that “the old chain of Friendship now is broke by several Nations of Indians.”¹⁹ That same day settlers at the mouth of Penn’s Creek notified Morris about women and children carried off as prisoners, and that they had come across a burned house owned by Jacob King, who they found “barbarously burnt and two Tomhawks sticking in his forehead.”²⁰ At Great Cove on 2 November, Delawares and Shawnee under the Delaware king Shingas killed six and took seventeen prisoners. With the outbreak of violence, the Delawares declared war against the “English,” claiming, “We have been their Friends many years, but now have taken up the Hatchet against them, & we will never make it up with them whilst there is an English man alive.”²¹ Having been neglected for years by their allies, cheated out of their lands, and faced with a choice of siding with one of the two converging European empires in the Ohio, the Delawares and other tribes viewed the French as a logical choice and turned against their old allies.

As Indians began to raid frontier settlements, settlers expressed their distress over the lack of protection available and took measures to defend themselves. Local leaders at Reading exclaimed in early November that “We are all in uproar, all in Disorder, all willing to do, and have little in our power. We have no authority, no commissioners, no officers practised in War, and without the commiseration of our Friends in Philadelphia, who think themselves vastly safer than they are.”²² The spatial difference between frontier and eastern communities in their perception of danger was apparent in this address from the settlers at Reading. Morris

¹⁹ *MPC*, 6:646.

²⁰ *MPC*, 6:647.

²¹ *MPC*, 6:645-655, 675-676, 683, 766-767. The Iroquois Scarrooyady related the war announcement.

²² *MPC*, 6:667.

championed the frontier settlers' cause in his address to the Assembly on 3 November, as he related their frustration: "The people in the back Counties have on this important Occasion behaved themselves with uncommon spirit and activity, but complain much of the Want of Order & Discipline, as well as of Arms and Ammunition."²³ While frontier settlers vented their frustration and sought relief from officials in Philadelphia, they also took the initiative to organize and defend themselves militarily. Indian trader John Harris of Paxton wrote to Edward Shippen, a local official at Lancaster, on 29 October that a number of men should be raised to make a show of force. He advocated a black and white approach to security, insisting "on the Indians declaring either for or against us," and that men should be kept in the woods hunting them out.²⁴ Writing from the frontier to Morris in Philadelphia and former Assemblyman William Parsons at Easton, Conrad Weiser noted that his company of about 300 men, armed with guns, axes, and pitchforks, had organized and courageously declared their willingness to die together and fight the enemy.²⁵ And from Bethlehem, an official named Timothy Horsfield urged inhabitants of Northampton County "to range about the Mountains at such Passes or Places there as shall be thought most likely for the Enemies to come thro'."²⁶ As organized military units took shape in Pennsylvania, the recent waves of Scots-Irish and German immigrants along the frontier largely filled the ranks. Native-born Pennsylvanians, descendants from those settled in the longer established and prosperous eastern counties, namely the of the early Quaker generation, were negligible. The muster rolls of Major James Burd's company in Pennsylvania's First Regiment

²³ *MPC*, 6:671.

²⁴ *MPC*, 6:656; David Edward Michlovitz, "Harris, John," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00376.html> (accessed May 20, 2014).

²⁵ *MPC*, 6:656-657; "Conrad Weiser to W. Parsons," (October 28, 1755), *Horsfield*, APS.

²⁶ "Address from Timothy Horsfield, William Parsons, and James Martin, to the Inhabitants of Northampton County," (November 24, 1755), *Horsfield*, APS. Craig W. Horle, et al., eds., *Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania: A Biographical Dictionary, Volume 2, 1710-1756* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 801-808; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 6, 20, 260. For discussion on the organization of provincial soldiers, see Stephenson, "Pennsylvania Soldiers" (Spring 1995).

of Foot in 1756 lists the names and origins of thirty-four registered men. Thirteen (38%) had been born in Ireland and eight (23.5%) in Germany, while nine (26.5%) claimed New Jersey as their home, three (9%) claimed Pennsylvania, and one (3%) claimed England.²⁷ Recent immigrants, under attack and fearing for their lives and prosperity, opted to defend themselves militarily.

Pennsylvania's government provided both military and diplomatic responses to the outbreak of violence on the frontier. Governor Morris pushed for militia and supply bills on 3 November. Six days later, he again addressed the Assembly, discussing the need to keep Indians living along the Susquehanna River and their estimated 300 fighting men within Pennsylvania's orbit, for if "we continue to refuse either to act in defence of ourselves or them, they must necessarily leave us and throw themselves for protection into the hands of the French."²⁸ With no money at his disposal, Morris told the Iroquois Scarrooyady of his inability to act. The Iroquois delegate appeared amazed but remained optimistic. He believed that the Delawares just needed some kind of symbolic reassurance from Pennsylvania, such as the construction of a fortified trading post, to encourage them to stand against the French. While Morris and Scarrooyady promoted a more active response, the Assembly leaned on restraint and diplomacy. In trying to find answers to why the Delawares and Shawnee would breach their dependence on the Six Nations and their treaties with Pennsylvania, the Assembly asked Morris if the Indians had suffered any injury. If the problem could be identified, then it could be addressed, as previous instances of tension had been smoothed over with dialogue and exchanging wampum and gifts,

²⁷ *Pennsylvania Archives, Series 5*, ed. Thomas Lynch Montgomery, (Harrisburg: Harrisburg Publishing Company, State Printer, 1906), 1:60. Hereafter: *PA, Ser. 5*, volume and pg. number. The muster rolls of Burd's company of the Augusta Regiment, dated May – October 1757, continued to reflect large numbers of recent immigrants making up large percentages of the ranks. Of the forty-seven men listed, over 60% came from Ireland and Germany. Native-born Pennsylvanians made up 17%, England nearly 13%, and the remainder originated from New Jersey, New England, and Scotland. See *PA, Ser. 5*, 1:92-94.

²⁸ *MPC*, 6:690.

and community could be restored. The Assembly pointed to the culture of restraint and could not help feeling surprised at the violence, as Pennsylvania had “been founded on Maxims of Peace, & had hitherto maintained an uninterrupted Friendship with the Natives.”²⁹ In pursuing dialogue and further information in order to address the recent violence, the Assembly also made a practical argument laced with fiscal conservatism against military action. While considering the task of guarding the frontier, the Assembly stated to Morris on 11 November that “it is next to impossible to guard effectually an extended Frontier, settled by scattered single Families at two or three miles Distance, so as to secure them from the insidious attacks of small parties of skulking Murderers.”³⁰ The Assembly considered the frontier to be too extensive to effectively defend against small groups of warriors acting in defiance of Indian leaders that had practiced restraint in the past. Members firmly believed in the practices of the culture of restraint. Assembly members, not wanting to expand executive authority or see some their power transferred to the frontier counties, and emboldened by a renewed peace testimony, had few options to pursue and relied upon diplomacy as the best chance of restoring community.³¹

As violence persisted into November, Pennsylvania’s defenses began to take shape. The Assembly passed a militia act and a supply bill for £60,000, and ordered that 300 men be immediately raised “to range the Frontiers & Blockhouses for Stages to be erected at proper

²⁹ *MPC*, 6:692.

³⁰ *MPC*, 6:695.

³¹ *MPC*, 6:672, 678, 690, 692. While Morris promoted military action, he could not help but feeling surprised at Delaware and Shawnee attacks. In a letter to William Johnson dated 15 November 1755, he stated, “The unhappy defeat of Gen^l Braddock has brought an Indian War upon this and the neighbouring Provinces, and from a Quarter where it was least expected, I mean the Delawares and Shawanese, from whom we thought there was no danger, as they had the very last Year given us assurances of their continuing Quiet and taking part with us when we should ask them to do so; and they made the same promise to the Six Nations, so that we depended on them not only to remain neuter but to prevent other Indians from joining the French.” Because of Johnson’s role of Superintendent of Indian Affairs and his ties to the Six Nations, Morris hoped Johnson could use his influence among the Iroquois in order that they could exercise leverage over the warring Delawares and Shawnee. See *MPC*, 6:700.

Distances & garrison'd."³² Sixteen-year-old Samuel Miles joined a company raised by Isaac Wayne and marched into Northampton County. After rendezvousing with Colonel Benjamin Franklin, Miles helped build a stockade called Ft. Allen as part of a string of fortifications stretching from the Kittatinny Hills at the Delaware River to the Maryland border at the Potomac. Intended to protect frontier settlements, these fortifications ranged from the simple stockades and blockhouses that could be built relatively quickly, such as Ft. Allen, to more elaborate defenses such as Ft. Augusta, a building project that started in the summer of 1756 and stood ready to resist attack by winter.³³ Miles continued to spend the winter of 1755-1756 "erecting a number of Stockade forts on the frontier of Northampton County" during this defensive building program.³⁴ During Governor Morris' tour of the initial frontier defenses in January 1756, he spoke to Indians at a council at Carlisle on 15 January and tried to display strength despite Pennsylvania's unfamiliarity with war: "But tho' we have been unused to a Warlike Life and were at first unprepared for War, yet our Enemies may be assured that we are not incapable of it, or defending ourselves."³⁵ While the forts represented visible signs of the beginnings of a military tradition, their significance was more psychological. With this defensive line in place, Morris attempted to speak to the Indians from a position of strength. He also hoped the forts would hearten settlers. Upon returning to Philadelphia in February, Morris expected the chain of forts and blockhouses to "render the Settlements within them tolerably secure." He

³² "Ben Franklin to William Parsons," (December 5, 1755), *Horsfield*, APS.

³³ Additional construction on Ft. Augusta's defenses continued into 1757. See Northumberland County Historical Society, "Fort Augusta & Hunter House," <http://www.northumberlandcountyhistoricalsociety.org/page.asp?tid=153> (accessed December 20, 2014). Scholarship regarding Pennsylvania's frontier fortifications is substantial and largely follows a traditional military history interpretation analyzing construction, design, and effectiveness in war. See Stillé, "The Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania," (1896); Cummings, "The Frontier Forts of Provincial Pennsylvania," (Jan. 1947); Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (1960); Labaree, "Benjamin Franklin and the Defense of Pennsylvania," (Jan. 1962). See also Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection* (2008) and Seymour, *Pennsylvania Associators* (2012) for traditional military history accounts of the French and Indian War.

³⁴ Samuel Miles, "Autobiographical Sketch," in *Samuel Miles Papers*, Coll. No. B M589, APS. Hereafter: Miles, "Autobiographical Sketch," APS.

³⁵ *MPC*, 7:2.

highlighted the chain's defensive attributes: "They are placed at convenient Distances from each other, and at the most important Passes thro' the Mountains, [...] I believe will prove a sufficient Protection to our Inhabitants against such Parties as have hitherto appeared upon our borders."³⁶

While Pennsylvania had reacted in a traditional military fashion, through raising troops and erecting fortifications, the efforts had only been defensive in nature. The newly raised soldiers had not set out to chastise Indian raiding parties.³⁷

Violence along the frontier did not slacken in late 1755. Cumberland County's sheriff reported "that 27 Plantations were burnt and a great quantity of Cattle killed; That a Woman of 93 years of age was found lying killed with her Breast tore off and a stake run thro' her Body."³⁸ Michael Hute related a grisly family dinner affair from 12 December, when Indians attacked Frederick Heoth's home. "Heoth's Wife ran into the Bakehouse, which was also set on Fire. The poor Woman ran out thro' the Flames, and being very much burnt she ran into the Water and their dyed. The Indians cut her belly open, and used her otherwise inhumanely. They killed and scalped a Daughter, and he thinks that three other Children who were of the Family were burnt."³⁹ Edward Biddle of Reading wrote to his father in Philadelphia that "This night we expect an attack, truly alarming is our situation. The people exclaim against the Quakers, & some are scarce restrained from burning the Houses of those few who are in This Town. Oh my

³⁶ *MPC*, 7:11, 19.

³⁷ "Ben Franklin to William Parsons," (December 15, 1755), *Horsfield*, APS; Miles, "Autobiographical Sketch," APS; *MPC*, 6:766, 776, 7:10-11. In analyzing the creation of the Pennsylvania Regiment in the spring of 1756, Matthew Ward finds that former indentured servants and other landless laborers composed the ranks. Ward argues that military service offered economic opportunity for foreigners and that government authorities sought to entice potential recruits and avoid social challenges of compulsory military service. This project builds off this interpretation. Recently arrived immigrants along the frontier were under no pretence to observe the practices and understanding of the culture of restraint. Furthermore, for those wanting to advance themselves economically and in society, military service offered a possible avenue to challenge Quaker political and economic influence. See Matthew C. Ward, "An Army of Servants," (1995).

³⁸ *MPC*, 6:707.

³⁹ *MPC*, 6:758-759.

Country! My bleeding Country!”⁴⁰ Frontier settlers increasingly felt that they would have to rely on their own devices to regain security. Conrad Weiser related to Morris that as Paxton settlers questioned an Indian, “The Indian begged his Life and promised to tell all what he knew tomorrow morning, but (shocking to me) they shott him in the midst of them, scalped him and threw his Body into the River.”⁴¹ As violence raged along the frontier, frontier settlers took a hardened racial outlook toward Indians. For them, their struggle was a fight for life or death. Furthermore, with little assistance seeming to come from Philadelphia and the eastern counties, frontier settlers grew resentful toward at the Quaker-dominated Assembly.⁴²

Believing their Pennsylvania allies had forsaken them and witnessing the confident French defeat British arms twice in battle, the Delawares and Shawnees found their interests to be better served in gravitating toward the French and attacked Pennsylvania’s frontier settlements in October 1755, catching the colony unprepared. While reaction among locals brought the beginnings of military organization for defense, the government remained split on how to deal with the military threat. Leaders explored military and diplomatic efforts, all in a defensive effort to provide reassurance to the backcountry against Indian raids. By the spring of 1756, Pennsylvania prepared itself to go on the offensive in two distinct avenues: unfamiliar military action and the recently weakened approach of restraint once promoted by William Penn.

Pennsylvania’s Dual Methods for Regaining Peace

Community between the long standing allies and trading partners of Pennsylvania and the Delawares crumbled with Morris’ public declaration of war on 14 April 1756. Scarrooyady had convinced the governor to remain in a defensive posture and allow one last effort at Iroquois

⁴⁰ *MPC*, 6:705.

⁴¹ *MPC*, 6:763.

⁴² For reports on violence from the frontier, see *MPC*, 6:704-707, 737, 758-759, 763, 766-767; *Pennsylvania Journal*, (December 4, 1755), TLC. Hereafter: *PA Journal*, (Date), TLC.

intervention to prevent further violence. When that failed, Morris spoke resolutely to the Council, Scarrooyady, and the interpreter Andrew Montour: “I now find I can no longer answer it to his Majesty, nor to his Subjects committed to my care, nor to those of the other colonies, to delay any longer to declare [the Delawares] Enemies to his Majesty, and to act against them with all the Vigour possible.”⁴³ Offering a war belt and bounties for Indian prisoners and scalps, Morris received approbation from his Iroquois ally. Scarrooyady, amazed at Morris’ restraint and willingness to exhaust all possibilities to hold onto a sense of community and brotherhood in the face of violence, encouraged Brother Onas to “awake, shake off your Lethargy; Stand up with your Hatchet in your Hand, and use it manfully. Your Enemies have got great advantage by your Inactivity; Show them you are Men.”⁴⁴ Morris’ interaction with Scarrooyady is analogous to the deterioration and rupture in community with the Delawares. By listening to the Iroquois and allowing one last attempt at diplomacy, Pennsylvania’s government had given primacy to the Six Nations in its Indian relations. The decision to go to war against an old ally, and to receive Iroquois support, demonstrates that the sense of brotherhood with the Delaware had eroded.

With the war declaration, however, came reservations and objections. Morris himself remained optimistic that the Delawares would see their folly. In a 24 April letter to Sir William Johnson, Britain’s Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the northern colonies, he argued the French spurred the Delawares into behaving rashly, and that he would readily meet them to make peace on acceptable terms. Morris’ willingness to return to peace derived from his awareness that diplomacy had long guided Pennsylvania’s security and that the colony faced a steep challenge in waging a war. Objections to war came expectedly from the Quakers. While

⁴³ *MPC*, 7:75.

⁴⁴ *MPC*, 7:74-76, 79, 88-89. For Scarrooyady urging Morris to allow the Six Nations to try to intervene and speak with the Delawares, see *MPC*, 7:12-14.

prominent Quakers expressed their renewed peace testimony against war, they also spoke of past methods of nurturing peace and the belief they could be an avenue to peace.⁴⁵

Israel Pemberton and the Quakers offered a different avenue from war in order to resolve differences with the Indians and return to a state of community. In hosting a dinner on 19 April with his wife Mary and some Iroquois delegates, Pemberton spoke about the peace of their ancestors, especially William Penn. Scarrooyady pointed out that Pennsylvania had neglected its friendship with the Indians for too long, that if Brother Onas would have regularly affirmed its alliance and, from the Iroquois point of view, hierarchy over the smaller tribes with gifts and wampum, then “the Delawares would have remained more subject, both to the Six Nations and us.”⁴⁶ Pemberton responded by outlining how he and other traditionalists viewed the situation. In order to show love and regard for one another, he explained, the Delawares must be convinced of their errors and urged to return to their allegiance. This would be done not through force, but through dialogue, as the Quakers would act as mediators between the Indians and the government. Happy to hear the Quaker resolve to restore community and that there remained some men who adhered to the old principles of peace and love, Scarrooyady offered his assurance that the Iroquois would assist in the effort. Pemberton drafted a letter to Johnson describing the Quaker stance on entering into dialogue with the Indians, for without the interposition of people in whom the Indians could confide, “there’s no room to expect a permanent peace will be made.”⁴⁷ Pemberton and the Quakers had taken the first steps not only in establishing the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by

⁴⁵ *MPC*, 7:83-85, 98-99.

⁴⁶ “Substance of conference between Quakers in Philadelphia and the heads of the six Indian Nations,” (April 19, 1756) in *Miscellaneous Manuscripts*, Box 14 (1756-1762), FHL. Hereafter: “Conference between Quakers and the Six Nations,” FHL.

⁴⁷ *Pemberton Papers*, “Draft of a letter to Sir William Johnson,” (April 26, 1756), Coll. No. 1036, HCL. Material from the Pemberton Papers collection will hereafter be abbreviated as “Letter,” (Date), *Pemberton*, HCL.

Pacific Measures, but in providing a distinct avenue for regaining peace apart from military action.⁴⁸

Initial success at restoring peace and community with Indians came not from military exertions, but from the familiar mechanism of dialogue and restraint. Now involved in a greater coalition struggle for empire along with other colonies and Indian groups, Morris received messages from Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts and Governor Charles Hardy of New York to desist from pursuing hostilities. Johnson feared that violence from Pennsylvania might upset his own influence and diplomatic efforts in the wider prosecution of war and the workings of empire, which prompted him to ask, “What will the Delawares & Shawonese think of Such Opposition and Contradiction in our Conduct [when] these Hostile Measures which Mr. Morris has Entered into is Throwing all our Schemes into Confusion[?]”⁴⁹ Within Pennsylvania itself, diplomatic efforts bore fruit with the Delawares and other tribes living along the Susquehanna River in early June. The Iroquois delegate Captain Newcastle informed these Indians that despite Pennsylvania’s warriors rising up to defend themselves against the outbreak of violence, the Six Nations and Johnson had convinced them to lay aside their tomahawks in favor of peace. In response, a Delaware chief addressed Brother Onas and his Brethren: “We rejoice to hear from you, and that you are willing to renew the old good Understanding, and that you call to mind the first treaties of Friendship made by Onas, our great Friend, with our deceased Fore fathers.”⁵⁰ In this initial exchange of dialogue, Indians living along the Susquehanna also asked for caution in order that they be distinguished from the Ohio Indians. The close proximity of these Indian

⁴⁸ “Conference between Quakers and the Six Nations,” *FHL; MPC*, 7:103. Like Scarrooyady likening Pennsylvania to being lethargic, so too did Quakers understand how the period of distraction and lethargy had eroded the sense of community with Indians. Anthony Benezet wrote on 24 April 1756: “Many of our Friends begin to rouse from that Lethargy in which they have too long been plunged, thro’ a love of this World, an endeavour to reconcile those two contrarieties the World & Heaven.” See Letters of Anthony Benezet, “Letter to Jonah Thompson,” (April 24, 1756), Coll. No. 852, HCL.

⁴⁹ *MPC*, 7:117.

⁵⁰ *MPC*, 7:140.

groups, the Delawares' decentralized nature, the memory of Penn and Indian forefathers, and invocation of language, namely an "old good Understanding," that specified a unique security culture allowed for diplomacy to begin healing the rift. Morris offered hope when addressing the Assembly on the eve of a council at Easton, "the Delaware King & People living on the River Susquehanna are in a good Disposition to Return to their Alliance & former friendship with us, I think so favourable an Opportunity of fixing those people in our Interest should not be neglected."⁵¹

The Council of Easton during the last week of July 1756 began the slow process of bringing about peace diplomatically with Indians living along the Susquehanna River. Morris opened the proceedings by saying that Pennsylvania restrained itself from war upon receiving word that the Delawares, Shawnee, and tribes along the Susquehanna sought to bring about peace. Harkening back to the ancient friendship established during William Penn's era, Morris addressed the Delaware king Teedyuscung: "I therefore desire your Assistance for Pennsylvania in this matter. Having great Influence with many who live far Distant from us, you are esteemed & will be heard. We therefore, Chuse you as Agent & Councillor for this Province."⁵² Born in New Jersey, Teedyuscung was a complex character. He declared he had been appointed a king or sachem to conduct public business by ten Indian nations, including the Iroquois. Following the "improper conduct and menaces of a young man from Northampton, name [Charles] Broadhead, he was "surprised into a war before he could think," and in his own expressive language, "he struck the English."⁵³ Yet when meeting with Morris at Easton, Teedyuscung shifted his

⁵¹ *MPC*, 7:112-114, 117, 139-142, 193, 203; "Captain Newcastle's Report," (June 1, 1756), *Horsfield*, APS. With the planned council at Easton in July, Captain Newcastle reported on the Indians' desire that Quakers be present, as "the Indians having heard that "the children of Onas" were the first to propose and promote pacific measures, it was important for a few of them to attend the coming treaty, taking with them some things necessary for the relief of the Indians, as a peace offering." See *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, HCL, 149-150.

⁵² *MPC*, 7:212.

⁵³ *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, 359.

strategy. Having declared his authority to represent Indians along the Susquehanna, he presented a belt denoting that the Six Nations had renewed their Covenant Chains with the Delawares and that the Iroquois “have made men of [the Delawares], and as such are now come to this Treaty, having this Authority as a man to make peace.”⁵⁴ Teedyuscung saw an opportunity to exercise authority and a sense of independence. Morris also saw an advantage in working with Teedyuscung. He viewed the declared king as a representative to achieve peace not only with Indians in the Susquehanna River Valley, but also to engage with Indian groups in the Ohio. Hoping to reduce violence, Morris closed the short conference by presenting gifts, invoking Brother Onas’ memory, and informing the Indians that the Quakers, descendants of those who first came to this country with the Indians’ old friend, had contributed to the gifts in order to promote the good work of peace. While Morris tried to achieve peace, he may have doubted his decision to entrust the mission with Teedyuscung, for following the Easton conference the Delaware king loitered along the frontiers instead of directly promoting peace amongst Indians, giving doubt to his sincerity and authority.⁵⁵

Diplomacy took time to have the desired effects. In the meantime, Pennsylvania’s military response continued to be ineffective, as the chain of fixed forts and defenses failed to stop mobile Indian war parties. Writing on 6 July from Ft. Norris, located in Northampton County and northwest of Easton, Captain Jacob Orndt informed William Parsons that Indians had killed four men about ten miles from Ft. Henry in Berks County. Parsons also received a

⁵⁴ *MPC*, 7:212.

⁵⁵ *MPC*, 7:210-215, 224-225; *PYMIC*, *Indian Records, 1502-1800*, 154; “Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese,” APS; “Governor Morris to Timothy Horsfield,” (August 13, 1756), *Horsfield*, APS. At the close of the Easton Council, the Six Nations used sexual imagery to maintain their hierarchy over the Delawares and chastise them, but also began to empower them in the process of reestablishing peace: “and as you have thrown off the Cover of your modesty and become Stark naked, which is a shame for a woman, We now give you a little Prick and put it into your private Parts, and so let it grow there till you shall be a compleat man.” See *MPC*, 7:218. Nancy Shoemaker argues that the Iroquois giving the Delaware “a little Prick” represented an alternative hierarchy based on age, not power. Similar to the Iroquois designating the Delawares as women, colonial officials interpreted the sexual imagery as a power hierarchy. See Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness*, 110.

letter from Captain George Reynolds dated 10 July from Ft. Allen, also in Northampton County along the west branch of the Delaware River, informing him that the garrison lacked arms and ammunition and that its personnel remained unfit for an engagement. Pennsylvania's military deficiencies became obvious when Ft. Granville, located on the Juanita River in Cumberland County, fell in early August to a French force and their Indian allies. Settlers from York County complained to Morris that the forts did little in offering protection. With the loss of Ft. Granville and its small garrison "carried into barbarous Captivity," they felt that their "prospects of safety and protection are now vanished."⁵⁶ The dead at Ft. Granville included Lieutenant Edward Armstrong. Seeking revenge for the loss of Ft. Granville and the death of his brother, Colonel John Armstrong, a Scots-Irish immigrant and surveyor who had settled along the frontier, led a Pennsylvania militia force into the backcountry in a retaliatory raid on Kittanning in September. After setting fire to the Delaware buildings, Armstrong's men gunned them down as they ran out. From the Pennsylvanians' perspective, especially those living in frontier communities, they perceived it as a raid that avenged the loss at Ft. Granville and hailed it as a victory. However, the expedition's purpose and the method of attack point to an increasingly racialized war along the frontier. For the Delawares, this massacre served to amplify their animosity and led to an intensification of violence along the frontier. Kittanning had been considered a success in the midst of military setbacks, but diplomacy continued to be Pennsylvania's preferred method in bringing about peace.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ *MPC*, 7:233.

⁵⁷ "Captain Jacob Orndt to [Major] William Parson," (July 6, 1756), "Captain George Reynolds to William Parsons," (July 10, 1756), "Jacob Morgan regarding Fort Granville," (August 19, 1756), *Horsfield*, APS; *MPC*, 7:231-233, 260; Robert Grant Crist and Patrick G. William, "Armstrong, John," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00029.html> (accessed December 23, 2014); Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 163-164. In planning the raid against Kittanning, Armstrong relied on a rough map sketch of the area and Indian locations based on the report of John Baker, who made his escape from Kittanning in the winter of 1755. See James Armstrong, "Scheme of expedition to Kittanning," (ca. 1755), *Miscellaneous*, APS.

Just as Braddock learned a frustrating lesson in how Pennsylvania dealt with its security, so did Major General John Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, as Pennsylvania defined its diplomatic role in the conflict. Writing to the new governor William Denny on 22 September, Loudoun, the British commander-in-chief in North America, outlined Johnson's powers as Indian Superintendent, forbidding Denny and his "Government from Confering or Treating with these Indians in any shape, or on any account whatsoever."⁵⁸ Though the Assembly understood the need to regulate Indian affairs and avoid separate treaties, violence and military failures pushed members to build upon the diplomatic stepping stones set at Easton. Members urged Denny to follow up on Morris' efforts, "lest the Opportunity of bringing them to a general Peace with all the British Colonies be lost," and continue with offering presents and professions of making peace.⁵⁹ Having also been offered Quaker services to assist at another pending council at Easton, Denny deferred to the Assembly to continue negotiations.⁶⁰

Resolved to meet with the Indians living along the Susquehanna, despite orders from British authorities not to do so, Denny and Pennsylvania's government got what they wanted when those people presented their grievances and justified their violence. As proceedings opened at Easton on 8 November, Teedyuscung offered good news by telling of his efforts to spread the words of peace and encouragement he had received from Brother Onas. Yet five days later the conference turned to the issue of violence, as Teedyuscung explained why he had unfortunately struck his brethren. He admitted that pressures in the Ohio had led foolish and ignorant young

⁵⁸ *MPC*, 7:270.

⁵⁹ *MPC*, 7:307-308.

⁶⁰ *MPC*, 7:312-313. On violence during October 1756, see *MPC*, 7:278, 302-304. Teedyuscung's authority continued to be questioned before the Easton council of November 1756. In late October, the Iroquois delegate Newcastle reported his meeting with Canyase, a Mohawk chief and principal counselor, who said Teedyuscung did not hold authority over the Six Nations and likened the Delawares to women in order to show authority. Conrad Weiser wrote on 3 November: "I am apt to think that Teedyuscung's authority, or influence, is not so great among the Indians as he first gave out, or was represented to this Governement, but I take him to be entirely in our Interest, and will do what ever he can to serve Pennsylvania." Despite reservations, even the experienced Weiser understood that Teedyuscung offered an avenue to restoring community. See *MPC*, 7: 297, 310.

men to attack, but signaled to “some things that have passed in former times, both in this and other Governments, were not well pleasing to the Indians.”⁶¹ After Denny inquired for further detail, Teedyuscung responded, “I have not far to go for an Instance; this very Ground that is under me (striking it with his Foot) was my Land and Inheritance, and is taken from me by fraud.”⁶² The Delaware king’s language spoke of multiple instances of abuse and breakdowns in community between Pennsylvania and the Delawares. While the conference’s location at Easton and Teedyuscung stamping the ground point to land stolen in the Walking Purchase, citing multiple instances and former times demonstrated the gradual breakdown of restraint. Denny initiated an investigation into the fraud claim, and though prisoners held by Indians remained an issue of tension, the governor affirmed the peace made with Teedyuscung and the Indians along the Susquehanna by using the language and symbolism of the culture of restraint and Indian diplomacy. He wiped away the Delawares’ tears, tried to remove the grief from their hearts, and covered the graves of their dead to give rest to the spirits. The method of diplomacy and restraint, long a tradition of Pennsylvania, began to restore peace.⁶³

While Pennsylvania’s restrained diplomatic method had an effect on the Indians in close proximity, military efforts continued to falter, stirring debate on the effectiveness of troops and

⁶¹ *MPC*, 7:323.

⁶² *MPC*, 7:324.

⁶³ *MPC*, 7:314, 321-327, 337-338, 389-390. In commenting on the claim of fraud, George Croghan saw no way of ignoring the issue, “I am of Opinion, that the Government cannot avoid giving the Indians a Meeting to settle this or any other Difference That subsists between them, as I think it will be for the Good of His Majesties Service to have these Affairs speedily accommodated.” See George Croghan Papers, *Cadwalader*, HSP. Acting as an informal mediator, the Friendly Association continued to offer monetary support to assist with dialogue with the Indians. Regarding the claim of fraud, Quakers took on an inquiry role. While Denny assured the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting for Sufferings that Teedyuscung’s charge was false, Quakers William Callender and Israel Pemberton continued to seek permission to go through the governor’s and Council’s minutes in order to get a true sense of Indian claims. See *MPC*, 7:391, 394-395; *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Men’s Meeting and Joint Minutes*, 141, Coll. No. B3.1, HCL. *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Men’s Meeting and Joint Minutes*, will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYMS-MJM*, (Date), pg. number, B3.1, HCL. By January 1759, a Council committee investigating the fraud claim reported, “And it appears to us equally absurd and ridiculous in the Indians to say, that instead of its being a Journey as a Man can go in One Day and an half, as the Deed expresses, it should only be an idle, trifling Walk, such as a Person would take who had little else in View, but to spend the Time in Pleasure, killing Game, and every now and then setting down to smook his Pipe.” See *MPC*, 8:253.

military action in the summer of 1757. Despite passing bills to support a militia in the field, the Assembly found the frontier to be in a poor condition. Members looked to the governor to explain the lack of military exertion, citing neglect of the recruiting services and troops hiding inside forts rather than venturing beyond the palisades in search of the enemy. Instead, hostile war parties passed between forts, destroyed settlements, and got away unmolested.

Commissioners writing from Lancaster affirmed the Assembly's views. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* published their May findings concerning the frontier: "It is with Concern we observe of how little Benefit the Provincial Troops are, in protecting the People, and with inexpressible Horror we see the recent Proofs of this Truth"⁶⁴ In the minds of Assembly members, government officials, and frontier settlers themselves, soldiers and fortifications may have offered symbolic reassurance early on, but their visible ineffectiveness could only bring questions of why have them at all. Diplomacy, successful at the Easton conference, continued to be the favored method to return to peace among government leaders. Its success also emboldened the Assembly to resist executive authority. The Assembly found "That it appears to us that the Governor is determined to withhold that Protection from the People of this Province which a proper Militia might afford them, unless we will present him with such a Bill as will enable certain designing Men to subvert the Constitution, and deprive the Inhabitants of every Liberty they think worth enjoying."⁶⁵

Assembly members sought to secure the powers of their body in the face of the governor and proprietors, and defend citizens' rights and liberty of conscience. Pacifism did not restrain the Assembly members; since 1756 Quakers had lost their majority as they resigned seats and

⁶⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, (July 7, 1757), TLC. Hereafter: *PA Gazette*, (Date), TLC. Letters from William Parsons and Conrad Weiser in late June note violence near fortifications, as Indians killed numerous animals and scalped a person a mile in sight of Ft. Hamilton and killed and scalped Peter Gersinger at his plow between Ft. Henry and the fort at Mortkill. See *MPC*, 7:621, as well as *PA Gazette*, (August 4, 1757), TLC.

⁶⁵ *PA Gazette*, (July 7, 1757), TLC. See also *MPC*, 7:611. For Quakers urging the Assembly to defend the right of liberty of conscience over the matter of Quakers having to serve in the military, see *PYMS-MJM*, (March 30, 1757), 75-78, B3.1, HCL.

withdrew from elections. With executive power proving ineffective and diplomacy working, they found no reason at this time to give preference to a martial path toward peace.⁶⁶ This reliance on diplomacy and resistance by the Assembly against the governor, however, stood as a retreat on defense in the eyes of frontier settlers and added to their resentment of those who enjoyed the comforts of stability in the eastern counties.

The success of diplomacy with Indians made an impression on British authorities, but at the same time drew their increasing oversight. Johnson warned Denny of the tight rope that Pennsylvania walked between war and peace, but came to admire the colony's diplomatic efforts. He wrote to his counterpart in the southern colonies, Edmund Atkin, on 21 June:

Pennsylvania have for some time been pursuing pacific Measures with their Neighbours, the Delawares & Shawonese, and matters seem to be in a promising Way. If they will keep up to that System I think they may succeed, at least with those Indians, and probably carry it further. But if they push Peace with one hand and War with another they will have a ticklish & hazardous Part to act. I have co-operated with them in their Pacific Measures and not without Success.⁶⁷

As Indian Superintendent Johnson understood the difficulty in balancing war and diplomacy with Indian groups, and though technically he held authority over Pennsylvania's dealings, he deferred to their progress. However, Pennsylvania remained free to pursue its dual methods only to a degree. British authorities attempted to exclude the Quakers from another approaching conference at Easton, as any effort made by the Friendly Association, without any kind of appointment or instruction, undermined imperial authority. Upon being informed that their role

⁶⁶ *MPC*, 7:572-577. According to March 1757 Council Records, Pennsylvania fielded 1,400 men at the cost of £70,000 for the year to garrison the chain of forts and make patrols. See *MPC*, 7:448. In 1755 Quakers held two-thirds of the Assembly seats. The following year, after resigning seats and not standing for reelection, the Quaker majority had been lost as they held only one-third of the Assembly seats. Quakers did not regain half of the Assembly seats again until 1762. See Horle, *Lawmaking and Legislators, Volume 2, 1710-1756*, 1123-1127; Horle and others, eds., *Lawmaking and Legislators, Volume 3, 1757-1775*, 1513-1517. In addition to discussing the strategy of fort construction and their relationship to Indian attacks, Louis Waddell comments on fortification costs, finding that offensive operations were cheaper than fixed installations. See Waddell, "Defending the Long Perimeter," (Spring 1995).

⁶⁷ *MPC*, 7:628. For Johnson's warning to Denny, see *MPC* 7:623.

as mediators had violated the king's prerogative to treat with independent peoples, Quakers and the Friendly Association defended themselves, and cited their critical role as descendants of those who had gained the Indians' interest and friendship "by their upright dealing and hospitable Treatment of the Indians in the first Settlement of this Province."⁶⁸ They promoted Christian tenderness, linked military preparations with increases in violence, and noted how Weiser "thought the only Method to save the Province from ruin, was to endeavour for a Peace with them by pacific Measures."⁶⁹ Despite the defense, as well as the appearance of Indians eager to return to a good disposition and having confidence in Quakers, Denny told the Friendly Association not to attend the forthcoming conference at Easton, as they had "given great Offence."⁷⁰

Diplomacy proved successful with the confirmation of peace with Teedyuscung in the summer of 1757 at Easton. The council got off to a tenuous start. Barred from attending the formal proceedings, Quakers nevertheless made their presence felt when Israel Pemberton met with the Delaware king at a nearby public house and urged Teedyuscung to demand a clerk to verify the minutes, and not rely solely on government officials. Pemberton successfully swayed him. When Teedyuscung asked for a clerk, Denny resisted and noted that such a request had never been made in the past. Yet with Teedyuscung's growing importance in preaching peace, Denny could not oppose that development and risk affronting the Delaware in the process of diplomacy. He relented, and the king chose Charles Thomson of Philadelphia's Public Quaker School as his clerk. Other issues surrounded land, trade, and prisoners. Teedyuscung wanted fixed boundaries for his people at Wyoming, as well as for Ft. Augusta to remain under British

⁶⁸ *MPC*, 7:639.

⁶⁹ *MPC*, 7:640-641.

⁷⁰ *MPC*, 7:641, 643, 647-648. See also *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1502-1800*, HCL, 230. As British imperial officials exercised greater oversight over frontier diplomacy, those negotiators, interpreters, and go-betweens who acted as agents and in the employ of Pennsylvania saw their role diminish. See Merrell, *Into the American Woods* (1999).

administration as a trading house. Denny urged that prisoners be returned. With unfriendly Indians still active, amity would take time to cultivate. Nevertheless, Teedyuscung presented Denny with a belt to “brighten the chain of Friendship,” and confirmed peace.⁷¹

Peace at Easton had an impact with Indians beyond the Susquehanna River. In a meeting with Teedyuscung, two principal Ohio Indians stated that “we have heard of the good Work of Peace you have made with our Brethren, the English, and that you intend to hold it fast. We will not lift up our Hatchet to break that good Work you have been transacting.”⁷² On hearing that groups of “Shawonese, Mohiccons and Unamies” sought to settle along the Susquehanna River in Wyoming, the Assembly entreated Denny to build a small fort there as a symbolic gesture. Denny responded with open arms to these Ohio Indians, forgiving them and telling Teedyuscung to encourage them to stop warring and join the Delaware king in promoting peace. Diplomacy, in the memory of Brother Onas, his descendants, and the efforts of Teedyuscung, continued to make small steps toward restoring peace and community.⁷³

Though diplomacy had been effective with spatially closer Indians of the Susquehanna River Valley and had even trickled over to groups beyond the Appalachians, it could not fully abate the violence stemming from those tribes under French influence. In September and October the *Pennsylvania Gazette* carried stories from Hanover, Carlisle, and Paxton of settlers scalped and children carried off into captivity. The Assembly, still distrustful of the effectiveness of military activity and enlarging the governor’s executive power, resisted the governor’s request to nominate officers. When Denny pressed for a militia law, Indian trade bill, and supply bill for Pennsylvania defenses in October, the Assembly showed its adherence to the diplomatic path by

⁷¹ MPC, 7:657-666, 677-679, 700-706, 713; Boyd Stanley Schlenker, “Thomson, Charles,” *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00886.html> (accessed May 20, 2014).

⁷² MPC, 7:725-726.

⁷³ MPC, 7:730-736.

addressing the Indian supply bill first. Postponing it, members argued, “may be attended with a total Alienation of the Indians from the British Interest.”⁷⁴ As a result of the success found with Teedyuscung and Indians along the Susquehanna, the ineffectiveness of military force after being raised, and the Assembly’s resistance to delegating the governor power that might endanger liberties, the Assembly remained steadfast in its support for the culture of restraint and the use of diplomacy to foster community with Indians.⁷⁵

By the end of 1757, Pennsylvania had largely followed a diplomatic path toward restoring peace and community with Indians. The lack of a military tradition had resulted in ineffective and largely defensive efforts to counter the Indian military threat. The practice and observance of restraint over the decades, however, allowed for dialogue to bring overtures of peace from those Indians in closer proximity to settlement areas. Yet much like how spatial distance resulted in the breakdown of community with groups west of the Appalachians, Pennsylvania could not effectively engage in dialogue with warring Indians living in the Ohio. 1758 brought a different approach by the British government, as military force brought Indian groups to terms and allowed for peace to be discussed, thus inverting Pennsylvania’s order of preference.

British Application of the Dual Method Strategy

William Pitt’s direction of Britain’s war effort brought an aggressive campaign against French colonial holdings, including those in the Ohio River Valley. In February 1758 Lord Loudoun initiated the shift toward British control of military affairs in Pennsylvania by applying to Denny to provide 800 men, in addition to those already defending forts and the frontier, “to act in Conjunction with his Majesty’s Forces the next Spring in carrying on Vigorous and

⁷⁴ *MPC*, 7:760.

⁷⁵ *PA Gazette*, (September 29, 1757), (October 31, 1757), *TLC*; *MPC*, 7:745-748, 757-760.

Offensive Measures against the Enemy.”⁷⁶ A delayed letter from Pitt dated 30 December 1757 informed Denny that Loudoun had been relieved by Major General James Abercromby, but affirmed Pennsylvania’s quota in raising troops to assist Brigadier General John Forbes’ expedition against Ft. Duquesne. The Assembly moved to prepare bills to support the requested men. As Forbes and Pennsylvania prepared for the summer campaign, Denny took time to offer assurances to Teedyuscung and the Indians on the Susquehanna. The governor and the Delaware king symbolically smoked tobacco and shared pipes passed down from Indian grandfathers and Brother Onas himself, dispelling dark clouds and affirming peace and community. With Britain’s reinvigorated military campaign, however, Pennsylvania’s leaders also had to soothe Indian fears of the Cherokees: enemies to the Delawares, but allies to the British. Denny, Abercromby, and the Cherokee chiefs sent messages to the Delawares that the Cherokees had been asked to fight alongside their British brothers and that they had no reason to fear mischief or war. As Forbes launched his slow-moving expedition of building a road, erecting fortifications, and establishing supply depots, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* printed a letter detailing the shift in focus brought by Pitt: “the Great Mr. PITT has the Preservation and Interest of the Colonies in America so much at Heart, that those who are sufficiently sensible of their Importance, say, He is America-mad.”⁷⁷

Britain’s intertwining of military force and diplomacy in order to achieve peace along the Pennsylvania frontier became evident in the capture of Ft. Duquesne. Prior to Forbes’ victory, French ties to the Ohio Indians had been weakened, as demonstrated during another Easton treaty in October 1758. There, the Six Nations symbolically halted Delaware aggression by

⁷⁶ *MPC*, 8:23.

⁷⁷ *PA Gazette*, (June 15, 1758), TLC; *MPC*, 8:26-28, 32-36, 43, 53-55, 129-137. Teedyuscung himself offered reassurance to Pennsylvania leaders by trying to stop violence from spreading, as Timothy Horsfield wrote to Denny from Bethlehem on 19 April 1758, “I do assure your Honour I never was so much convinced of Teedyuscung’s Zeal for the English Interest before [...] says he will do all in his Power to keep the Peace.” See *MPC*, 8:85, as well as “Robert Strettell to Timothy Horsfield,” (April 14, 1758), *Horsfield*, APS.

taking their hatchet out of Pennsylvania's head and declared that those former enemies would not think of war, "but employ their thoughts about Peace, and Cultivating Friendship" with the British.⁷⁸ Forbes occupied the ruins of Ft. Duquesne on 25 November after the French burned and abandoned that stronghold. As construction of Ft. Pitt on that spot began, Forbes understood the symbolic importance of the British victory to Indian perceptions, as he wrote Denny: "As the Conquest of this Country is of the greatest Consequence to the adjacent Provinces, by securing the Indians, our real Friends, for their own Advantage."⁷⁹ Both Denny and the Assembly agreed with Forbes on the need to follow up military operations by nurturing Indian relations. Denny, arguing for "Common Prudence" in securing that strategic location, found that Indians "will be liable to be again poisoned and misled by the French, unless we speedily evince to them that a firm Reliance may be had on our Friendship, and that we are able and willing to protect them against the French."⁸⁰ The Assembly, having promoted the diplomatic route, pointed to the several treaties held with Indians and of the late negotiations with Ohio Indians at Easton for playing a fundamental role in weakening French power. British military projection had forcefully removed the weakened French hold, and efforts began to fill the trade and diplomatic vacuum.⁸¹

Israel Pemberton and the Friendly Association took the initiative with regards to filling the trade void in the Ohio following the French retreat. Pemberton, "determin'd to send a quantity [of goods] to meet y^c General to be apply'd as he would think best amongst y^c Western

⁷⁸ *MPC*, 8:181.

⁷⁹ *MPC*, 8:233.

⁸⁰ *MPC*, 8:237-238.

⁸¹ *MPC*, 8:232-241; *PA Gazette*, (December 14, 1758), TLC. Samuel Miles took part in the expedition against Ft. Duquesne. He described the sickly state of Forbes, describing the general as "a poor emaciated old man, who was for the most part of our march, obliged to be carried in a House litter." See Miles, "Autobiographical Sketch," *APS*. For the Easton Treaty of October 1758 and Indian declarations against the French, see *MPC*, 8:181-182, 206-213. Denny foreshadowed the need to follow up military victory with nurturing trade and friendship, "without which, it is much to be feared, the French and their Emissaries will still maintain such an Influence over the Warriors of the Several Nations as to excite them to renew their Barbarities against the unhappy People on the Frontiers." See *MPC*, 8:228. For a military history of the British triumph at the Forks of the Ohio, as well as a discussion of the design and construction of five forts built in the area of forks, see "Decision at the Forks" and "Defense in the Wilderness" by Alfred James and Charles Stotz, respectively, in *Drums in the Forest* (1958).

Indians,” employed Quaker James Kenny to transport the items to Ft. Pitt.⁸² Invoices indicate Pemberton purchased over £1,300 in metal and refined goods, ranging from kettles, knives, and fish hooks to shirts, rum, and sugar, all of which the Indians had come to rely on. Seeing an “opportunity of Cultivating the Friendship of the Indians,” Pemberton wrote Forbes of his intent to send the goods out west: “The Confirming the Indians in a pacific disposition depending much on our future Conduct at this Juncture very evidently on our being prepared to furnish them with suitable Goods.”⁸³ Whether used by Forbes or another authority, Pemberton believed that trade goods, like the gifts of old, held the key to making Indians loyal and to cultivating peace.⁸⁴

Overseeing the fulfillment of the diplomatic void came not from a noted Indian negotiator, commissioner, or governor, but from a military officer, Colonel Hugh Mercer of the Pennsylvania militia. Mercer had been placed in command at Ft. Pitt as an ill Forbes left for Philadelphia. In writing to Denny on 8 January 1759, he warned that the French still had plans for the Ohio Valley, and that as a result Indians grew anxious about whether the British would stay or not. The diplomat within Mercer saw that to establish peace with Delawares, Shawnee, and other Ohio Indians, he must “convince them of the Sincerity of the Friendship we offer, and at the same time of our Ability to Command what we now put it in their Power to accept.”⁸⁵ In a very brief conference at Ft. Pitt in late February, Mercer spoke to the King Beaver, a Delaware, from a position of strength, noting that because of pity, remembrance of the ancient friendship, and above all eviction of the French, the British could now offer peace. In sharing a common

⁸² James Kenny, “James Kenny’s “Journal to Ye West-Ward,” 1758-59,” ed. John W. Jordan, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 37, no. 2 (1913): 395.

⁸³ “Israel Pemberton to Brigadier General Forbes,” (December 20, 1758) *Account of Easton Treaty*, Coll. No. SC 043, FHL. Hereafter: “Item,” (Date), *Easton Treaty*, FHL. *Associated Executive Committee of Friends on Indian Affairs*, Coll. No. 1003, HCL. Hereafter: *Friends on Indian Affairs*, HCL.

⁸⁴ *Friends on Indian Affairs*, HCL; “Israel Pemberton Invoices, etc,” (1758-1759), *Easton Treaty*, FHL; “Pemberton to George Ross,” (January 4, 1759) and “Pemberton to Samuel Lightfoot,” (January 6, 1759), *Pemberton*, HCL; *PYMS-MJM*, (February 1, 1759), 149-150, B3.1, HCL.

⁸⁵ *MPC*, 8:305.

enemy, Mercer hoped that the British and Delawares would offer each other profitable information in order that they could begin to re-cultivate a friendship. Though his discussions with Beaver remained short, Mercer did not fear the Delawares. As the Delawares continued to observe the progress of events, Mercer found “they give assurances that all their Allies in the late War will follow their Example in Burying the French Hatchet.”⁸⁶

While Ft. Pitt acted as a venue for dialogue following a military victory, British military efforts elsewhere prepared for further diplomatic success at restoring peace along Pennsylvania’s frontier. Provincial Major General Jeffrey Amherst, Abercromby’s replacement, continued Pitt’s aggressive strategy by sending an expedition against Ft. Niagara. In mid-July, James Kenny and spy intelligence from Venango reported that a French and Indian force of 1,500 had been preparing to attack Ft. Pitt, but had retreated north to Niagara. Kenny wrote on 6 August that “we hear from Niagara that it is like to be taken by General [Sir William] Johnston,” and a week later recorded Indian intelligence that the French had indeed lost the fort and had burned Venango and Presque Isle.⁸⁷ Both Amherst and Johnson confirmed the victory in letters to Denny. The capture of Ft. Niagara, in addition to victory at Duquesne, had created a vacuum that reduced French diplomatic and trade influence in the Ohio River Valley.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *MPC*, 8:270, 292, 305, 308-310. King Beaver and the Delawares returned to Ft. Pitt to continue peace discussions in early July. George Croghan began proceedings by announcing the intent to renew the sense of community “and brighten the Ancient Chain of Friendship.” Referencing the important concord at Easton the previous October, Croghan noted the peace made there had allowed other Delawares, namely Teedyuscung, to take the long journey to inform the Westward Nations of what had transpired. Croghan understood that the Ohio Delawares could not immediately bring all prisoners, but that the army could support the establishment of trade relations in a quicker manner. Beaver, speaking on behalf of the Delawares and Shawnee, reciprocated the role of Easton by announcing their great pleasure in peace being confirmed. Seeing good intentions in the English, Beaver requested that Croghan send a message to western tribes at Venango still allied to the French. In making peace with the British at Ft. Pitt and asking that messages be sent to other tribes, Beaver assumed a role similar to Teedyuscung as a vehicle of peace and restoring community among tribes along the Ohio, especially the Delawares and Shawnee. See *MPC*, 8:387-391; Kenny, “Journal to Ye West-Ward,” 427-428.

⁸⁷ Kenny, “Journal to Ye West-Ward,” 436. See also *PA Gazette*, (August 30, 1759), TLC.

⁸⁸ Kenny, “Journal to Ye West-Ward,” 435; *PA Gazette*, (August 2, 1759), TLC; *MPC*, 8:380. Shortly after receiving news of British victory at Niagara on 13 August, as well as Ticonderoga the following day, celebration appears to have been in order. James Kenny recorded that George “Croghan has a black eye this morning & I have

Enabled by British military success in removing the French presence from the Ohio, Pennsylvania's tradition in Indian relations and Penn's legacy began to make positive inroads toward reestablishing community. In an October meeting with Denny, Teedyuscung gave reassurances that he had been working on gathering up prisoners to return to the English, and in response to detractors who claimed that he and Brother Onas had made a false peace, he said, "now that they have been Witnesses of our mutual Sincerity, they must and will acknowledge that we are a good People, and that we have made a good Peace."⁸⁹ At a conference at Pittsburgh later that month, Beaver looked to Pennsylvania to promote trade and provide goods, and to "Be strong and perform your Promises; don't make me ashamed."⁹⁰ As the two Delaware kings engaged in dialogue, the descendants of Brother Onas' people continued to promote their restrained method in achieving peace. In a letter to Thomas and Richard Penn in March 1760, the Friendly Association pointed back to the era of William Penn and the first Quakers in an effort "to revive in the Minds of the Indian those happy Impressions." This state of community had disappeared when "the most rational Methods of retaining their Friendship," such as regular gift giving and affirmations of alliance and friendship, were neglected and shifted upon the Six Nations. Yet in the attempt to bring back community and peace, they commended Forbes' efforts in pursuing "pacific Measures," or rather diplomacy and trade, to help withdraw the Ohio Indians from the French interest.⁹¹ After decades of promoting community, the Quaker perspective remained that peace with the Indians could "be restored & preserved by pacific Measures only," despite the increasingly apparent need for military power to evict the French from the scene so

been informed, that he was drunk & fought with y^e Indians, & that Teedyuscung gave him y^e black eye." See Kenny, "Journal to Ye West-Ward," 438.

⁸⁹ *MPC*, 8:404.

⁹⁰ *MPC*, 8:434.

⁹¹ "Israel Pemberton, et. al. to Thomas and Richard Penn," (March 20, 1760), *Easton Treaty*, FHL.

that trade and diplomatic discussions could court Indian groups, now without a European backer, and bring them into the British and Pennsylvania's orbit.⁹²

The fruits of diplomacy and restoration of community continued to grow over the course of 1760. In the spring Teedyuscung changed the analogy of the fallen tree obstructing the path of friendship between Indians and Pennsylvania. The erosion of community and restraint, represented by the fallen tree, had changed to violence where dead bodies laid uncovered on the ground, causing grief, tears, and again inhibiting the relationship between Indians and Pennsylvania. Governor James Hamilton acted swiftly and instructed Frederick Post, a Moravian missionary, to accompany the Delaware king to the Ohio "to assure the Indians of our sincere disposition toward peace, and that we shall do our utmost Endeavors not only to renew and strengthen our friendship and Alliances, but to settle everything to their Satisfaction."⁹³ In July, Papoonhack of the Minisink Indians, visiting Philadelphia upon the invitation of the Quakers, spoke of William Penn's legacy in fostering community: "I am a great Lover of Peace. I have never been concern'd in War Affairs. I have a sincere remembrance of the old Friendship which subsisted between the Indians and your forefathers, and shall always observe it. I love my Brethren, the English, and they shall ever find me faithful."⁹⁴ Peace overtures continued, as Robert White of the Nantycokes spoke to Hamilton: "We come to acquaint you that we have a

⁹² *PYMS-MJM*, (March 22, 1760), 172, B3.1, HCL. Though Pennsylvania officials and the Friendly Association played a critical role in promoting reconciliation and trade with Indians, it could not overturn the British view that the road to peace came from military success. From December 1759 through February 1760, the Assembly debated governor James Hamilton on the issue of troop reduction. Seeing the French evicted and violence along the frontier dropping, the Assembly sought to disband troops and decrease military spending. Hamilton related Amherst's fear of losing momentum, and as a result Hamilton pressed the Assembly to raise troops for the 1760 campaign. The same debate occurred again from October 1760 through January 1761. See *MPC*, 8:425-450, 509-523.

⁹³ *MPC*, 8:464, 470.

⁹⁴ *MPC*, 8:488. While promoting peace, Papoonhack found the recent behavior of the Christians troubling. He questioned why Christians were such great warriors, but not lovers of peace. When considering the Quakers, however, he found they spoke to his heart and that they "walked the nearest to what Jesus Christ had required us to do." In debating the scenario of defensive war and a man defending himself, he responded, "why did not Jesus Christ fight when the people took him to kill him[?]" See *PYMIC, Indian Records, 1668-1838*, HCL, 47-53; "Some account of the behaviour...of...well-disposed Indians," (1760) in *Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Box 14 (1756-1762)*, FHL.

good disposition for Peace. Our Grand Fathers always lived in Love and Friendship with the English.”⁹⁵ In speaking about the wisdom of his grandfathers, White asserted that he and his people hoped to follow in their good example. With the French backing removed, violence stemming from Ohio Indians fell. Seeking ties with the stronger British, Indians along the Ohio used the familiar language of community to bridge both the frontier and enmity.

As Pennsylvania and British authorities filled the trade and diplomatic void left by the French, efforts continued to spread messages of peace and remove the sources of tension. In the summer of 1761, Johnson and Croghan capitalized on the success in bringing the Ohio Delawares back into the English fold by accompanying Beaver to Detroit to make peace with western tribes. When the ambassadors returned in the early fall, Beaver and his brother Shingas met with Croghan at Ft. Pitt, stating they would meet with Brother Onas to confirm their alliance with Pennsylvania the following year. Shawnee chiefs also followed the Delaware example, as “they promis’d to keep in friendship with y^e English for ever & blam’d y^e French for drawing them away from y^e English Intrest.”⁹⁶ In June 1762, as Beaver traveled to a conference at Lancaster, Johnson met with Teedyuscung at Easton to resolve the fraud issue. Proceedings opened with strain, as Johnson and Pemberton had a heated argument over whether Teedyuscung could understand the English language in land deeds, resulting in Johnson suspending the conference. Wanting to maintain his position and status as Indian Superintendent, Johnson kept out Quaker influence while also saving face by reassuring the Delaware king that clerks would be made available. Treating now with the sole person authorized to hear his complaints, Teedyuscung informed Johnson that the charge of forgery regarding the Walking Purchase had been a mistake. He wanted to bury the controversies about land, and prepared to sign a release

⁹⁵ *MPC*, 8:492.

⁹⁶ James Kenny, “Journal of James Kenny, 1761-1763,” ed. John W. Jordan, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 37, no. 1 (1913): 26.

for the disputed lands. Hamilton congratulated Teedyuscung on dropping the charge, excusing the Delaware king for being turned against the British by the French. By burying “all disputes about Land underground so deep that neither we nor our children shall ever hear of them again,” community with Teedyuscung and the Indians along the Susquehanna grew stronger.⁹⁷

Governor Hamilton’s conference with Beaver, Shawnee deputies, and other Western tribes at Lancaster in August 1762 brought increasing pronouncements of peace while also highlighting the role that white prisoners played in restoring community. Upon introductions and the customary pleasantries of seeking to remove the clouds of war and renew the Chain of Friendship, Beaver assured Brother Onas that his people had been “endeavouring to bring in your Flesh and Blood,” and had begun to deliver them at Ft. Pitt.⁹⁸ The Shawnee followed suit and declared their intent to hurry home and return prisoners. Hamilton affirmed that the issue of prisoners “was a principal reason of our inviting you here; it really was so, for we had it very much at Heart.”⁹⁹ On receiving assurances from the Ohio Indians of the proactive process of returning prisoners, he affirmed Pennsylvania’s commitment to honest trade at Ft. Pitt, and gave gifts to symbolize the colony’s regard for their old friends and allies, the Delawares. As he brightened and strengthened the Chain, Hamilton wished that it “may continue and grow stronger

⁹⁷ Kenny, “James Kenny, 1761-1763,” 16, 25, 34-35; George Croghan Papers, *Cadwalader*, HSP; “Account of the Easton treaty with the Indians,” (June 15-27, 1762), “Teedyuscung, et. al, to General William Johnson,” (June 22, 1762), “William Johnson to Brethren of the Delaware Tribe,” (June 23, 1762), “Teedyuscung to William Johnson,” (June 28, 1762), “James Hamilton to Teedyuscung, et. al,” (June 28, 1762), *Easton Treaty*, FHL. Following the peace made with Western tribes in 1761, Hamilton sent a letter to Beaver and his brother Shingas, through Frederick Post, stating, “It pleases me to hear of the great care you have taken to communicate the good news of the Peace to all the Nations that you are connected with, & that they have, at your instance, renewed & brightened the old chain of Friendship.” See *MPC*, 8:690. While the Walking Purchase issue had been settled, another simmering source of tension arose with Connecticut settlers squatting on Indian lands in Wyoming. Pennsylvania feared a renewal of an Indian War, and worked to pressure the New Englanders to leave, to gain assistance from Connecticut’s governor, and to commend Teedyuscung for his restraint and not pursuing violence. For the Connecticut settlement of Wyoming, see *MPC*, 8:567-573, 600-601, 613-614, 622-623, 643, 663-664, 9:7-9, 27-28.

⁹⁸ *MPC*, 8:726.

⁹⁹ *MPC*, 8:737.

as long as the Sun shall Shine or the Rivers run.”¹⁰⁰ While the proceedings at Lancaster may have spoken of the return to community, Ft. Pitt held a different reality. Kenny noted in September and October that as Indians brought prisoners in piecemeal, they negotiated prices in order to maximize profits in returning the “hostages.” Croghan and Colonel Henry Bouquet applied to Kenny for goods in order to secure prisoners. While reports of peace between Europeans trickled into Ft. Pitt in early February 1763, peace with the Ohio Indians remained in a developmental stage as the Delawares and Shawnee used their advantage gained early in the conflict to return prisoners based on their terms.¹⁰¹

Peace in 1763 held different meanings. For Britain and France, peace indeed had ended the Seven Years’ War. Pennsylvanians, having withstood the onslaughts of the French and their allied Indians, had reached peace through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Diplomacy had reestablished community with Delawares and other groups along the Susquehanna, and behind the power of British military force, dialogue had brought the Ohio Delawares and Shawnee back into Pennsylvania’s sphere of influence. Tribes along the Ohio and Great Lakes, however, had not been conquered and exchanged prisoners for the maximum price of goods they could exact. Most importantly, however, these tribes did not participate in the treaty proceedings that resulted in European powers dictating boundary lines. Indians faced pressure and violence from British settlers and a suspension in gift giving from British officials, despite the peace they thought had been established. As a result, another war broke out in the Great Lakes region, as Indians tested British intent “to live in Friendship.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ *MPC*, 8:751.

¹⁰¹ *MPC*, 8:721-726, 736-739, 751, 776-777; James Kenny, “Journal of James Kenny, 1761-1763,” ed. John W. Jordan, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 37, no. 2 (1913): 168-169, 186; “Minutes of Indian conference at Lancaster 1762,” in *Indian Papers*, Coll. No. 310, HSP.

¹⁰² *MPC*, 9:87. Regarding settlement along the frontier, Holly Mayer challenges the notion that the army repressed settlement after 1763, arguing that the army encouraged settlement and civilization by needing civilians, especially

Pontiac's War, the Paxton Boys, and a 'Forced' Peace

In the summer of 1763 reports reached Philadelphia of an outbreak of Indian violence among Western tribes in the Great Lakes area, in what became known as Pontiac's War. Writing from Bethlehem, Timothy Horsfield told Governor Hamilton that "many frightfull relations Concerning War being begun again, viz, that the Western Indians together with the Six Nations had taken Fort Detroit and several others, where they had killed many white people."¹⁰³ Though no disturbances had yet reached the Pennsylvania frontier, Horsfield observed people growing uneasy at the prospect of renewed violence. Hamilton and the Assembly reacted immediately, as the governor reinforced Ft. Augusta and put the frontier in a state of defense, while the Assembly proceeded with legislation to raise 700 men. British reaction followed suit, as Amherst sent troops to Philadelphia to be used at Bouquet's discretion. Bouquet himself wrote Hamilton from Carlisle, informing the governor that the garrisons at Presque-Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango had been massacred with few survivors, and that Ft. Pitt and Ft. Ligonier had withstood attacks. Hamilton continued to demonstrate his proactive posture by sending recruiting authorization to experienced commanders such as John Armstrong of Cumberland County and Horsfield of Northampton County. Because of his local rapport and familiarity with inhabitants, Horsfield received 100 men to bolster confidence amongst the locals, protect the harvest, and post soldiers where appropriate. Before violence had arrived among frontier settlements, Pennsylvania had already taken a military approach to defend itself.¹⁰⁴

Violence reached Pennsylvania's frontiers in October, sparking anger and military initiative within frontier settlements. Settlers began to organize themselves for defense as well as

women, for support services. See Holly A. Mayer, "From Forts to Families: Following the Army into Western Pennsylvania, 1758-1766," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 130, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 5-43.

¹⁰³ "Timothy Horsfield to the Governor," (June 27, 1763), *Horsfield*, APS.

¹⁰⁴ *MPC*, 9:31-36; "Governor Hamilton to Timothy Horsfield," (July 11, 1763) and "Recruiting Instructions," (July 11, 1763), *Horsfield*, APS.

to deal with Indians on their own terms. Horsfield received a letter dated 13 October stating that a company of “Irish Volunteers” appeared “very exasperated against the Indians, and had even a Suspicion against them, that they had done the Mischief in Allens Township.”¹⁰⁵ Hamilton heard that Indians had killed some twenty people near Bethlehem and warned the friendly Wighalousin Indians that Pennsylvania settlers had been enraged and had gone out into Indian country to take their revenge. He feared that the settlers would not distinguish between friendly and enemy Indians and tried to offer reassurance that the government would try to prevent the settlers from avenging “the blood of their Fathers, Brothers, and Children.”¹⁰⁶ Frontier settlers believed that to secure themselves, they had to violently remove the Indian threat. For their part, British and Pennsylvania authorities understood the need for military force to bring Indians to terms. In November and December, Amherst and his replacement, Major General Thomas Gage, pressed Pennsylvania to raise 1,000 men for an offensive campaign. John Penn, the new governor, summarized the reality facing Pennsylvania in its attempt to return to peace: “nothing but a vigorous exertion of the united Strength of the [colonies], & carrying the War into the Enemy’s Country, can effectually secure our back Inhabitants from the barbarous inroads of the Savages, Or is so likely to reduce them speedily to hearken to reasonable Terms of Accommodation.”¹⁰⁷

Pontiac’s War acted as the final straw for the Scots-Irish frontiersmen. Having withstood the raids of the Seven Years’ War, they had witnessed their government take defensive measures to protect their settlements. The treaties with Indians had reduced both frontier violence as well as the settlers’ grumblings. With the renewal in Indian violence, however, those treaties made by their government in Philadelphia appeared worthless. In the settlers’ eyes, the politicians in Philadelphia, characteristically Quaker in composition, ignored the frontier interests. For the

¹⁰⁵ “B. A. Grube to Timothy Horsfield,” (October 13, 1763), *Horsfield*, APS.

¹⁰⁶ *MPC*, 9:67-69.

¹⁰⁷ *MPC*, 9:74-75, 90-92.

Scots-Irish, only they could preserve their lives and future well-being. To do so required that they organize themselves and remove the Indian threat. Described by the Quaker Meeting for Sufferings as “Rioters” who “were mostly Presbyterians from the North of Ireland and their Descendants,” about fifty armed Paxton Boys descended on the Conestogoe Indian town in Lancaster County on 14 December and murdered six friendly Indians. For the Paxton Boys, only dead Indians brought complete assurance of security. The violence along the frontier had become a race war.¹⁰⁸

Government leaders found themselves in a difficult position on how to react to the Paxton Boys’ murder. While leadership could not resist the rioters’ initiative to defend themselves, they could not endorse the violence, both for its barbarity and because it did not fit within the tradition of restraint and dialogue with Indians. Both Governor Penn and the Assembly looked upon the Conestogoe Indians with a sense of responsibility, for they had lived “peaceably & inoffensively during” the late conflict.¹⁰⁹ Penn wrote the magistrates of York, Lancaster, and Cumberland

¹⁰⁸ *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 230-231, 234, B3.1, HCL; *MPC*, 9:92-93. Scholarship regarding Pennsylvania’s ethnic and religious pluralism, the Paxton Boys, and the role of race among settlers and soldiers in heightening their violence against Indians has grown in recent decades. Sally Schwartz’ “*A Mixed Multitude*” (1987) argues that the colony’s diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds coalesced into a pluralistic and tolerant society, and that the discord of the 1750s and 1760s, while highlighting these differences, did not affect most Pennsylvanians. Patrick Griffin’s *The People with No Name* (2001) argues the Scots-Irish asserted their rights and individualism along the frontier, even at the expense of Indians and other groups. Ward’s *Breaking the Backcountry* also notes this individualism, and how frontiersmen lived divided based on religion and ethnicity. The breakdown in the backcountry exasperated these ethnic and religious divisions. Gregory Knouff’s *The Soldiers’ Revolution* (2004) finds communities defined by class, race, region, and religion. Violence against Indians brought unification among local, white settlers. Peter Silver’s *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008) argues that fearing and fighting Indians created a shared notion of “white people,” that others could be excluded from a group through violence. Kevin Kenny’s *Peaceable Kingdom Lost* (2009) uses a declension model to show the growth of Indian hating, and that the violent seizure of Indian land and killing of Indians became a patriotic norm, as demonstrated by the Paxton Boys. David Preston’s *The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667-1783* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009) challenges the declension model of Indian relations, suggesting that Indians and settlers could establish harmonious cohabitation. The French and Indian War, however, ushered in an era of violence and hatred. See also Krista Camenzind, “Violence, Race, and the Paxton Boys,” in *Friends and Enemies in Penn’s Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania*, ed. William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). Rather than continuing this trend of considering ethnicity and race in frontier violence, this project shows how peace was achieved, through the culture of restraint, in the face of heightened racial violence.

¹⁰⁹ *MPC*, 9:95.

counties, instructing them to apprehend those involved in the murders, while the Assembly supported the governor in moving fourteen Conestogoe Indians still present to the jail in Lancaster. These moves did nothing. On 27 December, both Shippen and John Hay, the sheriff of Lancaster County, wrote Governor Penn that an estimated group of fifty to one hundred Paxton Boys “armed with Rifles [and] Tomahawks” rushed into town and “stove open the door and killed all the Indians, and then took to their Horses and rode off.”¹¹⁰ Despite Lancaster reportedly having several thousand inhabitants and a number of the king’s soldiers in the barracks there, only verbal protests were made against the Paxton Boys, and they left unmolested. Both Shippen and Hay also reported rumors that the Paxton Boys intended to continue on to Province Island, and kill the 140 Indians there. On receiving this intelligence, and with the reality that an armed insurrection might be developing amongst frontier settlers to secure themselves from every Indian, whether friend or foe, the Council advised Penn to raise fifty men to protect the Indians at Province Island. Penn wrote Gage asking for the assistance of regular troops. While officials in Philadelphia feared for Indians in the capitol, they soon feared for their own safety.¹¹¹

The new year saw Philadelphia under considerable threat for the first time since King George’s War. Whereas that conflict saw French and Spanish privateers sailing up the Delaware River, people in Philadelphia now faced a threat stemming from frontier settlers bent on killing the friendly Indians of Bethlehem and Nazareth, now living in the capital. On 3 January 1764, Penn received a report from Shippen in Lancaster that the Paxton Boys had formed into a company of 200 men to march on Philadelphia to kill the Indians. The governor attempted to remove the source of tension, and appealed to New York to take in the Indians as they walked

¹¹⁰ *MPC*, 9:100, 103.

¹¹¹ *MPC*, 9:92-93, 97, 101-106; *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 230-231, B3.1, HCL.

across New Jersey under a convoy of Highlanders. New York rejected the bid, declaring that its settlers had grown irritated by Indians from the northeast branch of the Susquehanna. Forced to take back the Indians, Penn felt some relief when Gage forwarded three companies of the Royal American Regiment to Philadelphia to help maintain civil authority and protect the friendly Indians. Yet the city continued to have a target fixed upon it as the Paxton Boys moved eastward. On 28 January Benjamin Kendal, a Philadelphia merchant, provided an affidavit regarding the 1,500 people expected to descend on the capital. While Kendal exaggerated the number of rioters, he captured their anger and discontent. In meeting with Robert Fulton, a leader of the Paxton Boys, Kendal related Fulton's words and his intention:

If Gabriel was to come down from Heaven and tell *us or them* (but which of the words this affirmant cannot be sensible of) *we or they* were wrong, they would not desist for it, for that they were of the same Spirit with the blood-ran, blood-thirsty Presbyterians, who cut off King Charles his Head. This Affirmant then said to the said Fulton, 'I hear you intend to kill the Quakers.' Fulton answered, 'No, God forbid, but they or any others who should oppose them they would kill.'¹¹²

Seeing the resolve of the Paxton Boys, Philadelphia citizens moved to defend their city in order to deter the rioters. Penn had arms, ammunition, and cannon sent to the city barracks and dispatched spies to gather intelligence. Ferryman along the Schuylkill River kept their boats on the opposite bank to prevent the Paxton Boys' further advance. Even youthful Quakers, fearing for their lives and feeling the rush and exhilaration of military activity, carried arms in defense of their city. Slowed by a heavy rain, the Paxton Boys halted at Germantown in the face of the gathered opposition of Philadelphia's inhabitants and the Royal American Regiment. Civic leaders, including Benjamin Franklin, then met with them to hear their grievances.¹¹³

¹¹² *MPC*, 9:108, 111, 118-126; *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 231-232, B3.1, HCL; "John Penn to Samuel Potts," (February 4, 1764), "John Penn to John Potts," (February 4, 1764), and "John Penn to Jonas Seely," (February 4, 1764), *Miscellaneous*, APS.

¹¹³ *MPC*, 9:133, 137; *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 232-234, B3.1, HCL. Upon reports that members of the Philadelphia Quarterly Meeting had violated the "Ancient Testimony against bearing of Arms," Quakers met with

The complaints of the Paxton Boys, followed by the Quaker defense of their actions, demonstrated the two distinct methods utilized by Pennsylvania in trying to regain peace. In addition to noting their lack of government representation, the rioters harped mainly on the violence along the frontier. From their perspective, having suffered Indian attacks, they found it dangerous to allow Indians, even if friendly, to live amongst settlers while the colony fought an Indian war. They questioned “In what nation under the Sun was it ever the custom that when a neighboring Nations took up Arms, not an individual should be touched but only the Persons that offered Hostilities? Who ever proclaimed War with a part of a Nation, and not with the Whole?”¹¹⁴ The Quakers and Friendly Association did not escape criticism either. Treaties and gift giving with Indians had long been the preferred method of maintaining community and peace within Pennsylvania, a policy linked to the Quakers and those who sought to mediate peace at councils. And yet the Paxton Boys declared that in the treaty at Lancaster in 1762, “not only was the Blood of our many murdered Brethren tamely covered, but our poor unhappy captivated Friends abandoned to slavery among the Savages, by concluding a Friendship with the Indians, and allowing them a plenteous trade of all kinds of Commodities, without those being restored, or any properly spirited Requisition made of them.” Diplomacy had failed the frontier settlers, as their sense of security and peace still required that they aggressively protect themselves.¹¹⁵

Discontent with Quakers appeared in print as well. In a piece of propaganda by Henry Dawkins (see Figure 5), Israel Pemberton, labeled as King Wampum for his role in treaty

their brethren to convince them of their error. These visits continued over the course of a couple of years, as the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of 27 September – 3 October 1766 reported that the Philadelphia Quarterly Meeting reported that “some further visits have been made to [those of] their members who appeared under Arms in the Second month [1764] and remain’d unconvinced of their Error, which yield a prosp[ect] of a satisfactory effect.” See *PYM-MJM*, (September 22-29, 1764), (September 27-October 3, 1766) A1.3, HCL. For Pennsylvania’s Associators assisting in the defense of Philadelphia, see Seymour, *Pennsylvania Associators*, 111-114.

¹¹⁴ *MPC*, 9:140.

¹¹⁵ *MPC*, 9:140-145. See also *PA Journal*, (April 19, 1764), TLC.

making with Indians, spied on an Indian “squaw” which made “his lustful passions rise.” While Pemberton embraced the woman and conducted “a friendly Jobb,” or rather being in league with the Indians, she reached for the Quaker’s watch encased in gold, indicating that the Quakers profited from Indian friendship while frontier settlers suffered.¹¹⁶ Pemberton and Quakers continued to be linked with Indians at the expense of frontier settlers. In a cartoon by James Claypoole (see Figure 6), Abel James, a Quaker merchant who acted as the Friendly Association’s clerk, handed out tomahawks to a group of Indians and told them, “Exercise those on the Scotch Irish & Dutch & Ill support you while I am Abel.” What was notable about the cartoon was that the tomahawks were stored in a barrel labeled “I P,” standing for Israel Pemberton in the Quaker fashion of using a set of initials for identity. Discontented settlers viewed Pemberton as the source of their troubles and sufferings.¹¹⁷ In this racial animosity and violence against Indians, the Paxton Boys and other enemies of the Quakers depicted Friends as not supporting the interests of fellow whites. In lusting over Indians, as Claypoole also depicted (see Figure 7), the Quakers were being taken advantage of, portrayed again by an Indian taking a Quaker’s watch, despite their wanting to embrace and be in fellowship with Indians.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Henry Dawkins, “An Indian Squaw King Wampum Spies...,” (Philadelphia, 1764), Accession Number: Cartoon [1764] Ind/795.D.21b, TLC. See also Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 209-210.

¹¹⁷ James Claypoole, “[Franklin and the Quakers],” (Philadelphia, 1764) in Watson’s Annals Ms., 1823, Accession Number: Cartoon [1764 Fra] Yi 2, TLC. Hereafter: Claypoole, “[Quakers],” TLC. See also Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 209-210.

¹¹⁸ Claypoole, “[Quakers],” TLC. See also Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 209-210.

FIGURE 5: KING WAMPUM ¹¹⁹



¹¹⁹ Dawkins, "King Wampum Spies...", Courtesy of The Library Company of Philadelphia.

FIGURE 6: ANTI-QUAKER PROPAGANDA ¹²⁰



¹²⁰ Claypoole, "[Quakers]," Courtesy of The Library Company of Philadelphia.

FIGURE 7: DEPICTION OF QUAKER FELLOWSHIP WITH INDIANS ¹²¹



¹²¹ Claypoole, "[Quakers]," Courtesy of The Library Company of Philadelphia.

Criticized by the Paxton Boys for their adherence to restrained methods for promoting peace, Quakers sought to defend themselves. The Philadelphia Meeting for Sufferings, in an address to Governor Penn, tried to deflect slandering by pointing to 1756 when Quakers promoted reconciliation in the face of the Indian war. The Meeting noted the “Countenance and Approbation” received from British generals and the proprietors, and also pointed to Quaker Assemblymen resigning their seats and thus removing themselves from the responsibility of defense.¹²² In response to accusations that they cared more about Indians than the plight of frontier settlers, the Meeting responded that the “Accusation of our having been profuse to Savages, carefully avoiding to contribute to the Relief and Support of the Distressed Families on the Frontiers, who have abandoned their Possessions and fled for their Lives, is equally insidious and mistaken.”¹²³ Despite the defense, it is clear that methods preferred by the violent Paxton Boys and the restrained Quakers remained at odds. While diplomacy had helped to bridge peace with some Indian groups, the fact that Quakers had raised money to help pacify Indians who continued to make war on the frontier surely assisted the Paxton Boys in forming the opinion that the Quakers acted in league with the Indians. From their point of view, only violence could bring assurance of removing security threats. Similar to the British evicting the French from the Ohio, the Paxton Boys’ use of armed violence demonstrated that the dual strategy for regaining peace had been inverted, as military force brought parties, whether Indians or Philadelphia officials, to terms.

Resolving the disruption of peace caused by Pontiac’s War required that violence be reciprocated, just as the British application of force in the Ohio during the war with France allowed for peace to be discussed. In July 1764, Penn revisited the idea of Indian bounties, most

¹²² *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 225, B3.1, HCL.

¹²³ *PYMS-MJM*, (February 25, 1964), 227, B3.1, HCL.

likely as an appeasement to the Paxton Boys. The promotion of violence through monetary reward, however, in conjunction with the governor's proclamation of the Delaware, Shawnee, and other hostile Indians being "Enemies, Rebels, and Traitors" indicates that Pennsylvania's leadership understood that to have peace and restore community, military action must be considered in order to bring about terms.¹²⁴ As it had been in the conflict with France, it took British military force to place pressure on warring tribes. The first attempt occurred under the command of Colonel John Bradstreet in August, who granted terms to the Western Indians living between Lake Erie and the Ohio. Bradstreet's report indicated that on the approach of his force, Huron, Delaware, and Shawnee Indians questioned his army's objective and his intentions. On seeing the army approach, the Indians recalled their warriors and begged "for Mercy, & forgiveness and Peace" for "their past Folly and unjust Behaviour to the English, without Cause."¹²⁵ Bradstreet affirmed his intent "to revenge the Insults and Injuries done to the English, on those Savages who have not asked forgiveness, & given Sureties for their future good Behaviour."¹²⁶ Bradstreet demanded that those Indians desiring peace give up all prisoners, be they English, French, or black slaves. Furthermore, he required the Indians to relinquish claims to British forts and to allow the construction of trading posts. To ensure adherence to these terms, the Indians had to leave six principal men as hostages. While appearing definitive on paper, however, Bradstreet's peace proved hollow.¹²⁷

Continued Indian violence following Bradstreet's expedition required further aggressive action by the British to bring about terms. Colonel Henry Bouquet, having been attacked in the woods and noting Indian attacks on Ft. Pitt and settlements the previous year, found that

¹²⁴ *MPC*, 9:188-189.

¹²⁵ *MPC*, 9:194.

¹²⁶ *MPC*, 9:194.

¹²⁷ *MPC*, 9:195.

Bradstreet had overstepped his authority in making peace. Bouquet marched a force from Ft. Pitt into the Ohio country, causing Indian representatives to again sue for peace. He believed that only force could bring the Indians to terms and bring peace. In a letter to George Washington in July 1754, Bouquet, unacquainted with the country, had asked for Washington's advice on sending a strong force against Indian settlements in the Ohio, for "if their houses and families were in danger, I would think it a great inducem^l for them to provide for their immediate defence and leave to the french their own quarrels to fight."¹²⁸ By the end of hostilities with France, Bouquet's opinion had not changed. The loss of troops in 1763 resulted in Bouquet seeking revenge against an enemy for whom he harbored little respect: "I would rather chuse the liberty to kill any Savage that may come in our Way, than to be perpetually doubtful whether they are Friends or Foes."¹²⁹ He still believed that "the only certainty we can have of a lasting Peace with Savages, is not to grant it to them, but at the Head of Such Forces as must convince them of our ability to chastise them if they break it."¹³⁰ When Bouquet saw Bradstreet's terms for peace, he was astonished that no satisfaction had been obtained after the "massacres" of officers, garrisons, traders, and settlers during a time "of profound Peace."¹³¹ With General Gage's backing, he

¹²⁸ "Bouquet to Washington," (July 14, 1758), in *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, ed. S. K. Stevens, et. al. (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951), 2:206. Hereafter *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 2. Washington advised against the idea, citing troubles with logistics and the risk it posed to the force being so far in enemy country. *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 2, 222. Bouquet also voiced his opinion on bringing the fight to the Indians, as well as his distrust and low view of natives, in a letter to Brigadier General John Forbes in September 1758, "As regards the negotiation on foot with the Indians, it seems to me that the best way of dealing with them is at the time when we have the means of chastising them; and by the mental attitude and location of those settled on the Ohio, they would never dare to desert the French, if they did not see us prepared and ready to beat them; and in this case, too, a delay would be harmful to us." See "Bouquet to Forbes," (September 4, 1758), *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 2, 471.

¹²⁹ "Bouquet to J. Amherst," (June 25, 1763), in *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, ed. Louis M. Waddell. (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1994), 6:256. Hereafter *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 6.

¹³⁰ "Bouquet to Gage," (December 27, 1763), *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 6, 471.

¹³¹ "Bouquet to Gage," (August 27, 1764), *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 6, 621; "Bouquet to Bradstreet," (September 5, 1764), *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 6, 629-630.

marched his troops into the Ohio country, placed pressure on the Indians, and brought them to a treaty discussion at Ft. Pitt.¹³²

When Bouquet opened a conference with the Western Indians at Ft. Pitt on 20 September, he curtly informed Captain Jacobs and other Delaware chiefs that the Delawares are “a People whose promises I can no more trust,” and that with the rest of his army expected to arrive shortly, he remained determined to attack.¹³³ Urged by the Six Nations to restrain his aggression, Bouquet clung to his resolve by characterizing the Delawares and Shawnee as “a false People, and they deceive you [the Six Nations] as they have always done; if they are sincere, why don’t their Chiefs come speak to me.”¹³⁴ Bouquet appeared to have allowed the Indians to consult and determine their course of action, for the council continued into late October. On 20 October, Bouquet asserted that the British expected sincerity “not from your Words, but from your Actions,” and referenced British power as well as leniency: “You must be sensible that you deserve the severest Chastisement, but the English are a merciful and generous people, averse to shed the blood even of heir most cruel Enemies.”¹³⁵ Bouquet held the sword over the Indians’ heads, but had offered them one last chance to prove their sincerity and avoid military aggression.¹³⁶

Bouquet’s threats had their desired effect, for Indians began to deliver prisoners, their last bargaining chip, and moved toward establishing more binding peace terms. On 2 November Beaver arrived with prisoners, and the following day Bouquet received word from a Shawnee

¹³² “Bouquet to Governor Penn,” (September 12, 1764), *Bouquet Papers*, Vol. 6, 639.

¹³³ *MPC*, 9:208.

¹³⁴ *MPC*, 9:210.

¹³⁵ *MPC*, 9:217-218.

¹³⁶ *MPC*, 9:208-219. Regarding the continued violence, Bouquet pointed to how Indian “partys killed, lately, in one day, eleven Children at a School, and not satisfied with that infamous action, they massacred, near the Little Beaver Creek, the only Boy they had spared, & had the imprudence to fix his head upon a pole in the middle of the path, and this they did after they had begged Peace from Colonel Bradstreet.” Needless to say, Bouquet and the British had reason to continue their aggressive threat of force in order to bring about dialogue and work toward establishing peace. See *MPC*, 9:218.

chief of his expected arrival with all their prisoners. In a conference with Bouquet on 9 November, Chief Keyashuta of the Seneca Indians also promised the return of prisoners, and hoped that the path between the Senecas and the English would be opened. Bouquet's response continued to demonstrate the dual methods pursued in reestablishing peace in Pennsylvania, albeit flipped in the order in which they first began. He stated: "You ask Peace; the King, my Master, and your Father, has appointed me to make War upon you, but he has other Servants who are employed in the Work of Peace, and his Majesty has been pleased to empower Sir William Johnson to make Peace with the Indians."¹³⁷ Bouquet had acted as a hammer of war that allowed for the pursuit of peace. His report to Governor Penn dated 15 November detailed "that the Mingo, the Delawares, & the Shawonese, after a long Struggle, have at last submitted to the Terms prescribed to them."¹³⁸ In addition to delivering all prisoners, which Bouquet reported that some 200 captives had already been delivered, the Indians had to provide fourteen hostages as security for returning prisoners as well as not committing further hostilities. Furthermore, they received permission to send deputies from each tribe to make peace with Johnson. With terms agreed upon and peace slowly moving forward, Bouquet asked Penn to suspend military action, while also commending Pennsylvania's soldiers for their "great Zeal and Chearfulness," adding that "their Conduct does them Honour in every respect."¹³⁹

Final confirmations of peace with the Delawares, Shawnee, and other Ohio and Western tribes in 1764-1765 demonstrated that the application of British military pressure had superseded diplomacy and dialogue in restoring peace. On receiving Bouquet's report, Governor Penn

¹³⁷ *MPC*, 9:225.

¹³⁸ *MPC*, 9:207.

¹³⁹ *MPC*, 9:207, 221-225, 230; Series 1: Benjamin Chew, *Chew Family Papers Collection*, Coll. No. 2050, HSP. Hereafter: *Benjamin Chew Correspondence*, HSP. The same day as he wrote to Penn, Bouquet wrote to Benjamin Chew of the symbolic nature of the terms agreed upon at Ft. Pitt, "a Patriot of your magnitude will be pleased to hear that his country is freed of the Scourge of an Indian War." See *Benjamin Chew Correspondence*, HSP.

proclaimed a cessation of hostilities. Gage offered Penn his congratulations “on the happy Conclusion of all Hostilities with the Indians Nations who had appeared in Arms against his Majesty,” and gave permission for trade to resume with those tribes.¹⁴⁰ Regarding the peace concluded with Bouquet, the Delawares asked Croghan at Ft. Pitt if they could consult the Quakers for advice on making a lasting peace before they met with Sir William Johnson. Croghan responded, “You will, therefore, return to your Chiefs, & let them know that no People whatever, in this Country, can give you Peace but the King’s Commander-in-Chief.”¹⁴¹ Quaker influence had been shut out and replaced by Britain’s agents. Johnson confirmed peace between the Delawares, Shawnee, and Seneca tribes and the British shortly thereafter, as General Gage wrote Penn that “The Indians have appeared so well disposed that there is great reason to expect the Country will enjoy a Series of peace and Tranquility.”¹⁴² In a symbolic twist of events, Britain’s commander-in-chief notified Brother Onas’ own blood that peace had been established through Britain’s Superintendent of Indian Affairs.¹⁴³

Conclusion

In the course of the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s War from 1754-1765, the legacy of William Penn’s communal and restrained approach toward security determined how Pennsylvania approached the problem of restoring a broken peace, yet ultimately became overshadowed within the larger framework of achieving peace within empire. Both Pennsylvania’s leadership and British imperial authorities followed two distinct methods of achieving peace and security at the same time: military force and diplomacy. Their preference and reliance on one over the other, however, reflected Penn’s security vision and Pennsylvania’s

¹⁴⁰ *MPC*, 9:239.

¹⁴¹ *MPC*, 9:252.

¹⁴² *MPC*, 9:266.

¹⁴³ *MPC*, 9:234, 250-255, 266; George Croghan Papers, *Cadwalader*, HSP.

increasing envelopment within the British North American Empire. At the outset of violence, Pennsylvania's leadership and its frontier settlers took defensive measures, both militarily and diplomatically, to steady themselves following the shock of its first war. By the spring of 1756, the colony proactively pursued the dual method strategy in an effort to restore peace. Dialogue with Indian groups along the Susquehanna proved effective, as Brother Onas' memory acted as a common bond with Teedyuscung, Pennsylvania's governors, and the Friendly Association in mediating a peace. Yet with a security culture based solely on diplomacy and maintenance of Indian relations, Pennsylvania's military response to additional threats that could not be resolved by the traditional methods alone proved weak and ineffective. In seeing the traditional methods of diplomacy and restraint succeed, compounded with an unwillingness to invest greater executive power in the governor, the Assembly remained short-sighted to effectively reach across space and the Appalachian Mountains in order to treat the raids from the Ohio River Valley.

Britain's direction of the war effort began the shift in the dual method strategy, whereby military force trumped diplomacy in terms of effectiveness in bringing peace. Success at Ft. Duquesne and Ft. Niagara created a diplomatic and trade vacuum, whereby Delaware, Shawnee, and other groups in the Ohio saw their reliance on the French vanish. Facing British military power and no longer having French backing, the Indians approached the British for peace and trade terms. Diplomacy with King Beaver took time and several meetings, as it became a negotiation between a victorious British army and Indian warriors who themselves had proved their valor and success in war by their raids and capture of prisoners. The Western tribes became agitated at persistent settler incursions despite the peace between France and Britain, a peace established without any Indian representation during treaty discussions.

The flare up of Pontiac's War and the threat of the Paxton Boys proved that for Pennsylvania, the dual method strategy to restoring peace had actually been inverted. In dealing with the threats and demands of the Scots-Irish settlers from the frontier, Pennsylvania's leaders understood that organized violence could not be discounted in its ability to bring about terms. In the British handling of the Indian war, Bouquet's firm and 'forced' peace again demonstrated the inversion, as the threat of military aggression forced the Delawares and Shawnee to cash in their last bargaining chips and accept peace.

William Penn's communal approach to security had long directed Pennsylvania's approach to Indian affairs and proved effective in restoring peace with some Indian groups during the French and Indian War. Yet its ability to project power and influence within the larger workings of empire diminished due to increasing spatial distances and differing approaches of imperial authorities. British military pressure had surmounted diplomacy in bringing peace to Pennsylvania. The security culture of restraint, characterized through dialogue and a promotion of community and brotherhood of man with Indians along the frontier, made its impact felt as tribes brightened and renewed the Chain of Friendship established long ago with Brother Onas. However, with the acceptance of military force in bringing peace, the budding growth of a military culture and tradition among recently arrived immigrant groups largely settled on the frontier, and the withdrawal of Quakers from the political scene during war, the culture of restraint had started to alter where the framework of restraint, marked by memory, language, and symbolism, still remained as the ethical impetus of brotherhood and community shrank in importance.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE LEGACY OF RESTRAINT

Restraint ruptured along Pennsylvania's frontier in the fall of 1755. At war for the first time and having no sense of military tradition, Pennsylvania's military reaction could not prevent Indian war parties from raiding settlements. The security culture of restraint, however, remained a viable method as dialogue achieved peace between Indians east of the Appalachians, Pennsylvania's governors, and the Friendly Association. In the dual application of military force and diplomacy, William Penn's communal approach to security proved more successful with nearby Indians who retained memories of Brother Onas' friendship with their ancestors. Despite this success, the preference for dialogue remained weak in addressing the threats from the distant Ohio River Valley. Military force by British arms enabled talks with Indians in the Ohio. Without French backing, the Western tribes negotiated with the powerful British for peace and trade. By the end of the French and Indian War and the racially charged violence of Pontiac's War and the Paxton Boys, the long-standing communal approach to security no longer remained the sole method for securing peace. British arms, the massacres of innocent Indians by settlers, and frontier threats against the established eastern counties all pointed to the use of violence as a viable alternative to bring about a sense of security. While both diplomacy and military force claimed degrees of success by the end of hostilities in 1765, the heightened aggression exhibited in the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War stood in contrast to the sense of community and brotherhood instilled by Penn and the first Quakers. The culture of restraint, exposed to war and racially charged violence, had been altered. Its identifiable symbols, language, and memories

continued to be invoked, but the humanitarian impulse in which it had thrived had started to recede.

The outbreak of the War for American Independence witnessed the continued alteration of the culture of restraint. In an action similar to that taken by frontier settlers and Paxton Boys during the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War, rebel leaders in Congress, Pennsylvania's government, and the military relied on force to defeat Britain and its allied Indians. The communal approach of diplomacy became associated with the Quakers who had appeared to turn their backs on the frontier counties in the previous conflict and who now stood as suspected Tories in the fight for independence. Rebels could not allow Quakers to exercise any influence on Indian affairs, both for suspected Quaker loyalties to the Crown, the fear they could incite Indians against frontier settlements, and because harbored resentment now had the opportunity to react against Quaker leadership.

While rebels removed orthodox Quakers from exercising any influence in Pennsylvania's security affairs and used military force to reduce the Indian threat to the frontier, they did not completely discard the old culture of restraint and community. Rather, they used diplomacy with Indians as it suited their needs, invoking the traditions long established by governing officials and their original Quaker caretakers. Increasingly ostracized from colonial politics, including having their male leadership removed to internment camps, and relegated to their own meetings with like-minded members, the descendants of the first Pennsylvania Quakers found themselves no longer able to effectively promote their communal approach toward security. Their public voice had become a whisper and the principles of brotherhood of man and community mattered little to rebel leaders, who subsumed the Quakers' diplomatic approach within their military efforts to subdue Indian incursions and restore peace on the frontier. The willingness and need to

use violence in both the French and Indian War and the War for American Independence exposed the culture of restraint to new factors. Trade, friendship, and brotherhood no longer remained the sole pillars supporting peace. Military pressure and violence had stripped away the humanitarian impulse. In the overtures for peace with Indians from 1783-1786, leaders and representatives of Indian tribes, Pennsylvania, and Congress observed and invoked the methods, symbols, and memories of the security culture of restraint, but their reasoning and interests no longer remained in league with the spirit of community and brotherhood of their ancestors.

The Ancient Culture Partially Returns

In the spring of 1765 the old communal approach to security experienced a resurgence as British officials met with Indian representatives to conclude the final affirmations of peace. Without their French backers and faced against the victorious military force of the British, Indians had no alternative but to deal with the British and Pennsylvania's government. Colonial officials stood reluctant to fight another Indian war. As a result, both sides looked beyond the military violence they had come to rely upon over the past decade to further their interests and achieve security, and instead turned to the old diplomatic highway they once knew.

While Quaker-influenced frontier policy provided common ground across the frontier, the effects of war and violence had taken their toll and had altered the culture of restraint. At Ft. Pitt in the beginning of April 1765, Delaware Indians asked to consult with Quakers in order to make peace, only to be refused by George Croghan's directive that peace came through "the King's Commander-in-Chief."¹ The diplomatic dancing continued on 30 April when Delaware chiefs and warriors again asked Croghan to meet with Quakers, "as they were the first Nation that met the Quakers when first they came to Philadelphia, they ought to be the first apply'd to in making a lasting peace for all other Nations in this Country, and if they would agree to that, they

¹ *MPC*, 9:255.

would make a peace & bring all other Nations into it.”² It was evident from the Delaware perspective that they trusted the Quakers as being able to help foster peace as they had done in the past, as opposed to British imperial officials who had recently displayed a willingness to use military force in their approach to security policy. With the French gone and thus no other European power to play off British officials, the Delawares saw the Quakers as the only group they could lean upon for support. Yet the old culture had begun to shift in composition. The Quakers no longer controlled frontier diplomacy. Croghan maintained that Sir William Johnson controlled British Indian policy, and rejected the proposition for Quakers to assist in making peace. When Johnson, as Britain’s Indian Superintendent, concluded peace with the Six Nations and Delawares at Johnson Hall in May 1765, he advised restraint from Pennsylvania’s frontier settlers. After an Onondago envoy identified settler encroachment and cheating the Indians out of land to be the chief causes of the late conflict, Johnson wrote Governor John Penn, urging settlers “to reflect on the dangerous consequences attending an illtimed resentment which would prove of no advantage to themselves & might be of bad consequence to their Country.”³ Grudges from war still simmered between Indians and Pennsylvanians. As settlers migrated westward into what seemed to be endless amounts of open territory, they risked encroaching upon Indian lands and sparking conflict. A familiar element was needed to bind them in peace.⁴

Despite peace agreements in 1765, local incidents of violence between Pennsylvania settlers and Indians continued to provide sources of tension along the frontier. To avoid another frontier war, both Indians and government officials resorted to using elements and traits from the Quaker communal approach to keep peace. In mid-February 1768, the Assembly wrote Governor

² *MPC*, 9:255.

³ *Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1*, ed. Samuel Hazard, (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co., 1853), 4:227. Hereafter: *PA, Ser. 1*, volume and pg. number.

⁴ *MPC*, 9:255, *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:326.

Penn, informing him that a £3,000 bill had been raised for gifts of condolence for Indians murdered in the colony and for removing “their Discontent and regaining their Friendship.”⁵ At a conference with Indians at Johnson Hall in March, the Superintendent issued a present from Brother Onas to demonstrate Pennsylvania’s love and its resolve to punish offenders. The Indian Thomas King responded to Johnson about the murders in Pennsylvania: “We heard with the utmost attention what you said to us yesterday, and we thank you for reminding us of our Old Customs, that whenever any of us were aggrieved we should not immediately take revenge, but endeavor first to obtain Justice from those who had been guilty of the Injury.”⁶ This old custom of seeking out justice, rather than resorting to violence, harkens back to William Penn’s promotion of community with dialogue and joint juries. His descendant Governor John Penn also used language from his ancestor. Addressing chiefs and warriors of the Six Nations, Delawares, and Shawnee at Ft. Pitt on 26 April, he stated: “The great Giver of Life has given us a good Heart, and Tongues to speak the sentiments of our hearts to each other, And when any Misfortune happens of this King to either of us, We should consider well the Consequences, and meet under the Tree of Peace, and smoak together as our fore Fathers formerly did.”⁷ As the meeting at Ft. Pitt concluded the following month, commissioners reminded tribes of the fast friendship of their forefathers, and that now they, as their descendants, had “renewed and brightened that *antient* Chain of Friendship.”⁸

⁵ *MPC*, 9:465-466.

⁶ *MPC*, 9:503-504. See also *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:294.

⁷ *MPC*, 9:517.

⁸ *MPC*, 9:535. Emphasis added. The return to friendship gained support from the fact that William Penn and his descendants, by sharing the title Brother Onas, had held a longer friendship with tribes than Sir William Johnson. The Conoy King Last Night spoke at a conference at Ft. Augusta on 23 August 1769, “I would have my Brother, the Governor, be strong to hold fast that good Friendship whereof our Grandfathers laid fast Foundations when you came first into this Country. Sir William Johnson is but lately come. But We had in old Time a very firm Peace, and you and I used always then to speak to one another.” See *MPC*, 9:616.

The renewal of Quaker frontier security policy through its shared memories and symbols continued into the early 1770s. Former governor James Hamilton, acting as president of the Provincial Council and familiar with Pennsylvania's traditions of Indian diplomacy, spoke in Philadelphia to Indians from the west and east branches of the Susquehanna River in September 1771: "Brethren, I am pleased you have found out, and travelled here in, the same Great Road that was first opened between you and us by our Fore-fathers. I believe you, when you say that this old Road is somewhat covered with Grass and Leaves and not so easily seen as it used to be. The Reason is plain, it is not so much travelled in as it formerly was."⁹ The old road to Philadelphia, home to the council fire that once burned brightly, had become less traveled as the sense of community ebbed away and Sir William Johnson increasingly took control of Indian affairs. Yet Hamilton remained optimistic in the friendship between Indians, Brother Onas, and Pennsylvania: "we consider this Visit of Yours as a Testimony of your Friendship and Regard for us [...] We are glad to hear you profess yourselves so hearty in your Friendship to us, and can so well remember that this is what your Fathers have always done."¹⁰ Western tribes used similar language and symbolism from the communal approach to peace in December, as the Delaware captain John Killbuck, noting the great distance to Philadelphia and that its council fire was nearly out, affirmed his tribe's desire that the fire "may be renewed, that we may meet together as our forefathers used to do, and strengthen our Friendship."¹¹ The old customs of Quaker frontier policy became evident again as Indian and colonial officials traveled along the old

⁹ *PA, Ser. I*, 4:438.

¹⁰ *PA, Ser. I*, 4:438-439.

¹¹ *MPC*, 10:10-11. When a Six Nations chief suffered from the poor behavior of settlers, Governor Richard Penn commended Indian wisdom in not taking immediate revenge, but rather following the restrained approach of informing colonial authorities "in order to prevent the least Breach in our Chain of Friendship." See *PA, Ser. I*, 4:450.

diplomatic road to affirm peace. The culture of restraint's management and spirit, however, continued to shift as imperial officials sought to exercise control over frontier policy.

As Indians and colonial officials reestablished and built up friendship in the early 1770s, it became clear that Quakers no longer influenced frontier diplomacy. In November 1772, Netattwallaman, Chief of the Delawares on the Ohio, sent a message to Governor Richard Penn indicating his wish to visit England and see the king. While the actual likelihood of his request being fulfilled appeared remote, Penn's response indicated that the frontier policy cultivated by the Quakers no longer remained in their hands. He acknowledged that Brother Onas and the Indians had "kindled a Great Council Fire at this Place, where all Business was to be transacted between us," but Johnson had been appointed as Superintendent of Indian affairs.¹² With tension mounting between the colonies and Britain, Penn deflected the request and deferred to Johnson. William Penn's descendants did not wish to alienate imperial authority. While the governor attempted to soften his denial by referencing Brother Onas and the ancient friendship, his citation of Johnson's authority over this matter indicates an alteration within the culture of restraint. The sense of brotherhood between Indians and Brother Onas was now subject to Johnson.¹³

Quakers nevertheless worked to foster friendship and peace. In a letter to Netattwallaman and the rest of the head men of the Delaware Indians of Kekailammapaikung in July 1773, Israel Pemberton spoke of Quaker desires for Indian welfare, happiness, "and that the old Friendship which was made between your Fathers and Ours may still be maintained, and may ever continue

¹² *MPC*, 10:62-63.

¹³ The Assembly understood the growing sense of peace along the frontier, and sought to avoid inhibiting its growth, as it stated to Governor Penn on 22 February 1773: "but being of Opinion that any warlike Preparations, even within our own Frontiers, at a time of prevailing Harmony between us and the Natives, may be attended with more Ill than good Consequences." See *MPC*, 10:75. On the colonies regaining some authority to treat with Indians, see Daniel Richter's discussion of the Plan of 1764 in *Trade, Land, Power*, 199.

between your and our Children and Grandchildren from one Generation to another.”¹⁴ The Indians responded to Pemberton by noting the joy in their hearts and spoke of a common spirit that had permeated their friendship on the frontier: “We think that as we two Brothers, the Quakers and Delawares, were brought up together as the Children of one Man, it is our Savior’s will we should be of one Religion.”¹⁵ According to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes in September 1773, Zebulon Heston and two other Friends visited the Delaware Indians to the west of the Ohio for religious purposes, and reported the kind reception they received from the Delawares and other Indians as well as Indian desires to have more manifestations of “Gospel Love.”¹⁶ With a common bond established between William Penn and Indian forefathers regarding the Great Spirit and a sense of brotherhood, Quaker missionaries proselytized to Indians along the frontier. Though their political control and social influence over Pennsylvania affairs had been reduced, Quaker ties to Indians and the valued traditions of friendship, peace, and delivering the Gospel spurred Friends to meet with Indians and invoke the memories of the culture of restraint.

The restoration of a familiar bond helped to avoid major violence in the Pennsylvania backcountry during Dunmore’s War, as leaders from both sides recurred to familiar tropes of community and friendship to explore the possibility of keeping peace. As tensions rose and conflict between Virginia settlers and the Shawnee broke out, Arthur St. Clair spoke to the Six Nations and Delawares in May 1774 about keeping “the Path open to our Brothers” and keeping the Chain of Friendship bright in order to avoid violence from reaching Pennsylvania

¹⁴ *Pemberton Papers*, “To Netawattwaleman, and the rest of the head Men of the Delaware Indians of Kekailammaikung, and to John Papunekung and the rest of the Indian Brethren at Wolhick Thuppeck and all other Indians living beyond the Ohio,” (July 8, 1773), *Pemberton*, HCL. See also *PYMS-MJM*, (July 1773), 388-391, B3.1, HCL.

¹⁵ “Response from Kekailammaikung,” (July 28, 1773), *Pemberton*, HCL. See also *PYMS-MJM*, (September 25, 1773), 395, B3.1, HCL.

¹⁶ *PYM-MJM*, (September 21-30, 1773), A1.3, HCL.

settlements.¹⁷ St. Clair's report from Ligonier on 29 May indicates that the Shawnee saw an open path, or rather peace, with Philadelphia, but that Virginia had struck at them.¹⁸ Indian agent Alexander McKee's letter from Ft. Pitt on 10 June noted violence committed by both Shawnee and Virginians and warned of the grave consequences if an Indian war broke out on a defenseless countryside. But he gave the Indians their due, as "they have given great proofs of their Pacific disposition."¹⁹ The Delaware Captain White Eyes, in a meeting at Pittsburg on 29 June, continued to display peaceful intentions toward Pennsylvania as the Delawares focused their attention on avoiding the conflict, stating that all the nations are fully disposed to adhering "to their Antient Friendship, & the advice of their Wise men," and that both the various tribes and the settlers must hold fast to the Chain of Friendship made by their forefathers.²⁰

While Indians and Pennsylvania remained at peace, growing hostility between the Shawnee and Virginia sparked fear among frontier settlers and required a response by governing officials. At the same time that White Eyes made peace overtures in Pittsburgh in late June, Governor John Penn was writing to Sir William Johnson with reports of panicked settlers fleeing their homes. With Pennsylvania wanting to preserve peace with the embattled Shawnee and reestablish friendship with the Delawares, Penn asked Johnson to use his influence with the Six Nations and act as mediator. In addition to requesting the help of Britain's Indian Superintendent, Penn maintained a proactive defense policy by recommending to the Assembly in late September to keep troops employed by the government until "Affairs upon the Frontiers

¹⁷ *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:500.

¹⁸ The governments of Pennsylvania and Virginia had already been at odds regarding their claims over Pittsburgh. Local officials Arthur St. Clair and John Conolly found themselves locked in a struggle as both exercised their authority given to them from Philadelphia and Williamsburg, respectively. After Conolly attempted to raise troops in the area and created disturbances, St. Clair had him arrested. Governors Penn and Dunmore exchanged letters regarding Pittsburgh, Conolly, and St. Clair in the spring of 1774, and on May 7 Penn issued instructions to two Council members to discuss land issues with Dunmore and attempt to mark Pennsylvania's borders. See *MPC*, 10:145, 149, 157, 161-162, 165-168, 174-176.

¹⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:501-502, 511.

²⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:531-532.

may happily have a more favorable Aspect.”²¹ He held this position despite having sent messages to the Shawnee and Delawares in early August that affirmed friendship established by forefathers and Pennsylvania’s inclination toward peace. The Delawares reciprocated, as they professed peace and sought to restore it between the Shawnee and Virginians. Penn’s efforts to prepare Pennsylvania militarily while leaning on the diplomatic understanding demonstrate that while the Quaker communal approach to security remained present, the culture of restraint had been altered in that military force had become a viable option for achieving security, particularly among frontier settlers. Furthermore, Penn’s reliance upon Johnson indicates a weakening in the sense of community that once existed between Indians and Pennsylvania’s government. From the Indian perception, Brother Onas no longer acted with the Indian interests at heart, but rather sought guidance from someone else. Peace, nevertheless, endured along Pennsylvania’s frontier thanks to Penn’s diplomatic efforts according to the traditions and memories of the Quaker communal approach. As Dunmore’s War concluded in October 1774, the old caretakers of frontier security policy expressed hope for reconciliation between Virginia and the Shawnee. With their “old Neighbours the Delawares” giving repeated proofs of desiring peace, the Quakers looked forward to tranquility being restored.²²

In the ten years following the conclusion of peace between Indians and British and Pennsylvania authorities that ended Pontiac’s War, a familiar and old relationship resurfaced that acted as a bonding element among former enemies. Both sides used language, character traits, and old customs in reference to an ancient friendship established by Indian forefathers and

²¹ *MPC*, 10:208.

²² *PYMS-MJM*, (November 5, 1774), 430, B3.1, HCL; *MPC*, 10:180, 192-197, 201-205; *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:574; *Pennsylvania Packet*, (July 4, 1774), TLC. *PA Gazette*, (July 6, 1774), TLC. Sir William Johnson died on 11 July. Arthur St. Clair, in a letter to Governor Penn dated 8 August, noted that deputies from the Six Nations professed their intentions to adhere to treaties despite Johnson’s passing, to retain other nations in peace, and sent wampum belts to the Delawares, informing “them that tho’ their great Friend is Dead, the Council Fire kindled by the English and them continued to burn as bright as Ever.” See *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:559.

Quaker ancestors, including the original Brother Onas, William Penn, to rebuild a diplomatic bridge along the frontier. It became increasingly clear, however, that the role of old Quaker caretakers had become overshadowed by imperial authorities, and that their influence had become limited. With the outbreak of Dunmore's War, Pennsylvania leaders maneuvered the colony away from an Indian war on its frontier by utilizing the communal approach to security. Diplomacy had returned to help keep peace, despite some changes in how colonial officials managed Indian relations. With the outbreak of hostilities in April 1775, the security culture of restraint underwent continued alteration. Pennsylvania's rebel government and Congress faced threats not only from British arms, but also from Tories and the fear they could incite allied Indians against frontier settlements. As rebels moved toward independence and needed to use military force to address security matters, they linked Quakers with Tories because of their unwillingness to support military endeavors. With Quaker ties to Indians, rebels both in Congress and Pennsylvania's government removed Quakers from the public sphere to guard against them using their influence to assist the British war effort. This in effect removed the humanitarian impulse from the culture of restraint, while rebels utilized the language and symbols of the culture of restraint as it suited their needs.

Early Rebel Policy for Quakers and Frontier Security

Following the outbreak of rebellion in New England in the spring and summer of 1775, both the Continental Congress and Pennsylvania's Council of Safety addressed the Quakers, their place in society, and thus their historic role in frontier security policy. As Quaker representatives increasingly distanced themselves from the rebellion, radicals, including western county representatives who harbored resentment against Quakers from the previous Indian war,

used the question of military service to pressure Quakers to step down.²³ Quakers did not yet receive draconian terms with regards to their expectations for supporting the rebellion, however, as the British military threat remained in New England and both Congress and Pennsylvania's government did not face direct and imminent pressure. On 18 July, the Continental Congress stated it intended no violence against the consciences of those "who from Religious Principles cannot bear Arms in any case," "but earnestly recommend it to them to *Contribute Liberally*, in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed Brethren in the several Colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed country, which they can consistently with their Religious principles."²⁴ Pennsylvania's Council of Safety followed suit in late September and proposed that:

[Quaker] Contributions to the Common Cause should be pecuniary, and for that purpose a Rate or assessment be laid on their Estates, equivalent to the expence and loss of time incurred by the associators. A measure of this kind appears to be founded on the principles of impartial Justice, calculating to appease the Complaints which have been made, likely to give general Satisfaction.²⁵

Unable to count on raising troops from Quakers and other religious dissenters in Pennsylvania's population, both Congress and the Council of Safety sought out monetary donations and taxes to support the rebellion. The rebels believed wealthy Quaker merchants and old families in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania's eastern counties could be compelled. With other citizens forming themselves into Association companies for military service and possibly risking their lives, all other members of society needed to contribute.

²³ See John Frantz' and William Pencak's "Introduction: Pennsylvania and Its Three Revolutions" and Rosemary Warden's, Owen Ireland's, Karen Guenther's, and Robert Crist's chapters in Frantz and Pencak, ed., *Beyond Philadelphia* (1998). For discussion of Pennsylvania's Revolutionary committees and how they steered the colony toward rebellion and challenged the existing political order, including Quaker power, see Richard Alan Ryerson, *The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia 1765-1776* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978). Regarding Quaker merchants, see Frederick B. Tolles, *Meeting House and Counting House: The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia, 1682-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948).

²⁴ *MPC*, 10:293.

²⁵ *MPC*, 10:349.

As volunteers entered into Association units and gained recognition from the Assembly in the summer of 1775, Quakers sought to protect their long-standing right of liberty of conscience and adherence to diplomacy for preserving peace. Aggressive Associators grew envious of Quakers who did not appear to be taking the same risks as those under arms. Furthermore, the memories from the previous Indian war and the perceived Quaker neglect of frontier settlers who suffered under Indian raids emboldened Associators to petition the Assembly to force conscientious objectors to support the rebellion. Reacting in defense of their rights and liberties, the Meeting for Sufferings described liberty of conscience as the “most essential of all Privileges” and entreated the Assembly to uphold the charter and guard against any attempt to force them to go against their peace testimony and support war-making enterprises.²⁶ Furthermore, they promoted the restoration of peace and fellowship with Britain: “We fervently desire the most conciliatory Measures for removing the impending Calamities, and for restoring Peace to the Colonies in general, may be pursued, and that all such may be avoided.”²⁷ With wealth and trade ties with Britain at risk, Quakers in the eastern counties, particularly merchants, identified as pro-imperial. Pacifism offered a convenient mask to shield their interests and offer stability and security to their way of life and political power. For rebels, this appearance of seeking protection while offering nothing in exchange, and to make peace with Britain, appeared as Toryism.²⁸

Faced with increasing demands for military preparations and calls from the Quaker community to maintain the peace testimony, Friends in government positions found themselves

²⁶ *PA Gazette*, (November 1, 1775), TLC.

²⁷ *PA Gazette*, (November 1, 1775), TLC.

²⁸ *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes, 1775-1785*, (October 21, 1775), (October 25, 1775), 26-34, Coll. No. B3.2, HCL. *Philadelphia Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Men's Meeting and Joint Minutes, 1775-1785*, will hereafter be abbreviated as *PYMS-MJM*, (Date), pg. number, B3.2, HCL. Pennsylvania Historical & Museum Commission, “Revolutionary War Records at the Pennsylvania State archives,” http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/revolutionary_war/3852 (accessed January 15, 2015).

in a literal tug of war. Rather than support a martial approach for security, four Quakers of the Committee of Safety of Bucks County desired that they be relieved from further attendance, as they alleged “scruples of Conscience relative to the business necessarily transacted by the Committee.”²⁹ In January 1776, Quakers issued an epistle, urging individuals in public employments “to consider the end and tendency of the measures they are promoting.”³⁰ Faced with a growing movement that promoted war to settle differences, Quakers removed themselves from office and attempted to point to the past successes of their ancestors, who while practicing justice and mercy, enjoyed “tranquility and peace, free from the desolating calamities of war; and their endeavours were wonderfully blessed and prospered.”³¹ Rebels filled the political vacuum and drafted a radical new constitution, putting Pennsylvania on a path toward independence. They instituted such policies as the Test Act to declare allegiance to Pennsylvania and renounce the king, thereby helping to silence and target Quaker opposition. With war between America and Britain deepening, Quakers, adherents to a culture of restraint, found their calls for diplomacy and peace falling on deaf ears.³²

As the threat to Pennsylvania and its capital rose during the New Jersey Campaign of 1776, so too did the expectations and restrictions for the defense of the state continue to marginalize Quakers. Before the capture of New York City, Quakers remained subject to taxes and having any arms they may own requisitioned to supply Pennsylvania troops. Although they did not participate in the active defense of Pennsylvania or support the endeavors of the assertive

²⁹ “Minutes of the Committee of Safety of Bucks County, 1774-1776,” in *Pennsylvania Archives, Series 2*, ed. William Henry Egle (Harrisburg: E. K. Myers, State Printer, 1893), 15:348. Hereafter: “Title,” in *PA, Ser. 2*, volume and pg. number.

³⁰ *Epistles Issued and Received, 1668-1821*, “The Ancient Testimony and Principles of the People called Quakers, Renewed with Respect to the King and Government; and Touching the Commotions now prevailing in these and other Parts of America, Addressed to the People in General, Jan. 20, 1776,” Coll. No. 1250, C5.3, HCL. Hereafter “Ancient Testimony,” *Epistles*, HCL.

³¹ “Ancient Testimony,” *Epistles*, HCL.

³² Frantz and Pencak, ed., *Beyond Philadelphia*, xvi, xxv.

Associators, Quakers were still expected to share the burdens and expenses of all members of society. The British advance across New Jersey after Major General William Howe's victory at New York generated excitement, fear, and urgency in Pennsylvania's Council of Safety. With reports in mid-November stating that several hundred transports had sailed from New York, the Council called in militia units for Philadelphia's defense, and on 2 December ordered all shops and schools closed to enable the inhabitants to defend the city. The Council expected "all persons to give the Associators all the Assistance of every kind, which may be in their Power."³³ Only the sick, infirm, young and old, those with orders from the state, and those who held religious scruples remained exempted from service. Yet immediately following this provision in the Council of Safety minutes, the board made the resolve "that every person who is so void of Honor, virtue and Love of his Country, as to refuse his assistance at this time of eminent public danger, may justly be suspected of designs Inimical to the Freedom of America."³⁴ The line between being excused from military service and being persecuted for withholding one's expected duty remained too sharp for Quakers to escape unnoticed. By professing their peace testimony and having withdrawn from public positions, Quakers' religious scruples against military service placed them in opposition to the Associators and citizens of Philadelphia in their time of greatest alarm and need.³⁵ Despite the increased restrictions, the Quakers' firm belief in Pennsylvania's charter, founded and defended by their religious brethren, and its assurances in

³³ *MSEC*, 11:29-30, 38.

³⁴ *MSEC*, 11:38.

³⁵ "Committee of Safety of Bucks County," in *PA, Ser. 2*, 15:356, 359; *PA Journal*, (July 24, 1776), TLC. *MSEC*, 11:23-38. In addition to the 7 December call for persons to march with the militia and labeling those who refused to serve as being enemies to America, the Council of Safety authorized militia officers to send men out "in different parties, compell all the able bodied men within the district to which it belongs to join the said Battalion immediately," excepting "such as refuse from Religious scruples, or are excusable on account of age or some bodily infirmity." See *MSEC*, 11:55. For Associator disaffection toward Quakers, the preparation of defenses, and an account of military activity along the Delaware River Valley and at Philadelphia, see Dorwart, *Invasion and Insurrection* (2008).

protecting against persecution for religious beliefs bolstered their stance that they could withstand and eventually overcome this period of increased scrutiny.

With General George Washington's victories in the winter of 1776-1777 and the British return to New York, the apparent deliverance of Pennsylvania only gave credence to Associators and the state's rebel government that their struggle, rather than the position of the non-Associators, had received God's endorsement. Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council, under pressure from militiamen who complained that non-Associators, with Quakers identified by their religious scruples, had not been compelled to contribute to the Association or support the American cause, praised the Associators and vilified Quakers. It described the "vigourous, manly efforts of a few brave Associators" for stepping forward to defend their country, and ascribed the little loss of life "as a signal evidence of the favour of Divine Providence." With "the continuance of his blessing who is indeed the God of Armies," the Council urged "every Man among us [to] hold himself ready to march into the field whenever he shall be called upon so to do; if the Enemy really intend to make an attack on this State, no time should be lost; every moment should be employed in putting ourselves in perfect readiness to repel them."³⁶

In describing Quakers as lesser men for not supporting the military struggle and identifying divine support in their victories, rebels demonstrated their belief that military force would secure Pennsylvania. Margaret Hill Morris, a Quaker living in the vicinity of Burlington, New Jersey, offered her opinion on God showing favoritism to the rebel cause and their victory at Trenton: "not considering there is a God of Battle, as well as a God of peace, who may have given them the late advantage, in order to draw them out [?] [?] the Chastisement that is reserv'd

³⁶ *MSEC*, 11:198, 204; *PA Journal*, (April 2, 1777), TLC. Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council convened in March 1777.

for them.”³⁷ While she held that the promotion of violence contradicted her belief in the Christian message of peace, she found her resentment checked on soldiers being hypocritical in their Christian beliefs when on 8 January 1777, as rebel soldiers passed by her home following their victory at Princeton, one man stopped to say farewell and thank you, reminding her that when God cleansed lepers, only one in ten gave thanks. Like William Penn a century earlier, Morris saw peace and security in society derived from brotherhood. But with Quakers removing themselves from the public sphere and being portrayed as unsupportive of the rebel cause, their influence in the practices and understanding of restraint along the frontier became subject to the management of Indian relations by the rebels.

While the first two years of conflict brought a flurry of activity in eastern Pennsylvania with erecting river defenses, raising troops, and weathering an invasion scare in the winter of 1776-1777, Pennsylvania’s frontier remained relatively quiet as the previous ten years of renewing the ancient friendship had reduced tensions by invoking memories of William Penn and Indian ancestors in order to rebuild the diplomatic bridge across the frontier. In late January 1777, Colonel Joseph Dean and Colonel John Bull met with Indians at Easton in order “to preserve peace and harmony with the Indians Nations.”³⁸ Finding the Indians to be well disposed, in part because of the reliance upon European goods and not wanting to lose a trade relationship with the rebels, the military representatives stated that the Indians appeared to stay in a neutral position and urged that a gift be given “to Continue the friendship of the Indians.”³⁹ Dean’s and Bull’s use of diplomacy and gift-giving acted within the practices of the culture of

³⁷ *Journals*, “Margaret Hill Morris Journal, 1776-1778,” Coll. No. 975B, HCL. Material from the Journals collection will hereafter be abbreviated as “Title,” *Journals*, HCL.

³⁸ *MSEC*, 11:96.

³⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 5:201, 203, 208.

restraint, and provides an example of the old Quaker policy to security being retained by Pennsylvania's leaders.

Diplomacy served the needs of the rebel government in these early years, despite the willingness of some officials to pursue military measures. John Harris of Paxton, an active promoter of violence against Indians in the French and Indian War, described his experiences and racial views in July 1776: "I know the Indians well from my infancy, warr is their delight, & they will be concern'd on some side & Likely both for & ag^t us." Believing that no treaty or presents could not stop an Indian war, he encouraged that "the Warr be pushed on with the Greatest Vigour into their own Country, (they Begining first) Surely their Territory of the best lands in American is a fine prize for our Warriors to fight for."⁴⁰ Harris saw opportunity for frontier settlers and soldiers to advance themselves economically and also held no faith in the friendship of Indians. One year later the commander at Ft. Pitt, Brigadier General Edward Hand, reiterated the lack of faith as the number of individual cases of violence by miscreant Indians rose. Wanting to invade Indian country and destroy settlements, Hand stated that "Sad experience has taught us that little dependence can be put on the promises or professions of the savages, & I am well assured that the Tribes making the greatest show of Friendship, will not sit still whilst we chastise the Banditti that infests our settlements."⁴¹ While Dean and Bull noted peace with Indians in Easton, farther west tension grew with incidents of violence. Rebels used diplomacy when needed, but stood ready and willing to use violence in order to serve their interests and bring security to the frontier.

⁴⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 4:789.

⁴¹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 5:443. On the early stages of the war along Pennsylvania's frontier and the Ohio Country, see Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 31-37. For discussion of land hungry settlers, their racial hatred and unwillingness to accommodate Indian interests, and settlement of the Ohio River Valley, see Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires* (1997).

For the first two years of conflict, Quakers withdrew from the public sphere and found the culture of restraint hostage to the needs of the rebels. Moderate expectations of offering financial support for the war effort turned to grumblings of animosity, as members of Pennsylvania's Associators felt Quakers had not shared in the burden of fighting the British. When the British threatened Philadelphia in 1776, the Friends lost face when rebels identified Quaker religious reasoning for not offering support as being less honorable and holy than the divinely appointed fight for liberty. With their public image deteriorating, Quakers also witnessed the practices of restraint and diplomacy with Indians subject to Pennsylvania's government. With no outbreak of war on the frontier, and despite the advocacy for violence by those who held no faith in Indian assurances, Congress and Pennsylvania's government pursued friendly relations with Indians. By the summer of 1777, however, rebels reacted to reports of the British targeting Philadelphia by detaining Quakers and removing their influence on the culture of restraint.

Gutting the Culture of Restraint

As expresses and intelligence arrived in Philadelphia in June 1777 confidently claiming that the British intended to attack Pennsylvania, the Continental Congress and the Supreme Executive Council moved to round up suspected Tories, particularly Quakers. Not wanting disaffected persons to assist the British in their campaign, Congress ordered Pennsylvania President Thomas Wharton, Jr., Vice President George Bryan, and the rest of the Supreme Executive Council to apprehend and secure disaffected persons and to search for weapons. By early August, former Governor John Penn and Benjamin Chew, former Chief Justice and Provincial Council member, had been arrested by order of John Hancock. Later that month, resolutions issued by Congress described Quakers as people filled with rancor, bitterness, and

“disaffected to the American Cause.”⁴² Because orthodox Quakers had been unsupportive of the war effort up to this point, rebels feared Quakers held Tory sympathies, could provide intelligence to the British, and could use their ties with Indians to influence native groups to side with the British along the frontier. In 1764 a political cartoon depicted Israel Pemberton, the leader of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures and known as the “King of the Quakers,” embracing an Indian. Another cartoon from 1764 involving Pemberton showed the Quaker merchant Abel James taking tomahawks from a barrel labeled “I P,” or Israel Pemberton, and passing them out to Indians to use against Scots-Irish and Germans along the frontier.⁴³ Working with an order from Congress endorsed by Hancock, President Wharton, a disowned Quaker, and the rest of the Council met with David Rittenhouse, Colonel William Bradford, and Colonel Sharp Delaney to form a list of dangerous persons to the state, prepare to arrest influential Quakers, and seize their records and papers from the Quaker Meeting of Sufferings. The rebels, faced with an imminent British invasion and a segment of the population who portrayed Tory leanings and held known influence with Indians, had to establish a sense of control over the Quakers for fear they could undermine the fight for independence.⁴⁴

While Quakers as a whole appeared as unsupportive of the fight for independence and thus drew suspicions of being Tories, some individual Friends supported the rebel cause. Suffering disownment from the greater Quaker body because of their support for the rebels, these Friends identified themselves as Free Quakers. When Samuel Preston Moore considered entering the military and gaining an officer’s commission, his uncle, Charles Moore, responded to his nephew and pointed to Samuel’s youth, vigor, and lack of patience and restraint as the reasons

⁴² *PA, Ser. 1, 5:554-555.*

⁴³ See Figures 5, 6, and 7 in Chapter Four.

⁴⁴ “Margaret Hill Morris,” *Journals, HCL; MSEC, 11:227, 264, 279, 283-284; PA, Ser. 1, 5:551, 554-555.*

for Samuel not considering the inconsistency of military service “with the religious Principles of thy Education & the Wishes of thy nearest Relations & best Friends.”⁴⁵ In offering points for not joining the military, Charles’ pleas to his nephew demonstrated a division among Friends, as a younger generation, raised during an Indian war and now of age during a second conflict, disagreed with views held by older and more reflective Quakers who experienced periods of both peace and war. Free Quaker Samuel Wetherill reflected in 1793 on the division among Quakers and his decision to serve in the War for American Independence. After the Paxton Boys threatened Philadelphia in 1764 and Quaker youths shouldered arms in defense of the city, the Quaker community deliberated on how to wipe away the reproach. Wetherill’s response on this case demonstrates him not being in league with older Quakers: “Strange, indeed, that it should be thought a reproach, for men who were not in danger themselves, to step forward, and at the risk of their own lives, defend the lives of others! every other part of mankind, would term it an high instance of heroic virtue.”⁴⁶ Wetherill’s decision to declare allegiance to the United States continued to demonstrate his beliefs about the duty of defending one’s home. He described how the Quaker community perceived his actions: “I knew when I took the test [of allegiance] there was no rule in the society against it, altho’ divers men of influence in the society disapproved it, but being fully persuaded that the event of the war would justify it, I dared not do it in the dark, and chose to do it in open day.”⁴⁷ The larger and more orthodox Quaker community disowned the tainted individuals who bore arms, such as Samuel Wetherill. Disownment not only divided

⁴⁵ *Howland Collection, Logan Letters*, “Letter to Samuel Preston Moore,” (June 2, 1777), HCL.

⁴⁶ Samuel Wetherill, “An Apology for the Religious Society called Free Quakers, in the City of Philadelphia, Shewing That All Churches Who Excommunicated Act Inconsistently with the Gospel of Jesus,” in *Joseph Scattergood Collection on Free Quakers*, Coll. No. SC 113, FHL. Hereafter: Wetherill, “Free Quakers,” *Scattergood Collection*, FHL.

⁴⁷ Wetherill, “Free Quakers,” *Scattergood Collection*, FHL.

the Quaker community, but it also produced a sense of animosity between Friends that came to a head with the British advance on the City of Brotherly Love.⁴⁸

With the British advancing on Philadelphia from the Chesapeake in late August and early September, rebel officials moved in earnest to round up Quaker leadership so as to avoid giving them the opportunity to share intelligence with the British. Timothy Matlack, a Quaker who had served in the army as a colonel, now acted as the secretary for the Supreme Executive Council. The Quaker community disowned him for going against the peace testimony. Embittered, Matlack could now gain satisfaction in helping arrest influential Quakers viewed as being able to give “aid and comfort to the enemies of the Colonial cause.”⁴⁹ By 8 September agents of the Council had arrested Israel Pemberton, the Quaker merchant, leader of the Friendly Association, and hated symbol for frontier settlers, as well as his brothers James and John. Other Quakers included the minister John Hunt, Henry Drinker, the clerk for the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting, and the successful merchants Samuel Fisher and Samuel Pleasants.⁵⁰

Imprisoned in the Free Masons Lodge in Philadelphia, the prisoners demanded that as freemen they had the right to be heard before the Council. Congress issued a resolve that Pennsylvania’s Council allow for the prisoners to demonstrate that they were not dangerous to the United States. However, with time being of the essence as the British continued to march toward Philadelphia, the Council informed Congress that it did not have the time to consider the Quaker protests. British pressure served to allow rebel officials to remove the Quakers. The

⁴⁸ On Free Quakers not seeking to make new religious doctrine, but to escape the religious imperiousness of the Quaker community, see “An Address To those of the People called Quakers, who have been disowned for Matters religious or civil,” *Scattergood Collection*, FHL. For Free Quakers being disowned for holding office, bearing arms, and paying taxes, as well as not being buried among mainstream Quakers because of bearing arms, see “To the Representatives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met. Divers Freemen of the said Commonwealth beg Leave to shew,” *Scattergood Collection*, FHL.

⁴⁹ George Vaux, “The Free Quakers,” *The Friend* 68 (1895): 341, Coll. No. BX 7601, F78, HCL.

⁵⁰ Wendy Lucas Castro, ““Being Separated from My Dearest Husband, in This Cruel Manner:” Elizabeth Drinker and the Seven-Month Exile of Philadelphia Quakers,” *Quaker History* 100, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 40; *PYMS-MJM*, (September 8, 1777), 128-129, B3.2, HCL; *MSEC*, 11:287-289.

Council offered the prisoners one last chance to declare their loyalty, as Secretary Matlack signed a resolution that allowed prisoners to be discharged if they took an oath or affirmation of loyalty to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. With Congress and Pennsylvania's government on the cusp of having to leave Philadelphia, the Quaker prisoners faced two options: declare their allegiance to Pennsylvania or remain as prisoners and by default stay loyal subjects to the Crown. President Wharton and Secretary Matlack, as disowned Quakers, stood to gain from either decision. Either they would see prisoners declare loyalty to the rebel government of Pennsylvania, or they could gain satisfaction in being able to arrest Tory members of the religious community that had turned its back on them.⁵¹

As the Quakers protested and Pennsylvania's Council schemed against the prisoners, Congress made plans to remove the Quaker prisoners from Philadelphia in the face of the British advance and initially selected Stanton in Augusta County, Virginia, as an appropriate place for the Quakers' "residence and security."⁵² Because the transfer of prisoners involved two states, Congress appropriately took on the responsibility. On 8 September, after receiving word from the Supreme Executive Council that it could not adequately address the prisoners' protests in a timely fashion, Congress ordered prisoners who refused to swear or affirm allegiance to be sent to Stanton. Twenty-two prisoners refused to promise to refrain from corresponding with the enemy and declined to give assurances of allegiance. Wharton, Bryan, and members of Council described the prisoners, through conduct and conversation, "as highly inimical to the cause of America" and declared the prisoners had renounced "all the priviledges of Citizenship, & that it appears they consider themselves as subjects of the King of Great Britain, the Enemy of this, &

⁵¹ *PYMS-MJM*, (September 8, 1777), 128-129, B3.2, HCL; *MSEC*, 11:289-293.

⁵² *PA, Ser. 1*, 5:580.

the other United States of America.”⁵³ Council members validated their actions of declaring the Quakers enemies of the United States and stripping them of citizenship by making reference to past precedence set forth in other states: “That persons of like Character, & in emergencies equal to the present, when the Enemy is at our Door, have in the other States been Arrested & Secured upon suspicions arising from their general behaviour & refusal to acknowledge their Allegiance to the State of which they were the proper Subjects.”⁵⁴ The Quaker protest on 9 September failed to sway rebel officials. Invoking their forefathers who had maintained a “firm & steady adherence to their peaceable & inoffensive Principles” and who had not promoted conspiracies or bloodshed, the Quakers in the Masons Lodge held that they had upheld their religious principles and had been restrained by the guiding and divine Principle of Grace & Truth” from holding correspondence with contending parties.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, as Samuel Fisher noted in his diary on 11 September, rebel officials gathered up the Quakers and other prisoners, and informed them they were to be sent to Augusta County. Hearing the guns from the Battle of Brandywine in the distance, Fisher commented: “so that it is likely they were afraid of our being[?] by them rescued if we were sent out of town by the Lancaster Road as they intended.”⁵⁶ Based on Fisher’s diary entry and the urgency of Congress and the Council to remove the Quakers, the rebels feared the British would rescue the suspected Tories and use the Quakers to their advantage. As Congress and the Council abandoned Philadelphia to establish temporary locations of government in Pennsylvania’s interior, the prisoner party set off to travel 219 miles to their new homes in Winchester, Virginia.

⁵³ *MSEC*, 11:295-296.

⁵⁴ *MSEC*, 11:296.

⁵⁵ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:509.

⁵⁶ Samuel R. Fisher, “Photocopy of Diary, 1777,” in *Joseph Wharton Family Papers*, Coll. No. RG 5-162, FHL.

As the Continental Army suffered at Valley Forge during the harsh winter of 1777-1778, the raw weather seemed to have a corresponding influence on Pennsylvania's government officials in wanting Tories and Quakers to suffer as well. Presiding in Lancaster, a newly constituted Council of Safety in October 1777 received powers "to proceed against, seize, detain, imprison, punish, either capitally or otherwise, as the case may require" in order to secure Pennsylvania as well as restrain and punish traitors who "may be deemed inimical to the common cause of liberty and the United States of North America."⁵⁷ Despite not having control over Philadelphia with General Howe's troops occupying the city, the Council appointed commissioners to confiscate and sell Tory property where it could be seized. Lieutenant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania Line spoke of how polarized the struggle had become, as evicted rebel forces in light of their misfortunes detested Tories and Quakers:

By Tories we were now surrounded
Either when marching or retreating
But Tories still are pusillanimous
And can't encounter men magnanimous.
We made us merry at their expense
While they wish'd we were all gone hence.
These were the people called Quakers
Who in war would not be partakers.
To Liberty's Sons this seem'd but light
We still allow'd that we could fight.⁵⁸

McMichael's polemic speaks of seizing Tory property to give rebels some enjoyment, and of asserting the righteousness of the rebel cause, particularly in the face of those Quakers who would not partake in war.

Rebel officials continued to watch Quakers warily. In Chester County, the local commander received instructions to "watch the meetings & especially the Quarterly meetings of

⁵⁷ *MSEC*, 11:325-326.

⁵⁸ "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael, of the Pennsylvania Line, 1776-778," in *PA, Ser. 2*, 15:214.

the Quakers. At these assemblies, [spies] will without doubt, be busy, & mischeivous.”⁵⁹ The Board of War investigated Owen Jones, Jr., a prisoner at Winchester, after intercepting letters bound for people in Lancaster which discussed exchanging gold at high premiums for paper money with the assumed intent to degrade Continental currency. Jones declared his innocence, and ironically appealed to the disowned Quaker Timothy Matlack on 18 December:

Respected Friend, My particular hard situation indices me to apply to some person in Council, and there is none except thyself that I can make an application to with same freedom. I believe from our former acquaintance & the personal Regard thou always professed for me, thou will take the same pleasure in rendering me a service, as be assured I should do to thee, were it in my power.⁶⁰

Rebels had done more than simply march off Quaker leaders to an internment camp. In removing merchants with trade ties to Britain, philanthropists who offered gifts to Indians to secure peace in the previous Indian war, and prominent leaders from the Quaker community, the rebels had in their view withheld assistance to the British.⁶¹

In this time of upheaval for both Pennsylvania’s Quakers and the rebel government, cases of localized violence and emotional calls for help from frontier commanders brought attention back to frontier security. Reporting instances of murder and scalping, Lieutenant A. Lochry in Westmoreland County wrote to Supreme Executive Council President Thomas Wharton in early November that “very few Days there is not some murder committed on some part of our fruntears.”⁶² He hoped that with assistance from the Council the frontier could be held and pointed to a belief in military force and carrying on an expedition into Indian country as the only method to secure the frontier in face of rising violence. Settlers in Bedford County offered a similar perspective of an imminent Indian war on 27 November: “The present situation of this

⁵⁹ *PA, Ser. 1, 6:4.*

⁶⁰ *PA, Ser. 1, 6:106.*

⁶¹ *PA, Ser. 1, 6:74-75.*

⁶² *PA, Ser. 1, 5:741-742.*

County is so truly deplorable that we should be inexcusable if we delayed a moment in acquainting you with it, an Indian War is now raging around us in its utmost fury.”⁶³ With these messages from the frontier, the Council authorized Bedford and Westmoreland counties to call out parts of the militia as needed for defending inhabitants against Indians, and ordered local commanders to correspond with one another regarding public safety. Despite such moves, the Council remained out of touch with the western counties, where racism against Indians promoted continued calls for military action to secure the frontier. John Harris of Paxton renewed his warnings of an Indian war, and stressed that settlers ought to prepare for it. He lamented that “a Defensive Warr ag^t Savages will never doe the needful,” or rather his wish of the complete and violent removal of Indians. “However prudent & necessary it may be to Grant assistance to several parts of the frontiers,” he stated, “we must attack them in their Own Country, (at all hazards.)”⁶⁴ While Quaker leadership and representatives in the eastern counties in the previous Indian conflict had also been out of touch with the realities in the western counties, frontier settlers now had their neighbors in office, who held no reservation about using military force. Frontier policy management now stood with the radicals, who had physically removed Quaker leadership from providing any assistance to the British. In addition to being physically removed, Quaker leadership found its energy and influence in the public sphere reduced.⁶⁵

⁶³ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:39.

⁶⁴ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:211.

⁶⁵ *MSEC*, 11:382-383, 439. While the British occupied Philadelphia, Congress and Pennsylvania had to contend with the British enticing Tories with rewards for military service, as Howe advertised to potential volunteers: “Such spirited Fellows, who are willing to engage, will be rewarded at the End of the War, besides their Laurels, with Fifty Acres of Land in any County they shall chuse, where every gallant Hero may retire, and enjoy his Bottle and Lass.” See “First Battalion of Pennsylvania Loyalists, commanded by His Excellency Sir William Howe, K. B.,” [1777], Document #50427 in *Early American Imprints*, The Library Company Supplemental, TLC. For discussion of racially-fueled violence on the frontier and the identification of frontier settlers as “white” as opposed to the Indians and later the British, see Frantz and Pencak, ed., *Beyond Philadelphia*; Knouff, *The Soldiers’ Revolution* (2004); Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors* (2008).

The manner in which the Quaker prisoners obtained their release illustrates that the Quakers had lost their place in the public sphere, as ultimate authority now lay with the rebels. In December 1777, Quakers sent a memorial to Congress and the Supreme Executive Council, again reiterating their innocence and that they had “never held any Correspondence verbally or otherwise with the Generals of the British Armies, or any others concerned in concerting or carrying on their Military operations, and are free further to Declare that we will not give them any information of the circumstances of this Country, the disposition of the Inhabitants, or any Public Transactions.”⁶⁶ Upon being read on 5 January 1778, the Council referred the Quaker case to Congress, viewing the prisoners as the responsibility of the United States. Citing the expenses incurred in moving the prisoners to Winchester, Pennsylvania officials did not wish to waste funds on dealing with a group of people who did not support the fight for independence. Furthermore, because the Quakers held links to Indians along the frontier and resided in another state, the inter-state security issue fell appropriately in the coalition government of Congress. The following month, the Westerly Quarterly Meeting of the Quakers petitioned the Council on behalf of their imprisoned brethren. Again, the issue remained dormant, as the Council informed the Quarterly Meeting that the issue lay before Congress. Not until direct intervention from George Washington did the Pennsylvania Council finally release the Quaker leaders in late April 1778. While the twenty men (two died while in captivity) were free, it had not been through their efforts. The prisoners’ wives had pleaded to Washington to release their husbands on humanitarian grounds. Knowing the strains of prolonged separation from his wife Martha, Washington pressured the Council to allow the men to return home to Pennsylvania. These voices of the Quaker community had been sapped of their energy. Indeed, Israel Pemberton, known as “King Wampum” for his diplomatic efforts with Indians, died the following year.

⁶⁶ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:114.

According to his brother John, the fatigue and distress of the exile proved too much for Israel.

Though released and restored to society, the Quakers had been effectively silenced and removed from public affairs.⁶⁷

When the British invaded Pennsylvania, Congress and the Supreme Executive Council evacuated the capital. In the process, they managed to remove and silence Quakers deemed hostile to the American cause. The rebels feared that Quakers could assist the British by

⁶⁷ *MSEC*, 11:395, 426-427; *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:158. When Israel Pemberton died on 22 April 1779, John Pemberton wrote the following to explain his brother's death: "In the 9th mo 1777 [Israel] was, with others banished to Virginia & remained a prisoner nearly 8 months under which trial being separated from an aged & endeared wife & beloved children & grandchildren & in advanced age in a violent manner hurried from home, & among those that great endeavors had been used to exasperate by misrepresentation, he was endued with constancy & a good share of fortitude & patience. The separation however nearly affected him, being a man of great feeling & tenderness. On his return found his wife in a declining state of health, & from the time of her departure, he visibly declined & seemed sensible that the time of his departure drew near." See "Memorandums taken from the original diary of John Pemberton, now in the possession of Henry Pemberton," *Journals*, HCL.

The efforts of the Quaker prisoners' wives and George Washington's personal intervention secured the release of the Quaker leaders held at Winchester. On 31 March Mary Pemberton wrote to Washington on behalf of Quaker women seeking the release of their husbands. Having received word that a prisoner had died and that others had become ill and needed supplies, Pemberton wrote of the wives' emotional distress and requested that Washington offer protection for wagons in order that the prisoners could be visited. This appeal on behalf of the Quaker wives began a chain of events that resulted in the release of the prisoners. Washington leaned on President Wharton on 5 April: "I have assured her, that I would transmit her letter to you, and did not doubt, but her application would meet with your ready concurrence." The next day, Washington again wrote to Wharton, noting that Quaker women had waited upon him in an effort to gain the release of their husbands, and that he had allowed them to continue their journey "As they seem much distressed, humanity pleads strongly in their behalf." Such persistence and humanity by the Quaker women combined with their influence on a man of such stature as Washington to sway Pennsylvania's government to act. After receiving Washington's letters, the Council responded on 6 April that it would "cheerfully comply with the request of that Lady" and provide a passport for wagons. The Council informed Washington that the Assembly had passed a law that would apply to the prisoners for their release back in Pennsylvania. Two days later, the Council ordered that the prisoners be transported to Shippensburg in Pennsylvania, where they would "be informed of the Law passed for the further security of the Government" and set at liberty. Such a turnaround in language and approach to the Quaker prisoners by Pennsylvania's government, to the point that it gave instructions that the prisoners be "treated with the respect due to their Characters," indicates of the influence of Washington and the critical appeal made by the wives. The inroads made by the women did not end with Washington, as they appealed to Pennsylvania's President, Council, and Assembly on 10 April. Invoking the emotional distress held by the wives and children of these officials, eighteen Quaker women signed a representation affirming their belief in the innocence of their men and their pacific principles, urging that the officials would "Take no offence at the freedom of Women so deeply Interested as we are in this matter," "and that divine Providence may so influence your Hearts as to Grant our Earnest Request." Moved by this request, the Council ordered that the prisoners be brought to Lancaster according to the request of the wives. By 27 April agents had gathered the prisoners and received orders to send them to Pottgrove in Philadelphia County for their release. Eight months after their arrest and exile to Virginia, Pennsylvania's influential Quakers returned, albeit with two less among the ranks, as Thomas Gilpin and John Hunt had died from illness while in captivity. See "George Washington to Thomas Wharton," (April 1778), and Mary Pleasants, et. al., "Representation of the wives of the prisoners in Virginia, to the Congress, Board of War, President and Council, and Assembly of Pennsylvania, read in Council," (April 10, 1778), in *Miscellaneous Manuscripts*, Box 16 (1778-1787), FHL; *MSEC*, 11:457-458, 460-462, 468-473; *PYMS-MJM*, (September 1778), 178, B3.2, HCL; *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:401-402, 405.

providing local intelligence or possibly use their influence over Indians to the detriment of settlers on the frontier, and thus took the opportunity to remove the non-compliant Society of its leadership in the face of invasion. Held at Winchester, Virginia, Quaker leadership and the promoters of community and diplomacy in the culture of restraint had been removed from the public scene. Only the intervention of George Washington and the moving pleas of Quaker wives gained their release, but their physical and emotional energy had been exhausted. With attention and violence returning to the frontier, rebels now managed the frontier, balancing war with the culture of restraint as they saw fit.

War and Diplomacy along the Frontier

Following reports of violence in the winter of 1777-1778 and the continued urging by John Harris of Paxton to waste no time attacking the Indians, attention increasingly shifted to the frontier in the spring and summer of 1778, as displaced governing officials attempted to manage settler fears with the British still occupying Philadelphia. Henry Hamilton, Governor of Detroit, offered backing and encouraged Indians in the Ohio country to side with the British and attack the frontier. Following the assassination of the diplomatic and neutral Cornstalk, a Shawnee leader, by American soldiers in late 1777, Indians fell upon Pennsylvania's frontier settlers. General Edward Hand, commander at Ft. Pitt, led an expedition against Indians in the Ohio country in early 1778. In what is known as the "squaw campaign," Pennsylvania militia killed Delaware non-combatants. This only drove Indians deeper into the British orbit.⁶⁸ Attacks on the frontier increased and settlers pleaded for action. Arthur Buchanan, writing from the Kishacoquillas Valley in central Pennsylvania, gave a depressed report that all he wanted "is to have Justice done to all Men, to have Villains tried for their Offences," especially the Indians

⁶⁸ R. Douglas Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 66-69.

who continued to murder men, women, and children.⁶⁹ In addition to facing Indian raids, outlying settlements also faced Tory neighbors who grew bolder with rebel governance in flux and British forces in control of Philadelphia. Colonel John Piper in Bedford County related how arrested Tories confessed their “Intention of destroying both Men and Property; as these People thus in open rebellion are so numerous, there is great Reason to believe them as a part of a greater whole in some dangerous confederacy with the Common Enemy either at Phil^a or Detroit.”⁷⁰ On 19 May Pennsylvania’s Council applied to Congress to authorize an expedition into Indian country in order to destroy towns, for “it would be much the most effectual defence, and be attended with less expence, and the loss of fewer men, than any mode of mere defence.”⁷¹ Displaced refugees and their accounts made frontier violence a closer reality for rebel officials as refugees sought shelter in York and Lancaster, the temporary governing sites for the Continental Congress and Pennsylvania’s Council, respectively. With the Continental Army already in Pennsylvania and British forces making no movements in the eastern counties, the Council looked to utilize available military forces to address frontier security. Congress, however, turned to conciliation in hopes of maintaining friendly Indians in the American orbit, rather than risk alienating more Indians with military force.⁷²

Despite the increased violence on the frontier, Congress focused on not losing more Indians to British influence. To do this, rebel officials and friendly Indians relied on the shared practices and memories from the culture of restraint that existed across the Pennsylvania frontier.

⁶⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:487-488.

⁷⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:469.

⁷¹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:524-525. Timothy Pickering, Jr. wrote directly to George Washington in support of regular troops securing the frontier, repelling Indians incursions, and reducing the disaffected to obedience, arguing that “nothing in our opinion will be effectual but a regular force under the direction of good officers.” See *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:528-529.

⁷² *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:460, 467-468. John Carothers commented on displaced refugees, writing in late May from East Pennsborrow some 30-40 miles away from York and Lancaster, respectively: “The Indians Continue their savage cruelty upon our frontiers; Numbers of families are obliged to fly and Leave their all to the mercy of a savage foe, and numbers fall victims to their unabated cruelty.” See *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:578.

In June 1778 the Delaware leaders Captain White Eyes and John Killbuck, seeking to secure Delaware territory in the Ohio, thanked George Morgan, the American Indian agent at Ft. Pitt, for encouraging the Delawares “to hold fast to the Chain of Friendship” until the dark clouds of war disappeared. Whites Eyes displayed his position as an envoy and mediator, telling Morgan that he would relay information from Indians gathering at Detroit and that the Shawnee “desired me to let you know that they will join their Grandfather in coming to the Treaty.” He offered assurances to Morgan in the language and legacy of the culture of restraint, offering love and friendship from the Delawares and saying that Morgan had “made our Hearts glad & strong again.”⁷³ General Hand convened a conference with Delawares and Shawnee envoys in mid-June. He utilized practices and memories of friendship from the culture of restraint not out of compassion for the Indians, but from the need to maintain Indian allies. He described the violence on the frontier as being carried out by “foolish Young Men” of the Wyandots who had listened to the evil spirit, namely Detroit, but that “the United States are more willing to forgive an Injury, than to avenge it.” He encouraged White Eyes, John Killbuck, and the wise Delawares to bring Wyandot chiefs with them to a treaty later that summer at Ft. Pitt, as the United States would “be ready to take them by the Hand & enter into friendship with them.”⁷⁴ Though the culture of restraint had been sharply altered, as desires for territory and defensive alliance replaced brotherhood of man, old Indian observers and new American managers utilized the familiar language and symbolism in an attempt to give both sides some sense of peaceful intentions, and therefore reduce violence on the frontier.

Congress’ pursuit of diplomacy and trying to keep friendly Indians in the American orbit brought little relief for frontier settlements, as few other Indian groups observed restraint along

⁷³ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:587-588.

⁷⁴ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:601-602.

Pennsylvania's frontier. While the Delawares under the leadership of White Eyes and Killbuck declared friendship, the Shawnee for example joined the Wyandots in fighting with the British when American militia murdered Chief Cornstalk. Settlements in the Wyoming Territory to the north and along the foothills of the Appalachians to the west continued to suffer from a growing Indian war in the summer of 1778. Lieutenant Samuel Hunter at Ft. Augusta noted carnage in Wyoming, and added that both branches of the northern reaches of the Susquehanna River "are almost evacuated, and from all appearances the Towns of Northumberland & Sunbury will be the Frontier in less than twenty-four hours."⁷⁵ Matthew Smith of Paxton reiterated that the frontier had contracted, with the Blue Mountains acting as a physical barrier and frontier. He told of fleeing settlers being butchered, scalped, and some thrown into fires while still alive, and feared Indians would soon descend onto settlements in Lancaster County. Pennsylvania General John Armstrong insisted that only an attack on Indian towns and destruction of their homes and cornfields, which in turn would affect their non-combatants, could scale back Indian attacks. In a letter to George Bryan, acting President of the Council, dated 29 July, Armstrong argued that Indian towns, in this case the Senecas, ought to be a first target, and inquired about using allied Oneida Indians as guides.⁷⁶ Despite the violence and arguments for taking the war into Indian country, Bryan and the rest of Pennsylvania's Council found little support from the Continental Army. Washington's focus remained on the British army. When Major General Sir Henry Clinton, having replaced Howe, evacuated Philadelphia in mid-June 1778 and returned to New York, Washington followed. With the arrival of French forces, he hoped to attack the city. These events left the Supreme Executive Council with no significant force from the Continental Army to defend the frontier, aside from garrisons at posts such as Ft. Pitt. Congress had pursued

⁷⁵ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:631.

⁷⁶ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:614, 669.

diplomacy in June because its focus remained to the east, not to the west. Its use of diplomacy and restraint along the frontier served its needs of trying to avoid an escalation of frontier war, not out of firm friendship with Indians.⁷⁷

Despite the focus on diplomacy along the frontier, the limited degree of success with which rebel leaders managed relationships with friendly tribes provided an indication that the culture of restraint continued to alter without its Quaker managers. Reporting on developments in the Ohio country and Detroit, the pro-American White Eyes related that Indian groups had taken the tomahawk from Governor Hamilton and agreed to fall upon the Delawares. White Eyes had avoided listening to the rumors made by “Singing Birds,” but with eye witness accounts confirming the threat, White Eyes pleaded:

I have always told you that I shall hold fast to our friendship so long as the sun shall shine & the rivers run, & so my Heart is yet. I still hold fast to our Friendship, but you know that I am weak & am in Need of your assistance; if you do not assist me now as soon as possible I shall be ruined and destroyed, but if you will assist me now at this dangerous Time, then Nobody will then be able to break our Friendship.⁷⁸

Trusted by White Eyes to observe the culture of restraint and friendship, Morgan relayed the message to acting President Bryan on 24 August. Bryan received assurances from General Armstrong, who in knowing the diplomatic ties that existed between Pennsylvania and the Delawares, argued against Brigadier General Andrew Lewis’ opinion “that all the Indian Tribes are combined ags^t us” and stated, “I can scarcely think it general with the Delawares.” Though he acknowledged that depredations had recently occurred in the vicinity of Ft. Pitt, thus possibly implicating the Delawares, Armstrong showed restraint and faith in that General Edward Hand, having lately arrived from Ft. Pitt, could “furnish the Board of War with his sentiments on that

⁷⁷ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:632; *MSEC*, 11:532; Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 30-37.

⁷⁸ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:652-653.

department.”⁷⁹ Armstrong proved reassuring, and in wanting to secure friendly Indians rather than reject their requests for assistance, Andrew and Thomas Lewis, representing the United States, agreed to a treaty with the Delawares White Eyes, Killbuck, and Captain Pipe at Ft. Pitt on 17 September.⁸⁰

While on the surface the treaty signed at Ft. Pitt appeared to maintain positive relations with the Delawares as a whole, fragmented elements distrusted the Americans. Captain Pipe, having lost relatives to American aggression in the “squaw campaign,” viewed the treaty as deceptive and moved a group of Delawares to the Sandusky River in northwest Ohio and closer to British and Wyandot influence. Captain Pipe’s distrust of the Americans proved correct when a militia officer killed White Eyes on 5 November. This murder, along with the American failure to provide trade to the Delawares as agreed to in the treaty, only enhanced Captain Pipe’s influence and increasingly allowed the British to lure the Delawares, in need of trade goods, into their sphere. The culture of restraint, having been sharply altered by the growth of militant racism and the lack of a Quaker presence in managing Indian relations, such as Israel Pemberton had done with the Friendly Association in the last Indian war, no longer maintained the core beliefs of brotherhood of man and community. For those rebel officials who shaped frontier security policy, only the outer framework of symbols, language, and invocation of memories served their needs.⁸¹

The case of continuing Indian attacks during 1778, the threat they posed to morale and sources of food and fodder, reports of the Senecas preparing for war, Delaware resentment, and

⁷⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:717.

⁸⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 6:714.

⁸¹ Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 37-38; Hermann Wellenreuther, “The Succession of Head Chiefs and the Delaware Culture of Consent: The Delaware Nation, David Zeisberger, and Modern Ethnography,” in *Ethnographies and Exchanges: Native Americans, Moravians, and Catholics in Early North America*, ed. A. G. Roeber (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 34.

the willingness by frontier soldiers to pursue violence against Indians, whatever tribe, pushed Congress and the Continental Army toward major military action on the frontier. Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh, in command at Ft. Pitt, reported to President Bryan at the end of the year that he had erected a fort at the confluence of the Ohio and Beaver Rivers for the purpose of securing prisoners and stores, and another fort 100 miles west in the Ohio country. McIntosh expected that this latter installation, in the example set by Colonel Henry Bouquet in Pontiac's War, would "keep the Savages in aw, & Secure the peace of the frontiers effectually in this quarter hereafter if they are well supported, & also facilitate any future Enterprises that may be attempted that way."⁸² He envisioned future offensive operations against the Indians and had laid a foundation for those operations by building fortifications deeper into Indian country. Despite his preparations, McIntosh also expressed frustration with Pennsylvania's lack of militia support, as strict language in the militia law limited soldiers to serving two months on a rotating basis. He wrote to Bryan that because Pennsylvania suffered under Indian raids, "your own Interest, & Justice to the sufferers, as well as the reputation of the State demands every possible assistance to retaliate & cheque their repeated Barbarities and Ravages upon the poor helpless & peaceable Inhabitants of your Country."⁸³

Resolutions from Congress on 25 February 1779 continued to build upon McIntosh's efforts. The resolutions authorized the raising of five ranger companies for the frontier and directed Washington to "take effectual measures for the protection of the inhabitants & chastisement of the Savages."⁸⁴ Two days later Washington wrote President Joseph Reed, asking for intelligence on the frontier and Indian country, avenues into it, and waterways. The following

⁸² *PA, Ser. 1, 7:132.*

⁸³ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:11, 81-82, 132; Joseph R. Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July-September 1779* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 31.

⁸⁴ "US Continental Congress, Resolutions", (February 25, 1779), *Miscellaneous, APS.*

month Reed reported to the Council that Washington continued to take “vigorous measures for covering the frontiers of this State, and for making an attack upon the Indians in their own Country,” and encouraged officers to keep silent on the matter, in order that the upcoming venture may be successful and “restore Peace & Comfort to that distressed Country.”⁸⁵ For the rebels, so long as the British backed the Indians, peace could only be achieved by military arms.⁸⁶

As the Continental Army prepared for an expedition into Indian country, who constituted friendly and unfriendly tribes mattered little to those along the frontier. They understood the threat of military action against Indian homes and non-combatants as the only sure way to bring Indians to terms. In the spring of 1779 a dozen chiefs from friendly Delaware tribal bands, described by Congress’ Board of War as having evidenced their fidelity to the United States during the conflict, arrived in Philadelphia to visit Congress and Washington. Reports from the Ohio country also gave a glimmer of hope that the Wyandots, who had attacked the frontier the previous year, appeared ready to make peace. However much this good news from tribes bolstered prospects of peace, reality set back in as other tribes continued to prepare for war along the frontier. William McClay reported from Sunbury in late April that the “whole Force of the Six Nations seems to be poured down upon Us.”⁸⁷ Disconnect between Pennsylvania’s eastern counties and the western frontier counties is perfectly summarized by William Holliday in his petition to the Council. With the country infested with Indians and most frontier inhabitants fleeing, he exclaimed that the few remaining settlers were “in such a distres’d Condition that Pen can hardly Describe, nor your Honors can only have a faint Idea of, nor can it be Conceiv’d properly by any but such as are the subjects thereof, But while we suffer in the part of the County

⁸⁵ *MSEC*, 11:723-724; *PA, Ser. 1*, 7:268, 275-276.

⁸⁶ *PA, Ser. 1*, 7:210.

⁸⁷ *PA, Ser. 1*, 7:357.

that is most frontier, the Inhabitants of the Interior part of this County live at ease and safety.”⁸⁸ Frontier settlers and commanders grew frustrated with the lack of support from government officials in Philadelphia. From their perspective, only military force could bring satisfaction and security to the frontier. Colonel Daniel Brodhead, having replaced General McIntosh at Ft. Pitt, could not fathom making peace without a fight, as he wrote President Reed on 5 June: “There is nothing I so much dread as a dishonorable peace, for Heavens sake let every good Man hold up his Hands against it. [...] I am willing to suffer much more for the glorious cause for which I have & wish to bleed.”⁸⁹ The culture of restraint, devoid of its humanitarian impulse, could not hold back the resolve of the Continental Army or embattled frontier commanders from carrying the war into Indian country. They used diplomacy when it suited them.⁹⁰

In an effort to reduce Indian raids on the frontier, Major General John Sullivan’s expedition against the Six Nations sought to bring war to the Indian country and force the defense of villages.⁹¹ With the exception of the pro-American Oneida and Tuscarora, the other four tribes had allied with the British. Beginning in June, Sullivan marched his detachment of the Continental Army north through Pennsylvania toward New York. Writing from his headquarters in Wyoming on 30 July, Sullivan summarized his plans to Colonel Samuel Hunter of Pennsylvania: “Nothing can so Effectually draw the indians out of your Country, as Carrying the War into theirs, Tomorrow morning I shall march with the Whole Army for Tioga.”⁹² Reverend

⁸⁸ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:445.*

⁸⁹ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:467.*

⁹⁰ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:292, 516.*

⁹¹ Joseph Fischer’s account of the Sullivan Campaign provides a study of the Continental Army in the middle of the war. He argues that the Sullivan Campaign demonstrates how the army had developed in operational planning, intelligence gathering and interpretation, and tactics. The expedition, aided by the harsh winter of 1779-1780, reduced Indian raids on the frontier but did not bring peace nor make a significant impact on the outcome of the war. Sullivan’s scorched-earth policy only strengthened Indian resolve, their support to the British cause, and their desire for revenge in future raids. See Fischer, *A Well-Executed Failure*, viii, 192-195.

⁹² *PA, Ser. 1, 7:594.* Sullivan expressed disappointment that Pennsylvania had failed to provide soldiers for the expedition as Washington had earnestly requested. His disappointment turned into a snipe at Pennsylvania’s

William Rogers, a chaplain during the expedition, noted in his journal that though the Indians were a “secret, desultory and rapid foe, seizing every advantage and availing themselves of every defeat on our part,” they could not withstand the brave and disciplined troops under Sullivan. Rogers criticized the Indian way of war, as “They follow the unhappy fugitives with all the cruel and unrelenting hate of prevailing cowards, and are not satisfied with slaughter until they have totally destroyed their opponents.” Only the frown of Providence, according to Rogers, could prevent the Americans “from obtaining that which will insure peace and security to our frontiers, and afford lasting honor to all concerned.”⁹³ With such animosity held toward Indians for the violent murders of frontier settlers, the rebels felt justified in conducting a scorched-earth policy.

As Sullivan’s army and a concurrent expedition under Colonel Brodhead attacked Iroquois villages in the summer of 1779, strategy focused on targeting Indian homes, foods, and infrastructure to disrupt the lives of non-combatants and weaken their alliance with the British. William Rogers noted in his journal on 12 August that despite American troops forcing Indians from a hill, Sullivan arrived and reformed the ranks in order that they could destroy about 100 acres of Indian corn. The Board of War forwarded President Reed an extract of a letter from an officer in Sullivan’s army, dated 9 September:

Since the Action of the 29th of last Month, the Indians have fled at the Approach of our Army, & left their Settlements to our Mercy. Newtown, Konowarohala, French Katherines, Candai, Shayes, Gaghsconghwa & Konadasagea, are great heaps of Ruin ;--besides these, we have burnt a number of scattering Houses, & destroyed a large Country of Corn, Pumpkins, Cymblins, Cucumbers, Water Mellons, Peaches & Apples. This day we shall set out for Genessee, & lay that Country in ashes. The Enemy having retired to Niagara, we expect no Opposition as we Advance, but an Attack as we return.⁹⁴

defenses, concluding that since it did not provide substantial numbers as requested, certainly Pennsylvania “will be enabled to defend her Frontiers without much inconvenience.” See *PA, Ser. 1, 7:594; MSEC, 12:43.*

⁹³ “Journal of Rev. William Rogers, D. D., Chaplain of Gen. Hand’s Brigade in the Sullivan Expedition,” in *PA, Ser. 2, 15:281.*

⁹⁴ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:709.* In another instance of scorched-earth policy, John Hubley of Lancaster reported the American army burned the Indian town of Shehung and destroyed corn, beans, and other foods in its approach. See *PA, Ser. 1, 7:667.*

While warriors fled before advancing soldiers, the destruction of Indian villages did leave some cause for concern. In mid-September Richard Delapt of Bedford County noted Colonel Brodhead's destruction of Seneca towns at the Forks of the Allegheny River and proclaimed it a great event. His exposed position on the frontier sobered Delapt, however, as he described the nature of Indians to "look for revenge, and of course we must be the first Victims of their Rage, as we lie nearest and most convenient to them."⁹⁵ Inhabitants of Northumberland County expressed a similar fear, believing the withdrawal of Sullivan's Army in October would leave them exposed to Indian reprisals. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania's Council expressed optimism that Sullivan's and Brodhead's expeditions had made an effective impression on Indians to "dread the weight of the American arms" and had given a sense of safety and security to the frontier.⁹⁶ Brodhead seemed to feel that the show of force had a desired effect, as Delawares, Wyandots, and Shawnee Indians appeared well disposed. "Indeed," he stated, "the Delawares seem ready to follow me whenever I go."⁹⁷

Colonel Brodhead's handling of the Delaware Indians from the late fall of 1779 through late spring 1781 illustrated the back and forth use of diplomacy and military force in order to bring about a sense of security along the frontier. Following his destruction of Seneca villages during the summer, Brodhead witnessed tribes such as the Delawares and Shawnee appear friendly while at Ft. Pitt. Their friendly demeanor derived both from needing to maintain access to trade goods and in hearing of American soldiers attacking Indian villages. On 22 November he wrote President Reed that Delawares made promises to join him on future expeditions, and

⁹⁵ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:702.*

⁹⁶ *MSEC, 12:167-168.*

⁹⁷ *PA, Ser. 1, 7:710*; "Journal of Rev. William Rogers," in *PA, Ser. 2, 15:282*; *MSEC, 12:138*. Samuel McNeill's orderly book describes a skirmish between Americans and Indians on 29 August, and the adoption of Indian methods of violence along the frontier, where Americans claimed: "Fifteen scalps we got—the Hurry of our Pursuit obliged us to leave a number on the Ground not scalped." See "Journal of Samuel McNeill, B. Q. M. "His Orderly Book."" in *PA, Ser. 2, 15:756.*

encouraged officials in Philadelphia to supply him with goods to support the destitute Indians, especially the Wyandots who had been cut off from British support at Detroit following their treaty of amity with the Americans. Professions of Delaware friendship continued into February 1780 and Brodhead hoped to use the Delawares to his advantage, as “their chief Warriors are very desirous of having commissions in our Service and alledge that the Enemy Indian Captains have british Commissions, I should be glad to indulge them.”⁹⁸

Even when Indians killed five men and took three boys and three girls prisoners in March 1780, Brodhead held out for keeping the Delawares on friendly terms, despite suspicions falling upon them. Brodhead’s reliance on diplomacy did not derive from a fondness of the Delawares, but rather on a real military situation in which he found himself, stating that “If the Delawares are set against us with their numerous alliances they will greatly distress the frontier as my Force is quite too small to repell their invasions.”⁹⁹ Restraint proved to be fruitful, as he informed President Reed in May that he felt assured that the Delawares did not commit the crimes as had been first believed. While Brodhead held good faith with the Delawares, he understood that their observance of peace and restraint depended on their interests. On 13 May 1780 he warned that though the Delawares “continue their professions of Friendship and some of them are now with my Scouts,” he feared that fair words alone would soon not be enough to entice their services.¹⁰⁰

While restraint served Brodhead’s purposes of keeping violence to a minimum on the frontier, observance of the culture of restraint continued to depend on the interests of both Indians and Americans. Brodhead noted in September 1780 that the Delawares could change their approach to the Americans, and stated that if their friendship “is thought to be valuable, it is time that goods should be forwarded to clothe them, before winter, otherwise they will be

⁹⁸ *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:107, 120.

⁹⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:140.

¹⁰⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:22, 246, 249.

compelled to go where they can be supplied.”¹⁰¹ The “squaw campaign” and alienation of Captain Pipe, the murder of White Eyes, and the failure to nurture what remained of Delaware goodwill through trade goods served only to push Indians toward British support at Detroit and Niagara. William Maclay wrote from Sunbury on 9 April 1780: “And while the English continue to supply the Indians at Niagara, pay them and support them as at Present, Peace with the Indians (in my opinion) is unattainable.”¹⁰² Colonel Samuel Hunter concurred that Niagara acted as a source of trouble, and upon invoking his credentials of being on the frontier in the last Indian war, argued that only regular forces marching into Indian country could bring peace, as had the strong armies of Colonel Bradstreet and Colonel Bouquet. Brodhead followed in the example of Bradstreet and Bouquet when he anticipated the start of a general war and led a preemptive strike against the Delaware town of Coshocton following a rise in violence in early 1781. Assisted by one of the few remaining friendly Delawares, John Killbuck, Brodhead attacked the town, killing warriors, taking prisoners, and driving survivors into the arms of the British and their allied Indians. The culture of restraint’s visible framework of symbolic language and memory only proved useful in the diplomatic endeavors of both Indians and American officials when it suited them. Their interests of preserving trade, lands, independence, and security, however, overshadowed the ethical infusion of brotherhood and friendship brought by the Quakers, now removed from the public sphere.¹⁰³

Mainstream Quakers remained absent during the escalation in violence from 1778-1781 and could not exercise any of the influence they once had in promoting a culture of restraint. Marginalized in the early years of the war, with their leaders physically removed and sapped of energy with the imprisonment at Winchester, Quakers continued to suffer persecution in the

¹⁰¹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:559.

¹⁰² *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:172.

¹⁰³ *MSEC*, 12:530; *PA, Ser. 1*, 8:189-190, 9:39, 97-98, 161-162; Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 38.

latter half of the war. Samuel Fisher remained under suspicion following his return from Winchester in 1778. Imprisoned in 1779 for allegedly trying to convey intelligence to the British, Fisher noted a rumor on 27 September that Congress had considered detaining Friends and preventing the Yearly Meeting. Fisher's resentment over his treatment following Winchester and his new arrest seemed to fluctuate. On 28 October 1779 he expressed satisfaction at the British victory at Savannah, hoping it would disunite the French and Americans and "bring the latter to a sense of their error and restore peace to the inhabitants of this land."¹⁰⁴ Yet on 6 February 1780 he found "however irksome a long confinement may appear, I have sometimes been ready to conclude that I have enjoyed more freedom and ease of mind than many others that are not thus restrained, yea and much more than I myself should have enjoyed, had I been at liberty on terms not satisfactory to the feelings of my own mind."¹⁰⁵ Fisher may have reached peace of mind while in prison, but his religious brethren continued to be persecuted and shut out of exercising influence on public policy. Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council indicate in early February 1780 that Quakers suffered hardship and oppression over "the collection of Public dues, Militia and other fines, by the persons employed in those services."¹⁰⁶ Violence continued into the fall of 1781, as people in Philadelphia paraded down streets plundering Quaker homes. Upon gathering at the Meeting for Sufferings, Quakers petitioned President William Moore, the rest of the Council, and the Assembly to exercise the powers of civil authority, "originally instituted for the support of public peace and good order, and the preservation of the just rights of the people."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Samuel Fisher, "Samuel Fisher Diary, 1779-1781," in *Joseph Wharton Family Papers*, Coll. No. RG 5-162, FHL. Hereafter: Fisher, "Diary, 1779-1781," FHL.

¹⁰⁵ Fisher, "Diary, 1779-1781," FHL.

¹⁰⁶ *MSEC*, 12:244.

¹⁰⁷ "Society of Friends to the President (William Moore), Executive Council, and the General Assembly of Pennsylvania" in *Sol Feinstone Collection of the American Revolution*, (December 6, 1781), Mss. B. F327, APS; *PA, Ser. 1*, 9:450.

With no documented response from rebel officials, and faced with continued resentment and persecution, active Quaker participation in security affairs had been removed.¹⁰⁸

Confronted with a burgeoning Indian conflict in 1778 that continued into 1781, rebel officials in Congress and Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council used diplomacy and military force with Indian tribes in an attempt to be secure and keep relative peace along the frontier. Having removed Quakers from public positions and their ties to frontier diplomacy, the rebels utilized the practices and language of diplomacy when it suited their needs, and resorted to armed violence to subdue tribes when diplomacy and restraint failed to keep Indians from raiding frontier settlements. Sullivan's and Brodhead's expeditions in 1779 and 1781 placed the pressure of American arms upon the homes of those Indians who actively sided with the British. With this military demonstration on the part of American forces, diplomacy took on a new role in the overtures for peace from 1782-1786. The legacy and framework of the culture of restraint remained, yet the purpose and intent behind peace had changed.

Peace and the Legacy of a Culture of Restraint

During the fall of 1782, Pennsylvania's state and frontier officials and the Continental Army led by George Washington approached the frontier and Indian relations in different manners. Iroquois retaliatory raids along the frontier in 1780 created the impression among Pennsylvanians that the frontier remained unsecure and necessitated carrying on the war against Indians. For Washington, however, overtures of peace with the British led him to restrain military expeditions against Indians. With heightened violence exhibited along the frontier where both Indians and Americans attacked the other's homes and fields, to allow military expeditions risked allowing racial animosities to reduce prospects of peace. James Potter, Vice President of the Supreme Executive Council, received his appointment to lead troops on an expedition into

¹⁰⁸ Fisher, "Diary, 1779-1781," FHL.

Indian territory on 16 September 1782, yet a week later Washington sent a letter to the Council directing an end to expeditions against Indians. The Council quickly followed up on Washington's directive and forwarded orders to lieutenants of frontier counties to call out no more militia, informing them that Washington had "received intelligence that the British have called in all the savages, and that no more parties are to be permitted to be sent out against the frontiers."¹⁰⁹

While Washington ordered restraint, frontier commanders stood torn in being on the frontlines and receiving continued reports of Indian raids. Brigadier General William Irvine, having assumed command at Ft. Pitt, wrote in early October of his intent to carry on an expedition into Indian country, "being apprehensive of the further ravages of the Indians."¹¹⁰ At Sunbury, Colonel Samuel Hunter wrote Potter concerning violence in the Wyoming territory and described Indians as a "Perfidious Enemy" going against the assurances that Washington had received from British authorities. He claimed that "It appears very Like a scheme of General Carleton to put a stop to our Expedition, Which I wish had gone on, As it Certainly would put a stop to the Enemy from Committing Any Hostilities this Fall on the Frontiers."¹¹¹ Believing that previous expeditions had a degree of success and witnessing continued violence, Hunter did not trust diplomacy or British ability to rein in Indian warriors, and felt that only military force could secure the frontier. Despite their wishes to retaliate against Indian raids that continued into the next year, frontier commanders followed Washington's orders. The Council also removed a source for promoting violence against Indians by nullifying rewards for scalps. The prospect of

¹⁰⁹ *MSEC*, 13:370, 380-381, 408-409; *PA, Ser. 1*, 9:642.

¹¹⁰ *MSEC*, 13:406.

¹¹¹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 9:657.

ending the war with Britain, not brotherhood and friendship with Indians, necessitated that American officials pursue diplomacy according to the practices in the culture of restraint.¹¹²

News of peace agreements between the United States and Britain initiated endeavors to conclude peace with Indians along the frontier. Violence continued into April 1783, as Council President John Dickinson informed Congress that some forty Pennsylvanians had been lately killed or taken by the Indians, and urged its members to take speedy measures toward “making Peace with the Indian nations.”¹¹³ In considering the articles of peace with Britain, Dickinson understood that with frontier forts being ceded to the United States, British material support would be removed from Indians, thereby forcing them to rely on American goodwill. With this leverage, Dickinson argued that if raids continued, the “armies that have conquered the king of Great Britain” should turn on the Indians and “extirpate them from the Land where they were born and now live: But, that if they behave as they ought to do, they shall be treated not only justly, but friendly.”¹¹⁴ Dickinson adhered to the theory of conquest in approaching peace with Indians, and stood ready to use military force to bring Indians to terms. Congress also observed the conquest theory and issued a resolve on 1 May 1783 to “take the most effectual measures to inform the several Indian Nations, on the frontiers of the United States,” of peace with Britain. The young, confederated nation had “conquered” Britain and lands east of the Mississippi River through military force, and now stood ready “to enter into friendly treatys with the different tribes.”¹¹⁵ Through its shared language and memories, the altered culture of restraint allowed for peace to be bridged across the frontier.

¹¹² *MSEC*, 13:538.

¹¹³ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:45.

¹¹⁴ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:45. For further discussion of the conquest theory approach and how it guided commissioners from Congress and Pennsylvania in their peace negotiations with Indians, see Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 202-226.

¹¹⁵ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:46.

In pursuing peace, intermediaries served as the critical links between Indians and Americans, just as Peter Alrichs, Mattahorn, William Penn, Conrad Weiser, and Teedyuscung had done in the past. Ephraim Douglas served as the American envoy in the summer of 1783 to the western tribes. He spoke with Captain Pipe in first meeting with Delawares along the Sandusky River. Though he had sided with the British, Captain Pipe sought to remain independent from both the British and Americans, as he angrily spoke with British commander Lieutenant Colonel Arent DePeyster at Detroit in November 1781: “Father! Many lives have already been lost on your account! Nations have suffered and been weakened! Children have lost Parents, brothers, and relatives! Wives have lost Husbands! It is not known how many more may perish before Your war will be at end!”¹¹⁶ Still seeking to maintain independence in discussions of peace in 1783, Captain Pipe treated Douglas “with greater Civility than is usual with them in time of profound Peace.”¹¹⁷ Douglas thought that Captain Pipe was dissimulating when he declared he had been pushed into war by the Wyandots and Shawnee, since the Delaware leader’s friendly demeanor resulted from his need to gain favor from the Americans and find a middle, neutral ground now that support from the British had dried up with their peace with the Americans. Douglas continued onto Detroit where DePeyster, “professed the strongest desire of bringing about a reconciliation between the United States and the several Indian Nations,” but said he had to await word from superiors before speaking with Indians regarding any matter of boundaries.¹¹⁸ DePeyster stayed true in promoting peace, speaking to an Indian council of the folly of continuing to fight and that he could not give them any future assistance against the Americans. Understanding that to continue the fight meant greater sacrifice, and with no other

¹¹⁶ As quoted in Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 39. See James H. O’Donnell, III, ed., “Captain Pipe’s Speech: A Commentary on the Delaware Experience, 1775-1781,” *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 64 (1992), 126-133.

¹¹⁷ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:83.

¹¹⁸ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:86.

options, the Indians leaned on the culture of restraint and gave signs of friendship toward working on a future treaty. Douglas continued to Ft. Niagara, learning that the Six Nations “would never quietly submit” to Americans seizing their land.¹¹⁹ Having made his rounds, Douglas submitted his report to the Board of War indicating that the Indians are “heartily tired of war and sincerely disposed to Peace.”¹²⁰ In the altered culture of restraint, the idea of conquest and lack of British support brought Americans and Indians, respectively, to discuss peace terms.

The culture of restraint’s legacy continued to be demonstrated in the United States’ investment in diplomacy over military force on the frontier. In Congress’ report on Indian Affairs dated 15 October, the hostile tribes are described as being “seriously disposed to a pacification, yet they are not in a temper to relinquish their territorial claims without further struggles.”¹²¹ Not only would Indians resist attempts to expel them from their lands, but Congress believed that military force would only drive them into the open arms of the British in Canada. Such a scenario multiplied in effects, as British-backed tribes would be formidable in war and would choose to trade with the British in times of peace. Congress made other financial considerations in its assessment of how to proceed with peace negotiations. Discounting the aggressive actions and massacres perpetrated by American soldiers against Indians, Congress labeled Indians as the aggressors who had violated neutrality, attacked settlements, and had been defeated by military expeditions, such as those led by Sullivan and Brodhead. At the same time, however, Congress wanted to avoid aggravating the Indians and fighting an expensive war. In the altered culture of restraint, expenses, not brotherhood or friendship, helped promote dialogue

¹¹⁹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:88.

¹²⁰ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:83-90. Douglas reported eleven tribes at the council held with Depeyster, noting the “Chipewas, Otawas, Wyandots or Hurons, Shawneze, Delawares, Kickaboos, Oweochtanoos, Miamis, Pootawotamies and Pienkishas with a part of the Senecas; most of whom gave evident marks of their Satisfaction at seeing a subject of the United States in that Country.” See *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:86-87.

¹²¹ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:120. Regarding the friendly Oneida and Tuscarora tribes, who “adhered to the cause of America and joined her arms in the course of the late war,” Congress instructed commissioners to reassure the tribes of the United States’ friendship. See *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:122-123.

and seek peace. The report found that in negotiations, “care ought to be taken neither to yield nor require too much, to accommodate the Indians as far as the public good will admit.”¹²² Congress sought to find a middle ground that would not cause resentment among Indians and yet provide terms favorable to the American victory. Peace required that the United States acknowledge a balance in its interests and those of the Indians so as not to aggravate them, thus promoting restraint on the frontier.¹²³

Though Pennsylvania played second fiddle to the United States in the peace negotiations, its government’s participation in treaties with Indians over the course of 1784 reflected the lasting impact of the culture of restraint. If negotiations between Indians and the United States faltered, the Council wanted to ensure peace and instructed Pennsylvania’s commissioners to make a separate treaty if necessary. Pennsylvania could lean on its history and relationship with Indians to achieve peace. Samuel J. Atlee, William Maclay, and Francis Johnson, Pennsylvania’s commissioners, relied on shared memory with Indians as they continued with preparations to meet with the Six Nations, Shawnee, and Delawares. With the state’s long relationship with these tribes, the commissioners recommended that Samuel Weiser, son of Conrad Weiser, help act as interpreter and serve notices, for his “Father was much esteemed by the Six Nations and formerly their Interpreter at almost every Treaty for a series of years.”¹²⁴ Further invocation of the past and the culture of restraint occurred in August, as the Assembly resolved that a

¹²² *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:121.

¹²³ Hostages, as they had been in the last Indian war, remained an important issue to promoting restraint, as Congress stated that all prisoners should be delivered up in order to extinguish “as far as possible all occasion for future Animosities, disquiet & contention.” See *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:121-122. Just as the removal of Quakers from the public sphere had removed a core component in the culture of restraint, so too did Pennsylvania’s joining in the confederation see its primacy reduced and replaced by the United States in determining Indian relations. On 20 September 1783 Congress began to define Pennsylvania’s authority in conducting treaties with natives, giving Pennsylvania the authority to purchase Indian lands within its borders, but clearly restricting it from dealing with issues of war or peace. With its power defined according to Congress, Pennsylvania’s Assembly empowered the Council to appoint commissioners to meet with Indians and purchase lands, “agreeable to ancient usage.” As frontier policy became absorbed in the duties of the confederated Congress, Pennsylvania officials exercised less management of the culture of restraint. See *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:105-108, 111.

¹²⁴ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:266.

conference with Indians must take place in part to restore “that ancient friendly and profitable intercourse with the Indians and guarding against all occasions of war with them.”¹²⁵ In terms of gift giving and finances for the conferences, the commissioners received instructions to purchase lands from the Indians “agreeable to ancient usage,” or rather the era of William Penn and his just practice of offering payment for land.¹²⁶ The treasury issued a warrant for £3,375 worth of goods for purchasing lands, another demonstration of the financial and trading aspect of the culture of restraint. While trade and economic relationships offered a very tangible aspect of establishing peace with Indians, perhaps the more important factor remained in the approach. The culture of restraint, having relied so much on community and friendship, had limited violence over the years because of the mutual respect among parties. In their final instructions, commissioners were admonished to regulate their “conduct by the principles of Justice.”¹²⁷

Separate treaties with Indians restored peace with Indians. Pennsylvania commissioners working alongside those representing the United States first met with the Six Nations at Ft. Stanwix in October 1784. Interestingly, the Marquis de Lafayette took part in the opening stages, praising allied nations while blaming those who had been enemies of America’s freedom. The commissioners’ report described the Indian response as breathing “the spirit of peace,” with the Mohawks specifically declaring their repentance for their errors.¹²⁸ For the Six Nations, particularly those who sided with the British, the lack of British support and American declarations to use force if necessary left them with no options but to seek peace. Pennsylvania commissioners noted the need to exercise patience as they worked to secure title to Indian lands.

¹²⁵ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:316-317.

¹²⁶ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:317.

¹²⁷ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:317, 320-321; *MSEC*, 14:46; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 211. Pennsylvania’s commissioners also received instructions on treating the issue of prisoners. Like Congress’ position, all prisoners taken by Indians must be returned, both white settlers and any black slaves, “as proof of the sincere disposition of the Indians to establish peace and friendship.” See *PA, Ser. I*, 10:325-326.

¹²⁸ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:346.

By mid-November patience had paid off, as they reported a successful negotiation with the Six Nations for purchasing lands within Pennsylvania.¹²⁹

Congressional and Pennsylvania commissioners next moved to Ft. McIntosh to treat with Western tribes, where the fortification that had acted as a foundation for military excursions into Indian country now served as a seat for peace. Colonel Josiah Harmar wrote from Ft. McIntosh on 15 January 1785 of the tough stance issued by the Continental Commissioners toward the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Delawares, that since the Indians had fought with the British and had suffered invasion and defeat, they were now considered conquered peoples, “and had therefore nothing to expect from the United States, but must depend altogether upon their Lenity and Generosity.”¹³⁰ With the United States holding a firm stance, the Western Indians likely found satisfaction in dealing with Pennsylvania’s representatives. The culture of restraint’s legacy became evident as the commissioners successfully acquired un-purchased lands within the state, “agreeably to an ancient custom,” with the Indians acknowledging that they had been dealt with “kindly” and “generously.” They declared that “Pennsylvania has never deceived or wronged them, and thanked her, not only from their lips, but from their hearts.”¹³¹ However much pressure Indians may have faced without British backing, they utilized memories with Pennsylvania in the culture of restraint to make peace. Upon completion of the treaty at Ft. McIntosh, the Supreme Executive Council summarized Pennsylvania’s relationship with Indians along the frontier: “we have every reason to believe that the affections of the Indians are now conciliated, their confidence gained, and their former friendship restored.”¹³²

¹²⁹ Pennsylvania’s land purchases from the Six Nations amounted to \$5,000 in goods. See Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 213.

¹³⁰ *PA, Ser. I*, 10:395.

¹³¹ *MSEC*, 14:366.

¹³² *PA, Ser. I*, 10:346, 357; *MSEC*, 14:261-262, 367. A third treaty in January 1786 at Ft. Finney established peace with the Shawnee. Pennsylvania’s land purchases at the Ft. McIntosh treaty amounted to \$2,000 in goods. See Calloway, *Revolution in Indian Country*, 282; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 213.

As formal treaties restored peace to the frontier, it became evident that the original spirit and caretakers of the culture of restraint had been removed from having influence on frontier policy. Quakers could not effectively manage the culture of restraint because new settlers pushed the frontier farther west from Quaker residences in eastern Pennsylvania and Friends no longer held influential public positions. On 8 March 1782 Pennsylvania militia murdered ninety-six Christian and friendly Delawares in the Ohio country. An extract of a letter from George Niser, dated 5 April 1782, described the events:

The Moravian Indian Congregation at Sandusky is butchered, as it is reported by the *Scotch*. They came and told them, they must prepare directly for Death. The Indians requested but an hours Time for this Purpose, which was granted. They went to their Meeting house to join in Prayers to the Lord. After the hour had passed, they fell upon the, and butcher'd all of them in cold Blood, *in the meeting house* and then set fire to the House.¹³³

The Gnadenhütten Massacre, also known as the Moravian Massacre, found Quakers agonized but utterly ineffectual in not being able to stop the racially-charged killing of the peaceful Indians. Anthony Benezet, writing a friend in London in April 1784, described the wicked disposition of frontier peoples, whose promotion of extermination at Gnadenhütten exemplified “a most shoking instance of inconsiderate barbarity; scarce to be paralelled in history; they were a pious, innocent people, who had manifested themselves to be our particular Friends.”¹³⁴ While the frontier offered rich land and opportunity for future settlement, Benezet warned that in order for easy living, immigrants must be informed of the necessity for virtue and good understanding with Indians. Quaker influence in the public sphere had been removed. No longer able to guide public policy, Quakers could only attempt philanthropic endeavors with Indians.

Despite the Gnadenhütten Massacre, glimmers of a lasting impact of the culture of restraint’s framework continued to be seen. In May 1785 a Delaware Indian murdered one man

¹³³ *PA, Ser. 1, 9:525.*

¹³⁴ Anthony Benezet, “Letter to Caspar Wistar,” (April 25, 1784), *Anthony Benezet Letters*, Coll. No. 852, HCL.

and wounded three others. Captured, the Indian appeared ready for trial when the Honorable George Bryan, former vice president of the Supreme Executive Council and now a judge in Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, offered his opinion on how to hand out justice: "the Indian, if he demands it, has a right to a party Jury, half foreigners. Wm Penn, the founder, in 1683, established something of this nature, in respect to damages done by Indians; and I have in my memory some traces of a tryal formerly at Chester, of an Indian for rape, where six Indians were called in."¹³⁵ William Penn's provision that trials involving Indians should have mixed juries, established over 100 years prior, offered an avenue to dispense justice and avoid letting this case of violence spiral out of control. The legacy of restraint continued into the next year, as James Dickinson, commissioned by Pennsylvania to survey recently purchased Indian lands, spoke with the Seneca Chief Whole Face regarding Indian uneasiness with the survey. Dickinson's approach utilized the language of restraint, as he assured Whole Face that "the great Council of the State would do every Thing on their side to keep alive Friendship, To maintain Peace, To Increase Friendship, To support a Union & to make Trade Flourish between their Brothers the Indians and themselves, as long as Time shall measure the rolling year, & uttermostly endeavour the Happiness of both Nations."¹³⁶ Whole Face's response could not settle the issue, but he offered powerful symbolism and language speaking to a lasting legacy of the culture of restraint. He spoke of a future council in the spring at Ft. Pitt, where the Six Nations and their brethren "hoped to make an endless Peace with their Brothers of the thirteen Fires."¹³⁷ The symbolism of thirteen fires, in reference to the thirteen United States, speaks to the changed inner core of the culture of restraint. Whereas community and brotherhood, as promoted by the Quakers, had kindled a

¹³⁵ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:464-465, 474. Larry Gragg, "Bryan, George," *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00112.html> (accessed January 21, 2015).

¹³⁶ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:740.

¹³⁷ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:741.

single fire in Philadelphia during Pennsylvania's management of the culture of restraint, that spiritual inner light had now been removed and dispersed across thirteen fires. True intent had changed, yet the framework remained the same, as Whole Face concluded in the language of their forefathers the hope that "every obstruction would be removed & we should walk the Woods together as Brothers aught to do, in Love & Pleasure."¹³⁸

Conclusion

Frontier security policy underwent a change in character and management as Pennsylvania became absorbed in the confederated United States' fight for independence. The culture of restraint, having for over a century maintained relative peace and smoothed over incidents of local violence between Indians and settlers through the promotion of community and brotherhood, had yielded ground and preference to military force in the middle of the eighteenth century. Pressure in 1765 brought tribes back to the peace table, and with the French evicted from the continent, Indians had no choice but to deal with British imperial officials and only to a lesser extent with Pennsylvania's government, much less with the Quakers who exercised minimal influence. The language, symbols, and memory of the culture of restraint acted as a familiar diplomatic road that allowed both sides of the middle ground to exchange pleasantries and live in relative peace along Pennsylvania's frontier for ten years. With the advent of the War for American Independence in 1775, Quaker influence and Pennsylvania's ability to deal with its frontier continued to diminish. The culture of restraint retained its outer framework, yet its purpose had changed from promoting community to suiting the needs of rebels in their fight for independence.

While the frontier remained relatively quiet in the first several years of war, events along the Atlantic seaboard affected the culture of restraint as those with the longest history and

¹³⁸ *PA, Ser. 1*, 10:741.

influence over Indian relations on the frontier, the Quakers, became subject to increasing marginalization. As Pennsylvania and the seat of the rebel government in Philadelphia came under pressures of invasion, the reaction against Quakers increased. Rebels, especially those of western counties who harbored resentment from the previous Indian war, identified Quakers as undesirables because of their unwillingness to support the rebels' divinely approved fight for independence. Fearing that Quakers would assist the British, or worse, use their influence over Indians to the detriment of American settlements, rebel officials took the opportunity to remove Quaker leadership with the fall of Philadelphia. The eight-month imprisonment effectively sapped the energy of the Society of Friends, its main leaders such as Israel Pemberton, and its ability to engage in the public sphere and affect policy. Continued persecution in the latter half of the conflict kept pressure on the Quakers, who could not wiggle free to offer any role on the frontier.

With Quakers removed from the public scene, and the outbreak of sustained violence on the frontier in 1778, rebel officials in the Continental Congress and Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council pursued a balance of diplomacy and military force with the Indian threat. Frontier settlers and commanders desired to use force out of revenge and racial animosity, and the Sullivan and Brodhead expeditions of 1779 and 1781 brought war to Indian settlements in an attempt to take pressure off frontier settlements. While the undercurrents and mechanisms of the culture of restraint still remained after their renewal from 1765-1775, diplomacy could not effectively ensure peace with the multitude of forces at play along the frontier during the conflict, giving frontier commanders more reason to use force.

The overtures for peace beginning in 1782 provided the final demonstration that the culture of restraint retained only the outer shell of its original self and purpose. Peace with Indian

tribes, from the perspective of the confederated United States, developed more from fatigue and wanting to avoid an expensive war that would only drive tribes back to the British and disrupt the fur trade than from a desire to promote community as under Quaker and Indian forefathers. Yet achieving peace required the old diplomatic road as recognized by both Indians and Americans from the culture of restraint. Language, symbols, and references to forefathers and the ancient friendship bridged over not only physical barriers, but also allowed for sides with different interests to find a common ground and make peace. The culture of restraint endured only in form; its spiritual core of community as promoted by William Penn, the Quakers, and Indian forefathers had been removed.

EPILOGUE

Colonial Pennsylvania's security culture of restraint began with a quick episode of violence in 1631 when Delaware Indians destroyed the Dutch colony of Swanendael. Experiencing the damage and disruption caused by the outbreak of violence, Indians and European settlers began developing practices and an understanding that each could benefit through trade partnerships, alliances, and dialogue rather than military force to address sources of tension. One hundred and fifty-five years later, at the end of the colonial period and into the early years of the Republic, the situation along the frontier preserved many of these features. While details may have shifted – the frontier had moved west from the Delaware River Valley to the Ohio country; the Delawares and Susquehannocks had migrated and become absorbed in a larger collection of Indian groups including Shawnee and Iroquois; Dutch and Swedish settlers too were part of a larger group of people called Americans; and Euro-American military force now sent messages of power and authority to Indian tribes – both Indians and Americans continued to turn to dialogue to secure trade and diplomatic relationships that would ensure their security and prosperity. This ability and willingness to engage in dialogue after such an extensive period, especially when the last thirty years saw two devastating conflicts between Indians and settlers along Pennsylvania's frontier, resulted from a distinct security culture that grew, matured, altered in purpose, and remained recognizable by both Indians and Euro-Americans across the expanse of time examined in this dissertation.

In the course of European settlement and interaction with neighboring Indians in what became the colony of Pennsylvania, a viable method for security took shape that brought

unparalleled peace in comparison to the rest of the colonies along the Atlantic seaboard. Whereas other settlement areas fought wars with Indians within their first decades of existence, Europeans in Pennsylvania did not fight in a major Indian conflict for 120 years. Local incidents of violence occurred to be sure, but none snowballed into a general war that threatened the integrity of either Indian or European settlements. This anomaly in colonial American history has begged the question of how and why did peace become viewed as a viable security choice for Colonial Pennsylvania?

The foundation of Colonial Pennsylvania proper as a Quaker colony founded by William Penn and his religious brethren, as well as the continued governance of the colony by their descendants, generates the perception that because Pennsylvania's government leadership rested largely with Quakers, traditionally identified as pacifists because of their peace testimony, the colony did not engage in an Indian war for much of its history. Quaker governance and pacifism have also served to explain the colony's poor military reaction when violence did arrive in the French and Indian War, eventually leading to the loss of Quaker political power during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The fact, however, that a security culture of restraint had developed in the fifty years prior to William Penn's arrival in the Delaware River Valley requires a reevaluation of the long period of peace between Indians and Europeans as well as a reconsideration of how Quakers approached security in Pennsylvania. When Penn and the Quaker leadership arrived, they came to recognize that a distinct understanding and way of doing things already existed between the local Indians and European settlers in the Delaware River Valley. More importantly, they recognized that it was working in terms of maintaining peace and security. Accepting this, Quakers infused their ideals of brotherhood and community into the practices and understanding already in place with Indians, leading to a true friendship between

Indians and settlers in the first decades of the colony's existence. The Long Peace did not result from happenstance. Rather, Quakers maintained a viable security method already in play in their colony, one that in the end could not withstand such forces as immigration, empire, and geography from exerting pressure on the culture of restraint and ultimately bringing war to Pennsylvania.

Pennsylvania's Long Peace came to a violent halt in 1755, yet the culture of restraint, having become embodied in shared language, memory, and symbols, continued to endure. The French and Indian War and the War for American Independence broke the sense of community and friendship between Indians and Euro-Americans. By the end of America's fight for independence, Quakers, those who instilled these ethical virtues into the understanding and practice of the culture of restraint, no longer held positions that affected frontier policy or nurtured the ideals of community. Their removal from the public sphere, both through imprisonment and in being labeled Tories by American forces, in effect hollowed out the culture of restraint's ethical impetus. Indians and Americans no longer concerned themselves with brotherhood. Rather, they sought only trade and diplomatic ties, much like the first interactions in the Delaware River Valley during the seventeenth century, to ensure they could again gain access to goods and achieve a sense of peace and security for their settlements.

To bridge the frontier paths once traveled by ancestors, where two wars had felled trees and strewn boulders, both Indians and Americans turned to the outward signs of the culture of restraint. In its lasting legacy, the culture of restraint offered Indian leaders and American commissioners memories and language, such as Brother Onas and the ancient Chain of Friendship, to attempt to rebuild the old diplomatic road across the frontier in treaty conferences held from 1784-1786. This peace, void of both parties observing community and brotherhood,

did not last. Settler encroachment into the Ohio country sparked the Northwest Indian War. In its continued legacy, the memories and language of the security culture of restraint again aided in the peace process, as Quakers, no longer a political force that could control frontier policy, now offered their philanthropic efforts and ancient ties with Indians to bring an official end to the war.

The Security Culture of Restraint and the Northwest Indian War

Despite the peace treaties made with Indians at the end of the War for American Independence and the perception by American officials that they had “conquered” pro-British Indians by right of victory in the war, military force did not immediately bring about peace. By the spring of 1786, with American settlers encroaching upon lands and the British providing material support, Indians in the Northwest Territory resumed their attacks, marking the failure of conquest theory and the dictation of peace to Indians with military force. In July 1787 Henry Knox, serving as Secretary at War under the Articles of Confederation, believed that the nation could not maintain an Indian war and wanted to follow the British custom of paying for ceded lands. He urged the negotiation of new treaties instead of military force, as the “strong principles of humanity [...] forbid a war for an object which may be obtained by peaceable and honorable means.”¹ The following month the Committee on Indian Affairs issued a policy of conducting peace talks with as many tribes as possible. Keeping expenses and spent energy to a minimum certainly played a role in wanting to reach multiple Indian tribes at the same time, but the shift from conquest to diplomacy and traits of restraint is evident: “Instead of a language of superiority and command; may it not be politic and Just to treat with the Indians more on a footing of equality, convince them of the Justice and humanity as well as power of the United

¹ As quoted in Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of Political Anomaly* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 54.

States and of their disposition to promote the happiness of the Indians.”² Despite Knox’s and the Committee’s advice and changed outlook, the first major attempt at making peace with Indians failed. In the deliberations at Ft. Harmar, Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, continued to speak boldly with Indians, leaving them with a choice between peace and war. Not in a position to resist St. Clair, the Indians, including Iroquois, Wyandots, and Delawares, resentfully signed the treaties. The peace proved false and Indian attacks along the frontier continued.³

The Washington Administration’s initial attempts to defeat the Western Indian Confederacy, in what is known as the Northwest Indian War, resulted in disaster. Allied Indians defeated General Josiah Harmar’s force in October 1790. The following year, St. Clair led a response with a hastily organized and poorly equipped expedition of 1,400 regulars and militia against the Confederacy. On 4 November 1791 about 1,000 allied warriors, including those of the Miamis, Shawnee, Delawares, Iroquois, and Wyandots under the leadership of the Miami chief Little Turtle, attacked and annihilated St. Clair’s force. In what is known as the Battle of the Wabash or more appropriately St. Clair’s Defeat, Indians won their greatest and most deadly triumph over the U.S. Army. Frontier settlers reacted with fear upon hearing of St. Clair’s defeat: “We never go to our fields but we are seized with an involuntary fear, which lessens our strength, and weakens our labour.”⁴ Unexpected noises, especially at night, gave rise to the gravest concerns. The warning of a dog barking at night caused one settler to “leap out of bed and run to arms; my poor wife with panting bosom and silent tears takes leave of me, as if we were to see each other no more [...] I place all my servants at the windows, and myself at the

² As quoted in Prucha, *American Indian Treaties*, 55.

³ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 218, 223; Prucha, *American Indian Treaties*, 53-58.

⁴ As quoted in Alan D. Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness: Anthony Wayne’s Legion in the Old Northwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 10.

door, where I am determined to perish.”⁵ Harmar’s and St. Clair’s defeats continued to demonstrate that military force had failed to “conquer” the Western tribes. His administration having suffered two military setbacks, Washington hoped to reach peace with Indians.⁶

As Washington pursued peace with Indians and called upon Major General Anthony Wayne to prepare a third military expedition should the peace movement fall apart, the culture of restraint continued to have a lasting legacy both in its memory and in a philanthropic effort by its old caretakers, the Quakers. In April 1792 Washington entertained an Indian delegation led by the Seneca chief Red Jacket. While in Philadelphia, Red Jacket made a courtesy call to Pennsylvania governor Thomas Mifflin, whom he addressed with the symbolic title Brother Onas. Looking upon William Penn’s portrait, the namesake of the Iroquois designation for Pennsylvania’s governors, Red Jacket declared the sight “brought fresh to our minds the friendly conferences that used to be held between the former governor of Pennsylvania and our tribes and the love which your forefathers had of Peace.”⁷ Hoping for peace and that the same spirit would prevail among the Western tribes, Red Jacket’s expression demonstrates a continued legacy of the culture of restraint as he looked upon past memories of friendship between ancestors in order to allow its replication in the present. Such a visit encouraged Washington to think of the prospect of peace as he sent General Rufus Putnam to meet with the Western tribes at Vincennes in the summer of 1792. Putnam succeeded in persuading the tribes to agree to a treaty, but it stalled in the Senate the following year.⁸

⁵ As quoted in Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*, 10.

⁶ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 223; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*, 4-10; Gregory Evans Dowd, “St. Clair, Arthur,” *American National Biography Online*, <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00850.html> (accessed January 23, 2015); Wiley Sword, *President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 175-191.

⁷ As quoted in Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 202.

⁸ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 202; Prucha, *American Indian Treaties*, 90-91.

Quakers, likely aware of the status of Putnam's treaty in the Senate because the nation's capital was located in Philadelphia, took it upon themselves to encourage Indians to preserve peace.⁹ In April 1793, Pennsylvania and New Jersey Friends drafted their appeal that contained specific language, symbols, and memories of the culture of restraint that had secured peace between Indians and settlers in the spirit of brotherhood and community for so long:

Brothers, When our Grandfathers came with Onas over the great Waters to settle in this Land more than One hundred years ago, they Kindled a large Council fire with your Grandfathers, and sat together round it in much good Will & Friendship smooking [sic] the Calumet Pipe together; and they told your Grandfathers that they were Men of Peace, & desired to live among you in Peace & Love, and that their Children might also be careful always to live in the same Love one with another as Brothers of one Family.¹⁰

They acknowledged that though the council fire burned brightly and the Chain of Friendship was kept clean of rust for many years, an "evil Spirit" forty years prior had "whispered bad Stories in the Ears of some of your People, and of some of the white People; so that the light of the antient Council Fire was allmost put out, and the old Chain of Friendship was made dull & rusty."¹¹

Warfare had removed the sense of community and brotherhood. With violence again prevalent, the Quaker appeal of 1793 declared the Friends to have the same principles as their "Grandfathers, which teaches us to love you & all Men" and urged Indians "to promote Peace & brighten the old Chain of Friendship with the white People of the united States."¹²

Indian reception to the Quaker appeal, however, also showed the altered state of the culture of restraint. When Philadelphia Quakers William Hartshorne and John Parrish extended their arms to the hearty greeting of six Ojibwas outside of Detroit, the Indians responded by drawing back and exclaiming "Shemockteman Boston." "Shemockteman," translated as "long

⁹ Donald F. Carmony and Luther M. Feeger, "Message of Pennsylvania and New Jersey Quakers to Indians of the Old Northwest," *Indiana Magazine of History* 58, no. 1 (March 1963): 52.

¹⁰ As quoted in Carmony and Feeger, "Quakers to Indians," 55-56.

¹¹ As quoted in Carmony and Feeger, "Quakers to Indians," 56.

¹² As quoted in Carmony and Feeger, "Quakers to Indians," 57.

knives,” had been a designation given to Virginians, much like how Brother Onas referenced Pennsylvania and its governor. Parrish learned from Detroit trader Isaac Williams that though Indians had had confidence in the people of Pennsylvania in the past, they now saw the different state governments as thirteen united fires. Pennsylvania as a result now stood as part of the long knives. Military force had altered the culture of friendship, as the violence along the frontier over the past forty years made Indian groups perceive Pennsylvania as no different than the “Long Knives” of Virginia. The Quakers’ philanthropic endeavors could only go so far, as their lack of political power did not allow them to manage frontier policy. Putnam’s peace, having stalled in the Senate, also failed to gain ratification. With the peace movement falling apart and continued hostilities likely, General Wayne moved his Legion of the United States to the site of St. Clair’s defeat where soldiers constructed Ft. Recovery. Wayne hoped the display of force would impress the Indians and lead them to sue for peace without a fight. Buckongahelas, Blue Jacket, and Little Turtle, leaders of the Delawares, Shawnee, and Miami, respectively, rejected peace. The Indians felt confident following their two victories over American armies. Furthermore, they had received assurances from Guy Carleton, Governor General of The Canadas, that the British would soon be at war with the United States and would also assist the Indians in gaining back their lands. Like the French and Indian War and War for American Independence, the path to diplomacy and peace required the use of military force.¹³

“Mad” Anthony Wayne’s victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers on 20 August 1794 broke the Western Indian Confederacy. Following his victory, Wayne continued to destroy Indian crops and villages. In October he moved a portion of his army toward Miami villages and the site of General Harmar’s defeat. There he built Ft. Wayne, a symbolic move showing that

¹³ Carmony and Feeger, “Quakers to Indians,” 55; Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 202-204; Paul David Nelson, *Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 253-254; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*, xix.

despite a previous Indian victory, American forces continued to move forward and that Indian hegemony had been broken. Wayne described the bayonet as “the most proper instrument, for removing the Film from the Eyes – & for opening the Ears of the Savages, that has ever been discover’d.”¹⁴ According to Wayne, military force did what diplomacy could not accomplish for the United States: establish a peace with Indians. During the winter of 1794-1795, Indian delegations made preliminary peace with Wayne and promised to live in friendship with the United States. The Confederacy also turned its back on the British, who offered no support to the Indians and closed the doors to Ft. Miami as Indians fled the battlefield. Blue Jacket and Grand Glaize King, a Delaware chief, described how the British “remained idle spectators, and saw their [Indian allies’] best and bravest chiefs and warriors slaughtered ... under the muzzles of their great guns, without attempting to assist them.”¹⁵ Labeling his old allies liars and cowards, and seeing an opportunity to gravitate toward American trade, Blue Jacket declared that hearts and minds had changed and that Indians wanted to be friends and brothers. Wayne’s victory, and the inaction on part of the British, had reversed the roles of ally and benefactor.¹⁶

The Treaty of Greenville in the summer of 1795 exhibited the legacy of an altered culture of restraint, for not only had military force brought Indians and Americans to the peace table, but the Quakers and their old ties to Indians continued to be invoked in order to assist in establishing peace. Prior to the commencement of discussions between General Wayne, representing the United States, and a dozen tribes and 1,130 members of the Western Indian Confederacy, including the Wyandots, Delawares, and Shawnee, Secretary of War Thomas Pickering informed Wayne that Quaker emissaries, with Washington’s approval, were going among the tribes to

¹⁴ As quoted in Nelson, *Anthony Wayne*, 279.

¹⁵ As quoted in Sword, *Washington’s Indian War*, 319.

¹⁶ Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 224; Nelson, *Anthony Wayne*, 266, 269-270, 277; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*, xix, 364-365; Sword, *Washington’s Indian War*, 319, 323.

promote peace. Washington had dealt with Quakers during the fight for independence, and in understanding their peaceful disposition, desires to end war, and old ties with Indians, he saw no risk in allowing the Friends to promote peace with Indians. They would actually be serving the interests of the United States. Indeed, Wayne confirmed the Quakers' presence on 25 June as he spoke to Indian chiefs: "The council fire remains covered, until the arrival of the rest of our brothers. General Washington and his great council have sent you large presents, whose arrival I expect about the same time. Your friends (Onas) the Quakers, have also sent you a message, and some small presents, as a token of their regard for you."¹⁷ Wayne's use of Onas and taking the time to specify the Quaker message of peace and their gift reflect Wayne's understanding of the value of old Quaker ties with Indians. Wayne's interests did not center on community and brotherhood with Indians, as he had designed and built his redoubts so that his cannon could fire directly into the gathered Indians, no doubt an ominous demonstration of military force enabling diplomacy. Still, Wayne utilized the culture of restraint's framework of memories and language to help seal peace.¹⁸

3 August is the date in which parties signed the Treaty of Greenville, but it is 2 August that provided one last demonstration of the ancient security culture of restraint. Wayne originally intended to sign the treaty on 2 August, but with the document not yet ready as the tribes gathered to sign it, Wayne turned to the Quakers for his first words according to the treaty minutes. Introducing the "ancient friends and brothers" of the Indians, Wayne described the Quakers as "a people whom I much love and esteem, for their goodness of heart, and sincere

¹⁷ *American State Papers, Class II, Indian Affairs*, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew Clarke (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 1:565.

¹⁸ *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 562, 582; Nelson, *Anthony Wayne*, 279-282; Sword, *Washington's Indian War*, 325; Carmony and Feeger, "Quakers to Indians," 52-53.

love of peace with all nations.”¹⁹ A Pennsylvanian who grew up in Chester County alongside Quaker neighbors, Wayne understood the relationship between Indians and Quakers.²⁰ He read the 1793 Quaker appeal and noted that while their present may be small, it had been “designed with the benevolent view of promoting the peace and happiness of mankind” and stood “as a token of their regard for you, and a testimony of their brotherly affection and kind remembrance of you.”²¹ Upon completing this last invocation of the ancient culture of restraint, Quaker memory of the past, and spirit of brotherhood that once existed between Pennsylvania and its friendly Indian allies, Wayne then informed the Indians that the treaty would have to be signed the following day. He did not need to cite the Quakers, but his choice to do so as one last encouragement for the Indians to complete the peace treaty shows the value he placed in the culture of restraint. The Shawnee chief Blue Jacket responded next, informing Wayne that the chiefs and warriors around them have joined in the good work of peace and asked that Wayne inform their elder brother, Washington, of the agreement. Blue Jacket requested that a message be transmitted to Washington, asking that two chiefs from each nation be allowed to “pay him a visit, and take him by the hand: for your younger brothers have a strong desire to see that great man, and to enjoy the pleasure of conversing with him.”²² In wanting to take Washington by the hand and walk beside him in friendship, Blue Jacket walked along the old diplomatic road traveled by his ancestors, when they walked hand in hand with their friend Brother Onas.

¹⁹ *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 579.

²⁰ Owen S. Ireland, *Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics: Ratifying the Constitution in Pennsylvania* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 237.

²¹ *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 579.

²² *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 579.

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