

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
AND THE NATIONALIST PARTIES

by

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting nationalist parties' support for the EU over time and across regions. Investigating how European integration and nationalist parties interconnect and looking for patterns among a large number of cases are important to understanding the nature of nationalism and the future of the EU. The approach of looking for patterns among a large number of cases contributes to overcoming limitations of existing studies that are based on a small number of cases and allows more valid generalizations about the nature of nationalist parties in the European context.

This study combines a big-N method with case studies. The big-N method relies on aggregated data over a 30-year period from 1984 to 2014 in both Western and Eastern EU member countries to investigate the attitudes and behaviors of all kinds of contemporary nationalist parties toward European integration. A total of 105 nationalist parties across 26 EU member states are included. I build on Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries's (2012) model for predicting Western European parties' EU positions based on their electorate, parties, and party system characteristics. The differences are that (1) I focus strictly on nationalist parties, while Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries included all parties, (2) I broaden the scope to include both Western and Eastern European countries, and (3) I have added a variety of country-level variables. In particular, I emphasize party-level variables and party system characteristics, but other country-level variables are also included as controls because these might matter too. A variety of possible variables are classified into two categories: party-level (including ideology, party type (statewide versus minority nationalist), party size, and incumbency) and country-level (including party

system fractionalization and polarization, as well as East versus West, state size, immigrant population, the length of EU membership, economic conditions, and public opinion). I look separately at statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties, in addition to all nationalist parties combined, in order to investigate whether the independent variables have different effects for different types of nationalist parties. I found that extreme nationalist parties are more negative toward the EU, minority nationalist parties are more positive than statewide nationalist parties, larger nationalist parties are more positive, incumbent nationalist parties are more positive, political context matters differently for statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties, and characteristics of the state matter more for minority nationalist parties than for statewide nationalist parties.

Along with the big-N method, I conducted three case studies in order to investigate the actual changes in strategies and behaviors within real-life political contexts and to access similarities and differences between strategies of different parties in a comparative context.

## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to everyone who helped me and guided me through the trials and tribulations of creating it, particularly my family, who waited a long time for this moment, my close friends, who showed faith in my ability to do it, and my professors, who stood by me throughout the time taken to complete this work. Your support is greatly appreciated.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

AdP	Alliance of Progressives (Alleanza dei Progressisti, Center-Left alliance in Italy)
AD	Democratic Alliance (Alleanza Democratica, Italy 1992-1996)
AE	Ecologists Association (Associazione Ecologisti, Italy 2009-2010)
AfD	Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, Germany)
AN	National Action (Azzjoni Nazzjonali, Malta)
AN	National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, Italy)
AN	National Alliance (Alianza Nacional, Spain)
ANEL	Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες, Greece)
ATAKA	Attack (Атака, Bulgaria)
AWS	Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, Poland)
BBT	Bulgaria Without Censorship (България без цензура, Bulgaria)
BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Galicia in Spain)
BNV	Valencian Nationalist Bloc (Bloc Nacionalista Valencià, Valencia in Spain)
BZÖ	Austrian Alliance for the Future (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Austria)
CEU	Coalition for Europe (coalition: CiU, PNV, CC, CxG, etc., Spain)
CC	Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria, Canary Islands in Spain)
CCD	Christian Democratic Centre (Centro Cristiano Democratico, Italy 1994-2002)
CDC	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Catalonia in Spain)
CE	European Coalition (coalition: CC, PA, etc., Spain)

CG	Galician Coalition (Coalición Galega, Galicia in Spain)
CHA	Aragonese Union (Chunta Aragonesista, Argon in Spain)
CiU	Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, Catalonia in Spain)
CN	Nationalist Coalition (coalition: PNV, etc., Spain)
CN-EdP	Nationalist Coalition-Europe of the People (coalition, Spain)
CONS	Conservative and Unionist Party (The UK)
CS	Czech Sovereignty (Česká suverenita, the Czech Republic)
ČSNS	Czech National Social Party (Česká strana národně sociální, the Czech Republic)
CxG	Commitment to Galicia (Compromiso por Galicia, Galicia in Spain)
DE	European Democracy (Democrazia Europea, Italy 2001-2002)
DC	Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, Italy 1943-1994)
DIKKI	Democratic Social Movement (Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα, Greece)
DiL	Democracy and Freedom (Democràcia i Llibertat, Catalonia in Spain)
DISY	Democratic Rally (Dimokratikós Sinagermós, Cyprus)
DF	Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, Denmark)
DIKO	Democratic Party (Dimokratikó Kómma, Cyprus)
DK	Way of Courage (Drąsos Kelias, Lithuania)
DL	Democracy is Freedom (Democrazia e Liberta, Italy 2002-2007)
DN	National Democracy (Democracia Nacional, Spain)
DP	Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria, Italy 1975-1991)
DPS	Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи, Bulgaria)
DRP	German Reich Party (Deutsche Reichspartei, Germany)
DS	Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra, Italy 1998-2007)

DS	Workers' Party of Social Justice (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti, the Czech Republic)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland in the UK)
E-2000	Spain 2000 (España 2000, Spain)
EA	Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna, Basque country in Spain)
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDD	Left for the Right to Decide (coalition: ERC, etc., Spain)
EDEK	Movement for Social Democracy (Kinima Sosialdimokraton, Cyprus)
EdP	Europe of the People (coalition: EA, ERC, etc., Spain)
EE	Basque Country Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra, Basque country in Spain)
EE	Empire Europe (Imperium Europa, Malta)
EEC	European Economic Community
DEM	Democrats (I Democratici, Italy 1999-2002)
EHB	Basque Country Unite (Euskal Herria Bildu, Basque country in Spain)
EKRE	People's Party of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, Estonia)
ELAM	National Popular Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, Cyprus)
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ERC	Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Catalonia in Spain)
ERSP	Estonian National Independence Party (Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei, Estonia)
ESIF	European Structural and Investment Funds
EU	European Union

EÜ R	Constitution Party; Estonian United People's Party (Konstitutsioonierakond; Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei, Estonia)
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
EÜ V	Estonian United Left Party (Eestimaa Ühendatud Vasakpartei, Estonia)
EV	Estonian Free Party (Eesti Vabaerakond, Estonia)
Evroko	European Party (Evropaiko Komma, Cyprus)
FdL	Federation of Liberals (Federazione dei Liberali, Italy 1994-PRE)
FI	Forza Italia Political Movement (Movimento Politico Forza Italia, Italy)
Fidesz	Hungarian Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Hungary)
FKGP	Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás- és Polgári Párt, Hungary)
FLI	Future and Freedom for Italy (Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia, Italy)
FN	National Front (Front National, France)
FN	New Force (Fuerza Nueva, Spain)
FP	Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, Denmark)
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Austria)
FPTP	first-past-the-post voting system
FRN	National Front (Frente Nacional, Spain)
FRONTAS	Front Party (Fronto partija, Lithuania)
Galeusca	Galeusca (coalition: BNG, CiU, PNV, etc., Spain)
Harmony	Social Democratic Party “Harmony” (Sociāldemokrātiskā Partija “Saskaņa,” Latvia)
HB-EH	Basque Citizens (Herri Batasuna, Basque country in Spain)
HČSP	Croatian Pure Party of Rights` (Croatian: Hrvatska čista stranka prava, Croatia)

HDSSB	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje, Croatia)
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, Croatia)
HSP	Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, Croatia)
HSP-AS	Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević (Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević, Croatia)
HZDS	People's Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Ľudová strana–Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, Slovakia)
ICV	Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Catalonia in Spain)
IDV	Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori, Italy 1998-PRE)
II–SP	Internationalist Initiative – Solidarity between Peoples (coalition, Spain)
IMRO-BNM	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (BMPO – Българско Национално Движение, Bulgaria)
IRL	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit, Estonia)
JL	Young Lithuania (Partija „Jaunoji Lietuva“, Lithuania)
JOBBIK	Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Hungary)
K'15	Kukiz'15 (Kukiz'15, Poland)
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, Hungary)
KLD	(Liberal Democratic Congress (Polish: Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, Poland)
KNP	Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, Poland)
KPN	Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, Poland)
LAB	Labor/Labour Party (The UK)
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός, Greece)
LB	Bonino List (Lista Bonino, Italy 1999-2009)

LBP	Bonino-Pannella List (Lista Bonino-Pannella, Italy 2009-2012)
LIB	Liberal Party (The UK)
LibDem	Liberal Democrats (The UK)
LKS	Latvian Russian Union (Latvijas Krievu savienība, Latvia)
LLRA	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija, Lithuania)
LMP	Politics Can Be Different (Another Politics Is Possible, Poland)
LN	Northern League (Lega Nord, Italy)
LNNK	Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība, Latvia)
LP	Pannella List (Lista Pannella, Italy 1992-1999)
LPD	People Decide (coalition: EHB, BNG, etc., Spain)
LPR	League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, Poland)
LRS	Lithuanian Russian Union (Lietuvos rusų sąjunga, Lithuania)
LTS	Lithuanian Nationalist Union (Lietuvių tautininkų sąjunga, Lithuania)
LV	Green Lists (Liste Verdi, Italy 1986-1990)
M5S	Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, Italy)
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, Hungary)
MIÉP	Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, Hungary)
MN	German Minority (Mniejszość Niemiecka, Poland)
Moravians	Moravians (Moravané; HSD-SMS Hnutí samosprávné Moravy a Slezska – Moravské národní sjednocení, the Czech Republic)
MOST	the Bridge (Most–Híd, Slovakia)
MpA	Movement for the Autonomies (Movimento per le Autonomie, Italy 2005-PRE)
MpS	Movement for the Left (Movimento per la Sinistra, Italy 2009-2010)

MSI	Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, Italy)
MSI-AN	Italian Social Movement - National Alliance (Movimento Sociale Italiano - Alleanza Nazionale, Italy)
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Design
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungary)
NA	National Alliance (Nacionālā apvienība, Latvia)
NDSV	National Movement for Stability and Progress (Национално движение за стабилност и възход, Bulgaria)
NFSB	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (Национален фронт за спасение на България, Bulgaria)
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany)
NS	National Party (Národn í strana, the Czech Republic)
NS-LEV21	National Socialists–Left of the 21st century (Národn í socialisté–levice 21. stolet í, the Czech Republic)
NSi	New Slovenia–Christian Democrats (Nova Slovenija–Kriřčanski demokrati, Slovenia)
NSJ	National Unity (Národn í sjednocení, the Czech Republic)
NVA	New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Belgium)
Ö VP	Austrian People's Party (Ö sterreichische Volkspartei, Austria)
PA	Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista, Andalusia in Spain)
PAR	Aragonese Party (Partido Aragonés, Argon in Spain)
PAX	PAX Association (Stowarzyszenie PAX, Poland)
PCI	Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, Italy 1943-1991)
PD	Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, Italy 2007-PRE)
PdL	People of Freedom (Il Popolo della Libertà, Itlay)

PdL	Pole of Freedoms (Polo delle Liberta, Center-Right alliance in Italy)
PDS	Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, Italy 1991-1998)
PE	European Spring (coalition: BNV, CHA, etc., Spain)
PiS	Polish Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Poland)
PN	Nationalist Party (Partit Nazzjonalista, Malta)
PNG	Galician Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Galego, Galicia in Spain)
PL	Labour Party (Partit Laburista, Malta)
PLI	Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano, Italy 1922-1994)
PNG	New Generation Party–Christian Democratic (Partidul Noua Generație-Creștin Democrat, Romania)
PNR	National Renovator Party (Partido Nacional Renovador, Portugal)
PNV	Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea; Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Basque country in Spain)
PO	Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, Poland)
POC	Center Civic Alliance (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum, Poland)
PP	Italian People's Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, Italy 1994-2002)
PP	Pro Patria Union (Isamaaliit, Estonia)
PP-DD	People's Party–Dan Diaconescu (Partidul Poporului–Dan Diaconescu, Romania)
PPI	Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism
PpL	Pact for Italy (Patto per l'Italia, Center alliance in Italy)
PpLL	Pole for Freedoms (Polo per le Liberta, Center-Right alliance in Italy)
PR	Poland Together (Polska Razem, Poland)
PRC	Communist Refoundation Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Italy 1991-PRE)
PRI	Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano, Italy 1895-PRE)

PRM	Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, Romania)
PS	Finns Party; True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, Finland)
PS	Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, France)
PSDI	Italian Democratic Socialist Party (Italian: Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, Italy 1947-1998)
PSI	Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, Italy)
PSL	Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Poland)
PSD	Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, Romania)
PUNR	Romanian National Unity Party (Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor, Romania)
PVV	Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, Hungary)
PxC	Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya, Catalonia in Spain)
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, Poland)
RAD	Italian Radicals (Radicali Italiani, Italy 2001-PRE)
Rainbow	Rainbow Greens (Verdi Arcobaleno, Italy 1989-1990)
REP	Republicans (Die Republikaner, Germany)
RETE	Movement for Democracy - The Network (Movimento per la Democrazia - La Rete, Italy 1991-1999)
RI	Italian Renewal (Rinnovamento Italiano, Italy 1996-2002)
RKEI	Pro Patria National Coalition (Rahvuslik Koonderakond Isamaa, Estonia)
RMS	Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka; SPR-RSČ, the Czech Republic)
RN	National Movement (Ruch Narodowy, Poland)
RP	Res Publica Party (Erakond Res Publica, Estonia)
SC	Harmony Center (Saskaņas Centrs, Latvia)

SD	Alliance of Democrats (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, Poland)
SD	Democratic Left (Sinistra Democratica, Italy 2007-2010)
SD	Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet, Denmark)
SD	Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, Sweden)
SDI	Italian Democratic Socialists (Socialisti Democratici Italiani, Italy 1998-2007)
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party (Pairti Soisialta Daonlathach and Lucht Oibre, N.Ireland in the UK)
SDS	Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka, Slovenia)
SeS	Socialism and Left (Socialismo e Sinistra, Italy)
SFP-RKP	Swedish People's Party (Svenska folkpartiet i Finland, Finland)
SGP	Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, the Netherlands)
SI	Italian Socialists (Socialisti Italiani, Italy 1994-1998)
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Poland)
SLS	Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, Slovenia)
Smer-SD	Direction–Social Democracy (Smer–sociálna demokracia, Slovakia)
SEL	Left Ecology Freedom (Sinistra Ecologia Liberta, Italy 2010-PRE)
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Poland)
SMK-MKP	Party of the Hungarian Community (Magyar Közösség Pártja/Strana maďarskej komunity, Slovakia)
SNP	Scottish National Party (Scots Naitional Pairtie, Scotland in the UK)
SNS	Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, Slovakia)
SNS	Slovenian National Party (Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka, Slovenia)
Solidarity	Solidarity Citizens' Committee (Komitet Obywatelski "Solidarność", Poland)
SP	Solidary Poland/United Poland (Solidarna Polska, Poland)

SPF	Socialist People's Front (Lithuanian: Socialistinis liaudies frontas, Lithuania)
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, Austria)
SRP	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Poland)
SVP	South Tyrolean People's Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, S. Tyrol in Italy)
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, Greece)
SZDSZ	Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party (Hungarian: Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt, Poland)
TB	For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai, Latvia)
TB-LNNK	For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK, Latvia)
TS-LKD	Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Tėvynės sąjunga- Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai, Lithuania)
TSP	National Harmony Party (Tautas Saskaņas partija, Latvia)
TT	Order and Justice (Tvarka ir teisingumas, Lithuania)
UD	Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, Poland)
UD	Democratic Union (Unione Democratica, Italy 1996-1999)
UDC	Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, Catalonia in Spain)
UDC	Union of the Centre (Unione di Centro, Italy 2002-PRE)
UDMR	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, Romania)
UKIP	UK Independence Party (the UK)
ULS	Unite the Left (Unire la Sinistra, Italy 2008-2010)
UMP	Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire, France)
UPV	Valencian Nationalist Bloc (Bloc Nacionalista Valencià, Valencia in Spain)

UPN	Navarrese People's Union-People's Party (Unión del Pueblo Navarro-Partido Popular, Navarre in Spain)
Ú SVIT	Dawn-National Coalition (Ú svit-Národní Koalice, the Czech Republic)
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland in the UK)
UV	Valencian Union (Unió Valenciana, Valencia in Spain)
VB	Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, Belgium)
VdU	Federation of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, Italy)
VEE	Russian Party in Estonia (Vene Erakond Eestis, Estonia)
VERDI	Federation of the Greens (Federazione dei Verdi, Italy 1990-PRE)
VL	All For Latvia (Visu Latvijai, Latvia)
Vox	Vox (Spain)
VU	People's Union (Volksunie, Belgium)
VV	Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, the Czech Republic)
WAK	Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka, Poland)
XA	Popular Association - Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή - Chrysí Avgí, Greece)
ZSL	United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, Poland)

[Abbreviations for the EU Member Countries]

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany

DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
GR	Greece
HU	Hungary
HR	Croatia
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
MT	Malta
NL	Netherlands
PO	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
UK	The United Kingdom

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

How have nationalist parties responded to the European Union (EU) over time? Is a statewide nationalist party different from a minority nationalist party in its reactions toward the EU? This dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which different types of nationalist parties have responded to European integration over time and across issue areas and regions. Although there are a few comparative studies on the attitudes of regional parties or radical right parties toward European integration based on a small number of cases, there has been little comprehensive analysis of the attitudes and behaviors of nationalist parties. This dissertation examines the attitudes of all 105 nationalist parties which have participated in elections in EU member countries over the 30-year period from 1984 to 2014. A multilevel modeling was carried out to analyze a variety of factors that might affect party attitudes toward the EU. A case study analysis is also conducted to clearly show the strategic attitudes and behaviors of nationalist parties toward European integration.

The rise of nationalist parties across Europe in the twenty-first century is a profoundly important factor in efforts to shape a united Europe. A resurgence of aggressive nationalism in Europe and strengthening Euro-skeptic sentiment have led to a growing concern about further European integration and resulted in slowing the integration process. Therefore, understanding how the processes of European integration and nationalist parties interconnect is an important step toward understanding both the nature of nationalism within the European context and the future of the EU.

Table 1. 2014 European Parliament Elections

France	The far-right National Front (FN), which campaigned for France's exit from the euro zone, new limits on immigration and the reintroduction of national border controls, finished first with 24.86% of the vote and 24 of France's 74 seats in the European parliament, ahead of the two mainstream parties – the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) with 20.8% and the Socialist Party (PS) with 14%.
The UK	The Euroskeptic nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP), which advocates leaving the EU, received the greatest number of votes (27.49%) of any British party in the European parliament.
Denmark	The nationalist Danish People's Party (DF), which campaigned to reclaim border controls and curb benefits to other EU citizens living in Denmark, came in first with 26.7% of the vote, ahead of the governing Social Democrats (SD) with 19.1%, and became one of the three biggest Euroskeptic parties in the European Parliament along with UKIP in the UK and FN in France.
Austria	The nationalistic Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) came in third place, increasing its vote by 7% compared with the 2009 EP elections and winning 19.7% of the vote, behind the conservative the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) with 27% and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ, until 1991 the Socialist Party) with around 24%.
Finland	The Euroskeptic nationalist True Finns (PS) campaigned for a referendum on EU membership and became the third biggest party after winning 12.87% of the vote and 2 seats in the European parliament.
Germany	The Euroskeptic the Alternative for Germany (AfD) got 7 seats in the European parliament by winning 7% of the vote; the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) survived an attempt by the Social Democratic Party to ban it for its radical views and won a seat in the European parliament.
Greece	The Euroskeptic Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) placed first with over 26% of the vote and 7 seats in the European parliament, while the far-right ultra-nationalist Popular Association - Golden Dawn (XA) came in third by gaining over 9% of the vote, winning 3 seats in the European parliament.
Hungary	The radical nationalist Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK), which rejects the EU's key legal framework, won nearly 15% of the vote and gained 3 seats in the European parliament.
The Netherlands	The far-right anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV), which campaigned for Dutch withdrawal from the EU and reintroduction of state border controls, finished with 13.3% of the vote and 4 of 26 seats in the European parliament.

Europeans who experienced devastating wars in the twentieth century believed that an integrated Europe would avoid another war between nation-states in the future. The EU was expected to weaken nationalism by decreasing the necessity for traditional large states; however, contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism remains alive and is on the rise across an

increasingly integrated Europe. These trends were evident in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections (see Table 1), whose results show that although mainstream parties still hold a majority of seats in the European Parliament, nationalist parties who want to be out of the EU or demand tighter border controls, nationalized decision-making, and dissolution of the currency union, gained ground in many European countries. In addition, regional nationalism has surged: there have been a number of secessionist movements across Europe including the Venetian online independence referendum, the Scottish independence referendum, and the Catalan self-determination referendum, all of which occurred in 2014 (see Table 2). In light of these facts, there is little sign that nationalism in Europe is dying out.

Table 2. Secessionist Movements across Europe in 2014

Italy: Venetian online independence referendum	Although it was unconstitutional to hold an independence referendum under Italian law, an unofficial online referendum held March 16-21, 2014, in Veneto, Italy by the Venetian nationalist organization Plebiscite drew 63.2% of eligible Venetian voters, 89.1% of whom agreed with Venetian independence. After that, the regional nationalist Northern League (LN) in Italy, which advocated the secession of the Padanian-Venetian region, won 6.2% of the vote and 5 seats in the EP elections, held May 22-25.
The UK: Scottish independence referendum	In the 2014 EP elections, the nationalist Scottish National Party (SNP), which supports Scottish independence from the UK, won the most votes within Scotland and 2 seats. After the election, the Scottish independence referendum, which was held on September 18, 2014, had a 55.3% turnout, with 84.6% voting in favor of staying in the UK. Although it was unsuccessful, the referendum ignited the debate about self-determination and regional autonomy within the EU.
Spain: Catalan self- determination referendum	After the Scottish vote, the Catalan independence referendum was held on November 9, 2014. Although it was a symbolic vote which was not recognized by the Spanish government, 36% of the Catalan electorate turned out in the informal ballot, and 80.76% of them voted in favor of independence. Before the referendum, Spain's pro-secession nationalist the Convergence and Union (CiU), which held the Catalan independence referendum together with the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), won 5.42% of the vote and 3 seats in the EP elections with 3 other regionalist parties together: the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in the Basque Country and Navarre, the Canarian Coalition (CC) in the Canary Islands, and the Commitment to Galicia (CxG) in Galicia.

It is clear that European integration has not weakened nationalism, as early supporters of European integration hoped it would. Some have instead argued that European integration and

nationalism are in competition, and that nationalists in Europe are consistently anti-integration. However, are all nationalist parties consistent in their anti-EU positions? Nationalist parties organize across different territorial levels, and this fact may affect their positions on European integration. Statewide nationalist parties, which participate in all or most elections across the entire state, are interested in promoting statewide identity and statewide interests. Minority nationalist parties, which participate in elections in one or more regions but not in all or most regions of the country, including regionalist, ethno-territorial, or sub-state autonomist parties, tend to pursue sub-state national or regional interests. A few comparative studies that examine nationalist party orientations toward Europe based on a small number of cases hold that most minority nationalist parties tend to have pro-European attitudes and that statewide nationalist parties are likely to have antagonistic positions about European integration. However, little of this work has analyzed the attitudes and behaviors of all kinds of nationalist parties toward European integration. Many studies on EU positions of nationalist parties have made the mistake of making generalizations from a small number of cases. A few studies of party positions on European integration that rely on aggregated data of all EU parties lump all nationalist parties together, regardless of types of nationalism, party ideologies, values or identities, aims, strategies, relations with the state, participation in government, and self-reliance of regional economy. They also generally have not addressed change over time. Although small-N studies can examine the cases in more depth, they are harder to generalize. Therefore, I investigate the nature of nationalist parties' European positions and the future of nationalism in the context of accelerating pressures from integrated European structures and globalization by combining a big-N method with case studies. I believe that this method of looking for patterns in a large number of cases is crucial for making valid generalizations.

This dissertation seeks to explain nationalist parties' positions toward European integration by tracing factors and dynamics that shape party behavior regarding European integration and by focusing on positional adaptive strategies for European integration. In this dissertation, I analyze the relationship of nationalist parties to the EU from a party strategic perspective. I argue that nationalist parties respond to European integration in neither unconditionally supportive nor straightforwardly skeptical ways over time. Based on previous studies, I will analyze determinative factors that are likely to affect nationalist parties' positions on European integration and then provide evidence that their strategies are not necessarily fixed; rather, nationalist parties have refined their goals of autonomy and altered their strategies for obtaining these goals as a result of the opportunities presented by European integration.

The dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including the introduction (Chapter 1) and the conclusion (Chapter 7). Chapter 2 lays out the definition and types of nationalism, a comparison between statewide nationalism and minority nationalism, and the theoretical groundwork for the relationship between nationalism and regional integration. The chapter is concerned with presenting a foundation for better understanding of the complex relationship between nationalism, statewide nationalism, minority nationalism, nationalist parties, European integration, and multilevel governance. Based on multiple strands of literature, I argue that the relationship between nation-states and the EU is complicated and that nationalist parties respond to the EU very pragmatically. I also discuss the determinants of nationalist parties' positions on European integration.

Chapter 3 presents recent trends of nationalist parties to highlight their characteristics. The trends show that the rise of nationalist parties in Europe is a constant phenomenon. I then describe the theoretical base of party behavior and strategies of nationalist parties in regard to the

integration of Europe. Party behavior can be shaped by party goals and competition, institutional conditions, cleavages, resources and political opportunity structures; both statewide and minority parties respond to European integration pragmatically.

Chapter 4 discusses the statistical methods to be used and presents a series of hypotheses based on all possible determinants of parties' positions on European integration to be tested in the subsequent study. This study combines a multilevel modeling with case studies.

Chapter 5 will present the results of the statistical analysis.

Chapter 6 will present cases of a few nationalist parties that show the strategic attitudes and behaviors of nationalist parties toward European integration along with a detailed analysis.

The concluding chapter brings all the test results together and summarizes the arguments of the dissertation and main findings. After this, I explain the importance of my work, discuss the implications of the findings, show how to generalize the results to a wide range of alternate areas of interest, and then suggest directions for further research.

## CHAPTER 2

### NATIONALISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

#### 2.1 DEFINITION AND TYPES OF NATIONALISM

The concepts of ethnicity and nation are fundamental to defining nationalism. Ethnicity refers to a group of people related by blood that share a common and distinctive culture, history, religion, language, or the like. A nation is defined as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991, 14). While both ethnic identity and national identity are based on inherent characteristics, ethnic identity is more primordial and national identity has characteristics related to civil ties.

A combination of ethnicity and nationalism is closely associated with the modern state, which is a political unit holding sovereignty over a given territory and the people within it. Nationalism has played a driving role in modern history as it has combined legal and governmental systems in order to make ethnic boundaries congruent with political ones and emphasized vernacular language and common historical experiences. National symbols such as flags and anthems are used to promote feelings of nationhood. In this context, modernization theorists claim that nations and national identities are modern inventions and social constructions (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). This view stands in opposition to the views of the primordialists, who believe that nationalism derives from fundamental roots and sentiments, and the perennialists, who believe that nations have been around for a very long time despite taking different shapes at different points in history (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; Shils 1957).

The term “nationalism” is defined differently according to which structural, cultural or political dimensions are being emphasized. Gellner (1983) defines nationalism as “a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1). Gellner notices a structural connection between nationalism and the needs of industrial society and argues that nationalism is intended to unify people from widely different backgrounds in modern societies by creating a common culture, identity, and language, and thus social homogeneity. Nationalism is the “imposition of a high (state) culture on society,” replacing low local cultures (Gellner 1983, 57). That is, industrialization and consequent universal literacy via education give birth to the nation, where everyone can communicate. Thus, Gellner argues that a nation is the product of nationalism.

Anderson (1983) also adheres to the modernization argument. However, in contrast to Gellner, who recognizes a possible link between nationalism and racism, Anderson considers nationalism as a positive force and argues that racism based on ideologies of class is not linked with nationalism based on ideologies of nation (Anderson 1983, 149) and defines a nation as “an imagined political community” that is both inherently limited and sovereign (15). Anderson emphasizes the importance of national consciousness and argues that print capitalism plays an important role in developing nations and national identity. In other words, socially constructed national cultures which are conceived in vernacular language spread into a society through a technology of communication (e.g. print) and a system of production (e.g. capitalism), replacing pre-national religious culture (Anderson 1991, 37-46). A sense of nationhood is the inevitable result of the spread of print technology because this technology allowed enormous numbers of people in a territorial nation-state to get to know one another indirectly and then to understand and unite with each other.

Hobsbawm (1983), like Gellner, regards nations as a modern construction and argues that social changes during the Industrial Revolution encouraged people to develop new forms of political identification. Hobsbawm (1990) follows Gellner's definition of nationalism in that state and nation should be congruent and views nationalism as "situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation" (9-10). Criticizing theorists who view nations as top-down constructions, he claims that the formation of nationalism must be understood from both above and below and suggests that "proto-nationalism" arises from popular roots. He pointed to four criteria that bind people together and develop popular proto-nationalism: language, ethnicity, religion, and political bonds. In response to the binding that occurs when these criteria are present, nationalism is considered as a reappearance of local ideas and interests.

Breuilly (1985) emphasizes the political dimension of nationalism, defining it as "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments" (3). According to Breuilly, a nationalist argument involves three basic assumptions: "there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; the nation must be as independent as possible" (3). Stressing the ability of nationalism to achieve public support as a political strategy, Breuilly argues that nationalism only became important to solve the crisis of a community after the formation of the modern nation-state, in which resources need to be mobilized on a national scale.

While this range of modernist work has been very influential, some scholars reject the idea that nationalism is only modern. Among them, Smith (1986) attempts to combine modernist, primordialist, and perennialist views. Like other modernists, Smith views nations as modern

creations, but he claims that pre-modern roots are also important for understanding the relationship between people and the nation. According to Smith, modern nations have ethnic origins such as an older cultural community, constructed of cultural elements and earlier ethnic identities, that Smith terms “*ethnie*.” For Smith, myths, memories, traditions, values, and symbols hold a continued importance in the creation of modern nations and in understanding nationalism. Along this line, Smith (1991) lists historic territory, common myths, common culture, common legal rights and duties, and a common economy as needed components for nationalism. Then he defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute a nation” (Smith 1995, 149-150).

In this paper, I follow Smith’s definition of nationalism. Since claims of the modernists are based upon a disconnect between the premodern and modern ages by confining the advent of nationalism and nations to the modern age, their claims do not fully explain ethnic or tribal sentiments or loyalties that make individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for their own nations or ethnicities. Although Smith also accepts nations and nationalism as modern phenomena, he stresses the ethnic, cultural, and symbolic continuity of ages and the origins of nations in premodern forms that he called “*ethnie*”. Since I include every kind of nationalist parties, including ones that show strong ethnic or exclusive nationalism, I believe Smith’s definition of nationalism is better fitted to my study.

There are at least three different kinds of nationalism: *ethnic nationalism* rooted in popular consciousness, *civic nationalism* driven by ruling elites, and *state nationalism* associated with nation building. While ethnic nationalism is based on inherited ancestry and blood kinship which cannot be acquired and does not accept diversity but forces others to accept their identity,

civic nationalism is based on a common perception of rule of law and citizenship which can be acquired regardless of ethnicity, language, religion, or traditions, approves sub-state representation, and encourages multiculturalism. Although ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism seem to be dichotomous, they have intermingling components. Meanwhile, state nationalism often combines with ethnic nationalism but is a type of civic nationalism. While ethnic nationalism opposes state authority, state nationalism promotes a sense of common nationality (Sweeney 2005, 65).

Hechter (2000) categorizes nationalism into four types: *state-building nationalism* that “attempts to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state,” *peripheral nationalism* that “resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government,” *irredentist nationalism* that seeks to “extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals,” and *unification nationalism* that “involves the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state” (15-17).

## 2.2 STATEWIDE NATIONALISM AND MINORITY NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

Since the late 1980s, nationalism has looked different than it did before. In the wake of a resurgence of nationalism caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, minority nationalism that demands sub-state or regional autonomy began to emerge, re-emerge, or become more active in Western Europe. In the deeply and widely integrating Europe, the EU has compromised the sovereignty of its member states. The EU’s regional policies may have influenced the dynamics between regions and their corresponding national governments, and in the process minority nationalist sentiment has (re)emerged along

with regional devolution of policy responsibility to sub-state levels. Nation-states have been challenged by both supranational institutions and sub-state regions since the creation of the EU. That is, as communalism that transcends the dimension of nation-states has emerged in various parts of Europe as a result of European integration, multi-nationalism that involves more than one territorial/ethnic/religious/cultural group that demands independence or greater autonomy in a state has become more common in Europe. As a result, prevailing statewide nationalism has shown a tendency to be replaced by more complex multi-nationalism in the European integration process.

Statewide nationalism affects citizens across the country, transcends heterogeneous territorial interests, advocates reduced autonomy for sub-state regions, tries to unite the various sub-state territorial units, and promotes statewide identity, statewide interests, and the cultural unity of people within a country. For example, the Spanish nationalism which developed in the state-building process of the Spanish monarchy considers Spain as a single, united nation-state and promotes Spanish cultural unity by suppressing other minority nationalism within Spain. The British nationalist view considers all of the English, Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish as the British nation and therefore seeks to strengthen the links between diverse people of the UK and favors the continuation of the UK. Belgian nationalists do not advocate autonomy for or independence of regional ethnic communities in Belgium but support the creation of a unitary state between all language communities through keeping all official languages and promoting multiculturalism. Italian nationalism promotes Italian ethnic, cultural, and linguistic unity and supports the unification of Italian states. French nationalism, which developed based on popular sovereignty and popular cooperation in the state-building process, considers the French as a nation and seeks the cultural unity of the French.

According to Singh (2008), statewide nationalism and minority nationalism are theoretically the same, but minority nationalism promotes goals of independence or more autonomy within the nation-state, while statewide nationalism reveals a desire for sovereign statehood (3). In short, these two types of nationalism are different in scale. Singh defined minority nationalism as “‘we-feeling’ below the level of the nation-state” (3). Notable cases of minority nationalism in the EU member countries are Basque, Catalanian, and Galician nationalism in Spain, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism in the UK, Flemish nationalism in Belgium, Padanian nationalism in Italy, and Basque, Breton, and Corsican nationalism in France. Spain contains seventeen different regions; since the new Spanish constitution was passed in 1978 after the dictator Francisco Franco’s death in 1975, a high degree of devolved power has benefited these regions, especially Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia. The UK consists of four different nations. Different national entities have been accepted in recent years within the UK, and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales respectively achieved the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, and the National Assembly for Wales in the English-dominated state. Belgium is composed of the French-speaking Wallonia province in the South, the Dutch-speaking Flanders province in the North and small German-speaking communities in the East. While Flemish separatist movements led by Northern Dutch speakers that make up nearly 60% of the population have become a mainstream phenomenon gaining growing electoral success (unlike the Scottish or Catalanian separatist movements), the German-speaking communities received considerable autonomy as a result of the conflict between Wallonia and Flanders. Italy can be divided into the prosperous Northern regions and the relatively dependent Southern regions. The Padanian nationalist movement in Northern Italy seeks more autonomy or independence from Italy. France is divided into 13 regions. Some areas such as Brittany, Corsica,

Alsace, or the Catalan-speaking and Basque-speaking areas still retain distinct identities, but minority nationalism that advocates more autonomy for these areas has limited influence in France.

Both types of nationalism can exist within a nation-state simultaneously. In the countries mentioned above, many citizens have multiple identities, including their statewide national identity and sub-state minority national identity. In other words, they are attached to a particular area and/or culture as well as to the nation-state. While these nationalities cannot be divided in many people's minds, they also can be contradictory to each other when minority nationalism is strong enough to encourage sub-state minority nationalists to build their own nation-state. Keating and McGarry (2001) suggest that European integration has led minority nationalist groups to promote their sub-state minority national agendas by providing opportunities and thus has led to the rise of minority nationalism. That is, minority nationalist groups began to use the EU in order to achieve their goals in integrating Europe. Minority nationalism of varying intensities can be found almost everywhere in Western Europe, and it has been as important as nationalism in the development of Europe. Within the context of my paper, minority nationalism is conceptualized as a sub-state nationally or regionally based nationalism demanding greater autonomy or independence from the nation-state; the concept includes both sub-state nationalism and regionalism.

### 2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONALIST PARTIES TO THE EU

In this section, I examine the literature that sheds light on the issues of nationalist parties and European integration. Multiple strands of literature are relevant to the question of nationalist parties and the EU. First, there is theoretical literature about the relationship between nationalism

and European integration. Second, there have been studies focusing specifically on nationalist parties and their positions on the EU. Finally, there have been studies of all types of parties and the factors that affect their positions toward the EU.

### 2.3.1 Nationalism and European integration

While some people see nationalism as a force opposing regional integration, others think that they can coexist. Those who see nationalism in opposition to integration tend to focus on statewide nationalism and the centralization of Europe, while the others focus on minority nationalism and the decentralization of Europe. In point of fact, both phenomena of the centralization and the decentralization of Europe have been observed throughout Europe.

Hobsbawm (1990) argues that nationalism will decline as the nation-state declines (192). Other contemporary theorists have shared similar views. Inglehart (1977) suggests the decreasing importance of the nation-state as supranational identity has developed (70-71). According to Laible (2001), scholars with supranational views consider that European integration would erode national sovereignty and national culture (223-4). Moore (2001) says that proponents of supranationalism argue that supranational institutions need to respond to the global reality and interdependent nature of the global economy by increasing international cooperation (46). As a result of an increasingly standardized supranational culture, the demise of smaller-scale nationalism is inevitable. According to Moore (2001), Marx held a similar view of the integrated world that the capitalist economy would lead to the consolidation of a common supranational culture and thus could result in the demise of small nations (44). In this context, Jacobs and Maier (1998) say that European identity decreases national resistance against European integration (28). To sum up, as the distances between nation-states have decreased, national identities were expected to be extinguished or replaced either by a supranational identity or by a

post-national civic or constitutional identity. These arguments that the more Europe is integrated, the less important nation-states will be seemed to be somewhat remote from reality. Despite the progress of European integration, nation-states are still thriving in Europe. Thus, the supranational argument that nationalism is dying in the globalized world seems to be problematic.

In contradiction to some arguments that European integration and nationalism are in rivalry, in reality European integration exists alongside growing nationalism, and nation-states are arguably still the most important decision-makers in integrated Europe (Jenkins 2000, 64; Sakwa and Stevens 2000, 256). Kymlicka (2001) argues that the prediction of the end of nationalism is clearly wrong because there has been no sign of decreased nationalism (61); indeed, it is even stronger than before and appears in every corner of the world. Moreover, Graham (1998) suggests that the successful integration of Europe does not necessarily replace national identity (42-43). Some people might think that national authenticity is threatened by European integration because European integration can cause loss of diversity and production of cultural homogeneity such as a European identity or culture. However, various cultures do not always compete against each other or try to purify their own cultures from all external influence. European integration does not always mean trying to integrate different national cultures into a common culture by solving the “problem” of cultural differences as Moore (2001) suspects. Different national cultures are able to coexist within an integrated Europe (Moore 2001, 49). In this context, Opp (2005) found positive correlations between European and national identifications in a two-wave panel study (653). In addition, European integration is not likely to cause decreasing nationalism because the EU lacks policy responsibility for culture and because a united Europe does not even have a hegemonic culture (Laible 2001, 225; Leslie 1996, 143; Lynch 1996, 16). Therefore, European integration does not necessarily seem to erode

nationalism. Some scholars instead argue that regional integration can strengthen nationalism. Moore (2001) argues that the globalized environment tends to strengthen minority nationalism because minority nationalist regions have more opportunities to enter the political arena (46; 57-8). Kymlicka (2001) also suggests that since small-scale nationalism more easily accommodates and adapts to modern transformation, the minority nationalist regions can participate more effectively and actively in the integrated networks (61-62).

Simply considering the basic purpose of building a united Europe, the argument that a negative relationship exists between European integration and nationalism seems to be plausible, but this argument is problematic because it is based on a false assumption that the two concepts are in competition. Nation-states and the EU are sometimes relative to and overlapping one another, sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative (Kacowicz 1999, 527). Nevertheless, previous studies tend to analyze the relationship between European integration and nationalism dichotomously, without comprehensively taking into account a number of complex factors. The present study attempts to shed greater light on this relationship.

### 2.3.2 Attitudes of nationalist parties toward European integration

Political parties are no less important than national governments in the study of nation-building (Sutherland 2012, 102). Parties shape policies across many and diverse social concerns, help politicians work more effectively to promote the national interest, provide a broad political education, enable citizens to participate in the policy-making process, and challenge the government. Thus, analyzing nationalist parties is of great importance to understanding the relationship between European integration and nationalism, especially since contemporary nationalist parties are very flexible and adaptable in responding to social and political change, and an analysis of *changing* nationalist parties' strategies over time is needed to examine the

impact of European integration on nationalism (Sutherland 2012, 110). Thus far, few researchers have analyzed the attitudes and behaviors of nationalist parties toward European integration over time.

With regard to nationalist parties' positions toward the EU, many studies have separately analyzed two different types of nationalist parties—statewide nationalist parties and non-statewide minority nationalist parties—and have generally found that the two have differences in their positions toward the EU. While statewide nationalism is characterized by skepticism toward the EU due to fear of losing national identity by integrating into a united Europe, minority nationalism is frequently characterized by positive feelings about European integration because the EU is viewed as a desirable means of affirming their cultural, economic, and political power (Friend 2012, 3; Keating 2001; Olsson 2006, 4).

To summarize, the existing literature on nationalist party orientations toward Europe has demonstrated that many minority nationalist parties have pro-European attitudes and that many statewide nationalist parties have antagonistic positions regarding European integration. However, the studies in the literature do not seem to set importance on the facts that not all minority nationalist parties are favorable to the EU and European integration, not all statewide nationalist parties are unfavorable to European integration, and many of both types of party have changed their EU positions over time. This study will shed greater light on the reasons for pro- and anti-EU sentiment among all types of nationalist parties. As a first step, I will review the existing literature on which nationalist parties have taken pro-EU or anti-EU attitudes and *why* they take more supportive or skeptical attitudes despite their similar goals. Then I will explore what the literature suggests about why parties change their positions.

### 2.3.2.1 Pro-European attitudes toward European integration

In general, minority nationalist parties take pro-European attitudes toward European integration because they believe that European integration enhances their sovereignty rather than diminishes it and because they can get political, economic and/or cultural opportunities through the EU (Jolly 2007, 110-1; Laible 2008, 12).

First of all, minority nationalist parties view the EU as an additional political arena which enables them to bypass their central government and push toward their political goals (Closa 1995; Fraga 1992; Friend 2012, 162; Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011, 394). The EU's regional development policy encourages minority nationalist parties to participate actively in the European political arena either through lobbying efforts or via the Committee of the Regions (Dudek 2003, 5). Thus they can get help from the EU to sidestep or challenge a central state by gaining a direct political voice in Europe (Laible 2001, 225). For example, the EP election is a new arena where minority nationalist parties can participate, gain visibility, and advance minority-related agendas (Spirova 2012, 76). In addition, as Jolly (2007) suggests, the viability theory can explain why minority nationalist parties take pro-European positions (111; 114). Minority nationalist parties seek visibility in European institutions and thus enhance their political legitimacy and reputation both at home and abroad by raising awareness of the uniqueness of their region and becoming more involved in EU activities (Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011, 393). In other words, minority nationalist parties that are relatively less influential in their own states can become more viable under the EU umbrella and thus more effectively and smoothly pursue their goals of regional autonomy or diverse types of self-determination (Bolton and Roland 1997).

Secondly, minority nationalist parties view the EU as an economic opportunity from which they can benefit by taking advantage of the bigger market, euro system, and funds and aid from the EU (Friend 2012, 162). The EU not only provides direct aid or funding to regions such as through regional development policy and common agricultural policy, but also attempts to protect and develop the competitiveness of regional economies through single market legislation (Laible 2001, 227). Moreover, its smaller optimal size enables minority nationalist parties to adapt easily, quickly and flexibly to a free trading system under the EU umbrella (Bolton and Roland 1997; Jolly 2007, 111).

Thirdly, minority nationalist parties view the EU as a source of support to preserve their languages and cultural rights (Friend 2012, 162). The EU is multicultural and has no single dominating culture, and thus the EU is more likely to allow regional variations and to respect the diversity that exists (Jolly 2007, 112; Lynch 1996, 15). Therefore, in order to establish minority protection, the EU may be friendlier toward sub-nations than toward traditional larger states.

To sum it up, since the Single European Act signed in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 reorganized opportunities for all levels of actors, increasing political, economic, and cultural opportunities have provided incentives for minority nationalist parties to more actively participate in making decisions at the European level (Laible 2008, 205; Mitchell and Cavanagh 2001). Therefore, since minority nationalist parties can use European integration to increase the credibility of their autonomy movements from independence to devolution to cultural rights, they can expect to increase their parties' credibility. This has resulted in minority nationalist parties' taking more pro-EU positions (Dudek 2003, 7-8; Jolly 2007, 124).

However, minority nationalist parties are not the only nationalist parties that receive opportunities through the EU. These opportunities have been substantial for the newly joined

former Communist countries of Central and Southeastern Europe to project both economic and political state sovereignty in the EU. Political parties in post-Communist Europe have been affected by the EU-level political process more than the parties and party systems in Western Europe (Spirova 2012, 77). Although EU membership implies a loss of national sovereignty, former Communist countries can gain powerful support for the establishment of democratic institutions by having full EU membership (Whitehead 1996, 19). They also become beneficiaries of European funds, and their economic reforms undertaken since the end of Communism may be guaranteed with EU membership (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002, 557). Of course not everyone in Central and Southeastern Europe is happy with EU membership, but EU-skeptic parties there experienced less success in the 2014 EP elections compared to Western Europe, where EU skepticism and outright opposition parties dominated the elections. It seems likely that post-EU accession increases in exports, funding for construction and development, and greater access to schools and better paying jobs in other EU countries have led to less anti-EU sentiment in Central and Southeastern Europe (Szczerbiak 2007).

#### 2.3.2.2 Anti-European attitudes toward European integration

While many minority nationalist parties and statewide parties in Central and Southeastern Europe see the EU as a set of political, economic, and/or cultural opportunities and take positive stances toward the EU, the attitude toward European integration does not seem to be the same for other nationalist parties, especially those that are statewide. Many Western statewide nationalist parties seem to look at European integration similarly; that is, they view the EU as a constraint on their national interests (Hepburn 2010, 188).

First of all, statewide nationalist parties reckon that the EU threatens national sovereignty (Jolly 2007, 112; Marks and Wilson 2000). The EU's multi-level governance gives all sub-

national, national and supranational actors authority over and influence on policymaking (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996). That is to say, statewide nationalist parties perceive that the EU's institutions and collective bargaining processes erode national sovereignty (Dudek 2003, 3). Statewide nationalist parties not only feel threatened due to the EU's collective actions, but also feel endangered by the centralizing of Europe, particularly in small nations. They believe that the EU threatens their own domestic political arrangements that support national culture and their future capacity to preserve autonomy and protect cultural interests (Laible 2001, 224). Thus, they think that their representation in their own countries will be overridden by the EU (Laible 2001, 228).

Secondly, statewide nationalist parties seem to be afraid of cultural assimilation and loss of national identity because Europe has moved toward multiculturalism with an aim of being more than a supranational bureaucracy and economic association (Jolly 2007, 112; Mudde 2007; Polyakova and Fligstein 2013, 3). EU policies have facilitated free movement within the EU, and thus Western European statewide nationalist parties may perceive increased labor mobility from outside Western Europe as a threat to national identity, cultural homogeneity, civic peace and even their jobs or wage levels no matter whether there is a direct connection between unemployment and immigrants or not (Givens 2005, 37-38; 75). As a result of this fear, they feel animosity toward immigrants.

Thirdly, even if they are not statewide nationalist parties but minority nationalist parties, they can simply take a negative position on European integration as their winning strategy for attracting voters because most mainstream parties have kept pro-European attitudes (Givens 2005, 91; Jolly 2007, 112-3; Vasilopoulou 2011, 223). That is, framing the EU in negative terms of threat can be a strategy to attract voters in their domestic party systems. By exploiting fear of

the EU and criticizing majority parties who support the EU decision, they try to gain more electoral support (Jolly 2007, 110).

However, one point to keep in mind here is that there is a disparity of degrees of EU skepticism. Nationalist parties in Europe do not always reject the EU as a whole (Mudde 2007; Vasilopoulou 2011, 243). Although they belong to the same party family and oppose European integration, their patterns of opposition vary by degrees. Some are rather pragmatic in their approach to integration (Vasilopoulou 2011, 243). Vasilopoulou sorted opposition toward European integration into rejecting, conditional and compromising patterns (224). The rejecting group (e.g., the French FN) is associated with strong opposition to the EU and greater national self-determination and wishes for their country's withdrawal from the EU. The conditional group (e.g., the Austrian FPÖ, the Belgium Vlaams Belang (VB), the Italian LN, the Danish DF and the Greek LAOS) believes that a degree of intergovernmental joint action is needed for general prosperity of the state and that cooperation among nation-states at a European level is important, but wishes to be governed inter-governmentally. The compromising group (e.g., the Italian Social Movement - National Alliance (MSI-AN)) seeks to make their national interest stronger through participation in the supranational EU and agrees with the principle of cooperation and the policy practice of European integration, but they are not active proponents of further integration and may even oppose it (Vasilopoulou 2011, 232; 241).

### 2.3.2.3 Attitudes toward European integration have changed

Some nationalist parties have clearly changed their positions on European integration over time. According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, which will be described in more detail below, some nationalist parties' EU positions have become more favorable (see Table 3): the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) went from strongly oppose to mildly

oppose, the Italian MSI-AN from oppose to favor, and the Italian South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP) from neutral to favor. Other nationalist parties’ EU positions became more opposed: the Austrian FPÖ went from favor to oppose, the Belgian VB from mildly oppose to strongly oppose, the Danish Progress Party (FP) from mildly oppose to strongly oppose, the Finnish Swedish People’s Party (SFP-RKP) from neutral to oppose, the Italian LN from favor to oppose, the Lithuanian Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) from favor to neutral, and the Slovak SNS from mildly oppose to strongly oppose. Furthermore, some nationalist parties’ EU positions have been in flux: the Dutch Reformed Political Party (SGP) from oppose to neutral and back to oppose, the Hungarian Fidesz from neutral to favor and then to oppose, the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom - Latvian National Independence Movement (TB-LNNK) from favor to neutral and back to favor, the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) from neutral to oppose to mildly oppose, the Romanian Greater Romania Party (PRM) from mildly oppose to neutral then to mildly oppose, the Spanish EA from favor to neutral and back to favor, and the Spanish ERC from favor to neutral and to favor again. This study will try to shed light on explanations for such changes over time.

Table 3. Changed attitudes toward European integration

Move to more favor	Move to more oppose	In flux
Greek LAOS	Austrian FPÖ	Dutch SGP
Italian MSI-AN	Belgian VB	Hungarian Fidesz
Italian SVP	Danish FP	Latvian TB-LNNK
	Finnish SFP-RKP	Polish PiS
	Italian LN	Romanian PRM
	Lithuanian LLRA	Spanish EA
	Slovak SNS	Spanish ERC

Nationalist parties as a group do not have a single coherent position on the EU, and their attitudes toward European integration do not seem to be fixed (Keating and Jones 1995, 289). The relationship is rather flexible. The importance of the EU within domestic politics has caused contemporary nationalist parties to demand greater policy flexibility in order to incorporate EU issues, face pressures from outside their party, and obtain opportunities presented by European integration (Dudek 2003, 5). As a result, nationalist parties have responded to the European integration process very pragmatically by modifying their organizational structures, ideologies, electoral strategies, goals, and even their nationalist ambitions in order to adjust to new situations (Downs 2002; Kacowicz 1999, 527; Keating 2004; Laible 2008, 8; Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011, 396; Sutherland 2012, 102). Positions toward the EU might be expected to be affected by a combination of several factors.

### 2.3.3. Determinants of Parties' Position on European Integration

A number of studies look at a variety of specific factors that might affect a party's attitude toward the EU and European integration. For example, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) used a multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis of party position on European integration to test party family, public opinion, ideological extremity, median supporter position, party size, and incumbency over the period 1984 to 1996. Their results indicate that the location of a party on the ideological spectrum is the strongest predictor of the party's position toward the EU, far stronger than the next most powerful factor, public opinion, in determining a party's position toward the EU; centered ideology, government participation, and party size are positively correlated with party position as well. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) looked at 125 parties in 14 countries at five different time points: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 1999. They combined expert evaluation on each party's position toward the EU with party's position on the

ideological spectrum and then tested the impact of ideological extremism, incumbency status, and party size by using a multiple OLS regression. Their analyses show that ideological location affects party's position toward the EU, EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, and EU employment. Specifically, ideological extremist parties are more skeptical, and incumbent parties are more positive toward the EU. Meanwhile, party size matters only to a non-incumbent party. Ray (2003) examined the relationship between incumbent parties and European position. He found a weak positive relationship between incumbent parties and support for the current EU, but a negative relationship between incumbent parties and support for further integration.

Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries (2012) added the party system level factors of fractionalization and polarization to previous studies. They collected information from the CHES data, Eurobarometer survey data, and the World Bank's Database on Political Institutions to create a multi-level dataset and looked at 220 political parties in 14 Western EU member states from 1984 to 1996. Their multivariate analyses using a multi-level OLS regression show that ideologically centered parties are more positive, ideologically extreme parties are more negative, and bigger parties and centered parties are more clearly pro-EU in a competitive party system. The impacts of incumbency and EU issue salience were positive but not significant. Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries' results also demonstrate that the electoral context in which parties operate moderates the impact of party characteristics. They argue that although the impact of contextual characteristics is not direct, these party system characteristics shape and condition both the interaction of parties and the parties' strategic considerations, and thus parties' EU positions are functions of a combination of party characteristics and contextual factors.

On the other hand, Jolly (2007) focused on 21 regionalist political parties across five Western countries for the years 1984 to 2002, testing the impact of party family, national view of

European integration, ideological extremity, median supporter position, electoral support, and government participation on party positioning using multivariate OLS analysis. He finds that regionalist parties are consistently more supportive of the EU over time, and pro-EU positions of regionalist parties do not vary across time, space, or issue area. Jolly also explored the UK's SNP as a case to clarify the causal mechanism and found that SNP elites favor the EU owing to a more favorable political opportunity structure for their autonomy.

Kopecky and Mudde (2002) developed a two-dimensional conceptual model and explored the relationship between ideology, party type, and electoral strength and parties' attitudes toward European integration in four countries in Eastern Central Europe (ECE) using a qualitative analysis of party positions. Parties were classified into Euro-enthusiast, Euro-skeptic, Euro-reject, and Euro-pragmatist categories. A large number of Euro-enthusiastic parties were electorally strong, most Euro-reject parties were small and less influential, the number of Euro-pragmatists was small, and Euro-skeptics were electorally strong. Kopecky and Mudde argue that ideology is the main determinant of a party's support of the EU.

Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards (2006) looked at 73 Eastern and 98 Western political parties in 23 countries to compare the EU positions of Eastern and Western parties. They divided the parties into Left/Right and GAL (green/alternative/libertarian)/TAN (traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist) dimensions and argued that although left parties and TAN parties are consistently more negative toward European integration, Eastern and Western parties showed distinctive patterns of support and opposition due to different party competition structures. While Euro-skepticism is spread over Left-GAL and Right-TAN parties in the West, Right-GAL parties are more positive and Left-TAN parties are more negative toward European

integration in the East. Their results also showed that wealthier groups are more positive and poorer groups are more negative toward European integration.

Mattila and Raunio (2006) analyzed variation in party-voter congruence on European integration based on the European Election Study 2004 project data including 122 parties from the 22 EU member states. They found that parties are closer to their voters on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension, parties in the new member countries are closer to their voters on the EU dimension than parties in the older EU member states, opposition parties were more responsive to European integration than government parties, and smaller parties were more responsive than centrist parties.

De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) found that cultural threat is an important negative predictor of EU support, and anti-immigration sentiments are strongly related to opposition to European integration and rejection of the idea of further European integration.

Based on the literature, I argue that the possible determinants of parties' positions on European integration can be classified into two categories: (1) *party-level variables*, including ideology, type of nationalist party, size of party, and whether the party has participated in government; and (2) *country-level variables*, including party system characteristics (the fractionalization and polarization of the party system), public opinion, and characteristics of the state (East versus West, the size of the immigrant population, size of the state, the length of EU membership, and economic conditions). Compared to previous studies that rely on aggregated data, my goal is to narrow the focus to nationalist parties, to broaden the scope to include both Western and Eastern European countries, and to test country-level factors that might affect a party's attitude toward the EU and European integration as well as the impact of party-level factors. I propose a model which considers all of these variables in Chapter 4.

## CHAPTER 3

### NATIONALIST PARTIES IN THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE: TRENDS AND STRATEGIES

#### 3.1 RECENT TRENDS OF NATIONALIST PARTIES

In the mid-1980s, nationalist parties' share of the vote was under the 5% level in most Western EU member countries. Nationalist parties started to gain more power after 2000, and the share of popular vote won by nationalist parties in national parliamentary elections has increased dramatically since 2010. For many decades after the Second World War, Europeans were afraid of being like the Nazis, and extreme nationalism was socially excluded from the political arena. In this atmosphere of social exclusion, European nationalist parties have not wielded political power. However, the share of nationalist parties in national parliamentary elections in Europe began to increase starting in the late 1980s, and these parties have started to take active roles in politics in almost every EU member country. Although the majority of nationalist parties have not remained in power in most countries, they have become an important political force to be reckoned with. The presence of nationalist parties in Europe does not seem to be a temporary but a constant phenomenon.

##### 3.1.1 EU founding Members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands

In Belgium, there are two influential Flemish nationalist parties in the Dutch-speaking regions: the radical VB and the moderate New Flemish Alliance (NVA, the successor of the People's Union (VU)). They are represented at both regional and federal levels, and their total share of votes has been on the rise although there is a bit of decline since 2007 (see Table 4). The

influence of VB was reduced due to the great success of NVA in the 2010s: NVA won the largest share of the vote in both the 2014 Belgian federal elections and the 2014 EP elections and now leads the 2014-2019 Flemish coalition government. Meanwhile, the Belgian Walloon nationalist parties in the French-speaking regions do not appear to be a serious nationalist movement and do not have strong support either.

Table 4. Belgian EP and Federal Election Results, 1979-2014 (% of votes)

	1979	1981	1984	1985	1987	1989	1991	1994	1995	1999	1999	2003	2004	2007	2009	2010	2014	2014
	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP
VB	-	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.9	4.1	6.6	7.8	7.8	9.9	9.4	11.6	14.3	12	9.9	7.8	3.64	4.26
VU-NVA	9.7	9.8	13.9	7.9	8.1	8.7	5.9	7.1	4.7	5.6	12.2	3.1	14.43	18.5	9.88	17.4	20.32	26.67
SUM	9.7	10.9	15.2	9.3	10	12.8	12.5	14.9	12.5	15.5	21.6	14.7	28.73	30.5	19.78	25.2	23.96	30.93

In France, FN, founded in 1972, fared poorly during the 1970s and early 1980s, but the party had an important breakthrough starting in the mid-1980s and has become the major force of French nationalism (see Table 5). FN continues to grow in popularity and scored strong gains in elections in the 2010s, winning the 2014 EP elections with 24.86% of the votes and coming out in first place in the 2015 regional election with 27.73% of the votes. Although FN has been set to become one of the largest and most popular political forces in France, the French two-round runoff electoral system has limited its representation. FN, in effect, failed to win any seats in the second round in the 2015 regional election despite its significant share of the vote in the first round.

Table 5. French EP and Legislative Election Results, 1973-2014 (% of votes)

	1973	1978	1981	1984	1986	1988	1989	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2004	2007	2009	2012	2014
	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP										
FN	0.5	0.3	0.2	11.0	9.8	9.8	11.7	12.7	10.5	14.9	5.7	11.1	9.8	4.3	6.3	13.6	24.9

In Germany, since the neo-Nazi NPD was founded in 1964 as the successor to the nationalist German Reich Party (DRP, founded in 1950), the party has never crossed the 5% threshold for national representation (see Table 6). However, it has gained representation in regional parliaments. The Republicans (REP, founded in 1983) had temporary success with 7.1% in the 1989 EP elections due to prospects of a reunified Germany, but the party has kept a very small share of votes in the German federal elections (see Table 6). While nationalist parties in Germany have been outlawed since the Second World War, the changed German election rules in 2013 allowed NPD to enter the European Parliament for the first time in 2014, and the party gained 1.03% of the votes. Unlike other German nationalist parties, AfD (founded in 2013) is quickly growing in popularity, receiving 4.7% of the votes in the 2013 federal election (although it failed to win any seats) and 7.04% and 7 seats in the 2014 EP elections. AfD scored an average of 10.83% in the three 2014 state elections, 6.0% in the two 2015 state elections, and 17.37% in the three 2016 state elections.

Table 6. German EP and Federal Election Results, 1972-2014 (% of votes)

	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987	1989	1990	1994	1994	1998	1999	2002	2004	2005	2009	2009	2013	2014
	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP
NPD	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.6	-	0.3	-	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	1.6	-	1.5	1.3	1.03
REP	-	-	-	-	-	7.12	2.1	3.92	1.9	1.8	1.7	0.6	1.88	0.6	1.32	0.4	0.2	0.4
AfD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	7.04
SUM	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.6	8.7	2.4	3.92	1.9	2.1	1.7	1	1.88	2.2	1.32	1.9	6.2	8.47

In Italy, LN, which unified regionalist movements in Northern Italy in 1991, and AN, founded in 1995 as a successor to the neo-fascist MSI, have exercised influence over Italian politics. Support for the two nationalist parties surged until the mid-2000s (see Table 7). After 2006, AN merged with the People of Freedom (PdL) and received 37.38% in 2008 and 21.56% in 2013, while LN gained 8.30% in 2008 and 4.08% in 2013. Meanwhile, FLI, founded by Fini and his followers in 2010 as a split from the Silvio Berlusconi-led PdL, scored 1.95% of the votes in the 2013 general election and 3.66% in the 2014 EP elections. Nationalist parties' total share of the Italian vote was sharply reduced due to the great success of the Eurosceptic populist M5S (founded in 2009): M5S came in second place nationally with 25.55% of the votes in the 2013 general election and 21.2% in the 2014 EP elections.

Table 7. Italian EP and General Election Results, 1979-2014 (% of votes)

	1979	1983	1984	1987	1989	1992	1994	1994	1996	1999	2001	2004	2006	2008	2009	2013	2014
	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP
LN	-	0.34	-	1.44	1.83	8.65	8.36	6.56	10.07	4.48	3.94	4.96	4.58	8.30	10.21	4.08	6.15
MSI-AN	5.45	6.81	6.47	5.91	5.51	5.37	13.47	12.47	15.66	10.30	12.02	11.49	12.34	-	-	-	-
FLI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.95	3.66
PdL-FI	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.01	30.62	21.06	25.16	29.43	20.93	23.72	37.38	35.26	21.56	16.81
SUM	5.45	7.15	6.47	7.35	7.34	14.02	42.84	49.65	46.79	39.94	45.39	37.38	40.64	45.68	45.47	27.59	26.62

In heavily pro-European Luxembourg, there are no serious nationalist parties. The only Eurosceptic party ADR, which was founded in 1987, is the strongest supporter of state sovereignty in Luxembourg. ADR promotes the Luxembourgish language, opposes multiple citizenship, and aspires to a Europe of nation-states. It received 7.9% of the vote in 1989, 9.0% in 1994, 11.3% in 1999, 9.9% in 2004, 8.1% in 2009, and 6.6% in 2013 (see Table 8).

Table 8. Luxembourg EP and General Election Results, 1989-2014 (% of votes)

	1989	1994	1994	1999	1999	2004	2004	2009	2009	2013	2014
	Parl.	Parl.	EP								
ADR	7.9	9	6.94	11.3	8.99	9.9	8.04	8.1	7.39	6.6	7.53

In the Netherlands, the nationalist party LPF, which sought immigration restrictions on ethnic grounds, was enormously successful for a short time after it was founded in February of 2002. It received more than a third of the votes in the March 2002 local elections, and the party also had a great success with 17.0% in the May 2002 general election despite the murder of its leader Fortuyn a few days before the election. However, support for LPF declined sharply in 2003 (see Table 7), and the party won less than 1% of the vote in 2006. It was finally dissolved in 2008. Fortuyn's heir Geert Wilders founded PVV in 2005, and it has steadily gained power and influence. PVV received 5.9% of the national vote in 2006, 15.5% in 2010, and 10.1% in 2012; it won 16.97% and 13.35% in the 2009 and 2014 EP elections (see Table 9).


Table 9. Dutch EP and General Election Results, 2002-2014 (% of votes)

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2009	2010	2012	2014
	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP
LPF	17	5.7	2.6	0.2	-	-	-	-
PVV	-	-	-	5.9	16.97	15.5	10.1	13.35
SUM	17	5.7	2.6	6.1	16.97	15.5	10.1	13.35

Figure 1 shows trends of nationalist parties in the six EU founding countries. Nationalist parties in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg began to appear in the 1970s and 1980s. While these parties show growing trends in Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy,

Luxembourg’s nationalist party is on the decrease, and support for nationalist parties in the Netherlands has been in flux.

Figure 1. [BE, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



3.1.2 EU accession in 1973: The UK, Ireland, and Denmark

After being denied the opportunity to join as a founding member, the UK was accepted into the EU in 1973, along with Ireland and Denmark. Nationalist parties have been getting stronger all over the UK. While UKIP, founded in 1993, had not won any seats in the UK general elections until 2015, its support sharply increased in that year (see Table 8). UKIP has also had an astonishing rise in the EU elections, receiving 1.0% in 1994, 6.7% in 1999, 16.1% in 2004, 16.6% in 2009, and 27.5% in 2014. Meanwhile, BNP, founded in 1982, peaked with 6.3% of the vote in the 2009 EP elections, but has seen a dramatic decline in support since the rise of UKIP. In Northern Ireland, while SF has increased in support since the mid-1990s to become the largest or second largest party since 2004, support for British unionist parties including UUP and

DUP has declined gradually since the mid-2000s (see Table 10). The UK's SNP, founded in 1934 and the largest political party in Scotland, won a landslide victory in the 2015 UK general election. SNP's desire for Scottish independence from the UK garnered little support until the mid-1960s, but the party has steadily increased in popularity since the early 1970s (see Table 10). In Wales, the Welsh Nationalist Party Plaid, founded in 1925, has slightly increased in support since the 1980s.

Table 10. UK EP and General Election Results, 1983-2015 (% of votes)

		1979	1983	1984	1987	1989	1992	1994	1997	1999	2001	2004	2005	2009	2010	2014	2015
		EP	Parl.														
UKIP		-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.3	6.7	1.5	16.1	2.2	16.6	3.1	27.5	12.6
BNP		-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.1	-	0.1	1.1	0.2	4.9	0.7	6.2	1.9	1.1	0.0
UUP	UK	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4
	Reg.	21.9	34.0	21.5	37.8	22.2	34.5	23.8	32.7	17.6	26.8	16.6	17.7	17.0	15.2	13.3	16.0
DUP	UK	-	0.5	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.7	-	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6
	Reg.	29.8	20.0	33.6	11.7	29.9	13.1	29.2	13.6	28.4	22.5	31.9	33.7	18.1	25.0	20.9	25.7
SF	UK	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.4	-	0.7	-	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6
	Reg.	-	13.4	13.3	11.4	9.0	10.0	9.9	16.1	17.3	21.7	26.3	24.3	25.8	25.5	25.5	24.5
SNP	UK	1.9	1.1	1.7	1.3	2.6	1.9	3	2.0	2.7	1.8	1.4	1.5	2.1	1.7	2.4	4.7
	Reg.	19.4	11.7	17.8	14.0	25.6	21.5	32.6	22.1	27.2	20.1	19.7	17.7	29.1	19.9	29.0	50.0
Plaid	UK	1	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.5	1	0.5	1.9	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6
	Reg.	11.7	7.8	12.2	7.3	12.9	9	17.1	9.9	29.6	14.3	17.1	12.6	18.5	11.3	15.3	12.1

Ireland, SF, founded in 1970, has been active in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The nationalist SF aims to achieve a united Ireland and is closely associated with IRA, which challenged British rule in the whole of Ireland. In the Republic of Ireland, SF was politically weak until the late 1990s and never won more than 10% of the national vote until

the early 2010s (see Table 11). However, its support has risen dramatically in elections in 2010s: the party received 15.2% in the 2014 Irish local election, 19.5% in the 2014 EP elections, and 13.8% in the 2016 general election. Support for SF in Northern Ireland has increased steadily there as well. The party gained 10.1% of the vote in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election, 15.5% in 1996, 17.7% in 1998, 23.5% in 2003, 26.2% in 2007, and 26.3% in 2011. It is the second largest party in Northern Ireland as of 2016.

Table 11. Irish EP and General Election Results, 1982-2016 (% of votes)

	1982	1983	1987	1989	1989	1992	1994	1997	1999	2002	2004	2007	2009	2011	2014	2016
	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.										
SF	1	4.9	1.9	1.2	2.2	1.6	3	2.5	6.3	6.5	11.1	6.9	11.2	9.9	19.5	13.8


The nationalist parties in the Nordic countries have been gaining an increasing amount of support and power. In Denmark, the Euro-skeptic nationalist DF, founded in 1995, seeks the protection of Danish culture, the re-introduction of border controls, and further restrictions on immigration. Support for it has risen dramatically since its foundation. Although its share of votes remained similar during the 2000s, DF swept into power with 26.6% of the vote in the 2014 EP elections and became the second biggest party in the Danish parliament, earning 21.1% of the vote in 2015, a massive increase from 2011 (see Table 12).

Table 12. Danish EP and General Election Results, 1998-2015 (% of votes)

	1998	1999	2001	2004	2005	2007	2009	2011	2014	2015
	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.
DF	7.4	5.8	12	6.8	13.2	13.8	15.3	12.3	26.6	21.1

Figure 2 shows the trends of nationalist parties in the UK, Ireland and Denmark. While nationalist parties in the UK and Ireland have been on the rise since the early 1980s, Danish nationalist parties began to appear in the late 1990s and gained popularity in a short period of time.

Figure 2. [UK, IE, DF] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



3.1.3 EU accession in 1981 and 1986: Greece, Portugal, and Spain

After dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal ended in 1970s, Greece joined the EU in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986.

Since Greece joined the EU, support for Greek nationalist parties was virtually unchanged until the early 1990s. It started to rise in the mid-1990s and made a gigantic leap in the 2010s (see Table 13). The main Greek nationalist parties are the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI, founded in 1995), LAOS (founded in 2000), SYRIZA (founded in 2004), XA (founded in 1980), and the Independent Greeks (ANEL, founded in 2012).

The left-wing nationalist DIKKI, formed by the nationalist left that broke away from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), opposes further European integration. The populist nationalist LAOS supports tax cuts as well as banning and deporting illegal immigrants and opposes Turkey's accession to the EU. The left-wing nationalist SYRIZA demands an end to Greece's austerity policies and insists on the defense of the interests of the Greek capital. The ultranationalist XA seeks ultimate state power and wants to cleanse the nation from outsiders and thus supports immediately deporting illegal immigrants and restricting legal immigration. The radical nationalist ANEL places importance on the role of the Greek Orthodox Church, opposes multiculturalism, supports patriotism, and is anti-immigration.

DIKKI has participated in SYRIZA since 2007, and ANEL, which had an initial success with 10.62% of the vote in May 2012, formed a governing coalition with SYRIZA in 2015. SYRIZA's nationalist-populist strategy has been a dramatic success. XA has stayed at about 7% of the vote since a sharp rise in popular support in 2012 and has played an important role in Greek politics.

Table 13. Greek EP and Legislative Election Results, 1990-2015 (% of votes)

	1990	1993	1994	1996	1999	2000	2004	2004	2007	2009	2009	2012.5	2012.6	2014	2015.1	2015.9
	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.
SYRIZA	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	-	5.0	4.7	4.6	16.8	26.9	26.6	36.3	35.5
XA	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.3	7.0	6.9	9.4	6.3	7.0
ANEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.6	7.5	3.5	4.8	3.7
LAOS	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	4.1	3.8	7.2	5.6	2.9	1.6	2.7	1.0	-
DIKKI	-	-	-	4.4	4.7	2.7	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SUM	0.0	0.0	0.1	4.5	4.7	2.7	7.3	4.1	8.8	12.4	10.5	37.3	42.9	42.2	48.4	46.2

In Portugal, there have never been any strong nationalist challenges to the establishment. The National Renovator Party (PNR, founded in 2000) is the main Portuguese nationalist movement, but it has never received significant popular support (see Table 14).

Table 14. Portuguese Legislative Election Results, 2002-2015 (% of votes)

	2002	2004	2005	2009	2009	2011	2014	2015
	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.
PNR	0.09	0.25	0.16	0.37	0.2	0.31	0.46	0.5

In Spain, there have been many sub-state minority nationalist movements advocating greater autonomy or independence for the regions since Franco's death in 1975. Support for sub-state minority nationalist parties appears to be relatively higher in the Basque country and Catalonia than in other regions, with nearly 60% of votes in autonomous community elections (see Table 15). Support for Basque nationalist parties including PNV (founded in 1895), EA (founded in 1986), the Basque Citizens (HB-EH, founded in 1978), and the Basque Country Unite (EHB, founded in 2011) decreased in the late 2000s but rose again to 58.8% in 2012. Support for Catalan nationalist parties including CiU (1978-2015) and ERC (founded in 1931) have tended to gradually decline since 1992 but still remains at a high level.

Table 15. Spanish Autonomous Parliamentary Election Results, 1980-2015 (% of votes)

		1980	1984	1986	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005	2009	2012	
Basque Nationalist	PNV	38	41.8	23.6	28.3	29.3	27.6	42.4	38.4	38.1	34.2	
	EA	-	-	15.8	11.3	10.1	8.57	-	-	3.65	-	
	HB-EH	16.5	14.6	17.4	18.2	16	17.7	10	-	-	-	
	EHB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.7
	SUM	54.4	56.4	56.8	57.8	55.5	53.9	52.4	38.4	41.8	58.8	
		1980	1984	1988	1992	1995	1999	2003	2006	2010	2012	2015
Catalonian Nationalist	CiU	UDC										2.51
		CDC	27.8	46.8	45.7	46.2	41	37.7	30.9	31.5	38.4	30.7
	ERC	8.9	4.4	4.14	7.96	9.49	8.67	16.4	14	7	13.7	39.59
	SUM	36.7	51.2	49.9	54.2	50.4	46.4	47.4	45.6	45.4	44.4	42.1


Meanwhile, various Spanish nationalist parties supporting Franco-style nationalism, Spanish unionism, or Spanish centralism, such as the New Force (FN, 1966-1982), the National Democracy (DN, founded in 1995), the Spain 2000 (E-2000, founded in 2002), the National Alliance (AN, founded in 2006), the National Front (FRN, 2006-2011), and Vox (founded in 2013) have never had any chance of winning legislative seats. Taken as a whole, while there has been no majority statewide nationalist party in Spain, support for sub-state nationalist parties has increased slowly since the early 1980s, though there was a sharp decline in 2015 due to the dissolution of CiU over disagreements over the coalition's separatist turn (see Table 16).

Table 16. Spanish EP and General Election Results, 1982-2015 (% of votes)

		1982	1986	1987	1989	1989	1993	1994	1996	1999	2000	2004	2004	2008	2009	2011	2014	2015
		Parl.	Parl.	EP	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.
Basque country	PNV	1.88	1.53	-	-	1.24	1.24	-	1.27	-	1.53	1.63	-	1.19	-	1.33	-	1.20
	EA	-	-	-	-	0.67	0.55	-	0.46	-	0.43	0.31	-	0.20	-	-	-	-
	HB-EH	1.00	1.15	1.9	1.7	1.06	0.88	0.97	0.72	1.45	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	EE	0.48	0.53	-	-	0.51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	EHB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.37	-	0.87
Catalonia	CiU	3.67	5.02	4.5	4.3	5.04	4.94	4.66	4.60	4.5	4.19	3.23	-	3.03	-	4.17	-	-
	ERC	0.66	0.42	-	-	0.41	0.80	-	0.67	-	0.84	2.52	-	1.16	-	1.06	-	2.39
	ICV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.19	-	0.51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	PxC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	-	0.25	-	-
	UDC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.56	-	0.26
	DiL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.25
Canary	CC	-	-	-	-	0.32	0.88	-	0.88	-	1.07	0.91	-	0.68	-	0.59	-	0.32
Andalusia	PA	0.40	0.47	1.0	1.9	1.04	0.41	0.76	0.54	-	0.89	0.70	1.3	0.27	-	0.32	0.32	-
Navarre	UPN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.52	-	-	-	-
Aragon	PAR	-	0.36	-	-	0.35	0.61	-	-	-	0.17	0.14	-	0.16	-	1.41	-	-
	CHA	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.03	-	0.20	-	0.33	0.36	-	0.15	-	-	-	-
Galicia	BNG	0.18	0.13	-	-	0.23	0.54	0.75	0.88	1.65	1.32	0.81	-	0.83	-	0.76	-	0.28
	PNG	-	-	-	-	0.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CG	-	0.40	-	-	0.22	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	-	-	-	-	-	-
Valencia	UPV	0.09	0.20	-	-	0.20	0.17	-	0.11	-	0.25	0.16	-	0.12	-	-	-	-
	UV	-	0.32	-	-	0.71	0.48	-	0.37	-	0.25	0.16	-	-	0.04	-	-	-
Alliance of REG/NAT for EP elections	Galeusca			-	-			-		-			5.15		-		-	
	CEU			-	-			-		-			-		5.10		5.42	
	CE			-	-			-		3.20			1.27		-		-	
	CN			1.2	1.9			2.8		-			-		-		-	
	EdP			1.7	1.5			1.29		-			2.45		2.49		-	
	CN-EdP			-	-			-		2.90			-		-		-	
	II-SP			-	-			-		-			-		1.12		-	
	EDD			-	-			-		-			-		-		-	4.01
	LPD			-	-			-		-			-		-		-	2.08
	PE			-	-			-		-			-		-		-	1.9
SUM (sub-state)		9.36	10.53	10.30	11.30	12.09	11.53	11.23	11.89	13.70	11.79	10.94	10.17	8.32	8.75	12.82	13.73	7.57
Spanish Nat'lism	FN	0.52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	-	-	0.05	-	-	-
	DN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.06	-	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.08	0.01
	E-2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	-	0.03	-	0.04	-	-
	AN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.01	-	-	-	-
	FRN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Vox	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.57
SUM (state)		0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.05	1.65	0.24

Figure 3 shows trends of nationalist parties in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. While Greek nationalist parties show a rising trend since 1990s and have considerable popular support, nationalist parties in Portugal have little influence over national politics, with less than 1% of popular support. Meanwhile, public support for Spanish sub-state minority nationalist parties has tended to decrease since the late 1990s except in the Basque region.

Figure 3. [GR, PT, ES] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



### 3.1.4 EU accession in 1995: Austria, Finland, and Sweden

Austria, Finland, and Sweden had been neutral in the Cold War, and then joined the EU in 1995 after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

In Austria, the share of the national vote for the FPÖ has risen significantly since the mid-1980s. The party received 4.98% of the vote in 1983, increasing to 9.73% in 1986, 16.64% in 1990, 20.50% in 1994, 21.89% in 1995, and 26.91% in 1999 (see Table 17). However, its share of the vote decreased to 10.02% in 2002 due to an internal row and a split between the FPÖ and the Austrian Alliance for the Future (BZÖ). Since then, the FPÖ has started to re-gain votes, and the FPÖ and the BZÖ together received 15.15% in 2006, 28.24% in 2008, and 24.04% in 2013. In the 2015 state election, the FPÖ doubled its votes and came in second at 30.4%.

Table 17. Austrian EP and Legislative Election Results, 1975-2014 (% of votes)

	1975	1979	1983	1986	1990	1994	1995	1996	1999	1999	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009	2013	2014
	Parl.	EP	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP						
FPÖ	5.4	6.1	5	9.7	16.6	22.5	21.9	27.5	23.4	26.9	10	6.3	11	17.5	12.7	20.5	19.7
BZÖ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1	10.7	4.6	3.5	0.5
SUM	5.4	6.1	5	9.7	16.6	22.5	21.9	27.5	23.4	26.9	10	6.3	15.1	28.2	17.3	24	20.2

The anti-immigration Finnish PS, established in 1995, places importance on traditional or conservative values such as family and religion, promotes Finnish identity, insists on the removal of a compulsory second official language and seeks to reduce the EU's role in domestic issues as well as Finland's contributions to the EU. PS received 0.99% of the vote in 1999, 1.57% in 2003, and 4.05% in 2007. PS's share of votes increased to 19.05% in 2011, and it won the second largest number of seats with 17.65% in 2015 (see Table 18). The Finnish SFP-RKP, which seeks to protect the Swedish-speaking minority's interests, has been in a slight decline due to the

decreasing population of Swedish-speaking Finns and increasing support for the nationalist agenda of PS.

Table 18. Finnish EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1972-2015 (% of votes)

	1972	1975	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1996	1999	1999	2003	2004	2007	2009	2011	2014	2015
	Parl.	EP	Parl.														
PS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.67	0.99	0.79	1.57	0.54	4.05	9.79	19.1	12.9	17.7
SFP	5.1	4.7	4.2	4.6	5.3	5.4	5.1	5.75	5.1	6.77	4.6	5.71	4.5	6.09	4.3	6.8	4.88

In Sweden, the nationalist Sweden Democrats (SD), founded in 1988 with roots in neo-Nazism, did not receive any significant support until the late 1990s, but began to rise in the 2000s (see Table 19). SD received 1.4% of the vote in 2002 and 2.9% in 2006. It crossed the 4% threshold necessary for national parliamentary representation for the first time in 2010, gaining 5.7% of the vote. Its share increased to 12.9% in 2014, and it became the third largest party in Sweden.

Table 19. Swedish EP and General Election Results, 1988-2014 (% of votes)

	1988	1991	1994	1998	1999	2002	2004	2006	2009	2010	2014	2014
	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.
SD	0	0.1	0.3	0.4	5.8	1.4	6.8	2.9	15.3	5.7	26.6	12.9

Figure 4 shows trends of nationalist parties in Austria, Finland and Sweden. While Austrian nationalist parties show a rising trend since the mid-1980s, these parties in both Nordic countries appeared to rise only since the early 2000s.

Figure 4. [AT, FI, SE] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



### 3.1.5 EU accession in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia

After the collapse of Communism, the former Communist countries wanted to join the EU to consolidate their democracies and not fall back under Russian influence. The EU accepted their applications, and thus three former Baltic Soviet Union countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), four Central European alliance Visegrád Group members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), one former Yugoslavian country (Slovenia), and two former British colonies in the Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta) joined the EU in 2004.

In Estonian politics, the role of nationalist parties has been steadily growing since the early 1990s and has become more relevant since 2003. Overall support for nationalist parties dropped temporarily between 2007 and 2010, but began to slowly rise again (see Table 20). The most influential Estonian nationalist party is the moderate Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL). The Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP, founded in 1988) and Pro Patria National Coalition (RKEI, founded in 1992) merged to form the Pro Patria Union (PP) in 1995, and then merged with the Res Publica Party (RP) in 2006 to form IRL. IRL or its roots won 8.8% in 1992, 7.9% in 1995, 16.1% in 1999, 31.9% in 2003, 17.9% in 2007, 20.5 in 2011, and 13.7% in 2015. There are also two more newly founded nationalist parties: the conservative People's

Party of Estonia (EKRE, founded 2012) and the Estonian Free Party (EV, founded in 2014). EKRE and EV received 8.1% and 8.7% of the vote respectively in the 2015 parliamentary election. Nationalist parties for Russian minority interests including the Constitution Party (EÜ R), the Russian Party in Estonia (VEE), and the Estonian United Left Party (EÜ V) have exercised little influence over politics in Estonia.

Table 20. Estonian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1992-2015 (% of votes)

			1992	1995	1999	2003	2004	2007	2009	2011	2014	2015	
			Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	
Estonian Nationalism	IRL	PP-ERSP	8.8	7.9	16.1	7.3	10.5	17.9	12.2	20.5	13.9	13.7	
		PP-RKEI	-										
		RP	-	-	-	24.6	6.7						
		EIP	-	-	-	0.5		0.2	-	0.4	1.3	0.2	
		EV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.7
		EKRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0	8.1
		SUM	8.8	7.9	16.1	32.4	17.2	18.1	12.2	20.9	19.2	30.7	
Russian minority		EÜ R	-	5.9	6.1	2.2	-	1	-	-	-	-	
		VEE	-		2	0.2	-	0.2	0.3	0.9	-	-	
		EÜ V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	
		SUM	0.0	5.9	8.1	2.4	0.0	1.2	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.1	
SUM			8.8	13.8	24.2	34.8	17.2	19.3	12.5	21.8	19.2	30.8	

After Latvia regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the nationalist TB (founded in 1993) merged with LNNK (founded in 1988) to form TB-LNNK in 1997, and then merged again with the more hardline nationalist All For Latvia (VL, 2006-2011) to form the National Alliance (NA) in 2011. NA or its roots received considerable national support in their early years, but support for these parties continued to decline until EU accession in 2004. Since

then, it has appeared to rise. As of 2016, the NA, which has an anti-immigration and anti-Russia platform, is the fourth-largest party in Latvia, participating in Latvian government since 2011. On the other hand, nationalist parties representing Russian minority interests have remained strong in Latvian politics since the early 1990s. Support for nationalist parties for Russian minority interests including the National Harmony Party (TSP, 1994-2010), the Latvian Russian Union (LKS, founded in 1998), the Harmony Center (SC, 2005-2014), and the Social Democratic Party “Harmony” (Harmony, founded in 2010) shows growing trends (see Table 21). Harmony is the ruling party in Latvia as of 2016.

Table 21. Latvian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1993-2014 (% of votes)

			1993	1995	1998	2002	2004	2006	2009	2010	2011	2014	2014
			Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.
Latvian Nationalist	NA	LNNK	13.4	6.3	14.7	5.4	29.8	7.0	7.5	7.8	13.9	14.3	16.6
		TB	5.4	12.0									
		VL	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	2.8				
	SUM		18.8	18.3	14.7	5.4	29.8	8.5	10.3	7.8	13.9	14.3	16.6
Russian Minority	LKS		-	-	-	19.1	10.7	6.1	9.7	1.5	0.8	6.4	1.6
	Harmony	TSP	12.0	5.6	14.2	-	4.8	14.5 (SC)	19.6 (SC)	26.6	28.4	13.0	23.0
		SC	-	-	-	-	-						
	SUM		12.0	5.6	14.2	19.1	15.5	20.6	29.3	28.1	29.2	19.4	24.6
SUM			30.8	23.9	28.9	24.5	45.3	29.1	39.6	35.9	43.1	33.7	41.2

In Lithuania, overall support for nationalist parties rose after the fall of the Soviet Union, temporarily declined before Lithuania’s admission to the EU in 2004, and then rose again after EU membership was attained (see Table 22). The Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD, founded in 1993) and the Order and Justice (TT, founded in 2002) have


been playing important roles in Lithuanian politics. The newly established populist nationalist Way of Courage (DK, founded in 2012) won 7.99% in the 2012 parliamentary election. On the other hand, LLRA, founded in 1994 for Polish minority interests, has had an influence on politics in Lithuania.

Table 22. Lithuanian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1990-2014 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2004	2008	2009	2012	2014
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP
Lithuanian Nationalist	TS-LKD	-	-	31.3	8.6	14.8	12.6	19.7	26.7	15.1	17.4
	TT	-	-	-	-	11.3	6.8	12.7	11.9	7.3	14.3
	DK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.0	-
	SPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	-
	JL	-	3.6	4.0	1.2	0.0	-	1.8	-	0.6	-
	FRONTAS	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	2.4	-	-
	LTS	-	2.0	2.2	0.9	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
	SUM	0.0	5.6	37.5	10.7	26.3	19.4	37.4	40.0	32.2	31.7
Other Minorities	LLRA	-	-	3.1	2.0	3.8	5.7	4.8	8.2	5.8	8.1
	LRS	-	-	1.7	0.3	0.0	-	0.9	-	-	-
	SUM	0.0	0.0	4.8	2.3	3.8	5.7	5.7	8.2	5.8	8.1
SUM		0.0	5.6	42.3	13.0	30.1	25.1	43.1	48.2	38.0	39.8

Figure 5 shows the trends of nationalist parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Support for nationalist parties in all three countries shows growing trends since the early 1990s, but dropped temporarily in the period before EU accession. While nationalist parties for Russian minority interests have a strong influence on Latvian politics, these parties have little or less influence in Estonia and Lithuania.

Figure 5. [EE, LV, LT] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



Nationalist parties in the Czech Republic, including the Czech National Social Party (ČSNS, founded in 1898), Moravians (founded as HSD-SMS in 1990 and as Moravané in 2005), the National Party (NS, 2002-2011), the National Unity (NSJ, founded in 2002); the Czech Sovereignty (CS, founded in 2011), the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (RMS, 1989-2013), the Workers' Party of Social Justice (DS, founded in 2004), and the National Socialists–Left of the 21st century (NS-LEV 21, founded in 2011), have not had much appeal to the electorate. Most have failed to gather any significant support in the Czech legislative elections. Support for all Czech nationalist parties was highest in the 1992 legislative elections, held before Czechoslovakia split in 1993, and lowest in 2002 and 2006, before and after EU accession in 2004 (see Table 23). Since then, public support for these parties has risen again as a result of the successful electoral performances of the anti-immigration radical right Public Affairs (VV, 2001-2015) and the nationalist populist Dawn-National Coalition (Ú SVIT, founded in 2013). VV received 10.9% of the vote in 2010, and Ú SVIT received 6.88% in 2013. However, VV did not last long. Although it entered the coalition government in 2010, it did not run for the 2013 legislative election due to a bribery scandal in 2011 and then was dissolved in 2015.

Table 23. Czech EP and Legislative Election Results, 1990-2014 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1996	1998	2002	2004	2006	2009	2010	2013	2014
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP
Czech Nationalist	ČSNS	2.7	6.5	2.1	0.3	0.8	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0
	Moravané	10.0	5.9	0.5	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.4
	RMS	-	6.0	8.0	3.9	1.0	-	-	-	0.0	-	-
	CS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.3	3.7	0.3	0.1
	DS	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.5
	LEV21-NS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	
	VV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	10.9	-	0.5
	NS	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-
	NSJ	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
	ÚSVIT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.9	3.1
	SUM	12.7	18.4	10.6	4.2	1.8	0.2	0.4	7.8	15.9	8.2	4.6

Unlike the Czech Republic, nationalist parties have been a huge influence on Slovakian politics. The People’s Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS, 1991-2014) won an overwhelming victory in the 1992 parliamentary election and formed a minority government, and the Slovak National Party (SNS, founded in 1989) joined the Slovak government in 1993. HZDS and SNS together voted for a declaration of independence of the Slovak nation and participated in the establishment of an independent Slovakia. Together, they formed another coalition government from 1994-1998. Support for HZDS continued to decline and HZDS won even less votes than SNS in the 2006 Slovak parliamentary election. Following its victory in 2006, the Direction–Social Democracy (Smer-SD, founded in 1999) formed a coalition government and HZDS and SNS became junior coalition partners. Smer-SD promotes Slovak identity and demands the empowerment of the Slovak Republic in the EU. National support for

Smer-SD had continued since its beginning, and the rise of the Smer-SD appeared to influence the decline of HZDS and SNS (see Table 24). In 2006 Smer-SD took control of the government with an absolute majority of 83 seats in 2012. Meanwhile, nationalist parties for Hungarian minority interests have also remained an important political force in Slovakia. Two of these parties, the Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK-MKP, founded in 1998) and the Most-Híd (MOST, founded in 2009), have won a combined total of about 9-13% of votes since 1994.

Table 24. Slovak EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1990-2016 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1994	1998	2002	2004	2006	2009	2010	2012	2014	2016	
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	
Slovak Nationalist	SNS	13.9	7.9	5.4	9.1	3.3	2.0	11.7	5.6	5.1	4.6	3.6	8.6	
	PSNS	-	-	-	-	3.7		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	HZDS	-	37.3	35.0	27.0	19.5	17.0	8.8	9.0	4.3	0.9	-	-	
	HZD	-	-	-	-	3.3	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SMER-SD	-	-	-	-	13.5	16.9	29.1	32.0	34.8	44.4	24.1	28.3	
	SUM	13.9	45.2	40.4	36.1	43.3	37.6	49.6	46.6	44.2	49.9	27.7	36.9	
Other Minorities	SMK-MKP	-	-	10.2	9.1	11.2	13.2	11.7	11.3	4.3	4.3	6.5	4.1	
	MOST	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	6.9	5.8	6.5	
	SUM	0.0	0.0	10.2	9.1	11.2	13.2	11.7	11.3	12.4	11.2	12.3	10.6	
SUM		13.9	45.2	50.6	45.2	54.5	50.8	61.3	57.9	56.6	61.1	40.0	47.5	

In Hungary, nationalist parties have been very successful. Since the end of Communism, nationalist parties joined together to form coalition governments in 1990, 1998, 2010, and 2014. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, 1987-2011) won the first parliamentary election in 1990 with 24.72% of the vote and formed a government coalition with two other nationalist parties, the Independent Smallholders (FKGP, founded in 1988) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP, founded in 1989). These three parties together achieved 42.92% in 1990.

In the 1998 parliamentary election, FKGP, MDF and Fidesz (founded in 1988) together formed a government coalition with 45.08%. Later, Fidesz and KDNP formed government coalitions in the 2010 and 2014 parliamentary elections with a combined 52.73% and 44.87% of the vote, respectively. Support for Hungarian nationalist parties including the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP, founded in 1993) and JOBBIK (founded in 2003) rose sharply since EU accession in 2004 (see Table 25). The rise in support of radical nationalist JOBBIK party is especially worthy of notice: it received 2.2% of the vote in 2006, but dramatically increased to 16.67% in 2010 and to 20.22% in 2014.

Table 25. Hungarian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1990-2014 (% of votes)

		1990	1994	1998	2002	2004	2006	2009	2010	2014	2014	
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	
Hungarian Nationalist	FKGP	11.7	8.8	13.8	0.8	-	0.0	-	0.0	0.2	-	
	MDF	24.7	12.0	3.1	41.1	5.3	5.0	5.3	2.7	-	-	
	FIDESZ	9.0	7.0	28.2		47.4	42.0	56.4	52.7	44.9	51.5	
	KDNP	6.5	7.0	2.6	4.0	-		2.2	-	0.0	0.0	-
	MIÉP	-	1.6	5.5	4.4	2.4	-		14.8	16.7	20.2	14.7
	JOBBIK	-	-	-	-	-	-		14.8	16.7	20.2	14.7
		SUM	51.9	36.4	53.2	50.3	55.1	49.2	76.5	72.1	65.3	66.2

In Poland, there has been a continuing rise in support for nationalist parties, especially after its EU accession in 2004 (see Table 26). The main Polish nationalist party PiS (founded in 2001) won the 2005 parliamentary election and formed a Polish government with the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP, founded in 1992) and the League of Polish Families (LPR, founded in 2001) in 2006. Support for PiS has continued to grow, and the party finally took control of the government with the majority of seats in 2015. It is notable that three newly


founded nationalist parties received considerable support in the 2015 parliamentary election: the United Poland (SP, founded in 2012) won 7.55%; and the Kukiz'15 (K'15, founded in 2015) and the National Movement (RN, founded in 2012) together won 8.81%. Meanwhile, the German Minority (MN), a party focused on German minority interests, has had a small amount of national support.

Table 26. Polish EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1991-2015 (% of votes)

		1991	1993	1997	2001	2004	2005	2007	2009	2011	2014	2015
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.
Polish Nationalist	PiS	-	-	-	9.5	12.7	27.0	32.1	27.4	29.9	31.8	37.6
	SRP	0.0	2.8	0.1	10.2	10.8	11.4	1.5	1.5	0.1	0.0	0.0
	LPR	-	-	-	7.9	15.9	8.0	1.3	1.1	-	-	-
	SP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0	7.6
	K'15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.8
	RN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	
	SUM	0.0	2.8	0.1	27.6	39.4	46.4	34.9	30.0	30.0	37.2	54.0
German Minority	MN	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.4	-	0.3	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.2
	SUM	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2
SUM		1.2	3.4	0.5	30.0	39.4	46.7	35.1	30.0	30.2	37.2	54.2

Figure 6 shows trends of nationalist parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, support for Czech nationalist parties has fluctuated, and these parties have had little influence on Czech politics. On the other hand, support for nationalist parties in the other three countries shows growing trends, and these parties have had considerable influence on their national politics.

Figure 6. [CZ, SK, HG, PL] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



The referendum on Slovenian independence from Yugoslavia passed with 88.5% in December 1990. The Slovenian war for independence broke out following the Slovenian declaration of independence on June 25, 1991. The independence movements appeared to lead the rise of support for nationalist parties in Slovenia, but nationalist parties have declined since Slovenia's admission to the EU in 2004 (see Table 27). The main nationalist parties are the Slovenian People's Party (SLS, founded in 1988), the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS, founded in 1989), the Slovenian National Party (SNS, founded in 1991), and the New Slovenia—Christian Democrats (NSi, founded in 2000). SDS is the most influential, participating in the Slovenian government coalition in 1990 and 1992. Support for SDS began to increase in 1996, and the party won the 2004 parliamentary election and took control of the government. Support for SDS slightly decreased in 2011, thus the party became a junior coalition partner. SDS has been the second largest party since 2011.

Table 27. Slovenian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1990-2014 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2004	2008	2009	2011	2014	2014
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.
Slovenian Nationalist	SDS	7.4	3.3	16.1	15.8	17.7	29.1	29.3	26.7	26.2	24.8	20.7
	NSi	-	-	-	8.7	23.6	9.1	3.4	16.6	4.9	16.6	5.6
	SLS	12.6	8.7	19.4	9.5	8.4	6.8	5.2	3.6	6.8		4.0
	SNS	-	10.0	3.2	4.4	5.0	6.3	5.4	2.9	1.8	4.0	2.2
	SUM	20.0	22.0	38.7	38.4	54.7	51.3	43.3	49.8	39.7	45.4	32.5

In Cyprus, which is dominated by a division of power between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, most political parties appear to have nationalistic historical roots and characteristics. Some major parties, such as the conservative Democratic Rally (DISY, founded in 1976) which advocates for Cyprus' reunification and free market economic policies, are nationalistic but broad-based in their appeals, and thus support for these parties has been constant. The four nationalist parties in Cyprus are the Greek Cypriot nationalist left-wing Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK, founded in 1969), which supports socialized medicine, state ownership of banks and foreign-owned mines and a more punitive approach to Turkey; the Greek Cypriot nationalist Democratic Party (DIKO, founded in 1976), which takes a hardline stance on Cyprus; the Greek Cypriot nationalist European Party (Evroko, founded in 2005), which supports free market economic policies and maintenance of Greek influence; and the National Popular Front (ELAM, founded in 2008), which promotes Greek nationalism and opposes Turkish Cypriots and immigration. These nationalist parties together received 27.70% of the vote in 1981, 38.70% in 1985, 30.50% in 1991, 26.20% in 1996, 24.30% in 2001, 32.60% in 2006, and 29.65% in 2011. Their support appeared to rise slightly since Cyprus's admission to the EU in 2004, but has declined in the 2010s (see Table 28).

Table 28. Cypriot EP and Legislative Election Results, 1976-2014 (% of votes)

		1976	1981	1985	1991	1996	2001	2004	2006	2009	2011	2014
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP
Cypriot Nationalist	DIKO	38.4	19.5	27.6	19.6	16.4	14.8	17.1	17.9	12.3	15.8	10.8
	EDEK		8.2	11.1	10.9	8.1	6.5	10.8	8.9	9.9	8.9	7.7
	EVROKO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.8	4.1	3.9	-
	ELAM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	2.7
	SUM	38.4	27.7	38.7	30.5	26.2	24.3	27.9	32.6	26.3	29.7	21.2
Other major parties	DISY	27.6	31.9	33.6	35.8	34.5	34.0	28.2	30.3	35.7	34.3	37.8
	AKEL	32.8	32.8	27.4	30.6	33.0	34.7	27.9	31.1	34.9	32.7	27.0

The main Maltese nationalist parties are the National Action (AN, 2007-2010), the radical nationalist Empire Europe (EE, founded in 2000), and the Nationalist Party (PN, founded in 1880), which is the main opposition to the Labor Party (PL). Support for Maltese nationalist parties appears to be in decline since Malta's EU accession in 2004 (see Table 29).


Table 29. Maltese EP and General Election Results, 1971-2014 (% of votes)

		1971	1976	1981	1987	1992	1996	1998	2003	2004	2008	2009	2013	2014
		Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP							
Maltese Nationalist	PN	48.1	48.5	50.9	50.9	51.8	47.8	51.8	51.8	39.8	49.3	39.8	43.3	40.0
	AN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-
	EE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	0.0	1.5	-	2.8
	SUM	48.1	48.5	50.9	50.9	51.8	47.8	51.8	51.8	40.5	49.8	41.3	43.3	42.8

Figure 7 shows trends of nationalist parties in Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. Support for Slovenian nationalist parties began to increase in the early 1990s due to the Slovenian war for independence and continued to grow until 2004. Public support began to decrease after EU accession. Support for Cypriot nationalist parties has fluctuated slightly and shows a decreasing

trend since the mid-2000s. Maltese nationalist parties have also been losing support since the early 2000s. Although nationalist parties in these three countries show decreasing trends, they have had considerable influence on their national politics.

Figure 7. [SI, CY, MT] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



3.1.6 EU accession in 2007 and 2013: Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia

Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. These two countries lagged behind other former Central European Communist countries in joining the EU due to the poorly functioning justice system, and their incapacity in fighting corruption. By contrast, Croatia was the second country to join the EU among former Yugoslavian countries.

After the end of Communist rule in Bulgaria in 1989, support for nationalist parties remained low until the late 1990s, but increased greatly due to temporary enthusiasm among the public surrounding the former King Simeon II’s National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV, founded in 2001) in 2001. While the NDSV received 42.74% of the vote in its first 2001 parliamentary election, its popularity decreased to 19.90% in 2005 due to its failure to keep its campaign pledges, and eventually the party garnered only 3% and 0.24% of votes in 2009 and in 2014. The radical nationalist ATAKA (founded in 2005) made an electoral breakthrough in 2005 that drew particular attention. ATAKA won 8.14% in 2005 and 9.36% in 2005, but it began to

lose support starting in 2013. The rise of other nationalist parties in 2010s also stands out. The coalition of IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM, founded in 1991) and the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB, founded in 2011) received 7.28% in 2014, and the newly founded Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT, founded in 2014) was successful with 5.69% of votes in 2014. Meanwhile the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS, founded in 1990), which focuses on Turkish minority interests, has gained support (see Table 30).

Table 30. Bulgarian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1986-2014 (% of votes)

		1986	1990	1991	1994	1997	2001	2005	2009	2009	2013	2014	2014
		Parl.	EP	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.						
Bulgarian Nationalist	IMRO-BNM	-	-	-	-	-	3.6	-	2.3	-	1.9	-	7.3
	NFSB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.7	3.1	-
	ATAKA	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	12.0	9.4	7.3	3.0	4.5
	BBT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.7	5.7
	NDSV	-	-	-	-	-	42.7	19.9	8.0	3.0	0.0	-	0.2
	SUM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	46.3	28.0	22.3	12.4	12.9	16.8	17.7
Turkish Minority	DPS	-	6.0	7.6	5.4	7.6	7.5	12.8	-	14.0	11.3	-	14.8
	SUM	0.0	6.0	7.6	5.4	7.6	7.5	12.8	0.0	14.0	11.3	0.0	14.8
SUM		0.0	6.0	7.6	5.4	7.6	53.8	40.8	22.3	26.4	24.2	16.8	32.5

After the fall of Communism in Romania in 1989, nationalist parties gained increasing support until 2000 but declined somewhat until Romania became a member of the EU in 2007. The most notable nationalist parties are the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR, 1990-2006), PRM (founded in 1991), the New Generation Party–Christian Democratic (PNG, founded in 2000), and People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD, 2011-2015). These four parties have played an important role in Romanian politics, and all together received 2.10% of the vote in 1990,

11.61% in 1992, 8.82% in 1996, 21.02% in 2000, 15.67% in 2004, 5.45% in 2008, and 15.24% in 2012 (see Table 31). PUNR and PRM participated in a government coalition with the mainstream Social Democratic Party (PSD) from 1994 to 1996. In 2000, PRM gained particular strength as a major political power and became the second largest party. While PRM began to lose support due to its ideological transformation to very strong nationalism, the newly founded less extreme nationalist PP-DD entered the Romanian parliament successfully with 13.99% of the votes in 2012. Support for nationalist parties representing small minority interests has remained to some degree in Romanian politics. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), a party for Hungarian minority interest, has been playing an especially important role as one of the main parties of Romania.

Table 31. Romanian EP and General Election Results, 1990-2014 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2009	2012	2014
		Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	Parl.	EP	Parl.	EP
Romanian Nationalist	PP-DD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.0	3.7
	PRM	-	3.9	4.5	19.5	12.9	3.2	8.7	1.3	2.7
	PNG	-	-	-	0.2	2.2	2.3	-	-	-
	PUNR	2.1	7.7	4.4	1.4	0.5	-	-	-	-
	SUM	2.1	11.6	8.9	21.1	15.6	5.5	8.7	15.3	6.4
Other Minorities	FDGR	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	-	0.5	-
	UDMR	7.2	7.5	6.6	6.8	6.2	6.2	8.9	5.1	6.3
	Other 22 parties	0.8	1.1	1.6	2.4	1.9	3.2	-	2.9	-
	SUM	8.3	8.9	8.4	9.5	8.5	9.7	8.9	8.5	6.3
SUM	10.4	20.5	17.3	30.6	24.1	15.2	17.6	23.8	12.7	

After the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995) ended with a Croatian victory, Croatia gained its independence from Yugoslavia. Support for Croatian nationalist parties


appeared to decline after the war was over, but rose slightly after Croatia joined the EU in 2013. The main nationalist parties are the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, founded in 1989) and HSP. Support for HSP dwindled to almost nothing in the 2015 elections, but HDZ has remained a strong player in Croatian politics (see Table 32), ruling the Croatian government six times in 1990, 1992, 1995, 2003, 2007, and 2015.

Table 32. Croatian EP and Parliamentary Election Results, 1990-2015 (% of votes)

		1990	1992	1995	2000	2003	2007	2011	2014	2015
		Parl.	EP	Parl.						
Croatian Nationalist	HSP	-	7.1	5.0	5.2	6.4	3.5	3.0	6.9	0.60
	HDSSB	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	2.9		
	HČSP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.8	-	-
	HSP-AS	-	-	-	-	-	-		41.4	33.46
	HDZ	41.9	44.7	45.2	26.9	33.9	36.6	23.4		
	SUM	41.9	51.8	50.2	32.1	40.3	41.9	32.1	48.3	34.06

Figure 8 shows the trends of nationalist parties in Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. In all three countries, nationalist parties have had considerable influence on their national politics. Support for Bulgarian and Romanian nationalist parties rose greatly in the late 1990s and then showed declining trends before and after EU accession. Support for these parties has risen again since the late 2000s. In contrast, support for Croatian nationalist parties has decreased since the mid-1990s.

Figure 8. [BG, RO, HR] Recent Trends of Nationalist Parties



### 3.2 PARTY RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In order to understand how nationalist parties respond to the EU, we need to identify the dynamics that shape party behavior regarding European integration.

#### 3.2.1 Electoral competition and coalition formation

There are three well-known models of party behavior in the rational choice literature: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking behaviors (Sartori 1976). Vote-seeking behavior assumes that parties seek to maximize votes in order to control government. Thus, vote-seeking parties' policies, ideologies, and party lines on particular issues could change depending on political or economic situations before elections or on party leaders' policy orientations. Downs (1957) argues that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (28). According to Downs, vote-seeking behavior is more common in a two-party system. Broadly, vote-seeking behavior includes Hinich and Ordeshook's (1969) concept of maximizing pluralities in a single-member district system and Robertson's (1976) notion of maximizing probabilities of winning a majority in a multi-member district system as well as Downs's maximizing vote strategy (Strom 1990, 567). The main purpose of vote-seeking behavior may be to seek office and/or policy benefits, but parties sometimes adopt counterproductive electoral strategies. For example, Tsebelis (1990) used a

“nested games” approach to explain why UK Labor party adopted an electorally suicidal platform in 1983. According to him, activists who play an internal game are more concerned with policy and politicians who play electoral game are more concerned with the survival of the party. Since these two groups value electoral success differently, who dominates the party is very important in deciding electoral strategies and policy preferences. If the party has a strong organizational connection to activists, it is more likely to stick to its traditional policy preferences despite massive electoral losses (Tsebelis 1990). That is, intra-party competition may affect parties’ vote maximizing strategies.

Office-seeking behavior plans to maximize party control over elected office (Leiserson 1968; Riker 1962). Downs (1957) defines political parties as “a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (24). Office-seeking parties try to accomplish their fundamental goals by entering government. To benefit from office, office-seeking parties endeavor to install their leaders in government posts or to build political partnerships with government. By joining government on their own or as part of a coalition, they ensure their survival, play a role as a balancer or a stabilizer within government, and have a chance to access public funds and legal support. Cartel parties that use government resources to maintain their positions within the political system could be included in office-seeking parties. Smaller parties are more likely to have this office-seeking strategy when there is a proportional representative system, and they can actually affect the success of governing coalitions in this setting (Strom 1990, 593). However, some parties decide to give up the benefits of staying in office or resign in the middle of a parliamentary term in office. The concept of office-seeking behavior cannot explain these kinds of cases because short-term incumbency benefits can have a negative effect on long-run electoral interests. In other words, parties must modulate their

policies in order to form coalitions with other parties or maximize votes, but policy flexibility for coalition formation or election has the risk that ideologically committed party supporters will withdraw their support for the party (Almeida 2012, 15). Rose and Mackie (1998) found that office-seeking parties reacted less sensitively to election results than vote-seeking parties.

Through policy-seeking behavior, parties aim to maximize their effect on public policy (Strom 1990, 567). Policy-seeking parties emphasize defending the policies they pursue rather than winning elections or achieving office. Moreover, they seek legislative coalitions that enable them to control laws or policies in parliament rather than executive coalitions in which they share government/cabinet positions. Cross-voting, in which parliamentary members vote across party lines on particular laws, is presumably relevant to legislative coalition. While vote-seeking parties focus on strengthening coalitions before elections in order to maximize votes, office-seeking and policy-seeking parties are alike in that they focus on forming coalitions after elections. Although policy-seeking parties are driven by policy, policy considerations alone cannot explain how these parties ally themselves with other parties (Laver and Budge 1992). The most representative cases of policy-seeking parties would be social-democratic parties in the Nordic countries and green parties. Meanwhile, the theory behind vote-seeking and office-seeking behaviors does not explain the existence of many ideologically peripheral parties who have no chance to win elections or control public office. The policy-seeking objective is more likely to cause parties to be established to enact changes for their concerned group. Because they are more concerned about activists' policy preferences than electoral success, they are likely to pursue electoral strategies and policies attractive to a small number of their concerned electorate rather than the majority of the general electorate. According to Strom (1990), policy-seeking behavior is promoted by "noncompetitive elections, multi-party systems, electoral laws yielding

unpredictable outcomes, and spatially constrained interparty bargaining” (593-594).

Emotional appeals are an important part of nationalism and can be a possible motive for nationalist parties. Although emotional motives may not seem like a strategic change from an individual perspective, I argue that reacting differently to voters’ emotional changes can be a strategic change from a party perspective because the strategic behavior of a nationalist party to bring about an achievement of its vote-, office- and policy-seeking goals can be motivated by an emotional commitment to nationalism. For example, if EU actions results in changes that hurt their core supporters, the party becomes more anti-EU as a result. Since one thing parties do is represent groups of voters, this kind of policy change based on changes of voters’ stances can be considered as a strategic behavior for the parties to seek more votes or to survive by preventing the alienation of their core supporters. Moreover, an emotional commitment to nationalism has caused nationalist parties to be established and to decide their policy orientations, and nationalist parties have used emotional appeals as strategies by manipulating voters’ emotions to reduce criticism of their policies and/or to glue different voters together in their parties, as in the concept of “rally-round-the-flag” (Mueller 1970, 1973).

### 3.2.2 Role of institutions

No parties take a single approach of vote-, office- or policy-seeking. All rational choice behaviors can be observed in all parties, and their behaviors are complicated. While these behaviors can complement each other to some extent, they may conflict at times. Arguing that parties have to make compromises between these different goals, Strom (1990) suggests that organizational and institutional conditions should indeed be taken into consideration as factors that constrain party behavior (566; 569-570).

Electoral arrangements may influence party behavior. Parties may not necessarily engage in vote-seeking behavior in proportional representative systems in which coalition or minority governments are common. Since a party can hardly achieve a majority in the parliament on its own in these systems, parties need to concede their policies in order to form a coalition government or to cooperate with other parties. In systems in which multiple representatives are elected in a district, voters tend to cast votes mainly based on party policies rather than candidates, and thus parties are more likely to pay more attention to policies. By contrast, parties are more likely to engage in vote-seeking behavior in majoritarian systems in which a single representative is elected. In these settings, voters tend to focus more on particular candidates rather than parties or policies, and the parties' vote-seeking behavior probably does coincide with office-seeking behavior. In two-round elections in which a majoritarian voting method is used, cooperative behavior between parties must be favorable in the second round. Electoral threshold can also affect party behavior. Since the threshold blocks small parties from entering parliament, it may force small parties to cooperate with other parties to seek office benefits or to survive.

Institutions may play an important role in determining party behavior, but they are limited as exclusive explanatory variables because they do not produce outcomes by themselves and because parties can change these institutional constraints. Thus, institutional arrangements such as the electoral system should matter in interaction with other factors that affect party position on the EU.

### 3.2.3 Cleavage theory

In addition to party behaviors based on different goals and institutional constraints, it is necessary to consider the effect of cleavage-based identities on party behavior. Cleavages are defined as “criteria that divide the members of a community or sub-community into groups in a

specific time and space” (Rae and Tylor 1970, 1) and “potential lines of division within any given society” (Flanagan 1973, 64). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggest that there are four basic cleavages in modern European society: center and periphery, state and church, employer and worker, and agriculture and industry. Meanwhile, Rae and Tylor (1970) sort cleavages into three different types: trait cleavages such as race or social classes, attitudinal cleavages such as ideology or preference, and behavioral cleavages such as voting or membership. Flanagan (1973) classifies them into three different forms: segmental cleavages such as race, language, or religion; cultural cleavages such as young versus old, urban versus rural, traditional versus modern, or authoritarian versus libertarian; and economic-functional cleavages such as class, status, or role differences.

Political parties emerge as political organizations that represent these cleavages, thus political cleavages that disagree with different belief systems and party allegiances can have considerable implications for party behaviors by structuring party competition or affecting the party’s policies (Almeida 2012, 18). For example, cleavages between center and periphery areas led to the rise of minority nationalist parties, and centralization or cultural standardization can make minority nationalist parties based on regions and statewide nationalist parties behave differently. Not only do cleavages provide parties with instructions about what they must deal with and what they can ignore when they take positions on new issues, they also give voters information on political cleavages such as ideologies through parties’ past alignments. (Almeida 2012, 18; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). That is, voters make choices based on cleavages such as race, religion, class, and familial pressures (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). In short, parties’ past alignments and cleavage-based identities can be cues to predict voters’ choices and positions of parties on new issues in the face of these uncertainties and limited information.

### 3.2.4 Political opportunity structures

Party behavior is also likely to vary according to political opportunity structures.

Changing circumstances change a party's opportunities. For example, Italy's political corruption scandal and the collapse of mainstream parties in the early 1990s increased fringe parties' chance to take more influential positions in domestic politics. Hungary's nationwide anti-government protests in 2006 increased opposition parties' chance of winning elections. The UK's discovery of oil in the North Sea in 1969 helped to build a more stable foundation for Scotland's independence movements. In addition, joining the EU, using a single currency, reducing border controls, and so forth have caused a lot of changes in European political, social, and economic systems.

Kitschelt (1986) defines political opportunity structures as "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the developments of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others" (58). Tarrow (1994) defines political opportunity structures as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (85). According to Kriesi (1995), political opportunity structures are defined by the openness or closedness of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of political alignments, the availability of potential alliance partners, and the political conflicts within and among elites. Taken together, political opportunity structures can be conceptualized as the external environment which needs to be evaluated to determine if it could bring about the achievement of desirable goals. In the literature on social movements, political opportunity translates the potential for collective action into actual mobilization. Early social movement

theories like Smelser's (1962) collective behavior theory focused on a social psychological paradigm in which factors such as grievances and the irrational reaction of actors are causes of social movements. McCarthy and Zald (1977) built on the concept of grievances to develop resource mobilization theory, which highlights the importance of available resources and organizational leadership for the success of a social movement. The resource mobilization theory puts extra emphasis on the strategy for how the movement will achieve change in government policies or legislation. As resources or benefits can be causes of participation in social movements, these can also induce political parties to change their behavior.

Building on this foundation, the political process model that sees social movements as a form of mass politics made another important development in the social movement literature (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). According to this approach, the chances of a social movement's achieving success depend on available opportunities, and thus social movements under a weak government are more likely to succeed than under a strong and repressive government because political opportunities may arise in the former case. This model can explain why groups without deep grievances and dense resources may appear in social movements (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1994, 18). As the success of a social movement depends on political opportunity structures, party strategies and party behavior are also expected to vary based on political opportunity structures. For example, in the former EU candidate countries in Eastern and Central Europe, opposition of some political parties to European integration was not obvious before EU accession. Furthermore, the EU positions of mainstream parties can influence how peripheral parties respond to the EU because peripheral parties are likely to have anti-establishment appeal. That is, parties are expected to see a variety of incentives and behave flexibly and strategically in response to changes in political opportunities.

### 3.3 GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF NATIONALIST PARTIES

Party behavior related to European integration can be shaped by party goals and competition, institutional conditions, cleavages, resources, and political structure opportunities. This section discusses how nationalist parties map out their strategies for European integration. Political parties promote the interests of their supporters, draw up party programs, select candidates, contest elections, and assist in elections in order to control power in the government or to achieve policy goals. Their ultimate goal is to spread party ideology. Nationalist parties are the same way. Statewide nationalist parties seek to attain and maintain their country's sovereignty or autonomy, to unite their diverse people, heterogeneous sub-state cultures, different languages and diverse identities, or to keep out those who differ.

In order to accomplish their aims, statewide nationalist parties either win enough votes to hold power or build a coalition with other parties. In Europe, where multiparty systems are common, it is very difficult to come to power as a single party with only the number of votes the party can get. Large statewide nationalist parties may be able to win a plurality without a coalition, but small or medium-sized statewide nationalist parties prefer to form coalitions to enter a government. In reality, neither vote-seeking nor office-seeking strategies of statewide nationalist parties sometimes are likely to work. There have been plenty of cases of the vote shares of statewide nationalist parties not being reflected in seats despite their popularity because of electoral system procedures, and efforts to build coalitions can be limited by negative publicity or demands for a ban on nationalist parties in government. If they are too small, marginal statewide nationalist parties that are not able to seek office may choose a strategy to maximize votes in order to cross election thresholds and survive.

Statewide nationalist parties' responses to European integration can vary depending upon public opinion about the EU and the positions of the parties they are cooperating with in building a coalition if they aim to run a government. They may take amicable or pragmatic attitudes toward the EU if they prioritize support and cooperation from the EU or if their national advantages from the EU largely outweigh the disadvantages. However, if they do not participate in a government, statewide nationalist parties may try to brand themselves as opposed to the government in order to stimulate confrontation with the ruling parties and to differentiate themselves visually from the ruling parties. Thus, their responses to the EU can be revised depending on the government parties' positions. An opposition party free from government responsibilities and accountability can attract more voters, including those who voted for the government parties previously, by taking more audacious and radicalized positions (Alonso 2012, 164). Marginal statewide nationalist parties are likely to take an anti-establishment strategy and to have clear and coherent positions in relation to the EU.

Minority nationalist parties pursue autonomy and capacity strategies. While autonomy strategies include various forms of constitutional recognition such as unitarism, unionism, devolution, federalism, and independence, capacity strategies make use of political, cultural, and social-economic capacities that enable the party to design and carry out policies and projects and to control resources for their sub-state territories (Hepburn 2010, 30, 42-49). These minority nationalist parties may also have representatives at the sub-state, state, and European levels, and thus their strategies need to be considered for each level.

First, minority nationalist parties definitely use vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies at the sub-state level to win influence over their local territories. By entering the local government, they can devise and implement policies at the sub-state level. In addition, the sub-

state branches of statewide mainstream parties that want to take voters away from the minority nationalist parties could be affected by minority nationalist parties' growing popularity and influence over local people. Since the local branches may have to align local demands and their central parties' interests to boost their votes at the sub-state level, these branches need to put pressure on their central parties to modulate the policies they pursue.

Second, minority nationalist parties that succeed in accessing national politics even with a small number of seats or succeed in entering a ruling coalition government at the state level are able to nationally politicize their sub-state issues and to try to maximize sub-state interests.

Third, minority nationalist parties can voice their local interests directly at the European level by participating in European institutions and being supported by the EU as European structures change, and thus they could reduce their focus on their corresponding country, develop strategies to combat statewide nationalist parties within the country, and use the EU to exert pressure on their country to meet their local demands (Hepburn 2010, 2-9).

Considering their strategies at different levels, minority nationalist parties' responses to European integration can change according to their influence over policy decisions and representation at the state level, different access to the state and to the EU, disparities in resources from the central government and the EU, level of protection of sub-state policies from the EU and from statewide nationalism, and so forth. That is, their positions toward the EU seem to be pragmatic depending on the degree to which they see advantages.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESEARCH DESIGN

The following research questions guide this dissertation:

1. How have nationalist parties responded to the EU over time?
2. What factors make nationalist parties change their strategies and respond to Europe in different ways?
3. How have nationalist parties changed their strategies in response to the impact of the process of European integration?

This study will combine big-N tests with case studies. A multilevel modeling will be used to evaluate the hypotheses about nationalist parties' positions on the EU in multiple countries and at multiple points in time. A total of 105 nationalist parties<sup>1</sup> across 26 EU member countries are included, covering points in time from 1984 to 2014. I posit that the EU positions of nationalist parties are most likely a function of party-level variables (ideology, party type, party size and government participation) and country-level variables including party system characteristics (fractionalization, polarization), public opinion and characteristics of the state (East vs. West, immigrant population, state size, length of EU membership and economic conditions).

In addition to a statistical analysis, Przeworski and Teune's (1970) Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) analysis is used to compare different EU positions across similar nationalist parties. Three case studies that clearly show strategic attitudes and behaviors of nationalist

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<sup>1</sup> These 105 nationalist parties are described in Appendix 1.

parties toward European integration will be discussed. The first case study compares two Italian nationalist parties (LN and MSI-AN) whose positions on European integration have changed in opposite directions. Comparing a minority nationalist party with a statewide nationalist party within one country allows us to hold constant country-level factors and examine party-level factors. The second case study compares the Italian minority nationalist party (LN) that has changed its EU position over time with a UK minority nationalist party (SNP) that has not changed its EU position over time. This case study allows us to look at the impact of country-level factors as well as party-level factors. The final case compares the Italian statewide nationalist party (MSI-AN) with another Western European statewide nationalist party (FPÖ) and two other Eastern European statewide nationalist parties (Fidesz and PiS), all of which show different directions of change. This allows me not only to examine the impact of different level factors but also to investigate whether there are West-East differences.

#### 4.1 DATA

The dissertation will rely heavily on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) datasets for 1984-1999, 1999-2010, and 2014. In addition to the CHES data, statistical analysis will be performed to make up for the weak points in the CHES data, to supplement variables that the CHES data do not have, and to reinforce the validity of the CHES data using the following datasets: the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset, European Election Studies (EES) data, the World Bank's Database on Political Institutions (DPI) data, Eurobarometer surveys (EB) data, the UN's Economic Survey of Europe data, the European Economy Statistical Annex of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), Eurostat data, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI)'s International Migrants by Country of Destination Data, the

Parliaments and Governments (ParlGov) database, and other available data. These data sets are described in Appendix 2.

#### 4.2 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Nationalist parties' positioning on European integration will be considered as the dependent variable. The overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration in the CHES data from 1984-1999, 1999-2010, and 2014 will be collected at nine points: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. Party positions on European integration in 1984-2014 are rated by CHES experts based on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly opposed to European integration to 4 = neutral to 7 = strongly in favor of European integration. Nationalist parties are those categorized as REG (Regionalist/ethnic) FAMILY and RADRT (Radical Right) FAMILY in the CHES data, that strongly promotes nationalism ( $\text{COSMO} \geq 8$ ) in the 2006 and ( $\text{NATIONALISM} \geq 8$ )<sup>2</sup> in the 2014 CHES data and that belong to the 70 (NAT: Nationalist parties) FAMILY and the 90 (ETH: Ethnic and regional parties) FAMILY in the CMP data.

The independent variables will include each of the factors discussed in Chapter 2, including party-level variables (ideology, type of party, size of party, and government participation) and country-level variables (party system characteristics, public opinion, and characteristics of the state). While there is a large amount of literature on party-level variables that impact EU positions, there is not much on country-level variables. In doing this, I build on Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries's (2012) model for predicting Western European parties' EU positions based on the electorate, parties, and party system characteristics. The difference is that I focus strictly on nationalist parties, while Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries included all parties.

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<sup>2</sup> COSMO and NATIONALISM are the same thing.

Moreover, Arnold, Sapir, and De Vries look at political context, and I retest their findings for nationalist parties. In addition, I have also corrected their measure of polarization. Furthermore, I also have added a variety of country-level variables. I emphasize party-level variables and party system characteristics, but other country-level variables are also included as controls because these might matter too. With these country-level variables, I test a number of possible hypotheses. Although there is no well-established theory underlying my hypotheses my findings might help with building a theory. Specific hypotheses on each will be tested. The measurement of each variable will be discussed as each hypothesis is presented.

## 4.3 HYPOTHESES

### 4.3.1 Party-level variables

#### 4.3.1.1 Left/right ideological spectrum and ideological extremity

Some evidence suggests that party positions on European integration can be predicted by ideology. Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) find that liberal and Christian democratic parties are strongly in favor, moderately left social democratic and regionalist parties are moderately strongly in favor, Protestant and conservative parties are in favor of economic integration but strongly opposed to political integration, agrarian parties are moderately opposed, and extreme left/right parties are strongly opposed (587). Jolly (2007) found that regionalist parties have consistently showed their support for the EU across issue area, region, and time—less than liberals, social democrats, and Christian democrats, but much more than other minor parties (120; 124). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) found correlation between ideological placement and position on European integration and argued that extreme parties are more skeptical and parties in the middle are generally much more favorable to European integration (4). Some scholars

argue that the EU is a centrist project created by mainstream parties (Aspinwall 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Marks et al. 2006; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Taggart 1998).

Aside from the role of left-right ideology, some scholars highlight the importance of ideological extremism (of either left or right). Peripheral parties located toward the left/right extreme are less likely to take supportive positions toward European integration, while center-oriented parties such as liberal and social democratic parties may take more positive EU positions on average (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1344; Hooghe et al. 2002; Jolly 2007, 113; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002, 588; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004).

All things considered, previous studies demonstrate that the left/right ideological spectrum is importantly associated with the perception of European integration. My goal is to figure out how this logic of support and opposition to European integration affects nationalist parties' positions on the EU. As nationalism may exist on a continuum from simple attachment to local culture or symbols to extreme xenophobia, nationalist parties also have various features. Ideologically, nationalist parties do not belong to a particular party family from left to right; rather, they are located across the left-right spectrum; some nationalist parties are located toward an extreme ideology, but some are not. If the left-right spectrum of a party family is a powerful predictor of its position on the EU, then it is necessary to consider ideology when analyzing nationalist party groups. I will test two specific hypotheses:

*H1-a: The more a nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.*

*H1-b: The closer a nationalist party is to the ideological center, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.*

The LR\_GEN variable in the CHES data are used to measure ideology. All ideological data from 1984 to 2014 is adjusted to an 11-point scale from 0 = extreme left to 10 = extreme right. A variable for LR-extremity was created by computing the absolute value of distance from ideological neutrality ranging from 0 = not extreme to 5 = very extreme.

#### 4.3.1.2 Type of party (statewide vs. non-statewide minority)

For the purpose of this dissertation, nationalist parties are categorized into statewide nationalist parties and non-statewide minority nationalist parties based on territorial levels. As noted above, the literature suggests possible differences between these different types of nationalist parties. It is not hard to find active attempts to transfer some governmental authority/power into local or smaller governments/institutions in European states such as Belgium, Italy, Spain, the UK, and France; statewide nationalist parties do not generally look favorably at these devolution processes. Minority nationalist parties often have little or no effect on national domestic politics, so they try to win a bigger voice using the EU. The EU has increased opportunities for minority nationalist parties to encourage people to take action for electoral success, to cooperate with electoral alliances instead of competing, and to gain political visibility and legitimacy (De Winter and Gomez-Reino 2002, 487). Incentives provided by deepened European integration to minority nationalist parties have made them rethink their policy stance on European integration and sometimes leading them to switch from anti-EU to pro-EU (Downs 2002; Keating 1996; 2004). For these reasons, minority nationalist parties may prefer European integration and might be expected to take the most pro-European stances among all European party families. De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002) found that minority nationalist parties indeed have grown more pro-European over a long period of time (491).

However, minority nationalist parties have not always been supportive of the EU and have changed their positions strategically to meet their goals. These positions also vary depending on the parties' access to European institutions and organizations, local party competition, economic resources, constraints of state structure, EU structural change, their own goals and strategies, across regions and across time (Hepburn 2010, 206). For example, the UK's SNP has changed its EU position several times. It took an anti-EU position during 1979-1987, when it was seeking independence outside Europe, but then during 1988-1994 it adopted a pro-EU stance toward a "Europe of the Regions," seeking independence in Europe. Since 1995, however, the SNP has shown skepticism due to frustration with the EU's continuous intergovernmental moves, ignoring of regional interests, and limited regional action.

On the other hand, despite an agreement in recent scholarly literature that statewide nationalist parties have been less favorable to the EU, not all statewide nationalist parties were anti-EU from the start. For example, the French FN expected to gain advantages from the creation of empowered EU institutions in the belief that these institutions would diminish the influence of the mainstream parties. However, these institutions have only strengthened the power and influence of the mainstream parties, and the FN has since taken an anti-EU position (Topaloff 2012, 28). In light of these observations, I will test the following hypothesis:

*H2: Minority nationalist parties will be more likely to be in favor of European integration, while statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to be skeptical toward European integration.*

Based on the FAMILY variable in both CHES and CMP data, a dummy variable was created, with 0 corresponding to statewide nationalist parties and 1 corresponding to minority nationalist parties.

#### 4.3.1.3 Size of party

Party size is likely to be important to positions of nationalist parties on European integration. Major parties with a high popular support rate do not have to politicize the issue of European integration to shake up the party system, and thus they may be more supportive. However, minor parties may politicize the issue of European integration because they want to differentiate themselves from other major parties and not be penalized by moderating their policies, and thus they may take EU-skeptical positions (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1345; De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hix and Lord 1997; Kitschelt 1994; Mair 2007; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Taggart 1998; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). The rationale is that small parties that want to maximize their vote share will radicalize their position in order to try to avoid losing their distinctiveness (Alonso 2012, 203). Alonso (2012) argues that “radicalization is the rational reaction of vote-maximizing peripheral parties in a decentralized state” (11). That is, more electorally successful major parties are more likely to take EU-positive positions, while less electorally successful minor parties may take less positive positions to differentiate themselves from the major parties (Jolly 2007, 112-3; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002, 588). Thus:

*H3: The larger a nationalist party is, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.*

The VOTE variable, which is operationalized as the share of votes that each party received in the national elections prior to the data year in the CHES data, is tested. Missing data are added based on measurements collected from the ParlGov database.

#### 4.3.1.4 Participation in government

Whether a party participates in government or not is important in relation to their positions on European integration because the result of policies a party pursues may be

contingent upon their control of government (Jolly 2007, 119; Ware 1996, 352). Some scholars argue that governmental parties may take more pro-EU or median positions and tend to be reluctant to try new things because they want to keep the status quo, while parties that have been excluded from government may take EU-skeptical or more extreme positions to make important changes. In any case, the relationship between incumbency and EU positions is likely to be complex from a pragmatic standpoint (Jolly 2007, 119; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002, 588; Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; Ray 2003, 263; Taggart 1998). Even though a range of parties have gradually become more involved in EU decision-making, national incumbent parties still have a stronger influence on EU decision-making because they hold a privileged influential position through the Council of the EU or through the direct involvement of member states' chief executives (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1344-5; Ray 2003). Thus, taking into consideration their deep involvement in decision-making in the early stages, taking anti-EU stances can ruin those incumbent parties' credibility (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1345; De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).

Furthermore, political parties with past government experience are more likely to have similarly supportive positions on Europe integration due to a strong incentive for coalition membership (van de Wardt, De Vries, and Hobolt 2014, 990; 997). However, although incumbent parties may have more pro-European attitudes, the strengthening of European institutions can also change their EU stances (Ray 2003, 262). Further European integration can be expected to make the national political status quo less secure, and this means that the power of a political arena within which incumbent parties are currently winning can be weakened. Once they expect national political power to be threatened by European integration, incumbent parties should be unfavorable to further European integration (Ray 2003, 263).

All things considered, the positions of political parties on European integration are related to past government experience as a part of the dynamics of inter-party competition, and both positive and negative effects of incumbency on the EU positions are reasonable. In that case, how does this incumbency factor affect the EU positions of nationalist parties? Since most nationalist parties have been minor or anti-establishment in their respective political party systems, it is hard for them to participate in government in majoritarian bipartisan systems. However, proportional representation multiparty systems force large parties to form coalitions with smaller parties, thus there is high probability of even small nationalist parties being part of government coalitions. In reality, a few<sup>3</sup> nationalist parties have been or are in government through an alliance with other political parties or on their own. Based on the previous literature, I propose:

*H4: Nationalist parties with government experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.*

The binary GOVT variable in the CHES data will be tested, but since only data from 1999-2010 are available, data from 1984-1999 and in 2014 will be added separately based on measurements collected from the ParlGov database. A dummy variable that represents government participation was created. No government experience is coded as 0, government participation for part of the year is coded as 0.5, and government participation for the full year is coded as 1.

In addition to testing the impact of government experience in the multilevel modeling, case studies and other statistical analysis can be used to investigate whether nationalist parties

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<sup>3</sup> For example, the Austrian FPÖ, the Bulgarian DPS, the Czech VV, the Finish SFP, the Italian MSI-AN, the Italian LN, the Latvian TB-LNNK, the Lithuanian Russian Union (LRS), Polish LPR, Polish PiS, Polish SRP, Romanian UDMR, and Slovakian SMK

change, moderate, or keep their original attitudes toward the EU once they participate in a government.

#### 4.3.2 Country-level variables

##### 4.3.2.1 Party system characteristics (1) – Fractionalization

Political parties think strategically about the electoral environment, and inter-party competition affects the positions of parties on a variety of issues (Arnold and Pennings 2009; Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012: 1346; Lijphart 1999; Sartori 1976). Thus, the structure of inter-party competition can be a strong and powerful factor to shape party positioning (Bartolini 2005; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Even though it is somewhat unclear whether party fractionalization affects party stances on European integration, scholars have paid attention to the relationship between inter-party competition and public preferences (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012: 1342, 1346; Sartori 1976). The more fractionalized a party system is, the more intensively parties compete for support. The more parties try to differentiate themselves from others, the more strikingly distinctive their positions over the issue of European integration parties are expected to be (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012: 1346). Political parties that want to sharpen distinctions with mainstream parties which largely take positive positions on European integration may take negative positions on the issue of European integration as their strategy, therefore a high degree of fractionalization can increase negative stances toward European integration (Arnold, Sapir and de Vries 2012: 1346; De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). However, a system characterized by higher degrees of fractionalization could also encourage competition for positive positions toward the EU because EU-favorable parties have been electorally more successful (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012: 1346). That is, it is

unclear how fractionalization may affect or change EU positions of political parties (Arnold, Sapir and de Vries 2012: 1346).

In addition to examining whether party system fractionalization has a direct effect on nationalist parties' EU positions, I also look at the interaction effects between fractionalization and party-level variables (ideology and party size). Party system characteristics are expected to affect how party-level variables matter because institutional contexts such as party system characteristics condition party behavior and thus the effect of party-level variables on EU positions can be modified by the contexts. That is, ideology matters differently in different party systems depending on the levels of fractionalization of the party system. As Downs (1957) points out that a multiparty system would diverge from the center, more parties are likely to move to the ideological extreme in more fractionalized party systems and thus extreme nationalist parties could take a more positive attitude toward the EU in multiparty systems in order to differentiate themselves from other large parties at the extreme which largely take negative EU positions. In addition, party size has different significance in different systems. For example, a party with 10% of the vote is a potentially major player in highly fractionalized systems, but not in a less fractionalized one. A large number of parties are also likely to take more negative EU positions in order to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties which are largely pro-EU in more fractionalized party systems, and thus larger nationalist parties are expected to have a clearer positive attitude toward the EU because they are more mainstream. Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries (2012) employed interaction terms to test whether party characteristics interact with contextual factors. They found that levels of party system fractionalization moderate the impact of ideology, and bigger parties within highly fractionalized systems have more positive positions on European

integration. Therefore, I test for two competing expectations about the impact of fractionalization and for two interactive effects:

*H5-a: The more fractionalized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.*

*H5-b: The more fractionalized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.*

*H5-c: Fractionalization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration.*

*H5-d: Fractionalization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration.*

The FRAC variable in the DPI data from 1975-2012 indicates the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties. This variable is tested to examine these hypotheses.

#### 4.3.2.2 Party system characteristics (2) – Polarization

While scholars highlight the role of party polarization in voting behavior (Freire 2008; Sartori 1976) and there is a growing literature on the impact of a polarized political environment on political participation, most studies do not give attention to the importance of party polarization in parties' policy positions on European integration. Dalton (2008) argues that party system polarization, which refers to how parties are dispersed along the left-right ideological spectrum, is more important and accurate in measuring party competition than party system fractionalization that counts the number of parties because proximity of parties (e.g., compacted multiparty systems or dispersed fewer-party systems) is poorly measured by the number of parties (913-914). Within highly polarized systems, the public has more chances to choose a

party which is closer to their own policy preferences (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012: 1346; Downs 1957). While more dispersed political parties can be more congruent with the public and better reflect public preferences, the relationship between polarization and EU position is unclear. A highly polarized system in which a number of parties are at the political extreme could not only increase competition for negative EU positions among extreme parties but rather press these parties to take positive EU positions to differentiate themselves from a number of anti-EU parties. Thus, I first examine how party system polarization affects nationalist parties' EU positions.

I also look at the interaction effects between party system polarization and party-level variables as I do for party system fractionalization to see how the impact of party-level variables on EU positions can be modified by the polarized party system context in which parties operate. Higher levels of polarization could press parties that lean to the extreme and which largely take negative EU positions to take clearer anti-EU positions in order to differentiate themselves from the competition. That is, ideology matters differently in different party systems depending on the levels of polarization of the party system. For example, if ideological extremity is supposed to have a negative impact on EU positions, nationalist parties are expected to be more negative toward the EU in more polarized systems. In addition, party size also matters differently in different party systems. Larger nationalist parties could have a clearer positive or negative attitude toward the EU within highly polarized systems due to the clearer EU positions of a number of large rival parties at the political extremes. Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries (2012) found that levels of party system polarization also moderate the impact of party characteristics along with party system fractionalization. Their results show that bigger parties within highly polarized systems have more positive positions on European integration, and the closer a party is to the center in more polarized systems, the more strongly the party supports European integration.

However, this was less true within less polarized systems. Thus I have two competing expectations about the impact of polarization and will also test for two interactive effects:

H6-a: *The more polarized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.*

H6-b: *The more polarized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.*

H6-c: *Polarization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration.*

H6-d: *Polarization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration.*

Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries (2012) used the POLARIZ variable in the DPI data that measures the distance between the chief executive's party, the two other largest government parties and the largest opposition party. This measure examines polarization among the largest parties rather than polarization in the party system as a whole, but this is arguably not appropriate for testing these hypotheses. Thus, I relied on a different measure of dispersion. In order to measure average party polarization for each EU country during 1984-2014 using the LR\_GEN variables in the CHES data, I applied the formula that Xezonakis (2012) developed:

$$\text{Average Party Polarization} = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1} \frac{(P_{jk} - P_k)^2}{n}}$$

where  $P_k$  is the mean Left-Right ideological placement of all parties in country  $k$ , and  $P_{jk}$  is the ideological position of party  $j$  in country  $k$ . Xezonakis (2012) reports both weighted and unweighted measures of average party system polarization. While weighting party system polarization by party size is based on the argument that small parties do not have real political

influence, unweighting party system polarization relies on the argument that parties' influence is not necessarily correlated to party size (Alvarez and Nagler 2004, 48-52; Xezonakis 2012, 8; 21). Since party fractionalization data are included separately, I measured unweighted average party polarization because weighted average party polarization captures some of what fractionalization does.

#### 4.3.2.3 Characteristics of the state (1) – East vs. West

The East-West divide is relevant to understanding party attitudes toward European integration. The differences in social, political, and historical culture as well as economic conditions between East and West can be huge. Some scholars have found that left, green, alternative, and/or libertarian parties in the Western European countries have tended to have pro-European attitudes, whereas right, traditional, authoritarian, and/or nationalist parties have showed anti-European attitudes (Marks et al. 2006). However, the opposite has occurred in the Eastern European states (Beichelt 2004; Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). Vachudova (2008) argues that strong opposition to Communism in Eastern Europe made parties take pro-European positions (867). Thus, I will analyze the East-West divide effect on the EU positions of nationalist parties. In line with this I hypothesize:

*H7: Nationalist parties in Eastern Europe will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

Based on the EASTWEST variable in the CHES, a dummy variable was created by which nationalist parties in Western Europe are coded as 0 and nationalist parties in Eastern Europe are coded as 1.

#### 4.3.2.4 Characteristics of the state (2) – State size

There are two different views with regard to the impact of state size. One side argues that larger states are generally expected to have a bigger influence than smaller states on the EU's decision making processes due to their greater economic weight, increased voting power in the EU Council, more credible veto power, relative ease of making side-deals outside the formal decision-making process, and so on (Laible 2001, 240). However, another side argues that the advantage of larger states is rather diminished in the EU because smaller states become more viable under the EU umbrella and free trading system (Bolton and Roland 1997; Jolly 2007, 111). Successive EU enlargements have made small states a majority within the EU, and small states exercise real influence within the EU through coalition-building, knowledge-based bargaining skills, pro-European reputation in policy negotiations, early engagement with the policy process and networking, building niche expertise in key policy fields, gaining a reputation for policy leadership, scientific and technical knowledge, acting as honest brokers, maximizing the opportunities of the Council Presidency and so on (Keating, McEwen, and Harvey 2014). Based on these two competing views, I suggest:

*H8-a: Nationalist parties in larger states will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

*H8-b: Nationalist parties in larger states will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.*

According to the EU official website, the present EU is comprised of six large states with a population of more than 30 million, ten medium-sized states with a population between 7 and 22 million, and twelve small states with a population of less than 7 million.<sup>4</sup> Population changes

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over time are coded based on the UN's Economic and Social Affairs department's database from 1960 and 2013 and Eurostat data from 1998-2013 are used.

#### 4.3.2.5 Characteristics of the state (3) – Immigrant population

In the integrating era, many states have their own national people and their descendants who now live in other states due to political purges, need for political asylum, political or economic immigration, positions as expatriates or foreign correspondents, ethnic groups divided by the movement of borders, cross-border ethnic groups after independence, and so forth.

According to Eurostat data in 2014, 33.5 million people born outside of the EU member states lived in an EU member state and 17.9 million lived in a different EU member state from where they were born. The number of immigrants in Europe was just 3.5% of the total population in 1960, but it reached 10.3% in 2013.

However, as the immigrant population increases and unemployment rises within the EU, the belief that unassimilated immigrants threaten national cultures and the fear that they take away local people's jobs has become widespread across Europe. Thus, immigration has been an issue of growing importance in transnational politics in the integrating of Europe and its member states (Hepburn 2009). Immigration issues affect not only cultures and identities, but also economic development, infrastructure, healthcare, and housing. As a consequence, anti-immigrant sentiment has risen and support for nationalist parties opposed to immigration has significantly increased in EU member states. These parties have sometimes succeeded very well

Six Large States	Germany (82 million), France (64.3 million), United Kingdom (61.7 million), Italy (60 million), Spain (45.8 million), and Poland (38.1 million)
Ten Medium-sized States	Romania (21.5 million), the Netherlands (16.4 million), Greece (11.2 million), Belgium (10.7 million), Portugal (10.6 million), Czech Republic (10.5 million), Hungary (10 million), Sweden (9.2 million), Austria (8.3 million), and Bulgaria (7.6 million)
Twelve Small States	Denmark (5.5 million), Slovakia (5.4 million), Finland (5.3 million), Ireland (4.5 million), Croatia (4.4 million), Lithuania (3.3 million), Latvia (2.3 million), Slovenia (2 million), Estonia (1.3 million), Cyprus (0.8 million), Luxembourg (0.5 million), and Malta (0.4 million)

in elections (Gomez-Reino 2002, 132; Hepburn 2009; Mudde 2007; Zaslove 2004, 99). Since both statewide and minority nationalist parties care about national/regional identities, languages, traditional cultures, social values, and distinct ways of life and seek to preserve their cultures and identities, both might be expected to be more negative toward the EU the more immigrants they have (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Hepburn 2009, 1-2; Keating and McGarry 2001; McGarry and Keating 2006). Thus:

*H9: Nationalist parties in a state with a larger immigrant population will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.*

The UN's Economic and Social Affairs department's database from 1960 and 2013 is mainly used, and Eurostat data on non-national population collected on an annual basis from 1998-2013 and International Migrants by Country of Destination data from 1960-2013 are also used as supplementary data.

#### 4.3.2.6 Characteristics of the state (4) – Length of EU membership

Previous EU experience such as length of EU membership and intensity of EU cooperation matters to party positions on European integration (Binnema 2009, 10; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009, 191). Parties may try to make policies easily compatible with EU policies to meet the requirements for EU membership in the process of joining the EU, and the EU's different set of mechanisms may change the preferences of important groups and voters in society after a country joins the EU. As a result, political parties can shape and/or change their EU positions in response to EU membership. For example, no parties in post-Communist countries opposed qualifying for EU membership because they felt such support was necessary to win elections (Vachudova 2008, 865-866, 874-875). In the East, major parties initially adopted pro-EU, non-nationalist, and market-oriented agendas.

Yet, over time, other parties emerged to take advantage of new opportunities to oppose European integration. In some countries, nationalist parties took control of the government and strongly criticized European integration. Vachudova (2008) says that this is because prior to accession, EU conditionality policy guided and constrained government actions and required political parties to deliver reforms needed within the framework of the EU accession negotiations (864; 875). After EU accession had become a certainty, some parties felt free to express criticism. Aylott, Morales, and Ramiro (2007) suggest that when the duration of EU membership is longer, Euro-skepticism might grow because the increasing EU powers will encroach on sensitive national issues (183). However, a country that has been a member longer will accept the EU structure and process more and their parties' leadership will be less constrained. Therefore, arguments can be made for either a positive or negative effect of length of membership. In line with this, I will test:

*H10-a: Nationalist parties in a country that has been a member of the EU longer will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

*H10-b: Nationalist parties in a country that has been a member of the EU longer will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.*

The EUMEMBER variable in the CHES data are tested. Length of EU membership is measured as the number of years a member state has belonged to the EU.

#### 4.3.2.7 Characteristics of the state (5) – Economic conditions

Many studies suggest that economic conditions are a key factor affecting public support for European integration (Anderson 1998; Hooghe 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). There are a number of ways that economic factors may matter. First of all, while minority nationalist parties seem to be more supportive of the EU than statewide ones, minority

nationalist parties in wealthier regions are likely to be more supportive of the EU than minority nationalist parties in poorer regions. Poorer regional parties may perceive that they receive more from their central governments than they give, and thus they may take a similar EU position that mainstream parties have and enjoy benefits from the EU at the same time. However, wealthier regional parties may perceive that they give more than they receive from their central governments and thus they tend to demand greater autonomy or even independence when central governments expand their size and scope. By reducing the state's dominance over their region, the EU can help them to pursue their autonomy (Cinnirella 2000; Jolly 2006). Thus, as far as their sovereignty is not violated by the EU, they may take more pro-EU positions.

Secondly, at the state level, while EU skepticism has grown in the more affluent Western Europe, the fact that the new member states in Eastern Europe have kept positive EU positions may be due to the effects of the inflow of EU funding, estimated at 16.2% of the annual GDP for all of the Central and Eastern EU member countries according to Eurostat data<sup>5</sup>. Mahler, Taylor, and Wozniak (2000) found that there is a strong relationship between net budgetary transfers and average national support for European integration, and their study shows very obvious results that net beneficiary states and recipient regions of EU regional funds tend to have positive national attitudes toward the EU (440, 447).

Finally, it may be expected that pro-EU positions are more likely to be taken in times of economic growth, while anti-EU positions are taken in times of economic crisis because the

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<sup>5</sup> The 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries joined the EU on May 1, 2004 (CZ, EE, HG, LV, LT, PL, SV, SI), January 1, 2007 (BG, RO), and July 1, 2013 (HR). Based on Eurostat data, in the 2007-2013 period the 11 CEE countries had access to EUR 174.72 billion of EU funds, i.e. from ERDF, CF and ESF, excluding national public and private contributions. This equals 16.2% of the annual GDP of the region: Bulgaria (6.67 EUR, 16.7% per GDP), Croatia (1.00 EUR, 2.3% per GDP), Czech Republic (26.30 EUR, 17.6% per GDP), Estonia (3.40 EUR, 16.7% per GDP), Hungary (24.92 EUR, 25.4% per GDP), Latvia (4.54 EUR, 19.4% per GDP), Lithuania (6.77 EUR, 19.6% per GDP), Poland (67.19 EUR, 17.2% per GDP), Romania (19.18 EUR, 13.4% per GDP), Slovakia (11.65 EUR, 16.2% per GDP), and Slovenia (4.10 EUR, 11.6% per GDP).

attitudes toward the EU are based on positive economic results (Anderson and Reichter, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2005). In other words, economic crisis may ruin the image of the EU based on economic aspects, and thus the perception of the EU's responsibility for the poor economic situation can increase EU-skepticism. In line with this, I hypothesize:

H11-a: *Minority Nationalist parties in wealthy regions will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

H11-b: *Nationalist parties in a state that is a beneficiary of EU-subsidized programs will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

H11-c: *Nationalist parties in a state where the economy is strong will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

The World Bank's GDP data from 1981-2014, the Eurostat's regional economy data from 200-2013 and the EU's European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) data from 1994-2016 are mainly used. Supplementary data come from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (I.Stat), Spain's National Institute of Statistics and the UK's National Statistics.

#### 4.3.2.8 Public opinion

Many studies on the causes of party position change focus on the role of the electorate. Party position often mirrors the electorate's preferences for European integration (Adams et al. 2006; Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012; Budge 1994; Carrubba 2001; Iversen 1994; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007; van der Eijk and Franklin 1991). Political parties try to find out the electorate's attitudes and then change or define their positions in consideration of the electorate's position. This view is consistent with Downs (1957), Miller and Stokes (1963), and Powell's (2004) perspectives. The electorate would prefer to support parties that best fit their own policy preferences and rationally vote for them in national and European elections (Arnold, Sapir, and

de Vries 2012, 1343; De Vries 2007). In an election system in which democracy functions correctly, it is natural for party elites to follow public preferences and for parties to respond to changes in the electorate’s policy mood in the process of legislating (Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1343). Therefore, I expect:

*H12: Nationalist parties in a state with more favorable public opinion on the EU will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.*

Eurobarometer survey (EB) data from 1974-2014 are used. Each country’s average support for the EU in each year is measured using answers to VAR136: “Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY)’s membership in the EU would be (1) a good thing? (2) a bad thing? (3) neither good nor bad?”

Table 33 presents the summary of hypotheses.

Table 33. Summary of hypotheses

[4.3.1] Party-Level Variables		
4.3.1.1 Ideology & ideological extremity	H1-a: The more a nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.	CHES LR_GEN data
	H1-b: The closer a nationalist party is to the ideological center, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.	
4.3.1.2 Party type	H2: Minority nationalist parties will be more likely to be in favor of European integration, while statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to be skeptical toward European integration.	CHES & CMP FAMILY data
4.3.1.3 Party size	H3: The larger a nationalist party is, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.	CHES VOTE data
4.3.1.4 Gov’t Participation	H4: Nationalist parties with government experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.	CHES GOVT data

[4.3.2] Country-Level Variables

4.3.2.1 Fractionalization	H5-a: The more fractionalized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.	DPI FRAC data from 75-12
	H5-b: The more fractionalized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.	
	H5-c: Fractionalization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration.	
	H5-d: Fractionalization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration.	
4.3.2.2 Polarization	H6-a: The more polarized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.	CHES LR_GEN data are used to create an unweighted average party polarization.
	H6-b: The more polarized a party system is, the more likely it is that nationalist parties within it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.	
	H6-c: Polarization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration.	
	H6-d: Polarization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration.	
4.3.2.3 East vs. West	H7: Nationalist parties in Eastern Europe will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	CHES EAST WEST data
4.3.2.4 State size	H8-a: Nationalist parties in larger states will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	UN 60-13 & Eurostat 98-13
	H8-b: Nationalist parties in larger states will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.	
4.3.2.5 Immigrant pop.	H9: Nationalist parties in a state with a larger immigrant population will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.	UN 60-13, MPI 60-13, Eurostat 98-13
4.3.2.6 Length of EU membership	H10-a: Nationalist parties in a country that has been a member of the EU longer will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	CHES EUMEMBER data
	H10-b: Nationalist parties in a country that has been a member of the EU longer will have a more negative attitude toward European integration.	
4.3.2.7 Economic conditions	H11-a: Minority Nationalist parties in wealthy regions will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	World Bank GDP data 81-14, Eurostat reg. economy data 00-13, ESIF data 94-16, and others.
	H11-b: Nationalist parties in a state that is a beneficiary of EU-subsidized programs will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	
	H11-c: Nationalist parties in a state where the economy is strong will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	
4.3.2.8 Public opinion	H12: Nationalist parties in a state with more favorable public opinion on the EU will have a more positive attitude toward European integration.	EB data from 74-14

#### 4.4 CASE STUDIES

The results of the big-*N* quantitative empirical tests will show how nationalist parties have repositioned themselves in response to widening and deepening European integration and what factors have affected their EU positions for the past thirty years. Some nationalist parties have changed drastically or gradually, while others have stuck to their positions supporting or opposing European integration.

Along with examining the longitudinal trends of statewide and minority nationalist parties' EU positions, I also conduct case studies in order to investigate the actual changes in strategies and behaviors within real-life political contexts. Choosing good cases that are representative of the population of cases is not easy. Case selection should meet two objectives: each case should be “a representative sample” and a “useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest” Seawright and Gerring (2008, 296). Seawright and Gerring (2008) present seven different processes of choosing cases: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different (296). I used MSSD analysis to identify what factors lead to dissimilar EU positions when the cases appear rather similar in most regards. The MSSD analysis derived from J.S. Mill's classic method of difference in *System of Logic* (1843) and developed by Przeworski and Teune (1970) and Lijphart (1971) is a method to choose the most similar cases across all backgrounds and to examine a small number of cases in depth in order to access differences between cases that have similar characteristics. Like all other case study types, MSSD analysis has limits that cannot entirely overcome “the inherent unreliability of generalizing from small-*N* samples” as a purposive method (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295). To avoid selection bias, some matching strategies are suggested: propensity score matching

(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 305) or exact matching and Mahalanobis matching (Nielsen 2016, 577).

Six cases from five different countries are selected in total. Among a range of EU countries, Italy is first selected because it is not only one of the founding EU members, but also has both statewide and minority nationalist parties. Thus, comparing one Italian statewide nationalist party with one Italian minority nationalist party is expected to highlight differences in party-level variables that cause dissimilar changes of EU positions while controlling for the same country-level variables. The UK is also a case in which both statewide and minority nationalist parties exist, and thus one of the UK's minority nationalist parties is selected in the same context to compare with the Italian minority nationalist party. Moreover, one Austrian statewide nationalist party that has some similarity to Italian statewide nationalist party in party-level variables is selected to assess differences of country-level variables that cause the dissimilar changes of EU positions while controlling for similar party-level variables. In addition, two statewide nationalist parties in Hungary and Poland that share similarities in party-level variables with other Western statewide nationalist parties are selected in order to compare East with West.

In summary, six nationalist parties will serve as cases to illustrate some of the factors that affect party position on the EU over time. First, I compare two Italian nationalist parties whose positions on European integration have changed in opposite directions: the Italian LN and the MSI-AN. Comparing a minority and a statewide nationalist party within one country allows us to hold state-level factors constant and examine other factors. Second, I look at the impact of country-level factors as well as party-level factors for two minority nationalist parties whose positions on European integration have changed in different directions in different countries in Western Europe: the Italian LN and the UK's SNP. Finally, I look at the impact of country-level

factors as well as party-level factors to compare four statewide nationalist parties whose positions on European integration have changed in different directions in various countries in Western and Eastern Europe: the Italian MSI-AN, the Austrian FPÖ , the Polish PiS, and the Hungarian Fidesz. This allows me not only to examine the impact of different levels of factors but also to find the West-East impact in these four statewide nationalist parties. The comparative case studies start with a more detailed presentation of how each party has changed its EU positions and then include analysis of factors at three different levels.

## CHAPTER 5

### STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 OVERVIEW: MULTILEVEL MODEL<sup>6</sup> ANALYSES

I posited that the possible determinants of nationalist parties' positions on European integration are most likely a function of two levels of characteristics: party-level variables (ideology, type of party, size of party, and government participation) and country-level variables (fractionalization and polarization, East vs. West, size of state, immigrant population, length of EU membership, economic conditions, and public opinion). I assume that their positions on the EU are dependent partly on other parties within that country. To estimate the degree of non-independence in my dependent variable (EU positions) across countries, I computed the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) with the defined formula (Hayes 2006, 394):

$$ICC = \frac{\tau_{00}}{\tau_{00} + \sigma^2}$$

where  $\sigma^2$  is the estimated residual variance, and  $\tau_{00}$  is the estimated variance of the random components. The ICC tells us how much of the variance in the dependent variable comes from country-level variables. I estimated the null model without any predictors to ascertain only the extent to which countries differ in how their nationalist parties respond to the EU and found that the ICC is  $1.403 / (1.403 + 1.944) = .419$ , which means that 41.9% of the total variance in EU positions is accounted for by differences between countries in how much the countries affect the EU positions of nationalist parties on average. Since ICC is different from zero, countries are

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<sup>6</sup> Multilevel models are sometimes called hierarchical linear models, nested models, random coefficients models, mixed models, etc.

statistically not independent. That is, my dependent variable varies significantly by country, thus I need multilevel modeling. Multilevel modeling is suitable for nested analysis because it takes into account multilevel regression relationships between predictor and outcome variables, accurately disentangles the effects of between- and within-group variance, and requires fewer assumptions to be met than other statistical methods (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Woltman, Feldstain, MacKay, and Rocchi 2012, 56). Therefore, I test my hypotheses by employing multilevel modeling in order to assess the relationship across levels.

My multilevel modeling is conducted in three steps. First, I tested the effect of characteristics of party-level (Level 1) predictors on nationalist parties' positions on the EU in the first model. In the second model, I added country-level (Level 2) predictors including party system characteristics, characteristics of the state, and public opinion and then controlled for these country-level variables. Finally, to compare the fit of the model with no interactions to the fit with interactions, I added cross-level interaction terms to test the interactive effects of party system characteristics and party-level variables in the last three models. Model 3 was run with just fractionalization interactions with left-right extremity and party size; Model 4 was run with just polarization interactions with left-right extremity and party size; and then I interacted left-right extremity and party size with both fractionalization and polarization in Model 5. When continuous variables are multiplied, the interactions between the predictors and the interaction terms are highly correlated with the main effects. Since centering is particularly important to increase interpretability of interactions when interaction terms are included, I centered interaction terms between party-level variables (left-right extremity and party size) and party system characteristics (fractionalization and polarization) in order to calculate a multiplicative function. All the party-level variables and the party system characteristics are considered my

primary variables of theoretical interest because these have to do with the behavior of parties given strategic considerations within their particular political environments.

The values for GDP that tend to increase and generally move in the same direction over time had severe multicollinearity and thus I grouped GDP into a five-category ordinal scale ranging from 1 = low GDP to 5 = high GDP. The other three variables (state size, immigrant population, and EU subsidies) had 0 degrees of freedom for the numerator terms and missing values for the  $F$  and significance, and thus showed zero impact. Therefore, I grouped these variables into a five-category ordinal scale ranging from 5 = top 20%, to 4 = top 21-40%, to 3 = top 41-60%, to 2 = top 61-80%, and to 1 = top 81-100%.

Finally, I conducted three different analyses in this chapter: all nationalist parties combined (NP), statewide nationalist parties (SWNP) and minority nationalist parties (MNP). I focus on all nationalist parties combined with the full sample of all nationalist parties. However, I have a dummy variable controlling for type of party and some of the explanatory variables may have different impacts in the different subsamples. That is, these differences could end up canceling each other out in the full sample model. Since it could be that the full sample model is hiding effects in SWNP and MNP, I divide all nationalist parties into statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties to look at these two subsamples separately and discuss what is different between each subsample and the full sample.

I did not deal with the regional performance in GDP variable in these multilevel analyses because this predictor affects only minority nationalist parties and because data are not available for all countries. Rather, I separately used bivariate correlation analysis to measure the relationship between regional performance in GDP over time and minority nationalist parties' EU positions in order to determine if minority nationalist parties' EU positions are related to

regional performance in GDP. I will discuss this when I get to minority nationalist parties in section 5.4.

## 5.2 ALL NATIONALIST PARTIES COMBINED

Table 34-A presents multilevel modeling equation forms for all nationalist parties combined. In the multilevel equation forms, the subscripts  $i$  and  $j$  on the  $Y$  indicate that each nationalist party  $i$  ( $NP_i$ ) is nested within country  $j$ . In addition,  $Y_{ij}$  indicates EU position of  $NP_i$  within country  $j$ ,  $\beta_{0j}$  indicates the average EU position across all NPs within country  $j$ ,  $r_{ij}$  indicates the difference between country  $j$ 's average EU position of nationalist parties and  $NP_i$ 's EU position,  $\gamma_{00}$  indicates the grand mean (the average NPs' EU position of all countries), and  $u_{0j}$  indicates the difference between country  $j$ 's average EU position of nationalist parties and the grand mean. The mixed equations model shows that the EU position of  $NP_i$  within country  $j$  is a function of six components: how much countries affect NPs' EU positions ( $\gamma_{00}$ ), what the average effect of each party-level variable is ( $\gamma_{10} \dots \gamma_{50}$ ), what the average effect of each country-level variable is ( $\gamma_{01} \dots \gamma_{09}$ ), how much country  $j$ 's average NPs' EU position differs from this grand mean ( $u_{0j}$ ), how the effect of each party-level variable differs from this respective average ( $u_{1j} \dots u_{5j}$ ), and how much  $NP_i$ 's EU position differs from its own country  $j$ 's average ( $r_{ij}$ ).



A summary of the results of the multilevel model analysis for EU positions of all nationalist parties combined, referred to as “NP,” can be found in Table 34-B. The value of the Wald test ( $Z = 3.064, p < .05$ ) shows the significance of a random effect. Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood) quantifies how much worse the current model is in comparison to a saturated model that explains all the variation in the data, thus a model with a lower deviance has a better fit (Luke 2004, 36). In my multilevel modeling, deviance goes down with each model.<sup>7</sup> Model 1 (992.662) is lower than the null model (1251.483); Model 2 (955.048) is lower than Model 1; Models 3 and 4 (949.287 and 949.359) are lower than Model 2; and Model 5 (943.395) has the lowest deviance. The fact that deviance goes down for each model means the bigger model is potentially the best, but there is a better test to show whether one model is significantly better than another (Hayes 2006, 394): a “likelihood ratio test” that compares the deviances of models. Therefore, I conducted the likelihood ratio test as Hayes (2006) describes. The likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the null hypothesis versus Model 1 is  $1251.483 - 992.662 = 258.821$ , for testing Model 1 versus Model 2 is  $992.662 - 955.048 = 37.614$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 3 is  $955.048 - 949.287 = 5.761$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 4 is  $955.048 - 949.359 = 5.689$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 5 is  $955.048 - 943.395 = 11.653$ , for testing Model 3 versus Model 5 is  $949.287 - 943.395 = 5.892$ , and for testing Model 4 versus Model 5 is  $949.359 -$

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ALL NP	Parameter	Deviance (-2LL)	Chi-squared	Conclusion	at $p < 0.10$	at $p < 0.05$
Null Model	3	1251.483				
Diff between null and 1	5		258.821	$p < 0.00001$	Model 1 is better than Null Model	sig. sig.
Model1	8	992.662				
Diff between 1 and 2	9		37.614	$p = 0.00002$	Model 2 is better than Model 1	sig. sig.
Model2	17	955.048				
Diff between 2 and 3	2		5.761	$p = 0.056107$	Model 3 is NOT better than Model 2	sig. not sig.
Diff between 2 and 4	2		5.689	$p = 0.058163$	Model 4 is NOT better than Model 2	sig. not sig.
Diff between 2 and 5	4		11.653	$p = 0.002948$	Model 5 is better than Model 2	sig. sig.
Model3 (Frac)	19	949.287				
Model4 (Polariz)	19	949.359				
Diff between 3 and 5	2		5.892	$p = 0.052549$	Model 5 is NOT better than Model 3	sig. not sig.
Diff between 4 and 5	2		5.964	$p = 0.050691$	Model 5 is NOT better than Model 4	sig. not sig.
Model5 (Frac+Polariz)	21	943.395				

943.395 = 5.964. These statistics use a chi-squared distribution, and the degrees of freedom are determined by the difference in the number of parameters in the models. While the  $p$ -values of the statistics for differences between the null model and Model 1 ( $p < 0.00001$ ), between Models 1 and 2 ( $p = 0.00002$ ), and between Models 2 and 5 ( $p = 0.002948$ ) are significant at the 0.05 level, the  $p$ -values of the statistics for differences between Models 2 and 3 ( $p = 0.056107$ ), between Models 2 and 4 ( $p = 0.058163$ ), between Models 3 and 5 ( $p = 0.052549$ ), and between Models 4 and 5 ( $p = 0.050691$ ) are not significant at the 0.05 level. The likelihood ratio test indicates, therefore, that Model 5 is the best. At the 0.05 standard, it is better than Model 2, while Models 3 and 4 are not better than Model 2 at the 0.05 level. Thus, my discussion for NP only focuses on Models 1, 2 and 5. In all models, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was used.  $\gamma_{00}(3.91)$  in the null model shows the average EU positions of nationalist parties when no variables are considered.

Meanwhile, since multilevel modeling does not give standardized estimates automatically, I conducted manual tests to get standardized coefficients. To create a new standardized version of each variable, I subtracted the mean from the original value, and then divided that by the standard deviation. By using those standardized versions, I got my standardized estimates (Beta) in the table below.

Table 34-B. All 105 Nationalist Parties' (All NP) EU positions, 1984-2014

N = 342	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4				Model 5			
	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.																
<b>Average NP's EU position in the EU (Y<sub>00</sub>)</b>	290	.427	.44	.000***	397	.414	1.00	.000***	432	.415	.99	.000***	399	.416	.98	.000***	433	.416	.97	.000***
<b>Party-Level Variables</b>																				
Ideology (Y <sub>10</sub> )	.02	.05	.04	.561	.02	.05	.03	.526	.00	.00	.03	.972	.03	.08	.03	.337	.01	.03	.03	.709
L-R extremity (Y <sub>20</sub> )	-.63	-.87	.05	.000***	-.66	-.91	.05	.000***	-.67	-.92	.05	.000***	-.64	-.89	.05	.000***	-.65	-.90	.05	.000***
Type of party (Y <sub>30</sub> )	1.70	.85	.19	.000***	1.70	.85	.18	.000***	1.64	.82	.18	.000***	1.76	.88	.18	.000***	1.70	.85	.18	.000***
Size of party (Y <sub>40</sub> )	.03	.20	.01	.004**	.03	.22	.01	.001**	.03	.22	.01	.001**	.03	.21	.01	.001**	.03	.21	.01	.001**
Gov't Participation (Y <sub>50</sub> )	.69	.22	.19	.000***	.56	.18	.19	.003**	.56	.18	.18	.003**	.49	.16	.19	.008**	.49	.16	.18	.008**
<b>Country-Level Variables</b>																				
Party System																				
Fractionalization (Y <sub>01</sub> )					-.99	-.11	.94	.292	-1.26	-.13	.94	.180	-1.15	-.12	.92	.213	-1.39	-.15	.92	.132
Polarization (Y <sub>02</sub> )					.26	.12	.16	.110	.33	.16	.16	.044*	.21	.10	.16	.202	.27	.13	.16	.092†
Characteristics of the state																				
East vs. West (Y <sub>03</sub> )					.22	-.10	.33	.521	.27	-.12	.32	.408	.19	-.08	.32	.553	.24	-.11	.31	.443
State size (Y <sub>04</sub> )					-.11	-.15	.11	.307	-.12	-.17	.11	.252	-.11	-.15	.11	.292	-.12	-.16	.10	.253
Immigration (Y <sub>05</sub> )					.19	.27	.11	.101	.18	.26	.11	.100	.19	.27	.11	.091†	.18	.26	.11	.102
EU membership (Y <sub>06</sub> )					-.01	-.25	.01	.069†	-.01	-.25	.01	.069†	-.01	-.26	.01	.055†	-.01	-.25	.01	.057†
EU-subsidies (Y <sub>07</sub> )					-.06	-.12	.04	.138	-.06	-.12	.04	.141	-.05	-.10	.04	.213	-.05	-.10	.04	.220
GDP (Y <sub>08</sub> )					-.16	-.21	.11	.158	-.16	-.21	.11	.159	-.15	-.20	.11	.179	-.15	-.20	.11	.179
Electorate																				
Public opinion (Y <sub>09</sub> )					-.01	-.08	.01	.335	-.01	-.09	.01	.252	-.01	-.07	.01	.393	-.01	-.08	.01	.296
<b>Interaction Terms</b>																				
Fractionalization * L-R extremity (Y <sub>21</sub> )									.88	.13	.39	.023*					.91	.14	.38	.019*
Fractionalization * Party-size (Y <sub>41</sub> )									.05	.04	.07	.514					.04	.03	.07	.617
Polarization * L-R extremity (Y <sub>22</sub> )													-.17	-.10	.11	.105	-.18	-.11	.11	.089†
Polarization * Party-size (Y <sub>42</sub> )													-.03	-.09	.02	.096†	-.03	-.09	.02	.098†
<b>Variance</b>																				
Residual (σ <sup>2</sup> )					.943***				.875***				.867***				.867***			.858***
Intercept (τ <sub>00</sub> )					.395*				.188*				.160†				.159†			.135†
Wald Z					2.539				1.978				1.833				1.875			1.710
Slope of Ideology (τ <sub>11</sub> )					.18				.18				.17				.17			.17
Slope of L-R extremity (τ <sub>22</sub> )					.28				.30				.29				.28			.27
Slope of Party type (τ <sub>33</sub> )					.35				.28				.28				.28			.27
Slope of Party size (τ <sub>44</sub> )					.14				.13				.13				.13			.13
Slope of Gov't participation (τ <sub>55</sub> )					.24				.19				.19				.19			.18
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)					992.662				955.048				949.287				949.359			943.395
Intra-class Correlation (ICC)					.295				.177				.156				.155			.136

DV: EU positions († p < .10. \*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001). Note: B (unstandardized coefficient), Beta (standardized coefficient), S.E. (Standard Error)

### 5.2.1 All NP: Party-level variables

First, looking at Models 1 and 2 with no interaction, the results show an insignificant relationship between ideology and nationalist parties' EU positions (Model 1:  $B = .02$ ,  $\beta = .05$ ,  $p = .561$ ; Model 2:  $B = .02$ ,  $\beta = .05$ ,  $p = .526$ ). The effects of ideology are similar for the two models for NP, and country-level variables do not change the impact of ideology even though Model 2 is superior to Model 1 according to the likelihood ratio test. The coefficient is positive, showing a tendency for ideologically right-wing nationalist parties to be more positive toward European integration, but the impact of ideology is small and not statistically significant. In Model 5 with interactions, ideology does not gain statistical significance ( $B = .01$ ,  $\beta = .03$ ,  $p = .709$ ). Therefore, I reject hypothesis H1-a that the more a nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.

Second, ideological extremity is tested. The associations of ideological extremity with nationalist parties' EU positions in Models 1 and 2 are negative and significant (Model 1:  $B = -.63$ ,  $\beta = -.87$ ,  $p = .000$ ; Model 2:  $B = -.66$ ,  $\beta = -.91$ ,  $p = .000$ ), indicating that ideologically extreme nationalist parties on either the right or the left are more likely to oppose European integration. Moreover, country-level variables increased the negative impact of ideological extremity slightly. The  $\beta$ -value of -0.91 for nationalist party's ideological extremity in Model 2 shows that nationalist parties would have a more negative attitude toward European integration by 0.91 standard deviation when their ideology moves one standard deviation to the extreme right or the extreme left on the ideological spectrum. Although ideological direction is found to be of less particular importance in nationalist parties' EU positions, ideological extremity matters.

Thus, hypothesis H1-b that the closer a nationalist party is to the ideological center, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration is accepted.

On the other hand, the impact of ideology can be modified by the context of the party system in which parties operate. In Model 5, where the effects of all country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for, fractionalization decreases the impact of ideological extremity and polarization increases the impact of ideological extremity.<sup>8</sup> The originally negative impact of ideological extremity on nationalist parties' EU position in systems where fractionalization and polarization are zero is  $-.90$  ( $B = -.65, \beta = -.90, p = .000$ ), but the impact of ideological extremity becomes less negative when interacted with party system fractionalization ( $B = .91, \beta = .14, p = .019$ ) and more negative when interacted with party system polarization ( $B = -.18, \beta = -.11, p = .089$ ). In other words, the negative impact of ideological extremity is weakened ( $-.90 + .14 = -.76$ ) in systems with non-zero fractionalization but is strengthened ( $-.90 - .11 = -1.01$ ) in systems with non-zero polarization. In sum, ideologically extreme nationalist parties that take anti-EU positions to sharpen the distinctions between themselves and other parties are expected to exhibit lower levels of opposition to European integration in order to achieve electoral success in highly fractionalized party systems where more parties are competing for support, and higher levels of opposition to European integration in highly polarized party systems where parties are dispersed along the political spectrum in order to be congruent with their increasingly dispersed voter base. It seems that the number of parties and the degree of ideological differentiation among parties lead to different types of party

<sup>8</sup>

ALL NP	Fractionalization		Polarization	
	Zero	Non-zero	Zero	Non-zero
Impact of L-R extremity	-.90	$(-.90 + .14) = -.76$	-.90	$(-.90 - .11) = -1.01$
	Fractionalization reduces the impact of L-R extremity		Polarization increases the impact of L-R extremity	

competition. Hence, hypothesis H5-c that fractionalization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration and H6-c that polarization will mediate the impact of ideology on nationalist party support for European integration are accepted.

Third, nationalist party type's association with its EU position is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = 1.70$ ,  $\beta = .85$ ,  $p = .000$ ; Model 2:  $B = 1.70$ ,  $\beta = .85$ ,  $p = .000$ ). The effects of party type are the same for the two models for NP, and country-level variables do not change the impact of ideology. That is, at a 99.9% confidence level, the results of the NP analyses of party type indicate that minority nationalist parties are more likely to be in favor of European integration than statewide nationalist parties. Thus, hypothesis H2 that minority nationalist parties will be more likely to be in favor of European integration while statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to be skeptical toward European integration is accepted. I speculate that the advantages of the incentives provided by increased political, economic, and cultural opportunities through the EU outweigh the disadvantages for minority nationalist parties. Meanwhile, the impact of party type in Model 5 with interactions does not differ from the impacts in Models 1 and 2 with no interactions ( $B = 1.70$ ,  $\beta = .85$ ,  $p = .000$ ).

Fourth, the association of party size with nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = .03$ ,  $\beta = .20$ ,  $p = .004$ ; Model 2:  $B = .03$ ,  $\beta = .22$ ,  $p = .001$ ), indicating that a larger nationalist party is more positive about European integration than a smaller nationalist party. Moreover, controlling for country-level variables increases the positive impact of party size slightly. Thus, hypothesis H3 that the larger a nationalist party is, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration is accepted. Larger nationalist parties, who likely have higher potential for winning elections or becoming government coalition partners, are more likely to take more positive positions toward European

integration, while smaller nationalist parties and smaller statewide nationalist parties with lower potential to participate in government may take less positive positions toward European integration.

On the other hand, the impact of party size, like the impact of ideology, can be modified by the party system context in which parties operate. In Model 5, where the effects of all country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for, fractionalization increases the impact of party size and polarization reduces it.<sup>9</sup> The positive impact of party size on nationalist parties' EU position in systems where fractionalization and polarization are zero is .21 ( $B = .03$ ,  $\beta = .21$ ,  $p = .001$ ). Party size does not gain significant results when interacted with party system fractionalization ( $B = .04$ ,  $\beta = .03$ ,  $p = .617$ ). The fact that the interaction is insignificant means that fractionalization does not mediate the effect of party size on nationalist parties' EU positions, but the positive impact of party size on nationalist parties' EU positions still matters when fractionalization and polarization are zero. Meanwhile, the positive impact of party size on nationalist parties' EU positions becomes less positive when interacted with party system polarization ( $B = -.03$ ,  $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p = .098$ ). In other words, the positive impact of party size is not changed in systems with non-zero fractionalization but is weakened ( $.21 - .09 = .12$ ) in systems with non-zero polarization. That is, party size is less likely to affect EU position in highly polarized systems. Since a number of large parties are located at the political extreme in highly polarized systems and they are less likely to be supportive of European integration in order to be congruent with their increasingly dispersed voters, larger nationalist parties in more polarized

<sup>9</sup>

ALL NP	Fractionalization		Polarization	
	Zero	Non-zero	Zero	Non-zero
Impact of party size	.21	.21 (not significant)	.21	(.21-.09) = .12
	Fractionalization does not change the impact of party size		Polarization reduces the impact of party size	

systems can be expected to exhibit less support for the EU than in less polarized systems to compete with other large parties which become less pro-EU by moving to the political extremes. Hence, hypothesis H5-d that fractionalization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration is rejected, but hypothesis H6-d that polarization will mediate the impact of party size on nationalist party support for European integration is accepted.

Fifth, the association of government participation with nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = .69$ ,  $\beta = .22$ ,  $p = .000$ ; Model 2:  $B = .56$ ,  $\beta = .18$ ,  $p = .003$ ), indicating that a nationalist party with government experience is more positive toward European integration than a nationalist party with no government experience at a 99.2% confidence level. Country-level variables reduce the positive impact of government participation slightly. The  $\beta$ -value of 0.18 for the relationship between government experience and its EU positioning in Model 2 shows that an increase of 1 standard deviation in government experience results in a 0.18 standard deviation increase in EU position. Thus, hypothesis H4 that nationalist parties with government experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration is accepted. Since incumbent parties take part in the decisions of EU institutions such as the EU Council or the Commission and thus they are responsible for the European integration process to a certain extent, evaluations of the incumbent parties tend to move together with evaluations of the EU (Anderson 1998, 577). Viewed in this way, the EU can empower incumbent nationalist parties and thus the ones that hold a privileged position to influence EU decision-making as well as national policy-making are more likely to be in favor of European integration. Meanwhile, the impact of government experience in Model 5 with interactions does not differ from the impacts in Models 1 and 2 with no interactions ( $B = .49$ ,  $\beta = .16$ ,  $p = .009$ ).

### 5.2.2 All NP: Country-level variables

Not only do party system characteristics change the impacts of party-level variables on EU attitudes as I discussed above, but they themselves may affect EU attitudes directly. First, the association of party system fractionalization with nationalist parties' EU positions in Model 2 is negative ( $B = -.99, \beta = -.11, p = .292$ ), indicating that nationalist parties operating in highly fractionalized political systems are more likely to oppose European integration. However, its  $p$ -value is less than the significance level, thus both hypotheses H5-a and H5-b are rejected: fractionalization has neither a positive nor negative impact on EU attitudes. The impact of party system fractionalization is increased slightly in Model 5 with interactions, but did not gain statistical significance ( $B = -1.39, \beta = -.15, p = .132$ ),

Second, the associations of party system polarization with nationalist parties' EU positions are positive but insignificant in Model 2 ( $B = .26, \beta = .12, p = .110$ ), indicating that nationalist parties operating in highly polarized political systems are more likely to support European integration. However, its  $p$ -value is less than the significance level, thus both hypotheses H6-a and H6-b are rejected: polarization has neither a positive nor negative impact on EU attitudes. On the other hand, adding interaction terms (Model 5) strengthens the impact of polarization. Specifically, polarization gains marginal statistical significance at a 90.8% confidence level ( $B = .27, \beta = .13, p = .092$ ). This means that party system polarization can lead nationalist parties to take positive positions on European integration.

Third, the associations of East-West with EU positions of nationalist parties are not statistically significant ( $B = .22, \beta = -.10, p = .521$ ). Contrary to my expectations, a relatively large amount of the inflow of EU funding into relatively poorer Eastern European countries may not influence the EU position of nationalist parties in Eastern Europe. Thus, hypothesis H7 that

nationalist parties in Eastern Europe will have a more positive attitude toward European integration is rejected. Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not make the impact of the East-West divide significant ( $B = .24, \beta = -.11, p = .443$ ).

Fourth, the association of state size with nationalist parties' EU positions is negative but not significant ( $B = -.11, \beta = -.15, p = .307$ ). Against my expectation that a larger state's privileged influential position regarding EU-level decision-making or greater benefits from the EU may affect EU positions of nationalist parties in the state, I found no impact of state size in regard to the EU positions of nationalist parties. Thus, both hypotheses H8-a and H8-b (nationalist parties in larger states will have a more negative attitude toward European integration) are rejected: state size has neither a positive nor negative impact on EU attitudes. Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not make its impact significant ( $B = -.12, \beta = -.16, p = .253$ ).

Fifth, the association of immigrant population with nationalist parties' EU positions is positive, but the  $p$ -value is less than the significance level ( $B = .19, \beta = .27, p = .101$ ). I expected that nationalist parties may take more negative positions toward European integration in an atmosphere of growing immigrant population that leads to anti-immigration sentiments based on beliefs about threatening (sub-) national cultures and fears of losing jobs to immigrants, but I could not find any significant results in regard to immigration population. Thus, hypothesis H9 that nationalist parties in a state with a larger immigrant population will have a more negative attitude toward European integration is rejected. Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not increase significance of immigrant population ( $B = .18, \beta = .26, p = .102$ ).

Sixth, the association of the length of EU membership with nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and significant ( $B = -.01, \beta = -.25, p = .069$ ). At a 93.1% confidence level,

the results of the NP analyses of the length of EU membership indicate that nationalist parties in a country with longer EU membership are more likely to oppose European integration than nationalist parties in a country with shorter EU membership. Thus, hypothesis H10-a that nationalist parties in a country that has been a member longer will have a more positive attitude toward European integration is rejected, and hypothesis H10-b that nationalist parties in a country that has been a member longer will have a more negative attitude toward European integration is accepted. As European integration intensifies, increasing EU powers are more likely to encroach on sensitive national or sub-national issues, and thus nationalist parties are likely to oppose European integration as their respective countries' length of EU membership increases. The impact of the length of EU membership in Model 5 is essentially the same as its impact in Model 2.

Seventh, with regard to EU subsidies, in the NP analyses, the association of EU subsidies with nationalist parties' EU positions is negative but not significant ( $B = -.06$ ,  $\beta = -.12$ ,  $p = .138$ ). Thus, H11-b that nationalist parties in a state that is a beneficiary of EU-subsidized programs will have a more positive attitude toward European integration is rejected. Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not increase significance of EU subsidies ( $B = -.05$ ,  $\beta = -.10$ ,  $p = .220$ ).

Eighth, with regard to GDP, as I mentioned above, since the generally increasing yearly GDP values over time cause multicollinearity problems, I performed analyses after grouping GDP into a five-category ordinal scale ranging from 1 = low GDP to 5 = high GDP. In the NP analyses, GDP's association with nationalist parties' EU positions is negative but not significant ( $B = -.16$ ,  $\beta = -.21$ ,  $p = .158$ ). Thus, hypothesis H11-c that nationalist parties in a state where the economy is strong will have a more positive attitude toward European integration is rejected.

Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not increase GDP's significance ( $B = -.15, \beta = -.20, p = .179$ ).

Ninth, the association of public opinion with nationalist parties' EU positions is negative but not significant ( $B = -.01, \beta = -.08, p = .335$ ). Thus, hypothesis H12 that nationalist parties in a state with more favorable public opinion toward the EU will have a more positive attitude toward European integration is rejected. Controlling for interaction effects in Model 5 does not make public opinion's impact significant ( $B = -.01, \beta = -.08, p = .296$ ).

### 5.2.3 All NP: Summary

I argue that Model 5 is the superior model and focus on this to discuss the effects of all variables. Model 5 shows that the most influential factor in the EU positions of nationalist parties is ideological extremity, followed by party type, the length of EU membership, party size, government participation, and polarization. Four party-level variables and two country-level variables are found to affect nationalist parties' EU positions when I look at the full sample of all nationalist parties combined. Moreover, neither fractionalization nor polarization is significant at the 0.05 level, but party system characteristics moderate the impacts of ideological extremity and party size on nationalist parties' EU positions. While the negative impact of ideological extremity is weakened when interacted with party system fractionalization, its impact is strengthened when interacted with party system polarization. That is, ideologically extreme nationalist parties take less negative EU positions in fractionalized systems than in systems that are not fractionalized and take clearer negative EU positions in polarized systems than in systems that are not polarized. Meanwhile, the positive impact of party size is weakened when interacted with party system polarization. In other words, larger nationalist parties take less positive EU positions in polarized systems than in systems that are not polarized. Thus, I can note that the

structure of inter-party competition affects the EU positions of nationalist parties. In short, the multilevel model analysis for all nationalist parties combined shows that party-level variables and party system characteristics that define electoral competition matter for the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined, some of the other country-level variables also matter, and the political context can be an important factor to shape party positioning. I found that:

1. Ideologically extreme nationalist parties will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration. On the other hand, by adding up the impact of ideological extremity on nationalist parties in non-fractionalized party systems and in fractionalized party systems or in non-polarized party systems and in polarized party systems respectively, ideological extremity has less negative impact in nationalist parties in fractionalized party systems but more negative impact in nationalist parties in polarized party systems. Thus, ideologically extreme nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear negative attitude toward European integration within highly fractionalized party systems, but a clearer negative attitude within highly polarized party systems.
2. Minority nationalist parties will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration than statewide nationalist parties.
3. The larger a nationalist party is, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration in less polarized systems. While fractionalization does not change the impact of party size, larger nationalist parties can be expected to take less positive EU positions in highly polarized party systems. By adding up the impact of party size on nationalist parties in less polarized party systems and in polarized party systems, party size has less positive impact in nationalist parties in polarized party systems. Thus,

larger nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear positive attitude toward European integration within highly polarized party systems.

4. Nationalist parties with government experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration than nationalist parties without government experience.
5. Nationalist parties within highly polarized party systems will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.
6. Nationalist parties in a country with a longer EU membership will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration than nationalist parties in a country with a shorter EU membership.

### 5.3 STATEWIDE NATIONALIST PARTIES

As I mentioned above, the full sample of all nationalist parties combined would be superior because of the larger number of cases, but it could be that variables have different effects in statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. Thus, in order to assess the difference between each subsample and the full sample, I divided the full sample into two subsamples. Now I will look at the two separately and then discuss how they are different.

Table 35-A presents multilevel modeling equation forms for statewide nationalist parties, and Table 35-B shows the results of the multilevel modeling for statewide nationalist parties, referred to as “SWNP.” The value of the Wald test ( $Z = 2.785, p < .01$ ) shows the significance of a random effect. In my multilevel model analysis for SWNP, deviance goes down with each model (Null: 605.994; Model 1: 547.367; Model 2: 516.538; Models 3 and 4: 504.805 and

503.659; and Model 5: 495.924).<sup>10</sup> The likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the null hypothesis versus model 1 is  $605.994 - 547.367 = 58.627$ , for testing model 1 versus model 2 is  $547.367 - 516.538 = 30.829$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 3 is  $516.538 - 504.805 = 11.733$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 4 is  $516.538 - 503.659 = 12.879$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 5 is  $516.538 - 495.924 = 20.614$ , for testing Model 3 versus Model 5 is  $504.805 - 495.924 = 8.881$ , and for testing Model 4 versus Model 5 is  $503.659 - 495.924 = 7.735$ . All the  $p$ -values of the statistics for differences between the null model and Model 1 ( $p < 0.00001$ ), between Models 1 and 2 ( $p = 0.000317$ ), between Models 2 and 3 ( $p = 0.002833$ ), between Models 2 and 4 ( $p = 0.001597$ ), between Models 2 and 5 ( $p = 0.000378$ ), between Models 3 and 5 ( $p = 0.01179$ ), and between Models 4 and 5 ( $p = 0.020911$ ) are significant at the 0.05 level. For statewide nationalist parties, Model 2 is better than Model 1 at the 0.05 level, either Model 3 or Model 4 is better than Model 2 at the 0.05 level, and Model 5 is better than either Model 3 or Model 4 at the 0.05 level. Therefore, I argue that Model 5 is the best model in the multilevel model analysis for SWNP. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was used in all models, and  $\gamma_{00}(3.23)$  in the null model shows the average EU positions of statewide nationalist parties when no variables are considered.

<sup>10</sup>

SWNP	Parameter		Deviance (-2LL)	Chi-squared	Conclusion	at $p < 0.10$	at $p < 0.05$
Null Model	3		605.994				
Diff between null and 1	4		58.627	$p < .00001$	Model 1 is better than Null Model	sig.	sig.
Model1	7		547.367				
Diff between 1 and 2	9		30.829	$p = 0.000317$	Model 2 is better than Model 1	sig.	sig.
Model2	16		516.538				
Diff between 2 and 3	2		11.733	$p = 0.002833$	Model 3 is better than Model 2	sig.	sig.
Diff between 2 and 4	2		12.879	$p = 0.001597$	Model 4 is better than Model 2	sig.	sig.
Diff between 2 and 5	4		20.614	$p = 0.000378$	Model 5 is better than Model 2	sig.	sig.
Model3 (Frac)	18		504.805				
Model4 (Polariz)	18		503.659				
Diff between 3 and 5	2		8.881	$p = 0.01179$	Model 5 is better than Model 3	sig.	sig.
Diff between 4 and 5	2		7.735	$p = 0.020911$	Model 5 is better than Model 4	sig.	sig.
Model5 (Frac+Polariz)	20		495.924				



Table 35-B. Statewide Nationalist parties' (SWNP) EU positions, 1984-2014

N = 175	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4				Model 5			
	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.
<b>Average NP's EU position in the EU (<math>\gamma_{00}</math>)</b>	5.11	3.49	.55	.000***	6.67	3.19	1.43	.000***	9.03	3.36	1.54	.000***	6.13	3.12	1.38	.000***	8.13	3.26	1.52	.000***
<b>Party-Level Variables</b>																				
Ideology ( $\gamma_{10}$ )	-.15	-.36	.10	.160	-.19	-.46	.10	.048*	-.23	-.55	.09	.016*	-.19	-.45	.09	.043*	-.22	-.53	.09	.017*
L-R extremity ( $\gamma_{20}$ )	-.38	-.52	.16	.017*	-.40	-.55	.15	.009**	-.46	-.63	.15	.002**	-.37	-.51	.14	.011*	-.43	-.59	.14	.003**
Size of party ( $\gamma_{40}$ )	.03	.21	.01	.011*	.03	.22	.01	.004**	.03	.24	.01	.002**	.03	.22	.01	.004**	.03	.22	.01	.003**
Gov't Participation ( $\gamma_{50}$ )	.71	.23	.27	.009**	.61	.20	.26	.020*	.48	.16	.25	.057†	.52	.17	.25	.089*	.44	.14	.25	.078†
<b>Country-Level Variables</b>																				
Party System																				
Fractionalization ( $\gamma_{01}$ )					-.121	-.13	1.29	.352	-.426	-.45	1.52	.006**	-.132	-.14	1.25	.294	-.372	-.40	1.49	.014*
Polarization ( $\gamma_{02}$ )					.55	.26	.26	.087*	.71	.34	.26	.006**	.94	.45	.28	.001**	1.00	.48	.28	.000***
Characteristics of the state																				
East vs. West ( $\gamma_{03}$ )					.69	-.30	.51	.185	.85	-.38	.51	.102	.64	-.28	.49	.205	.78	-.34	.50	.126
State size ( $\gamma_{04}$ )					-.07	-.10	.16	.661	-.13	-.17	.16	.420	-.09	-.12	.15	.551	-.14	-.19	.15	.372
Immigration ( $\gamma_{05}$ )					.19	.27	.19	.315	.18	.27	.18	.321	.10	.15	.19	.583	.11	.16	.19	.548
EU membership ( $\gamma_{06}$ )					-.00	-.04	.01	.855	.00	.01	.01	.945	-.00	-.08	.01	.687	-.00	-.03	.01	.879
EU-subsidies ( $\gamma_{07}$ )					-.07	-.14	.07	.306	-.06	-.13	.07	.344	-.06	-.12	.07	.384	-.05	-.10	.07	.420
GDP ( $\gamma_{08}$ )					-.38	-.50	.15	.014*	-.34	-.46	.15	.021*	-.29	-.39	.15	.051†	-.28	-.37	.15	.060†
Electorate																				
Public opinion ( $\gamma_{09}$ )					-.02	-.24	.01	.054†	-.02	-.25	.01	.034*	-.02	-.25	.01	.033*	-.02	-.27	.01	.023*
<b>Interaction Terms</b>																				
Fractionalization * L-R extremity ( $\gamma_{21}$ )									.245	.37	.79	.002**					.210	.32	.78	.008**
Fractionalization * Party-size ( $\gamma_{41}$ )									.20	.17	.09	.023*					.14	.12	.09	.130
Polarization * L-R extremity ( $\gamma_{22}$ )													-.41	-.25	.17	.018*	-.33	-.20	.17	.056†
Polarization * Party-size ( $\gamma_{42}$ )													-.07	-.20	.02	.002**	-.06	-.17	.02	.010*
<b>Variance</b>																				
Residual ( $\sigma^2$ )					1.044***				911***				841***				849***			803***
Intercept ( $\tau_{00}$ )					.826*				.501*				.520*				.452*			.478*
Wald Z					2512				2010				2160				2033			2151
Slope of Ideology ( $\tau_{11}$ )					.24				.23				.21				.18			.18
Slope of L-R extremity ( $\tau_{22}$ )					.34				.42				.39				.38			.38
Slope of Party size ( $\tau_{44}$ )					.19				.14				.14				.12			.13
Slope of Gov't participation ( $\tau_{55}$ )					.23				.32				.26				.23			.19
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)					547367				516538				504805				503659			495924
Intra-class Correlation (ICC)					.442				.355				.382				.347			.373

DV: EU positions († p < .10. \*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001). Note: B (unstandardized coefficient), Beta (standardized coefficient), S.E. (Standard Error)

### 5.3.1 SWNP: Party-level variables

I found that while right/left ideology has a different effect on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions compared to the full sample (NP), three other party-level variables (ideological extremity, party size, and government participation) have the same effects on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions.

First, compared to the insignificant impact of the left-right ideological spectrum of all nationalist parties combined on the EU positions, the association of the left-right ideological spectrum with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and significant when country-level variables are considered in Model 2 (Model 2:  $B = -.19$ ,  $\beta = -.46$ ,  $p = .048$ ). The  $\beta$ -value of -0.46 for statewide nationalist party's ideology in Model 2 shows that statewide nationalist parties would have a more negative attitude toward European integration by 0.46 standard deviation when their ideology moves one standard deviation to the right on the ideological spectrum. Meanwhile, the impact of ideology was insignificant in Model 1 (Model 1:  $B = -.15$ ,  $\beta = -.36$ ,  $p = .160$ ). This means that controlling country-level variables strengthens the impact of ideology for statewide nationalist parties. Therefore, when country-level variables are considered, the more a statewide nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a negative attitude toward European integration ideology. Meanwhile, the negative impact of ideology and its significance are intensified in Model 5 with interactions (Model 5:  $B = -.22$ ,  $\beta = -.53$ ,  $p = .017$ ).

Second, the association of ideological extremity with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = -.38$ ,  $\beta = -.52$ ,  $p = .017$ ; Model 2:  $B = -.40$ ,  $\beta = -.55$ ,  $p = .009$ ), indicating that statewide nationalist parties that are ideologically more extreme on either right or left are also more likely to oppose European

integration than more center statewide nationalist parties. Moreover, country-level variables increase the negative impact of ideological extremity slightly. The  $\beta$ -value of -0.55 for statewide nationalist party's ideological extremity in Model 2 shows that statewide nationalist parties have a more negative attitude toward European integration by 0.55 standard deviation when their ideology moves one standard deviation to the extreme right or the extreme left on the ideological spectrum.

On the other hand, the impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions can be modified by the context of the party system in which parties operate. In Model 5, where the effects of all country-level variables and interactions terms are controlled for, fractionalization reduces the impact of ideological extremity and polarization increases the impact of ideological extremity.<sup>11</sup> The impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties' EU position in systems where fractionalization and polarization are zero is -.59 ( $B = -.43$ ,  $\beta = -.59$ ,  $p = .013$ ), but the impact of ideological extremity becomes less negative when interacted with party system fractionalization ( $B = 2.10$ ,  $\beta = .32$ ,  $p = .008$ ) and more negative when interacted with party system polarization ( $B = -.33$ ,  $\beta = -.20$ ,  $p = .056$ ). In other words, the negative impact of ideological extremity is weakened ( $-.59 + .32 = -.27$ ) in systems with non-zero fractionalization; and strengthened ( $-.59 -.20 = -.79$ ) in systems with non-zero polarization. In sum, ideologically extreme statewide nationalist parties that take anti-EU positions in order to sharpen the distinctions between themselves and other parties are less likely to oppose European integration in order to get more votes in highly fractionalized party systems in which more

<sup>11</sup>

SWNP	Fractionalization		Polarization	
	Zero	Non-zero	Zero	Non-zero
Impact of L-R extremity	-.59	$(-.59+.32) = -.27$	-.59	$(-.59-.20) = -.79$
	Fractionalization reduces the impact of L-R extremity		Polarization increases the impact of L-R extremity	

parties are competing for support, but are more likely to oppose European integration in highly polarized party systems where parties are dispersed along the political spectrum in order to compete with a number of large parties that move to the political extreme. Therefore, I argue that party system fractionalization and polarization mediate the impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties' EU position, as was true for all NP.

Third, the association of party size with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = .03$ ,  $\beta = .21$ ,  $p = .011$ ; Model 2:  $B = .03$ ,  $\beta = .22$ ,  $p = .004$ ), indicating that a larger statewide nationalist party is more positive toward European integration than a smaller statewide nationalist party. Moreover, country-level variables increased the positive impact of party size very slightly. The  $\beta$ -value of 0.22 for statewide nationalist party size in Model 2 shows that statewide nationalist parties have a more positive attitude toward European integration by 0.22 standard deviation when their party size increases by one standard deviation. That is, larger statewide nationalist parties with higher potential for winning elections (like larger nationalist parties) are more likely to take more positive EU positions than smaller statewide nationalist parties with lower potential—as was true for all NP.

On the other hand, the positive impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is modified by the context of the party system in which parties operate. While party system fractionalization increases the impact of party size in Model 3 with just fractionalization interactions, party system fractionalization does not change the impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions in the better model (Model 5), in which the effects of all country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for. On the other hand, party system polarization reduces the positive impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU

positions in Model 5.<sup>12</sup> The negative impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions in systems where fractionalization and polarization are zero is .22 ( $B = .03, \beta = .22, p = .003$ ). Regardless of the significance of the interaction term between party system fractionalization and party size in Model 3 ( $B = .20, \beta = .17, p = .023$ ), party size did not gain significant results when interacted with party system fractionalization in Model 5 ( $B = .14, \beta = .12, p = .130$ ). The fact that the interaction is insignificant means that fractionalization does not mediate the effect of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions, but the positive impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions still matters when fractionalization and polarization are zero. Meanwhile, the positive impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions becomes less positive when interacted with party system polarization ( $B = -.06, \beta = -.17, p = .010$ ). In other words, the positive impact of party size is not changed in systems with non-zero fractionalization but is weakened ( $.21 - .17 = .05$ ) in systems with non-zero polarization. That is, party size is less likely to affect EU positions in highly polarized systems. Therefore, I argue that statewide nationalist parties in highly polarized party systems are less likely to be supportive of the EU in order to be congruent with their increasingly dispersed voters like other parties.

Fourth, the association of government participation with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = .71, \beta = .23, p = .009$ ; Model 2:  $B = .61, \beta = .20, p = .020$ ), indicating that statewide nationalist parties with government

<sup>12</sup>

SWNP	Fractionalization		Polarization	
	Zero	Non-zero	Zero	Non-zero
Impact of party size	.22	(.22+.17) = .39 (Model 3: only fract) .22 (Model 5: not significant)	.22	(.21-.17) = .05
	Fractionalization does not change the impact of party size		Polarization reduces the impact of party size	

experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration, as was true for all NP. Country-level variables reduce the positive impact of government participation slightly. The  $\beta$ -value of 0.20 for the relationship between government experience and a party's EU position in Model 2 shows that an increase of 1 standard deviation in government experience results in a 0.20 standard deviation increase in EU position. Meanwhile, the impact of government experience on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is somewhat moderated in Model 5 when interaction effects are controlled for ( $B = .44, \beta = .14, p = .078$ ), but it seems to be an important factor to shape party position. Incumbent statewide nationalist parties with responsibilities for the European integration process as EU policy makers are likely to be more positive toward European integration than non-incumbent statewide nationalist parties.

### 5.3.2 SWNP: Country-level variables

In the NP Model 5, fractionalization alone was not significant and polarization was marginally significant. In contrast, I found that both party system characteristics had statistically significant effects on statewide nationalist parties. First, the negative effect of party system fractionalization on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions in Model 2 is found to be insignificant ( $B = -1.21, \beta = -.13, p = .352$ ), but its impact gains statistical significance in Model 5 with interactions ( $B = -3.72, \beta = -.40, p = .014$ ). The result indicates that statewide nationalist parties operating in highly fractionalized political systems are more likely to oppose European integration when the effects of country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for.

Second, the association of party system polarization with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and statistically significant ( $B = .55, \beta = .26, p = .037$ ), unlike the impact in all nationalist parties combined. This indicates that statewide nationalist parties operating in highly polarized political systems are more likely to support European integration. The impact of

polarization is strengthened in Model 5, where the effects of country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for ( $B = 1.00, \beta = .48, p = .000$ ).

Third, the association of East-West with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is not significant ( $B = .69, \beta = -.30, p = .185$ ), similar to its impact in all nationalist parties combined. Controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 increases the impact of the East-West divide, but does not make it significant ( $B = .78, \beta = -.34, p = .126$ ).

Fourth, the association of state size with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions is negative but not significant ( $B = -.07, \beta = -.10, p = .661$ ), similar to its impact in all nationalist parties combined. Controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 does not make its impact significant ( $B = -.12, \beta = -.16, p = .253$ ).

Fifth, immigrant population is positively associated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, but the association is not significant ( $B = .19, \beta = .27, p = .315$ ), as in the case for all nationalist parties combined. Controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 does not make its impact significant ( $B = .11, \beta = .16, p = .548$ ).

Sixth, while length of EU membership is negatively associated with the EU positions in all nationalist parties combined at a 94.3% confidence level, its association with statewide nationalist parties is not significant ( $B = -.00, \beta = -.04, p = .855$ ). Controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 does not make its impact significant ( $B = -.00, \beta = -.03, p = .879$ ).

Seventh, receiving EU subsidies is found to be negatively associated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, but the association is not significant ( $B = -.07, \beta = -.14, p = .306$ ), similar to the impact in all nationalist parties combined. Controlling for country-level

variables and interaction terms in Model 5 does not make its impact significant ( $B = -.05$ ,  $\beta = -.10$ ,  $p = .420$ ).

Eighth, the impact of GDP gained statistical significance in the multilevel model analysis for SWNP, unlike the effect on all nationalist parties combined. GDP is negatively associated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties at a 98.6% confidence level ( $B = -.38$ ,  $\beta = -.50$ ,  $p = .014$ ). That is, statewide nationalist parties in a country where the economy is strong have more negative positions regarding European integration. Statewide nationalist parties in a wealthier state that usually spend more money on the EU than they receive from it can be more sensitive to the EU's infringement on the sovereignty of the country than statewide nationalist parties in relatively poorer countries that are more dependent on the EU, and thus they may take more negative EU positions. Meanwhile, controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 reduces GDP's impact slightly ( $B = -.28$ ,  $\beta = -.37$ ,  $p = .060$ ).

Ninth, the impact of public opinion gained statistical significance in the multilevel model analysis for SWNP, unlike the insignificant effect in all nationalist parties combined. Public opinion is negatively associated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, and the association is significant at a 94.6% confidence level ( $B = -.02$ ,  $\beta = -.24$ ,  $p = .054$ ). That is, statewide nationalist parties in a state with more favorable public opinion on the EU will have a more negative attitude toward European integration. Since general parties are more likely to be congruent with their voters' EU positions in a state with more favorable public opinion on the EU, statewide nationalist parties may take a stand opposed to pro-EU parties to differentiate themselves from others. Meanwhile, controlling for country-level variables and interaction terms in Model 5 increases its impact and significance ( $B = -.02$ ,  $\beta = -.27$ ,  $p = .023$ ).

### 5.3.3 SWNP: Summary

I argue that Model 5 is the superior model, and focus on that to discuss the effects of all variables. Model 5 shows that the most influential factor in the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties is ideological extremity, followed by ideology, polarization, fractionalization, GDP, public opinion, party size, and government participation. Four party-level variables and four country-level variables are found to affect statewide nationalist parties' EU positions when I look at the subsample of statewide nationalist parties. Moreover, while neither fractionalization nor polarization is significant with the full sample, fractionalization gains significance when controlling for interaction effects and polarization is significant for statewide nationalist parties. Statewide nationalist parties that have relatively higher chances of winning national elections or of being in national office are sensitive to party competition systems. For statewide nationalist parties, political context matters both in terms of direct impact, and in terms of mediating the impact of party-level variables. Party system characteristics moderate the impacts of ideological extremity and party size on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions. While the negative impact of ideological extremity is weakened when interacted with party system fractionalization, its impact is strengthened when interacted with party system polarization. That is, ideologically extreme statewide nationalist parties take less negative EU positions in fractionalized systems than in systems that are not fractionalized and take clearer negative EU positions in polarized systems than in systems that are not polarized. Meanwhile, the positive impact of party size is weakened when interacted with party system polarization. In other words, larger statewide nationalist parties take less positive EU positions in polarized systems than in systems that are not polarized. Thus, I note that party-level variables and party-system characteristics that define the electoral competition matter for the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, some

country-level variables also matter, and the political context seems to affect party positioning. I found that:

1. The more a statewide nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a negative attitude toward European integration.
2. Ideologically extreme statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration. On the other hand, by adding up the impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties in non-fractionalized party systems and in fractionalized party systems or in non-polarized party systems and in polarized party systems respectively, ideological extremity has less negative impact in statewide nationalist parties in fractionalized party systems but more negative impact in statewide nationalist parties in polarized party systems. Thus, ideologically extreme statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear negative attitude toward European integration within highly fractionalized party systems, but a clearer negative attitude within highly polarized party systems.
3. The larger a statewide nationalist party is, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration in non-polarized systems. On the other hand, by adding up the impact of party size on statewide nationalist parties in non-polarized party systems and in polarized party systems, party size has less positive impact in statewide nationalist parties in polarized party systems. Thus, larger statewide nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear positive attitude toward European integration within highly polarized party systems.

4. Statewide nationalist parties with government experience will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration than statewide nationalist parties without government experience.
5. Statewide nationalist parties within highly fractionalized party systems will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration.
6. Statewide nationalist parties within highly polarized party systems will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.
7. Statewide nationalist parties in a country where the economy is strong will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration.
8. Statewide nationalist parties in a country with more favorable public opinion on the EU will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration than statewide nationalist parties in a country with less favorable public opinion on the EU.

#### 5.4 MINORITY NATIONALIST PARTIES

Now I will look at the subsample of minority nationalist parties. Table 36-A presents multilevel modeling equation forms for minority nationalist parties, and Table 36-B shows the results of the multilevel modeling for minority nationalist parties, referred to as “MNP.” The value of the Wald test ( $Z = 1.666, p < .01$ ) shows the significance of a random effect. In my multilevel model analysis for MNP, deviance goes down with each model (Null: 506.748; Model 1: 389.325; Model 2: 357.782; Models 3 and 4: 357.091 and 352.268; and Model 5: 351.732). The likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the null hypothesis versus model 1 is  $506.748 - 389.325 = 117.423$ , for testing model 1 versus model 2 is  $389.325 - 357.782 = 31.543$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 3 is  $357.782 - 357.091 = 0.691$ , for testing Model 2 versus Model 4 is

357.782 - 352.268 = 5.514, for testing Model 2 versus Model 5 is 357.782 - 351.732 = 6.05, for testing Model 3 versus Model 5 is 357.091 - 351.732 = 5.359, and for testing Model 4 versus Model 5 is 352.268 - 351.732 = 0.536<sup>13</sup>. While the  $p$ -values of the statistics for differences between the null model and Model 1 ( $p < 0.00001$ ) and between Models 1 and 2 ( $p = 0.000239$ ) are significant at the 0.05 level, the  $p$ -values of the statistics for differences between Models 2 and 3 ( $p = 0.707866$ ), between Models 2 and 4 ( $p = 0.063482$ ), between Models 2 and 5 ( $p = 0.195445$ ), between Models 3 and 5 ( $p = 0.068597$ ), and between Models 4 and 5 ( $p = 0.764908$ ) are not significant at the 0.05 level. The likelihood ratio test for minority nationalist parties indicates, therefore, that Model 3 is not better than Model 2, Model 4 is not better than Model 2, and Model 5 is not better than Model 2 at the 0.05 level. Therefore, I argue that Model 2 is the best model, and interactive variables are not significant at the 0.05 level in the multilevel model analysis for MNP. Thus, my discussion for MNP only focuses on Models 1 and 2. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was used in all models, and  $\gamma_{00}(5.50)$  in the null model shows the average EU positions of minority nationalist parties when no variables are considered.

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MNP	Parameter		Deviance (-2LL)	Chi-squared	Conclusion	at p < 0.10	at p < 0.05
Null Model	3		506.748				
Diff between null and 1		4		117.423	$p < 0.00001$	Model 1 is better than Null Model	sig. sig.
Model1	7		389.325				
Diff between 1 and 2		9		31.543	$p = 0.000239$	Model 2 is better than Model 1	sig. sig.
Model2	16		357.782				
Diff between 2 and 3		2		0.691	$p = 0.707866$	Model 3 is NOT better than Model 2	not sig. not sig.
Diff between 2 and 4		2		5.514	$p = 0.063482$	Model 4 is NOT better than Model 2	sig. not sig.
Diff between 2 and 5		4		6.05	$p = 0.195445$	Model 5 is NOT better than Model 2	not sig. not sig.
Model3 (Frac)	18		357.091				
Model4 (Polariz)	18		352.268				
Diff between 3 and 5		2		5.359	$p = 0.068597$	Model 5 is NOT better than Model 3	sig. not sig.
Diff between 4 and 5		2		0.536	$p = 0.764908$	Model 5 is NOT better than Model 4	not sig. not sig.
Model5 (Frac+Polariz)	20		351.732				



Table 36-B. Minority Nationalist parties' (MNP) EU positions, 1984-2014

N = 167	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4				Model 5			
	B	Beta	S.E.	Sig.																
<b>Average NP's EU position in the EU (Y<sub>00</sub>)</b>	631	.509	.28	.000***	470	.504	.120	.000***	457	.500	.121	.000***	473	.499	.119	.000***	471	.497	.119	.000***
<b>Party-Level Variables</b>																				
Ideology (Y <sub>10</sub> )	.05	.13	.04	.134	.07	.17	.03	.028*	.07	.18	.04	.052†	.08	.20	.03	.013*	.07	.17	.04	.067†
L-R extremity (Y <sub>20</sub> )	-.65	-.90	.05	.000***	-.66	-.92	.05	.000***	-.67	-.92	.05	.000***	-.65	-.90	.05	.000***	-.66	-.91	.05	.000***
Size of party (Y <sub>40</sub> )	.01	.05	.02	.755	.01	.09	.02	.535	.00	.02	.02	.906	.01	.09	.02	.569	.01	.09	.02	.602
Gov't Participation (Y <sub>50</sub> )	-.01	-.00	.26	.966	-.02	-.01	.24	.940	-.01	-.00	.24	.975	-.00	-.00	.23	.998	.02	.01	.24	.925
<b>Country-Level Variables</b>																				
<b>Party System</b>																				
Fractionalization (Y <sub>01</sub> )					1.82	.19	1.09	.098†	2.03	.22	1.13	.075†	1.94	.21	1.08	.075†	2.12	.23	1.14	.064†
Polarization (Y <sub>02</sub> )					.07	.03	.15	.660	.07	.03	.16	.650	-.03	-.01	.22	.894	-.04	-.02	.23	.875
<b>Characteristics of the state</b>																				
East vs. West (Y <sub>03</sub> )					.36	-.16	.34	.297	.36	-.16	.34	.290	.49	-.22	.34	.154	.49	-.22	.34	.150
State size (Y <sub>04</sub> )					.00	.00	.13	.985	-.00	-.00	.13	.995	.09	.12	.13	.504	.10	.13	.13	.452
Immigration (Y <sub>05</sub> )					.03	.05	.10	.742	.03	.04	.10	.808	-.01	-.02	.10	.915	-.02	-.03	.10	.839
EU membership (Y <sub>06</sub> )					-.04	-.69	.01	.000***	-.04	-.67	.01	.000***	-.04	-.68	.01	.000***	-.04	-.67	.01	.000***
EU-subsidies (Y <sub>07</sub> )					-.08	-.16	.04	.023*	-.08	-.16	.04	.028*	-.09	-.18	.04	.013*	-.09	-.17	.04	.015*
GDP (Y <sub>08</sub> )					.46	.61	.14	.002***	.45	.59	.14	.002***	.43	.57	.14	.003***	.42	.56	.14	.003***
<b>Electorate</b>																				
Public opinion (Y <sub>09</sub> )					-.01	-.18	.01	.017*	-.01	-.17	.01	.027*	-.01	-.18	.01	.014*	-.01	-.18	.01	.015*
<b>Interaction Terms</b>																				
Fractionalization * L-R extremity (Y <sub>21</sub> )									.04	.01	.44	.920					.32	.05	.45	.474
Fractionalization * Party-size (Y <sub>41</sub> )									.12	.10	.16	.461					-.02	-.02	.19	.906
Polarization * L-R extremity (Y <sub>22</sub> )													-.27	-.16	.15	.085†	-.30	-.18	.16	.065†
Polarization * Party-size (Y <sub>42</sub> )													.05	.16	.03	.097†	.05	.17	.04	.147
<b>Variance</b>																				
Residual (σ <sup>2</sup> )																				
Intercept (τ <sub>00</sub> )																				
Wald Z																				
Slope of Ideology (τ <sub>11</sub> )																				
Slope of L-R extremity (τ <sub>22</sub> )																				
Slope of Party size (τ <sub>44</sub> )																				
Slope of Gov't participation (τ <sub>55</sub> )																				
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)																				
Intra-class Correlation (ICC)																				

DV: EU positions († p < .10. \*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001). Note: B (unstandardized coefficient), Beta (standardized coefficient), S.E. (Standard Error)

#### 5.4.1 MNP: Party-level variables

I found that while right/left ideology and ideological extremity are influential factors in the EU positions of minority nationalist parties, the impacts of party size and government participation lost statistical significance, unlike in the multilevel model analyses for all nationalist parties combined and for statewide nationalist parties. Moreover, characteristics of the state are found to matter more for minority nationalist parties than for statewide nationalist parties.

First, compared to the insignificant impact of the position on the left-right ideological spectrum of all nationalist parties combined on the EU positions, the association of the left-right ideological spectrum with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant when country-level variables are considered in Model 2 ( $B = .07, \beta = .17, p = .028$ ). While its impact attains statistical significance with 97.2% confidence when country-level variables are considered in Model 2, the association of party ideology with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is not significant in Model 1 ( $B = .05, \beta = .13, p = .134$ ). This means that controlling for country-level variables strengthens the impact of ideology for minority nationalist parties, like it does for statewide nationalist parties. Since the second model is superior, I can argue that more right-wing minority nationalist parties are more likely to be in favor of European integration when country-level variables are considered. This contrasts with the results for statewide nationalist parties, in which right-wing parties are more opposed to the EU. Taken together, the lack of significance of ideology for EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = .01, \beta = .03, p = .709$ ) is driven by both statewide nationalist parties' negative association with ideology ( $B = .19, \beta = -.46, p = .048$ ) and minority nationalist parties' positive association

with ideology ( $B = .07, \beta = .17, p = .028$ ). That is, different impacts in the different subsamples end up canceling each other out in the full sample.

Second, the association of ideological extremity with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and significant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = -.65, \beta = -.90, p = .000$ ; Model 2:  $B = -.66, \beta = -.92, p = .000$ ), indicating that minority nationalist parties that are ideologically more extreme on either right or left are also more likely to oppose European integration than more center minority nationalist parties. The significant impact of ideological extremity on the minority nationalist parties' EU positions is slightly intensified when country-level variables are considered. That is, country-level variables increased the negative impact of ideological extremity slightly. To sum up, the impact of ideological extremity on minority nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = -.66, \beta = -.92, p = .000$ ) is stronger than the impact of ideological extremity on statewide nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = -.40, \beta = -.55, p = .009$ ), and thus the negative impact of ideological extremity on nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = -.66, \beta = -.91, p = .000$ ) is driven by both statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. Furthermore, the influence of ideological extremity on minority nationalist parties' positions is bigger than the influence of the left-right ideological spectrum and in fact ideological extremity is found to be the most influential factor on EU positions—as is also the case for both statewide nationalist parties and all nationalist parties combined.

Third, the association of party size with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is positive but insignificant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = .01, \beta = .05, p = .755$ ; Model 2:  $B = .01, \beta = .09, p = .535$ ), indicating that party size is of no particular importance in minority nationalist parties' EU positions, unlike its significant impacts on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties. In short, the positive effect of party size on nationalist

parties' EU positions ( $B = .03, \beta = .22, p = .001$ ) is primarily driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .03, \beta = .22, p = .004$ ), but minority nationalist parties are of no great import ( $B = .01, \beta = .09, p = .535$ ).

Fourth, the association of government participation with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and insignificant in Models 1 and 2 (Model 1:  $B = -.01, \beta = .00, p = .966$ ; Model 2:  $B = -.02, \beta = .01, p = .940$ ), unlike its significant impacts on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties. Thus I argue that the positive effect of government participation on nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = .56, \beta = .18, p = .003$ ) is mainly driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .61, \beta = .20, p = .020$ ).

#### 5.4.2 MNP: Country-level variables

First, party system fractionalization matters differently for statewide nationalist parties versus minority nationalist parties. While party system fractionalization is negatively correlated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties when country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for, the MNP analysis shows a direct positive association between party system fractionalization and minority nationalist parties' EU positions at a 90.2% confidence level ( $B = 1.82, \beta = .19, p = .098$ ). That is, minority nationalist parties operating in highly fractionalized political systems are more likely to be in favor of European integration. While fractionalization has only a weak positive impact for minority nationalist parties, the interactive variables with fractionalization for minority nationalist parties do not add to our understanding. Putting things together, the negative direction of the impact of party system fractionalization on the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = -.99, \beta = -.11, p = .292$ ) seems to be driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = 1.21, \beta = -.13, p = .352$ ), not by minority nationalist parties ( $B = 1.82, \beta = .19, p = .098$ ).

Second, while party system polarization is positively and significantly correlated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, the association of party system polarization with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is very weak and insignificant ( $B = .07, \beta = .03, p = .660$ ). That is, party system polarization is of no particular importance in minority nationalist parties' EU positions, and the interactive variables with polarization for minority nationalist parties do not add to our understanding either. Minority nationalist parties that have relatively lower chances of winning national elections or of being in national office seem to be less sensitive to party competition systems. Taken together, the positive impact of party system polarization on the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = .26, \beta = .12, p = .110$ ) seems to be driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .55, \beta = .26, p = .037$ ), while its reduced impact and significance seem to be caused by minority nationalist parties ( $B = .07, \beta = .03, p = .660$ ).

Third, the association of East-West with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is not significant ( $B = .36, \beta = -.16, p = .297$ ), similar to its impacts in all nationalist parties combined and in statewide nationalist parties. In sum, the insignificant impact of the East-West divide on the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = .22, \beta = -.10, p = .521$ ) seems to mirror the insignificant impacts on statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .69, \beta = -.30, p = .185$ ) and on minority nationalist parties ( $B = .36, \beta = -.16, p = .297$ ).

Fourth, while state size is negatively but insignificantly correlated with the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined and of statewide nationalist parties, the MNP analysis shows no association between state size and minority nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = .00, \beta = .00, p = .985$ ), indicating that state size is of no particular importance in minority nationalist parties' EU positions. Taken together, the insignificant association of state size with the EU positions of

all nationalist parties combined ( $B = -.11, \beta = -.15, p = .307$ ) is mainly driven by the insignificant impact on statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .07, \beta = -.10, p = .661$ ), and minority nationalist parties seem to be of no particular importance ( $B = .00, \beta = .00, p = .985$ ).

Fifth, the associations of immigrant population with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and insignificant ( $B = .03, \beta = .05, p = .742$ ), like its impacts in all nationalist parties combined and in statewide nationalist parties. Putting things together, I could not find any significant results in regard to immigrant population, and the insignificant association of immigrant population with the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = .19, \beta = .27, p = .101$ ) is driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .19, \beta = .27, p = .315$ ), while its reduced impact and significance are caused by minority nationalist parties ( $B = .03, \beta = .05, p = .742$ ).

Sixth, I found that the association of length of EU membership with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is negative and significant at a 99.9 % confidence level ( $B = -.04, \beta = .69, p = .000$ ), while the association of length of EU membership with statewide nationalist parties is of no particular importance. This indicates that minority nationalist parties in a country that has been an EU member longer have more negative positions regarding European integration than minority nationalist parties in a country with a shorter EU membership. Putting things together, the negative and significant association of length of EU membership with the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = -.01, \beta = -.25, p = .069$ ) seems to be mainly driven by minority nationalist parties ( $B = -.04, \beta = -.69, p = .000$ ), while its reduced significance seems to be caused by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = .00, \beta = -.04, p = .855$ ).

Seventh, receiving EU subsidies is significantly negatively associated with the EU positions of minority nationalist parties ( $B = -.08, \beta = -.16, p = .023$ ), while the associations of

receiving EU subsidies with all nationalist parties combined and with statewide nationalist parties are not significant. This indicates that the more EU subsidies a state receives, the more negative EU positions minority nationalist parties in the state seem to have. Meanwhile, interactive variables for minority nationalist parties do not add to our understanding. Taken together, the insignificant association of EU subsidies with the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = -.06, \beta = -.12, p = .138$ ) seems to be mainly driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = -.07, \beta = -.14, p = .306$ ), despite its significant impact on minority nationalist parties' EU positions ( $B = -.08, \beta = -.16, p = .023$ ).

Eighth, while GDP is negatively correlated with the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties, the MNP analysis shows that GDP's association with minority nationalist parties' EU positions is positive and significant at a 99.8% confidence level ( $B = .46, \beta = .61, p = .002$ ), indicating that minority nationalist parties in a country where the economy is strong can be expected to have a more positive attitude toward European integration. While statewide nationalist parties in a wealthier state that usually spends more money for the EU than it receives from it are more likely to take more negative EU positions, minority nationalist parties are more likely to take more positive EU positions because they are able to use the EU for their local interests. While GDP is found to be significantly associated with the EU positions of both statewide and minority nationalist parties, its impact on the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined lacks statistical significance. Putting things together, the negative and insignificant association of GDP with the EU positions of all nationalist parties combined ( $B = -.16, \beta = -.21, p = .158$ ) seems to be driven by statewide nationalist parties ( $B = -.38, \beta = -.50, p = .060$ ), while its reduced impact and loss of significance seem to be caused by minority nationalist parties ( $B$

= .46,  $\beta = .61$ ,  $p = .002$ ). That is, GDP has different impacts in the different subsamples, and these differences could end up canceling each other out in the full sample.

Ninth, public opinion is negatively and significantly associated with the EU positions of minority nationalist parties ( $B = -.01$ ,  $\beta = -.18$ ,  $p = .017$ ), as in the cases of statewide nationalist parties. This indicates that minority nationalist parties in a state with more favorable public opinion toward the EU will have a more negative attitude toward European integration. I speculate that this is because minority nationalist parties may feel that their sovereignty or identities are intruded upon by European integration or they may want to differentiate themselves from other pro-EU parties that try to be congruent with their voters' EU positions as in the case of statewide nationalist parties for better electoral success. Taken together, while both statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties individually show negative significant effects for public opinion, this significance is not confirmed in the full sample, suggesting that the results are less than robust.

Tenth, as I mentioned above, the regional performance in GDP variable was not included in the multilevel analyses due to limited data and the scope of application of the data. With regard to regional performance in GDP, this predictor affects only minority nationalist parties. In order to determine if minority nationalist parties' EU positions are related to regional performance in GDP, I used bivariate correlation analysis to measure the relationship between regional performance in GDP over time and minority nationalist parties' EU positions. Due to difficulty collecting regional data, I focused on only four countries – Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the UK – that experienced peripheral mobilization by minority nationalist movements. For these cases combined, I found that there is a strong negative correlation between the two variables. Thus, hypothesis H11-a that minority nationalist parties in wealthy regions will have a more

positive attitude toward European integration is rejected because minority nationalist parties in wealthy regions have a more negative attitude toward European integration at the significance level of 0.01, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.570. However, there is a discrepancy between countries. While the Belgian and Italian minority nationalist parties in wealthy regions have a more negative attitude toward European integration, the Spanish minority nationalist parties in wealthy regions have a more positive attitude toward the EU. The correlations between regional performance in GDP and EU position were very strong for the Belgian and Italian minority nationalist parties, but weak for the Spanish minority nationalist parties. Meanwhile, I could not find any statistically significant correlation between regional performance in GDP and the UK minority nationalist parties' EU positions. Table 37 presents the results of the analysis.

Table 37. Relationship between EU position and regional performance in GDP

Bivariate Correlations	Regional performance in GDP				
	MNP_all	MNP_BE	MNP_ES	MNP_IT	MNP_UK
Pearson Correlation	-.570(**)	-.663(*)	.266(*)	-.757(**)	.099
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.037	.047	.004	.785
N	88	10	56	12	10

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). \*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

#### 5.4.3 MNP: Summary

I argue that Model 2 is superior to Model 1 and focus mainly on Model 2 to discuss the effects of all variables. My superior Model 2 shows that the most influential factor in the EU positions of minority nationalist parties is ideological extremity, followed by length of EU membership, GDP, fractionalization, public opinion, ideology, and EU subsidies. Two party-level variables and five country-level variables are found to affect minority nationalist parties'

EU positions when I look at the subsample of minority nationalist parties. Moreover, the interactive variables with party system characteristics do not add to our understanding for minority nationalist parties. In addition, neither fractionalization nor polarization is significant for minority nationalist parties at the significance level of 0.05. Political context matters differently for statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. Furthermore, while party system characteristics matter more for statewide nationalist parties than minority nationalist parties, characteristics of the state variables matter more for minority nationalist parties than for statewide nationalist parties. Length of EU membership, EU subsidies, GDP, and public opinion have significant effects on minority nationalist parties' EU positions. I speculate that minority nationalist parties that have to maintain a balanced relationship between the central government and the EU to achieve more interests because they have little influence over national politics respond sensitively to changes in the characteristics of the state. Finally, I note that some of the explanatory variables have different impacts in the different subsamples and these differences could end up canceling each other out in the full sample. In summary, party-level variables and some country-level variables matter for the EU positions of minority nationalist parties. I found that:

1. The more a minority nationalist party leans to the ideological right, the more likely it is that it will have a positive attitude toward European integration.
2. Ideologically extreme minority nationalist parties will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration. The impact of ideological extremity is bigger than the impact of the left-right ideological spectrum, and ideological extremity is the most influential factor.

3. Minority nationalist parties within highly fractionalized party systems will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.
4. Minority nationalist parties in a country with a longer EU membership will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration than minority nationalist parties in a country with a shorter EU membership.
5. Minority nationalist parties in a country that receives more EU subsidies will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration than minority nationalist parties in a country that receives less EU subsidies.
6. Minority nationalist parties in a country where the economy is strong will be more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration.
7. Minority nationalist parties in a country with more favorable public opinion toward the EU will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration than minority nationalist parties in a country with less favorable public opinion toward the EU.
8. Minority nationalist parties in wealthy regions will be more likely to have a negative attitude toward European integration. (I found this association by a separate bivariate correlation analysis).

## 5.5 SUMMARY

My first key finding is that party-level variables (left-right ideological spectrum, ideological extremity, party type, party size, and government participation) matter for the EU positions of nationalist parties more than other variables, but their EU positions are not just a function of party-level variables, but rather a combination of various components at party and country levels. Factors that affect positions toward the EU are different based on the type of

nationalist party. With regard to party-level variables, the results show that ideology is negatively associated with statewide nationalist parties, but positively associated with minority parties. While right-wing statewide nationalist parties that emphasize a traditional, nation-centered agenda are more likely to oppose European integration (which seeks a full single market, more free trade, etc.), right-wing minority nationalist parties that advocate sub-state autonomy are more likely to be in favor of European integration because it may favor their own interests and goals. Moreover, all kinds of extreme nationalist parties are more likely to have negative EU positions, and minority nationalist parties are more likely to have positive EU positions than statewide nationalist parties. In addition, larger nationalist parties are more likely to have positive EU positions, as are nationalist parties with government experience. Furthermore, party size and government variables matter more for statewide nationalist parties than minority nationalist parties.

My second key finding is that while political context matters, it matters differently for statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. First, party competition shapes nationalist parties' strategic considerations, and thus statewide nationalist parties with higher possibility of getting into the mainstream differ from minority nationalist parties in their strategic considerations for electoral success. While statewide nationalist parties are more likely to oppose European integration to differentiate themselves from other pro-EU mainstream parties within highly fractionalized party systems where more parties are competing for votes, statewide nationalist parties are more likely to be in favor of it in order to differentiate themselves from other anti-EU mainstream parties within highly polarized party systems where most parties locate themselves on the left/right extreme in order to be congruent with their increasingly dispersed voters. On the other hand, minority nationalist parties are more likely to cooperate with

mainstream parties to become a government coalition partner or to promote sub-state autonomy or interests within a highly fractionalized party system, and they are more likely to oppose European integration in order to be congruent with their dispersed voters within a highly polarized party system. Second, with the full sample, neither party system fractionalization nor party system polarization is significant at the significance level of 0.05; both are significant for statewide nationalist parties and neither are for minority nationalist parties. For statewide nationalist parties, party system fractionalization matters in terms of mediating the impact of party-level variables, and party system polarization matters in terms of both direct impact and mediating the impact of party-level variables. Meanwhile, party system fractionalization has only a weak impact for minority nationalist parties, and models with interactive effects do not perform as well as those excluding them. That is, I found that party system characteristics matter differently in statewide nationalist parties and all nationalist parties combined. Statewide nationalist parties that have relatively higher chances of winning national elections or of being in national office are more sensitive to party competition systems. Hence, different results for the political system characteristics variable for statewide nationalist parties versus minority nationalist parties confirm that it was helpful to look at statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties separately.

My third key finding is that country characteristics variables matter more for minority nationalist parties than for statewide nationalist parties, and some variables have a different impact for the two types of parties. For minority nationalist parties, length of EU membership and EU subsidies have a negative impact of EU position, while these variables don't matter for statewide nationalist parties. Public opinion has a negative impact for both types of parties, while East-West divide, state size and immigration do not affect EU positions of either type of

nationalist party. Finally, country GDP has a positive impact on minority nationalist parties' EU positions, but negative for statewide nationalist parties. While statewide nationalist parties are more sensitive to party competition systems, minority nationalist parties that have to maintain a balanced relationship between the central government and the EU to achieve more interests because they have little influence over national politics respond more sensitively to changes in the characteristics of the state. That is, national strength in the EU and the influence of statewide nationalist parties in their domestic political arena can lead to the use of different strategies between statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. On the other hand, for all nationalist parties combined, the public opinion variable does not matter; it is negatively related with both statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. The full-sample model is hiding effects in statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties. Therefore, I argue that the attitudes of nationalist parties cannot be fully understood if we lump together statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties.

From a strategic standpoint, nationalist parties are motivated by votes, office, and policy. These goals have driven nationalist parties' choices about EU positions. First, statewide nationalist parties that have a higher possibility of getting into the mainstream seem to epitomize vote- and office-seeking parties. They do not stick to their original EU positions but change their positions depending on changes in party-level or country-level variables. Statewide nationalist parties not only move towards the center for greater electoral gain, but they also move to the extreme to differentiate themselves from other parties in the eyes of the voters and attract more voters. That is, centripetal incentives and policy differentiation lead statewide nationalist parties to choose party positions toward the EU. Moreover, the positive association of party size with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions means that vote-seeking statewide nationalist parties

choose more positive EU positions strategically to attract as great a number of voters as possible. That is, the incentive of election gains leads statewide nationalist parties to choose more positive EU positions. In a similar vein, incumbent statewide nationalist parties are more likely to choose positive EU positions that will make it easier to form coalitions and thus win elections. This means that their aims to seek to hold power or keep incumbents drive the choice of statewide nationalist parties' EU positions.

Second, minority nationalist parties that are relatively small in terms of vote share seem to be motivated more by ideological concerns, desire to shape policy, and the positions of their rivals. While party size and government experience are of little importance to minority nationalist parties, ideological extremity is negatively associated with their EU positions. This means that in order to survive, minority nationalist parties tend to retain their own identity or unique policy-based ground in order to strengthen support from their staunch supporters or activists. Minority nationalist parties that do not get much attention from the media and public also try to get noticed by carving out a distinctive position and seek to distinguish themselves from their larger rivals by having a strong issue ownership for party growth. The fact that minority nationalist parties' EU positions change depending on length of EU membership, EU subsidies, GDP, and public opinion can also be understood in the context of party competition because reaction to country-level factors depends on response of their larger mainstream rivals. In short, votes, office, and policy are important drivers of nationalist party behavior, and political context in the form of fractionalization and polarization also matters in terms of a party's EU position. Both of these lend support to the idea that nationalist parties are behaving strategically when determining their EU position.

## CHAPTER 6

### CASE STUDIES

This chapter is composed of three case studies of nationalist parties whose EU positions changed over time. I used MSSD analysis to identify what factors lead to dissimilar EU positions when the cases appear rather similar in most regards. Six cases from five different countries are selected in total. Among a range of EU countries, the first case study is to compare a statewide nationalist party with a minority nationalist party within one country: Italy. Italy is selected first because it is one of the founding EU members, which allows us to start with a case in which all parties are used to being part of the EU and in which both statewide and minority nationalist parties exist. Comparing one Italian statewide nationalist party with one Italian minority nationalist party is expected to point out differences of party-level variables that cause dissimilar changes of EU positions while controlling for the same country-level variables.


The next case is to compare an Italian minority nationalist party with a UK minority nationalist party that has not changed its EU position over time (according to the CHES data). The UK is also a case in which both statewide and minority nationalist parties exist, and thus one of the UK's minority nationalist parties is selected in the same context to compare with the Italian minority nationalist party.

The last case is to compare an Italian statewide nationalist party with another Western statewide nationalist party and two Eastern European statewide nationalist parties, all of which show different types of change. An Austrian statewide nationalist party that has some similarity in party-level variables to MSI-AN is selected to point out differences in country-level variables

that cause the dissimilar changes of EU positions while controlling for similar party-level variables. In addition, two statewide nationalist parties in Hungary and Poland that share similarities in party-level variables with other Western statewide nationalist parties are selected in order to compare East with West.

### 6.1 CASE STUDY 1 - COMPARING A STATEWIDE NATIONALIST PARTY AND A MINORITY NATIONALIST PARTY WITHIN ONE COUNTRY

Figure 9. [LN vs. MSI-AN] Position toward European Integration, 1984-2014



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data

First, I will compare two Italian nationalist parties whose positions on European integration have changed in opposite directions: LN went from favor to oppose and MSI-AN went from oppose to favor (see Figure 9). I will examine party and party system factors while holding state-level factors constant. Furthermore, since LN is a minority nationalist party, while MSI-AN is a statewide nationalist party, I will also look at differences between minority and statewide nationalist parties.

### 6.1.1 Background information about the selected country: Italy

Italy is a peninsula located in Southern Europe and bordered by Austria, France, Slovenia, and Switzerland to the North. Italy contains two large Mediterranean islands, 68 smaller islands, and two tiny independent states, the Vatican and the Republic of San Marino. Italy is the EU's 4th most populous country with around 61 million people (about 12% of total EU population) and the 7th biggest EU country with an area of 302,073km<sup>2</sup>. The modern Italian nation-state was established in 1861 after consolidating different states of the Italian peninsula. The Italian monarchy was faced with poor economic performances, political corruption, dissatisfaction with the territorial settlement and economic distress after the First World War, and its struggle for several years brought about growing support for the fascists and resulted in a fascist-led government in 1922. After 85 years, the Italian monarchy was replaced by a democratic republic following a national referendum in 1946 after Fascist Italy's defeat in the Second World War. Italy joined NATO in 1949 and became a founding member of the EU. Italy enjoyed economic growth between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s but Italy was in an economic recession until the early 1980s due to political, economic and social problems. After that the recovery plan of 1983 led to rapidly re-growing economy and Italy became the 4th largest economy in Europe since the 1990s, behind Germany, the UK, and France (WDI 2014).

Italy is one of the core countries of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1951, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) created in 1957, and the European Economic Community (EEC) founded in 1957. These bodies led the way to the founding of the EU. Italy became a member of the border-free Schengen Area in 1990 and joined the euro-zone in 1999. Italy has 73 seats in the European Parliament. It attends the Council of the EU to determine the agenda of meetings in each policy area and has held the revolving

presidency of the Council 12 times between 1959 and 2014. Italy also sends representatives to the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and so on. Despite Italy's role in building a united Europe, negative public sentiment for the EU began to increase in the 1980s: according to the Eurobarometer data, 70% of the population considered EU membership a good thing in 1984 compared to 41% in 2014 (EC 1974-2013).

Since its first republican constitution came into force on January 1, 1948, Italy had a multiparty system with two dominant parties – the governing Christian Democracy (DC) and the main opposition Italian Communist Party (PCI) – and a number of small influential parties until the early 1990s. While Italian mainstream parties including DC, PCI and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) fell into ruin after the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) drive against political corruption in the early 1990s, support for Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI), MSI-AN and LN started to increase. Despite Italy's steady economic growth, the country's government lacked political stability due to the large number of minor parties and rival factions within parties. The administration changed 62 times between the Second World War and 2016. Italy has a bicameral system composed of two legislative chambers which share the same powers in the legislation-making process. The major features of Italy's electoral system are proportional representation and majority premium that guarantee the winning party or coalition a strong majority in parliament. In the early 1990s, Italy's nearly pure party-list proportional system that had remained in force by the electoral law of 1946 was being blamed for party fragmentation and government instability. As a result, the new electoral law of 1993 introduced a mixed electoral system that allocated 25% proportional seats and 75% plurality seats. Consequently, 232 upper chamber members out of 315 were elected in single-member districts, and 83 members were elected by

regional proportional representation with no electoral threshold. For the lower chamber, 475 members out of 630 were elected in single member districts by a first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting system and 155 were elected by proportional representation with blocked lists and a 4% threshold. This created incentives for a “two-block” system, with parties of the left joining together in one block and the right in another block. Governments then alternated between left block and right block. However, this process did not exclude small parties from parliament as intended; rather, small parties formed unstable coalitions. A new electoral law led by Berlusconi was adopted in 2005. This electoral system was based on party-list representation with diverse thresholds and was designed to encourage small parties to coalesce: the thresholds for the lower chamber are a minimum of 4% for a single party, 10% for a coalition, and 2% for parties in a coalition; the thresholds for the upper chamber are a minimum of 8% for a single party, 20% for coalition and 3% for parties in a coalition. Moreover, the winning coalition was guaranteed at least 55% of the lower chamber seats at the national level and the upper chamber seats at the regional level. However, the 2005 electoral law was not only criticized for having closed lists of candidates but also judged unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2013 for its unlimited bonuses. Thus, a 40% minimum threshold for bonus assignment has been established. Finally, another new electoral law was introduced in 2015, creating a two-round system based on open party-list proportional representation. This law will come into force on July 1, 2016.

On the other hand, Italian regions have been controlled by center-right or center-left coalitions since the mid-1990s. As Table 38 below shows, Italy is composed of 15 regions with legislative power only and 5 autonomous regions with legislative, administrative, and financial powers, each with its own elected parliament and regional government. By granting special

autonomy to regions with cultural, ethnic, or language peculiarities, the Italian government has tried to keep them from separating from Italy after the Second World War.

Table 38. Regions of Italy

Macro-Region	Region	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )		Population (thousands)		GDP PPP 2014 (EUR)		Status
North-East	Emilia Romagna	22,446	62,310	4,451	11,662	32,487	31,358	Ordinary
	Friuli Venezia Giulia	7,858		1,228		27,856		Autonomous
	Trentino-S.Tyrol	13,607		1,056		36,863		Autonomous
	Veneto	18,399		4,929		30,034		Ordinary
North-West	Aosta Valley	3,263	57,931	128	16,139	37,028	32,468	Autonomous
	Liguria	5,422		1,584		29,026		Ordinary
	Lombardy	23,861		10,001		35,044		Ordinary
	Piedmont	25,402		4,425		27,763		Ordinary
Center	Lazio	17,236	58,051	5,890	12,087	31,673	29,419	Ordinary
	Marche	9,366		1,550		25,247		Ordinary
	Tuscany	22,994		3,752		28,926		Ordinary
	Umbria	8,456		895		23,916		Ordinary
South	Abruzzo	10,763	73,224	1,332	14,150	23,122	17,509	Ordinary
	Apulia	19,358		4,083		16,919		Ordinary
	Basilicata	9,995		576		18,740		Ordinary
	Calabria	15,081		1,977		16,177		Ordinary
	Campania	13,590		5,869		16,822		Ordinary
	Molise	4,438		313		20,326		Ordinary
Islands	Sardinia	24,090	49,801	1,662	6,751	19,791	17,711	Autonomous
	Sicily	25,711		5,089		17,031		Autonomous

Source: I.Stat (<http://dati.istat.it>)

Italy has had a problem of economic disparities between the rich industrialized North and the poor agrarian South. In addition, immigration has become a social issue as the immigrant population has increased rapidly. According to the UN, the share of immigrants in the Italian population multiplied tenfold between 1960 and 2013, reaching 9.4% of the total population: compared with 459,553 foreign nationals in 1960, there were 5,721,457 as of 2013 (UN 2013).

Because the largest influx of immigrants comes from Africa, the Middle East, Bosnia, and Albania, Islam has become the second-most popular religion in Italy, a country with deep Roman Catholic roots. The low birthrate and rapidly aging population are also current social issues in the country.

#### 6.1.2 Comparing the two selected nationalist parties: LN vs. MSI-AN

LN was launched in 1989 as a political alliance and became a party in 1991. It was established by the efforts of Umberto Bossi to unite various regional parties of Northern Italy into one movement to seek autonomy or independence for Northern Italy. By exploiting grievances against the Italian government, Southern Italy, and illegal immigrants, LN achieved electoral successes in the 1990 regional elections and the 1992 general election and became an influential political actor in Italian politics.

In 1994, LN allied with Berlusconi's newly established FI and won 8.4% of the vote, joining Berlusconi's first cabinet with five ministers. However, the coalition government collapsed in December 1994 due to a split between Berlusconi and Bossi, and LN left the center-right coalition and joined the center-left governing coalition in 1995. In 1996, LN ran alone against two big coalitions and made an electoral breakthrough with 10.1% of the vote. With this election success, LN focused on the secession of Northern Italy rather than devolution, but it was hard to achieve its goal outside the two big coalitions. After suffering an election defeat with 4.5% of vote in the 1999 EP election, LN adjusted its goal from secession to devolution and rejoined Berlusconi's center-right coalition. The coalition won the 2000 regional elections and the 2001 general election, and thus LN was able to enter four regional governments in the North and Berlusconi's second cabinet with three ministers.

Between 2001 and 2006, LN contributed to the passage of constitutional reform relating to federalism. Nevertheless, the coalition's continuous poor performances in the 2003 and 2005 regional elections as well as the 2004 EP elections led Berlusconi to form a new government with the same allies. The coalition did not do well again in the 2006 general election and failed to remain in power. In 2007, Berlusconi's FI and Fini's AN launched the center-right PdL. LN allied with PdL for the 2008 general election and entered Berlusconi's fourth cabinet with four ministers after the election victory. LN influenced the government's policies associated with immigration and federation, and the fiscal federation bill was passed by both chambers in 2009.

In 2011, Berlusconi resigned and LN endured internal strife. In 2012, Bossi was forced to step down due to a corruption scandal and Roberto Maroni became federal secretary. Maroni's LN won only 4.1% of the vote in the 2013 general election and did not deliver good results in the 2013 regional elections in 7 regions. In late 2013, Matteo Salvini, who had been supportive of anti-Euro movements, became the leader of LN. He focused more on illegal immigration and anti-euro policies rather than Northern regional issues. Support for the Salvini-led LN in the 2015 regional elections in 7 regions increased greatly. Table 39 shows that LN revived in Northern Italy in 2015 against poor performances in the early 2010s. Not only did LN recover its huge influence in Northern Italy, but it began to attain influence in Central Italy as it shifted its focus away from the separatist movement in Northern Italy in favor of an anti-immigration and anti-euro platform.

Table 39. Italian Regional Election results (% of votes)

	1985	1990	1993	1995	1998	2000	2003	2005	2008	2010	2013	2014	2015	
Northwestern Italy	Piedmont	-	-	-	9.9	-	7.6	-	8.5	-	16.7	-	7.3	-
	Aosta Valley	-	-	7.6	-	3.4	-	9.4*	-	-	-	12.2**	-	-
	Liguria	-	-	-	6.5	-	4.3	-	4.7	-	10.2	-	-	20.3
	Lombardy	-	18.9	-	17.6	-	15.4	-	15.8	-	26.2	-	-	23.2
*with CdL; ** with SA														
Northeastern Italy	Trentino-S.Tyrol	-	-	9.6	-	4.7	-	6.2	-	14.7	-	6.2	-	-
	Veneto	3.7	5.9	-	16.7	-	12.0	-	14.7	-	35.2	-	-	40.9
	Friuli-Venezia Giulia	-	-	26.7	-	17.3	-	9.3	-	12.9	-	8.3	-	-
	Emilia-Romagna	-	2.9	-	3.4	-	3.3	-	4.8	-	13.7	-	19.4	-
Central Italy	Tuscany	-	-	-	0.7	-	0.6	-	1.3	-	6.5	-	-	16.2
	Umbria	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	4.3	-	-	14.0
	Marche	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.3	-	0.8	-	6.3	-	-	13.0
	Lazio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mezzogiorno	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

MSI is a neo-fascist party founded in 1946 by a number of people who supported Mussolini's Republican Fascist Party. Although it was illegal to support fascism under the postwar Italian constitution, MSI grew into an influential political actor through the 1970s and 1980s. Despite a radical faction within the party, MSI tried to revise its fascist doctrine to become less extreme in order not to be banned from entering normal Italian politics. With support from anti-Communist businessmen and landowners, MSI won 2.0% of the vote in the first general election in 1948. Its founder Giorgio Almirante was replaced by the less radical Augusto De Marsanich in 1950 due to Italy's entry into NATO, and under De Marsanich's leadership the MSI won 5.8% of the vote in 1953. He was succeeded by the more moderate Arturo Michelini in 1954 in an attempt to bring MSI more into the political mainstream, but his attempts to cooperate with the governing Christian Democracy (DC) faced both the radical faction's resistance within the party and widespread anti-fascist protests due to concerns over MSI's growing role in Italian politics. Michelini's MSI failed to gain more electoral success: 4.8% of the vote in 1958, 5.1% of the vote in 1963, and 4.5% of the vote in 1968.

After Michelini's death, Almirante regained the leadership in 1969. Almirante adopted a strategy to appeal to both conservative and radical directions within the party, and MSI became the fourth largest party in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, winning 8.7% of the vote in 1972, 6.1% in 1976, 5.3% in 1979, 6.8% in 1983, and 5.9% in 1987. Almirante's newly moderate approach helped MSI to gain credibility from mainstream parties. Taken as a whole, MSI's strategy of image rehabilitation since 1946 was successful to an extent. Almirante stepped down due to poor health in 1987, and the leadership passed to Gianfranco Fini. Although Fini's weak leadership was defeated by leftist Pino Rauti in 1990, Fini took his leadership back in 1991.

There were huge changes to Italian politics in the early 1990s. Widespread political corruption and judicial investigations into the corrupt system transformed Italian politics. Along with the demise of the four mainstream parties, the change of the electoral law in 1993, de-radicalization of Italian politics due to the end of the Cold War, and the reconsideration of fascism in Italian society, Fini began to gradually transform the neo-fascist MSI into the more moderate post-fascist conservative party. AN was launched in 1994 and joined Berlusconi's electoral alliance for Central and Southern regions to win the 1994 general election.

However, AN did not ally with Berlusconi's Northern alliance due to Berlusconi's relationship with LN. The coalition won a decisive victory and AN gained 13.5% of the vote. As a result, AN entered the Berlusconi government with five ministers. In 1996, AN-FI formed the center-right coalition without LN. Although individually AN received an unprecedented vote percentage of 15.7%, their coalition was defeated by the center-left coalition. After that, AN suggested neo-liberal policies and limited state intervention that were very different from AN's original support for a centralized state (National Alliance 1998). This radical change caused their votes to drop more in the 1999 EP election, and thus AN returned to its original center-right positions (National Alliance 2001). In 2001, AN-FI formed an electoral alliance for the 2001 general election with LN, which had become more flexible. The coalition won the election, and thus AN entered Berlusconi's government from 2001 until 2006.

In 2006, AN managed to increase its share of the vote to 12.3% even though Berlusconi's coalition did not win the election. In 2007, FI launched a new center-right federation of political parties, PdL. PdL ran in the 2008 general election in alliance with LN and AN and won 37.4% of the vote. In 2009, the federation transformed into a party, and AN was merged into PdL while LN showed no interest in being a part of it.

Table 40 presents a brief comparison between LN and MSI-AN:

Table 40. Comparison between Statewide and Minority Nationalist Parties in Italy

		LN	MSI-AN
Party Type		Minority Nationalist Party	Statewide Nationalist Party
Ideological Spectrum		7.2 (1992) → 7.22 (1996) → 7 (1999) → 7.71 (2002) → 8.71 (2006) → 8.56 (2010) → 8.86 (2014)	9.1 (1984) → 9.14 (1988) → 9.18 (1992) → 9.22 (1996) → 8.17 (1999) → 7.79 (2002) → 8 (2006) → 7.33 (2010)
Party Size	lower house (% seats)	8.6, 55/630 (1992) → 8.4, 117/630 (1994) → 10.8, 59/630 (1996) → 3.9, 30/630 (2001) → 4.6, 28/630 (2006) → 8.3, 60/630 (2008) → 4.1, 20/630 (2013)	2.0, 6/574 (1948) → 5.8, 29/590 (1953) → 4.8, 24/596 (1958) → 5.1, 27/630 (1963) → 4.5, 24/630 (1968) → 8.7, 56/630 (1972) → 6.1, 32/630 (1976) → 5.3, 30/630 (1979) → 6.8, 42/630 (1983) → 5.9, 35/630 (1987) → 5.4, 34/630 (1992) → 13.5, 109/630 (AN, 1994) → 15.7, 92/630 (1996) → 12.0, 99/630 (2001) → 12.3, 71/630 (2006) → 37.4, 276/630 (PdL, 2008) → 21.56, 98/630 (2013)
	EP elections (% seats)	1.8, 2/81 (1989) → 6.5, 6/87 (1994) → 4.5, 4/87 (1999) → 5.0, 4/78 (2004) → 10.2, 9/72 (2009) → 6.2, 5/73 (2014)	5.5, 4/81 (1979) → 6.5, 5/81 (1984) → 5.5, 4/81 (1989) → 12.5, 11/87 (AN, 1994) → 10.3, 9/87 (AN, 1999) → 11.5, 9/78 (AN, 2004) → 35.3, 29/72 (PdL, 2009)
Gov't Participation		1994 Berlusconi's 1 <sup>st</sup> Cabinet; 2001-2005 Berlusconi's 2 <sup>nd</sup> ; 2005-2006 Berlusconi's 3 <sup>rd</sup> ; 2008-2011 Berlusconi's 4 <sup>th</sup>	1994 Berlusconi's 1 <sup>st</sup> Cabinet; 2001-2005 Berlusconi's 2 <sup>nd</sup> ; 2005-2006 Berlusconi's 3 <sup>rd</sup> ; AN was merged into the PdL

### 6.1.3 EU positions of the selected nationalist parties and factors that affect the changes

While most mainstream parties show positive EU positions and no change in their EU positions over time since the mid-1980s (see Table 41), both Italian statewide and minority nationalist parties' EU positions have changed. The minority nationalist party LN's EU positions have changed from somewhat favorable to very critical. The CHES data, which are based on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly opposed to European integration, to 4 = neutral, to 7 = strongly in favor of European integration, show that LN's overall orientation toward European integration in 1984-2014 moved from 5.5 in 1984, to 5.80 in 1988, to 5.88 in 1992, to 6 in 1996, to 3.17 in 1999, to 2.31 in 2002, to 1.5 in 2006, to 2.67 in 2010, and to 1.14 in 2014. The

statewide nationalist party MSI-AN's EU positions moved in reverse to LN's from very critical to somewhat favorable: 1.63 in 1984, 1.63 in 1988, 1.88 in 1992, 2.25 in 1996, 3.67 in 1999, 4.31 in 2002, 4.75 in 2006, and 5.75 in 2010.

Table 41. Italian Political Parties, 1984-2014

	DC (1943-1994)				PCI-PDS (1943-1998)				PSI (1892-1994)				PLI (1922-1994)				DP (1978-1991)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	5.4	6.4	32.9	1983	1.6	5.8	29.9	1983	3.1	6.4	11.4	1983	5.9	6.6	2.9	1983	0.5	2.7	1.5	1983
1988	5.6	6.4	34.3	1987	1.1	6	26.6	1987	3.5	6.4	14.3	1987	6.3	6.6	2.1	1987	0.5	3	1.7	1987
1992	5.7	6.4	29.7	1992	1.7	6.3	16.1	1992	4.0	6.4	13.6	1992	6.6	6.6	2.9	1992	-	7	-	1992
1996	5.9	-	-	1994	1.7	6.5	20.4	1994	4.4	6.3	2.2	1994	7.0	5.5	-	1994	-	7	-	1994
1999	-	-	-	1996	3	6.7	21.1	1996	-	-	-	1996	-	-	-	1996	-	-	-	1996
2002	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001
2006	-	-	-	2006	-	-	-	2006	-	-	-	2006	-	-	-	2006	-	-	-	2006
2010	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008
2014	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013
	PPI (1994-2002)				DS (1998-2007)				PSDI-SDI (1947-2007)				CCD (1994-2002)				PRC (1991-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	-	5.6	-	1983	-	-	-	1983	5.4	6.1	4.9	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983
1988	-	5.6	2.5	1987	-	-	-	1987	5.2	6.1	3.0	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987
1992	-	5	2.8	1992	-	-	-	1992	4.9	6.1	2.7	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	2.4	5.6	1992
1996	-	5.1	2.7	1994	-	-	-	1994	4.7	6.3	0.5	1994	6	6	0	1994	-	2.1	6.0	1994
1999	3.8	5.3	2.5	1996	-	-	-	1996	4.5	6.2	-	1996	6	6	2.9	1996	0.6	3	8.5	1996
2002	-	-	2.2	2001	3.1	6.5	16.6	2001	-	-	-	2001	5.9	6.2	1.6	2001	1.9	3.5	5.0	2001
2006	2.3	5.9	2.1	2006	2.7	6.9	18.7	2006	3.9	6.4	1.5	2006	-	-	-	2006	1.3	3	5.8	2006
2010	1.8	5.9	3.0	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	0.6	3.3	3.1	2008
2014	-	-	2.2	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	0.3	2	2.2	2013
	AD-UD (1992-1999)				RETE (1991-1999)				DEM-DL (1999-2007)				UDC (2002-PRE)				RI (1996-2002)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983
1988	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987
1992	-	-	-	1992	-	4.7	1.9	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	-	-	1992
1996	5	4.5	5.8	1994	-	5	1.9	1994	-	-	-	1994	-	-	-	1994	-	-	-	1994
1999	5	5	1.7	1996	-	-	<sup>w</sup> PDS	1996	4.3	7	-	1996	-	-	-	1996	4.8	6.5	4.3	1996
2002	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001	3.9	6.5	14.5	2001	-	-	-	2001	5.2	5.9	1.2	2001
2006	-	-	-	2006	-	-	-	2006	4	7	<sup>w</sup> DS	2006	5.9	6.3	6.8	2006	-	-	-	2006
2010	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	2008	5.3	6.3	5.6	2008	-	-	-	2008
2014	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	2013	5.3	6.1	1.8	2013	-	-	-	2013

	PD (2007-PRE)				PR-PAN-LB-RAD				PRI (1895-PRE)				VERDI (1990-PRE)				IdV (1998-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	-	-	-	1983	2.3	6.3	2.2	1983	4.8	6.5	5.1	1983	-	5.6	-	1983	-	-	-	1983
1988	-	-	-	1987	2.3	6.4		1987	4.9	6.5	3.7	1987	-	5.6	2.5	1987	-	-	-	1987
1992	-	-	-	1992	-	6.3	1.2	1992	5.0	6.5	4.4	1992	-	5	2.8	1992	-	-	-	1992
1996	-	-	-	1994	-	5.8	3.5	1994	5.1	7	PS	1994	-	5.1	2.7	1994	-	-	-	1994
1999	-	-	-	1996	4.6	6.2	1.9	1996	5	5.8	<sup>w</sup> PPI	1996	3.8	5.3	2.5	1996	-	-	-	1996
2002	-	-	-	2001	-	-		2001	-	-	<sup>w</sup> FI	2001	-	-	2.2	2001	5	5	4.0	2001
2006	-	-	-	2006	3.8	6.5	2.6	2006	-	-	<sup>w</sup> FI	2006	2.3	5.9	2.1	2006	4.8	5.6	2.3	2006
2010	3.2	6.6	33.2	2008	-	-	<sup>w</sup> PD	2008	-	-	<sup>w</sup> PdL	2008	1.8	5.9	3.0	2008	4	6.1	4.4	2008
2014	3.6	6.6	25.4	2013	-	-	0.2	2013	-	-	0.0	2013	-	-	2.2	2013	-	-	2.3	2013
	MSI-AN (1946-2009)				LN (1991-PRE)				FI-PdL-FI (1994-PRE)				M5S (2009-PRE)				SVP (1945-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	9.1	1.6	6.8	1983	-	5.5	0.3	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	0.5	1983
1988	9.1	1.6	5.9	1987	-	5.8	1.4	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	0.5	1987
1992	9.2	1.9	5.4	1992	7.2	5.9	8.7	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	-	0.5	1992
1996	9.2	2.3	13.5	1994	7.2	6	8.4	1994	6.8	4	21.0	1994	-	-	-	1994	-	-	0.7	1994
1999	8.2	3.7	15.7	1996	7.0	3.2	10.1	1996	6.8	4.8	21.1	1996	-	-	-	1996	5.8	5	0.6	1996
2002	7.8	4.3	12.0	2001	7.7	2.3	3.9	2001	6.9	4.6	29.4	2001	-	-	-	2001	5.8	4.8	0.4	2001
2006	8	4.8	12.3	2006	8.7	1.5	4.6	2006	7.1	4.1	23.8	2006	-	-	-	2006	5	6.3	0.5	2006
2010	7.3	5.8	<sup>w</sup> PdL	2008	8.6	2.7	8.3	2008	7.6	4.7	37.4	2008	-	-	-	2008	5.8	6.4	0.4	2008
2014	-	-	<sup>w</sup> FI	2013	8.9	1.1	4.1	2013	6.7	3.4	21.6	2013	4.7	1.4	25.6	2013	5	5.7	0.4	2013

Note: Ideology (0= extreme left, 5=center, 10=extreme right); EU Position (1= strong oppose, 4=neutral, 7=strong favor)

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 1984-2014

To examine the differences between two nationalist parties in the same country with constant country-level factors, I take a close look at party-level factors.

First of all, LN and MSI-AN are ideologically at odds. While LN, as a minority nationalist party based on the Northern regions, has supported federalist libertarianism, anti-centralism and cultural diversity for a long time, MSI-AN has traditionally been strongly associated with national cohesion and national identity as well as support for a centralized state with a presidential form of government and statist policies. Nevertheless, these nationalist parties do not always adhere to their original ideological stances. The CHES data measure parties' overall ideological stance based on a ten-point scale ranging from 0 = extreme left" to "5 =

middle of the left/right ideological spectrum” and to “10 = extreme right.” According to the CHES data, LN’s ideological stance moved from center-right to far-right; MSI-AN’s ideological stance moved from far-right to center-right (see Table 39). That is, LN has shifted to the right end of the ideological spectrum, and MSI-AN has moved to the center-right on the ideological spectrum.

LN’s pro-European position in its early years is a reflection of its original support for a liberal economy and federalism and the increased opportunity structure to gain more influence through the EU. By contrast, MSI-AN’s very skeptical EU position in the early 1980s is a reflection of its focus on statism and centralism. A series of changes in the early 1990s, including the Tangentopoli political corruption scandal in 1992, the 1992-1996 nationwide Mani Pulite judicial investigations, the collapse of mainstream parties, the adoption of a majoritarian electoral voting system in 1993, the positive results of LN and MSI-AN and the left-wing’s victory in the 1993 municipal elections, and the foundation of FI in 1994, opened the possibility that minor and medium-sized parties like LN or MSI-AN could become mainstream and also encouraged political parties to form coalitions for survival or victory. LN and MSI-AN had to compromise their policies and stances to enter into electoral alliances in response to changes in political opportunities. Nonetheless, LN and MSI-AN joined two different Berlusconi coalitions in 1994 for ideological reasons.

After being part of the short-lived Berlusconi government in 1994, running alone outside the coalitions in 1996 and receiving a lower share of the vote in 1999, LN became more flexible about rejoining a coalition. In accordance with electoral law changes and its political influence in a national context, LN very pragmatically used anti-establishment, office-seeking, and distinctiveness strategies to achieve better electoral results and more political influence. Along

with these strategies, a change in the political opportunity structure affected LN's EU position. Italy's accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998 also caused LN to shift from a pro-European to an EU-skeptical position (Huyseune 2010). LN expressed its aversion toward the EU authorities that imposed their rules and the use of a single currency because the Northern regions were no longer able to enjoy an economic boom due to the devaluation of the Italian lira and because LN was no longer able to criticize the Italian government's inability to be accepted into the EMU (Huyseune 2010, 71). Compared with 10.8% of the vote in 1996, the party won only 3.9% of the vote in 2001. Faced with the problem of the party's survival, LN adopted an anti-immigration ideology instead of emphasizing secession and kept a very skeptical position on European integration during its five years in the Berlusconi government. In 2008, LN recovered its share of the vote to 8.3% and its EU-skeptical position changed from hard skeptical to soft skeptical to gain political influence and government responsibility in the fourth Berlusconi government. From 2007 until 2009, most center-right coalition member parties including AN merged into the biggest center-right party PdL, but LN did not join it.

When PdL was defeated in 2011, LN's EU position moved from soft skeptical to hard skeptical in order to differentiate it from other parties. LN's distinctiveness strategy at this time is in line with this description by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004:5): "parties that see themselves as peripheral to their party system ... may use Euro-skepticism as a means of emphasizing that position. In addition, it is probable that peripheral parties are able to take Euro-skeptic positions because outside government that is a relatively cost-free stance." In short, LN's EU position has changed along with its electoral performances (vote-maximization), government participation (office-seeking), and changes in the opportunity structure.

In comparison, despite its antagonism toward social minorities, immigration, and regional devolution, MSI-AN took a strongly pragmatic position toward the EU. Given the history of MSI, its most noticeable feature was its dilution of fascism in order to take part in normal Italian politics. In line with these efforts, AN tried to distance itself from fascism and join forces with FI as part of its office-seeking strategy. After AN saw the possibility of getting into the mainstream after its unprecedented electoral success in the 1993 local elections, it aimed to transform the neo-fascist MSI into the post-fascist AN and strengthened its newfound legitimacy and centrality as a moderate center-right conservative party under the first Berlusconi government in 1994.


In 1996, the center-right coalition without LN was defeated, but AN had its highest ever voting record of 15.7%. After that, AN began to accept neo-liberal policies and limited state intervention similar to FI's policies. In other words, AN revised its office-seeking direction from salvaging its image to entrenching its leading position within the center-right coalition, and so it adopted a compromising strategy for both domestic and European issues. AN supported both statist policies and economic liberalization and tried to avoid controversial issues (Fella and Ruzza 2007, 217). For example, although AN opposed illegal immigration, it did not use "ethno-populist frames" (Fella and Ruzza 2006, 195). It also did not take open and clear EU positions, but supported Italy's inclusion in the EMU in 1998. That is, AN's traditional stance of strongly opposing European integration due to the fear of losing national autonomy until the mid-1990s became more moderate. After the 1999 EP election, the party showed little sign of returning to its original support for state-centralism and presidentialism; AN accepted federalism in order to make an alliance with LN in 2001. Its EU position has gradually solidified into a compromising pro-European stance since the late 1990s. In short, AN's EU position and ideology have been

both shifted in light of its office-seeking goals and party competition within a big electoral coalition.

After taking all into consideration, party size and ideological extremity played key roles in making different types of change in the two nationalist parties' EU positions. The changed Italian electoral system pressured political parties to build electoral coalitions to win or to survive. MSI-AN transformed from MSI into AN to play the role of conservative coalition partner in the Berlusconi government despite internal opposition. Joining the center-right coalition helped MSI-AN burnish its image, return to normal Italian politics, and increase its share of the vote. Thus the party took a strategy for becoming influential inside the coalition to increase their share of the vote. In this process, its extreme policies and ideology were adjusted and moderated, and their strongly negative EU positions moved to positive for the purposes of vote maximization and office-seeking. On the other hand, LN also participated in Berlusconi's government, but since LN tended to lose ground in terms of vote share by adjusting their policies to be in the coalition, the party has taken a strategy to keep its establishment image and opposition position even in governing coalitions. Because LN can get a larger share of the vote when it endorses more extreme policies, the party has moved to the political extreme. In this process, its positive EU position became more negative. In other words, both parties showed changes in their ideological stances when they were faced with electoral defeat, and their EU positions changed along with the changes in party ideologies. Hence, their different types of change in EU positions are strongly affected by their share of the vote (party size) and ideological stances.

## 6.2 CASE STUDY 2 - COMPARING TWO MINORITY NATIONALIST PARTIES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Figure 10. [WEST - LN vs. SNP] Position toward European Integration, 1984-2014



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data

I will compare the EU positions of two minority nationalist parties in different countries in Western Europe: the Italian LN, which went from favor to oppose, and the UK's SNP, which did not change greatly, as shown in Figure 10. This allows me to discuss how state-level factors may matter (Italy vs. the UK).

### 6.2.1 Background information about the selected countries: Italy and the UK

The information about Italy was explained above. On the other hand, the UK, located in Northwestern Europe, is an island made up of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The UK is the EU's third most populous country with around 64.6 million people (about 12.7% of total EU population) and the eighth biggest EU country with an area of 243,121km<sup>2</sup>. The Kingdom of England annexed Wales in 1535 and then united with Scotland to form the kingdom of Great Britain in 1707. Ireland joined the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, but the Southern Catholic parts of Ireland separated from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1922 after the Irish War of Independence. The new United Kingdom included the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Northern Protestant parts of Ireland. As Table 42 shows, England, which is the largest country of the United Kingdom, has dominated the UK for a very long time. The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly were established in 1999.

Table 42. Countries of the UK

	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )		Population 2014 (millions)		GDP 2013 (millions €)		GDP PPP 2013 (€)	Legislature (Devolution)	Constituencies
England	130,279	53.6%	54.3	84.2%	1,750,016	86.7%	32,228.66	-	533
Scotland	77,933	32.1%	5.3	8.2%	154,884	7.7%	29,222.40	Scottish Parliament (11/19/1998)	59
Wales	20,779	8.5%	3.1	4.8%	68,862	3.4%	22,213.55	NA for Wales (07/31/1998)	40
N. Ireland	14,130	5.8%	1.8	2.8%	43,432	2.2%	24,128.89	N. Ireland Assembly (11/19/1998)	18
The UK	243,121	100%	64.6	100%	2,017,194	100%	31,225.91	UK Parliament	650

Source: Office for National Statistics; Eurostat

After the Second World War, the UK joined the UN in 1945 and NATO in 1949. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK still played a significant role in international relations, but it was no longer a superpower. The UK joined the EU in 1973, but it is not a member of the euro-zone nor of the Schengen Area. The UK has 73 seats in the European Parliament. It attends the Council of the EU and has held the revolving presidency of the Council 5 times between 1977 and 2005. The UK also sends representatives to the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and so on. Public sentiment for the EU has gradually deteriorated, and a referendum on the UK's membership in the EU is expected on 23 June 2016 (EC 1974-2013). Since the early 2010s, along with the UK's withdrawal from the EU and regional independence issues, immigration is regarded as one of the biggest issues facing the country. According to the UN, the share of

immigrants in the UK population multiplied 4.7 times between 1960 and 2013, reaching 12.4% of the total population: compared with 1,661,888 foreign nationals resident in 1960, there were 7,824,131 foreign nationals resident in the UK as of 2013 (UN 2013).

Following the end of the Second World War, the UK had rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, but its economy was in recession throughout the 1970s because of labor disputes and poor economic performance. Starting in 1979, the Thatcher government pushed for privatization, tax cuts, and union reforms. The UK's economy stabilized as a result of Thatcher's neo-liberal drive during the 1980s, and the UK reported its highest economic growth rates in the late 1980s. GDP Annual Growth Rate in the UK averaged about 6% at that time. As of 2014, the UK has the second largest economy in the EU with an estimated GDP of about 2,989 trillion US dollars (WDI 2014).

Since a constitutional monarchy that transfers much of the monarch's real power to the executive was formed in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the UK's multi-party system has been dominated by two main parties: the Conservative Party (CONS) and the Liberal Party (LIB) before the 1920s, and CONS and the Labor Party (LAB) since the 1920s. The two-party (CONS-LAB) dominant system remained stable until the 1960s, but the decline of the UK's economy starting in the late 1960s brought about the re-emergence of support for LIB. Support for CONS and LAB has continued to fall since then.<sup>14</sup> The UK's bicameral parliamentary system has 650 constituencies: 533 in England, 59 in Scotland, 40 in Wales, and 18 in Northern Ireland. The 650 members in the lower chamber who represent each constituency are directly elected by

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<sup>14</sup>

(%)	1959	1964	1966	1970	1974	1979	1983	1987	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010	2015
CONS	49.4	43.4	41.9	46.4	35.8	43.9	42.4	42.2	41.9	30.7	31.7	32.4	36.1	36.9
LAB	43.8	44.1	48.0	43.1	39.3	36.9	27.6	30.8	34.4	43.2	40.7	35.2	29.0	30.4
SUM	93.2	87.5	89.9	89.5	75.1	80.8	70.0	73.0	76.3	73.9	72.4	67.6	65.1	67.3

a FPTP voting system, and most members of the upper chamber are appointed. The UK's upper chamber is larger than its lower chamber and the number of members is not fixed. The UK's single member plurality (SMP) voting system has produced single-party majority governments alternating between CONS and LAB. This system has been presumed to be of great advantage to the two major parties because voters tend to prevent dead votes, thus electoral system reform has been suggested by other parties such as the Liberal Democrats (LibDem). In the 2010 general election, CONS failed to achieve an overall majority and began coalition talks with LibDem. As a result, a CONS-LibDem coalition government was formed on condition that the government would hold a referendum on electoral system reform. The coalition government of 2010-2015 was the first since 1945. Based on the coalition agreement, the referendum took place in 2011, but the newly proposed alternative vote (AV) method was rejected by the electorate. In 2015, CONS won an outright majority and the coalition ended following the election. The main parties of the UK are CONS, LAB, UKIP, LibDem, and SNP as of 2016. UKIP's electoral breakthroughs in the early 2010s are noteworthy.

Both Italy and the UK have bicameral parliamentary systems. While Italy's two chambers have equal powers and are elected by universal suffrage, the UK's upper chamber has delaying power only and thus it is not equal to the lower chamber voted for by the public. While Italy's president is appointed by the Italian parliament and regional representatives, the UK's Prime Minister is appointed by the monarch of the UK. Since both countries have multiparty systems, their overall levels of fractionalization are similar. While both have high levels of fractionalization in the opposition parties, the UK, where coalition government is rare, has very low (0 or closer to 0) levels of fractionalization in the government parties, while Italy, whose governments are always coalitions, has high levels of fractionalization of government parties.

The party system polarization levels of both countries in the 2010s show that their elections became more competitive, but they both have had elections that were not or less competitive or in which the executive had an absolute majority in the legislature. Italy's territory is 1.24 times bigger than the UK's, but the UK's population is 1.04 times larger than Italy's. Compared to 1960, the immigrant population in the UK grew 4.7 times and 12.5 times in Italy in 2013; nevertheless, the immigrant population as a percent of population in the UK is still higher than in Italy. UK citizens are relatively much more EU-skeptical than Italians, and in both countries public opinion about the EU appears to be getting worse. The UK is 1.4 times higher than Italy in GDP and 1.3 times higher than Italy in purchasing power parity. Both countries with similar economic and country size contribute to the EU more than they receive. While Italy has joined both the euro-zone and the Schengen Area, the UK has its own currency and is not a Schengen member.

Table 43 presents a brief comparison between Italy and the UK:

Table 43. Country Comparison: Italy vs. the UK

	Italy				The UK			
Voting systems	Lower (630; Semi-PR; 2% threshold for parties in coalition; 4% for free parties; 10% for coalitions); Upper (315; Semi-PR; 3% threshold for parties in coalition; 8% for free parties; 20% for coalitions); 2005-16: majority bonus system				Lower (650; First-past-the-post; 5 years)			
Political system	75-15: Parliamentary (bicameral), multi-party system; Devolved; Republic; President (appointed by Parliament; 7yrs); Prime Minister (appointed by president)				75-15: Parliamentary system (bicameral); federate & devolved; Constitutional monarchy; Queen; Prime Minister (appointed by monarch of the UK)			
East vs. West	WEST				WEST			
Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	IT (302,073)				UK (243,610)			
Population (Thousands)	1960: 49,511 1965: 51,481 1970: 53,359	1975: 55,164 1980: 56,307 1985: 56,883	1990: 56,998 1990: 57,207 2000: 57,116	2005: 58,645 2010: 60,098 2013: 60,990	1960: 52,372 1965: 54,350 1970: 55,663	1975: 56,226 1980: 56,314 1985: 56,554	1990: 57,237 1995: 58,042 2000: 58,907	2005: 60,261 2010: 61,899 2013: 63,136
Immigration (Thousands)	1960: 456 1965: 630 1970: 863	1975: 1,006 1980: 1,109 1985: 1,253	1990: 1,428 1995: 1,723 2000: 2,121	2005: 3,068 2010: 4,463 2013: 5,721	1960: 1,662 1965: 2,542 1970: 2,946	1975: 3,148 1980: 3,357 1985: 3,536	1990: 3,716 1995: 4,191 2000: 4,790	2005: 5,838 2010: 6,452 2013: 7,824
Immigrants as % of Pop.	1960: 0.9 1965: 1.2 1970: 1.6	1975: 1.8 1980: 2.0 1985: 2.2	1990: 2.5 1995: 3.0 2000: 3.7	2005: 5.2 2010: 7.4 2013: 9.4	1960: 3.2 1965: 4.7 1970: 5.3	1975: 5.6 1980: 6.0 1985: 6.3	1990: 6.5 1995: 7.2 2000: 8.1	2005: 9.7 2010: 10.4 2013: 12.4

EU-member	EU Accession (1958), euro-zone (1999), Schengen (1997)					EU Accession (1973), No euro-zone, No Schengen				
Leg./ Exec.	75-15: competitively elected legislature & executives					75-15: competitively elected legislature & executives				
Plurality	75-93: NO		94-15: YES (FPTP)			75-15: YES (FPTP)				
PR	75-15: propositional representation					75-15: Not a propositional representation				
HouseSys*	Which electoral rule governs the election of the majority of House seats?									
	75-93: Proportional		94-05: Plurality		06-15: Proportional	75-15: Plurality				
Threshold	Single party (4%), Parties in coalitions (2%), Coalitions (10%)					-				
Largest Gov't Party (name, ideology, vote)	75-76: DC (center) 38.7%		95-96: PdL (right) 42.8%			75-79: Lab (left) 39.3%		98-01: Lab (left) 43.2%		
	77-79: DC (center) 38.7%		97-01: Olive (center) 45.4%			80-83: Cons (right) 43.9%		02-05: Lab (left) 40.7%		
	80-83: DC (center) 38.3%		02-06: CdL (right) 45.4%			84-87: Cons (right) 42.4%		06-10: Lab (left) 35.2%		
	84-87: DC (center) 32.9%		07-08: Olive (left) 49.8%			88-92: Cons (right) 42.2%		11-15: Cons (right) 36.1%		
	88-92: DC (center) 34.3%		09-13: PdL(right) 46.8%			93-97: Cons (right) 41.9%				
	93-94: DC (center) 29.7%		14-15: PD (C-L) 27.4%							
Gov't Parties (#, name)	75-76: 2 (DC, PRI)		94-94: 3 (DC, PSI, PRI)			75-77: 1 (Lab)		93-97: 1 (Cons)		
	77-79: 1 (DC)		95-96: 1 (PdL)			78-78: 2 (Lab, Lib)		98-01: 1 (Lab)		
	80-80: 3 (DC, PSDI, PLI)		97-01: 1 (Olive Tree)			79-79: 1 (Lab)		02-05: 1 (Lab)		
	81-83: 3 (DC, PSI, PSDI)		02-06: 1 (CdL)			80-83: 1 (Cons)		06-10: 1 (Lab)		
	84-90: 3 (DC, PSI, PLI)		07-08: 1 (Olive Tree)			84-87: 1 (Cons)		11-15: 2 (Cons, LibDem)		
	91-92: 3 (DC, PSI, PRI)		09-13: 3 (PdL, LN, MPA)			88-92: 1 (Cons)				
	93-93: 3 (DC, PSI, PSDI)		14-15: 3 (PD, SEL, CD)							
Opp. Parties (#, name)	75-76: 1 (PCI)		94-94: 6 (PDS, MSI, Green +)			75-77: 6 (Cons, Lib, +4)		93-97: 6 (Lab, LibDem, +4)		
	77-80: 9-10 (PCI, PSI, MSI +)		95-96: 4 (AdP, PpL +)			78-78: 5 (Cons, Scot, +3)		98-01: 9 (Cons, LibDem, +7)		
	81-87: 6-8 (PCI, MSI, RAD +)		97-01: 3 (PpIL, LN, RC)			79-79: 6 (Cons, Lib, +4)		02-05: 8 (Cons, LibDem, +6)		
	88-90: 9 (PCI, MSI, PRI +)		02-06: 5 (Olive Tree, PRC +)			80-83: 7 (Lab, Lib, +5)		06-10: 11 (Cons, LibDem, +9)		
	91-91: 6 (PCI, MSI, Green +)		07-08: 1 (CdL)			84-87: 9 (Lab, LibDem, +7)		11-15: 16 (Lab, DUP, +14)		
	92-92: 6 (PDS, MSI, Green +)		09-13: 2 (PD, IdV)			88-92: 7 (Lab, LibDem, +5)				
	93-93: 7 (PDS, MSI, PRI +)		14-15: 6 (PdL, LN, FdI)							
FRAC	1984: 0.75	1992: 0.76	1999: -	2006: 0.51	2014: 0.68	1984: 0.52	1992: 0.54	1999: 0.53	2006: 0.59	2014: 0.62
	1988: 0.76	1996: 0.54	2002: 0.51	2010: 0.68		1988: 0.54	1996: 0.56	2002: 0.54	2010: 0.59	
POLARIZ	1984: 2.48	1992: 2.58	1999: 1.97	2006: 2.09	2014: 2.25	1984: 1.69	1992: 1.55	1999: 1.75	2006: 1.85	2014: 2.37
	1988: 2.57	1996: 2.50	2002: 1.69	2010: 2.55		1988: 1.59	1996: 1.62	2002: 0.52	2010: 2.63	
Public Opinion (%)	1984: 70	1992: 76	1999: 62	2006: 56	2014: 41	1984: 34	1992: 54	1999: 31	2006: 42	2014: 26
	1988: 73	1996: 69	2002: 69	2010: 48		1988: 37	1996: 41	2002: 31	2010: 29	
EU-ESIF (€)	96: 3,160m		02: 4,069m		10: 4,600m	96: 1,516m		02: 2,234m		10: 1,686m
	99: 3,160m		06: 4,069m		14: 6,110m	99: 1,516m		06: 2,234m		14: 2,345m
	EU spending 10,695m / Contribution to the EU 14,368m					EU spending 6,985m / Contribution to the EU 11,342m				
GDP (Million \$)	1984: 436,602		1996: 1,309,407		2006: 1,943,530	1984: 461,487		1996: 1,306,576		2006: 2,588,077
	1988: 888,992		1999: 1,249,057		2010: 2,126,748	1988: 910,123		1999: 1,565,409		2010: 2,403,504
	1992: 1,316,286		2002: 1,267,043		2014: 2,141,161	1992: 1,179,660		2002: 1,680,256		2014: 2,988,893
GDP PPP (\$)	1984: 7,717		1996: 23,029		2006: 33,426	1984: 8,179		1996: 22,463		2006: 42,534
	1988: 15,698		1999: 21,946		2010: 35,878	1988: 15,987		1999: 26,676		2010: 38,293
	1992: 23,175		2002: 22,206		2014: 34,909	1992: 20,487		2002: 28,301		2014: 46,332

Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2015

## 6.2.2 Comparing the two selected nationalist parties: LN vs. SNP

After Elizabeth I died without an heir in 1603, King James VI of Scotland succeeded to the throne of England and worked to unify Celtic Scotland and Anglo-Saxon England. Supported by his integration policies, the two different countries merged into the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707. However, after being merged, Scotland and England maintained separate legal, educational, and religious systems, and Scots have kept a Scottish culture and national identity. Scottish nationalistic sentiments erupted occasionally, but more serious efforts for a separate political organization for Scottish home rule only began in the 1920s and 1930s.

SNP was formed in 1934 to establish an autonomous Scottish political system by the amalgamation of the center-left nationalist National Party of Scotland (NPS, founded in 1928) and the center-right nationalist Scottish Party (founded in 1932). After 1945, people began to doubt British control of Scottish affairs as a result of the Second World War and to demand a Scottish Parliament. Along with ethnic differences, culturally and politically different historical background, and criticism of British role, the relatively backward economy in Scotland caused by the destruction of industrial bases during the Second World War began to catalyze a surge in Scottish nationalism. Nonetheless, SNP had little power in Scottish politics until the late 1950s. It won 1.1% of Scottish votes in the 1935 UK general election, 1.3% in 1945, 0.4% in 1950, 0.3% in 1951, 0.5% in 1955, and 0.8% in 1959.

During the 1960s, SNP began to be moderately more popular, winning 2.4% of Scottish votes in the 1964 UK general election and 5.0% in 1966. SNP's competitiveness was totally changed in 1969, when oil was discovered in the northern North Sea east of Shetland in Scotland. SNP's "Scotland's Oil" strategy of arguing that oil and gas reserves discovered in Scotland's territorial waters should aid the Scottish economy appealed deeply to Scots (Deacon 2012, 112-

113). Public discussion about devolution and Scottish nationalism rose significantly in the 1970s, and SNP in Scotland achieved electoral successes in the UK general elections, winning 11.4% of Scottish votes in 1970, 21.9% in February 1974, and 30.4% in October 1974.

In an atmosphere of growing support for Scottish independence, the Scotland Act was introduced in 1978 to create a devolved Scottish parliament. However, it failed to gain sufficient support in the first Scottish referendum of 1979, and SNP also experienced a large drop in its support in the following 1979 general election. In 1979 the Conservatives came to power, and Thatcher became Prime Minister of the UK. Thatcher's strong drive for neoliberal policies and her opposition to legislative devolution led SNP to fall on hard times. Although SNP in Scotland did not perform well in the UK general elections during the 1980s (11.8% of Scottish votes in 1983 and 14.1% in 1987), the party began to gain enough support to become the main opposition in Scottish local elections and EP elections since the mid-1980s.

In 1990, Alex Salmond became the leader of SNP. Under Salmond's leadership, SNP was successful in winning 21.5% of Scottish votes in the 1992 UK general election and came in second with 22.1% of Scottish votes in the 1997 UK general election. In 1997, the Labor government, which had pledged to hold devolution referendums for Scotland and Wales, was elected, and thus the second Scottish devolution referendum was held in the same year. Its victory led to passing the Scotland Act 1998 and to creating the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive in 1999. The first Scottish parliamentary election was held in May 1999.

In 2000, Salmond stood down and returned to Westminster. He was replaced by John Swinney. Under Swinney, SNP fell: although it remained the main opposition party in Scotland, its share of the vote fell in the 2003 Scottish elections by 6.4% points and in the 2004 EP elections by 7.5% points. After Swinney resigned, Salmond got his leadership back in 2004 on a

joint ticket with Deputy Nicola Sturgeon. Right after he was re-elected, SNP won 17.7% of Scottish votes in the 2005 UK general election, along with 27.9% in the 2007 Scottish election and 29.1% in the 2009 EP elections. In 2007, SNP formed a minority government for the first time in Scotland and Salmond became the first nationalist to hold the position of minister of Scotland. In 2010, Salmond faced criticism for his close links with big business amid a global economic meltdown, and thus SNP did not achieve its hope of increasing the number of SNP members of UK parliament; it took 19.9% of Scottish votes although it advanced to second place. More impressively, SNP won a majority in the 2011 Scottish election by appealing to Scottish nationalism, forming Scotland's first majority government. Salmond became the first minister for the second time. As he had pledged, SNP held the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, but independence was rejected and Salmond resigned in response to the defeat. Following his resignation, Sturgeon became the party leader and was elected as first minister of Scotland. SNP won a landslide victory in Scotland in the 2015 UK general election. SNP won 50.0% of Scottish votes and gained 56 seats out of Scotland's 59 seats at Westminster.

As Western European minority nationalist parties, the UK's SNP and the Italian LN aim to achieve increased decentralization and greater powers for regional authorities. SNP was formed in 1934, and LN was founded in 1989. While the SNP's nationalist movement has been based on a distinctive cultural and historical identity, LN's main focus is on economic issues, and LN has expressed its need for devolved power and fiscal federalism. While SNP had little political influence for a long time due to long-standing strong competitors in Scotland, LN has had a very strong presence in northern Italy from its foundation due to relatively weak rivals.

According to the CHES data, SNP has been located on the center-left of the ideological spectrum since 1984, and LN is located from the center-right to the extreme right of the

ideological spectrum. Their ideological locations seem to be related to the relative economic situation of the regions they represent: Scotland has a relatively weak economy within the UK, while Northern Italy is relatively well-off within Italy. Both parties have moderated their goals: SNP's strategy was to accept devolution in the short run to attract more voters although their long-term goal is still independence, and LN's strategy moved from secession to federalism so that it could join the electoral coalition. In addition, while LN has affected policy decisions by entering the central coalition governments, SNP only runs in Scotland and did not win more than 2% of national votes until 2014. That is, SNP has had little influence on UK politics despite its recent political success in Scotland.

Table 44 presents a brief comparison between LN and SNP:

Table 44. Comparison of Minority Nationalist Parties in Italy and the UK

		LN			SNP			
Party Type		Minority Nationalist Party			Minority Nationalist Party			
Ideological Spectrum		1992: 7.2 1996: 7.22 1999: 7	2002: 7.71 2006: 8.71 2010: 8.56	2014: 8.86	1984: 4.40 1988: 4.19 1992: 3.99	1996: 3.78 1999: 3.42 2002: 3	2006: 3.89 2010: 3.33 2014: 3	
Party Size	lower house (% , seats)	1992: 8.6, 55/630 1994: 8.4, 117/630 1996: 10.8, 59/630 2001: 3.9, 30/630 2006: 4.6, 28/630 2008: 8.3, 60/630 2013: 4.1, 20/630			1935: SCT (1.1), 071 1945: SCT (1.2), 071 1950: SCT (0.4), 071 1951: SCT (0.3), 071 1955: SCT (0.5), 071 1959: SCT (0.5), 071 1964: SCT (2.4), 071 1966: SCT (5.0), 071 1970: SCT (11.4), 171 1974.2: SCT (21.9), 771		1974.10: SCT (30.4), 11/71 1979: SCT (17.3), 271 1983: UK (1.1), SCT (11.7), 272 1987: UK (1.3), SCT (14.0), 372 1992: UK (1.9), SCT (21.5), 372 1997: UK (2.0), SCT (22.1), 672 2001: UK (1.8), SCT (20.1), 572 2005: UK (1.5), SCT (17.7), 659 2010: UK (1.7), SCT (19.9), 659 2015: UK (4.7), SCT (50.0), 5659	
	EP elections (% , seats)	1989: 1.8, 2/81 1994: 6.5, 6/87 1999: 4.5, 4/87	2004: 5.0, 4/78 2009: 10.2, 9/72 2014: 6.2, 5/73		1979: UK (1.9), SCT (19.4), 18 1984: UK (1.7), SCT (17.8), 18 1989: UK (2.6), SCT (25.6), 18 1994: UK (3.0), SCT (32.6), 28		1999: UK (2.7), SCT (27.2), 28 2004: UK (1.4), SCT (19.7), 27 2009: UK (2.1), SCT (29.1), 26 2014: UK (2.4), SCT (29.0), 26	
Gov't Participation		1994; 2001-2005; 2005-2006; 2008-2011			2007-2011 Scottish Minority Gov't; 2011-PRE Scottish Majority Gov't			

### 6.2.3 EU positions of the selected nationalist parties and factors that affect the changes

From its beginning until the 1960s, SNP seems to have been goal-oriented and to have adopted a policy-seeking strategy. It was a pragmatic, moderate party with both right and left divisions. Ideology did not really matter to SNP; Scotland's national movement appears to have been more important. There seem to have been disagreements about whether to focus on electoral politics or wider cultural aims. With the decline of heavy industries during the late 1960s, SNP's Scotland-specific economic policy strategies contributed to increasing its popularity although Scotland's strong dependence on UK finances limited SNP's nationalist movement (Criddle 1978, 49; Lange 1999, 16). The North Sea oil discovered in 1969 changed the political opportunity structure, and SNP adopted a vote-maximizing strategy by mobilizing Scots' economic grievances and cultural resentment during the 1970s. SNP declared a "war on Scottish poverty" and used the slogan "It's Scotland's oil" to argue for Scotland's "sovereignty over territory and resources" (SNP 1974; SNP 1977). In the early 1970s, SNP also felt concern about economic threats caused by European centralization (Mitchell 1998, 112-3). SNP's opposition to the UK's membership in the EU was clearly stated in its 1974 manifesto (Tarditi 2010, 11):

SNP opposed British entry, basically on political grounds of opposition to the centralist thinking inherent in the Treaty of Rome, and in the belief that, within the Common Market, not only Scotland, but the United Kingdom, would find its quality and standards of life deteriorating. The United Kingdom being in the EEC, SNP will support moves for British withdrawal while continuing to demand Scottish representation in the organizations of the Common Market.

The Thatcher government established in 1979 also changed the political opportunity structure completely, and SNP moderated its anti-European stance during the 1980s by adopting the “Independence in Europe” slogan. In the 1980s, SNP used the EU in a pragmatic way under threat of Thatcher’s unionism. Although there was concern about the EU’s policies related to fishing and agriculture, SNP’s “Independence in Europe” strategy was used against the anti-European Thatcher government as a part of an anti-establishment strategy. According to Lynch (1996), SNP’s pro-European stance during this time was a strategy to avoid possible economic dislocations that might happen if they seceded from the UK (39).

In the 1990s, Salmond’s SNP kept a pro-European and pro-independence strategy but showed gradualist behaviors to work together with the governing Labor party for a victory in the Scottish devolution referendum of 1997 despite the opposition of fundamentalists within the party. The creation of an autonomous Scottish parliament and its proportional representation electoral system increased SNP’s chances of winning elections within Scotland, thus the party adopted vote-maximizing and office-seeking strategies in the late 1990s.

In the 2000s, SNP modernized and accepted devolution as one stage on the road to independence for Scotland. Meanwhile, its appeal to Scottish nationalism and its drive toward independence continued, and its support for the EU also continued. Taken together, changes in domestic political opportunity structures led to the rise of Scottish nationalism, and SNP exploited nationalism and used the European context strategically by changing its policy positions over time.

To summarize, SNP opposed the UK’s EU accession in the 1970s, but has held a pro-European policy since the late 1980s. There is little evidence that Europe was an important issue to SNP before then. Under Thatcher’s drive to centralize power from local authorities to central

government in the 1980s, SNP saw Europe as a means to achieve Scottish independence by bypassing the UK central government (Lange 1999, 25; Lindsay 1991, 87-90). SNP's pro-European position during the late 1980s and the 1990s can be explained in terms of party competition and resource mobilization. First, the Euro-skeptic CONs was the UK governing party at the national level from the early 1980s until the late 1990s, and UKIP was founded in 1991. Scots had many grievances against CONs's policies on regional autonomy issues and economic reforms, and thus, SNP tried to distinguish itself from CONs by taking a pro-European strategy. Second, the establishment of Scotland Europa to promote Scotland's interests across EU institutions and to the representatives of Europe's regions and member countries in 1992 and the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 provided Scotland the chance to have a strong voice in the EU and reduce its dependency on UK finances. In the 1990s and 2000s, SNP continued to exploit Scottish nationalism and to use a pro-independence strategy to maximize its share of votes and to seek office in Scotland by arguing that UK parties were ignoring Scotland.

SNP kept placing importance on strengthening its links to Europe during the 2000s. In the 2000s, SNP opposed some EU policies including the single currency, the fisheries policy, the austerity policy, and closer fiscal integration. Nonetheless, SNP did not return to opposition, but continued to take pro-European stances. In 2015, SNP revealed its pro-European position as a result of opposition to a referendum on the UK's withdrawal from the EU and clarified its EU position on its official website<sup>15</sup>:

SNP believes that membership of Europe Union is in Scotland's best interests. There are a huge number of benefits for Scotland from EU membership... SNP doesn't believe the EU is perfect and agree that it needs reform but SNP wants Scotland to have a louder voice in Europe.

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.snp.org/pb\\_what\\_is\\_the\\_snp\\_s\\_position\\_on\\_the\\_eu](http://www.snp.org/pb_what_is_the_snp_s_position_on_the_eu)

Taken as a whole, the EU has created political opportunity structures favorable for SNP's goals, and SNP's EU positions seem to be driven by its pragmatic strategy.

As I explained above, LN's EU positions moved from favorable in its early years, to skeptical after Italy's accession to the EMU, to soft skeptical in the fourth Berlusconi government, and to hard skeptical after being free from government responsibility. While LN's EU positions have changed from positive to very negative since the 1980s, SNP's EU positions shifted from negative in the 1970s to positive in the 1980s. When the CONS-led UK joined the EU in 1973, SNP opposed the EU accession along with LAB. SNP is close to LAB in ideology (See Table 45). However, the CHES data that have been collected since 1984 only show the SNP's favorable positions. SNP's overall EU positions have not changed much since 1984 and remained favorable during 1984-2014, and thus there is a limitation in showing all changes.

Table 45. UK Political Parties, 1984-2014

	CONS (1834-PRE)				LAB (1900-PRE)				LIB/LIBDEM (1988-PRE)				UKIP (1993-PRE)				BNP (1982-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	7.8	3.4	42.4	1983	2.3	4.5	27.6	1983	5	6.6	25.4	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	0.0	1983
1988	7.7	3.5	42.2	1987	2.8	5.5	30.8	1987	4.9	6.6	22.6	1987	-	-	-	1987	-	-	0.0	1987
1992	7.6	3.9	41.9	1992	3.3	6	34.4	1992	4.8	6.6	17.8	1992	-	-	-	1992	-	-	0.1	1992
1996	7.4	3.5			3.8	6			4.7	6.6			-	-			-	-		
1999	6.9	2.2	30.7	1997	4.7	5.4	43.2	1997	4	6.6	16.8	1997	7.2	1	0.3	1997	-	-	0.1	1997
2002	7.7	2	31.7	2001	5.2	5.2	40.7	2001	3.8	6.7	18.3	2001	-	-	1.5	2001	-	-	0.2	2001
2006	6.6	2.6	32.4	2005	4.9	5.2	35.3	2005	4.3	6.2	22.0	2005	8.4	1	2.2	2005	-	-	0.7	2005
2010	7.1	2.3	36.1	2010	4	4.8	29.1	2010	5	6	23.0	2010	8.8	1	3.1	2010	9.9	1.2	1.9	2010
2014	7	3.1	36.9	2015	3.6	5.6	30.5	2015	4.9	6.7	7.8	2015	9.1	1.1	12.6	2015	-	-	0.0	2015
	SNP (1934-PRE)				PLAID (1925-PRE)				SF (1905/1970-PRE)				SDLP (1970-PRE)				GREEN (1973-90-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	4.4	5.7	1.1	1983	3.4	5.7	0.4	1983	-	2.5	0.3	1983	4.6	6.3	0.4	1983	-	5.5	0.2	1983
1988	4.2	5.7	1.3	1987	3.2	5.7	0.4	1987	-	3	0.3	1987	4.1	6.3	0.5	1987	-	5.5	0.3	1987
1992	4.0	6.3	1.9	1992	2.9	6	0.5	1992	-	3.1	0.2	1992	3.5	6.2	0.5	1992	-	3.8	0.5	1992
1996	3.8	6			2.7	6			-	3			3.0	6.2			2.2	3.8		
1999	3.4	6.5	2.0	1997	3.3	6	0.5	1997	2.5	2.7	0.4	1997	-	-	0.6	1997	2.3	4.4	0.3	1997
2002	3	5.5	1.8	2001	3.2	5.8	0.7	2001	2.8	2	0.7	2001	-	-	0.6	2001	-	-	0.6	2001
2006	3.9	5.2	1.5	2005	3.1	5.4	0.6	2005	2	2.7	0.6	2005	-	-	0.5	2005	2.9	3.8	1.0	2005
2010	3.3	5.1	1.7	2010	3	5	0.6	2010	2.1	2.6	0.6	2010	-	-	0.4	2010	2.5	4.7	0.9	2010
2014	3	6.3	4.7	2015	3.3	6	0.6	2015	2.1	2.8	0.6	2015	-	-	0.3	2015	1.9	5.2	3.8	2015

Note: Ideology (0= extreme left, 5=center, 10=extreme right); EU Position (1= strong oppose, 4=neutral, 7=strong favor)

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 1984-2014




Next, I will look at what factors make the differences between these two minority nationalist parties' EU positions. After taking all into consideration, Italy seems to be a lot like the UK in terms of population, area, economic size, public opinion and immigrant population. However, ideological extremity, central government participation, and party system characteristics were key factors in making different types of change in the two minority nationalist parties' EU positions. First of all, while SNP's ideology has been center-left since 1984, LN's ideology changed from center-right to extreme right. That is, the non-extreme SNP has showed positive EU positions, whereas LN's original positive EU position during its early years changed to strongly negative as the party has become more extreme in its policies and ideology.

Second, the biggest difference between LN and SNP is their chances of being in national office. In the UK, where a SMP voting system is used and thus a single party mostly gains the majority, being in national office is not a possibility for SNP. SNP only runs in Scotland and has no chances of being in Westminster national office. Thus, when the UK has a government with a very strong unionist bent, the EU becomes an alternative political arena where SNP can press the UK government into accepting their sub-national demands or to bypass its central government to voice their sub-national interests. In this context, SNP has taken advantage of the political opportunity structure created by the EU and kept a positive EU position. By contrast, in Italy where proportional representation system is used, LN has chances of being in national office by forming electoral coalitions. LN also took advantage of the political opportunity structure created by the EU and sought separation through the EU during its early years and thus had positive EU positions. However, Italy's accession to EMU in the late-1990s brought a decline of their local economic gains and LN took a strategy of being influential in national politics instead of using

the EU. In this context, LN's EU position moved from positive to negative. That is, wanting to be in national office and the need to form coalitions in Italy – along with right-wing ideology – come into play.

Finally, party system characteristics matter. While LN has changed its EU positions flexibly as part of its anti-establishment or differentiation strategy, SNP tends to keep positive EU positions because the mainstream CONS that is critical of sub-national autonomy has taken EU-negative positions. According to data from the Eurobarometer surveys between 1973 and 2014, public opinion in Italy toward the EU became less positive over time but more supportive compared to other EU countries, while the UK has maintained negative attitudes toward the EU (See Figure 11). Average 67% of Italy's population per year and average 37% of the UK's population said their country's EU membership is a good thing. Moreover, it appears that the Italian people trust the EU more than they trust their national government, while people in the UK trust regional authorities the most, then their national government, then the EU. While the Italian minority nationalist party LN's change of EU positions from favor to oppose reflects Italy's increasing shift in public sentiment toward being more skeptical of the EU, the UK minority nationalist party SNP's continuous support for the EU reflects its contrary position to the governing parties' EU positions, which have resonated with broader EU-critical public sentiment over time, in order to achieve greater self-government or to pursue the SNP's sub-national agendas through the UK's membership in the EU and the resulting weakened central governmental authority.

Figure 11. [Italy vs. the UK] Public Opinion on the EU, 1973-2014




Source: Standard Eurobarometer

Hence, their different types of change in EU positions are strongly affected by their ideological extremity, central government participation, and party system characteristics.

### 6.3 CASE STUDY 3 - COMPARING FOUR STATEWIDE NATIONALIST PARTIES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE<sup>16</sup>

Figure 12. [FPÖ (WEST) vs. MSI-AN (WEST) vs. Fidesz (EAST) vs. PiS (EAST)] Position toward European Integration, 1984-2014



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data

I will now compare four statewide nationalist parties whose positions on European integration have changed in different directions: the Italian MSI-AN went from oppose to favor; the Austrian FPÖ went from favor to oppose; the Polish PiS moved from neutral to oppose and then to mildly oppose; and the Hungarian Fidesz went from neutral to mildly favor to oppose (see Figure 12). This allows me to not only to examine how different levels of factors may matter but also to find how Western European countries are different from Western European countries if they are.

#### 6.3.1 Background information about the selected countries: IT, AT, HG, and PL

The information about Italy was explained above.

<sup>16</sup> The EU positions of most Eastern European nationalist parties in the CHES data have only been collected since the early 2000s.

### 6.3.1.1 Austria

On the other hand, Austria, located in Central Europe, borders the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland. Austria is the EU's 15th most populous country with around 8.5 million people (about 1.7% of total EU population) and the 14th biggest EU country with an area of 83,879km<sup>2</sup>. The Austrian Empire, which formally unified the Habsburg monarchy who had dominated Austria from 1273 to 1806, was completely defeated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. After losing its influence, Austria reconciled with Hungary and established the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. The dual monarchy continued until it collapsed as a result of defeat in the First World War in 1918. The Austrian Republic was established in 1919, but it was annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938. After Austria's defeat as part of the Nazi state, it was occupied by the Allies for a decade after the war was over. Austria's status as a sovereign state was finally restored in 1955, and it declared perpetual neutrality in the same year. Since that time, Austria's foreign policy has been shaped based on neutrality, and thus joining a supranational organization did not seem to be suitable. Nevertheless, a debate over EU membership for economic reasons began in 1987, and finally the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) made an agreement to apply for entry in 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 contributed to further changes in Austria's definition of neutrality, and joined the EU in 1995. According to Eurobarometer data, only 40% of people at the time saw EU membership in a positive light, but 67% of Austrians supported Austria's EU accession in the 1994 referendum (EC 1974-2013).

The Austrian economy advanced rapidly after 1955, but growth began to slow somewhat between the 1970s and 1990s and the country passed through an economic crisis. Although economic growth has been relatively weak in the 2010s, its economy has remained resilient and

stable. Austria has the 10th largest economy in the EU with an estimated GDP of about 436.9 billion US dollars (WDI 2014). Austria joined the euro-zone in 1999 and became a member of the Schengen Area in 2007. Austria has 18 seats in the European Parliament. It attends the Council of the EU and has held the revolving presidency of the Council twice in 1998 and 2006. Austria also sends representatives to the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and so forth. Meanwhile, Austria has become central to Europe's immigration crisis: more than 15.7% of the Austrian population was immigrants in 2013 (UN 2013).

Austria is a federal republic with nine states. Since Austria became an independent sovereign state in 1955, two major parties – the center-left SPÖ and the center right ÖVP – have led Austrian politics by majority and minority governments of one of the two or grand coalitions between the two: 1955-1966 ÖVP-SPÖ coalition government; 1966-1970 ÖVP; 1970-1983 SPÖ; 1983-1986 SPÖ-FPÖ; 1986-1999 SPÖ-ÖVP; 1999-2005 ÖVP-FPÖ; 2005-2007 ÖVP-BZÖ; and 2007-2016 SPÖ-ÖVP. Although they have ideological differences, both have formed coalition governments to avoid Austria's pre-war turbulence or to keep the far-right out. Austria has a bicameral parliament, and its electoral system is based on the principles of proportional representation, a closed list system, and preferential votes. Austria has nine constituencies that correspond to the nine states and 43 regional constituencies. The Austrian bicameral federal Assembly has a total of 244 seats: 183 members in the lower chamber directly elected in single-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote with a minimum of 4% threshold for a single party, and 61 members in the upper chamber appointed by state parliaments. Thus, the upper chamber is far less powerful than the lower chamber. The president is directly elected for a six-year term by absolute majority popular vote in a two-round majority system. Although he or

she represents Austria in international relations, the president is a ceremonial presence in practice. Since 1951, only SPÖ and ÖVP candidates or independent candidates endorsed by both parties had been elected, but Green Party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen won the presidential election in 2016, narrowly defeating the FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer.<sup>17</sup>

### 6.3.1.2 Hungary

Hungary, located in central Europe, is surrounded by Austria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Hungary is the EU's 13th most populous country with around 9.9 million people (about 1.9% of total EU population) and the 12th biggest EU country with an area of 93,024km<sup>2</sup>. With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, Hungary became a democratic republic. After losing the First World War, Hungary lost 71% of its territory, 58% of its population, and 32% of ethnic Hungarians as a result of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, and its attempt to recover its territories by joining the Axis powers during the Second World War ended in failure. Hungary lost the territories it regained during the war in the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. After the fall of Nazi Germany, Hungary came under the influence of the Soviets until the fall of Communism. Its constitution was amended in 1989, and Hungary again became a democratic parliamentary republic and held multiparty elections in 1990.

After that, Hungary joined the Visegrad Group in 1991, the OECD in 1996, NATO in 1999, and the EU in 2004. It became a member of the Schengen Area in 2007. After transitioning from a centrally planned to a free market economy, the country's GDP grew steadily from 34.5 billion US dollars in 1991 to 157 billion dollars in 2008 (WDI 2014). However, along with much

<sup>17</sup>

	Norbert Hofer	Alexander Van der Bellen	Irmgard Griss	Rudolf Hundstorfer	Andreas Khol	Richard Lugner
	FPÖ	Greens	IND	SPÖ	ÖVP	IND
1st Round	35.1	21.3	18.9	11.3	11.1	2.3
2nd Round	49.7	50.3	-	-	-	-

of the world, Hungary experienced a severe economic contraction in 2009, and the economic recovery has only begun in the early 2010s. Hungary has the 18th largest economy in the EU with an estimated GDP of about 138.3 billion dollars, but it is not yet a member of the euro-zone (WDI 2014). Hungary has 21 seats in the European Parliament. Hungary regularly attends the Council of the EU to adopt EU laws and coordinate policies, and it held the revolving presidency of the Council once in 2011. Hungary is one of the largest net beneficiaries of EU subsidies: according to the official website of the EU, while Hungary contributed 890 million euros to the EU budget in 2014, it received 6.620 billion euros from the EU in the same year. Nonetheless, negative public sentiment against the EU has continued to increase in Hungary. As a transit country between West and East, Hungary is facing social problems related to increased immigration and refugee flow as of 2016.

Hungary has a parliamentary political system in which the unicameral National Assembly has the executive power. The president, who is elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term, is a symbolic presence to represent the nation, while the Prime Minister elected by the National Assembly takes the responsibility of government administration. Hungary has a mixed electoral system based on majority and proportional representation. The Hungarian unicameral parliament has a total of 199 seats: 106 members are directly elected as single-member districts, while 93 members are distributed proportionally by party lists with a minimum of 5% threshold for a single party and a minimum of 10% threshold for coalitions. Since 1989, Hungary's political system has been fully competitive based on a multiparty system. Since the right-wing nationalist MDF formed the center right-wing coalition government with FKGP and KDNP following the first free parliamentary election of 1990, the government changed hands between center-right wing parties and center-left wing parties in Hungarian politics: 1990-1994 (right):

MDF, FKGP, KDNP; 1994-1998 (left): MSZP, SzDSz; 1998-2002 (right): Fidesz, FKGP, MDF; 2002-2010 (left): MSZP, SzDSz; 2010-2016 (right): Fidesz.

### 6.3.1.3 Poland

Poland, located in central Europe, borders Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast), Slovakia, and Ukraine. Poland is the EU's 6th most populous country with around 38.5 million people (about 7.6% of total EU population) and the 5th biggest EU country with an area of 312,685km<sup>2</sup>. A Polish state was founded in 966 and merged with Lithuania in 1386. The Polish-Lithuanian state reached the peak of its power between the 14th and 16th centuries, but it was partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria during the 18th century due to internal disorder. After a long period of Poles' efforts for independence, independent Poland had a republican government in 1918 when the First World War was ended. However, during the Second World War, Poland was divided after invasions by Nazi Germany and the USSR in 1939 and then came under the influence of Nazi Germany in 1941. After Poland was liberated from Nazi Germany in 1945, it fell under Soviet sway. In 1989, Poland's Communist government was overthrown, and Poland had its first fully free parliamentary election in 1991. Like Hungary, Poland joined the Visegrad Group in 1991, the OECD in 1996, NATO in 1999, and the EU in 2004 and became a member of the Schengen Area in 2007. Poland's efforts to pursue a market economy faltered and resulted in widespread discontent in the early 1990s, but Poland has shown consistently strong economic growth since the early 1990s. According to the World Bank, the Poland's estimated GDP of about 64.7 billion dollars in 1990 increased to 545 billion dollars in 2014, and it was the only European country to avoid recession in the midst of the worldwide recession of 2008-2009. Poland has the 8th largest economy in the EU, but it is not yet a member of the euro-zone (WDI 2014). Poland has 51 seats

in the European Parliament. It regularly attends the Council of the EU and held the revolving presidency of the Council once from July to December 2011, right after Hungary (January-June 2011). Poland is one of the largest beneficiaries of EU funds. According to the official website of the EU, while Poland contributed 3.526 billion Euros to the EU budget in 2014, it received 17.436 billion Euros from the EU in the same year. As of 2016, faced with an increased number of registered immigrants and an unprecedented influx of refugees, the immigrant issue is becoming a critical national issue in Poland.

Poland has a bicameral parliament system. In 1989, the Communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the anti-Communist Solidarity Citizens' Committee (Solidarity) made an agreement that 65% of lower chamber seats would be allocated to PZPR, and 35% of lower chamber seats and 100% of upper chamber seats would be filled in a free election. In the first free election following the negotiation in 1989, Solidarity swept the non-allocated seats and the Polish party system became highly polarized. Despite big differences between the two parties, PZPR created a coalition government with Solidarity since it failed to gain a majority. Subsequently, PZPR's two allied communist parties (United People's Party (ZSL) and Alliance of Democrats (SD)) broke their long-standing alliance and PZPR dissolved in 1990 of their own accord. In 1991, pre-allocated lower chamber seats to PZPR were removed and a list proportional representation system for the lower chamber was adopted. The first entirely free election was finally held in 1991. The split of Solidarity caused by internal right and left factions led to a higher level of party fragmentation in 1991, and thus a 5% threshold and premium for stronger parties were added to the electoral law to eliminate small parties from the low chamber. However, the Polish system still had an issue of proportionality: the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) - Polish People's Party (PSL) coalition won 65.9% of the seats despite receiving 35.8% of

the votes in 1993. In 1997, the fragmented right-wing parties united as Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the party fragmentation problem recovered somewhat. As of 2016, the 460 members in the lower chamber are elected by party lists in multi-seat constituencies with a minimum of 5% threshold for a single party and a minimum of 8% threshold for coalitions, and 100 members in the upper chamber are elected by the first-past-the-post vote in 100 single-seat constituencies. Polish governments were ruled by leftist parties until the mid-1990s, by either right or left parties between the late-1990s and the mid-2000s and by rightist parties since the mid-2000s. The president is directly elected for a five-year term by absolute majority in general elections (with a second round if necessary) and represents the nation, while the Prime Minister is appointed by the president.

#### 6.3.1.4 Brief country comparison

Austria and Italy are considered Western European nations, and Hungary and Poland are considered Eastern European nations. Italy (302,073 km<sup>2</sup>, 60 million) and Poland (312,685 km<sup>2</sup>, 38.1 million) are two of six largest countries among EU countries, and Hungary (93,030 km<sup>2</sup>, 10 million) and Austria (83,855 km<sup>2</sup>, 8.3 million) are two of ten medium-sized countries, both by area and by population. Italy is the highest and Poland the second highest in GDP and population, but Austria is the highest in purchasing power parity. While the two Western countries contribute to the EU more than they receive, the two Eastern countries receive more than they contribute to the EU. Unlike Austria and Italy, Hungary and Poland are not members of the euro-zone. Compared to 1960, the immigrant population of Austria in 2013 grew 1.7 times and the immigrant population of Italy grew 12.5 times, but the immigrant population of the two Eastern countries dropped. Immigrant population as a percent of population is highest in Austria.

Increased immigration and/or unprecedented refugee flows are critical national issues in all four countries. Austrians and Hungarians are relatively more EU-skeptical than Italians and Polish.

While Austria and Italy have bicameral parliamentary systems, Hungary has a unicameral parliamentary system and Poland has a unique type of presidential system governed by a bicameral parliamentary. The presidents of Italy and Hungary are appointed by the Italian parliament and Hungarian National assembly respectively, but the presidents of Austria and Poland are appointed by popular vote in a two-round voting system. Prime Ministers (or Federal Chancellor in Austria) are appointed by the president in all four countries. All countries have multi-party systems, and parliamentary members are competitively elected. The electoral systems for lower chambers are mixed member proportional for Hungary and list proportional representation for the other three countries. Parties in Italy, Austria and Poland use closed lists that a party selects the order of election of their candidates, while parties in Hungary use an open list that voters' choices determine the order is used in Hungary. Proportional representation is used to determine the election of most members of the lower chambers in all countries. While levels of party system fractionalization are high in all four countries, levels of government parties' fractionalization are relatively lower than levels of opposition parties' fractionalization. Austria's polarization level makes elections consistently competitive, while Italy has had elections that were not or less competitive or in which the executive had an absolute majority in the legislature. The levels of polarization show that ideological differences between the Italian chief executive party and other three largest parties are growing, Austria has maintained a polarized party system, the Hungarian party system is becoming dominated by right-wing parties, and the Polish party system was less polarized in the 2000s than in the 2010s.

Tables 46 and 47 present a brief comparison between these four countries.

Table 46. Comparison – Characteristics of the state (IT vs. AT vs. HG vs. PL)

	Italy			Austria			Hungary			Poland		
East vs. West	WEST			WEST			EAST			EAST		
Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	302,073			83,855			93,030			312,685		
Population (Thousands)	60: 49,511	90: 56,998		60: 7,043	90: 7,671		60: 9,984	90: 10,365		60: 29,638	90: 38,111	
	65: 51,481	95: 57,207		65: 7,268	95: 7,936		65: 10,153	95: 10,332		65: 31,445	95: 38,595	
	70: 53,359	00: 57,116		70: 7,466	00: 8,005		70: 10,337	00: 10,215		70: 32,664	00: 38,433	
	75: 55,164	05: 58,645		75: 7,578	05: 8,232		75: 10,532	05: 10,078		75: 34,015	05: 38,198	
	80: 56,307	10: 60,098		80: 7,549	10: 8,387		80: 10,707	10: 9,973		80: 35,574	10: 38,038	
	85: 56,883	13: 60,990		85: 7,560	13: 8,495		85: 10,579	13: 9,955		85: 37,202	13: 38,217	
Immigration (Thousands)	60: 456	90: 1,428		60: 807	90: 793		60: 518	90: 348		60: 2,425	90: 1,128	
	65: 630	95: 1,723		65: 745	95: 989		65: 476	95: 293		65: 2,250	95: 964	
	70: 863	00: 2,121		70: 677	00: 997		70: 437	00: 297		70: 2,088	00: 823	
	75: 1,006	05: 3,068		75: 721	05: 1,156		75: 402	05: 333		75: 1,808	05: 825	
	80: 1,109	10: 4,463		80: 720	10: 1,310		80: 369	10: 368		80: 1,545	10: 827	
	85: 1,253	13: 5,721		85: 728	13: 1,334		85: 339	13: 473		85: 1,320	13: 664	
Immigrants as % of Pop.	60: 0.9	80: 2.0	00: 3.7	60: 11.5	80: 9.5	00: 12.4	60: 5.2	80: 3.4	00: 2.9	60: 8.2	80: 4.3	00: 2.1
	65: 1.2	85: 2.2	05: 5.2	65: 10.3	85: 9.6	05: 14.0	65: 4.7	85: 3.2	05: 3.3	65: 7.2	85: 3.5	05: 2.2
	70: 1.6	90: 2.5	10: 7.4	70: 9.1	90: 10.3	10: 15.6	70: 4.2	90: 3.4	10: 3.7	70: 6.4	90: 3.0	10: 2.2
	75: 1.8	95: 3.0	13: 9.4	75: 9.5	95: 12.5	13: 15.7	75: 3.8	95: 2.8	13: 4.7	75: 5.3	95: 2.5	13: 1.7
EU-member	EU Accession (1958)			EU Accession (1995)			EU Accession (2004)			EU Accession (2004)		
	Euro-zone (1999)			Euro-zone (1999)			No euro-zone			No euro-zone		
	Schengen (1997)			Schengen (2007)			Schengen (2007)			Schengen (2007)		
Public Opinion (%)	84: 70	96: 69	06: 56	92: 40	02: 37	10: 36	02: 49	10: 38		02: 50	10: 62	
	88: 73	99: 62	10: 48	96: 34	06: 34	14: 37	06: 49	14: 32		06: 56	14: 53	
	92: 76	02: 69	14: 41	99: 36								
EU-ESIF* (Millions of €)	96: 3,160m	06: 4,069m		96: 310m	06: 210m		02: 1,245m	10: 3,129m		02: 5,118m	10: 11,086m	
	99: 3,160m	10: 4,600m		99: 310m	10: 176m		06: 1,245m	14: 3,573m		06: 5,118m	14: 12,285m	
	02: 4,069m	14: 6,110m		02: 210m	14: 703m							
EU spending / Contribution to the EU (€)	10,695 million			1,573 million			6,620 million			17,436 million		
	14,368 million			2,691 million			890 million			3,526 million		
GDP (Millions of \$)	84: 436,602			84: 67,822	02: 212,971		92: 38,514	06: 114,734		92: 92,528	06: 343,261	
	88: 888,992	02: 1,267,043		88: 133,018	06: 334,309		96: 46,485	10: 130,094		96: 157,079	10: 479,243	
	92: 1,316,286	06: 1,943,530		92: 194,608	10: 390,235		99: 49,033	14: 138,347		99: 168,225	14: 544,967	
	96: 1,309,407	10: 2,126,748		96: 236,720	14: 436,888		02: 67,517			02: 198,681		
	99: 1,249,057	14: 2,141,161		99: 216,725								
GDP PPP (\$)	84: 7,717	02: 22,206		84: 8,969	02: 26,351		92: 3,717	06: 11,392		92: 2,412	06: 9,000	
	88: 15,698	06: 33,426		88: 17,536	06: 40,431		96: 4,508	10: 13,009		96: 4,067	10: 12,598	
	92: 23,175	10: 35,878		92: 24,820	10: 46,660		99: 4,790	14: 14,029		99: 4,351	14: 14,343	
	96: 23,029	14: 34,909		96: 29,742	14: 51,191		02: 6,646			02: 5,197		
	99: 21,946			99: 27,116								

Note: \*ESIF (European Structural and Investment Funds)

Table 47. Comparison – Party system characteristics (IT vs. AT vs. HG vs. PL)

	Italy	Austria	Hungary	Poland
System	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	75-90: Assembly-Elected President 91-15: Parliamentary	75-90: Assembly-Elected President 91-15: Presidential
Head of State	President (7yrs, appointed by Parliament)	President (6yrs, appointed by popular vote, 2round system)	President (5yrs, appointed by National Assembly)	President (5yrs, appointed by popular vote, 2round system)
Head of Government	Prime Minister (appointed by president)	Federal Chancellor (appointed by president)	Prime Minister (appointed by president; 4years)	Prime Minister (appointed by president)
Government	Devolved	federal	unitary	unitary
Voting systems	Bicameral: Lower (630 Semi-PR); Upper (315 Semi-PR) ; closed list	Bicameral: Lower (183 PR); Upper (61 appointed by state); closed list	Unicameral: Mixed Member Majoritarian (106 FPTP + 93 list PR); open list	Bicameral: Lower (460 PR); Upper (100 FPTP); closed list
Plurality PR	75-93: NO   94-15: YES	75-15: NO	75-15: YES	75-89: Y   90-06: N   07-15: Y
HouseSys (dominant)	75-93: Proportional 94-05: Plurality 06-15: Proportional	75-15: Proportional.	75-90: plurality 91-15: proportional	75-89: plurality 90-15: proportional
Vote Threshold	Lower/Upper: 2%/3% for parties in coalition; 4%/8% for parties; 10%/20% for coalitions	Lower 4%	89-90: 4% 91-15: 5% for parties, 10% for coalitions	90-15: 5% for single party, 8% for coalitions, 0% for ethnic minorities
Legislature competitiveness	multi-party (competitively elected)	multi-party (competitively elected)	75-90: one party system 91-15: multi-party (competitively elected)	75-90: one party system 91-15: multi-party (competitively elected)
Executive competitiveness	comparatively elected	comparatively elected	75-90: only one candidate 91-15: competitively elected	75-90: only one candidate 91-15: competitively elected
Fractionalization	84: 0.75   96: 0.54   10: 0.68 88: 0.76   02: 0.51   14: 0.68 92: 0.76   06: 0.51	84: 0.56   96: 0.72   06: 0.66 88: 0.62   99: 0.72   10: 0.77 92: 0.67   02: 0.71   14: 0.77	02: 0.71   10: 0.52 06: 0.55   14: 0.50	02: 0.73   10: 0.65 06: 0.77   14: 0.67
Polarization	84: 2.48   96: 2.50   06: 2.09 88: 2.57   99: 1.97   10: 2.55 92: 2.58   02: 1.69   14: 2.25	84: 2.47   96: 2.13   06: 2.65 88: 2.60   99: 1.75   10: 2.48 92: 2.20   02: 2.14   14: 1.94	02: 2.16   10: 2.15 06: 1.35   14: 2.50	02: 1.91   10: 2.17 06: 2.03   14: 2.42
Largest Party (election year, name, ideology, vote)	72: DC (center) 38.7% 76: DC (center) 38.7% 79: DC (center) 38.3% 83: DC (center) 32.9% 87: DC (center) 34.3% 92: DC (center) 29.7% 94: PdL (right) 42.8% 96: Olive (center) 45.4% 01: CdL (right) 45.4% 06: Olive (left) 49.8% 08: PdL(right) 46.8% 13: PD (C-L) 27.4%	71: SPO (left) 50.0% 75: SPO (left) 50.4% 79: SPO (left) 51.0% 83: SPO (left) 47.7% 86: SPO (left) 43.1% 90: SPO (left) 42.8% 94: SPO (left) 34.9% 95: SPO (left) 38.1% 99: FPO (right) 26.9% 02: OVP (right) 42.3% 06: SPO (left) 35.3% 08: SPO (left) 29.3% 13: SPO (left) 29.3%	75: HSWP (left) 100% 85: HSWP (left) 94% 90: MDF (right) 24.7% 94: MSZP (left) 33.0% 98: Fidesz (left) 29.5% 02: MSZP (left) 42.1% 06: MSZP (left) 43.2% 10: Fidesz (right) 53.4% 14: Fidesz (right) 44.9%	76: PZPR (left) 56.7% 80: PZPR (left) 56.7% 85: PZPR (left) 55.4% 89: PZPR (left) 37.6% 91: UD (right) 12.3% 93: SLD (left) 20.4% 97: AWS (right) 33.8% 01: SLD-UP (left) 41.0% 05: PiS (right) 27.0% 07: PO (C-R) 41.5% 11: PO (C-R) 39.2% 15: PiS (right) 37.6%
Gov't Parties (#, name)	72-76: 1-3 DC, PRI+ 76-79: 1 DC 79-83: 3 DC, PSDI, PLI 83-94: 3-5 DC, PSI+ 94-96: 1 PdL 96-01: 1 Olive 01-06: 1 CdL 06-08: 1 Olive 08-13: 3 PdL, LN, MPA 13-16: 4 PD, SEL, CD+	55-66: 2 Ö VP, SPÖ 66-70: 1 Ö VP 70-71: 2 SPÖ, FPÖ 71-83: 1SPÖ 83-86: 2 SPÖ, FPÖ 86-99: 2 SPÖ, Ö VP 99-05: 2 Ö VP, FPÖ 05-07: 2 Ö VP, BZÖ 07-16: 2 SPÖ, Ö VP	75-90: 1 HSWP 90-94: 3 MDF, FKGP, KDNP 94-98: 2 MSZP, SzDSz 98-02: 3 Fidesz, FKGP, MDF 02-10: 2 MSZP, SzDSz 10-16: 1 Fidesz	75-89: 1-2 (FJN + INds) 89-91: 5 PZPR, SOL, ZSL+ 91-93: 3-7 UD, ZCH-N, PSL+ 93-97: 2 SLD, PSL 97-01: 1 AWS 01-05: 2 SLD-UP, PSL 05-07: 3 PiS, SRP, LPR 07-15: 2 PO, PSL 15-16: 4 PiS, SP, PR
Opp. Parties (#, name)	75-76: 1 (PCI) 76-91: 6-10 (PCI, PSI +) 91-94: 6-7 (PDS, MSI +) 94-96: 4 (AdP, PpL +) 96-01: 3 (PpIL, LN, RC) 01-06: 5 (Olive, PRC +) 06-08: 1 (CdL) 08-13: 2 (PD, IdV) 13-16: 6 (PdL, LN, Fdi)	76-83: 2 (OVP, FPO) 83-86: 1 (OVP) 86-94: 2 (FPO, Greens) 94-95: 3 (FPO, Greens, LF) 95-99: 3 (FPO, LF, DG) 99-05: 2 (SPO, Greens) 05-07: 3 (SPO, Greens, FPO) 07-13: 3 (FPO, BZO, Greens) 13-16: 3 (FPO, Greens, St.)	75-90: 0 90-92: 3 (SzDSz, MSZP, Fidesz) 92-94: 4 (SzDSz, MSZP, Fidesz+) 94-98: 6 (MDF, FKg, UDNP+) 98-02: 4 (MSZP, SzDSz, MIEP+) 02-06: 1 (Fidesz) 06-10: 2 (Fidesz, MDF) 10-14: 3 (MSZP, Jobbik, LMP) 14-16: 3 (MSZP, Jobbik, LMP)	75-91: 0 91-92: 26 (UD, SD, KPN +) 92-93: 22 (SD, KPN, PC +) 93-97: 5 (UD, UP, KPN +) 97-01: 4 (AWS, UW +) 01-05: 7 (PO, SRP, PiS +) 05-07: 4 (PO, SLD, PSL +) 07-11: 3 (PiS, LiD +) 11-15: 4 (PiS, RP, SLD +) 15-16: 5 (PO, K'15, .N +)

Sources: Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2015 and ACE Electoral Knowledge Network

### 6.3.2 Comparing the selected statewide nationalist parties: the Italian MSI-AN vs. the Austrian FPÖ vs. the Hungarian Fidesz vs. the Polish PiS

The Italian MSI-AN was described above.

#### 6.3.2.1 Austrian FPÖ

Anton Reinthaller-led FPÖ succeeded the Federation of Independents (VdU) in 1956 under the domination of the center-right ÖVP and the center-left SPÖ. FPÖ's ideology was a mixture of pan-German nationalism and liberalism: the liberal wing was more influential than the nationalist wing until the mid-1980s, and its stress on nationalism made it a unique type of liberal party.

Reinthaller was replaced by Friedrich Peter in 1958. Peter's FPÖ attempted to move toward the political center and became a coalition partner of the SPÖ minority government in 1970-1971. Under Peter's leadership from 1958 until 1978, FPÖ's liberal wing became stronger and its right-wing ideology was largely moderated. Despite its efforts to ally with SPÖ and the ensuing electoral reform that helped FPÖ's representation, the party had very limited political influence in the parliament until the late 1970s. Peter finally stepped down in 1978. Alexander Götz succeeded temporarily in 1979 and was replaced by liberal Norbert Steger in 1980.

Under Steger's leadership, FPÖ became more focused on individualization and anti-statism (Luther 2007, 5). These efforts made FPÖ a coalition government partner of SPÖ in 1983 when the party lost its majority with the worst-ever electoral result of slightly less than 5% of the vote. Steger's FPÖ not only faced internal strife but also encountered troubles with SPÖ. The party struggled with very low support, and FPÖ members feared for the party's strong stress on liberal views and its survival. At the 1986 party convention, the nationalist Jörg Haider defeated

the liberal Steger in the vote for party leadership with support from conservative and pan-German nationalist wings.

In 1986, Kurt Waldheim was elected as Austria's new president despite an international controversy over his involvement in war crimes during the Second World War, but international condemnation rather seemed to uplift Austrian national feeling. In this atmosphere, FPÖ, led by Haider, increased its electoral support to 9.7% in the same year. Haider later sparked a complete shift in FPÖ's ideology by stressing nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and EU-skeptical views in the late 1980s. Although the party lost its affiliation with Liberal International, the international federation for liberal political parties, FPÖ made dramatic gains in national elections in 1993: 16.6% of the vote in 1990, 22.5% in 1994, 21.9% in 1995, and 26.9% in 1999 (see Table 48). In 1999, FPÖ came in second and formed a coalition government with Ö VP in 2000. The grand SPÖ -Ö VP coalition from 1988 until 2000 was ended, and SPÖ sat in opposition for the first time in 30 years.

Table 48. Austrian Political Parties, 1984-2014

	SPÖ				Ö VP				FPÖ				BZÖ				GRÜ NE			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr												
1984	3.0	2.4	47.6	1983	5.8	4.2	43.2	1983	6.8	6.4	5.0	1983	-	-	-	1983	-	-	1.4	1983
1988	3.4	4.6	43.1	1986	5.9	6	14.3	1986	7.3	6.2	9.7	1986	-	-	-	1986	-	-	4.8	1986
1992	3.8	6.4	42.8	1990	6.0	6.6	32.1	1990	7.9	3.8	16.6	1990	-	-	-	1990	2.1	-	4.8	1990
1996	4.2	7	34.9	1994	6.1	7	27.7	1994	8.4	1.8	22.5	1994	-	-	-	1994	2.1	-	7.3	1994
			38.1	1995			28.3	1995			21.9	1995				1995			4.8	1995
1999	4.0	6.6	33.2	1999	6.2	6.8	26.9	1999	7.9	2.6	26.9	1999	-	-	-	1999	2.9	5.3	7.4	1999
2002	3.8	6.4	36.5	2002	7	6.9	42.3	2002	8.6	2.6	10.0	2002	-	-	-	2002	2.8	6.1	9.5	2002
2006	3.4	6	35.3	2006	7	6.5	34.3	2006	9.7	1.8	11.0	2006	8.8	2.5	4.1	2006	2.2	6.1	11.1	2006
2010	3.4	5.3	29.3	2008	7.1	6.4	26.0	2008	8.9	1.9	17.5	2008	8.3	2.4	10.7	2008	2.3	6.1	10.4	2008
2014	3.9	6	26.8	2013	6.1	6.7	24.0	2013	8.7	1.9	20.5	2013	7.8	2.7	3.5	2013	3	6.5	12.4	2013

Ideology (0= extreme left, 5=center, 10=extreme right); EU Position (1= strong oppose, 4=neutral, 7=strong favor)

FPÖ's participation in the government led to widespread protests and intense international pressure, and thus FPÖ let Ö VP take the chancellor position and Haider gave his leadership to his loyal subordinate Susanne Riess-Passer. FPÖ also faced internecine feuds and electoral losses in several local elections. With Haider controlling the party from behind the scenes, Riess-Passer resigned due to severe disagreements with Haider, and party leadership was taken over successively by Mathias Reichold (2002) and Herbert Haupt (2002-2004).

In 2002, FPÖ failed to reinvigorate the party's popularity, and its share of the vote dropped to 10.0% as Ö VP became the largest party in Austria with 42.3% of the vote. After the election, the FPÖ-Ö VP coalition was revived, but FPÖ was deeply divided by criticism against the party's strategy of seeking office at any cost. With the severe electoral defeat in the 2004 EP elections, Haider's sister Ursula Haubner took over FPÖ's leadership. In 2005, after failing to turn toward liberalism, Haider left FPÖ and founded BZÖ, which took the coalition with Ö VP from FPÖ. BZÖ won 4.1% of the vote in 2006 and 10.7% in 2008, but electoral support for BZÖ largely dropped after Haider's death. After Haider left FPÖ, Heinz-Christian Strache became the new leader of FPÖ in 2005. Being free from government responsibility, FPÖ returned to radical anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and Eurosceptic views and won 11.0% of the vote in 2006, 17.5% in 2008, and 20.5% in 2013.

#### 6.3.2.2 Hungarian Fidesz

After the fall of communism in 1989, the first free election in Hungary was held in 1990. By adopting an electoral system composed of both majority vote and a proportional representation system with a 4% threshold, Hungary avoided having numerous parties in parliament, unlike Poland. The conservative nationalist MDF won the election with 24.72% of the vote, and the former Communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) suffered heavy losses.

MSZP won only 33 seats (10.89%) for fourth place (see Table 49). After this, the national electoral threshold was modified from 4% to 5%. In the second free election in 1994, the governing MDF was defeated by MSZP and disintegrated, and MSZP was returned to power in response to government incompetence, poor economic performance, and other problems. MSZP won the election with 31.3% of the vote and won a disproportionate 54% of the parliament seats. Due to public concern over former Communist party control, MSZP formed a government coalition with the economically liberal SzDSz. During this time, MSZP seemed to be more supportive of liberal economic policies and more successful at combining populist and Western ideas than right-wing parties.

Table 49. Hungarian Political Parties, 1990-2014

	MDF (1987-2011)				SZDSZ (1988-2013)				FKGP (1988-PRE)				MSZP (1989-PRE)				KDNP (1989-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1992	-	-	24.7	1990	-	-	21.4	1990	-	-	11.7	1990	-	-	10.9	1990	-	-	6.5	1990
1996	-	-	12.0	1994	-	-	19.7	1994	-	-	8.8	1994	-	-	33.0	1994	-	-	7.0	1994
1999	-	-	3.1	1998	-	-	7.9	1998	-	-	13.8	1998	-	-	33.0	1998	-	-	2.6	1998
2002	6.4	5.9	*Fidesz	2002	4.2	6.9	5.6	2002	-	-	0.8	2002	3.4	6.9	42.0	2002	-	-	3.9	2002
2006	5.4	6.6	5.0	2006	4.8	7	6.5	2006	-	-	0.0	2006	3.7	6.8	43.2	2006	7.5	4.5	*Fidesz	2006
2010	6.3	5.9	2.7	2010	4	6.6	2.7	2010	-	-	0.0	2010	3.4	6.6	19.3	2010	7.6	4.9	*Fidesz	2010
2014	-	-	-	2014	-	-	-	2014	-	-	0.2	2014	3.4	6.1	25.7	2014	-	-	*Fidesz	2014
	Fidesz (1988-PRE)				MIÉP (1993-PRE)				JOBBIK (2003-PRE)				LMP (2009-PRE)							
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr				
1992	-	-	9.0	1990	-	-	-	1990	-	-	-	1990	-	-	-	-				
1996	-	-	7.0	1994	-	-	1.6	1994	-	-	-	1994	-	-	-	-				
1999	-	-	28.2	1998	-	-	5.5	1998	-	-	-	1998	-	-	-	-				
2002	7.6	4.6	41.1	2002	9.7	1.6	4.4	2002	-	-	-	2002	-	-	-	-				
2006	6.7	5.5	42.0	2006	-	-	2.2	2006	-	-	*MIÉP	2006	-	-	-	-				
2010	6.9	5.4	52.7	2010	-	-	0.0	2010	9.5	2.4	16.7	2010	3.5	6.5	0.0	2010				
2014	7.9	2.7	44.9	2014	-	-	0.0	2014	9.7	1.2	20.2	2014	4.3	5.3	0.2	2014				

Ideology (0= extreme left, 5=center, 10=extreme right); EU Position (1= strong oppose, 4=neutral, 7=strong favor)

Fidesz, founded in 1988 as a libertarian student movement by young democrats aiming to fight against the Communists, engaged in anti-establishment and intensive protest activities. Fidesz went from a political movement to a political party to gain constituency in 1989. However, Fidesz as a liberal opposition party did not have much appeal to voters in the first two parliamentary elections, winning only 8.95% for fifth place in 1990 and 7.02% for fifth place in 1994. Its dissatisfaction with these election results led Fidesz to take pro-establishment and vote-maximizing strategies and to transform from a liberal youth party to a conservative right-wing party that emphasized a traditional, nation-centered populist agenda. Although its mobilization strategy led to a severe split, Fidesz's new strategies brought visible success in 1998. Although MSZP's share of the vote was 32.2%, 4% ahead of Fidesz at 28.2%, Fidesz won 148 seats compared to MSZP's 134. After winning the 1998 parliamentary election, Fidesz formed a center-right coalition government with two smaller nationalist parties, FKGP and MDF, to get a majority. After losing the 2002 parliamentary election by only a small difference to MSZP, Fidesz won more votes (47.4%) than MSZP (34.3%) in the 2004 EP elections, but it failed to win the parliamentary election again in 2006. After the 2006 parliamentary election, nationwide anti-government protests swept Hungary, triggered by the leaks of MSZP Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's confessions about MSZP's lies and failed efforts in the previous governing years. Massive dissatisfaction with the MSZP government led to landslide victories for Fidesz in both the 2009 EP elections (56.4%) and the 2010 parliamentary election (52.7%), and Fidesz formed an outright majority government. With these victories, support of the newly founded radical nationalist JOBBIK increased at a terrific speed as well (2.2% in 2006 with MIÉP, 16.7% in 2010, and 20.2% in 2014). In 2014, Fidesz again won supermajorities (44.9% and 51.5%) in both the parliament and the EP elections.

### 6.3.2.3 Polish PiS

In Poland, 29 political parties achieved parliamentary representation in the first entirely free election of the post-Communist era in 1991. Poland reduced this massive fragmentation by establishing a 5% threshold for single parties and an 8% threshold for coalitions, but the former Communist party SLD won first place with 20.4% of the votes in the second free election and became the governing party in alliance with PSL in 1993. The former Communist SLD candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski was elected as Poland's president in 1995. SLD's electoral successes encouraged the numerous liberal, conservative, and Christian democratic parties to begin to consolidate, and the tactical election coalition AWS was created in 1996 as the result. Subsequently, AWS won the 1997 parliamentary election and formed a government. Despite infighting in the AWS-led government, Kwasniewski was re-elected as president in 2000 and SLD won the 2001 election overwhelmingly due to the AWS's organizational collapse and economic weaknesses. The internal conflicts within AWS brought three new parties: the center-right Civic Platform (PO), the right PiS, and the far-right LPR. While all three achieved representation in 2001, the shattered AWS failed to cross the threshold (see Table 50).

Table 50. Polish Political Parties, 1980-2014

	PZPR (1948-1990)				ZSL (1949-1989)				SD (1937-PRE)				Solidarity (1988-1991)				PAX (1947-1993)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1984	-	-	56.7	1980	-	-	24.6	1980	-	-	8.0	1980	-	-	-	1980	-	-	-	1980
1988	-	-	55.4	1985	-	-	25.4	1985	-	-	8.5	1985	-	-	-	1985	-	-	-	1985
			37.6	1989			16.5	1989			5.8	1989			35.0	1989			2.1	1989
1992	-	-	-	1991	-	-	-	1991	-	-	-	1991	-	-	5.1	1991	-	-	-	1991
	UD (1991-1994)				WAK (1990-1991)				POC (1991-1993)				KPN (1979-PRE)				KLD (1990-1994)			
1992	-	-	12.3	1991	-	-	8.7	1991	-	-	8.7	1991	-	-	7.5	1991	-	-	7.5	1991
1996	-	-	-	1993	-	-	-	1993	-	-	-	1993	-	-	-	1993	-	-	4.0	1993
	AWS (1996-2001)				SLD (1991-PRE)				PSL (1990-PRE)				SRP (1992-PRE)				MN (?-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
1992	-	-	-	1991	-	-	12.0	1991	-	-	8.7	1991	-	-	0.0	1991	-	-	1.2	1991
1996	-	-	-	1993	-	-	20.4	1993	-	-	15.4	1993	-	-	2.8	1993	-	-	0.6	1993
1999	-	-	33.8	1997	-	-	27.1	1997	-	-	7.3	1997	-	-	0.1	1997	-	-	0.4	1997
2002	7.8	5.4	5.6	2001	4.1	6.9	41.0	2001	4.4	4.1	9.0	2001	5.5	2.8	10.2	2001	-	-	0.4	2001
2006	-	-	-	2005	3.4	6	11.3	2005	5	4.8	7.0	2005	4.1	2.3	11.4	2005	-	-	0.3	2005
2010	-	-	-	2007	2.8	6.6	13.2	2007	4.9	5.1	8.9	2007	4.6	3.3	1.5	2007	-	-	0.2	2007
2014	-	-	-	2011	2.8	6.6	8.2	2011	5.3	5.5	8.4	2011	-	-	0.1	2011	-	-	0.2	2011
			-	2015			7.6	2015			5.1	2015			0.3	2015			0.2	2015
	PiS (2001-PRE)				PO (2001-PRE)				LPR (2001-PRE)				KNP (2011-PRE)				SP (2012-PRE)			
	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr	irgen	EU	vote	e-yr
2002	7.8	4.8	9.5	2001	6.9	6.8	12.7	2001	9.3	1	7.9	2001	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	2001
2006	7.8	3.5	27.0	2005	5.3	6.6	24.1	2005	9.3	1.4	8.0	2005	-	-	-	2005	-	-	-	2005
2010	8	2.9	32.1	2007	6	6.6	41.5	2007	9.3	1.7	1.3	2007	-	-	-	2007	-	-	-	2007
2014	7.9	3.8	29.9	2011	5.7	6.5	39.2	2011	-	-	-	2011	9.5	1.1	1.0	2011	8.3	3	-	2011
			37.6	2015			24.1	2015			-	2015			0.0	2015			7.6	2015

Ideology (0= extreme left, 5=center, 10=extreme right); EU Position (1= strong oppose, 4=neutral, 7=strong favor)

PiS, formed in 2001 by twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, in principle advocates a strong state, state intervention in the economy, strengthening of the Polish Army, a traditional social order, and a fight against crime and corruption. PiS succeeded in gaining a great deal of public support in a short period of time by taking a vote-maximizing strategy. PiS entered the lower chamber with 9.5% of the vote in 2001 and won 27.0% of votes in the 2005 general election, forming a minority government. However, since PiS narrowly became the

largest party with 155 of the 460 seats and the main opposition party PO won 133 seats with 24.1% of votes, PiS needed to ally with two other nationalist parties, SRP (11.4%, 56 seats) and LPR (8.0%, 34 seats), to secure stable parliamentary support (see Table 49). That is, the PiS-led government was dependent on the votes of the two parties. To form a coalition government with them, PiS used a carrots-and-sticks approach, promising to allocate budget for policies that SRP and LPR demanded such as unemployment benefits, supply of cheap petrol for farmers and a support fund for newborn babies as a carrot and calling for early parliamentary elections as a stick because of declining support, especially for LPR (Gwiazda 2006, 19). In the same year, Lech Kaczyński became the president. In 2007, early elections were held due to corruption allegations involving the SRP's leader Andrzej Lepper. PiS was defeated with 32.1% of the votes, and SRP and LPR did not cross the 5% threshold. PO became the largest party, with 41.5% of vote. Afterwards, PiS kept using an office-seeking strategy by taking strong right-wing stances. The party's direction and dissatisfaction with the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński led breakaway factions to leave the party starting in 2010, although these had little impact on the party. In the 2015 general election, PiS won the majority of seats (235 of the 460 seats) with 37.58% of the votes in alliance with Poland Together (PR) and Solidarity Poland (SP) and came back into power.

#### 6.3.2.4 Brief party comparison

While the Italian statewide nationalist party MSI-AN and the Austrian statewide nationalist party FPÖ were founded after the Second World War, the Hungarian statewide nationalist party Fidesz and the Polish statewide nationalist party PiS were founded along with the collapse of communism. FPÖ, MSI-AN, and Fidesz had little political influence in their early years, but it was not long after its founding before PiS performed well in elections. Increased

support for these parties is presumed to be caused by external factors: support for MSI-AN increased significantly in the early 1990s when Italian mainstream parties collapsed because of corruption scandals; the rise in support for FPO since the early 1990s coincides with the dispute about EU accession and international condemnation of Austria's new president; Fidesz's big ideological transition and visible electoral success occurred in the mid-1990s, when nostalgia for Communism spread across Hungary due to government incompetence and poor economic performance; and PiS experienced electoral growth in 2005 right after Poland's EU accession. All four statewide nationalist parties adopted vote-maximization and office-seeking strategies, and they have flexibly and strategically changed their stances and policies in response to the changing environment and to their coalition partners. However, there is a difference between their ideological directions: MSI-AN has taken a turn to the center and FPÖ has taken a turn to the right, whereas Fidesz and PiS have maintained their center-right positions. MSI-AN has taken a more favorable EU position as it has become a center-right party, and FPÖ has taken a more critical EU position as it has become more far-right. That is, there seems to be a correlation between the ideologies and EU positions of MSI-AN and FPÖ. On the other hand, there seems to be no correlation of ideology with changes in Fidesz's and PiS's EU positions. As Fidesz has taken a more critical EU position and PiS's EU positions are in flux between neutral and critical, there has been very little change in their ideology. The difference between Fidesz's and PiS's EU positions is presumed to be due to features of their main opposition parties: as Fidesz has lost ground to the far-right, Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant JOBBIK, it has seemed to take a hard line on EU issues, but PiS's main opposition party is the center-right pro-EU PO. While MSI-AN tried to gain credibility from the mainstream parties and stayed in center-right coalitions since it joined the government, FPÖ moved to extreme as a way of differentiating from the two major

parties. On the other hand, Fidesz and PiS have used populism as a strategy to become larger ruling center-right parties among the nascent parties that were founded since the fall of Communism. All parties entered coalition governments a few times (see Table 50), and leaders have been a valuable part of these parties. While FPÖ, Fidesz and PiS have grown enough to lead a government coalition, MSI-AN never became the head of its coalition and was merged into the center-right party. Amid concerns over rising nationalism, the EU applied sanctions against Austria when FPÖ entered the government, but there were no sanctions against Italy when MSI-AN was in government. On the other hand, the EU has expressed concern about Hungary's constitutional reforms in 2012 and Poland's new law in 2016 in accordance with EU democratic principles.

Table 51 presents a brief comparison of these four statewide nationalist parties.

Table 51. Comparison of Statewide Nationalist Parties (MSI-AN vs. FPÖ vs. Fidesz vs. PiS)

	MSI-AN (1946-2009)		FPÖ (1956-PRE)		Fidesz (1988-PRE)		PiS (2001-PRE)	
EU Position 1= strong Opp. 7=strong Fav.	84: 1.6 88: 1.6 92: 1.9 96: 2.3	99: 3.7 02: 4.3 06: 4.8 10: 5.8	84: 6.4 88: 6.2 92: 3.8 96: 1.8 99: 2.6	02: 2.6 06: 1.8 10: 1.9 14: 1.9	02: 4.6 06: 5.5	10: 5.4 14: 2.7	02: 4.8 06: 3.5	10: 2.9 14: 3.8
Ideological Spectrum 0= extreme L 10=extreme R	84: 9.1 88: 9.14 92: 9.18 96: 9.22	99: 8.17 02: 7.79 06: 8 10: 7.33	84: 6.80 88: 7.35 92: 7.90 96: 8.44 99: 7.90	02: 8.63 06: 9.67 10: 8.93 14: 8.70	02: 7.64 06: 6.67	10: 6.88 14: 7.93	02: 7.75 06: 7.76	10: 8 14: 7.94
	630 seats; Semi-PR; closed list; threshold (2% for parties in coalition; 4% for parties; 10% for coalitions); multi-party		183 seats; PR; closed list; threshold (4%); multi-party		199 seats; Mixed Member Majoritarian (106 FPTP + 93 list PR); open list; threshold (5% for parties, 10% for coalitions); multi-party		460 seats; open-list PR; closed list; threshold (5% for single party, 8% for coalitions, 0% for ethnic minorities); multi-party	
lower house (%, seats)	48: 2.0, 6 15: 5.8, 29 58: 4.8, 24 63: 5.1, 27 68: 4.5, 24 72: 8.7, 56 76: 6.1, 32 79: 5.3, 30 83: 6.8, 42	87: 5.9, 35 92: 5.4, 34 94: 13.5, 109 96: 15.7, 92 01: 12.0, 99 06: 12.3, 71 08: 37.4, 276 13: 21.56, 98	56: 6.5, 6 59: 7.7, 8 62: 7.0, 8 66: 5.4, 6 70: 5.5, 6 71: 5.5, 10 75: 5.4, 10 79: 6.1, 11 83: 5.0, 12	86: 9.7, 18 90: 16.6, 33 94: 22.5, 42 95: 21.9, 41 99: 26.9, 52 02: 10.0, 18 06: 11.0, 21 08: 17.5, 34 13: 20.5, 40	90: 8.95, 22 94: 7.02, 20 98: 28.18, 148 02: 41.07, 164	06: 42.03, 141 10: 52.73, 227 14: 44.87, 117	01: 9.5, 44 05: 27.0, 155 07: 32.1, 166	11: 29.9, 157 15: 37.6, 235
EP elections (%, seats)	79: 5.5, 4 84: 6.5, 5 89: 5.5, 4 94: 12.5, 11	99: 10.3, 9 04: 11.5, 9 09: 35.3, 29	96: 27.5, 6 99: 23.4, 5 04: 6.3, 1	09: 12.7, 2 14: 19.7, 4	04: 47.4, 12 09: 56.36, 14	14: 51.48, 11	04: 12.7, 7 09: 27.4, 15	14: 31.8, 19
Fractionalization	84: 0.75 88: 0.76 92: 0.76 96: 0.54	02: 0.51 06: 0.51 10: 0.68 14: 0.68	84: 0.56 88: 0.62 92: 0.67 96: 0.72 99: 0.72	02: 0.71 06: 0.66 10: 0.77 14: 0.77	02: 0.71 06: 0.55	10: 0.52 14: 0.50	02: 0.73 06: 0.77	10: 0.65 14: 0.67
Polarization	84: 2.48 88: 2.57 92: 2.58 96: 2.50 99: 1.97	02: 1.69 06: 2.09 10: 2.55 14: 2.25	84: 2.47 88: 2.60 92: 2.20 96: 2.13 99: 1.75	02: 2.14 06: 2.65 10: 2.48 14: 1.94	02: 2.16 06: 1.35	10: 2.15 14: 2.50	02: 1.91 06: 2.03	10: 2.17 14: 2.42
Gov't Participation	94-96 in PdL coalition 01-05 in CdL coalition 05-06 in CdL coalition Since 2008 merged into PdL		70-71 with SPÖ 83-86 with SPÖ 99-02 with Ö VP 02-05 with Ö VP		98-02 with FKGP, MDF 10-14 with KDNP 14-16 with KDNP		05-07 with SRP, LPR 15-16 with SP, PR, PRz	
Government Parties (years, names, ideology)	72-76: DC, PRI+(C) 76-79: DC 79-83: DC, PSDI, PLI (C) 83-94: DC, PSI+ (C) 94-96: PdL (R) 96-01: Olive (C) 01-06: CdL (R) 06-08: Olive (L) 08-13: PdL, LN, MPA (R) 13-16: PD, SEL, CD+ (C-L)		55-66: Ö VP, SPÖ (R+L) 66-70: Ö VP (R) 70-71: SPÖ, FPÖ (L) 71-83: SPÖ (L) 83-86: SPÖ, FPÖ (L) 86-99: SPÖ, Ö VP (L+R) 99-05: Ö VP, FPÖ (R) 05-07: Ö VP, BZÖ (R) 07-16: SPÖ, Ö VP (L+R)		90-94: MDF, FKGP, KDNP (R) 94-98: MSZP, SzDSz (L) 98-02: Fidesz, FKGP, MDF (R) 02-10: MSZP, SzDSz (L) 10-16: Fidesz (R)		89-91: PZPR, SOL, ZSL+(L+R) 91-93: UD, ZCH-N, PSL+ (R) 93-97: SLD, PSL (L) 97-01: AWS (R) 01-05: SLD-UP, PSL(R) 05-07: PiS, SRP, LPR (R) 07-15: PO, PSL (C-R) 15-16: PiS, SP, PR (R)	

Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2015

### 6.3.3 EU positions of the selected nationalist parties and factors that affect the changes

The Italian statewide nationalist party MSI-AN was described above.

#### 6.3.3.1 Austrian FPÖ

According to the CHES data, the Austrian statewide nationalist FPÖ's overall orientation toward European integration in 1984-2014 moved from positive to very negative: 6.4 in 1984, to 6.2 in 1988, to 3.8 in 1992, to 1.8 in 1996, to 2.6 in 1999, to 2.63 in 2002, to 1.75 in 2006, 10, and to 1.14 in 2014, and FPÖ's ideological stance moved from center-right to far-right (see Table 49). FPÖ stressed liberalism in the early years, but as its focus turned to policy-seeking FPÖ began to seek office from the late 1960s. This office-seeking strategy led the party to be in danger of going extinct due to its participation in the coalition government with SPÖ from 1983-1986. In 1986, the international criticism against the newly elected Austrian president's involvement in war crimes was counterproductive, and nationalistic sentiments rose high. As the leader of FPÖ, the newly elected Haider had support from conservative and Pan-German nationalist factions in the same year and exploited nationalistic sentiments among the Austrian public. FPÖ's nationalist view under Haider's leadership moved from pan-Germanism to Austrian patriotism, and the party went in a completely different direction: FPÖ moved away from liberalization, appealed to labor voters, focused on immigration, and kept anti-establishment and EU-skeptical positions. The more FPÖ moved to the right on the ideological spectrum, the more critical EU positions it took. According to MPD data, its positive mentions of the EU began to drop starting in 1986, and FPÖ's anti-EU positions became more critical and grew stronger in the 1990s. FPÖ opposed both EU membership in 1994 and Austria's accession to the EMU in 1998, while the two major parties supported them. Although 67% of Austrians supported Austria's EU accession in the 1994 referendum, only 40% of the population had a

positive view of the EU, and this positive opinion dropped to 34% after the accession. Meanwhile, another 40% of the population saw the EU negatively. These were FPÖ's targets, and the populist approach was its strategy to maximize votes. Since Haider took a confrontational or party-competition strategy to maximize votes, FPÖ's share of the vote dramatically increased and the party had unprecedented electoral victories before and after the EU accession. According to Luther (2007, 5), Haider realized that being part of the government was important for achieving goals, but a sufficient share of the vote capable of affecting the governing coalition must be a priority. In 1999, prospective incumbency led FPÖ to shift its strategy from anti-establishment to office-seeking and to modify its nationalistic and very anti-EU positions. However, the party met with internal resistance to the process of adaptation and accommodation and consequently Haider left the party in 2005. After the split, FPÖ was free from government responsibility and returned to a vote-maximizing strategy concentrating on radical right-wing issues. Consequently, its EU position became more skeptical.

#### 6.3.3.2 Hungarian Fidesz

In the early 1990s, Hungarians saw EU accession as a guarantee of democracy and prosperity. Although there were differences in negotiation strategy priorities, Hungarian mainstream parties were in support of Hungary's integration into the EU (Batory 2002, 3). The foreign policy of the governing MSZP-SzDSz coalition placed top priority on Hungary's fastest possible integration into Europe. Fidesz also took a positive stance toward the EU. An application for Hungary's EU membership was submitted in 1994, and EU accession negotiations began in 1998. As a governing party in 1998, the leftist-turned-nationalist-center-right Fidesz began to emphasize the national interest in Brussels and favored government intervention in the market and control over the speed of the EU enlargement process. According

to the CMP data, Fidesz's positive mentions of the EU increased until 1998 and then began to decline (0.78 in 1990, 0.47 in 1994, 3.54 in 1998, 1.67 in 2002, 1.23 in 2006, and 0.49 in 2010), though the party did not make any negative mentions. The change in Fidesz's rhetoric toward the EU during the 1990s is related to its remarkable ideological transformation. However, this is not to say that Fidesz opposed EU accession between 1998 and 2002. Fidesz pledged to take Hungary into the EU in its 1994 manifesto and focused on its efforts to protect Hungarian national interest in the EU accession negotiations in its 1998 manifesto (Batory 2002, 4). Moreover, the Fidesz-led government made considerable progress in the EU accession negotiations (Batory 2002, 5).

In the 2002 parliamentary election, MSZP (42%), Fidez-MDF (41.07%), and SzDSz (5.57%) dominated the Hungarian party system. At that time, Fidesz took a populist vote-maximization strategy to appeal to those who wanted to seek for stable EU membership and those who wanted to protect Hungarian land. The title "The future has started" and the heading "Hungary at the heart of Europe" in Fidesz's 2002 manifesto describe its pro-EU accession position to promote the national interest (Batory 2002, 4; Fidesz 2002). Fidesz also took an office-seeking strategy for potential or actual coalitions. Since the Hungarian government changed hands frequently between center-right and center-left coalitions since the early 1990s, Fidesz needed to adjust its policies on the issue of EU membership to secure electoral support. All of the parties that received representation in parliament supported EU accession in principle, and levels of public support for EU membership were also very high in the early 2000s. Thus, Fidesz's EU positions need to be understood in the dynamic context of inter-party relations in coalitions and electoral politics. Following the 2002 election, 83.8% of voters approved Hungary's EU accession in a referendum on EU membership held in 2003. According to the

CHES data, Fidesz's neutral EU positions moved to somewhat favor before and after Hungary's EU accession, then to oppose after securing Hungary's membership in the EU: 4.64 in 2002, 5.5 in 2006, 5.35 in 2010, and 2.71 in 2014. Starting in 2009, right-wing parties showed a rising trend. The radical nationalist JOBBIK, which sought to completely withdraw from the EU, won landslide victories. In response to the right-wing trend, Fidesz has shifted to a Euro-skeptic position. It has also provoked international criticism concerning its anti-democratic changes and building of a border fence since 2010.

#### 6.3.3.3 Polish PiS

European integration played a major role in transforming the Polish Communist political system into a democratic system and market economy. Since 1989, Poland's top priority was integration into Western European structures (Szczurbiak 2002, 3). In this situation, levels of public support for EU membership were very high, and most Polish political parties were in favor of EU accession during the 1990s. Under the SLD government, negotiations toward a Poland-EU Association Agreement began in 1991, and an application for full EU membership was submitted in 1994. The subsequent AWS government began formal EU accession negotiations in 1998, and the re-elected SLD government accelerated these negotiations in 2001. However, negative attitudes toward the EU began to rise in the early 2000s. In 2001, the highly EU-critical LPR and SRP and the broadly pro-EU opposition PO and PiS entered parliament. Meanwhile, public support for EU membership fell from about 80% in the early 1990s to between 55-60% in the late 1990s (Szczurbiak 2002, 9). Vermeersch (2008) argues that the rise of Euro-skepticism coincides with the resurgence of nationalist politics (1).

During the 2001 election campaign, PiS was in favor of European integration, but criticized SLD's election pledge to accelerate EU accession negotiations. That is, PiS used anti-

EU arguments for political purposes to oppose SLD although the party was broadly supportive of EU membership. The CMP data show that PiS's negative mentions of the EU (measures of EU negative mentions: 1.46 in 2001, 0.32 in 2005, 1.15 in 2007, and 0.93 in 2011) began to outweigh its positive mentions (measures of EU positive mentions: 0 in 2001, 0.64 in 2005, 0.69 in 2007, and 0.12 in 2011). During the 2005 election held after Poland's EU entry, PiS argued that deeper European integration would be a threat to Polish national identity (Vermeersch 2008, 1). Given that Poland was ensured EU membership, PiS became more critical toward the EU starting in the mid-2000s, along with its two radical nationalistic coalition partners LPR and SRP. In the 2010s, PiS has shown a somewhat less skeptical attitude toward the EU. The party supported economic integration and military cooperation to benefit Poland, but opposed further political integration resulting in a supranational EU. PiS has asserted a more flexible EU and wanted to keep the Polish national currency *zloty* until Poland's standard of living improved to a Western European level. According to the CHES data, PiS's overall orientation toward European integration over the period 2002-2014 moved from neutral to oppose and then to mildly oppose: 4.75 in 2002, 3.5 in 2006, 2.93 in 2010, and 3.82 in 2014. In short, PiS connected its SLD opposition with an anti-EU stance, and its attitudes toward European integration have been influenced by public opinion, EU membership assurance, and intraparty competition.

PiS and Fidesz are similar in many ways. First, since the fall of Communism, both parties placed priority on EU accession as driving forces of democracy and prosperity. Second, the former Communist parties regained power due to painful economic transitions and party organization in their early years. Third, former Communist-led governments in both countries led to EU accession negotiations, and PiS and Fidesz were broadly supportive of EU membership. Fourth, after Poland and Hungary acquired full EU membership, both PiS and Fidesz moved to

more EU-skeptic positions, and their anti-EU arguments were part of their opposition strategies to differentiate themselves from leading pro-European former Communist parties. Fifth, PiS and Fidesz changed their EU positions flexibly to maximize their share of votes: PiS responded differently to EU policies, while Fidesz changed its ideological stances from liberal to right. Sixth, the attitudes of PiS and Fidesz toward European integration have been influenced by public opinion: in accordance with the majority opinion, both parties pledged to take their respective countries into the EU before EU accession, and they took more critical stances after EU accession. Seventh, both parties' EU stances changed in the dynamic context of intraparty competition, interparty relations in coalitions, and electoral politics. They adjusted their EU stances for potential or actual coalitions and changed their positions depending on their main opposition. While PiS has not been forced to move to a more radical position by the mild opposition PO, Fidesz has recently moved to a more anti-European position in response to the rise in popularity of radical nationalist JOBBIK.

#### 6.3.3.4 Brief party comparison

While the EU positions of Austria's FPÖ, Hungary's Fidesz, and Poland's PiS have become more critical, the EU position of Italy's MSI-AN moved from very critical to favorable. The four statewide nationalist parties in the 2010s are located between 6.88 and 8.93 on the ideological spectrum (0 = extreme left, 5.5 = center, 10 = right). While extreme statewide nationalist parties moved toward the center (i.e., MSI-AN), center-right statewide nationalist parties moved more right (i.e., FPÖ, Fidesz, and PiS). That is, these four statewide nationalist parties seem not only to be differentiating themselves from other centrist pro-EU mainstream parties but also to be avoiding too extreme positions in order to have better election results. That

is, their changes in ideology seem to be related to their vote-seeking motives. Indeed, support for these four statewide nationalist parties has steadily increased over the study period.

These parties compete in multi-party systems with 4% (e.g. MSI-AN and FPÖ) or 5% (Fidesz and PiS) thresholds. These electoral systems play an important role in removing small parties from parliament, and thus parties that could not cross a threshold on their own need to ally with other parties for survival. In other words, party size matters in this kind of system.

MSI-AN is such a case. Due to public concern over its past fascist tendencies, MSI-AN did not have good election results in its early years and thus the party decided to ally with other parties for its survival. Since the main government or opposition party also needed to be allied to secure stable government, MSI-AN could take an office-seeking strategy to become a coalition partner. The party also took a vote-seeking strategy to cross the 2% threshold for parties in coalition. MSI-AN stayed inside the center-right coalition to avoid the risk of holding no seats in a very competitive environment and to rehabilitate its past image in an atmosphere of rejecting fascism. For this purpose, MSI-AN presumed to adjust its policies, ideologies or EU positions in the process of integrating with center-right parties. Instead of using anti-establishment and anti-EU strategies, MSI-AN tried to be part of the establishment and thus used moderate and compromising strategies toward domestic and EU issues.

FPÖ is a similar case. Since the Austrian party system is dominated by two main parties, FPÖ had a slim chance to come to power and thus endeavored to be a coalition partner. However this was not easy because most of time one of the major parties won the majority. Once FPÖ allied with SPÖ in the mid-1980s, FPÖ was faced with extinction due to internal conflicts and was not able to affect the coalition government with SPÖ due to its small share of the vote. After FPÖ experienced internal resistance and decreased share of vote due to government coalition, the

party returned to vote-maximization strategy from office-seeking and tried to differentiate itself from other major parties by using nationalist-populist and anti-establishment appeal in an atmosphere of rising Austrian patriotism that is hostile to immigration and European integration. Later, FPÖ began to moderate their anti-EU stances to seek office when the party gained sufficient share of the vote incapable of affecting coalition. However, FPÖ returned to vote-maximization strategy again and began to use more radical nationalistic and populist rhetoric after the split with pragmatic leadership over office-seeking strategy. While MSI-AN pursued vote-maximization moderately inside a big electoral coalition due to institutional constraints, FPÖ used anti-establishment and nationalist appeals such as strict control on immigration to maximize votes without allying with less radical parties.

On the other hand, although the two Eastern statewide nationalist parties (Fidesz and PiS) competed with other parties in multi-party systems with a 5% threshold, there have been no dominant parties since the fall of Communism and thus they could obtain good election results by taking populist approaches and flexible EU positions.

All four statewide nationalist parties have experience of being part of coalition governments. MSI-AN was in government from 1994-1996, from 2001-2005, and from 2005-2006 as a right-wing coalition partner; FPÖ was in government from 1970-1971 and 1983-1986 with SPÖ and from 1999-2002 and 2002-2005 with Ö VP; Fidesz was in government from 1998-2002 with FKGP and MDF and from 2010-2014 with KDNP and has been in power since 2014 with KDNP as of 2016; and PiS was in government from 2005-2007 with SRP and LPR, and has been in power since 2015 with SP and PR. The parties' EU positions during their government years are a bit more favorable than their positions during opposition years except for Fidesz,

which took more critical positions during the 2014-2016 government years due to the rise of radical nationalist JOBBIK.







Along with party characteristics and party system, changes in the opportunity structure have affected these parties' EU positions. The collapse of Italian mainstream parties in the early 1990s provided chances of electoral success for fringe parties such as MSI-AN. By avoiding controversial issues, MSI-AN tried to entrench its leading position within the center-right coalition. Along with its ideological change, MSI-AN's EU position became more favorable. International criticism of Austria's new president Kurt Waldheim's involvement in war crimes in 1986 sparked Austrian national feeling, and FPÖ took advantage of the moment. Moreover, FPÖ gained strong support before and after Austria's EU accession in 1995. Hungary's EU membership in 2004 and the nationwide anti-government protests in 2006 led Fidesz to take a more Euro-skeptic position and since then Fidesz has had good election results. EU accession in Poland led PiS to use anti-EU arguments to oppose the governing pro-EU SLD party.

In addition, increased immigration and refugee flow have become critical national issues in all four countries. During the past half-century Austria's immigrant population has remained a high percentage of the total population, and Italy's immigrant population grew 12.5 times. Total immigrant population has dropped in Hungary and Poland, but unprecedented refugee flows have caused various social problems. In light of the increasing importance of immigration as a political issue, while MSI-AN abstained from using inflammatory rhetoric despite its opposition to illegal immigration, FPÖ accused immigrants of taking jobs, leading to higher unemployment and demanded stricter anti-immigration policies (Fella and Ruzza 2007, 214).

Moreover, public opinion matters for nationalist parties' EU positions. According to the Eurobarometer survey data, while Italy and Poland have relatively positive attitudes toward the

EU, Austria and Hungary have relatively negative attitudes (See Figure 13). Specifically, an average of 67% of Italy's population, 60% of Poland's population, 38% of Hungary's population and 37% of Austria's population said their country's EU membership is a good thing, and Italian, Polish and Hungarian people trust the EU more than they trust their national governments, while the Austrian people trust their national government more than they trust the EU. First, the Italian statewide nationalist party MSI-AN bears out the negative association of public opinion with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions from the quantitative analysis. While public opinion in Italy toward the EU became less positive over time, MSI-AN's EU positions changed from oppose to favor. This change reflected broader public sentiment in favor of the EU. Second, Austria's negative attitudes toward the EU have been relatively stable for the past 20 years, and the Austrian statewide nationalist party FPÖ's EU positions reflect Austria's broad EU-skeptical public sentiment and its contrary position to the two other major parties' pro-EU positions. Third, although public trust in the EU is decreasing, public opinion in Poland toward the EU is relatively supportive and stable. The Polish statewide nationalist party PiS has resonated with broader public sentiment in favor of the EU as one of Poland's leading major parties. Finally, the Hungarian statewide nationalist party Fidesz's positive EU attitudes before and after Hungary's accession to the EU reflect favorable public sentiment and the need for EU membership. Fidesz's shift toward being more skeptical of the EU reflects a growing negative public sentiment toward the EU. That is, public opinion toward Europe has influenced nationalist parties to articulate their EU positions, but the direction of their action compared to public opinion can be different.

Figure 13. [Italy vs. Austria vs. Poland vs. Hungary] Public Opinion on the EU, 1973-2014



Source: Standard Eurobarometer

In short, statewide nationalist parties moderated their ideological stances when they sought to become part of the establishment, and thus their EU position has been compromised in light of their office-seeking goals. Moreover, government participation also can moderate statewide nationalist parties' EU positions, and party size may matter in terms of party competition in different party system structures. The party system itself can lead similar parties to take different approaches in response to different institutional constraints. Furthermore, changes in opportunity structure have affected these parties' strategies and EU positions, and public opinion also matters despite different directions for the country.

#### 6.4 SUMMARY

After taking all into consideration, ideological extremity, party size, government participation, and party competition were key factors in making different types of change in the four nationalist parties' EU positions.

First, during the period of 1984-2014, MSI-AN's negative EU position changed to positive when its ideology moved to the center from the extreme right, and FPÖ's positive EU position changed to negative when its ideology moved to the extreme from the center-right. These results support the negative associations of ideological extremity with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions. Meanwhile, Fidesz and PiS were situated between the center-right and the right on the ideological spectrum during 2002-2014, and their EU positions have oscillated between mildly oppose and mildly favorable. All four cases bear out the negative association of ideological extremity with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions that I found from the quantitative analysis.

Second, Western statewide nationalist parties' radical changes in their ideologies and Eastern statewide nationalist parties' negligible changes seem to be driven by party size. MSI-AN needed to form coalitions to survive due to changed electoral law and thus had to modify their extreme policies, and FPÖ moved to the extreme and exploited renewed national feeling when it faced the possibility of extinction in the next elections due to very low share of the vote under the two-party dominant Austrian party system. Meanwhile, Fidesz and PiS took vote-maximization strategies to become governing parties during their early years within highly fractionalized party systems after the fall of communism and then maintained moderate positions during 2002-2014 so as not to lose their large share of the vote. These results support the positive associations of party size with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions. While MSI-AN, FPÖ until the mid-1980s, Fidesz, and PiS bear out the positive association of party size with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions that I found from the quantitative analysis, FPÖ since the late-1980s does not work in the expected direction. This could be the result not only of FPÖ's anti-establishment appeal in a system in which two pro-EU major political parties dominate, but also of FPÖ's populist appeal to EU-negative public opinion. That is, country-level differences may lead nationalist parties to take a different position toward the EU.

Third, wanting to be in office comes into play. In order to return to normal Italian politics, MSI-AN was rehabilitated and its EU positions moved to positive in the process of adjusting their extreme policies to keep a coalition partner role in government. FPÖ showed less extreme and less anti-EU sentiment during its government years to silence the voice of criticism and negative opinions about its government participation from the international community. After government years, it returned to extreme and strongly negative EU positions. Meanwhile, Fidesz and PiS, both of which have high chances of winning elections as main governing or main

opposition parties, have not taken extreme ideology and strong negative EU positions as they seek office. These results support the positive associations of government participation with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions. While MSI-AN, FPÖ, Fidesz until the early 2010s, and PiS bear out the positive association of government experience with statewide nationalist parties' EU positions that I found from the quantitative analysis, Fidesz since the mid-2010s does not work in the expected direction. This is due to a change in party competition, specifically the appearance and sudden rise of a new political party (JOBBIK) that targets the same voters. That is, a change in the party system may lead nationalist parties to take a different position toward the EU.

Finally, party competition affects nationalist parties' EU positions. In particular, EU positions are likely change depending who the party's main rivals are and what EU positions they have. SPÖ's negative EU positions changed to positive in the mid-1980s and ÖVP's neutral EU position changed to positive in the late-1980s. FPÖ's changed EU positions from positive to negative in the late-1980s seem to be related to SPÖ and ÖVP's changed positions as part of anti-establishment strategies. Likewise, Fidesz and PiS's main rivals MSZP and PO have positive EU positions, and Fidesz and PiS seem to want to differentiate themselves from them. JOBBIK has emerged as Fidesz's new main rival since 2014, and its strong anti-EU position has pressured Fidesz to take a more negative EU position.

## CHAPTER 7

### RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

I set out to explore the positions of different types of nationalist parties toward European integration since the mid-1980s and trace factors and dynamics that shape party behavior regarding European integration. I also sought to know how nationalist parties adopt strategies for European integration. The general theoretical literature on this subject has made the mistake of making generalizations with a small number of cases or put all nationalist parties together in traditional/authoritarian/nationalist group regardless of nationalist parties' different characteristics. Unlike previous studies, I narrowed the focus to nationalist parties and differentiated between statewide and minority nationalist parties, and then examined all nationalist parties which have gained seats in elections in EU member countries from 1984 to 2014 based on aggregated data, broadened the scope to include both Western and Eastern European countries, and tested party-level and country-level determinants of parties' positions on European integration. The study sought to answer the following questions:

1. How have nationalist parties responded to the EU over time?
2. What factors affect nationalist parties' EU positions over time?
3. How have nationalist parties changed their strategies in response to the impact of the process of European integration?

The main findings are chapter-specific and were summarized within the respective chapters: Chapter 3 (Nationalist parties in the integration of Europe), Chapter 5 (Statistical

analysis), and Chapter 6 (Case-studies). This section will synthesize the findings to answer the study's research questions.

Recent trends of nationalist parties as described in Chapter 3 and multilevel modeling carried out in Chapter 5 answer question 1:

1. How have nationalist parties responded to the EU over time?

The recent trends of nationalist parties as described in Chapter 3 show that the rise of nationalist parties varies depending on individual countries. There is growing support for nationalist parties in 17 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK) and the Basque country in Spain. On the other hand, there are decreasing trends in four countries (Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia) and most sub-state regions (except Basque country in Spain). Support for nationalist parties has been fluctuating in five countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Romania). Nationalist parties have little influence in Portugal. In other words, rising support for nationalist parties is prevalent in most Western European countries, and the rise of nationalist parties in those countries seems to be a constant phenomenon. However, these trends do not remain common in all EU member countries. Since support from some types of nationalist parties has grown, European integration and nationalism are not necessarily in competition. Rather, European integration exists alongside growing nationalism in some countries and decreasing nationalism in other countries.

The CHES data show that nationalist parties do not have coherent orientations toward European integration. They have changed their EU positions over time to greater or lesser degrees and have not been consistently anti-EU nor pro-EU. Rather, nationalist parties react to European integration in different ways, and their EU positions have been affected by many

different factors. Moreover, I found that statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties respond to the EU differently over time. Minority nationalist parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward European integration than statewide nationalist parties. The type of nationalist party is one of the most influential factor that affects nationalist parties' EU positions, although EU positions of statewide and minority nationalist parties have not been consistent either.

Multilevel modeling carried out in Chapter 5 answers question 2:

2. What factors affect nationalist parties' EU positions over time?

Factors that affect positions toward the EU vary depending on the type of nationalist parties. Four party-level factors (ideological extremity, party type, party size, and government participation) and two country-level factors (party system polarization and length of EU membership) affect the EU positions of nationalist parties as a whole. Multilevel modeling results of possible determinants of nationalist parties' EU positions show that

- (a) ideologically centered nationalist parties are more positive toward the EU than ideologically extreme nationalist parties,
- (b) minority nationalist parties are more positive than statewide nationalist parties,
- (c) electorally more successful nationalist parties are more positive than less successful nationalist parties,
- (d) nationalist parties with government experience are more positive than nationalist parties without government experience,
- (e) nationalist parties in states with higher levels of party system polarization are more positive, and

- (f) nationalist parties in states with a shorter EU membership are more positive than nationalist parties in states with a longer EU membership.

Four party-level factors (ideology, ideological extremity, party size, and government participation) and four country-level factors (party system fractionalization, party system polarization, GDP, and public opinion) affect the EU positions of statewide nationalist parties. Multilevel modeling results of possible determinants of nationalist parties' EU positions show that

- (a) statewide nationalist parties situated more to the left on the ideological spectrum are more positive,
- (b) ideologically centered statewide nationalist parties are more positive toward the EU than ideologically extreme statewide nationalist parties,
- (c) electorally more successful statewide nationalist parties are more positive than less successful statewide nationalist parties,
- (d) statewide nationalist parties with government experience are more positive than statewide nationalist parties without government experience,
- (e) statewide nationalist parties in states with higher levels of party system fractionalization are more negative,
- (f) statewide nationalist parties in states with higher levels of party system polarization are more positive,
- (g) statewide nationalist parties in states with a weak economy are more positive, and
- (h) statewide nationalist parties in states with less favorable public opinion toward the EU are more positive.

Two party-level factors (ideology and ideological extremity) and five country-level factors (party system fractionalization, length of EU membership, receiving EU subsidies, GDP, and public opinion) affect the EU positions of minority nationalist parties. Multilevel modeling results of possible determinants of nationalist parties' EU positions show that

- (a) minority nationalist parties situated more to the right on the ideological spectrum are more positive (the opposite of the SWNP finding),
- (b) ideologically centered minority nationalist parties are more positive toward the EU than minority nationalist parties situated more to the extreme, either left or right, on the ideological spectrum,
- (c) minority nationalist parties in states with higher levels of party system fractionalization are more positive,
- (d) minority nationalist parties in a state with a shorter EU membership are more positive,
- (e) minority nationalist parties in a state with less EU subsidies are more positive,
- (f) minority nationalist parties in a state with a strong economy are more positive than those in a state with a weak economy (the opposite of the SWNP finding),
- (g) minority nationalist parties in a state with less favorable public opinion toward the EU are more positive, and
- (h) minority nationalist parties in poor regions are more positive.

Nevertheless, the impacts of ideological extremity and party size on both statewide and minority nationalist parties are mediated by the level of party system fractionalization, polarization, or both. First, the negative impacts of ideological extremity on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties are weakened when there are higher levels of party system fractionalization. When the impact of ideological extremity in an unfractionalized party

system is added to the impact on a fractionalized party system, ideological extremity has less negative impact on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties in fractionalized party systems. Thus, extreme (statewide) nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear negative attitude toward European integration within a highly fractionalized party system. Second, the negative impacts of ideological extremity on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties are strengthened when there are higher levels of party system polarization. When the impact of ideological extremity in an unpolarized party system is added to the impact in a polarized party system, ideological extremity has a more negative impact on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties. Thus, extreme (statewide) nationalist parties will be more likely to have a clearer negative attitude toward European integration within a highly polarized party system. Third, the positive impacts of party size on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties are weakened when there are higher levels of party system polarization. Adding up the impact of party size on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties in an unpolarized party system and in a polarized party system, party size has a less positive impact on all nationalist parties combined and on statewide nationalist parties in polarized party systems. Thus, larger (statewide) nationalist parties will be more likely to have a less clear positive attitude toward European integration within a highly polarized party system.

In sum, party-level variables are important determinants of nationalist parties' EU positions, but various components at the country level also matter. In particular, length of EU membership, receiving EU subsidies, GDP, and public opinion are found to matter either for statewide or minority nationalist parties, and these matter more for minority nationalist parties

than for statewide nationalist parties. In addition, political context matters, and it matters differently for statewide nationalist parties and minority nationalist parties.

Three sets of case-studies conducted in Chapter 6 answer question 3:

3. How have nationalist parties changed their strategies in response to the impact of the process of European integration?

I found that nationalist parties' strategies are changeable over time. The six nationalist parties examined in the case studies do not always bear out my findings from the quantitative analyses, but they work in the expected direction most of the time (i.e, all cases showed more negative EU attitudes when they moved to the extreme on either right or left, and most cases showed more positive EU attitudes when they had more electoral gains or government experience), and clearly show strategic changes.

The Italian LN has changed its EU positions and strategies along with its electoral competition, government participation (1994, 2001-2006, 2008-2011), and changes in the opportunity structure (EMU accession in 1998). LN has used different strategies to achieve better electoral results and more political influence, including anti-establishment and vote maximization in its early years, office-seeking in the mid-1990s, vote and policy seeking after its government experience in 1994, office-seeking in the late 1990s, policy-seeking as a government partner in the 2000s, and distinctiveness strategy as an opposition party in the 2010s. Along with changing strategies, LN's EU position moved from pro-European in the beginning, to skeptical after Italy's EMU accession, to more skeptical during the party's survival crisis, to mild skeptical to gain government influence, and to hard skeptical as an opposition party.

The Italian MSI-AN's strategies and EU positions were affected by electoral competition, government participation, and changes in the opportunity structure. MSI-AN tried to rehabilitate

its fascist image and gain credibility from the mainstream parties from its foundation until the 1980s. Changes in the opportunity structure (the political corruption scandal and collapse of mainstream parties) in the early 1990s extended its reach in Italian politics. The party changed its name and tried to avoid controversial issues by supporting both liberal and conservative policies in the 1990s and 2000s. AN's office-seeking direction was revised from salvaging its image to entrenching its leading position within the center-right coalition. MSI-AN's EU position changed along with its ideological change. Its office-seeking goals and party competition within its coalition led EU-skeptical MSI to become somewhat favorable AN in the 2000s.

The Austrian FPÖ's strategies and EU positions were affected by its electoral competition and government participation. The policy-seeking liberal FPÖ began to seek office from the late 1960s. However, FPÖ's survival crisis due to its office-seeking strategy in the 1980s led the party to move from a liberal to a nationalist conservative ideology and to adopt vote-seeking and anti-establishment strategies. When FPÖ became a competitive party in the late 1990s, it pursued office-seeking and modified its radical stances. In the mid-2000s, after resuming its position as an opposition party due to internal resistance and a subsequent split, FPÖ took a populist vote-maximizing strategy by focusing on right-wing issues. Along with its changes in strategies, FPÖ's EU positions moved from positive to very negative from 1984 to 2014 and were somewhat less critical during its years in government.

The SNP changed its anti-EU accession position in the 1970s to pro-EU in the late 1980s. Since then, the SNP has pragmatically kept pro-European stances despite opposition to some EU policies. Changes in the opportunity structure (discovery of North Sea oil in 1969, Thatcher's strong drive for neoliberal policies, and creation of an autonomous Scottish parliament) have affected the strategies and EU positions of the UK's SNP. The SNP used policy-seeking

strategies until the 1960s and then adopted vote-maximizing strategies since the late 1960s. Under threat of Thatcher's centralization in the 1980s, the SNP took a pro-independence strategy and saw Europe as a means to achieve Scottish independence by bypassing the UK central government. Since the late 1990s, the creation of an autonomous Scottish parliament increased the SNP's chances of winning elections, and it adopted vote-maximizing and office-seeking strategies.

The Hungarian Fidesz's strategies and EU positions were affected by its electoral competition and changes in the opportunity structure (EU accession). Electoral disaffection in the early 1990s led Fidesz to take vote-maximizing strategies and shift from a liberal to a conservative, right-wing ideology. Fidesz focused on efforts to protect Hungarian national interest in the EU accession negotiations but also supported EU accession, and the Fidesz-led government made considerable progress in the EU accession negotiation between 1998 and 2002. Fidesz engaged in populist vote-maximization and office-seeking strategies. Changes in the opportunity structure (securing EU membership in 2004, nationwide anti-government protests in 2006, and a rising trend of radical right-wing parties in the late 2000s) have led Fidesz to take a more Euro-skeptic position.

The Polish PiS's strategies and EU positions were affected by its electoral competition and changes in the opportunity structure (EU accession). PiS used a vote-maximizing strategy in the early 2000s and was broadly supportive of EU membership, but used anti-EU arguments to oppose the governing SLD party. In the later 2000s and early 2010s, PiS kept focusing on electoral considerations and sought to maximize its share of votes and office, responding to the EU in a pragmatic manner. Once Poland was assured of EU membership, PiS became more critical toward the EU since the mid-2000s and experienced electoral successes. In an effort to

gain office, PiS has been somewhat less skeptical toward the EU in the 2010s and came back into power in 2015.

Next, I found that nationalist parties have refined their goals and altered their strategies for obtaining these goals as a result of the opportunities presented by European integration. European integration has affected nationalist parties, but it has not affected them all equally. Thus, they respond to European integration in neither unconditionally supportive nor straightforwardly skeptical ways over time. The relationship between nation-states and the EU is complicated, and nationalist parties respond to the EU very pragmatically depending on the degree to which they see advantages and party competition in supporting or opposing it.

Finally, I found that nationalist parties are not consistently anti-EU nor pro-EU. They respond to the EU in different ways, and there are disparities of degrees of anti-EU and pro-EU stances. EU positions of nationalist parties change in response to many different factors that vary depending on nationalist parties' characteristics, party system structures and the characteristics of the respective countries they belong to. The empirical study found that (a) ideologically extreme nationalist parties respond more negatively to the EU than centered nationalist parties, (b) statewide nationalist parties respond more negatively than minority nationalist parties, (c) smaller nationalist parties respond more negatively than larger nationalist parties, (d) nationalist parties within a highly fractionalized party system respond more negatively, and (e) nationalist parties within a highly polarized party system respond more positively when country-level variables and interaction terms are controlled for, and (f) nationalist parties in a country with a longer EU membership respond more negatively than nationalist parties in a country with a shorter EU membership.

Nationalist parties' strategies are changeable over time. Depending on their motives, in terms of prioritizing votes versus office versus policy, party competition structure, institutional conditions such as electoral arrangements, resources available, and changes in political structure opportunities, they modify their strategies and EU positions in a very pragmatic way. Case-studies showed that these strategies and positions are different depending on whether the party focuses more on policy preferences or more on electoral politics. Ideology did not seem to matter to some nationalist parties for achieving their electoral goals.

In addition, the same factors affect nationalist parties differently depending on which countries they belong to. Furthermore, compared to Western statewide nationalist parties' EU positions, which have been affected by ideology, the size of the state, the size of the immigrant population, and economic conditions, my case studies showed that Eastern European statewide nationalist parties' EU positions have not been much affected by these factors. Rather, their positions have been affected by changes in the political opportunity structure such as EU accession and party competition. In addition, nationalist parties have been more powerful in Eastern European politics than in Western European politics.

This study relies on aggregated data over a 30-year period of all nationalist parties in both Western and Eastern EU member countries to investigate the attitudes and behaviors of all kinds of contemporary nationalist parties toward European integration. The approach of looking for patterns in a large number of cases contributes to overcoming limitations of existing studies that are based on a small number of cases and allows more valid generalizations about the nature of nationalist parties in the European context. Previous studies on the EU positions of nationalist parties based on a small number of cases need to be replicated in order to further understand the dynamic of nationalist parties in the European integration process for the future of the EU.

This study was conducted with CHES data, which do not directly measure party positions based on election manifestos or media statements but rely on interpretations of party reputation by country experts. Furthermore, the CHES data do not cover the whole 30 years from 1984 to 2014 for countries that joined the EU after 1984. As a direct consequence of this methodology, the study encountered a number of limitations which need to be considered. First, since expert survey data depend on only the materials that experts investigated, the validity of the data may be limited because experts may not be able to cover all materials and because some nationalist parties do not reveal their EU positions in their manifestos. Second, since the CHES data have been collected since 1984, there is a limitation in showing all changes. For example, the SNP's EU positions represented in the CHES data have not changed much since 1984, but their actual position shifted from negative in the 1970s to positive in the 1980s. Third, the EU positions of most Eastern European nationalist parties in the CHES data have only been collected since the early 2000s, thus there is a limitation in comparing Western nationalist parties and Eastern nationalist parties with only the empirical data. Fourth, when nationalist parties merged into non-nationalist parties, there is a limitation in separating them from the non-nationalist parties. Thus, the years after merging were excluded from data collection. Fifth, the study had to rely on English language sources, which meant I was limited to secondary sources. To overcome the limitations of the CHES data, there is need for more case studies to allow further assessment of the details of the subject.

In spite of what is often reported about the relationship of nationalist parties to the EU in theoretical and policy debates, it is clear that European integration has not weakened nationalism, and nation-states are still the most important decision-makers in integrated Europe. The relationship between nationalist parties and European integration is flexible, and nationalist

parties respond to the EU pragmatically. These findings have important implications not only for the EU but also for regional integration processes in other regions. These help us understand that parties react differently based on the dynamics of their domestic party system and environment and also suggest that we need to consider the national context to understand the regional integration process. Therefore, this dissertation can be seen as a step toward a more thorough analysis of the interaction between regional integration and national-level factors.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix (1) 105 Nationalist Parties in Total

- CMP DATA – 70 NAT(Nationalist) Family & 90 ETH(Ethnic/Regionalist) Family
- CHES DATA – RADRT(Radical Right) Family & REG(Regionalist/Ethnic) Family  
 “One of the main defining features of radical right parties is their strong nationalism ... For all of the radical right parties, the preservation of national identity is paramount (Givens 2005: 35-36)”

- CHES DATA – Position toward Nationalism  $\geq 8$  (0: Strongly Promotes cosmopolitanism / 10: Strongly Promotes nationalism)

BE	1.	VU; N-VA (People's Union; New Flemish Alliance)	[CHES 110: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	2.	FDJ; RW (Francophone Democratic Front)	[CHES 111: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2014]	
	3.	VB (Flemish Bloc; Flemish Interest)	[CHES 112: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	4.	ID21 (ID21)	[CHES 114: 1999]	
	5.	FN (National Front)	[CHES 115: 1999, 2010]	
	6.	PP (People's Party)	[CHES 120: 2014]	
FR	1.	FN (National Front)	[CHES 610: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	2.	RPF/MPF (Rally for France / Movement for France)	[CHES 612: 1996, 1999, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	3.	MN (National Republican Movement)	[CHES 620: 1999]	
DE	1.	REP (Republikaner)	[CHES 305: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]	
	2.	DVU; NPD (German People's Union; National Democratic Party of Germany)	[CHES 309: 1999, 2014]	
	3.	AfD (Alternative for Germany)	[CHES 310: 2014]	
IT	4.	MSI/AN (Italian Social Movement - National Alliance)	[CHES 805: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010]	
	5.	LN (Lega Nord - Northern League)	[CHES 811: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	6.	MS-FT (Tricolor Flame Social Movement)	[CHES 821: 1999]	
	7.	PsDA (Sardinian Action Party)	[CHES 824: 1999]	
	8.	SVP (South Tyrolean People's Party)	[CHES 827: 1999, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	9.	MpA (Movement for Autonomies)	[CHES 840: 2010]	
	10.	FDL (Brothers of Italy)	[CHES 844: 2014]	
	NL	11.	SGP (Political Reformed Party)	[CHES 1006/1019: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2010, 2014]
		12.	CD (Center Democrats)	[CHES 1009: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]
		13.	LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn)	[CHES 1015: 2002]
14.		PVV (Party for Freedom)	[CHES 1017: 2006; 2010; 2014]	
15.		PvdD (Party for the Animals)	[CHES 1018: 2010; 2014]	
LU	16.	ADR (Alternative Democratic Reform Party)	[CHES 3805: 2014]	
	17.	FP (Progress Party)	[CHES 212: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]	
DK	18.	DF (Danish People's Party)	[CHES 215: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	19.	GP (Green Party)	[CHES 705: 2006]	
IE	20.	SF (Sinn Fein / We Ourselves)	[CHES 707: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	21.	SNP (Scottish National Party)	[CHES 1105: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
UK	22.	CYMRU/PLAID (Plaid Cymru – Party of Wales)	[CHES 1106: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	23.	UKIP (UK Independence Party)	[CHES 1108: 1999, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	24.	BNP (British National Party)	[CHES 1109: 2010]	
	25.	LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally)	[CHES 410: 2006, 2010, 2014]	
GR	26.	ANEL (Independent Greeks)	[CHES 412: 2014]	
	27.	XA (Popular Association - Golden Dawn)	[CHES 415: 2014]	
	28.	CiU (Convergence and Union)	[CHES 505: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
ES	29.	PNV (Basque Nationalist Party)	[CHES 506: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	30.	EA (Eusko Alkartasuna - Basque Solidarity)	[CHES 507: 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	31.	HB/EH (Euskal Herriarrok-We Basque Citizens)	[CHES 508: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]	
	32.	PSE/EE (Euskal Ezkerra - Basque Left)	[CHES 509: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996]	
	33.	PAR (Aragonese Party)	[CHES 510: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]	
	34.	ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia)	[CHES 511: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	35.	UV (Valencian Union)	[CHES 512: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999]	
	36.	BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc)	[CHES 513: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	37.	PA (Andalusian Party)	[CHES 516: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2002]	
	38.	CC (Coalicion Canaria)	[CHES 517: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]	
	39.	IC (Initiative for Catalonia)	[CHES 518: 1999]	

	40. CHA (Aragonese Council)	[CHES 520: 2006, 2010]
	41. CpE (Coalition for Europe)	[CHES 521: 2010]
	42. Amaiur (Amaiur)	[CHES 524: 2014]
<b>AT</b>	43. FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria)	[CHES 1303: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	44. GRÜNE (The Austrian Green Party)	[CHES 1304: 2010]
	45. BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	[CHES 1307: 2006, 2010, 2014]
<b>FI</b>	46. PS (True Finns)	[CHES 1405: 1999, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	47. RKP/SFP (Swedish People's Party)	[CHES 1406: 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
<b>SE</b>	48. NyD (New Democracy)	[CHES 1608: 1992, 1996, 1999]
	49. SD (Sweden Democrats)	[CHES 1610: 2010, 2014]
<b>CY</b>	50. DISY (Democratic Rally)	[CHES 4001: 2014]
	51. EVROKO (European Party)	[CHES 4002: 2014]
<b>CZ</b>	52. VV (Public Affairs)	[CHES 2110: 2010]
	53. USVUT (Dawn of Direct Democracy)	[CHES 2112: 2014]
<b>EE</b>	54. IRL (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union)	[CHES 2201: 2006, 2010, 2014]
	55. KP (Constitution Party)	[CHES 2205: 2006]
<b>HG</b>	56. Fidesz (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union)	[CHES 2302: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	57. MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party)	[CHES 2305: 2002]
	58. KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party)	[CHES 2307: 2006, 2010]
	59. JOBBIK (Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary)	[CHES 2308: 2010, 2014]
<b>LV</b>	60. TB-LNNK/NA (National Alliance-For Fatherland & Freedom)	[CHES 2406: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	61. SC (Harmony Center)	[CHES 2410: 2006]
<b>LT</b>	62. LRS (Lithuanian Russian Union)	[CHES 2503: 2002]
	63. LLRA (Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles)	[CHES 2511: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	64. LLS (Lithuanian Liberty Union)	[CHES 2512: 2002]
	65. JL-PKS (Young Lithuania - New Nationalists & Political Prisoner's Union)	[CHES 2513: 2002]
	66. DK (The Way of Courage)	[CHES 2520: 2014]
<b>PL</b>	67. PiS (Law and Justice Party)	[CHES 2605: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	68. LPR (League of Polish Families)	[CHES 2607: 2002, 2006, 2010]
	69. KNP (Congress of the New Right)	[CHES 2614: 2014]
	70. SP (United Poland)	[CHES 2616: 2014]
<b>SK</b>	71. HZDS (People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)	[CHES 2801: 2002, 2006, 2010]
	72. SMK/SMK-MKP (Party of the Hungarian Coalition)	[CHES 2808: 2002]
	73. PSNS (Right Slovak National Party)	[CHES 2809: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	74. SNS (Slovak National Party)	[CHES 2810: 2002]
	75. HZD (Movement for Democracy)	
<b>SI</b>	76. SDSS/SDS (Social Democratic Party of Slovenia; Slovenian Democratic Party)	[CHES 2902: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	77. SLS/SKD/SMS (Slovenian People's Party - Slovenian Christian Democrats)	[CHES 2904: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	78. SNS (Slovenian National Party)	[CHES 2907: 2002, 2006, 2010]
<b>BG</b>	79. NDSV (National Movement Simeon II)	[CHES 2001: 2006]
	80. DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedom)	[CHES 2004: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	81. VMRO-BND (VMRO-Bulgarian National Movement)	[CHES 2005: 2014]
	82. NOA/ATAKA (National Union Attack)	[CHES 2007: 2006, 2010, 2014]
	83. NFSB (National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria)	[CHES 2014: 2014]
	84. BBT (Bulgaria without Censorship)	[CHES 2015: 2014]
<b>RO</b>	85. PRM (Party of Great Romania)	[CHES 2703: 2002, 2006, 2010]
	86. UDMR (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania)	[CHES 2706: 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014]
	87. FDGR (Democratic Forum of Germans of Romania)	[CHES 2708: 2006]
	88. UNPR (National Union for the Progress of Romania)	[CHES 2709: 2014]
	89. PP-DD (People's Party - Dan Diaconescu)	[CHES 2710: 2014]
<b>HR</b>	90. HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union)	[CHES 3101: 2014]
	91. HSS (Croatian Peasant Party)	[CHES 3103: 2014]
	92. IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly)	[CHES 3106: 2014]
	93. HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja)	[CHES 3107: 2014]
	94. HSP (Croatian Party of Rights)	[CHES 3109: 2014]
	95. HSP-AS (Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević)	[CHES 3113: 2014]
<i>Accession to the EU</i>		1952-07-23: BE, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL
1981-01-01: GR		1986-01-01: PT, ES
2004-05-01: CY, CZ, EE, HG, LV, LT, MT, PL, SK, SI		2007-01-01: BG, RO
		1973-01-01: DK, IE, UK
		1995-01-01: AT, FI, SE
		2013-07-01: HR

## BE (BELGIUM) – 6 NATIONALIST PARTIES

VU; N-VA (People's Union; New Flemish Alliance)

*People's Union*

- Founded: 1954 ~ Preceded by Christian Flemish People's Union
- Succeeded by N-VA (right-wing) & Spirit (center-left)
- Ideology: Flemish nationalism, federalism
- European affiliation: European Free Alliance

*New Flemish Alliance* [www.n-va.be](http://www.n-va.be)

- Leader: Bart De Wever / Founder: Geert Bourgeois
- Founded: 2001 ~ Preceded by VU (split in 2001)
- Headquarters: Koningsstraat 47, bus 6, B-1000 Brussels Belgium
- Membership (2014): 41,176
- Ideology: Flemish nationalism, Regionalism, Liberal conservatism, Pro-Europeanism
- Political position: Center-right
- European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Chamber (Flemish seats): 33/87; Senate (Flemish seats): 12/35; Flemish P.: 43/124; Brussels P. (Flemish seats): 3/17; EP (Flemish seats): 4/12; Flemish Provincial Councils: 104/351

ID21 (ID21)

PP (People's Party) [www.partipopulaire.be](http://www.partipopulaire.be)

- Founded: 2009-11-26 ~ Leader: Mischaël Modrikamen
- Headquarters: Avenue Molière 144, 1050 Brussels
- Ideology: Populism, Belgian unionism, Conservative liberalism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe / EP group: No MEPs
- Chamber: 1/150; Senate: 0/60; Walloon P.: 1/75; EP: 0/21

FN (National Front) [www.fn.be](http://www.fn.be)

- Founded: 1985 ~ Dissolved: 2012 ~ Leader: Patrick Cocriamont
- Headquarters: National Secretariat, rue Tourette 100, Charleroi
- Ideology: Nationalism / Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Alliance of European National Movements / EP group: None

## FR (FRANCE) – 3 NATIONALIST PARTIES

FN (National Front) [www.frontnational.com](http://www.frontnational.com)

- President: Marine Le Pen / General Secretary: Nicolas Bay
- Founded: 1972-10-05
- Headquarters: 76-78 rue des Suisses, 92000 Nanterre, Hauts-de-Seine
- Youth wing: Front National Youth / Membership (2014): 80,000
- Ideology: French nationalism, National conservatism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Anti-immigration, Anti-globalism, Protectionism, Soverainism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing to Far-right
- Nat'l affiliation: Rassemblement bleu Marine / Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom / EP group: Europe of Nations and Freedom
- Nat'l Assembly: 2/577; Senate: 2/348; EP: 23/74; Regional Councils: 118/1,880; General Councils: 62/4,108; Municipal Councils: 1,545/536,519

## DE (GERMANY) – 3 NATIONALIST PARTIES

REP (Republikaner) <http://www.rep.de>

- Founded: 1983-11-26 ~ Leader: Rolf Schlierer
- Headquarters: Munich, Bavaria / Membership: 6,800 (2009)
- Ideology: National conservatism, Right-wing populism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None; EP group: None

VB (Flemish Bloc; Flemish Interest)

*Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc)* [www.vlaamsblok.be](http://www.vlaamsblok.be)

- Leader: Frank Vanhecke
- Founded: 1979-05-28 (1978) ~ Split from Volksunie
- Dissolved: 2004-11-14 ~ Succeeded by Vlaams Belang
- Youth wing: Vlaams Blok Jongeren / Membership: 18,000 (2004)
- Ideology: Flemish nationalism, Separatism, Euroscepticism, Right-wing populism
- Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: Non-Inscrits

*Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)* [www.vlaamsbelang.org](http://www.vlaamsbelang.org)

- Leader: Tom Van Grieken
- Founded: 2004-11-14 ~ Preceded by Vlaams Blok
- Headquarters: Madouplein 8 bus 9, 1210 Brussels
- Youth wing: Vlaams Belang Jongeren
- Membership (2014): 17,255
- Ideology: Flemish nationalism, Euroscepticism, Separatism, Conservatism
- Political position: Far-right
- European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom / EP group: Europe of Nations and Freedom
- Chamber (Flemish seats): 3/87; Senate (Flemish seats): 2/35; Flemish P.: 6/124; Brussels P. (Flemish seats): 1/17; EP (Flemish seats): 1/12; Flemish Provincial Councils: 29/351

FDF; RW (Francophone Democratic Front) [www.fdf.be](http://www.fdf.be)

- President: Olivier Maingain
- Founded: 1964-05-11
- Headquarters: Chaussée de Charleroi 127, 1060 Brussels
- Ideology: Interests of French speakers in Brussels, Regionalism, Liberalism
- Political position: Center-right
- Nat'l affiliation: Reformist Movement (2002–11) / Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: No MEPs
- Chamber (French-speaking seats): 2/63; Senate (French-speaking seats): 0/24; Walloon P.: 0/75; French Community P.: 2/94; Brussels P. (French-speaking seats): 12/72; EP (French-speaking seats): 0/8

RPF/MPF (Rally for France / Movement for France) [www.pourlafrance.fr/](http://www.pourlafrance.fr/)

- Founded: 1994 ~ Leader: Philippe de Villiers
- Headquarters: 16 bis avenue de la Motte-Picquet - 75007 Paris
- Ideology: Conservatism, Soverainism, Soft Euroscepticism
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy / EP group: Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009–2014)
- Nat'l Assembly: 1/577; Senate: 1/348; EP: 0/74; Reg. Councils: 10/1,880

MN (National Republican Movement) [www.m-n-r.net](http://www.m-n-r.net)

- Leader: Annick Martin ~ Founded: 1999-10-02
- Headquarters: 15 rue de Cronstadt, 75015 Paris
- Ideology: Nationalism, Eco. liberalism, Right-wing populism, Euroscepticism
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None
- Nat'l Assembly: 0/577; Senate: 0/343; EP: 0/72

AfD (Alternative for Germany) [www.alternativefuer.de](http://www.alternativefuer.de)

- Founded: 2013-02-06 ~ Chaimen: Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen
- Youth wing: Young Alternative for Germany / Membership (2015): 18,468
- Ideology: Euroscepticism, Conservatism, National conservatism
- Political position: Right-wing, Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Bundestag: 0/631; State Parliaments: 41/1,857; EP: 2/96

DVU; NPD (German People's Union; National Democratic Party of Germany) [www.npd.de](http://www.npd.de)

- President: Frank Franz
- Founded: 1964-11-28 ~ Preceded by German Empire Party
- Headquarters: Berlin / Membership (2013): 5,048
- Newspaper: Deutsche Stimme (German Voice)
- Youth wing: Junge (National demokraten)

- Ideology: Third Position, German nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Anti-immigration, Anti-globalism, Euroskepticism / Disputed: Neo-Nazism
- Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European Nat'l Front / EP group: Non-Inscrits
- Bundestag: 0/631; State Parliaments: 5/1,854; EP: 1/96

## IT (ITALY) – 7 NATIONALIST PARTIES

MSI-DN/AN (Italian Social Movement - Right National / National Alliance) *Italian Social Movement*

- Leaders: Giorgio Almirante, Augusto De Marsanich, Arturo Michelini, Pino Rauti, Gianfranco Fini
- Founded: 1946-12-26 ~ Preceded by Rep. Fascist Party (not legal predecessor)
- Dissolved: 1995-01-27 ~ Succeeded by National Alliance
- Headquarters: Via della Scrofa 43, Rome (last)
- Newspaper: Secolo d'Italia
- Youth wing: Fronte della Gioventù (Youth Front)
- Membership: 202,715 (1993) / 240,063 (peak, 1963)
- Ideology: Italian nationalism, Neo-fascism, Conservatism
- Political position: Right-wing to Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: European Social Movement (1951–62), National Party of Europe (1962–66) / EP group: Non-Inscrits (1979–84), European Right (1984–89), Non-Inscrits (1989–95)

*National Alliance*

- Leaders: Gianfranco Fini (1995–2008), Ignazio La Russa (2008–2009)
- Founded: 1995-01-27 ~ Preceded by Italian Social Movement
- Dissolved: 2009-03-22 ~ Merged into The People of Freedom
- Newspaper: Secolo d'Italia / Membership (2004): 250,000
- Ideology: Conservatism, National conservatism
- Political position: Right-wing
- National affiliation: Pole of Good Government (1994), Pole for Freedoms (1996–2001), House of Freedoms (2001–2008)
- Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: Alliance for Europe of the Nations / EP group: Union for Europe of the Nations

MS-FI (Tricolor Flame Social Movement) [www.fiammatriicolore.com](http://www.fiammatriicolore.com)

- Secretary: Attilio Carelli / President On.: Alessandro Bordonì
- Founded: 1995-01-27 ~ Split from Italian Social Movement
- Headquarters: via Roccaparena, 51 – Roma
- Newspaper: none / Membership (2005): 5,000
- Ideology: Italian nationalism, Fascism, Third position
- Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: Alliance of European National Movements / EP group: no MEPs

PsDA (Sardinian Action Party) [www.psdaz.net](http://www.psdaz.net)

- President: Giacomo Sanna / Secretary: Giovanni Columbu
- Founded: 1921-04-17 ~ Founder: Emilio Lussu
- Headquarters: Cagliari, Sardinia, Italy
- Newspaper: Il Solco / Membership (2014): unknown
- Ideology: Sardinian nationalism, Regionalism, Autonomism (until 1981), Separatism (from 1981 onwards), Social liberalism, Social democracy
- Political position: Center to Center-left
- Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: no MEPs
- Chamber: 0/630; Senate: 0/315; EP: 0/73; Regional Council of Sardinia: 3/60

LN (Lega Nord - Northern League) [www.leganord.org](http://www.leganord.org)

- Federal Secretary: Matteo Salvini / Federal President: Umberto Bossi
- Founded: 1989-12-04 (alliance) / 1991-01-08 (party) ~ Merger of Liga Veneta, Lega Lombarda, Piemont Autonomista, Unione Ligure, Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana
- Headquarters: via Bellerio, 41, 20161 Milan
- Youth wing: Giovani Padani (Young Padanians) / Membership (2008): 150,000
- Ideology: Regionalism, Federalism, Populism, Anti-immigration, Euroskepticism, Anti-globalization
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: EFA (1989–94), EAF (2013–14), MENL (2014–present) / EP group: Rainbow (1989–94), ELDR (1994–99), TGI (1999–2001), ID (2004–07), UEN (2007–09), EFD (2009–14), ENL (2015–present)
- Southern counterpart: Us with Salvini
- Chamber: 14/630; Senate: 12/315; EP: 5/73; Regional Gov't: 2/20

MpA (Movement for Autonomies) <http://www.mpa-italia.it/>

- Leader: Raffaele Lombardo / Federal Secretary: TBD
- Founded: 2005-04-30 ~ Split from Union of Christian and Center Democrats
- Headquarters: via dell'Oca, 27, 00186 Rome
- Newspaper: none / Membership: unknown
- Ideology: Regionalism, Autonomism, Christian democracy
- Political position: Center-right
- National affiliation: PdL-LN-MpA (2008–10), New Pole for Italy (2010–12), Center-right coalition (2013) / Int'l affiliation: none / European affiliation: none / EP group: EPP-ED (2005–09)
- Chamber: 0/630; Senate: 2/315 (in ALA); Sicilian Reg. Assembly: 6/90

FDL (Brothers of Italy) [www.fratelli-italia.it](http://www.fratelli-italia.it)

- President: Giorgia Meloni
- Founded: 2012-12-17 ~ Split from The People of Freedom
- Headquarters: Via di San Teodoro, 20, 00186 Rome
- Newspaper: La Gazzetta Tricolore / Membership (2014): 50,000
- Youth wing: Gioventù Nazionale
- Ideology: National conservatism, Nationalism, Euroskepticism, Social conservatism / Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: none; European affiliation: none / EP group: no MEPs
- Chamber: 8/630; Senate: 0/315; EP: 0/73

SVP (South Tyrolean People's Party) [www.svpartei.org](http://www.svpartei.org)

- Founded: 1945-05-08 ~ Chairman: Philipp Achammer / Secretary: Manuel Massl
- Headquarters: via Brennero 7/A, 39100 Bolzano
- Newspaper: ZIS / Membership (2003): 68,000 / Youth wing: Young Generation
- Ideology: Regionalism, Autonomism, Christian democracy, Social democracy (minority)
- National affiliation: Dem. Party / European affiliation: European People's Party (observer) / EP group: European People's Party
- Chamber: 4/630; Senate: 2/315; EP: 1/73; Provincial Council: 17/35

## NL (NETHERLANDS) – 5 NATIONALIST PARTIES

CD (Center Democrats)

- Leader: Hans Janmaat (1984-2002) / Chairperson: Hans Janmaat (1984-2002) / Secretary-General: Wil Schuurman (1987-2002) / Leader in the House of Representatives: Hans Janmaat (1989-1998)
- Slogan: Full = Full / Headquarters: The Hague
- Founded: November 7, 1984-11-07 ~ Founder: Hans Janmaat

- Dissolved: 2002-04-18 ~ Split from Center Party
- Membership (mid-1990s): 1,000–4,000
- Ideology: Nationalism, cultural conservatism, social conservatism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing

#### SGP (Political Reformed Party) [www.sgp.nl](http://www.sgp.nl)

- Leader: Kees van der Staaij / Chairman: Adri van Heteren / Leader in the Senate: Peter Schalk / Leader in the House of Representatives: Kees van der Staaij / Leader in the EP: Bas Belder
- Founded: 24 April 1918
- Headquarters: Burgemeester van Reenensingel 101 Gouda
- Youth wing: Reformed Political Party Youth
- Thinktank: Guido de Brès-Foundation (nl)
- Ideology: Christian right, Social conservatism, Theocracy, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Religion: Calvinism, Evangelicalism
- European affiliation: European Christian Political Movement / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Senate: 2/75; House of Representatives: 3/150; States-Provincial: 14/570; EP: 1/26

#### PVV (Party for Freedom) [www.pvv.nl](http://www.pvv.nl)

- Chairman: Geert Wilders / House Leader: Geert Wilders / Senate Leader: Marjolein Faber / European Leader: Marcel de Graaff
- Founded: 2006-02-22 Split from People's Party for Freedom & Democracy
- Ideology: National liberalism, Right-wing populism, Anti-Islam, Anti-immigration, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing to radical right
- Int'l affiliation: Int'l Freedom Alliance / European affiliation: European Alliance for Freedom / EP group: Europe of Nations and Freedom
- Senate: 9/75; House of Representatives: 12/150; States-Provincial: 66/570; EP: 4/26

### LU (LUXEMBOURG) – 1 NATIONALIST PARTY

#### ADR (Alternative Democratic Reform Party) [www.adr.lu](http://www.adr.lu)

- Founded: 1987-05-12 ~ Leader: Robert Mehlen
- Headquarters: 22, rue de l'eau, L-1449 Luxembourg
- Youth wing: Adrenalin
- Political position: Center-right, Right wing

### DK (DENMARK) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

#### DF (Danish People's Party) [www.danskfolkeparti.dk](http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk)

- Leader: Kristian Thulesen Dahl / Parliamentary leader: Peter Skaarup
- Founded: 1995-10-06 ~ Split from Progress Party
- Headquarters: Christiansborg, 1240 København K
- Youth wing: Danish People's Party Youth / Membership (2014): 14,000
- Ideology: National conservatism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Danish nationalism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing to Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Folketing: 37/179; EP: 4/13; Reg. Councils: 23/205; Municipal Councils: 255/2,444

### IE (IRELAND) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

#### GP (Green Party) [www.greenparty.ie](http://www.greenparty.ie)

- Leader: Eamon Ryan / Chairman: Roderic O'Gorman / Secretary-General: Alison Martin / Deputy leader: Catherine Martin / N. Ireland Assembly leader: Steven Agnew, MLA
- Founded: 1981
- Headquarters: 16-17 Suffolk Street, Dublin 2, Ireland
- Youth wing: Young Greens
- Ideology: Green politics
- Int'l affiliation: Global Greens / European affiliation: European Green Party / EP group: European Greens–European Free Alliance
- N. Ireland Assembly: 1/108; Local gov't in Ireland: 12/949; Local gov't in N. Ireland: 4/462

#### LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn)

- Leader: Pim Fortuyn (2002), Mat Herben (2002), Harry Wijnschenk (2002), Mat Herben (2002-2004), Gerard van As (2004-2006), Mat Herben (2006), Olaf Stuger (2006) / Chairperson: Pim Fortuyn (2002), Peter Langendam (2002), Ed Maas (2002-2003), Sergej Moleveld (2004-2006), Bert Snel (2006-2008) / Leader in the Senate: Rob Hessing (2003-2007) / Leader in the House of Representatives: Mat Herben (2002), Harry Wijnschenk (2002), Mat Herben (2002-2004), Gerard van As (2004-2006), Mat Herben (2006)
- Founded: 2002-02-14 ~ Founder: Pim Fortuyn / Dissolved: 2008-01-01
- Headquarters: Rotterdam / Youth wing: Young Fortuynisten
- Thinktank: Dr. W.S.P. Fortuynstichting / Membership (2003): 4,100
- Ideology: Fortuynism, Classical liberalism, Republicanism, Euroscepticism, Populism
- Political position: Center-right
- Nat'l affiliation: None / EP group: None / Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None

#### PvdD (Party for the Animals) [www.partyfortheanimals.nl](http://www.partyfortheanimals.nl)

- Leader: Marianne Thieme / Chairman: Luuk Folkerts / Leader in the Senate: Niko Koffeman / Leader in the House of Representatives: Marianne Thieme
- Founded: 2002-10
- Youth wing: PINK! / Thinktank: Nicolaas G. Pierson foundation
- Ideology: Animal liberation, Environmentalism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Left-wing
- Int'l affiliation: Euro Animal 7; EP group: European United Left–Nordic Green Left
- Senate: 2/75; House of Representatives: 2/150; States-Provincial: 18/570; EP: 1/26

- Ideology: Conservatism, National conservatism, Economic liberalism, Soft Euroscepticism

- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
- Chamber of Deputies: 3/60; EP: 0/6

#### FP (Progress Party) [www.frp.dk](http://www.frp.dk)

- Leader: Niels Højland
- Founded: 1972-08-22
- Headquarters: Liljeallé 11, 6920 Videbæk
- Ideology: Right-wing populism, Anti-tax, Anti-immigration
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None

#### SF (Sinn Féin / We Ourselves) [www.sinnfein.ie](http://www.sinnfein.ie)

- President: Gerry Adams TD / Secretary general: Dawn Doyle / Vice-President: Mary Lou McDonald TD / Assembly Group Leader: Raymond McCartney MLA
- Slogan: "Building an Ireland of Equals"
- Founded: 1905-11-28 / 1970 (current) ~ Founder: Arthur Griffith
- Headquarters: 44 Parnell Square, Dublin 1, Ireland
- Newspaper: An Phoblacht / Youth wing: Sinn Féin Republican Youth
- Ideology: Irish republicanism, Left-wing nationalism, Democratic socialism
- Political position: Left-wing
- EP group: European United Left–Nordic Green Left
- Dáil Éireann: 14/166; Seanad Éireann: 3/60; House of Commons (NI): 4/18 (Abstentionist); EP (Ireland): 3/11; EP (N. Ireland): 1/3; N. Ireland Assembly: 29/108; Local gov't (Ireland): 157/949; Local gov't (N. Ireland) 105/462

## UK (UNITED KINGDOM) – 4 NATIONALIST PARTIES

### SNP (Scottish National Party) [www.snp.org](http://www.snp.org)

- Leader: Nicola Sturgeon / Depute leader: Stewart Hosie / House of Commons Group Leader: Angus Robertson
- Founded: 1934 ~ Merger of National Party of Scotland, Scottish Party
- Headquarters: Gordon Lamb House, 3 Jackson's Entry, Edinburgh, EH8 8PJ
- Student wing: Federation of Student Nationalists
- Youth wing: Young Scots for Independence
- Membership (2015): 114,121
- Ideology: Scottish nationalism, Civic nationalism, Social democracy
- Political position: Center-left
- European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: Greens/EFA
- House of Commons (Scottish seats): 55/59; EP (Scottish seats): 2/6; Scottish P.: 64/129; Local gov't in Scotland: 405/1,223

### UKIP (UK Independence Party) [www.ukip.org](http://www.ukip.org)

- Leader: Nigel Farage / Deputy Leader: Paul Nuttall MEP / Chairman: Steven Crowther
- Founded: 1993-09-03 ~ Preceded by Anti-Federalist League
- Headquarters: Lexdrum House, Newton Abbot, Devon
- Youth wing: Young Independence
- Membership (May 2015): 47,000
- Ideology: Euroskepticism, Right-wing populism, Economic liberalism, Conservatism, British unionism
- Political position: Right-wing
- European affiliation: Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe
- EP group: Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
- House of Commons: 1/650 / House of Lords: 3/800 / EP: 22/73 / Local gov't: 496/20,565; N. Ireland Assembly: 1/108

### CYMRU/PLAID (Plaid Cymru – Party of Wales) [plaid.cymru](http://plaid.cymru)

- Leader: Leanne Wood / Chairperson: Dr Dafydd Trystan Davies / Chief Executive: Rhuanedd Richards / Honorary President: The Lord Wigley
- Founded: 1925-08-05
- Headquarters: Tŷ Gwynfor, Marine Chambers, Anson Court, Atlantic Wharf, Cardiff, Wales CF10 4AL
- Youth wing: Plaid Cymru Youth / Membership (2012): 7,863
- Ideology: Welsh independence, Welsh nationalism, Civic nationalism, Democratic socialism, Social democracy, Environmentalism
- Political position: Left-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: The Greens–European Free Alliance
- House of Commons (Welsh seats): 3/40 / House of Lords: 2/800 / EP (Welsh seats): 1/4 / National Assembly for Wales: 11/60 / Local gov't in Wales: 170/1,264

### BNP (British National Party) [www.bnp.org.uk](http://www.bnp.org.uk)

- Founded: 1982 ~ Chairman: Adam Walker
- Headquarters: Wigton, England
- Newspaper: Voice of Freedom / Youth wing: Resistance (YBNP)
- Membership: Estimated as low as 500 in 2015
- Ideology: Fascism, Right-wing populism, White nationalism, Ethnic nationalism, British nationalism, Anti-immigration, Anti-globalization, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Far-right
- European affiliation: Alliance of European National Movements
- House of Commons: 0/650 / EP: 0/73 / Local gov't: 2/21,871 / London Assembly: 0/25 / Police & Crime Commissioners: 0/41

## GR (GREECE) – 3 NATIONALIST PARTIES

### LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally) [www.laos.gr](http://www.laos.gr)

- President: Georgios Karatzaferis
- Founded: 2000-09-14 ~ Split from New Democracy
- Headquarters: 52, Kallirois Avenue, 117 45 Athens
- Youth wing: Youth of the Orthodox Rally
- Ideology: Greek nationalism, Right-wing populism, Conservatism, Euroskepticism / Political position: Far-right
- European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy / EP group: No MEPs
- Parliament: 0/300; EP: 0/21; Regions: 43/703

### XA (Popular Association - Golden Dawn) [www.xryshaygh.com/en](http://www.xryshaygh.com/en)

- Secretary-General: Nikolaos Michaloliakos / Spokesperson: Ilias Kasidiaris
- Slogan: Homeland, Honor, Golden Dawn
- Founded: 1985-01-01 ~ Founder: Nikolaos Michaloliakos
- Headquarters: Athens, Greece
- Newspaper: Chrysi Avgi / Youth wing: Youth Front
- Ideology: Metaxism, Ultranationalism, Euroskepticism / Disputed: Neo-Nazism / Political position: Far-right
- European affiliation: European National Front / EP group: Non-Inscrits
- Hellenic Parliament: 18/300; EP: 3/21; Regions: 26/725

### ANEL (Independent Greeks) [anexartitoiellines.gr](http://anexartitoiellines.gr)

- President: Panos Kammenos / General Secretary: Ioannis Moiras / Spokesperson: Marina Chrysoveloni
- Slogan: We are many – We are independent – We are Greeks
- Founded: 2012-02-24 ~ Split from New Democracy
- Headquarters: 196, Syngrou Ave. 176 71 Athens

- Ideology: National conservatism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / EP group: No MEPs
- Parliament: 10/300; EP: 0/21; Regions: 51/703

## ES (SPAIN) – 15 NATIONALIST PARTIES

### CiU (Convergence and Union) [www.ciu.cat](http://www.ciu.cat)

- President: Artur Mas / General Secretary: Ramon Espadaler
- Founded: 1978-09-19 (coalition) / 2001-12-02 (federation)
- Dissolved: 2015-06-17
- Headquarters: C/Corsega, 331-333 08037 Barcelona
- Ideology: Catalan nationalism, Centrism / Internal factions: Populism, Christian democracy, Liberalism, Conservatism, Catalan Independentism, Social democracy
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: Lib. Int'l, Centrist Dem. Int'l / European affiliation: Alliance of Lib. & Dem. for Europe, European People's Party / EP group: ALDE (CDC)
- Town councillors in Catalonia: 3,333 / 9,077

### ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia) [www.esquerra.cat](http://www.esquerra.cat)

- President: Oriol Junqueras i Vies / Secretary-General: Marta Rovira i Vergés
- Founded: 1931-03-19
- Headquarters: C/Calàbria, 166, 08015 Barcelona, Spain
- Ideology: Catalan nationalism, Catalan independence, Left-wing nationalism, Democratic socialism, Republicanism
- Political position: Left-wing
- European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: The Greens–European Free Alliance
- Congress: 3/350; Spanish Senate: 1/264; EP: 2/54; Catalonia P.: 21/135; Town councillors in Catalonia: 2,384/9,077; Town councillors in the Balearic Islands: 16/925

IC (Initiative for Catalonia) <http://www.iniciativa.cat/>

- President: Dolors Camats and Joan Herrera (national coordinators) / Secretary-General: Josep Vendrell
- Founded: 1987-02-23 / Headquarters: C/Ciutat, 7, 08002 Barcelona
- Ideology: Eco-socialism, Socialism of the 21st century, Federalism, Catalan nationalism
- Political position: Left-wing
- Int'l affiliation: Global Greens / European affiliation: European Green Party / EP group: European Greens–European Free Alliance
- Congress: 2/350; Spanish Senate: 2/264; EP: 1/54; Catalonia P.: 13/135

PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) [www.eaj-pnv.eus](http://www.eaj-pnv.eus)

- President: Andoni Ortuzar
- Founded: 1895 ~ Founder: Sabino Arana
- Headquarters: Sabin Etxea, Ibañez de Bilbao, 16, Bilbao
- Youth wing: Euzko Gaztedi / Membership: 32,000
- Ideology: Basque nationalism, Regionalism, Christian democracy, Conservatism, Conservative liberalism
- Political position: Center-right to Center
- Int'l affiliation: None, previously Alliance of Democrats / European affiliation: European Democratic Party / EP group: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
- Congress: 5/350; Spanish Senate: 5/264; EP: 1/54; Basque P.: 27/75; Town councillors in the Basque Autonomous Community: 1,017/2,628

PSE/EE (Euskal Ezkerra - Basque Left)

PA (Andalusian Party) <http://www.partidoandalucista.org/>

- Founded: 1965 ~ Dissolved: 2015 ~ Leader: Antonio Jesús Ruiz
- Headquarters: Seville, Seville Province, Andalusia
- Youth wing: Andalucista Youth
- Ideology: Social democracy, Andalusian nationalism, Regionalism / Political position: Center-left
- Nat'l affiliation: Andalusian nationalist movement / Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: No MEPs
- Local Gov't: 470/9,031; Andalusia P.: 0/109; Congress: 0/350; Spanish Senate: 0/264; EP: 0/50

CHA (Aragonese Council) [www.chunta.org](http://www.chunta.org)

- President: José Luis Soro / Secretary-General: Juan Martín Expósito
- Founded: 1986-06-29
- Headquarters: Calle Conde de Aranda 14-16, 1°50003 Zaragoza, Aragon
- Ideology: Eco-socialism, Aragonese nationalism
- Political position: Left-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: None
- Congress: 1/350; Aragonese Courts: 2/67; Local Gov't: 163/4,297

UV (Valencian Union) [www.uniovalenciana.org](http://www.uniovalenciana.org)

- Founded: 1982-08 ~ Leader: Jose Manuel Miralles
- Headquarters: C/ Maluquer, 1, 2 Valencia
- Ideology: Blaverism, Valencian regionalism, conservatism, Federalism
- Int'l affiliation: None; EP group: None

CpE (Coalition for Europe): Spanish electoral list in the EP election

- 2014: CiU + PNV + CC + CxG
- 2009: CiU + PNV + BNV + UM + Unió M. + CC + PA (5.1%, 2 seats)

Amaiur (Amaiur) [Amaiur.info](http://Amaiur.info)

- Leader: Xabier Mikel Errekondo
- Founded: 27 September 2011
- Ideology: Basque nationalism, Left-wing nationalism, Basque independence, Socialism, Ezker abertzalea
- Political position: Left-wing
- Affiliated parties and groups: Aralar, Eusko Alkartasuna, Alternatiba, Independents of ezker abertzalea, mainly in Sortu wv
- Congress: 7/350; Spanish Senate: 3/264

HB/EH (Euskal Herritarrok-We Basque Citizens)

*Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity)*

- Founded: 1978-04-27 (electoral coalition) / 1986-06-05 (political party) ~ Merger of Euskal Sozialista Biltzarrea, Langile Abertzale Iraultzaileen Alderdia, Herri Alderdi Sozialista Iraultzailea, Eusko Abertzale Ekintza
  - Dissolved: 2001-05-23 ~ Merged into EH
  - Headquarters: C/ Astarloa, n°8-1°, Bilbao
  - Newspaper: Herria Eginez / Youth wing: Jarrai
  - Ideology: Basque nationalism, Socialism, Izquierda Abertzale, Left-wing Nationalism, Basque independence
  - Political position: Far-left
- Euskal Herritarrok (We Basque Citizens)*
- Spokesperson: Arnaldo Otegi
  - Founded: 1998-09 ~ Merger of HB, Batzare (until 2000), Zutik (until 2000)
  - Dissolved: 2003-05-23 (banned by the Supreme Court of Spain) ~ Merged into Batasuna (A minority faction formed the Aralar Party)
  - Headquarters: c/ Juan de Bilbao, n°17, Donostia
  - Ideology: Basque nationalism, Socialism, Ezker abertzalea, Left-wing Nationalism, Basque independence, Feminism, Ecologism, Revolutionary socialism / Political position: Radical left
  - Basque P. (1998-2001): 14/75; Navarre P. (1999-2003): 8/55; EP (1999-2004): 1/64 ; Town councillors (1999-2003): 890/4,635

EA (Eusko Alkartasuna - Basque Solidarity) [www.euskoalkartasuna.eus](http://www.euskoalkartasuna.eus)

- Founded: 1986-09 ~ Leader: Pello Urizar
- Headquarters: San Sebastián, Basque Country, Spain
- Youth wing: Young Patriots
- Ideology: Basque nationalism, Social democracy, Separatism
- Political position: Left-wing
- Nat'l affiliation: Bildu, Amaiur; Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European Free Alliance
- Local Gov't (S. Basque): 255/4,635; Basque P. (Inside EH Bildu): 5/75; Navarre P. (Inside Bildu): 3/50; Congress: 1/350 (Inside Amaiur); Spanish Senate: 1/264 (Inside Amaiur); EP: 0/50

PAR (Aragonese Party) [www.partidoaragones.com](http://www.partidoaragones.com)

- Founded: 1978-01 ~ Leader: José Ángel Biel Rivera
- Headquarters: Calle Coso 87, 50001 Zaragoza
- Ideology: Aragonese regionalism, Conservatism, Anti-Catalanism
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: None
- Local Gov't: 916/4,297; Aragonese Courts: 6/67; Spanish Senate: 3/264

BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc) [bng.gal](http://bng.gal)

- Spokesperson: Xavier Vence
- Founded: 1982 ~ Merger of Galician People's Union, Galician National-Popular Assembly, Galician Socialist Party, Independents
- Headquarters: Santiago de Compostela
- Newspaper: Benegá ao día / Youth wing: Galiza Nova and Isca!
- Student wing: Galician Student League and Comités
- Ideology: Galician nationalism, Socialism, Left-wing nationalism, Galician independence, Feminism, Pacifism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Left-wing
- European affiliation: European Free Alliance / EP group: The Greens–European Free Alliance / Trade union affiliation: Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG)
- Congress: 2/350; Spanish Senate: 2/264; EP: 1/54; Galician P.: 7/75; Mayors in Galicia: 30/314; Town Councillors in Galicia: 468/3,766

CC (Coalición Canaria) [www.coalicioncanaria.org](http://www.coalicioncanaria.org)

- Founded: 1993-02 ~ Leader: Claudina Morales
- Headquarters: C/ Buenos Aires 24, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; C/ Galcerán, 7-9 Edif. El Drago, Santa Cruz de Tenerife
- Ideology: Regionalism, Canarian nationalism, Conservatism
- Political position: Center or Center-right
- Congress: 2/350; Spanish Senate: 1/264; EP: 0/54
- Canarian Parliament: 18/60; Town councillors: 300/1,382

## AT (AUSTRIA) – 3 NATIONALIST PARTIES

FPO (Freedom Party of Austria) [www.fpoe.at](http://www.fpoe.at)

- Leader: Heinz-Christian Strache
- Founded: 1956-04-07 ~ Preceded by Federation of Independents
- Headquarters: Theobaldgasse 19/4, A-1060 Vienna
- Newspaper: Neue Freie Zeitung / Membership: 50,000 (2014)
- Student wing: Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten
- Youth wing: Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend

- Ideology: Right-wing populism, National conservatism, Anti-immigration, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing to Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: Liberal Int'l (1978–1993) / European affiliation: EAF (2010–2014), MENL (2014–present) / EP group: Europe of Nations and Freedom
- National Council: 38/183; Federal Council: 12/62; EP: 4/18

GRUNE (The Austrian Green Party) [www.gruene.at](http://www.gruene.at)

- Leader: Eva Glawischnig
- Founded: 1993 (Die Grünen) / 1986 (Merger of Vereinte Grüne Österreichs and Alternative Liste Österreich)
- Headquarters: Lindengasse 40, A-1071 Vienna
- Ideology: Green politics, Social progressivism
- Political position: Center-left
- Int'l affiliation: Global Greens / European affiliation: European Green Party / EP group: The Greens–European Free Alliance
- Nat'l Council: 24/183; Federal Council: 4/62; EP: 3/18; State P.: 47/448

BZO (Alliance for the Future of Austria) [www.bzoe.at](http://www.bzoe.at)

- Leader: Gerald Grosz / Founder: Jörg Haider
- Founded: 2005-04-03 ~ Split from Freedom Party of Austria
- Headquarters: Volksgartenstraße 3/5, A-1010 Vienna
- Youth wing: Generation of the Future of Austria / Membership: 8,000 (2011)
- Ideology: Economic liberalism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Center-right to Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: Non-Inscrits
- Nat'l Council: 0/183; Federal Council: 0/62; EP: 0/18; State P.: 2/448

## FI (FINLAND) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

PS (True Finns) [www.perussuomalaiset.fi](http://www.perussuomalaiset.fi)

- Leader: Timo Soini / Youth wing: Finns Party Youth / Headquarters: Helsinki
- Founded: 1995-05-11 ~ Preceded by Finnish Rural Party (de facto)
- Ideology: Finnish nationalism, Economic nationalism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Social: Center-right / Economic: Center-left
- European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Parliament: 38/200; EP: 2/13; Municipalities: 1,195/9,674

RKP/SFP (Swedish People's Party) <http://www.sfp.fi/>

- Founded: 1906 ~ Leader: Carl Haglund
- Headquarters: Simonsgatan 8 A, 00100 Helsingfors (Helsinki), Finland
- Membership (2011): 28,000
- Ideology: Swedish speaking minority interests, Liberalism, Social liberalism / Political position: Center
- Int'l affiliation: Lib. Int'l / European affiliation: Alliance of Lib. & Dem. for Europe / EP group: Alliance of Lib. & Dem. for Europe
- Parliament: 9/200; EP: 1/13; Municipalities: 480/9,674

## SE (SWEDEN) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

NyD (New Democracy) [www.nydemokrati.se](http://www.nydemokrati.se)

- Founded: 1991-02-04 ~ Founder: Ian Wachtmeister, Bert Karlsson
- Dissolved: 25 February 2000
- Headquarters: Stockholm, Gothenburg
- Ideology: Right-wing populism, Economic liberalism, Pro-Europeanism, Welfare chauvinism
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None

SD (Sweden Democrats) [sd.se](http://sd.se)

- Party chairman: Jimmie Åkesson / Party secretary: Richard Jomshof / Parliamentary group leader: Mattias Karlsson
- Founded: 1988-02-06 / Headquarters: Stockholm / Membership: 19,000 (2015-09)
- Newspaper: SD-Kuriren / Youth wing: Sweden Democratic Youth
- Ideology: Swedish nationalism, Social conservatism, Right-wing populism, Euroskepticism / Political position: Right-wing to Far-right
- European affiliation: Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe / EP group: Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
- Riksdag: 49/349; EP: 2/20; Country Councils: 161/1,597; Municipal Councils: 1,324/12,780

## CY (CYPRUS) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

DISY (Democratic Rally) [www.disy.org.cy](http://www.disy.org.cy)

- Leader: Averof Neofytou / Founder: Glafkos Klerides
- Founded: 1976-07-04 ~ Preceded by United Party
- Headquarters: Nicosia, Cyprus
- Ideology: Conservatism, Christian democracy, Pro-Europeanism
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat Int'l, Int'l Democrat Union / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- House of Representatives: 20/56; EP: 2/6

EVROKO (European Party) [www.evropaikokomma.org](http://www.evropaikokomma.org)

- Leader: Demetris Syllouris
- Founded: 2005 ~ Merger of NEO and EvroDi
- Ideology: Greek Cypriot nationalism, Liberal conservatism, Centrism
- Political position: Center-right
- House of Representatives: 2/56; EP: 0/6

## CZ (CZECH REPUBLIC) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

VV (Public Affairs) <http://www.veciverejne.cz/>

- Founded: 2001 ~ Chairman: Jiří Kohout
- Headquarters: Štefánikova 23/203, Prague 5
- Ideology: Conservative liberalism, Right-wing populism, Direct democracy / Political position: Center-right
- Chamber: 0/200; Senate: 0/81; EP: 0/21; Regional councils: 0/675; Local councils: 332/62,178

USVUT (Dawn of Direct Democracy) <http://www.usvitnarodnikoalice.cz>

- Founded: 2013-06-13 ~ Leader: Miroslav Lidinský
- Headquarters: Papřenská 6B, 160 00 Prague 6 / Membership: 155
- Ideology: Right-wing populism, Anti-immigration, Euroskepticism, Direct democracy / Political position: Right-wing
- Chamber: 8/200; Senate: 0/81; EP: 0/22; Regional councils: 0/675; Local councils: 53/62,300

## EE (ESTONIA) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

IRL (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union) <http://www.irl.ee/>

- Leader: Margus Tsahkna / Membership (2014): 9,781
- Founded: 2006-06-04 ~ Merger of Pro Patria Union and Res Publica
- Headquarters: Paldiski mnt 13, Tallinn
- Ideology: Christian democracy, National conservatism, Conservatism
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat Int'l, Int'l Democrat Union / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- Riigikogu: 14/101; EP: 1/6

KP (Constitution Party)

- Leader: Sergei Jürgens
- Founded: 1994
- Dissolved: 2008-06-28 ~ Succeeded by Estonian United Left Party
- Headquarters: Estonia pst 3/5, 10143 Tallinn
- Ideology: Russian minority interests, center-left politics
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None
- EP group: None

## HG (HUNGARY) – 4 NATIONALIST PARTIES

Fidesz (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union) [www.fidesz.hu](http://www.fidesz.hu)

- President: Viktor Orbán / Vice Presidents: Lajos Kósa (executive), János Lázár, Ildikó Pelczné Gáll, Zoltán Pokorni / Parliamentary leader: Antal Rogán
- Founded: 1988-03-30
- Headquarters: 1088 Budapest, VIII. Szentkirályi Street 18.
- Youth wing: Fidelitas
- Ideology: National conservatism, Soft Euroskepticism
- Political position: Center-right to Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: Int'l Democrat Union, Centrist Democrat Int'l / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- Nat'l Assembly: 114/199; EP: 11/21; County Assemblies: 245/419

KDNP (CHRISTIAN Democratic People's Party) <http://kdnpp.hu/>

- Founded: 1943, 1989 (refoundation) ~ Leader: Zsolt Semjén
- Headquarters: 1072 Budapest, István utca Dózsa György út sarok
- Ideology: Christian democracy, National conservatism, Social conservatism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- National Assembly: 17/199; EP: 1/21

MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) [www.miep.hu](http://www.miep.hu)

- Founded: 1993-07-15 ~ Leader: Zoltán Fenyvessy
- Headquarters: Hercegrátnás utca 4, 1051 Budapest
- Ideology: Hungarian nationalism
- Political position: Far-right
- European affiliation: None, formerly Euronat / EP group: None

JOBBIK (Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary) [www.jobbik.com](http://www.jobbik.com)

- Founded: 2003-10-24 ~ Leader: Gábor Vona
- Headquarters: 1113 Budapest, Villányi út 20/A
- Paramilitary wing: Magyar Gárda
- Ideology: Hungarian nationalism, Radicalism, Hungarian Turanism, Hungarian irredentism, Euroskepticism, Anti-immigration, Anti-globalism, Anti-Zionism
- Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Alliance of European National Movements / EP group: Non-Inscrits
- Nat'l Assembly: 24/199; EP: 3/21; County Assemblies: 81/419

## LV (LATVIA) – 2 NATIONALIST PARTIES

TB-LNNK/NA (National Alliance "All For Latvia!" - "For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK") [www.nacionalaaapvieniba.lv](http://www.nacionalaaapvieniba.lv)

- Co-chairmen: Gaidis Bērziņš and Raivis Dzintars / General Secretary: Raivis Zeltis
- Founded: 2010 (electoral alliance) / 2011-07-23 (party) ~ Merger of All For Latvia! and TB/LNNK
- Headquarters: Kaļķu iela 11 3.stāvs Rīga LV-1050
- Youth wing: Nacionālās apvienības jauniešu organizācijas
- Ideology: National conservatism, Latvian nationalism, Economic liberalism, Right-wing populism
- Political position: Right-wing to Radical right
- European affiliation: Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Saeima: 17/100; EP: 1/8

SC (Harmony Center) <http://www.saskanascenrs.lv>

- Founded: 2005 ~ Dissolved: 2014 ~ Leader: Nils Ušakovs
- Headquarters: Riga
- Ideology: Social democracy, Russian minority politics
- Political position: Left-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: S&D (SDPS), GUE/NGL (LSP)

## LT (LITHUANIA) – 5 NATIONALIST PARTIES

LRS (Lithuanian Russian Union) [sojuzrus.lt/](http://sojuzrus.lt/)

- Leader: Sergey Dmitriyev ~ Founded: 1995
- Headquarters: Vilnius
- Membership: 1,400 (the end of 2010)
- Ideology: Russian minority interests

LLS (Lithuanian Liberty Union)

DK (The Way of Courage) <http://www.draskokeliapartija.lt/>

- Founded: 2012 ~ Leader: Jonas Varkala
- Headquarters: Garliava, Vytauto g. 57-2
- Membership (Sep 2012): 1,019
- Ideology: Populism, Anti-corruption
- Seimas: 7/141; EP: 0/12

LLRA (Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles) [www.llra.lt](http://www.llra.lt)

- Leader: Waldemar Tomaszewski
- Founded: 1994-08-28
- Headquarters: str. Pilies 16, Vilnius
- Membership: 1,200 (the end of 2010)
- Ideology: Polish minority interests, Christian democracy, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Center-right
- European affiliation: Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Seimas: 8/141; EP: 1/11

JL-PKS (Young Lithuania - New Nationalists and Political Prisoner's Union)

## PL (POLAND) – 4 NATIONALIST PARTIES

PiS (Law and Justice Party) [www.pis.org.pl](http://www.pis.org.pl)

- Chairman: Jarosław Kaczyński
- Founded: 2001-06-13 ~ Founder: Lech Kaczyński
- Headquarters: ul. Nowogrodzka 84/86 02-018 Warsaw
- Youth wing: Law and Justice Youth Forum
- Membership (2012): 21,766
- Ideology: National conservatism, Social conservatism, Populism, National clericalism, Soft Euroskepticism
- Political position: Center-right to Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Sejm: 132/460; Senate: 31/100; EP: 17/51; Reg. assemblies: 171/555

LPR (league of Polish Families) [www.lpr.pl](http://www.lpr.pl)

- Founded: 2001-05-30 ~ Leader: Witold Bałazak
- Headquarters: ul. Hoża 9, 00-528 Warsaw
- Ideology: National Democracy, Polish nationalism, Social conservatism, National clericalism, Euroscepticism / Religion: Roman Catholicism / Political position: Far-right
- Sejm: 0/460; Senate: 0/100; EP: 0/51

## SK (SLOVAKIA) – 5 NATIONALIST PARTIES

HZDS (People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)

- Leader: Last: Vladimír Mečiar
- Founded: 1991-04-27 ~ Dissolved: 2014-01-11
- Headquarters: Bratislava, Slovakia
- Ideology: National conservatism, Populism
- Political position: Center
- Int'l affiliation: None (member of the Alliance of Democrats) / European affiliation: European Democratic Party / EP group: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (2009-2014)

SMK-MKP (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) <http://www.mkp.sk>

- Founded: 1998-05-22 ~ Leader: József Berényi
- Headquarters: Bratislava
- Ideology: Hungarian minority interests, Christian democracy, Liberal conservatism, Autonomism, Agrarianism
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat International (observer) / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- National Council: 0/150; EP: 1/13

## SI (SLOVENIA) – 3 NATIONALIST PARTIES

SDSS/SDS (Social Democratic Party of Slovenia; Slovenian Democratic Party) <http://www.sds.si>

- Founded: 1989-02-16 ~ Leader: Janez Janša
- Headquarters: Ljubljana
- Ideology: Conservatism, Liberal conservatism, National conservatism
- Political position: Historical: Right-wing / Present: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat Int'l, Int'l Democrat Union / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- National Assembly: 21/90; EP: 3/8

KNP (Congress of the New Right) [nowaprawicajkm.pl](http://nowaprawicajkm.pl)

- Leader: Michał Marusiak (pl)
- Founded: 2011-03-25 ~ Merger of Freedom and Lawfulness Real Politics Union
- Headquarters: ul. Wilcza 29A lokal 4A, 00-544 Warszawa
- Ideology: Right-libertarianism, Conservative libertarianism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- EP group: Europe of Nations and Freedom
- Sejm: 0/460; Senate: 0/100; EP: 2/51

SP (United Poland) [www.solidarna.org.pl](http://www.solidarna.org.pl)

- Leader: Zbigniew Ziobro
- Secretary-General: Andrzej Dera
- Founded: 2012-03-24 ~ Split from Law and Justice
- Ideology: Social conservatism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists (2009–2012), Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2012–2014)
- Sejm: 11/460; Senate: 0/100; EP: 0/51

PSNS (Right Slovak National Party)

- minor extreme far-right political party
- 2002 legislative elections: 3.7% of the popular vote, no seats

SNS (Slovak National Party) <http://www.sns.sk/>

- Founded: 1989-12 ~ Leader: Andrej Danko
- Headquarters: Bratislava
- Ideology: Slovak nationalism, Hungarophobia, Right-wing populism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Far-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (2011-present) / EP group: Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009–2014)
- National Council: 0/150; EP: 0/13

HZD (Movement for Democracy)

- Split from People's Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in 2002
- First Leader: Ivan Gašparovič / Leader: Jozef Grapa
- 2006 parliamentary election: 0.6% of the popular vote, no seats
- European affiliation: Alliance for Europe of the Nations (2002-2009)

SLS-SKD-SMS (Slovenian People's Party - Slovenian Christian Democrats) [www.sls.si](http://www.sls.si)

- Founded: 1988-05-12 ~ Leader: Marko Zidanšek
- Headquarters: Ljubljana
- Ideology: Conservatism, Agrarianism, Christian democracy
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: European People's Party / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: EPP Group
- National Assembly: 0/90; EP: 1/8

SNS (Slovenian National Party) [www.sns.si](http://www.sns.si)

- Founded: 1991-03-17 ~ Leader: Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti
- Headquarters: Tivolska 13, 1001 Ljubljana
- Ideology: Slovenian nationalism, Populism, Euroskepticism, Xenophobia
- Int'l affiliation: None; European affiliation: None / EP group: None
- Nat'l Assembly: 0/90; Municipality mayors: 2/212

## BG (BULGARIA) – 6 NATIONALIST PARTIES

NDSV (National Movement Simeon II) <http://www.ndsv.bg/>

- Leader: Hristina Hristova
- Founded: 2001-04 ~ Founder: Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
- Headquarters: Sofia
- Ideology: Liberalism, Populism
- Political position: Center
- Int'l affiliation: Liberal Int'l / European affiliation: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe / EP group: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
- National Assembly: 0/240; EP: 0/17

DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedom) <http://www.dps.bg/>

- Chairman: Lyutvi Mestan
- Founded: 1990-01-04 / Founder and 1st chairman: Ahmed Dogan
- Headquarters: Sofia
- Ideology: Turkish minority interests, Centrism, Liberalism, Social liberalism, Populism
- Political position: Center-left
- Int'l affiliation: Liberal Int'l / European affiliation: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe / EP group: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
- National Assembly: 36/240; EP: 4/17

VMRO-BND (VMRO-Bulgarian National Movement) [vmro.bg](http://vmro.bg)

- Leader: Krasimir Karakachanov
- Founded: 1991 (cultural organisation) / 1999 (political party)
- Headquarters: 5th Pirotska Str, Sofia, Bulgaria
- Newspaper: Bulgaria / Youth wing: National Youth Committee of IMRO
- Ideology: Nationalism, Conservatism, Traditionalism
- Political position: Right-wing
- National affiliation: Patriotic Front / Int'l affiliation: None / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- National Assembly: 8/240; EP: 1/17

## RO (ROMANIA) – 5 NATIONALIST PARTIES

PRM (Party of Great Romania) [prm-central.ro](http://prm-central.ro)

- Founded: 1991 ~ President: vacant
- Headquarters: Bucharest / Membership (2014): 37,000
- Ideology: Romanian nationalism, Greater Romania, Right-wing populism, National conservatism, Euroscepticism
- Religion: Romanian Orthodoxy
- Political position: Center-left (nominally) / Far-right (in practice)
- European affiliation: None; EP group: No MEPs
- Chamber: 0/412; Senate: 0/176; EP: 0/32

FDGR (Democratic Forum of Germans of Romania) [fdgr.ro](http://fdgr.ro)

- Founded: 1989 ~ President: Paul-Jürgen Porr
- Chamber leader: Ovidiu Gañ
- Ideology: German minority interests
- EP group: not represented, EPP-ED (Jan - Nov 2007)
- Chamber: 1/412; Senate: 0/176; EP: 0/33

PP-DD (People's Party - Dan Diaconescu)

<http://www.partidul.poporului.ro/>

- President: Simona-Alice Man
- Secretary-General: Liviu-Robert Neagu
- Leader in the Chamber of Deputies: Dumitru Niculescu
- Founded: 2011 ~ Founder: Dan Diaconescu
- Dissolved: 2015-06-29 ~ Merged into UNPR
- Headquarters: Bucharest, Romania
- Ideology: Populism, Romanian nationalism
- Political position: Left wing
- National affiliation: None / Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: EU Democrats (collaboration) / EP group: None

NOA/ATAKA (National Union Attack) [ataka.bg](http://ataka.bg)

- Leader: Volen Siderov
- Founded: 2005-04-17
- Headquarters: 1 Vrabcha str., 1000 Sofia
- Newspaper: Ataka Newspaper
- Youth wing: National Youth Organization Attack
- Ideology: Nationalism, Populism
- Political position: Far-right
- Religion: Bulgarian Orthodox Church
- National Assembly: 11/240; EP: 0/17

NFSB (National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria) Website: [nfsb.bg](http://nfsb.bg)

- Leader: Valeri Simeonov
- Founded: 2011-05-17 ~ Split from Attack
- Headquarters: Burgas, Bulgaria
- Newspaper: Desant
- Youth wing: NFSB Youth
- Ideology: Nationalism, National conservatism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Religion: Bulgarian Orthodox Church
- National affiliation: Patriotic Front / Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy / EP group: Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2013–2014)
- National Assembly: 10/240; EP: 0/17

BBT (Bulgaria without Censorship) [bulgariabezczenzura.bg](http://bulgariabezczenzura.bg)

- Leader: Nikolay Barekov
- Founded: 2014-01-25
- Headquarters: Cherni Vrah Blvd, Sofia, Bulgaria
- Ideology: Populism, Euroscepticism
- Political position: Center-right (self-declared)
- EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- National Assembly: 14/240; EP: 1/17

UDMR (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania) [www.udmr.ro](http://www.udmr.ro)

- President: Hunor Kelemen
- Senate leader: Andras Levente Fekete Szabó
- Chamber leader: Márton Árpád
- Founded: 1989-12-25
- Headquarters: Bucharest (presidency), Cluj-Napoca (executive presidium)
- Ideology: Hungarian minority interests, Székely regionalism / Internal factions: Conservatism, Liberalism, Christian democracy, Social democracy
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat Int'l (observer)
- European affiliation: European People's Party
- EP group: European People's Party
- Chamber: 22/412; Senate: 9/176; EP: 2/32

UNPR (National Union for the Progress of Romania) [www.unpr.eu](http://www.unpr.eu)

- President: Gabriel Oprea
- Senate leader: Ilie Sârbu (part of PSD group)
- Chamber leader: Marian Neacșu (part of PSD group)
- Founded: 2010-03
- Split from Social Democratic Party
- Headquarters: Bucharest, Romania
- Youth wing: UNPR's Young
- Membership (2013): 350,000
- Ideology: Social democracy, Progressivism, Pro-Europeanism
- Political position: Center-left
- Chamber: 38/398; Senate: 13/168; EP: 2/32; County Council Presidents: 1/41; County Councilors: 13/1,393; Mayors: 25/3,186

## HR (CROATIA) – 6 NATIONALIST PARTIES

### HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) [www.hdz.hr](http://www.hdz.hr)

- President: Tomislav Karamarko / Secretary: Milijan Brkić
- Founded: 1989-06-17 ~ Founder: Franjo Tuđman
- Headquarters: Zagreb, Croatia
- Youth wing: Youth of the Croatian Democratic Union
- Membership (2013): 210,000
- Ideology: National conservatism, Conservatism, Christian democracy, Pro-Europeanism
- Political position: Center-right to Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: Centrist Democrat Int'l, Int'l Democrat Union / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- Sabor: 41/151; EP: 4/11; County Prefects: 11/21; Mayors: 61/128

### HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) [www.hss.hr](http://www.hss.hr)

- President: Branko Hrg / Founder: Stjepan Radić
- Founded: 1904-12-22
- Headquarters: Zagreb
- Ideology: Social conservatism, Green conservatism, Agrarianism
- Political position: Center-right
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: European People's Party / EP group: European People's Party
- Sabor: 1/151; EP: 1/11; County councils: 104/909; Mayors: 5/128; Municipal Councils: 862/9,564; County Prefect 3/21

### IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly) [www.ids-ddi.com](http://www.ids-ddi.com)

- Leader: Boris Miletić
- Founded: 1990-02-14
- Headquarters: Pula
- Membership (2013): 6,300
- Ideology: Istrian regionalism, Liberalism, Social liberalism, Pro-Europeanism
- Political position: Center-left
- National affiliation: Kukuriku coalition / Int'l affiliation: Liberal Int'l (observer) / European affiliation: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe / EP group: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
- Sabor: 2/151; EP: 1/11; Mayors: 8/128; County Prefect: 1/21

### HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja) [www.hdssb.hr](http://www.hdssb.hr)

- Leader: Dragan Vulin
- Founded: 2006-05-06
- Headquarters: Osijek
- Ideology: Slavonian regionalism, Right-wing populism, National conservatism
- Political position: Right-wing
- Int'l affiliation: None / European affiliation: None
- Sabor: 7/151; EP: 0/11; Mayors: 3/128; County Prefect: 1/21

### HSP (Croatian Party of Rights) <http://hsp.hr/>

- President: Daniel Srb / Founder: Dobroslav Paraga, Ante Paradžik / Vice Presidents: Pejo Trgovčević, Ivica Zorica
- Slogan: Bog i Hrvati (God and Croats)
- Preceded by Party of Rights
- Headquarters: Zagreb, Croatia
- Youth wing: Youth Club of the Croatian Party of Rights
- Military wing: Croatian Defence Forces (HOS) (1991-1993)
- Membership (2011): 41,400
- Ideology: Croatian nationalism, Social conservatism, National conservatism, Euroskepticism
- National affiliation: Savez za Hrvatsku / European affiliation: Euronat
- Sabor: 0/151; EP: 0/11; County Prefect: 0/21; Mayors: 2/128

### HSP-AS (Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević) [www.hsp-ante-starcevic.hr](http://www.hsp-ante-starcevic.hr)

- President: Ivan Tepeš / Secretary: Pero Ćorić
- Founded: 2009 ~ Split from Croatian Party of Rights
- Headquarters: Zagreb
- Membership (2013): 19,174
- Ideology: National conservatism, Social conservatism, Euroskepticism
- Political position: Right-wing
- European affiliation: Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists / EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists
- Sabor: 1/151; EP: 0/11

## Appendix (2) Data

### 1.1 Chapel Hill Expert Survey

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) datasets contain parties' general positions on European integration, several EU policies, and general left/right, economic left/right, and social left/right leanings of the leadership of national political parties including regional political parties for all EU member states. There were a total of 143 parties in the 14 largest EU member states in the 1999 survey, 171 parties in the 14 EU member states and 10 prospective EU members in the 2002 survey, 227 parties in the 24 EU member states (except for Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta) in the 2006 survey, 237 parties in all EU member states (except for Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta) plus 4 non-EU countries (Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey) in the 2010 survey, and 268 parties in all EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey in the 2014 survey. The Ray (1999) datasets for 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 were combined with the 1999 CHES survey. The data are available at the CHES website ([chesdata.eu](http://chesdata.eu)).

The advantage of the CHES dataset on party positions on European integration is that it covers more data on fringe parties than other datasets such as the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and the Standard Eurobarometer (EB). These parties are difficult to cover due to their small national share of votes (Jolly 2007, 114). The disadvantage of the CHES dataset is that it does not contain direct measures of party positions based on election manifestos or media statements but instead measures party reputation as interpreted by country experts (Budge 2000).

### 1.2 Comparative Manifestos Project

The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset provides different aspects of political party performance, the structure and development of party systems, and the stances of political parties on various ideological positions across time and space by using quantitative content

analyses and indicates how the parties try to present themselves to the electorate (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Spirova 2012: 84). The CMP data focus on national elections and have generated a rich time-series set. Although nationalist parties in the CMP data often are categorized into different party families, the CMP data directly show stated party positions, unlike the CHES data that primarily deals with leadership rather than party positions. Thus, although the CMP data provide relatively less detail on the EU compared to the CHES data and do not include many minority nationalist parties that the CHES data do, the CMP data are definitely worth using to supplement information on the EU positions of nationalist parties more clearly. The data are available at the CMP website (<http://manifestoproject.wzb.eu>) and will be adjusted to suit the goals of this dissertation paper.

### 1.3 European Election Studies

The European Election Studies (EES) dataset for 1979-2014 based on national elections will also be used as supplementary data. The EES data come from a cross-national survey about electoral participation and voting behavior in European Parliament elections as well as perceptions and beliefs with reference to the EU in general. The data are available at the EES website (<http://eeshomepage.net>).

### 1.4 World Bank's Database on Political Institutions Data

The World Bank's Database on Political Institutions (DPI) data has been compiled in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. The DPI data, which mainly measure aspects of the political system and electoral rules for 180 countries over the years 1975-2010, contains 125 variables. The variables are organized in five groups: chief executive variables (presidential or parliamentary system, years in office, the chief executive's party affiliation); party variables in the legislature, describing various aspects of the legislature and parties in the legislature (number

of seats held by various parties, whether one party holds an absolute majority and date of elections); electoral rules (plurality or proportional electoral systems, threshold for representation, whether or not elections are affected by fraud); stability and checks and balances (age of present regime, checks and balances, polarization); and federalism (whether there are autonomous regions and whether municipal governments are locally elected). Using the DPI data, I examined how inter-party competition and degree of polarization affect the EU positions of nationalist parties even if these have only indirect effects. The data are available at the World Bank website (<http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40>).

### 1.5 Eurobarometer Data

The Standard Eurobarometer (EB) survey is the Public Opinion Analysis that has been conducted by the European Commission. The EB data contain large-scale, cross-national, cross-sectional, and longitudinal information about attitudes, values, and beliefs on wide-ranging topics in the socio-cultural and socio-political areas for all EU member countries over the years 1973-2014. The exception is Croatia, which was added to the EB data in 2004. Each report was compiled based on about 1000 twice-yearly face-to-face interviews with regular citizens in each country. In this paper, the EB data was used to analyze how nationalist parties have responded to public opinion on European integration and how the electorate has shown support for the nationalist parties over time. The data are available at the European commission website ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion)).

### 1.6 Economic Survey of Europe Data

The UN's Economic Survey of Europe Data have been prepared to serve the needs of the UN's Economic Commission for Europe in reporting on and analyzing world economic conditions. The data are designed at the time of election and measure changes in unemployment

rate and GDP from the year before the election to the election year. Annual reports were issued once a year starting 1948 until 1997. There were three issues in 1998 and 1999 and there are now two issues a year published in April and November. In this dissertation, the Economic Survey of Europe Data was used to analyze how economic conditions have affected the EU positions of nationalist parties. The data are available at the UN's Economic Commission for Europe website ([http://www.unece.org/ead/ead\\_ese.html](http://www.unece.org/ead/ead_ese.html)).

### 1.7 European Economy Statistical Annex

The European Economy Statistical Annex will be used as supplementary data. The semi-annually updated European Economy Statistical Annex that has been reported by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs contains 112 tables with macroeconomic data for all EU countries including population, labor market, output, national final uses, prices, wage costs, foreign trade and current balance, saving, monetary indicators, and public finance. The data are available at the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs website ([http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/db\\_indicators/statistical\\_annex/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/statistical_annex/index_en.htm)).

### 1.8 Eurostat data

As a Directorate-General of the European Commission, the statistical office of the EU (Eurostat) provides statistical information at the European level to EU institutions. In this dissertation, Eurostat data will be used to examine the effect of immigrant population on the EU positions of nationalist parties. The Eurostat data have been collected and statistics compiled on an annual basis regarding international migration and non-national population stocks and the acquisition of citizenship over the years 1998-2013. Some statistics on unemployment and public spending quoted in this paper will be obtained from Eurostat. The data are available at the Eurostat website (<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do>).

### 1.9 International Migrants by Country of Destination

The European Economy Statistical Annex and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI)'s International Migrants by Country of Destination Data from 1960-2013 will be used as supplementary data. MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at local, national, and international levels. The data are available at the Migration Policy Institute website (<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/international-migration-statistics>).

### 1.10 Parliaments and Governments


The Parliaments and Governments (ParlGov) database contains information for approximately 1500 parties, 900 elections (8200 results), and 1100 cabinets (2800 parties) from 37 countries including all EU and most OECD democracies over the years 1945-2015. This database will be used to add some missing data. The data are available at the ParlGov website (<http://www.parlgov.org>).

## Appendix (3) Case-Studies: Selected Nationalist Parties



### 3-1: THE ITALIAN NORTHERN LEAGUE

	1979-EP	1983-Parl.	1984-EP	1987-Parl.	1989-EP	1992-Parl.	1994-Parl.	1994-EP	1996-Parl.	1999-EP	2001-Parl.	2004-EP	2006-Parl.	2008-Parl.	2009-EP	2013-Parl.	2014-EP
LN	-	0.34	-	1.44	1.83	8.65	8.36	6.56	10.07	4.48	3.94	4.96	4.58	8.30	10.21	4.08	6.15
	-	1/630	-	2/630	2/81	55/630	117/630	6/87	59/630	4/87	30/630	4/78	28/630	60/630	9/72	20/630	5/73
MSI	5.45	6.81	6.47	5.91	5.51	5.37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4/81	42/630	5/81	35/630	4/81	34/630	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AN	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.47	12.47	15.66	10.30	12.02	11.49	12.34	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	109/630	11/87	92/630	9/87	99/630	9/78	71/630	-	-	-	-
MS-FI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.91	1.60	0.39	0.73	0.60	2.43	0.80	0.13	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/630	1/87	0/630	1/78	0/630	0/630	0/72	0/630	-
FI	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.01	30.62	21.06	25.16	29.43	20.93	23.72	-	-	-	16.81
	-	-	-	-	-	-	113/630	27/87	122/630	22/87	178/630	16/78	140/630	-	-	-	13/73
PdL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.38	35.26	21.56	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	276/630	29/72	98/630	-	-
FdI-AN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.95	3.66
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9/630	0/73
FLI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.46	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/630	-
M5S	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.55
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108/630	17/73
SUM	5.45	7.15	6.47	7.35	7.34	14.02	42.84	49.65	47.70	41.54	45.78	38.11	41.24	48.11	46.27	53.73	47.77

Italian Nationalist Parties' share of votes, 1979-2014





2014	Population	GDP (Million €)	GDP PPP(€)
Northern Italy	27,801,460 45.73%	889,426 55.11%	32,002
Central Italy	12,086,829 19.88%	355,411 22.02%	29,419
Southern Italy	20,900,556 34.38%	367,576 22.78%	17,509
Italy	60,788,845 99.99%	1,613,859 99.91%	26,548




Source: ISTAT (<http://dati.istat.it>)


	1983 Parl.	1987 Parl.	1989 EP	1992 Parl.	1994 Parl.	1994 EP	1996 Parl.	1999 EP	2001 Parl.	2004 EP	2006 Parl.	2008 Parl.	2009 EP	2013 Parl.	2014 EP
Votes(%)	0.3	1.4	1.8	8.7	8.4	6.6	10.1	4.5	3.9	5.0	4.6	8.3	10.2	4.1	6.2
Seats	1/630	2/630	2/81	55/630	117/630	6/87	59/630	4/87	30/630	4/78	28/630	60/630	9/72	20/630	5/73



Source: Standard Eurobarometer




Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data




Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)


### 3-2: THE ITALIAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data





Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)






### 3-3: THE AUSTRIAN FREEDOM PARTY


	1956	1959	1962	1966	1970	1971	1975	1979	1983	1986	1990	1994	1995	1999	2002	2006	2008	2013
FPÖ	6.5%	7.7%	7.0%	5.4%	5.5%	5.5%	5.4%	6.1%	5.0%	9.7%	16.6%	22.5%	21.9%	26.9%	10.0%	11.0%	17.5%	20.5%
BZÖ																4.1%	10.7%	3.5%
SPÖ	43.0%	44.8%	44.0%	42.6%	48.4%	50.0%	50.4%	51.0%	47.6%	43.1%	42.8%	34.9%	38.1%	33.2%	36.5%	35.3%	29.3%	26.8%
Ö VP	46.0%	44.2%	45.4%	48.3%	44.7%	43.1%	42.9%	41.9%	43.2%	41.3%	32.1%	27.7%	28.3%	26.9%	42.3%	34.3%	26.0%	24.0%



Source: Standard Eurobarometer



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data




Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)

### 3-4: THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY

UK General Election results in Scotland, 1935-2015 (% of votes)

	1935 Baldwin	1945 Attlee	1950 Attlee	1951 Churchill	1955 Eden	1959 Macmillan	1964 Wilson	1966 Wilson	1970 Heath	1974F Wilson	1974O Wilson	1979 Thatcher	1983 Thatcher	1987 Thatcher	1992 Major	1997 Blair	2001 Blair	2005 Blair	2010 Cameron	2015 Cameron
SNP	1.1	1.3	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	2.4	5.0	11.4	21.9	30.4	17.3	11.8	14.1	21.5	22.1	20.1	17.7	19.9	50.0
Labor	36.8	47.9	46.2	47.9	46.7	46.7	48.7	49.8	44.5	36.6	36.3	41.5	35.1	42.4	39.0	45.6	43.9	39.5	42.0	24.3
Con.	-	40.3	44.8	48.6	50.1	47.3	40.6	37.6	38.0	32.9	24.7	31.4	28.4	24.0	25.6	17.5	15.6	15.8	16.7	14.9
Lib Dem	6.7	5.6	6.6	2.7	1.9	4.1	7.6	6.8	5.5	7.9	8.3	9.0	24.5	19.2	13.1	13.0	16.4	22.6	18.9	7.5
Greens	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.2	1.1	0.7	1.3
Socialists	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	3.1	1.9	0.1	0.0
UKIP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.7	1.6
BNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.4	-
Others	55.4	4.9	2.0	0.5	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.8	1.5	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.4
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SNP's Election Results, 1935-2015 (% of votes)



EP Election results in Scotland, 1979-2014 (% of votes)

	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
SNP	19.4	17.8	25.6	32.6	27.2	19.7	29.1	29.0
Labor	33.0	40.7	41.9	42.5	28.7	26.4	20.8	25.9
Con.	33.7	25.7	20.9	14.5	19.8	17.8	16.8	17.2
Lib Dem	14.0	15.6	4.3	7.2	9.8	13.1	11.5	7.1
Greens	-	0.2	7.2	1.6	5.8	6.8	7.3	8.1
Socialists	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	-
UKIP	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	10.5
BNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	0.8
Others	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.6	8.7	16.2	5.9	1.4
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Scottish Parliament Election results (% of votes)

	Constituency				Regional			
	1999	2003	2007	2011	1999	2003	2007	2011
SNP	28.7	23.8	32.9	45.4	27.3	20.9	31.0	44.0
Labor	38.8	34.6	32.2	31.7	33.6	29.3	29.2	26.3
Con.	15.6	16.6	16.6	13.9	15.4	15.5	13.9	12.4
Lib Dem	14.2	15.3	16.2	7.9	12.4	11.8	11.3	5.2
Greens	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	3.6	6.9	4.0	4.4
Socialists	1.0	6.2	0.0	0.0	2.0	6.7	0.6	0.4
Others	1.7	3.5	1.9	1.1	5.7	8.9	10.0	7.3
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Scottish Local Election results in Scotland, 1974-2012 (% of votes)


	1974	1977	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1995	1999	2003	2007	2012
SNP	12.6	24.2	20.9	15.5	13.4	11.7	18.2	21.3	21.8	24.3	26.8	26.1	28.7	24.1	27.9	32.3
Labor	38.5	31.6	39.6	45.4	37.6	45.7	43.9	42.6	44.0	34.0	41.8	43.6	36.6	32.6	28.1	31.4
Con.	28.6	27.2	30.3	24.1	25.1	21.4	16.9	19.4	19.2	23.2	13.7	11.5	13.5	15.1	15.6	13.3
Lib Dem	5.1	4.0	2.3	6.2	18.1	12.8	15.1	8.4	8.0	9.5	12.0	9.8	12.7	14.5	12.7	6.6
Greens	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.3
Socialists	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3
UKIP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3
BNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ind.	15.3	13.1	6.8	8.9	5.1	6.8	4.8	6.4	5.0	7.4	4.2	7.7	7.5	10.1	10.9	11.8
Others	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.7	1.6	1.1	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.0	3.6	4.8	1.7
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

		Scottish Referendum, 1979	Scottish Referendum Results, 1997		Scottish Referendum, 2014
		Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be put into effect?"	Do you agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament?	Do you agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers?	Should Scotland be an independent country?
Yes	Votes	1,230,937	1,775,045	1,512,889	1,617,989
	%	51.62	74.29	63.48	44.70
No	Votes	1,153,502	614,400	870,263	2,001,926
	%	48.38	25.71	36.52	55.30


Source: Glasgow Herald & Deacon (2012, 71) and General Register Office for Scotland



Source: Standard Eurobarometer





Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data




Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)

### 3-5: THE POLISH LAW AND JUSTICE


	2001 Parl.	2002 Reg.	2004 EP	2005 Parl.	2006 Reg.	2007 Parl.	2009 EP	2010 Reg.	2011 Parl.	2014 EP	2014 Reg.	2015 Parl.
Votes (%)	9.50	16.00	12.70	27.00	25.10	32.10	27.40	23.10	29.20	31.80	26.90	37.60
Seats	44/460	97/561	7/54	155/460	170/561	166/460	15.50	141/561	157/460	19/51	171/555	235/460



Source: Standard Eurobarometer



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data





Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)

3-6: THE HUNGARIAN FIDESZ – HUNGARIAN CIVIC ALLIANCE


			1990 Parl.	1994 Parl.	1998 Parl.	2002 Parl.	2004 EP	2006 Parl.	2009 EP	2010 Parl.	2014.4 Parl.	2014.5 EP
Nationalistic characteristics	30/10/12 (88/11/18) - Pre	FKGP	11.74%	8.82%	13.78%	0.75%	-	0.02%	-	0.01%	0.16%	-
			44/386	26/386	48/386	0/386	-	0/386	-	0/386	0/199	-
	87/09/27 - 11/04/08	MDF	24.72%	12.03%	3.12%	41.07%	5.34%	5.04%	5.31%	2.67%	-	-
			165/386	38/386	17/386	24/386	1/24	11/386	1/22	0/386	-	-
	88/03/30 - Pre	Fidesz	8.95%	7.02%	28.18%	41.07%	47.40%	42.03%	56.36%	52.73%	44.87%	51.48%
			22/386	20/386	148/386	164/386	12/24	141/386	14/22	227/386	117/199	11/21
	44/10/13 (1989) - Pre	KDNP	6.46%	7.03%	2.59%	3.9%	-	42.03%	56.36%	52.73%	44.87%	51.48%
			21/386	22/386	0/386	0/386	-	23/386	1/22	36/386	16/199	1/21
	93/07/15 - Pre	MIÉP	-	1.58%	5.47%	4.37%	2.35%	2.2%	-	0.03%	0.04%	-
			-	0/386	14/386	0/386	0/24	0/386	-	0/386	0/199	-
	03/10/24 - Pre	JOBBIK	-	-	-	-	-	2.2%	14.77%	16.67%	20.22%	14.67%
			-	-	-	-	-	0/386	3/22	47/386	23/199	3/21
Sum of Nationalist Parties			51.87%	36.48%	53.14%	50.09%	55.09%	51.49%	76.44%	72.11%	65.29%	66.15%
Non-Nationalistic	89/10/07 - Pre	MSZP	10.9%	33%	32.9%	42%	34.3%	43.2%	17.37%	19.3%	25.67%	10.9%
			33/386	209/386	134/386	178/386	9/24	190/386	4/22	59/386	29/199	2/21
	88/11/13 - 13/10/30	SZDSZ	21.4%	19.7%	7.88%	5.57%	7.77%	6.5%	2.16%	2.67%	-	-
			94/386	70/386	24/386	20/386	2/24	20/386	0/22	0/386	-	-

FKgP: Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party  
 MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum  
 Fidesz: Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance  
 KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party  
 MIÉP: Hungarian Justice and Life Party  
 JOBBIK: Jobbik- the Movement for a Better Hungary  
 MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party  
 SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party






Source: Standard Eurobarometer



Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data



Source: Manifesto Project Database (MPD)