

HOSTILE MEDIA PERCEPTION AND PARTISAN PROCESSING OF MEDIA MESSAGES:
SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DEBATES OVER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND POVERTY

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ABSTRACT

Hostile media perception (HMP) is a well-documented perceptual media effect. Yet, an understanding of its causal mechanisms has been difficult to ascertain. This study examined two promising, inter-disciplinary theoretical explanations – self-categorization and involvement. An experiment tested the effect of various facets of self-categorization and involvement on personal and perceived media positions regarding two issues that are salient to both political and religious identities – same-sex marriage and poverty. Political and religious self-categorization predicted personal positions on the issues, as well as perceptions of relevant media messages. Both HMP and message assimilation were related to self-categorization. Political self-categorization emerged as the strongest predictor of personal beliefs and media perceptions. Value involvement increased position extremity and message assimilation. Findings suggest particular usefulness of self-categorization in predicting HMP, while raising further questions about how readily HMP occurs, particularly among weaker partisans, and which audience or message factors predict message assimilation or contrast. Theoretical and methodological implications for future research are discussed.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family, who made me the person I am today; to my wife, who inspires me; to her family, who has become mine, for joining in the final push; and to the Lord and Savior they each draw me toward.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

α	Cronbach's alpha of internal consistency for scale reliability
β	Beta: The standardized coefficients of a regression
η^2	Partial eta squared: The amount of variance in an outcome variable explained by predictor variables in a General Linear Model test (e.g., ANOVA)
χ^2	Chi-square: A statistical test comparing the distributions of categorical variables
ANES	American National Election Studies
ANOVA	Analysis of variance: A statistical test measuring the effect of categorical predictors on continuous outcomes
ANCOVA	Analysis of covariance: A statistical test measuring the effect of categorical predictors and continuous covariates on continuous outcomes
B	Unstandardized coefficients of a regression
<i>df</i>	Degrees of freedom: number of values free to vary independently
<i>EMM</i>	Estimated marginal mean: A mean adjusted for the effect of covariates in a model, also known as an adjusted mean
<i>F</i>	Fisher's test of the equality of two variances
HMP	Hostile media perception
IDPG	Identification with a Psychological Group scale
IRB	Institutional review board
IPMI	Influence of perceived media influence
<i>M</i>	Mean: The sum of a series of observed values divided by the number of observed values in the set
NSL	South Korean National Security Law

p	Probability of accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis based on observed values
r	Pearson product-moment correlation between two variables
r^2	Amount of variance in an outcome variable explained by predictor variables in a regression test
RELTRAD	Steensland et al.'s (2000) religious tradition classification scheme
SD	Standard deviation: The degree to which individual values in a set differ from the observed mean
SE	Standard error: The degree to which estimated individual values in a set differ from the estimated marginal mean, or adjusted mean
t	Student's test statistic comparing the distribution of continuous variables

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Hostile media perception (HMP) is a perceptual media effect by which partisans – that is, those who align their beliefs with and perceive a psychological attachment to some party or cause (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) – interpret media messages as being less favorable toward their own position and more favorable toward an opposing position (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Collectively, it means that partisans on separate sides of an issue could each find hostile bias in the exact same media message. HMP has been observed regularly in a wide range of topical contexts, including politics (Eveland & Shah, 2003; Feldman, 2011; Huges & Glynn, 2010; Reid, 2012), international affairs (Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Vallone et al., 1985), science (Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Kim, 2011), law (Choi, Park, & Chang, 2011; Hall & Phillips, 2010), sports (Arpan & Raney, 2003), and community-specific issues (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002; Gunther, Miller, & Liebhart, 2009), and has been demonstrated across multiple continents and systems of government press controls (Chia, Yong, Wong, & Koh, 2007; Tsfati, 2007; Tsfati & Cohen, 2005) with a meta-analysis finding robust support over time and topic (Hansen & Kim, 2011).

Though broad in scope, the causal mechanisms underlying HMP are less clearly realized. The prevalence of the phenomenon highlights the importance of understanding why it occurs. Moreover, investigation seems particularly warranted in light of present-day partisanship and distrust in media.

The Founding Fathers believed a press free from government influence was essential to maintain a functioning democracy, so much so that it deserved to be granted specific protection by the Constitution – a document designed to be broad in application. The press was to be a watchdog and advocate for the people (Jefferson, 1905). Today, however, the American people do not trust the press¹. According to Gallup (2014), trust in media to report news “fully, accurately, and fairly” (para. 1) is at its lowest mark since the polling company began asking the question in 1972. Then, 68% of Americans had at least a fair amount of confidence in media, while only 6% had none at all. In 2014, 60% had little to no confidence in media, with 24% having none at all. A deeper inspection by the Pew Research Center found this distrust to be rooted in perceived media bias, political or otherwise; perceived carelessness in reporting and dealing with the public; and perceived conflicts of interest with the powerful (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press [Pew People-Press], 2013).

Numerous explanations have been offered for this erosion of trust, most centering on the political polarization of talk radio, cable news, and other media (e.g., Anand, Di Tella, & Galetovich, 2007; Jones, 2004; Pew People-Press, 2013). However, media are not the only entities becoming more polarized. So, too, is the American electorate (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006, 2008; Pew People-Press, 2014). Polarization has become one of the distinguishing attributes of the early 21st century American political climate. Beginning in the 1970s, national election surveys have documented greater differentiation in party platforms and a widening swath of voters that identify with these distinctions (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). It is not

¹ Though the term “press” technically refers to mass media printed at a press, it is regularly used interchangeably with “media.” “Press passes” are given to electronic news outlets, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press studies all forms of news media, and the International Journal of Press/Politics publishes non-newspaper research. Even media theories maintain the “press” language, though their reach extends beyond the printed page [e.g., the persuasive press inference (Gunther, 1998)]. Accordingly, the term “press” in this dissertation should not be construed as limiting context or application to print media. Rather, it should be taken as an attempt to avoid linguistic monotony in a very long document.

that moderates and independents are disappearing; rather, it is that partisans are simultaneously adhering more completely to their parties' platform and embracing stronger desires to differentiate from their rivals (Pew People-Press, 2014).

The argument could be made that media attempt to match the movement of the public. While this may be true on specific ideological outlets (Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2012), content analyses of traditional journalistic media continue to find little evidence of systematic bias against either major political party (Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Shah, Watts, Domke, Fan, & Fibison, 1999; Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Zeldes, Fico, Carpenter, & Diddi, 2008). Perhaps, then, the reason trust in the press has declined is not because of the press, but because of the people (Gunther, 1992; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010).

If partisans, who are growing more polarized in their positions, are prone to hostile media perception, which creates the impression media messages are biased against them, then actual media content might bear little weight on perceptions of media (Hall & Phillips, 2010). Essentially, HMP would predict that more people perceive more bias in the news because more people have a skewed sense of objectivity. Thus, attempting to understand the causal mechanisms of HMP carries great practical benefit to the people and the press. This study sheds light on why HMP occurs so that partisans may accurately process information contained in news items, allowing the public to be better informed, and perhaps, trust in the press to be restored.

To accomplish this aim, the present study considers two of the most promising theoretical routes for explaining HMP – self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and involvement types (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). While each has been used individually, no HMP study has combined the two frameworks. Together, they provide a social-psychological

avenue for exploring partisan decision-making and message interactions in terms of attitudes, beliefs, and social identities, offering a potentially rich view of the partisan mind.

This novel approach also utilizes a previously untapped context for HMP research – the interplay of politics and religion. Both political partisanship and religiosity constitute core social identities (Greene, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1985), which makes them ripe for biased processing of media messages (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Reid & Hogg, 2005; Reid, 2012). They also make for strange bedfellows at times. For instance, the moral opposition to same-sex marriage embraced by many religious groups does not fit neatly within the libertarian approach to personal freedoms touted by political conservatives (Klatch, 1999). Similarly, those who are highly religious have a moral imperative to aid the impoverished, but government attempts to do so are typically led by political liberals (Rawls, 1971). Understanding partisan psychological processes in these contexts would help in comprehending faith-based political movements, such as the Religious Right. Most importantly for the overarching aims of this study, political and religious interplay facilitates the manipulation of social identities and involvement types to explore whether HMP can be overcome through careful crafting of media messages.

Chapter 2 traces the arc of HMP research and explains how involvement types and self-categorization contribute to explaining the phenomenon. It also considers dimensions of partisanship and self-categorization associated with politics and religion, as well as similarities and differences between the two social identities. Formal hypotheses and research questions are advanced for investigation, and presented together at the end of the chapter (see Table 1, p. 43). Chapter 3 details an experimental methodology for answering the hypotheses and research questions, depicted visually at the end of the chapter (see Figure 2, p. 64). Results are presented in Chapter 4, with a summary displayed at the end of the chapter (see Table 24, p. 122). Finally,

Chapter 5 discusses the results in terms of their theoretical contribution to HMP research and practical consequences for political reporting and religious political appeals.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Origins of Hostile Media Perception

In the late 1970s, participants in a study at Stanford University (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) were presented with a pamphlet containing pro- and anti-death penalty messages. The researchers were interested in how the participants – all firmly entrenched on one side of the issue or the other – processed the mixed messages. Not surprisingly, the participants were far more critical of the contrasting information than that which supported their ideology. However, when it came to attitude change, both the favorable and unfavorable information served to solidify participants' pre-existing beliefs. In other words, opposing partisans were each finding support for their positions in the same messages. The intake of new information, even that which was disagreeable, served only to polarize attitudes rather than causing doubt or a softening of stance.

Lord and colleagues referred to this phenomenon as “biased assimilation.” The underlying causes, they proposed, were the pre-existing attitudes and beliefs of the partisans that triggered:

A propensity to remember the strengths of confirming evidence, but the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically. (Lord et al., 1979, p. 2099)

In the early 1980s, Ross and Lepper joined with another Stanford colleague, Vallone, to investigate “what seems at first consideration to be an exception” (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985, p. 577) to biased assimilation. Media coverage of the 1982 Beirut massacre was shown to pro-Arab and pro-Israeli partisans. Watching the same news content, partisans on both sides perceived the coverage to be unfavorable, or hostile, to their positions (Vallone et al., 1985). This time, opposing partisans were each finding opposition to their positions in the same messages.

Vallone and his associates called their finding the “hostile media phenomenon,” and the pre-existing attitudes and beliefs of the partisans, interestingly enough, were once again cited as a plausible explanation:

Partisans who have consistently processed facts and arguments in light of their preconceptions and prejudices [...] are bound to believe that the preponderance of reliable, pertinent evidence favors their viewpoint. Accordingly, to the extent that the small sample of evidence and argument featured in a media presentation seems unrepresentative of this larger “population” of information, perceivers will charge bias in the presentation and will be likely to infer hostility and bias on the part of those responsible for it. (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 579)

The epistemological approach of the Stanford psychologists at the time is important in understanding how HMP evolved, and possibly why missing pieces addressed by the present study have only recently been incorporated into the puzzle. The propositions of both Lord’s and Vallone’s teams came within a decade of their colleague Bandura’s social cognitive theory. It was a period of robust theory building on the foundation of cognition. Looking back, there is little doubt that the Stanford researchers were looking first toward cognitive explanations for their theories. Lord, particularly, (1989, 1992; Lord et al., 1979) was convinced that partisanship – a required condition for assimilation (and HMP) – could be explained through long-term, consistently flawed cognitive processing to defend a certain position. He reasoned that biased information processing, i.e., flawed cognitive processing, was not a defense mechanism to

combat psychological discomfort, but rather a formation of cognitive expectations by which “judgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence are biased” (Lord et al., 1979, p. 2099). Vallone and colleagues offered a softer interpretation in their pioneering HMP article. The insinuation was not that affect played no role – they agreed it was the origin of the biased information processing – but rather that future biased perceptions were the result of systematic processing through a mind that had built up a “preponderance of evidence” (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 579) that could not be overcome by new, disconfirming information. The first decade of HMP research would attempt to identify these systematic cognitive processes.

Early Cognitive Explanations of HMP

The seminal HMP study alluded to, and sometimes measured, three partisan cognitive processes – selective recall, selective categorization, and different standards (Vallone et al., 1985). Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) more concretely conceptualized and operationalized the processes, advancing them as causal mechanisms underlying HMP. The mechanisms were subjected to theoretical scrutiny by Gunther and colleagues in the mid-2000s that cast doubt upon their predictive power, and paved the way for new methodologies and explanations.

Selective Recall

Selective recall assumes that partisans devote greater cognitive resources to contrary information than agreeable information. HMP researchers hypothesized that the higher elaboration devoted to the contrasting messages means that they will be recalled more proximately than confirming data (Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004).

Selective recall was observed in the seminal study, as both pro-Arab and pro-Israeli partisans estimated that a much higher percentage of references to their side were unfavorable

than favorable (Vallone et al., 1985). However, almost every HMP experiment since that has measured selective recall has produced the opposite phenomenon. By asking participants to list a small number of statements they recall from the stimulus, researchers documented selective recall of *confirming* information among those exhibiting HMP (Arpan & Raney, 2003; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2004), just as they would in instances of assimilation (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979).

Selective Categorization

Selective categorization refers to the assigning of valence to statements from a media message. It assumes that the disharmony between valence judgments of partisans and moderates occurs because of how partisans assign valence to various arguments (Schmitt et al., 2004). It hypothesizes that partisans, in light of their pre-existing beliefs, would perceive as negative an argument that might seem neutral, or even positive, to someone less invested in a position.

Empirical evidence of selective categorization is stronger in HMP research than any of the other early cognitive mechanisms, though it is still far from definitive. Vallone and colleagues (1985) measured categorization by asking for the percentage of favorable/unfavorable statements in the stimulus and observed contrast. Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) measured the categorization differences between recalled statements for partisans and non-partisans and observed assimilation. Each of these methods, however, ran the risk of confounding selective categorization with selective recall.

Schmitt et al. (2004) separated recall from categorization by presenting participants with random statements instead of ones the participant self-selected. With this method, the researchers reported that partisans perceived more negative information than non-partisans, though the difference failed to meet the threshold for statistical significance and became confounded by age

and education. Maintaining this selective categorization method, Gunther & Liebhart (2006) found a link to HMP in a different experimental setting. Still, the relationship between selective categorization and HMP is difficult to place. While noting the promise of the selective categorization explanation, Schmitt and her associates also cautioned that it is impossible to tell “whether bias judgments result from the categorization process or precede it” (Schmitt et al., 2004, p. 637; see also Reid, 2012).

Different Standards

The different standards mechanism is similar to selective categorization, but instead of arriving at different perceptions of valence, partisans completely dismiss opposing arguments by different standards of validity and relevance (Schmitt et al., 2004). “Different standards” is almost a causal mechanism of a causal mechanism, as it attempts to explain how biased cognitive schema form. Here, partisans do not simply reject information as disagreeable, they reject it as irrelevant and invalid. In other words, new information does not enter a mental repository of negative arguments; it gets left out of the schema entirely.

The different standards explanation harkens back to the observation of Vallone and his colleagues that, for partisans, “the preponderance of *reliable, pertinent* evidence favors their viewpoint [emphasis added]” (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 579). It has recently been conceptualized as something of a defense mechanism, perhaps more automatic than the other cognitive mechanisms (Arpan & Nabi, 2011; Gunther, Edgerly, Akin, & Broesch, 2012), though this notion has not been directly tested in an experimental design.

The notion that different standards of accepting or rejecting arguments were part of biased information processing has long been assumed (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vallone et al., 1985), likely because it is so difficult to measure. When Schmitt et al. (2004) attempted to

disentangle different standards from selective recall and categorization, most of their data set had been removed from the analysis. Further, these studies observed different standards at work in both assimilated and contrasted messages (Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2004), suggesting that partisans can exercise different sets of different standards to either assimilate or contrast new information.

Usefulness of the Early Cognitive Explanations

The very specific experimentation and theoretical expositions of Gunther, Schmitt, and Liebhart shined a light on the original cognitive explanations of HMP. Instead of causality, they found mechanisms that were not consistently correlated with HMP, inconsistent or impossible to measure, and for all practical purposes endogenous. As Reid (2012) would later note, the early explanations were largely unique to the study of HMP, and lacked a firm theoretical grounding, limiting their explanatory strength even had their findings been more consistent. As a result, most researchers have abandoned selective recall, selective categorization, and different standards. However, their contribution is still noteworthy, as they introduced questions about receiver involvement. Some of the inconsistency in early findings might have been related to how much attention participants paid to the stimuli, and to which parts of it. Giner-Sorolla's co-author, Chaiken, developer of the heuristic-systematic model of information processing, recognized how characteristics of the message could lead to receivers engaging different levels of information processing (Chaiken, 1980). Both researchers noted as much, almost as an aside, wondering if general media skepticism was enough to heuristically sway perceptions of a media message (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). This would lead to different types of experimental manipulations, and implicitly, the pathways to HMP being understood in terms of involvement and self-categorization.

Message and Source Factors

Following the pioneering cognitive researchers, the next generation of HMP scholars would devote most of their efforts to manipulating source and message factors. While surprisingly few of these studies situate themselves in a theoretical framework, they tested the degree to which partisan receivers elaborate on a message and its features when assessing its agreement with their own ideology, consistent with information processing research (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).


Message Valence

An early assumption of HMP research was that the message had to be unbiased (Vallone et al., 1985; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). However, an increasingly diversified and opinionated media landscape limited the practical implications of this approach. Researchers began to experiment with biased messages and found that partisans on both sides recognized the bias. However, far more bias was perceived by the partisans the message opposed than by the partisans the message favored. The resulting *relative* hostile media perception (RHMP; Gunther & Chia, 2001) has found considerable support and been incorporated into traditional HMP literature (e.g. Choi et al., 2011; Coe et al., 2008).

In fact, a distinction between relative and absolute HMP is not entirely necessary. If one imagines a spectrum of perceived support, with position/group “A” at one end and opposing position/group “B” at the other, partisans exhibiting HMP should always perceive media messages to be the furthest away from their end of the spectrum, in comparison to opposing partisans and neutral observers. This may indeed take the form of a tidy categorical inverse relationship, whereby Partisan A perceives media support for Partisan B, and vice versa. However, with a message that actually favors Partisan A, HMP could just as easily manifest in

Partisan A perceiving neutrality, or even a slight bit of media support, while Partisan B perceives outrageous media bias in favor of Partisan A (see Figure 1). The order and relative distance between partisan groups – the true perceptual effect – does not change; it only slides down the spectrum.

Figure 1
Absolute and Relative Hostile Media Perceptions



Note: Italics represent perceived media position by partisan group.

Thus, it would appear that biased judgments can occur regardless of the valence of the message. This finding, recognized in terms of movement along a spectrum, expands the scope of HMP while maintaining its parsimony. It also makes an important contribution to the understanding of causal mechanisms. Though early cognitive explanations were unfruitful, relative HMP provides evidence that partisan audiences attend to media messages to at least an extent necessary to adjust the degree of hostile bias they perceive. More simply stated, in people who exhibit HMP, there is some level of cognitive processing taking place; otherwise, the content of the message would bear no relevance on partisan judgments.

Based on these absolute and relative HMP findings, the following HMP hypothesis can be offered:

H1: Partisans will perceive the media position on an issue to be more hostile toward their personal position, in comparison to the perceptions of other audiences.

Source Reach

Gunther believed that the unique contrasting qualities of HMP must lie in the carrier of the message. “Media” was deserving of inclusion in the name of the phenomenon, after all. He conducted numerous studies manipulating source reach, exposing partisans to messages appearing to originate from a newspaper (high reach) and a student essay (low reach). Despite the same content, the newspaper article was consistently perceived as more hostile than the essay (Gunther et al., 2009; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004). Applying the persuasive press inference (Gunther, 1998), he reasoned that partisans perceive media messages to be hostile because they fear the reach and influence of those messages. Again, this appears to be a uniquely partisan phenomenon, as the reach effect dissipated when tested on neutral observers (Gunther et al., 2012).

The results beg the question: Why do partisans react in such a defensive manner toward high-reach message sources? The mechanism most associated with reach effects is third-person perception – the propensity to overestimate the influence of unfavorable messages on others (Davison, 1983). The effect was prevalent in a replication of Vallone and associates’ original HMP study (Perloff, 1989) and elsewhere (Choi, Yang, & Chang, 2009; Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004). However, third-person perception presents a problem in time sequence. Third-person perception only maintains that people fear the reach of an unfavorable message. It does not state that people find a message unfavorable because it has a wide reach.

This is not mere semantics. If the latter were true, then HMP could be subsumed into the better developed third-person literature. As it stands, there must be some other factor or factors at work for a partisan to arrive at the perception of media contrast, only then to suffer from third-person perceptions.

Source Friendliness

The root cause of HMP could also be that people simply do not trust the media. Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) advanced the hypothesis that negative preconceptions of mass media might predict HMP. In other words, in a time when trust in the press is low, perhaps a source who has any type of connection to the media is enough to trigger HMP. Choi and his colleagues (2009) found media skepticism to be the greatest predictor of HMP in a model that also included measures of involvement and third-person perceptions. In a novel design, Gunther and Liebhart (2006) attempted to remove a journalist from his mass medium and test for HMP. They found that even when the message attributed to the journalist was characterized as an essay written for a university project during a sabbatical from professional work, HMP remained as prevalent as if it had been published in a newspaper. Media skepticism can even affect more objective audiences. In a study of biased assimilation about John F. Kennedy assassination conspiracies, McHoskey (1995) was puzzled by a large portion of the non-partisan members of his sample who were strongly persuaded by the pro-conspiracy stimulus. He speculated that one reason might have been a recent influx of negative media coverage toward the conspiracies. In other words, people were embracing a new fringe position in direct response to the media telling them not to.

Other studies have approached source friendliness in a different manner. Numerous researchers studying biased information processing beyond the scope of HMP have found that

partisans are far more likely to support a proposal or position if it is attributed – correctly or incorrectly – to their side (e.g. Cohen, 2003; Greitemeyer, Fischer, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2009; Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002). For example, Cohen (2003) manipulated the party affiliation of welfare reform proposals and observed Republicans supporting an expansion of welfare and Democrats supporting drastic cuts – the opposite of their party platforms.

Friendliness in HMP studies has similarly been manipulated by attributing the message to a source with known political allegiances. Reid (2012) observed such a strong effect of friendliness that even an attack on the partisan group was largely accepted when it was attributed to a member of that same group. Turner (2007) took advantage of the ideologically fractured cable news environment and found HMP to spike among Republicans when a message was attributed to CNN, but weaken when the same message was attributed to Fox News. The inverse relationship was observed in Democrats.

Studying HMP among sports fans, Arpan and Raney (2003) manipulated friendliness through geographic proximity to each partisan group. Among the football fans in their sample, HMP was most prevalent when reading a message attributed to the newspaper in their rival team's hometown, as opposed to their team's town. However, Gunther et al. (2009) observed the opposite phenomenon, as the most proximate source was perceived less favorably than other sources.

Understanding Partisan Interaction With Media: Theoretical Infusions

An impressive collection of studies have mounted confirmatory predictions of HMP. It is a parsimonious theory with predictions of practical relevance that can be tested and falsified. What is missing from the HMP literature is a consistent explanation of exactly *how* HMP occurs. The role of media skepticism is exemplary – it could be approached by any number of theoretical

frameworks with different emphasis on cognition and affect, and potentially arrive at different explanations.

Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) found that media skepticism could affect HMP in two different ways. In a semantic-network tradition (Bower, 1981), it could immediately invoke the existing emotional state of hostility toward the media, resulting in an immediate heuristic dismissal of the message. Conversely, according to affective infusion theory (Forgas, 1995), the skepticism might encourage systematic processing of the message, but motivated by an existing framework of negative information, a cognitive schema that the new message cannot overcome. Hwang, Pan, and Sun (2008) applied appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1982), whereby cognitive evaluations of media messages activate affective hostility, though their survey methodology lacked the ability to establish temporal precedence.

The most recent movement in HMP research has returned to the mind of the receiver, in an attempt to more clearly define cognitive and affective dimensions of “partisanship” – something that has always been required for HMP testing, but a construct that has not been fully conceptualized, much less operationalized. Vallone and colleagues observed the hostile media phenomenon only after a failed pilot test gave them insight into the importance of partisanship. In an unpublished manuscript, the results of which are presented in the Beirut paper (Vallone et al., 1985), the researchers conducted a phone survey days before the 1980 presidential election. They found that voters who perceived bias in media almost always perceived it to be against their preferred candidate. Further, two-thirds of respondents felt media coverage of the election was unbiased. After the election, the researchers asked participants to read news articles about the candidates. Instead of HMP, they observed malaise – the election was over and even political partisans, generally speaking, had lost interest. The researchers concluded that partisanship

meant more than affection or distaste for some general concept. Rather, “perceptions of hostile bias are difficult to document unless subjects are *intellectually* and *affectively* engaged by the matters being covered in the media” (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 582, emphasis added).

In recent years, two existing and inter-disciplinary frameworks have presented themselves as particularly fruitful for bridging many of the HMP findings. The most promising efforts toward adding explanatory power to HMP focus on self-categorization and involvement. Self-categorization, considered by Hartmann and Tanis (2013) to be “one of the more complete and coherent theoretical accounts” (p. 536) of HMP provides an excellent social explanation for the role of partisanship in message processing and interpretation of source cues, while involvement may help better explain situations in which partisans do not follow the predictions of the theory.

Self-Categorization

Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) follows the notion of McDougall (1920) that all individual psychology is grounded in social interactions. It explores the cognitive processes associated with group affiliation. Asch (1952) advocated “psychology of the whole,” whereby groups became a reality only because individuals began to act as if they were parts of a collective body instead of as separate units. Self-categorization describes how this occurs and how it affects individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The theory consists of five key components – prototypes, meta-contrast, entitativity, depersonalization, and fit.

Prototypes are the attributes one assigns to a social category. Attributes can change over time, especially if the behaviors of certain prominent group members are allowed to define the prototype (Lakoff, 1987). *Meta-contrast* is one’s tendency to imagine prototypes that maximize intragroup similarities (assimilation) and intergroup differences (contrast) (Oakes, Haslam, &

Turner, 1994). This meta-contrast serves to construct *entitativity* (Campbell, 1958) – the perception of groups as distinct, easily identifiable entities with clear boundaries. This results in *depersonalization* of group members. When depersonalization occurs, characterizations of individuals are based not on their unique self-identities, but by the meta-contrasted prototype that one has assigned them. For the contrast to work, one of the key assertions of self-categorization is that the individual making these social judgments has also depersonalized oneself, taking on one’s own group’s prototype. While the process may carry a negative connotation, especially to the independent-minded, Turner and colleagues (1987) found self-categorization to carry practical benefits. Without depersonalization, groups would never become cohesive and probably never accomplish much. However, that also means that depersonalization is not something that is “switched on” for a brief comparison; rather, it is something that becomes a central part of one’s self-identity, which is really a social identity (Rogers, 1959; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987).

Finally, self-categorization posits that social identity is fluid. People hold many social categorizations, and employ them when they become salient. This saliency is triggered when making evaluations, which the theory presents as impossible without social comparisons (Tajfel, 1972). Therefore, it follows that one’s social identity will always play an integral role in an evaluation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Saliency is all about *fit*. Self-categorization predicts an inclination to select the social categories that have the strongest meta-contrast in a particular comparative context.

While self-categorization attempts to distance itself from emotional motivations, subsequent researchers have reincorporated dimensions of the far more affect-oriented social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to suggest that comparisons are made to reduce

dissonance (Festinger, 1957) in a manner that protects one's self-concept. Turner (1999) himself eventually recognized this "social identity perspective." Thus, one may position self-categorization as a cognitive process spurred on by affective motivations.

Self-categorization has been applied to communication, and has been offered as a more encompassing, multi-disciplinary approach to explaining perceptual effects (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013; Hogg & Reid, 2006; Reid & Hogg, 2005). It situates itself well within the current media effects trajectory. Whereas the era of minimal effects focused on the strength of social ties overwhelming an impersonal media, moderate effects emerged by looking at individual cognition. Perceptual effects, like HMP or third-person perception, argue that the way people perceive media changes how it affects them. Self-categorization says that those perceptions are fueled by social identities. Therefore, knowing what social categorizations become salient when interacting with media become important in making predictions about effects.

As few as three published HMP studies have explicitly introduced the idea of self-categorization. The first (Matheson & Dursun, 2001), simply replaced traditional terms for partisanship with references to "in-groups" and "out-groups." One could easily argue that every HMP study of partisans could invoke this same terminology. Hartmann and Tanis (2013) used measures of in-group status and group identification and found that greater self-categorization produced HMP among anti-abortion, and to a lesser extent, abortion rights partisans. Though they used self-categorization measures, their experimental design was focused on other theoretical approaches and did not include manipulations directly relevant to self-categorization. Further, the convenience sample was disproportionately well-educated – over 40% of the sample had earned at least a master's degree. Reid's (2012) hypotheses directly related to tenets of self-categorization to better measure its applicability. First, he primed the fit of different social

categories by presenting one article involving legislation pitting Democrats against Republicans, and a second discussing the international ramifications of the legislation, pitting the world against America. In the first condition, HMP was observed as political partisans each found the article to be against their position. In the second condition, the partisan split disappeared. Reid argues that this is because the level of comparison became more abstract. Rather than seeing themselves as opposing ends of an American political spectrum, participants categorized themselves as Americans against the now more contrasting international “others” (see Turner, 1999). Essentially, the self-categorization removed partisanship from the sample.

Based upon self-categorization theory, and its application in perceptual media effects research, hypotheses can be advanced about the political and religious social identities pertinent to the present study.

H2a: Political self-categorization will predict agreement with the in-group position presented in the media message.

H2b: Religious self-categorization will predict agreement with the in-group position presented in the media message.

Because it cannot be assumed that political and religious identities produce specific topical positions, these preliminary hypotheses are necessary. These hypotheses predict that people who see themselves as belonging to a political or religious group will express personal support for the position being advocated by their respective group. Should these hypotheses fail to be supported, it would indicate contrast from the in-group, and likely that some other self-categorization is salient.

H3a: Greater political self-categorization will positively predict HMP.

H3b: Greater religious self-categorization will positively predict HMP.

Similar to the original HMP hypothesis, this uses one's self-categorization strength as the independent variable rather than individual-level support for a position.

RQ1: What is the relationship between political and religious self-categorizations?

Given the role of saliency and fit in self-categorization, one might anticipate interplay between the two self-categorizations. This research question will supplement H2-3 to better understand how the two social identities work in concert, and whether certain circumstances heighten the saliency of one over another, as measured by their effects on partisan position and HMP.

H4: Preexisting beliefs about media coverage of a partisan's self-categorized group will inversely predict HMP.

Many have speculated or provided correlational evidence that media skepticism predicts HMP (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Hwang et al., 2008). This hypothesis gauges skepticism specifically as it pertains to media coverage of a partisan group. If "the media" is perceived as an in-group, then HMP in one specific news item should not occur. If media is an out-group, then HMP should be evident in perceptions of the single news item.

Reid (2012) made one more contribution of note in his study. In a second test, Reid made the source of a political message explicitly partisan, though the information remained balanced. Here, he observed something similar to the RHMP, in which an out-group source was seen as strongly biased in favor of the out-group, while the in-group saw the source as only slightly favoring their side. Finally, Reid manipulated source and valence, exposing participants to a message condemning Democrats. The article was attributed to either a Republican strategist or a Democratic strategist. Reid found that Republican participants were thrilled with the attack against the out-group, no matter the source affiliation. Meanwhile, Democrats strongly rejected

the Republican (out-group) attack on their party. However, when the attack came from an in-group source, it was accepted as a fair criticism. Reid's conclusions have revealed two key theoretical applications. First, participants were reading the articles; otherwise, Republicans would have immediately dismissed the Democratic source. Second, in-group saliency did not change when the Democratic source went on the attack, indicating that there is a limit to the consonance motivation and a point when people listen to an argument they do not like. Self-categorization, by itself, does not explain these phenomena. Other ongoing HMP research might provide the missing element.

Involvement

An underlying assumption of HMP is that partisans have biased perceptions because they are heavily involved in their respective cause. *Involvement*, as a blanket term, can refer to many different things. It is perhaps most commonly associated with information processing, through the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) or the Heuristic-Systematic Model of Information Processing (Chaiken, 1980). Higher levels of involvement result in more elaborate (or systematic) processing of information, while lower levels of involvement increase the likelihood of relying upon heuristic cues as peripheral shortcuts to arriving at judgments. It would be simple to conclude that high involvement equals more careful processing and leads to more accurate judgments. However, partisanship puts an interesting "spin" on the model.

When a partisan directs systematic cognitive attention to a message, the resulting information processing can still be biased (Johnson & Eagly, 1990; Lord et al., 1979). As previously mentioned, Vallone et al. (1985) argued that this occurred because the partisan had collected a vast amount of information that had been consistently processed and stored in a

manner that confirmed their position. How, then, could a partisan with all the facts on his side, think that something truly objective was anything but hostile?

Distinguishing types of involvement may provide an answer. Social judgment theory – in many ways a predecessor to self-categorization – emphasized *ego involvement* as a strong incentive to protect one’s self-concept from attack (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Ego involvement triggered pre-existing attitudes called “anchors,” to which incoming messages could be compared. If the difference between the new message and the anchor was perceived to be small, the new message was assimilated into the pre-existing attitude. If the difference was perceived to be great, the new message was seen as contrasting from the pre-existing attitude, and subsequently rejected (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965). The more extreme one’s attitudes, or allegiance to them, the more likely one is to experience cognitive dissonance. As social judgment researchers discovered, these extreme partisans experienced a widening latitude of rejection and shrinking latitude of acceptance, leading to heightened perceptions of contrast and virtual elimination of assimilation (Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958; Sherif & Sherif, 1967).

Petty and Cacioppo (1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) conceptualized involvement more in terms of the direct effect of a stimulus on the receiver. In a series of experiments suggesting changes to academic procedures, such as exam frequency, students engaged in central-route processing when the changes would apply to them, but in peripheral-route processing when the changes would take place after the students had graduated. In these studies, involvement was not as affective and ego-protecting as it was practical.

Johnson and Eagly (1989) distinguished these conceptualizations of involvement into what they called *value* and *outcome involvement*. Value involvement invoked core beliefs and attitudes central to the self-concept, and were thought to be the main drivers of information

processing choices, often leading to defensive (biased) mechanisms. Outcome involvement, meanwhile, was triggered by a tangible threat beyond one's feelings (such as the exam experiment). This greatly emphasized systematic processing and even the overcoming of biases associated with the self-concept. Petty and Cacioppo (1990) engaged in a debate with Johnson and Eagly (1990) over the merits of the division – Petty and Cacioppo felt the two types of involvement were inseparable – but subsequent research has embraced the different types of involvement as a useful way to understand partisan motivations (Cho & Boster, 2005). Moreover, the role of a distinct outcome involvement has been debated within group membership approaches as well, though with different terminology. While self-categorizations are powerful, self-interests are reasoned to override group identities when the consequence is substantial and highly probable (Sears & Funk, 1991) – criteria that appear quite similar to outcome involvement.

Just as measures of partisanship indicate self-categorization, measures of partisan extremity can allude to involvement, so the concept is not new to HMP research. However, as few as three published HMP studies have employed Johnson and Eagly's (1989) distinctions. Hwang et al. (2008) isolated value involvement and found strong correlations between it and political partisanship, and found it predictive of HMP. Two studies by Choi and colleagues (2009, 2011) compared value and outcome involvement in the context of the passage of a South Korean National Security Law (NSL). The law places restrictions on public protest and criticism of the government, and levies prison sentences to offenders. From a value involvement standpoint, it runs counter to core democratic beliefs held by many South Koreans. However, for those who actively criticize the government, it holds real outcome-related consequences. Among a South Korean student sample, Choi et al. (2009) found that value involvement predicted HMP,

but not outcome involvement. Those participants, the authors reasoned, needed to know what was at stake in the factual news article, and so they read it carefully and recognized its objective nature. In a replication using a sample of activists, HMP was correlated with both types of involvement (Choi et al., 2011). Here, value and outcome involvement became difficult to untangle, though differences were observed in self-reports of future behaviors – value involvement was correlated with intentions for demonstrations that may well violate the NSL, while outcome involvement was correlated with intentions for more diplomatic resolutions.

Extending the academic policy experiments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1981), it may also be possible that geographic proximity affects perceptions of tangible consequence necessary for outcome involvement. Locality of an issue or event has long been identified as a key news value (Shoemaker, Lee, Han, & Cohen, 2007). Among a sample of college students, D'Alessio (2003) found articles about local campus issues produced weaker HMP than did an article about a national political issue. Finally, at least one study suggested that outcome involvement may mitigate actual effects of HMP. Though HMP was found, the influence of perceived media influence (conceptualized as third-person effect) was not apparent in a study utilizing Teamsters in the midst of a union strike (Christen et al., 2002). Though involvement types were not distinguished, one may reason that the Teamsters – uncertain about their jobs and finances – constituted highly outcome-involved partisans.

Not only do involvement hypotheses produce mixed results, but they also have been tested with many different scales. Further, generic value involvement measures sometimes struggle with reliability and validity regarding issues that do not appeal as obviously to higher principles. Whereas core principles may be readily relatable to detainment by government forces (Choi et al., 2009, 2011), topic-relevant value items fared much better than abstraction when it

came to involvement with campus Greek life (McLemore, 2015). Thus, additional measures and manipulations to achieve reliable and valid measures of value and outcome involvement may be worth the investment.

Based on involvement research and its application to perceptual media effects research, the following hypotheses and research questions are advanced.

H5: Stronger preexisting beliefs about a controversial topic will positively predict value involvement.

As value involvement is based upon core beliefs which have been made salient by the media message, the extremity of those preexisting beliefs should produce a topic-level partisanship that increases value involvement with the message.

H6: Higher value involvement among partisans will positively predict HMP.

Following the conceptualization of value involvement as making salient one's core beliefs, and considering the human propensity to protect those beliefs with information processing biases (Johnson & Eagly, 1989), a positive relationship should exist between value involvement and HMP.

H7: Higher outcome involvement will positively predict time spent consuming the media message.

This hypothesis more directly tests the assumption that outcome involvement produces central route information processing. Those with low involvement altogether would be expected to use quick, peripheral route processing out of disinterest, and those with high value involvement might be expected to do the same out of defense. However, for those with outcome-involved motivation, careful, cognitive, systematic processing of a message takes time (Chaiken,

1980; Sujan, 1985). Thus, increased outcome involvement should result in increased time spent processing the message.

H8: Personal or close social identification with the topic will positively predict outcome involvement.

H9: Being under the jurisdiction of the outcome will positively predict outcome involvement.

As outcome involvement is based upon the recognition that a topic is of immediate consequence to the individual, people who consider themselves part of the group directly affected by the outcome of a partisan debate will exhibit higher outcome involvement than those who are not directly affected. Following Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981), the reach of an outcome, conceptualized as the jurisdiction of policy makers, should similarly modify outcome involvement as the chance of it affecting the individual will be perceived differently.

H10: Higher outcome involvement among partisans will diminish HMP.

As outcome involvement represents the perception of a tangible impact on one's personal life, protection of the self-concept might be replaced by a need for comprehension (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). This does not represent simply a change in elaboration, but in the receiver's intent. Thus, outcome involvement should have a moderating effect on HMP. H10 does not predict a negative relationship between outcome involvement and HMP, as it would indicate expectation of message assimilation, rather than simply a lack of HMP.

RQ2: What is the relationship between value and outcome involvement regarding HMP?

It is expected that many partisans will respond to a media message regarding their area of partisanship with high value and outcome involvement. Johnson and Eagly (1989) suggest that value involvement is the chief motivator in information processing, suggesting that the potential

benefits of outcome involvement for accurate processing could be overridden. However, this relationship is far from certain, and particularly untested in HMP research. Thus, a research question was advanced.

The Present Study: A Merging of Approaches

The possibilities for research involving self-categorization and involvement types seem promising. Self-categorization provides a route for manipulating the saliency of social identities to better isolate different types of involvement observed in Choi et al.'s 2011 study. Types of involvement might better explain Reid's (2012) finding about the apparent information processing elaboration that occurred among partisans reading an attack article. Outcome involvement overriding HMP is an interesting prediction, one that, while adding a narrow exception to HMP, might greatly strengthen our understanding of the functions of partisanship (becoming salient through self-categorization) and what aspects of involvement are really contributing to biased perceptions. The following research question permits initial exploration into how involvement and self-categorization complement one another as theoretical explanations of HMP.

RQ3: What is the relationship between self-categorization and involvement regarding HMP?

The present study utilizes two related, yet distinct, self-categorizations – political ideology and religiosity. A notable deficiency in HMP literature is a proper conceptualization of partisanship (Choi et al., 2009; Gunther et al., 2009). Accordingly, the following sections briefly describe the relationship between political partisanship and religiosity, as well as prominent conceptualizations of partisanship in both areas.

The Relationship Between Politics and Religion

This study considers the role of political and religious social identities on perceptions of media coverage of legislative proposals. The two may seem inseparable, and indeed, their relationship extends back to classic electoral decision making studies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). It is true that, as a general rule, the more religious one is, the more likely he or she is to be politically conservative (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). This so-called “God Gap” is evident in voting patterns. Consistently, Republicans receive a higher share of the religious vote than do Democrats (Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project [Pew Religion], 2012, 2014b). However, to suggest that religiosity is perfectly correlated with Republicanism would be false.

The “God Gap” was not always so prominent. Through much of American history, religion was not a significant influence in voting because both major parties typically aligned on public issues of faith, but more commonly chose not to speak of them (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). In the 1980s, the Moral Majority, or Religious Right, movement positioned faith as a platform of political conservatism, and at the same time attempted to remove it from association with political liberalism. The movement combined with an increase in public dialogue about controversial moral issues – notably abortion and same-sex marriage – to drive a religious wedge between political parties (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de Vries, 2011).

Just as all religions do not hold the same tenets of faith, people of different religions do not align neatly in a political sense. Jewish voters, for instance, remain largely liberal (Pew Religion, 2012, 2014b). Even within Christianity, denominational differences can be observed. Catholics tend to be more liberal, though staunchly anti-abortion, while Black Protestants,

though strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, make up one of the most universally liberal voting blocs observable, with over 90% voting for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections, a trend predating the Obama elections (Pew Religion, 2012). The driving force behind the Religious Right has been Evangelical Protestants – the largest sub-group of Christians in the U.S. (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Sherkat et al., 2011).

However, to propose an Evangelical-conservative coupling may still be unreasonable. Instead, multiple studies have found that religiosity is most salient (if not *only* salient) when confronted with a moral political issue (Adkins, Layman, Campbell, & Green, 2013; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wilson, 2009). Moreover, the definition of a moral issue appears to have been selectively framed in the fused “composite Evangelical Republican identity” (Patrikios, 2013, p. 804). Putnam and Campbell (2010) failed to find significant effects of religiosity on all types of seemingly moral issues, including the death penalty and poverty (see also Adkins et al., 2013). Instead, they found just two issues accounting for a profound religious shift in voting. Abortion and same-sex marriage, they concluded, were “the glue which holds religiosity and partisanship together” (Putnam & Campbell, 2010, p. 370).

Many recent studies have attempted to keep up with rapid changes in public opinion and public policy regarding same-sex marriage (Olson et al., 2006; Pew Religion, 2014a; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Sherkat et al., 2011; Whitehead, 2014). These researchers have consistently found Evangelicals to have the strongest opposition among all major religious groups studied. Further, participation in religious activities, keeping religious social circles, and embracing orthodox views of the Bible all predicted greater opposition.

The findings also bear theoretical relevance to the present study. Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that those who opposed same-sex marriage placed more importance on the topic

than those who favored it, potentially suggesting very high value involvement. Similarly, self-categorization theory suggests that the framing of a small number of moral political issues by the Religious Right has created easily retrievable prototypes for fused religious-political in-groups of Evangelical conservatives and out-groups of secular liberals (Patrikios, 2013). In fact, there is some evidence of depersonalization fulfilling the prophecy of the social distinction, whereby liberals increasingly view religiosity as an out-group characteristic of conservatives (Adkins et al., 2013; Patrikios, 2013).

The relationship between political and religious identities leads to interesting hypotheticals. A political candidate who is pacifist and helps the poor would almost undoubtedly be recognized as a liberal, though peace and charity are tenets of every major world religion, including Evangelical Christianity. Moreover, worshipers in America are more likely to hear messages about poverty than any other potentially politicized topic (Pew People-Press, 2006). However, these are not moral issues that influence Evangelical voters. In accordance with self-categorization theory, it is because they have not been made salient areas of contrast by religious-political opinion leaders. Not a part of the prototype, they are cast aside in favor of more established frames that provide clearer contrast (Adkins et al., 2013; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Thus, one might reason that same-sex marriage is more likely to trigger a fused conservative-Evangelical identity, while an issue such as poverty would still carry moral weight under a religious identity, but perhaps not under a conservative political identity.

Dimensions of Partisan Identity

The majority of HMP studies measure strength of partisanship by a single-item measure of how strongly one associates with a certain side of the controversy chosen for the particular study. While this is important, it does not provide a complete measurement of partisan strength,

and certainly falls short of measuring a social identity. When the term “partisan” is mentioned, it is common to think of politics. Indeed, the field has developed numerous ways of adding nuance to conceptualizations of partisanship. For instance, most national election surveys include questions about political participation, awareness, and importance (see Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999 for an overview). While these measures alone do not indicate that one is an ideologue, they are useful in differentiating between those who say they are strongly aligned with a party or cause, and those who actually “walk the walk.” Despite attempts to define political parties or religiosity by value involvement, these measures also fall short of measuring partisan direction, as most groups believe what they stand for is based in similar moral ideals (see Feldman, 2003 for a review).

When studying perceptual media effects, it is important to identify to which side a person perceives alignment, as well as the affective and cognitive perceptions of what that membership means – something well recognized by political scientists working within similar social decision making frameworks (Greene, 1999; Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003). In fact, as Huddy (2003) observes, the social identity perspective is virtually synonymous with Campbell and colleague’s (1960) influential definition of political partisanship – saliency of defining political beliefs that engender a psychological attachment to the group.

However, this does not necessarily indicate an agreement with – or even knowledge of – specific policy positions associated with that group. Someone who identifies as a political conservative but favors larger government – or as a devout Evangelical but does not accept the Great Commission – may be viewed as a less genuine partisan in light of these incongruences, which is why both fields developed measures of ideological beliefs and doctrinal orthodoxy, respectively (Robinson et al., 1999; Sherkat et al., 2011).

Studies of political partisanship and religiosity rely on essentially the same conceptualizations of partisanship, recognizing that simple affiliation is simply not enough to arrive at accurate conclusions about correlations or effects (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Esmer & Pettersson, 2007). Partisans self-identify as such, value the resulting group identification, find the topic area important, have relevant attitudes consistent with the orthodoxy of their “side,” and participate in behaviors that involve them in the group and/or field.

HMP and the Influence of Perceived Media Influence

The most recent paradigm in media effects research, the influence of perceived media influence, or IPMI, proposed media effects are perceptual, or indirect (Gunther & Storey, 2003). Rather than an all-powerful media telling the masses what to think, or a powerless media overwhelmed by the uniqueness of each audience member, this line of thinking gives the audience the power to determine whether media exert an effect through their own perceptions of it. As Tsfati (2007) succinctly expressed, “people feel that what media say today reflects what other people will think tomorrow” (p. 634). This perceptual effect can occur whether or not there is any actual direct media effect on the public (Mutz, 1989). Instead, people who are confident in their own discernment doubt the ability of others to receive useful information and resist harmful persuasion, a phenomenon referred to as optimism bias (Gunther & Mundy, 1993).

Though perhaps the first to use the term “influence of perceived media influence,” Mutz turned her attention to how perceptions of the attitudes and opinions of unknown others could influence individual perceptions of public opinion, something she called *impersonal influence* (Mutz, 1992, 1998). Impersonal influence almost exclusively dealt with the reporting of public opinion polling data, which could result in a bandwagon effect toward the majority opinion, or a heightened need to defend one’s own deeply held minority opinion. The direction of impersonal

influence depended on the individual's level of involvement, though a more social explanation would also place weight on the social categorizations involved in the information (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Since it can be difficult to categorize "unknown others," the individual might instead categorize the messenger of that information – the media.

HMP suggests that such a categorization might be troublesome for the media outlet, especially if the receiver is a partisan. HMP predicts that partisans perceive an inordinate amount of media bias against their position, regardless of the reality. It has been incorporated into IPMI as a directional predictor. To extend the earlier sequence, if what we see in media today is what the public will believe tomorrow, and if we perceive what we see in media today to be biased, then we are likely to respond negatively toward the perceived media influence (Gunther, 1998). While this dissertation improves our understanding of HMP at the individual level, justification for such an endeavor comes through recognizing the macro-level ramifications of such a perceptual bias within the IPMI paradigm.

A Hostile Media Effect?

One of the interesting elements of IPMI is its effect on unintended, or indirect, audiences. In developing the third-person effect, a precursor to IPMI, Davison (1983) pointed to political campaign activity. When one candidate sees an opponent delivering mailers to potential voters, the campaign team scrambles to determine a response. This behavior is based in the assumption that the mailer will have some sort of effect, and since the source is hostile to the campaign, that effect is sure to be harmful.

Despite their feelings about the press (or, as IPMI would predict, because of them), political figures (at the national level, at least) perceive media coverage to be necessary for their survival in a democratic system (Cohen, Tsafati, & Sheaffer, 2008; Cook, 1998). This perception is

not without merit. In Davison's (1983) anecdote, if the candidate observing his opponent using mass communication tactics to reach voters decides to sit in his office and do nothing, he may indeed lose the election. Saliency-based effects theories suggest that media can bring particular issues to public consciousness (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and even define the criteria for evaluation of that issue (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991). Media play a role in increasing all-important name recognition leading up to an election, and can also heighten awareness of public policy. In fact, devoting attention to such topics is what American media was built to do. To be an informer to the people and a watchdog protecting against government corruption was the constructive purpose of the press when it was given unique protections in the First Amendment.

However, perceptions of bias decimate the legitimacy of media as an element of democracy. In fact, studies have suggested that HMP has consequences for the political legitimacy of the press, its sources, and the governments it covers, whether those press systems are controlled by the state (Chia et al., 2007) or are independent (Choi et al., 2011). Critics of media consider them to be mouthpieces for the establishment (Tsfati, 2007), and point to the funding of news organizations by individuals and corporations with political agendas as a source of corruption that lessens political capital (Golding & Murdoch, 1991). Gone are the days of the egalitarian "access theory," by which the judiciary reasoned that the marketplace of ideas advocated by great thinkers like Jefferson or Mill was a gambit from the start if the elite had access to a megaphone that allowed their voices to dominate the forum (Hall & Phillips, 2010; *Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo*, 1974; *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 1969). Today, the free market dictates that the elite have earned their platform, and yet, through what could reasonably be argued as a blending of perceptual biases and actual imbalances in political

power, our increasingly mediated democracy (see Bennett & Iyengar, 2008) has lost trust in its messenger.

A popular public relations perspective is the advocacy-accommodation spectrum, by which environmental contexts determine how practitioners respond to a threat (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997). If IPMI suggests that partisans perceive powerful media effects on the public, and HMP adds that the media is attacking their positions, then it stands to reason that the perceived environment demands aggressive advocacy. IPMI proposes a wide range of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (see Rojas, 2010, for a review). Similar to the public relations construct, there is a division between audience *compliance* and *defiance* (Mutz 1992, 1998). As expected, no IPMI studies utilizing partisan participants have observed compliance to the media message, due to their proclivity to perceive that message as hostile. However, there have been examples of entrenchment in defiant positions against the perceived media majority (e.g., Cohen & Tsfati, 2005). One way in which defiance can be achieved is through *corrective* action (Rojas, 2010). Here, partisans experiencing HMP respond through increased political participation. Most interestingly, they often do this by becoming mass communicators themselves. Whether by blogs, social networking, podcasting, or some other web-based vehicle, technology has given partisan advocates the ability to have the same message reach they originally feared. Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argued that technology would so fragment mass audiences that a return to a minimal effects paradigm was inescapable. At least in the case of IPMI and HMP, technology provides a way in which a fairly strong media effect can be observed through explicit behavioral outcomes.

These behaviors also factor in to a media systems perspective, as it exemplifies the blurred lines of media and the infamous question of “Who is a journalist?” Importantly, some of

the activists who are compelled to enter the fray (potentially because they experience HMP), become recognized members of at least a somewhat institutional media (e.g., Matt Drudge, Andrew Breitbart, Markos Moulitsas). In doing so, they largely insert the very partisan content that make people question the notion of media objectivity.

The most common implication of IPMI for media is public support for censorship (Hall & Phillips, 2010; Perloff, 2009; Xu & Gonzenbach, 2008). This can manifest itself in disengaged sentiment (e.g., a desire to see certain types of commercials taken off the air) or receiver actions (e.g., parents restricting their children's exposure to violent media or video games). Again, the desire for censorship affects largely unintended audiences who perceive a media effect on someone else, whether that effect is real or not. Most interesting among these effects for news is the relationship between journalists and their sources. Whereas politicians generally consider media coverage to be something they should try to obtain (Cohen et al., 2008), largely because of the public nature of the job and the fact that the public chooses whether or not politicians stay in those jobs, for people less dependent on exposure, there appears to be a relationship between HMP and a decision not to talk to journalists. For instance, Tsftati, Cohen, and Gunther (2011) found that scientists and academics typically did not desire to speak to the press, in spite of the majority belief among those surveyed that their research should be shared with the public. The sources simply did not trust the media to get the story right. The researchers reasoned that the apprehension was founded in a fear of inaccurate reporting, not of media reach. Most troubling is that a partisan categorization was not readily apparent. In other words, there is not much evidence of traditional media differentiating themselves along lines of scientific knowledge, yet sources still find media to be a salient out-group (Turner et al., 1987) to be contrasted. This

perception inhibits journalists from obtaining sources of information, and thus from telling the most informed story.

Another debated consequence of HMP is selective exposure (Marks & Miller, 1987). Numerous studies have indicated a division of news audiences along partisan lines (e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Pew People-Press, 2013), and some studies have specifically correlated HMP with a tendency to consume alternative media, such as partisan blogs (Choi, Watt, & Lynch, 2006; Hwang, Schmierbach, Paek, De Zuniga, & Shah, 2006). While the direction of causation deserves further inquiry, as previously discussed, it is still worthwhile to consider the possible role of HMP in engendering or exacerbating selective exposure, which bears influence on media fragmentation, consumption of news, and the state of objectivity.

In a free market, competition is supposed to create the best possible offering of a product or service. Media scholars assumed that the best possible media offering was one that met the ideal of objectivity (Anand et al., 2007; Mancini, 2013), a term the very notion of which is subjective. However, as media economists point out, the motivation of for-profit media entities is to generate revenue, and that is difficult to accomplish when all news outlets are competing for the same audience. Instead of the paradise of objectivity, differentiation has led to different partisan leanings, where untapped niche audiences reside (Anand et al., 2007; Sutter, 2001). Cable news is the prime example – rather than CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC all battling for the “fair and balanced” middle of the ideological spectrum, Fox News took the slogan and planted its flag on the right, where a conservative news audience with no other televised alternatives made it a ratings giant. MSNBC, after floating along the spectrum for a time, found its home as Fox’s antithesis on the left. Meanwhile, CNN attempted to stay the course in the center, and has largely failed to maintain its once-robust audience.

Why has the middle not produced for CNN the same benefits of the left and right for its cable competitors? Americans report that they want their news to be fair, accurate, and objective (Pew People-Press, 2013). However, considering that news audiences are typically more invested politically, and often have an ideological perspective, HMP would argue that their very conception of what “objective” means has been skewed. With a wealth of confirming evidence stored up in one’s mind over time, how could a truly objective analysis of the facts result in anything but support for the partisan’s position (Vallone et al., 1985)? This audience-defined objectivity is seen through the number of consumers of partisan media that do not recognize (or at least self-report) the ideological slant of the outlets they enjoy (Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003).

These findings are troublesome for the principle journalistic norm of the past 60 years (Mancini, 2013). Moreover, current news offerings are not engaging in the type of content necessary to overcome such perceptions. Catering to casual audiences, news content is designed to be low-involvement fare. This is certainly the case for television, largely considered an affective medium (Arpan & Nabi, 2011; Coe et al., 2008), but also in the *USA Today* model of made-for-TV print journalism, now incorporated into the pages of local Gannett affiliates (Johnston, 2014). In 2014, the Associated Press instructed its reporters to shorten their stories to an ideal length of 300 words, with only the “top 1-2 stories” in each state receiving permission to exceed 500 words (Wemple, 2014, para. 14). Such limited depth is unlikely to generate the type of elaboration needed to conquer partisan predispositions. Add the visual dominance, affect-inducing headlines, and native advertising tactics of popular online news destinations and the free market seems to be favoring clicks over credibility (Carlson, 2014; Sundar, 2000).

These trends in message construction and presentation are problematic because low-involvement information processing means a reliance upon source cues, allowing self-

categorization to highlight those out-group designations partisans have assigned to media organizations. There is widespread support that source cues are sufficient to trigger HMP, regardless of message content (Arpan & Raney, 2003; Gunther et al., 2009; Reid, 2012; Turner, 2007). McLemore (2010) found that the greatest perceptions of bias among specific media outlets were held by partisans, especially conservatives, who also reported never consuming the particular outlet. Evidence from other studies suggests that the information is coming secondhand from tightly-knit ideological group affiliations (Eveland & Shah, 2003; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995).

All of this begs the question – does fairness or objectivity even matter if it cannot be recognized? Hall and Phillips (2010) touched on such a dilemma when they argued that the reinstatement of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine, which once required all sides of controversies pertaining to the public interest be presented on regulated broadcast media (*Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 1969), would be pointless in light of HMP. Even if the FCC could effectively ensure objective news (prior attempts failed spectacularly, which was why “right-of-reply”-type regulations were abandoned, despite their appeal to the access theory mentioned earlier), partisans who have no trust in media institutions, save for those that cater to them, will not think that it is fair anyway.

Within the IPMI paradigm, it appears that hostile media *perception* can possibly produce hostile media *effects*, though this has been a troublesome and inconsistent aspect of IPMI research (Chapin, 1999; Xu & Gonzenbach, 2008). Journalism, in particular, faces significant threats to its legitimacy as a field, as well as its ability to gather and disseminate information. Thus, it is important to understand how HMP works, so that it is possible to make predictions

about its occurrence and develop strategies for content creators to combat it. In that spirit, a final research question is offered.

RQ4: What is the relationship between HMP and behavioral responses to the media message?

Table 1
Hypotheses and Research Questions

Basic HMP

H1: Partisans will perceive the media position on an issue to be more hostile toward their personal position, in comparison to the perceptions of other audiences.

Self-Categorization

Mechanisms

H2a: Political self-categorization will predict agreement with the in-group position presented in the media message.

H2b: Religious self-categorization will predict agreement with the in-group position presented in the media message.

HMP Hypotheses

H3a: Greater political self-categorization will positively predict HMP.

H3b: Greater religious self-categorization will positively predict HMP.

H4: Preexisting beliefs about media coverage of a partisan's self-categorized group will inversely predict HMP.

Involvement

Mechanisms

H5: Stronger preexisting beliefs about a controversial topic will positively predict value involvement.

H7: Higher outcome involvement will positively predict time spent consuming the media message.

H8: Personal or close social identification with the topic will positively predict outcome involvement.

H9: Being under the jurisdiction of the outcome will positively predict outcome involvement.

HMP Hypotheses

H6: Higher value involvement among partisans will positively predict HMP.

H10: Higher outcome involvement among partisans will diminish HMP.

Interactions

RQ1: What is the relationship between political and religious self-categorizations?

RQ2: What is the relationship between value and outcome involvement regarding HMP?

RQ3: What is the relationship between self-categorization and involvement regarding HMP?

Hostile Media Effects

RQ4: What is the relationship between HMP and behavioral responses to the media message?

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

Approach

To test the proposed hypotheses and research questions, an original experiment was conducted with random condition assignment. Experimental design is superior to surveys in demonstrating causation because of the researcher's ability to enact intervention and control (Brady, 2008). While both can readily observe correlations between variables, experiments provide the advantage of establishing temporal precedence of the cause over the effect. Additionally, treatment conditions that serve as what Lewis (1973) called *counterfactuals* – that is, an environment with the causal variable and a closest possible environment without it, preventing spurious relationships that are actually caused by some intervening environmental variable (Mill, 1888). Random assignment of participants to treatment conditions carries with it the assumption of control against spurious relationships actually caused by an intervening characteristic of participants (Cook & Campbell, 1979). The logic is that because each participant has an equal chance of being assigned to each treatment group, the characteristics of the entire sample – from socioeconomic status to taste in music – will be roughly the same in each treatment group. These are substantive advantages over a survey design, in which time order can be difficult to demonstrate and a variable can only be controlled if it is explicitly measured. Matthes (2013) recently lamented the control problems in HMP surveys, struggling to

identify causes and effects regarding existing media uses and preferences (see also Hwang et al., 2008).

A random sample from a population also ensures that the characteristics of the sample are representative of the characteristics of the population (Cook & Campbell, 1979), providing the most powerful experimental design. The present study utilizes a convenience sample of college students from one university campus. As such, generalizability of the results to a population cannot be assumed. Taken together, the present approach facilitates intervention and control for exploration of causation within this experiment, but cannot guarantee the extrapolation of findings.

Participants

Participants were recruited from introductory communication and business courses at a large public university in the southeastern United States. Depending on the course, students either received credit toward class research requirements or extra credit, as determined by the instructor. In all cases, students had alternative means of obtaining credit. Students were also informed that participation was entirely voluntary and could be ceased at any time without consequence. The experiment was conducted online, using the Qualtrics survey platform. Participants were presented an information sheet prior to the study and were required to check boxes indicating that they had read a debriefing statement after completing the experiment. All identifying information for purposes of awarding credit was entered and stored in a separate data file, maintaining anonymity of survey responses. The study was approved for human subjects by the institutional review board (IRB) at the university from which recruitment took place.

Stimulus Materials

This study utilized a 2 (topic) x 2 (group conflict) x 2 (jurisdiction) factorial design. The

intended effect of each manipulation is presented in Figure 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight possible experimental conditions. Each condition included a fictitious news article about a government action. The articles were written by the researcher and tested for comprehension and believability by a group of undergraduate students ($N = 30$). Regardless of condition, articles were of similar length and structure. Each article's lead paragraph announced a change to existing law. The second paragraph described the ramifications of the change in more detail. The third paragraph transitioned to proponents of the government action. The fourth and fifth paragraphs consisted of a full and partial quote from one fictitious proponent source. The sixth paragraph transitioned to opponents of the government action. The seventh and eighth paragraphs presented an equal full and partial quote from one fictitious opponent source. The final paragraph mentioned continued controversy surrounding the government action and that a decision as to whether to continue the action would be made later in the year, in order to give the appearance that one's opinion about the topic might still be actionable. The two topics necessitated variations in which branch of government served as the state actor in order to preserve realism and believability. Specific details are outlined in the following subsection. All article conditions are presented in Appendix A.

Topic

Two different news topics were utilized, each with a different political/religious relationship. The first topic was same-sex marriage, part of the religious-political "glue" observed by Putnam and Campbell (2010). Government action emanated from the judicial branch. The article reported that a judge had invalidated a state's constitutional ban on gay marriage. Both financial and relational ramifications of the bill for same-sex couples were

presented. Proponent arguments relied upon equality and personal liberty. Opponent arguments appealed to tradition and authority.

The second topic was poverty, an issue that has both political and religious facets, but the two have not been combined in the same way as with same-sex marriage. Government action came from the legislative branch. The article stated that a state legislature passed a bill to expand welfare programs that aid low-income residents. The article specifically mentioned access to food, housing, and healthcare as components of the bill. Proponent arguments relied upon equality and charity. Opponent arguments relied upon fairness and fiscal burdens.

There were a number of reasons for selecting two topics. It defends against novel findings being attributed to a unique historical circumstance (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Particularly in the case of the same-sex marriage condition, it is possible that the newsworthiness of the issue during the data collection period might produce some unforeseen effect. However, the same-sex marriage condition is both practically and theoretically important to the study. Practically, it presents a timely issue of great political and religious division. Theoretically, it represents a topic for which both religious and political identities are highly salient, facilitating the evaluation of multiple social identities necessary for selective self-categorization (Reid, 2012; Turner et al., 1987).

The poverty condition, on the other hand, is less commonly viewed as a fused political-religious issue. This is important as it allows for a stronger manipulation effect. That is, someone reading a politically framed story about poverty is less likely to carry into the experiment unprimed religious associations (or vice versa) because there are fewer external forces (such as churches or political advocacy groups) making those associations salient.

Group Conflict

Each topic had two different versions, each framing the story as a conflict between different partisan groups. This was done to heighten saliency of certain social identities, so that the self-categorization process might take place (Turner et al., 1987). While the sourcing of quotes and the motivations behind them changed across group conflict conditions, the arguments themselves were the same.

The first version appealed to a political identity. The headline and lead framed the topic as a political debate. Sources were given gender-neutral names and identified as members of political parties and organizations (a Republican state senator and member of a fictitious conservative group and a Democratic state senator and member of a fictitious liberal group). Each source cited political philosophies as the foundation of their arguments. Democrats were presented as proponents of the same-sex marriage ruling and the poverty bill. Republicans were presented as opponents of each action. Each position was generally true of each political party and the ideology they represent, though it could be argued that some libertarian conservatives would be supportive of same-sex marriage as a personal liberty.

The second version appealed to a religious identity. The headline and lead framed the topic as a religious debate. One source was identified as a pastor and member of a fictitious Evangelical group. The other source was identified as a member of a fictitious secular policy group. The religious source cited religious philosophies as the foundation of all arguments. The secular source appealed to morality, but without a religious component. The religious were presented as opponents of the same-sex marriage ruling and proponents of the poverty bill. The non-religious were presented as proponents of the same-sex marriage ruling and opponents of the poverty bill. Each religious position was largely reflective of the stance of most faiths, and

secular support for same-sex marriage seemed similarly accurate. The weakest connection in the design was that of secular morality opposing aid for the impoverished. However, because self-categorization of the religious was the primary interest of this study, it was necessary to stay true to the religious argument at the expense of a more disingenuous straw-man opponent.

Jurisdiction

Each topical news item took place in two different jurisdictional contexts, one in which the government action would be enforceable in the area where the participant lived and the other in which the government action would take place elsewhere and not directly affect the participant. This jurisdictional manipulation was adapted from Petty and Cacioppo's experiments (1979; Petty et al., 1981) and designed to manipulate outcome involvement. The first version placed the government action in the same state as the university from which the sample was drawn. To heighten awareness and realism of the manipulation, participants were primed with a statement explaining that they were about to read an article written by the largest newspaper in the state. The article itself was designed to match the fonts and masthead of the newspaper's mobile layout. Political and religious conflict conditions were paired with actual reporters who cover those beats.

The second version placed the government action in a state in a different region of the country, with no jurisdiction over the participants. Though it is unlikely participants would have engaged in comparative politics, the distant state was selected, in part, because its residents shared a similar political ideology and religiosity to the university's home state. More importantly, the distant state was not featured in national news regarding either topic during or in the months preceding data collection. Again, the article appeared to originate from the largest

newspaper in the state. Prime, layout, and authorship protocols were repeated to match the publication.

Measurements

All questionnaire items are presented in Appendix B. Items were worded to correspond with the topic and government action to which each participant was randomly assigned. Thus, questions in the same-sex marriage condition asked about “the judge’s ruling,” whereas questions in the poverty condition asked about “the legislation.” Appendix B only includes one of these wording variations.

Stimulus Interaction Variables

Hostile media perception and article credibility. After reading the article, participants were asked a pair of seven-point Likert scale questions to measure perceived bias. First, participants were asked the extent to which they supported or opposed the government action (1 = Strongly oppose; 7 = Strongly support). Second, participants estimated the degree to which the article was favorable or unfavorable toward the government action (1 = Very unfavorable; 7 = Very favorable). As HMP concerns partisans, participants selecting the midpoint for personal support (indicating no stance on the issue) were removed from subsequent analyses. For the remaining partisan participants, the difference between these two items has been the traditional operationalization of perceived media bias. For example, someone who strongly supports the government action and views the news article as being very unfavorable toward it would have a strong hostile media perception. On the seven-point scale, one can only be deemed a partisan if a value other than the midpoint is selected. It is possible, then, for a weak partisan to perceive media coverage as actually being even more congenial to the partisan’s position than the partisan him/herself – the reverse of HMP. Following the logic of Choi and colleagues (2009), this

presents the possibility of an “HMP Score” ranging from -2 to +6. The first example illustrates the maximum value – a partisan holding one polar position and perceiving the media stimulus to have the opposite polar position ($7 - 1 = 6$). However, if the weak partisan (5) perceives media coverage as more supportive of the same side (7), the HMP Score becomes negative ($5 - 7 = -2$). For HMP Score to be accurately calculated for all partisans, those who oppose the government action (occupying the lower end of the numerical spectrum), must have personal and media support values reverse coded so that one’s personal position is always reflected by the values on the right side of the scale (4-7) and a contrary media position is always reflected by the values on the left side of the scale (1-3). For purposes of statistical analysis, this allows for all partisans to be examined as a single group. If differences in partisan sides are suspected, the data set must be split by partisan position (Supporters/Opponents).

The distancing approach of these HMP measures, however, is problematic. First, it does not specifically measure differences in perceived media position between partisan groups. Second, since the predictions of HMP rely on degree of partisanship, the measure becomes endogenous. If one imagines a scenario in which two strong opposing partisans *each* perceive the same media message as being unbiased, practically, this would not meet the definition of a hostile media perception. However, the strong partisanship of each person (7 on the scale) combined with the neutral perception of the media message (4 on the scale) would result in a distancing measures of +3, and therefore would report a pronounced HMP.

The present study, then, measured HMP using an alternative method and a slightly more nuanced hypothesized relationship than “personal support will be greater than perceived media support.” First, partisans were divided into supporter and opposition groups. Next, measures of perceived media position were compared for significant differences. Folding the personal

position scale allows a uniform measure of partisan extremity for both groups (0 = no partisanship, 1 = weak, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong). Inserting the partisan extremity measure into the model allows for closer examination of HMP within partisan groups. However, if differences in perceived media position do not emerge, an HMP hypothesis must be rejected, even if distances between personal and media positions are great.

This same procedure was replicated, replacing perceived media position as the dependent variable with an article credibility scale. A six-item scale measured the extent to which participants believed the article to be fair, complete, accurate, biased (reverse coded), trustworthy, and beneficial to the community. The scale is adapted from Meyer's (1988) simplification of Gaziano and McGrath's (1986) media credibility index, with the final item added to the scale by Capella and Jameison (1997). While the original index struggled with reliability, the simplified scale has fared much better under scrutiny (Meyer, 1988; West, 1994). Additional items that had less to do with bias (e.g., entertainment and ease of reading) were scattered throughout the credibility scale to give the appearance of a more complete evaluation of the article, and were not included in the final scale calculation. Associating nuanced perceived credibility items with HMP might anticipate greater cognitive involvement than a single-item perception of article position (see Matthes, 2013). In addition to HMP testing, the article credibility scale was used to check for systematic biases in article conditions.

Behavioral response. In accordance with the IPMI paradigm, a series of questions were asked to determine how participants might respond to the media story about the government action. Seven items measured behavioral intentions including the likelihood of future information seeking and a variety of opinion expressions. Specific to media, participants were asked whether they would express their opinion to a journalist for a news story and if they would

warn others against media bias in reporting on the proposed legislation. These responses were used to inform RQ4.

Involvement. Each involvement type was measured using scales developed by Cho and Boster (2005). Cho and Boster (2005) reported reliability in these scales for measuring high-involvement sociopolitical issues, such as attitudes toward the death penalty, and low-involvement issues, such as feelings about toothpaste brands. Each response was measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). Value involvement (e.g., “Knowing my position on the ruling/legislation is central to understanding the type of person I am”) and outcome involvement (e.g., “It is easy for me to think of ways the ruling/legislation would affect my life.”) were each measured along seven-item scales. Prior HMP studies have utilized partial value and outcome involvement scales (Choi et al., 2009, 2011), but none has adopted the entire original scales. No justification was given for these decisions in prior works.

Though involvement is utilized as a predictor of HMP, it was measured after exposure to the stimulus. This was necessary (a) because the questions would likely prime participants to refer to their values or think about outcomes, making it difficult to ascertain the effect of the article conditions and (b) because information was fictionalized, the questions would likely produce confusion. The outcome involvement scale additionally provided a manipulation check on the two jurisdiction conditions. Involvement measures informed H5-10 and RQ2-3 (see Figure 2).

Timing. Each stimulus condition contained an embedded timer, invisible to the participants. It began when the article appeared and stopped when the participant clicked the button to advance to the next page. The amount of time spent on the page served as a clue as to whether peripheral route (brief time) or central route (lengthier time) processing was utilized in

reading the article, in order to answer H8. Timing also provided a means of identifying participants who skipped past the article without reading, so that they could be removed from the analysis.

Manipulation checks. Two additional questions served as checks to see if the article manipulations intended to vary perceptions and/or involvement types were successfully received by the participants. The first asked in which state the story took place in order to see if the jurisdiction condition was recognized. Four choices were given – the two states used for jurisdictional impact manipulations and two additional incorrect states. The second question asked whether the people interviewed for the story were everyday people, political leaders, or religious leaders, corresponding with a group conflict condition.

Finally, an original scale was developed to explicitly measure how important various beliefs and impacts were in determining one's position on the government action (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Extremely important). It included political and moral/religious beliefs, as well as how the action might affect the individual, one's family/friends, community, and the country. These items provided evidence as to saliency of social identities, as well as the degree of perceived impact attributed to the government action.

Topic-Specific Demographics and Attitudes

Same-sex marriage. Participants randomly assigned to the same-sex marriage topic condition answered additional questions to better understand relevant attitudes and background. Three five-point Likert scale items from the Pew Research Center's Social and Demographic Trends project (2014) measured support for marriage as an institution (e.g., "When two people decide to spend the rest of their lives together, it is important that they marry"). They were also asked, if unmarried, how strongly they desired to get married in the future, and if married, how

strongly they desired to get married when they were single (1 = Very strongly avoid; 5 = Very strongly prefer). These responses were combined to form a marriage tradition scale, whereby greater values indicated greater adherence to traditional, conservative American conceptions of marriage.

This section also asked two attribution questions – if homosexuality was a choice or if it was the result of natural biological causes. These items were combined to form an attribution measure, whereby 1 = natural occurrence (lack of agency) and 5 = result of choice (agency). Finally, participants were asked to disclose their sexual orientation, using the three-category classification (gay or lesbian, heterosexual or straight, bisexual) recommended by the Williams Institute (2009) at the UCLA School of Law. The institute found that additional options reduced comprehension, while including an “other” option disproportionately lowered the number of respondents likely to otherwise identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. They were also asked to indicate if they had a close friend or family member who was gay or lesbian, as the question may still generate some degree of outcome involvement, and is less likely to be skipped by a participant who prefers not to self-disclose. Attitude measures informed H5, while identification measures informed H8.

Poverty. Similarly, participants in the poverty topic condition received a set of unique questions. In order to determine attribution, participants completed Furnham’s (1982) Attributions for Poverty Questionnaire. Developed in Great Britain, the scale has since been validated in the United States (e.g., Bullock, 1999). It presented 15 causes of poverty, some blaming the individual (e.g., a lack of effort), some blaming external factors (e.g., lack of quality schools). Each item was measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). Together, responses to the scale produced a poverty attribution score, coded so

that low values indicated internal/personal attribution and high values indicated external/societal attribution.

Participants in the poverty condition were also asked whether they had a close friend or family member who is low-income/impoverished. As with same-sex marriage, attitude measures regarding poverty informed H5, while identification measures informed H8.

Identity

All participants completed questionnaire sections measuring different aspects of political and religious partisanship. Again, though treated as independent variables for the analysis, these questions were withheld until after exposure to avoid priming effects that were not intended by the stimulus. Core beliefs, such as those regarding politics and religion, develop over time and are quite resistant to change (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). Therefore, it is unlikely that an article discussing one topic that is salient to these beliefs would be powerful enough to change someone's basic social identity.

Separate scales measured the different dimensions of partisanship, conceptualized here as dimensions of political and religious identities that can be used for self-categorization, identified by existing literature. The scales all utilized five-point scaled responses so that mean values would be more easily comparable. Comparing personal positions to the self-categorization dimensions and the positions of in-group sources in the manipulated articles indicates the extent to which self-categorization has occurred, informing H2-4 and RQ1, 3 (see Figure 2).

Political identity. Political self-categorization was established by measuring participants' political identities. Six different identity dimensions were measured – ideology, group identification, media self-categorization, socialization, participation, and orthodoxy.

Political ideology. Ideology was measured by two standard items advanced by Campbell et al. (1960) and incorporated into a number of national election surveys. The first asked for personal ideology (1 = Very conservative; 5 = Very liberal). Moderates selected the midpoint, while an “I don’t care about politics” option was presented to remove the politically apathetic, who were not presented the more detailed items about political identification, socialization, and participation in order to decrease the chance of ceasing participation. The second question asked for affiliation among the two major parties (1 = Strongly Republican; 5 = Strongly Democrat). Independents were represented by the midpoint, and the apathetic option was again made available. At certain times in American history, ideology and party affiliation have not been as strongly correlated. However, in the present political climate, partisans have sorted such that conservatives are typically Republicans and liberals are typically Democrats (Levendusky, 2009). Methodologically, this has provided justification for using either individual measure or the mean of the two items to represent ideology. Because the present study addresses group affiliations and self-categorization, party membership was the preferred item for hypothesis testing.

Party identification. Participants that reported a party affiliation then completed the Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale (Mael & Tetrick, 1992). Though valid in a number of contexts, Greene (1999, 2002) has found particularly useful application in measuring political group identification. Extremity on the IDPG scale has been correlated with extremity in a single-item party affiliation scale, as well as in-group perceptions associated with self-categorization (Greene, 2004). The seven-item scale (consisting of Mael and Tetrick’s four original items and three items added by Greene) measures one’s strength of association with a

political party by considering the extent to which one takes personal pride in the party's accomplishments and personal offense to party criticisms.

Media coverage of group. Scales exist to measure the credibility of news or general trust in media (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Pew People-Press, 2013). However, none of these scales explicitly invoke self-categorizations to test the basic assumption that "the media" is seen as an out-group. Therefore, an original five-item scale was developed to measure the extent to which a partisan perceives media to understand, respect, attend to, and treat fairly their political party. Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree). This information was used in association with H4.

Political socialization. To determine the extent to which a political self-categorization includes a social bond, participants were asked how many of their friends belonged to their political group (1 = None; 5 = All). This question was adapted from religious identification studies (described in that section of the methodology).

Political participation. An 11-item scale measured political participation. Items were adapted from Verba and Nie's (1972) Political Participation in America study. It is perhaps the most well-known participation scale aside from that of the American National Election Studies (ANES) biannual survey (Brady, 1999). However, the ANES participation scale puts a great deal of weight on donating money, while the Verba and Nie scale presents diverse behaviors better suited to a cash-strapped student sample. Considering that many in the student sample were just entering the political forum, having just become eligible to vote, the participation scale was revised with wording to indicate the *likelihood* of engaging in the activities (1 = Very unlikely; 5 = Very likely) instead of documenting the past completion of the activities (for similar language,

see Barnes et al., 1979; Corning & Myers, 2002). Participation items included voting, joining groups, expressing opinions, campaigning, and political problem solving.

Political orthodoxy. Finally, the strength and consistency of each participant's political ideology was measured using the McClosky Conservatism-Liberalism Scale (McClosky & Bann, 1979). It consisted of 26 semantic differential-type questions measuring attitudes toward policy reform, leadership, capitalism, equality, and government responsibilities. A briefer, early version of the scale (McClosky, 1958) was criticized for producing a bias toward liberalism (Campbell et al., 1960; Stone, 1974). However, the present scale has quieted those concerns and remains in use (e.g., Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005; Knight, 1999; Peterson-Badali, Morine, Ruck, & Slonim, 2004; Wilson & Rule, 2014). For the present study, the scale offers two primary benefits. It addresses both social and fiscal dimensions of ideology – avoiding the underweighting or outright omission of one dimension that is common among such scales (Knight, 1999). It also avoided era-specific political debates, leading to fewer items that required revision. The only changes made were to use gender neutral language, provide a clarifying parenthetical that “public ownership” meant government ownership, and to revise the tense of an item about universal health care, in light of the Affordable Care Act.

Religious identity. Religious self-categorization was established by measuring participants' religious identities. Six different identity dimensions were measured – affiliation, group identification, media self-categorization, socialization, participation, and orthodoxy.

Religious affiliation. Participants could select one of six major world religions, as well as Unitarian Universalist, Other, and Atheist. Participants could also identify themselves as not religious by reason of indifference. Like the politically apathetic, the religiously indifferent were excluded from identification, socialization, and participation scales. However, atheists proceeded

through the religious identity measures, by reason that their denial of a deity is oftentimes a similarly core belief that influences attitudes, behaviors, and social relationships (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). To better pair with the political ideology items, participants were also asked to identify their feelings toward religion along a five-point scale, 1 = Strongly Oppose Religion; 3 = Indifference; 5 = Strongly Religious.

As with most American studies of religion, more detail was devoted to Christianity. Participants identifying as Christian were asked to choose a denominational affiliation from among 35 choices. Denominational affiliation was used to separate Christians into five groups, according to Steensland et al.'s (2000) extensive and widely-used religious tradition classification scheme (RELTRAD). These groups are Black Protestants, Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, and Other Christians.

Religious identification. The same IDPG scale used for politics was also used for religion, simply replacing the key terms.

Media coverage of religion. The same scale used for politics was also used for religion, replacing the key terms.

Religious socialization. To measure the strength of religious social bonds, participants were asked how many of their closest friends belonged to their religious group (1 = None; 5 = All) (Gilbert, 1993; Olson et al., 2006).

Religious participation. Studies measuring religiosity rely heavily on regularity of worship attendance. However, such self-reports are notorious for overstating what is often perceived as good behavior (Pew Research Center, 2013). While the present study did not go to lengths of diary measures or direct observation, it does utilize additional self-report participatory measures to spur thinking about specific religious activities, and perhaps overcome the single-

item response bias. Thus, a scale was used to measure religious participation (Guth, Green, Smidt, Kellstedt, & Poloma, 1997; Olson et al., 2006). It consisted of eight items measured by how often each activity was performed (e.g., “Read holy scriptures”; 1 = Never, 5 = Every Day). For one item, “Attend formal worship services,” which, by their nature, are not held every day, a slightly different scale was used, whereby 1 = Never, 5 = More than once a week (Olson et al., 2006).

Religious orthodoxy. To measure the strength and consistency of religiosity, an eight-item orthodoxy scale was adapted from surveys by the Pew Research Center’s Religion and Public Life Project (2006, 2014c). Originally designed to measure exclusively Christian orthodoxy, wording was changed and one item about the Rapture was removed to make it applicable to a wider range of faiths. It included items about scriptural inerrancy, belief in the miraculous, belief in the afterlife, and exclusive salvation, among other topics.

General Demographics

Demographic data was collected in the middle of the questionnaire to create separation between attitudes about the experimental articles and more general partisanship measures. These included gender (male, female), ethnicity (utilizing U.S. Census categories), age, and academic classification. Socioeconomic status was measured by asking student participants to think about their state of living locally, and at home, if still regularly staying with parents (lower class, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle, and upper class), and later associated with the poverty questionnaire. Finally, participants were asked for their home state when not at school. Text responses were then coded numerically, whereby 1 = the state in which the university was located, 2 = a different state, 3 = the non-proximate state used in the experiment, and 4 = a foreign country. This was used to distinguish those who reside in the state from those who came

to the state for college. It also would identify any participants who happened to reside in the non-proximate state used in the experiment.

Data Analysis Procedures


The Qualtrics survey platform recorded questionnaire responses in numerical format for quantitative data analysis. Analysis was performed using IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 23.0. For continuous variables, normality was established by skewness values between [-1, 1] and kurtosis values between [-1, 2], as well as visual distributions on a histogram. Specific skewness and kurtosis values are only reported when a variable falls outside of the established normality range. Scales were calculated as mean scores rather than sum totals for more consistent and understandable representations of scales that have varying numbers of items, resulting in varying sum total ranges. Scale means were only tabulated if participants assigned values to all individual scale items. Scale reliability was verified using Cronbach's α .

The statistical significance threshold for correlations between variables was a p -value $\leq .05$. Chi-square tests explored relationships between categorical variables, while Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests measured equal distributions within a single categorical variable. Linear regressions explored predictive relationships between continuous variables, with effect size represented by change in the coefficient of determination, or r^2 . The General Linear Model was used to compute t -tests, ANOVAs and ANCOVAs for relationships involving categorical predictors and normal continuous outcomes, with effect size represented by partial η^2 . Bonferroni post-hoc tests were used to pinpoint significant relationships for categorical variables with more than two categories. Levene's test was used to measure equality of variances among groups. Levene's test results are only provided when they are significant, indicating a lack of homogeneity. For cases in which a significant Levene's test indicated unequal variances, Games-

Howell post-hoc tests were used to extract significant relationships from categorical variables with more than two categories, while a *t*-test adjusting for unequal variance was used for categorical variables with two categories. Means and standard deviations were used to interpret ANOVA results, while estimated marginal means (sometimes referred to as adjusted means) and standard errors were used to interpret ANCOVAs.

In interpreting the findings of data analyses, significant results indicate differences between partisan groups, or in the case of within-group analyses, differences between members of the same group in regards to the independent variable or variables in the model. If biased information processing occurred, differences in message perceptions should emerge between partisan groups that had differing issue positions. More specifically, HMP was indicated by message perceptions among one partisan group that deviated from other groups in a direction moving further away from that group's issue position. For instance, if Democrats exhibit support for same-sex marriage, then HMP would manifest if they perceive the stimulus article to be significantly more oppositional toward same-sex marriage than do Republicans. Tests isolating Democrats would then indicate which predictor variables were responsible for directing article perceptions away from those of Republicans and from the personal position of the Democrats.

Figure 2
Study Design



CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Sample and Condition Distributions

The recruitment strategy resulted in 586 people choosing to open the online survey system and viewing the study information sheet. Of those, 565 proceeded to participate in the study. Incomplete questionnaires were maintained, resulting in slightly lower *ns* within particular tests. Participants who viewed the stimulus article for less than 20 seconds, according to an embedded timer, were removed from the sample, as it was unlikely that they read the article before advancing to the questionnaire. In a pilot test of the stimulus articles, student volunteers ($N = 30$) were timed as they read each article. The fastest quartile completed the article in an average of 25.78 seconds, with a low time of 23.43 seconds. The cutoff was rounded down so as not to exclude participants who might have been slightly quicker readers than the pilot testers. This procedure eliminated 33 participants, resulting in a final sample of 532.

The sample was 73.3% female and 26.7% male. Regarding ethnicity, the sample was 84.7% White, 7.4% Black, 2.1% Hispanic, 2.1% Asian, 0.8% Native American, and 0.6% Pacific Islander (2.3% chose not to disclose their ethnicity). The mean participant age was 20.1 years ($SD = 2.10$). Participants were not overly recruited from any single academic class – 28.5% were freshmen, 25.9% sophomores, 33.1% juniors, 12.3% seniors, and one participant was a graduate student (0.2%). Just 34.5% of participants were permanent residents of the state in which the

university was located, while 64% came from other states and 1.5% resided outside of the U.S. No participants resided in the state representing the distant jurisdiction in the stimulus articles.

Random assignment ensured equal distribution to experimental conditions. However, this equal distribution was altered by people who accessed the online survey system and then chose not to participate, as well as those participants that were removed for skipping the experimental article. Distribution of conditions among the final sample is presented in Table 2. Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests were used to determine if deviations from an equal distribution were statistically significant, but no significant results were found among combinations of topic, group conflict, and jurisdiction manipulations. Thus, assumptions regarding generalizability of treatment groups to the overall sample (Cook & Campbell, 1979) may be maintained.

Table 2
Condition Distribution Among Final Sample

Conflict	<u>Local Jurisdiction</u>		SUBTOTAL
	Topic		
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>	<u>Poverty</u>	
Political	64 (12.0%)	74 (13.9%)	138 (25.9%)
Religious	72 (13.5%)	66 (12.4%)	138 (25.9%)
SUBTOTAL	136 (25.6%)	140 (26.3%)	276 (51.9%)

Conflict	<u>Distant Jurisdiction</u>		SUBTOTAL
	Topic		
	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>	<u>Poverty</u>	
Political	66 (12.4%)	63 (11.8%)	129 (24.2%)
Religious	68 (12.8%)	59 (11.1%)	127 (23.9%)
SUBTOTAL	134 (25.2%)	122 (22.9%)	256 (48.1%)

TOTAL	270 (50.8%)	262 (49.2%)	532 (100%)
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Note: All percentages refer to the total sample ($N = 532$)

Stimulus Quality and Manipulation Checks

The article credibility scale was used to verify the quality of the stimulus articles. The

scale was reliable $\alpha = .808$. Each item's distribution was normal, as was the distribution for the mean scale value. Mean credibility scores for the articles ranged from 4.79 to 4.47, with a value of seven representing perfect credibility. Differences in credibility scores among partisan groups will be discussed as part of HMP findings. For present purposes, the mean scores suggest that the experimental articles were generally seen as legitimate sources of information.

Table 3
Article Credibility by Condition and Personal Position

Condition	Overall	Personal Position			<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
		Non-Partisans	Supporters	Opposition			
SSM-P-L	4.71	4.44	5.04 ^a	4.38 ^a	6.807	.012	.114
<i>n</i>	64	8	31	25			
SSM-R-L	4.59	4.39	4.96 ^a	4.28 ^a	4.955	.030	.081
<i>n</i>	72	14	31	27			
SSM-P-D	4.55	4.1 ^a	4.89 ^{ab}	4.36 ^b	3.904	.025	.113
<i>n</i>	66	11	28	27			
SSM-R-D	4.79	4.58	5.03 ^a	4.36 ^a	5.355	.024	.085
<i>n</i>	68	8	41	19			
POV-P-L	4.47	4.66	4.53	4.27	1.015	.318	
<i>n</i>	74	15	34	25			
POV-R-L	4.46	4.23	4.48	4.67	.360	.551	
<i>n</i>	66	16	36	14			
POV-P-D	4.55	4.48	4.87 ^a	4.13 ^a	7.807	.008	.142
<i>n</i>	63	14	29	20			
POV-R-D	4.49	4.02	4.59	4.55	.035	.853	
<i>n</i>	59	9	33	17			
OVERALL	4.58	4.37 ^b	4.80 ^{ab}	4.35 ^a	13.931	.026	.051
<i>N</i>	531	95	263	173			

Condition Key:

SSM - Same-sex Marriage (Topic)

P - Political (Group Conflict)

L - Local (Jurisdiction)

POV - Poverty (Topic)

R - Religious (Group Conflict)

D - Distant (Jurisdiction)

Two questionnaire items served as manipulation checks on jurisdiction and group conflict. Regarding the jurisdiction check, 93% of participants correctly identified the state in which the story they were presented took place. The success rate was better for the proximate

state (98.5%) than the distant state (86.9%), of which 24 participants (9.5%) incorrectly believed the story was taking place in the proximate state. Regarding the group conflict check, 63.9% of participants matched sources to their correct group affiliation. More specifically, 82.2% of participants in the political condition recognized that political sources were used in their article, while 16.7% believed the sources were unaffiliated “everyday people” and three participants (1.1%) believed that sources were religiously affiliated. Meanwhile, only 54.2% of participants in the religion condition recognized that religious sources were used in their article. Within that group conflict condition, 20.6% believed the sources were politically affiliated, while 25.2% believed that they were unaffiliated “everyday people.”

Issue Positions and Partisanship

Most participants (82.3%) reported either personal support for or opposition to the government action in their article, fitting the operational definition of a partisan. The remaining neutral participants served as a reference point for comparison of partisan groups. For the same-sex marriage topic, 36.3% of participants opposed a judge’s ruling overturning the state’s gay marriage ban. Supporters of the ruling accounted for 48.5% of participants, while 15.2% remained neutral on the issue. For the poverty topic, 29% of participants opposed legislation increasing spending on state welfare programs, while 50.4% supported the legislation and 20.6% did not take either side of the debate.

Mean personal support for the same-sex marriage ruling (4.337, $SD = 2.13$) and poverty legislation (4.344, $SD = 1.46$) were almost identical, and near the midpoint of the seven-point scale, indicating that one topic did not account for a disproportionate partisan shift in either direction. Accordingly, the results of an ANOVA were not significant, $F(1, 532) = .002, p = .967$.

The degree of personal support did not differ among supporters and opposition within the two topics. Folding the personal support scale, whereby 0 = neutral and 3 = strong support for one's position, supporters ($M = 2.27, SD = .76$) and opponents ($M = 2.11, SD = .80$) of the same-sex marriage ruling showed similar partisan extremity. Further, a model considering effects of the factorial design on partisan groups was not significant, $F(7, 221) = 1.101, p = .363$. A similar pattern was observed for the poverty topic, with a similar, though weaker, partisan extremity among supporters ($M = 1.56, SD = .66$) and opponents ($M = 1.53, SD = .66$). Once again, neither group conflict or jurisdiction manipulations altered this similarity among opposing partisans, $F(7, 200) = .760, p = .621$. Results are presented in Table 4.

However, as the means from the previous test indicated, the two article topics did produce varying degrees of personal support for the government actions. Both supporters, $F(1, 261) = 67.013, p < .001, \eta^2 = .204$, and opponents, $F(1, 172) = 26.687, p < .001, \eta^2 = .134$, exhibited stronger personal beliefs about same-sex marriage than about poverty. Thus, the topic manipulations produced differing degrees of personal support, but did not produce differences between partisan groups.

Table 4
Effect of Article Factors on Personal Position Extremity

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.101	.363	.034	Corrected Model	7	.760	.621	.026
Position	1	2.542	.112	.011	Position	1	.133	.716	.001
Group Conflict	1	2.917	.089	.013	Group Conflict	1	.161	.689	.001
Jurisdiction	1	.118	.732	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.049	.824	< .001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	2.005	.158	.009	Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.398	.239	.007
Pos x Juris	1	.078	.780	< .001	Pos x Juris	1	.070	.791	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.258	.612	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	3.329	.070	.016
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.241	.624	.001	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.632	.428	.003

Hostile Media Perception

H1 predicted that partisans would perceive the media position on an issue as more hostile toward their personal position, in comparison to the perceptions of other audiences.

Perceived Media Positions

Overall estimation of article support for the same-sex marriage ruling was near the midpoint of the seven-point scale ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.02$). Differences were observed among supporters ($M = 4.25$, $SD = .91$) and opponents ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.14$). An ANCOVA including article manipulations and partisan category with partisan extremity as a covariate produced a significant model, $F(8, 220) = 2.597$, $p = .010$, $\eta^2 = .086$. Supporters of the government action saw the article as being more supportive of their side ($EMM = 4.24$, $SE = .09$) than did opponents ($EMM = 3.95$, $SE = .10$). The main effect of jurisdiction was also significant, indicating perceptions that the article in the distant jurisdiction ($EMM = 4.28$, $SE = .10$) was more favorable toward same-sex marriage than the one in the local jurisdiction ($EMM = 3.92$, $SE = .10$).

Table 5
Effect of Personal Position and Article Factors on Perceived Article Position

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	8	2.597	.010	.086	Corrected Model	8	.971	.460	.038
Position Extremity	1	3.832	.052	.017	Position Extremity	1	.103	.749	.001
Position*	1	4.55	.034	.020	Position	1	.118	.732	.001
Group Conflict	1	.121	.728	.001	Group Conflict	1	1.499	.222	.007
Jurisdiction*	1	6.527	.011	.029	Jurisdiction	1	.034	.854	< .001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.308	.254	.006	Pos x Gp Cn	1	3.638	.058	.018
Pos x Juris	1	2.384	.124	.011	Pos x Juris	1	.137	.712	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.273	.260	.006	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.120	.291	.006
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.596	.441	.003	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	3.011	.084	.015

Articles about the poverty legislation were perceived to be slightly favorable toward the government action ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 0.95$). Differences between supporters ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.00$)

and opponents ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.01$) were small. The ANCOVA was not significant for the model, $F(8, 199) = 0.971$, $p = .460$. Results are presented in Table 5.


Article Credibility

Overall, the same-sex marriage articles received a mean credibility rating of 4.66 ($SD = 1.03$) on the seven-point scale. The mean rating was higher among supporters ($M = 4.99$, $SD = .99$) than among opponents ($M = 4.34$, $SD = 1.04$). An ANCOVA using the same fixed factors and covariates as the perceived media position tests was significant, $F(8, 218) = 3.392$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .111$. A main effect of partisan grouping was significant, as supporters found the articles to be more credible ($EMM = 4.97$, $SE = .09$) than did opponents ($EMM = 4.37$, $SE = .11$). Moreover, partisan extremity exacerbated this difference by influencing credibility scores of supporters. As Figure 3 displays, credibility scores increased as supporters became more convicted in their positions. A linear regression confirmed this positive linear relationship, $\beta = .264$, $t(1, 129) = 3.112$, $p = .002$, $r^2 = .070$.

The poverty articles received a mean credibility rating of 4.49 ($SD = 0.90$). The mean rating was 4.61 ($SD = .91$) for supporters and 4.36 ($SD = .93$) for opponents. The ANCOVA model was not significant, $F(8, 196) = 1.574$, $p = .135$. Results are presented in Table 6

Considering each of the article conditions, significant differences in credibility scores between supporters and opposition were found in five of eight conditions. All four conditions in which same-sex marriage was the topic produced a significant divide in perceived credibility. Only one poverty condition produced a credibility gap – the political group conflict in a distant jurisdiction. Complete results are included in Table 3.

Figure 3
Article Credibility by Position Extremity



Note: A truncated vertical axis was necessary to distinguish the opposition group from the neutral participant baseline. The credibility scale ranged from 1 (not credible) to 7.

Table 6
Effect of Personal Position and Article Factors on Article Credibility

	Same-Sex Marriage				Poverty				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	8	3.392	.001	.111	Corrected Model	8	1.574	.135	.060
Position Extremity*	1	4.409	.037	.020	Position Extremity	1	2.287	.132	.012
Position*	1	18.749	< .001	.079	Position	1	2.442	.120	.012
Group Conflict	1	.018	.894	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.750	.388	.004
Jurisdiction	1	.009	.924	< .001	Jurisdiction	1	.163	.687	.001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	.007	.931	< .001	Pos x Gp Cn	1	3.810	.052	.019
Pos x Juris	1	.078	.781	< .001	Pos x Juris	1	1.585	.210	.008
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.259	.611	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.322	.571	.002
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.086	.770	< .001	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.139	.710	.001

Significant differences between perceived media position and article credibility were found between supporters and opponents of the same-sex marriage ruling. However, the direction of the difference was such that partisans each felt the article was slightly *more* favorable to their own position compared to the perceptions of the opposing side. Additionally, article credibility increased in accordance with position strength among supporters, rather than decreased. These findings run counter to the predictions of HMP. No significant differences were apparent regarding the poverty topic. Taken together, H1 was not supported.

HMP Score

Failing to support H1 with the chosen method for this study, the HMP Score approach was utilized to test its validity in dealing with the proposition in H1. Using the HMP Score calculation, which removes non-partisans who had no personal opinion about the issue addressed by their respective article, the HMP Score across conditions was 1.72 ($SD = 1.27$). Examining the presence of HMP across conditions and dividing partisans into supporters and opposition provides more nuance.


In the same-sex marriage condition, the mean HMP Score was 2.02 ($SD = 1.24$). An ANCOVA including article manipulations and partisan grouping as fixed factors and partisan extremity as a covariate was significant, $F(8, 220) = 15.422, p < .001, \eta^2 = .359$. The vast majority of this effect was due to partisan extremity, which independently accounted for 93% of the model effect size.

In the poverty condition, the mean HMP Score was 1.39 ($SD = 1.24$). The same ANCOVA model was significant, $F(8, 199) = 16.236, p < .001, \eta^2 = .395$. Partisan extremity independently accounted for 72% of the model effect size. A significant difference was also

observed between partisan groups, with opponents ($EMM = 2.01, SE = .12$) having a greater HMP Score than supporters ($EMM = 1.03, SE = .09$).

As Figure 4 demonstrates, using a distancing measure created the appearance of HMP despite a lack of change in media position or credibility across partisan groups. Due to endogeneity between degree of personal support and HMP Score, the method was abandoned for subsequent tests. Differences in perceived media position and article credibility between partisan groups were maintained as dependent variables predictive of HMP.

Figure 4
HMP Score and Differences in HMP Variables Between Same-Sex Marriage Partisans



Self-Categorization

Self-categorization measures provided different ways of operationalizing partisanship. At its most basic level, single-item political and religious affiliation items were used to divide the sample into political liberals and conservatives, as well as different religious faiths. For Christians, RELTRAD denomination classifications (Steensland et al., 2000) provided greater context to the degree of religious partisanship.

Perceived group identification – the IDPG scale – was the primary measure of self-categorization extremity. The scale was reliable for both political ($\alpha = .892$) and religious ($\alpha = .925$) group identification. All individual items and both total scales met standards for normality. In-group socialization, participation, and adherence to in-group orthodoxy were measured as potential contributors to self-categorization extremity. The in-group socialization measure was a single item, while the others were scales.

Political participation and religious participation scales were each reliable (political participation $\alpha = .906$; religious participation $\alpha = .918$). One item on the original political participation scale did not have a normal distribution. Likelihood of voting in a presidential election was skewed in the direction of strongly intending to vote (skewness = -1.660; kurtosis = 2.946). Therefore, the item was removed, resulting in a 10-item political participation scale.

The political orthodoxy scale was reliable ($\alpha = .845$) and all items, as well as the total scale distributions were normal. The religious orthodoxy scale was also reliable ($\alpha = .893$), with each item and the total scale achieving normality. To see if these additional elements predicted self-categorization, correlational tests were performed, comparing each variable to the IDPG scale. For each group, only those elements which were correlated with IDPG, the primary self-categorization measure, were included in models. Correlation data are provided in the political and religious subsections, and together in Table 7.

To test self-categorization hypotheses (H2-4), initial ANOVAs using categorical group affiliation were run, followed by linear regressions measuring independent effects of self-categorization identity dimensions on partisan groups. Finally, ANCOVAs using group identification and correlated identity dimensions. In order to minimize tabular data within the

description of results, only the final ANCOVAs are displayed. Basic ANOVAs and regressions are included in Appendix D.

Table 7
Correlation of Identity Dimensions to Group Identification (IDPG)

Group Affiliation	Identity Dimensions		
	Participation	Socialization	Orthodoxy
Republicans	.494**	.241**	.209**
Democrats	.534**	.090	-.112
Evangelicals	.506**	.399**	.580**
Mainlines	.421**	.265**	.524**
Catholics	.475**	.087	.551**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$

Political Self-Categorization

Politically, 46.0% of the sample were Republicans (including 5.0% who were strongly Republican), 19.3% of the sample were Democrats (including 3.1% who were strongly Democrat), and 26.3% described themselves as independents. The politically apathetic represented 8.4% of the sample and were removed from political self-categorization analyses.

The assumption that American party affiliation echoed political ideology was supported, as party affiliation was highly correlated with political ideology, $r = .734$, $p < .001$. Means and standard deviations for party affiliation ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 0.94$) and ideology ($M = 2.77$, $SD = 0.94$) were similar. In light of these results, and the role of group membership in self-categorization theory, party affiliation was used for all subsequent analyses. Because of the small number of people identifying as strong Republicans or Democrats, the five-point scale was collapsed into a categorical variable, whereby 1 = Republicans, 2 = Democrats, and 3 = Independents.

Other identity measures associated with self-categorization all fell along five-point scales. Means by political party are presented in Table 8. Significant differences were observed between political parties for all measures except for political participation. Republicans had stronger group identification, social ties, and adherence to orthodoxy than Democrats.

Table 8
Mean Identity Measures by Self-Categorization

Group	Group ID*	Identity Dimension			Media Cat.**
		Participation	Socialization***	Orthodoxy***	
Republicans	2.94 (.73)	3.25 (.80)	3.60 (.81)	3.30 (.39)	2.78 (.65)
Democrats	2.74 (.79)	3.32 (.78)	3.10 (.87)	2.70 (.39)	3.01 (.55)
	Group ID**	Participation***	Socialization***	Orthodoxy***	Media Cat.*
Evangelicals	3.65 (.86) ^{ab}	3.43 (.87) ^{ab}	3.32 (.98) ^a	4.07 (.68) ^{ab}	3.03 (.73) ^a
Mainlines	3.38 (.74) ^a	2.87 (.89) ^a	2.76 (1.11) ^{ab}	3.60 (.75) ^a	3.24 (.53) ^{ab}
Catholics	3.36 (.86) ^b	2.78 (.92) ^b	3.18 (.80) ^b	3.51 (.72) ^b	2.98 (.67) ^b

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Note: Media Categorization was tested separately in accordance with H4.

Significant correlations were observed between group identification and each of the additional self-categorization measures among Republicans. Therefore, all measures were maintained for hypothesis testing. Among Democrats, group identification only correlated with participation (see Table 7), and so the other measures were dropped from hypothesis testing.

Issue support. H2a predicted that political partisans would align with the position of their party for each topic. This meant hypothesized support for both government actions among Democrats, and opposition for both government actions among Republicans. Indeed, political group affiliation predicted personal support for each topic. Democrats were more likely to support the same-sex marriage ruling ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 2.18$) than were Republicans ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 2.01$). An ANOVA including group conflict and jurisdiction manipulations was significant for the main effect of political affiliation, $F(1, 174) = 8.768$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .050$. Democrats were

also more likely to support the poverty legislation ($M = 5.49$, $SD = 1.07$) than were Republicans ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.44$). The model including article manipulations was significant, $F(7, 159) = 8.405$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .270$, though only a main effect of political affiliation was present. A significant Levene's test indicated unequal variances. Therefore, the effect of political affiliation on personal position was examined individually. A t -test assuming unequal variances remained significant, $t(127.299) = -8.375$, $p < .001$.

Additional measures were used to determine whether extremity of self-categorization predicted personal support for each topic within each political group. Inserting the primary group affiliation measure as a covariate, the overall model became significant for the same-sex marriage condition, $F(8, 166) = 1.997$, $p = .050$, $\eta^2 = .088$. The main effect of party affiliation maintained and estimated marginal mean differences between Republicans ($EMM = 4.07$, $SE = .19$) and Democrats ($EMM = 5.07$, $SE = .30$) increased. Additionally, a main effect became significant for jurisdiction, and there was a significant interaction between party affiliation and jurisdiction. Overall, support was greater for same-sex marriage when the judge's ruling affected the distant jurisdiction. This finding was due to Democrats, who demonstrated strong support for same-sex marriage in the distant jurisdiction ($EMM = 5.82$, $SE = .48$), but were more muted in support for the ruling in their local jurisdiction ($EMM = 4.31$, $SE = .38$).

Adding self-categorization extremity to the model for the poverty condition increased the amount of variance explained by just 0.6%, and party affiliation remained the only significant factor in the model.

The sample was then split by political party to test for the effect of the self-categorization measures correlating with IDPG score for each party. Independent of other factors, linear regression results indicated that political socialization and orthodoxy each predicted opposition

to poverty legislation among Republicans (see Figures 5-6). Meanwhile, none of the extremity measures predicted a personal position on same-sex marriage. Indeed, an ANCOVA testing the effect of the factorial design on personal support for same-sex marriage among Republicans with self-categorization dimensions as covariates was not significant, $F(7, 108) = 1.309, p = .409$. However, the same model was significant in the poverty condition, $F(7, 98) = 3.707, p = .001, \eta^2 = .209$. Placed in the complete model, conservative orthodoxy continued to predict opposition to poverty legislation, while in-group socialization lost significance (see Table 9).

Table 9
Effect of Political Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Personal Issue Position


<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	8	1.997	.050	.088	Corrected Model*	8	7.373	< .001	.276
Party Identification	1	2.586	.110	.015	Party Identification	1	1.206	.274	.008
Party Affiliation*	1	7.780	.006	.045	Party Affiliation*	1	50.424	< .001	.245
Group Conflict	1	.122	.727	.001	Group Conflict	1	.105	.746	.001
Jurisdiction*	1	4.360	.038	.026	Jurisdiction	1	.040	.843	< .001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.022	.881	< .001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.221	.639	.001
Party x Juris*	1	4.515	.035	.026	Party x Juris	1	.021	.884	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.150	.699	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.001	.975	< .001
Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	1.457	.229	.009	Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	2.484	.117	.016

<u>Republicans - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Republicans - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.039	.409	.063	Corrected Model*	7	3.707	.001	.209
Party Identification	1	1.766	.187	.016	Party Identification	1	.003	.958	< .001
Socialization	1	.338	.562	.003	Socialization	1	1.322	.253	.013
Participation	1	.050	.823	< .001	Participation	1	.004	.951	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	2.568	.112	.023	Orthodoxy*	1	14.274	< .001	.127
Group Conflict	1	.013	.909	< .001	Group Conflict	1	2.167	.144	.022
Jurisdiction	1	.100	.752	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.001	.983	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.884	.173	.017	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.273	.135	.023

<u>Democrats - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Democrats - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	5	1.393	.246	.139	Corrected Model	5	.738	.599	.079

Party Identification	1	.116	.735	.003	Party Identification	1	2.448	.125	.054
Participation	1	1.847	.181	.041	Participation	1	.420	.520	.010
Group Conflict	1	.010	.921	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.239	.628	.006
Jurisdiction	1	3.530	.067	.076	Jurisdiction	1	.031	.862	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.438	.512	.010	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.939	.338	.021

Figure 5
Issue Support by Political Orthodoxy




For Democrats, only participation was correlated with group identification. However, it did not predict personal position for either topic independently, nor within the model, as the results of each ANCOVA were not significant (see Table 9).

Political group affiliation predicted significant differences in personal issue positions between parties, and those positions followed the platforms of those parties. Self-categorization heightened these differences. Additionally, self-categorization extremity significantly predicted personal position on poverty among Republicans, though not for same-sex marriage, and not for

either topic among Democrats. Taken together, H2a was supported, in that political partisans followed their party platforms.

Figure 6
Personal Position on Poverty Legislation by Political In-Group Socialization



HMP. H3a predicted that self-categorization would positively predict HMP. To address the hypothesis, perceptions of article position and credibility were measured among political and religious groups. The same procedures for personal support were used to test for the effect of political self-categorization on perception of article position and article credibility to answer HMP hypotheses. Republicans and Democrats both largely perceived articles about same-sex marriage to be unbiased (Republican $M = 4.15$, $SD = 1.01$; Democrat $M = 4.02$, $SD = 1.02$). The results of an ANOVA were not significant, $F(7, 167) = .577$, $p = .774$. Perceptions of the poverty articles leaned slightly toward a favorable bias, but were still similar across political parties (Republican $M = 4.47$, $SD = .88$; Democrat $M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.00$). The overall model was not significant, $F(7, 159) = .858$, $p = .542$. However, a significant interaction was found between both article factors and party affiliation. Democrats saw the politically framed poverty article as

more favorable to their position in the local jurisdiction than in the distant jurisdiction, while the religiously framed article was more favorable in the distant jurisdiction than in the local jurisdiction.


Adding the IDPG score as a covariate to measure the effect of self-categorization extremity did not produce any changes in significance for either story topic regarding perceived article position. The sample was then split by political party and linear regressions tested the independent effect of the self-categorization dimensions. Among Republicans, none of the self-categorization measures significantly predicted perceived article position, either independently or jointly within the factorial model for either story topic (see Table 10).

Among Democrats, group identification and participation each predicted increased perceptions of article support for same-sex marriage. Adding these as covariates, the factorial model was significant, $F(5, 43) = 5.773, p < .001, \eta^2 = .402$, with a significant main effect of group identification. As identification with the Democratic Party increased, so too did the belief that the article was supporting same-sex marriage. Neither self-categorization extremity measure was significant in the poverty condition.

Using the article credibility scale as the dependent variable, significant differences were observed in both topic conditions. Regarding same-sex marriage, the results of an ANOVA were significant, $F(7, 164) = 2.127, p = 0.43, \eta^2 = .083$, with a significant main effect of party affiliation. Democrats saw the article as being more credible ($M = 5.02, SD = 1.00$) than did Republicans ($M = 4.47, SD = 1.00$). Regarding poverty, the model as a whole was not significant, $F(7, 158) = 1.916, p = 0.70$. However, there was a significant main effect for the group conflict manipulation, and a significant interaction between group conflict and party affiliation. Politically framed articles were seen as more credible than religiously framed articles,

with Democrats fueling that relationship (Political $M = 4.78$, $SD = 0.87$; Religious $M = 4.13$, $SD = 0.67$; see Figure 7).

Figure 7
Democratic Poverty Position and Article Perceptions by Group Conflict Frame



Note: A truncated vertical axis was necessary to distinguish differences in conditions. The scales ranged from 1 (negative) to 7.

Adding group identification to the models did not produce any changes in significant findings. Further, the self-categorization extremity measures were not significant predictors of credibility ratings for either party or topic. However, when placed in the factorial model, an ANCOVA indicated a significant effect of group identification among Republicans reading the poverty article, whereby greater identification with the party resulted in lower credibility ratings. Among Democrats, the only significant effect was also regarding the poverty article, with the credibility of the politically framed article increasing as self-categorization intensified (see Figure 8). Complete results are presented in Table 11.

Overall, there was not particularly strong evidence of HMP. Republicans perceived the poverty article, which was viewed by all groups as being biased in favor of the legislation, as less credible than did Democrats. Stronger self-categorization among Democrats, however, produced

greater estimation of article support and credibility, which is opposite of the HMP prediction.

Thus, regarding politics, H3a was weakly supported among Republicans and not supported among Democrats.

Table 10
Effect of Political Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Perceived Article Position

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.677	.711	.032	Corrected Model	8	.738	.658	.037
Party Identification	1	1.366	.244	.008	Party Identification	1	.097	.756	.001
Party Affiliation	1	.066	.797	< .001	Party Affiliation	1	.518	.473	.003
Group Conflict	1	.178	.673	.001	Group Conflict	1	.084	.772	.001
Jurisdiction	1	2.590	.109	.015	Jurisdiction	1	.009	.923	< .001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.190	.664	.001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.527	.469	.003
Party x Juris	1	.595	.441	.004	Party x Juris	1	.043	.836	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.061	.805	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.074	.302	.007
Party x GpCn x Juris	1	.005	.941	< .001	Party x GpCn x Juris*	1	4.944	.028	.031

<u>Republicans - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Republicans - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	.294	.955	.019	Corrected Model	7	.342	.933	.024
Party Identification	1	< .001	.985	< .001	Party Identification	1	.216	.643	.002
Participation	1	.684	.410	.006	Participation	1	.277	.600	.003
Socialization	1	.023	.880	< .001	Socialization	1	.683	.411	.007
Orthodoxy	1	.776	.380	.007	Orthodoxy	1	.144	.706	.001
Group Conflict	1	.008	.930	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.221	.639	.002
Jurisdiction	1	.327	.569	.003	Jurisdiction	1	.058	.810	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.233	.630	.002	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.623	.432	.006

<u>Democrats - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Democrats - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	5	5.773	< .001	.402	Corrected Model	5	.702	.625	.075
Party Identification*	1	13.384	.001	.237	Party Identification	1	.043	.837	.001
Participation	1	1.415	.241	.032	Participation	1	.285	.596	.007
Group Conflict	1	.183	.671	.004	Group Conflict	1	.363	.550	.008
Jurisdiction	1	.168	.684	.004	Jurisdiction	1	< .001	.993	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.007	.935	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	3.164	.082	.069



Table 11
Effect of Political Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Perceived Article Credibility

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.881	.066	.085	Corrected Model	8	1.675	.109	.080
Party Identification	1	.231	.631	.001	Party Identification	1	.964	.328	.006
Party Affiliation*	1	10.944	.001	.063	Party Affiliation	1	1.540	.217	.010
Group Conflict	1	.106	.746	.001	Group Conflict*	1	4.267	.041	.027
Jurisdiction	1	2.319	.130	.014	Jurisdiction	1	.112	.739	.001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.137	.712	.001	Party x Gp Cn*	1	5.723	.018	.036
Party x Juris	1	1.050	.307	.006	Party x Juris	1	.381	.538	.002
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.527	.218	.009	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.372	.243	.009
Party x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.130	.719	.001	Party x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.528	.469	.003

<u>Republicans - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Republicans - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	.568	.780	.036	Corrected Model	7	1.050	.402	.070
Party Identification	1	.124	.726	.001	Party Identification*	1	4.435	.038	.044
Participation	1	1.962	.164	.018	Participation	1	2.265	.136	.023
Socialization	1	.673	.414	.006	Socialization	1	.242	.624	.002
Orthodoxy	1	.579	.448	.005	Orthodoxy	1	.064	.801	.001
Group Conflict	1	.088	.767	.001	Group Conflict	1	.501	.481	.005
Jurisdiction	1	.114	.736	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.808	.371	.008
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.224	.637	.002	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.135	.714	.001

<u>Democrats - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Democrats - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	5	1.474	.219	.149	Corrected Model	5	2.302	.061	.211
Party Identification	1	3.663	.062	.080	Party Identification	1	.070	.793	.002
Participation	1	.417	.522	.010	Participation	1	.656	.422	.015
Group Conflict	1	.296	.590	.007	Group Conflict*	1	9.133	.004	.175
Jurisdiction	1	3.164	.083	.070	Jurisdiction	1	.151	.699	.004
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.043	.313	.024	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.047	.160	.045

Figure 8
Personal and Article Perceptions by Political and Religious Affiliation



Religious Self-Categorization

The majority of the sample valued religion (70.1%), with 30.9% strongly valuing religion. Those opposing religion accounted for 4.4% of the sample, with 2.0% strongly opposing religion. Those who neither valued nor opposed religion accounted for 22.4% of the sample. The most common religious affiliation was Christianity, accounting for 79.9% of respondents. Other religions were represented to far lesser degrees (see Appendix C), limiting their usefulness in data analysis. As a result, the non-Christian participants were not included in analyses relating to religion. For hypothesis tests including religious self-categorization sub-measures, the 10.3% of respondents who claimed no religious affiliation were also removed. However, the lack of religious opposition in the sample made it necessary to retain the non-religious for basic comparisons.

All but six Christian participants provided a denomination, which were grouped into the RELTRAD classification (see Appendix C for a complete list of denominations and their classifications). Among Christians, 43.8% were Evangelical Protestants (hereafter, Evangelicals), 27.5% were Catholic, 25.0% were Mainline Protestants (hereafter, Mainlines), 3.2% were Black Protestants, and two people (0.5%) were classified as “other.” Due to low frequencies, Black Protestants and Christians in the “other” category were not included in subsequent tests.

Other self-categorization items were measured along five-point scales. Means across religious affiliations are presented in Table 8. Significant differences were found in every self-categorization dimension. Evangelicals had greater group identification, adherence to orthodoxy, and participation rates than Mainlines and Catholics, while Mainlines had stronger social ties than Evangelicals and Catholics.

Significant correlations existed between group identification and each of the additional self-categorization dimensions among Evangelicals and Mainlines, and so all were maintained for hypothesis testing (see Table 7). The socialization item did not correlate with group identification among Catholics, and so it was not included in their self-categorization covariates.

Issue support. H2b predicted that religious self-categorization would lead to taking particular issue positions. More specifically, the religiously affiliated were anticipated to support the poverty legislation while opposing the same-sex marriage ruling. Religious affiliation significantly predicted issue position for same-sex marriage, though not for the poverty legislation. An ANOVA considering religious affiliation and the factorial article manipulations was significant, $F(15, 209) = 1.725, p = .048, \eta^2 = .110$, indicating a main effect for religious tradition. Bonferroni post-hoc tests found Evangelicals to have significantly lower support for same-sex marriage than Catholics and the non-religious. Such interfaith (or religious/non-religious) divisions did not emerge regarding personal positions on the poverty legislation. The model was not significant, $F(15, 201) = 1.221, p = .258$, nor did any individual items approach significance.

Non-religious participants were then removed and the IDPG group affiliation measure was inserted as a covariate, serving as the primary representation of self-categorization. For same-sex marriage, the overall model was significant, $F(12, 180) = 1.818, p = .048, \eta^2 = .108$, and main effects were observed for religious affiliation, identification with that group, and the group conflict article manipulation. Again, Evangelicals opposed same-sex marriage ($EMM = 3.83, SE = .22$) while Mainlines ($EMM = 4.55, SE = .32$) and Catholics ($EMM = 4.67, SE = .28$) showed support. Across all three Christian traditions, support for same-sex marriage was greater

when presented as a religious issue ($EMM = 4.67$; $SE = .23$) than as a political issue ($EMM = 4.03$; $SE = .23$).

The model for poverty still failed to reach significance, $F(12, 176) = 1.317$, $p = .212$. However, group identification strength did produce a significant effect as a covariate, and the role of the group conflict article manipulation became significant. Support was greater for the poverty legislation when framed as a religious debate ($EMM = 4.57$, $SE = .16$) than as a political debate ($EMM = 4.00$, $SE = .15$).

The sample was then split by religious affiliation to determine if other correlates to self-categorization affected issue position. Linear regressions measured independent effects of variables within each religion. For the same-sex marriage topic, religious orthodoxy significantly predicted opposition among Evangelicals and religious participation significantly predicted opposition among Mainlines. Regarding the poverty topic, orthodoxy significantly predicted opposition to the legislation among Catholics.

Placing these additional self-categorization elements into the ANCOVA yielded inconsistent results. Orthodoxy lost significance in predicting an Evangelical's personal position on same-sex marriage and a Catholic's personal position on poverty, as it and the entire models were not significant in both instances. However, the model was significant for Mainlines in the same-sex marriage condition, $F(7, 35) = 2.822$, $p = .019$, $\eta^2 = .361$, with a significant effect of participation as a covariate. The more Mainline Protestants engaged in religious activities, the less likely they were to support the same-sex marriage ruling. Results are presented in Table 12.

In-group alignment of personal position regarding same-sex marriage was most apparent for Evangelicals, though there was some evidence of it among highly self-categorized members of other denominations. However, many religious partisans still supported same-sex marriage,

particularly when a religious argument was made for opposing it – a rejection of the in-group. Meanwhile, religious participants lent modest support to the poverty legislation, and increased support when the argument was presented by an in-group source. Taken together, H2b was partially supported.

Table 12
Effect of Religious Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Personal Issue Position

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	12	1.818	.048	.108	Corrected Model	12	1.317	.212	.082
Religious ID*	1	5.007	.026	.027	Religious ID*	1	5.207	.024	.029
Religious Affiliation*	2	3.217	.042	.035	Religious Affiliation	2	.120	.887	.001
Group Conflict*	1	3.973	.048	.022	Group Conflict*	1	6.639	.011	.036
Jurisdiction	1	1.603	.207	.009	Jurisdiction	1	.044	.833	< .001
Relig x Gp Cn	2	.013	.987	< .001	Relig x Gp Cn	2	.046	.955	.001
Relig x Juris	2	.535	.587	.006	Relig x Juris	2	.649	.524	.007
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.218	.641	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.235	.268	.007
Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	2	.085	.918	.001	Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	2	.890	.412	.010

<u>Evangelicals - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Evangelicals - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.211	.307	.096	Corrected Model	7	.793	.596	.069
Religious ID	1	.275	.601	.003	Religious ID	1	1.606	.209	.021
Participation	1	.002	.962	< .001	Participation	1	.082	.776	.001
Socialization	1	.341	.561	.004	Socialization	1	.036	.851	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	2.601	.111	.031	Orthodoxy	1	.004	.951	< .001
Group Conflict	1	2.315	.132	.028	Group Conflict	1	2.620	.110	.034
Jurisdiction	1	.025	.876	< .001	Jurisdiction	1	.091	.764	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.020	.889	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.064	.801	.001

<u>Mainlines - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Mainlines - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	7	2.822	.019	.361	Corrected Model	7	1.839	.106	.243
Religious ID	1	.239	.628	.007	Religious ID	1	1.579	.216	.038
Participation*	1	8.434	.006	.194	Participation	1	.044	.835	.001
Socialization	1	1.083	.305	.030	Socialization	1	.218	.643	.005
Orthodoxy	1	2.345	.135	.063	Orthodoxy	1	.619	.436	.015
Group Conflict	1	.602	.443	.017	Group Conflict*	1	5.100	.029	.113
Jurisdiction	1	3.161	.084	.083	Jurisdiction	1	3.479	.070	.080


<u>Catholics - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Catholics - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	6	.706	.646	.080	Corrected Model	6	1.663	.154	.188
Religious ID	1	2.310	.135	.045	Religious ID	1	.013	.909	< .001
Participation	1	.331	.567	.007	Participation	1	.020	.887	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	.002	.965	< .001	Orthodoxy	1	2.419	.127	.053
Group Conflict	1	1.120	.295	.022	Group Conflict	1	1.762	.191	.039
Jurisdiction	1	.350	.557	.007	Jurisdiction	1	.254	.617	.006
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.270	.606	.005	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.860	.180	.041

HMP. H3b predicted that self-categorization would lead to HMP. The same procedures were used to test for the effect of religious self-categorization on perception of article position and article credibility to answer HMP hypotheses. Regarding same-sex marriage article stance, each of the Christian traditions and the non-religious saw the articles as similarly unbiased. An ANOVA including religious affiliation and article factors was not significant, $F(15, 209) = .904$, $p = .560$. The model did observe a significant main effect of jurisdiction, by which articles from the distant jurisdiction were perceived to be more supportive of same-sex marriage ($M = 4.29$, $SD = 1.01$) than articles from the local jurisdiction ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.03$). Once again, greater article favorability to the poverty legislation was perceived, and once again it was consistent across groups and was unaffected by article manipulations. The results of an ANOVA were not significant, $F(15, 201) = 1.120$, $p = .340$.

Adding group identification as a measure of self-categorization extremity failed to predict perceived article position for the same-sex marriage topic. Further, the main effect of jurisdiction lost significance. Group identification also did not change perceived article position for the poverty topic, as the results of an ANCOVA remained non-significant.

Isolating religious groups, group identification and participation predicted greater perceived article support for same-sex marriage among Evangelicals (see Figure 9), while participation predicted greater article *opposition* among Catholics. Catholics were the only religious group for which self-categorization affected perceived article position for the poverty condition. Group identification and participation each predicted greater perceived article opposition to poverty legislation.

Figure 9
Effect of Evangelical Group Identification Strength on Personal and Perceived Article Positions Regarding Same-Sex Marriage




An ANCOVA with the additional self-categorization variables was not significant for the overall model among Evangelicals regarding same-sex marriage, $F(7, 80) = 1.646, p = .134$. However, group identification strength remained significant as a covariate predicting perceived article support for the judge’s ruling. The overall model was also not significant for Mainlines, though commitment to orthodoxy became a significant predictor of perceived article opposition to the judge’s ruling. The effect of religious participation among Catholics lost significance when placed within the larger model, which was also not significant.

For the poverty topic, orthodoxy once again became significant for Mainlines when placed in the model, predicting greater perceptions of article support for the legislation. Among Catholics, significant independent effects of self-categorization extremity again lost significance within the model. Results are presented in Table 13.

Using article credibility as the dependent variable, mean scores between religious groups were again similar and ANOVAs were not significant for either topic. Adding group identification as a measure of self-categorization extremity had no effect on either outcome.

Isolating religious groups, greater religious group identification among Mainlines predicted lower credibility ratings for the poverty article. The exact opposite relationship was present among Catholics, as greater group identification predicted higher credibility scores (see Figure 10). In fact, every self-categorization measure that correlated with IDPG for Catholics predicted higher credibility scores for poverty articles. No significant effects were observed between self-categorization and the credibility of same-sex marriage articles.

Figure 10
Effect of Catholic Religious Group Identification Strength on Personal Position and Perceived Article Credibility Regarding Poverty



Not surprisingly, a model with article factors and self-categorization dimensions was not significant for any religious group. Regarding the poverty topic, a main effect was of group conflict was found among Evangelicals, whereby the religiously framed article ($EMM = 4.82$, $SE = .14$) was seen as more credible than the politically framed article ($EMM = 4.44$, $SE = .13$). The entire model was significant for Mainlines, $F(7, 38) = 2.305$, $p = .046$, $\eta^2 = .298$, and group identification as a covariate remained a significant negative predictor of credibility scores. The effect of self-categorization on perceived article credibility was even stronger among Catholics, $F(7, 42) = 3.964$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .398$. Group identification extremity and orthodoxy remained a significant positive predictor of credibility scores (see Table 14).

The results suggest the presence of HMP among religious groups, as Evangelicals, Mainlines, and Catholics each perceived the same-sex marriage article to be opposed to their personal position. The same relationship was observed with the poverty article for Mainlines and Catholics. Interestingly, however, article credibility ratings moved in the opposite direction among Catholics, increasing with self-categorization strength. Taken together, H3b was largely supported.

Table 13
Effect of Religious Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Perceived Article Position

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	12	.926	.522	.058	Corrected Model	12	.902	.546	.058
Religious ID	1	2.159	.144	.012	Religious ID	1	.549	.460	.003
Religious Affiliation	2	.212	.809	.002	Religious Affiliation	2	.348	.706	.004
Group Conflict	1	.107	.744	.001	Group Conflict	1	.487	.486	.003
Jurisdiction	1	2.946	.088	.016	Jurisdiction	1	.108	.743	.001
Relig x Gp Cn	2	.400	.671	.004	Relig x Gp Cn	2	1.015	.364	.011
Relig x Juris	2	.587	.557	.006	Relig x Juris	2	1.301	.275	.015
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.452	.502	.003	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.244	.622	.001
Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	2	1.010	.366	.011	Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	2	1.946	.146	.022

<u>Evangelicals - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Evangelicals - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.646	.134	.126	Corrected Model	7	.798	.591	.069
Religious ID*	1	5.411	.023	.063	Religious ID	1	1.293	.259	.017
Participation	1	.385	.537	.005	Participation	1	.014	.908	< .001
Socialization	1	.449	.505	.006	Socialization	1	.011	.916	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	1.778	.186	.022	Orthodoxy	1	.184	.669	.002
Group Conflict	1	.931	.338	.011	Group Conflict	1	.585	.447	.008
Jurisdiction	1	2.317	.132	.028	Jurisdiction	1	3.125	.081	.040
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.113	.738	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.080	.779	.001

<u>Mainlines - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Mainlines - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.683	.145	.252	Corrected Model	7	1.281	.284	.183
Religious ID	1	.227	.636	.006	Religious ID	1	1.822	.185	.044
Participation	1	.033	.857	.001	Participation	1	3.456	.070	.080
Socialization	1	2.028	.163	.055	Socialization	1	.023	.879	.001
Orthodoxy*	1	5.107	.030	.127	Orthodoxy*	1	5.874	.020	.128
Group Conflict	1	.361	.552	.010	Group Conflict	1	.480	.493	.012
Jurisdiction	1	2.594	.116	.069	Jurisdiction	1	.083	.775	.002
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.650	.426	.018	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.699	.108	.063

<u>Catholics - Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Catholics - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	6	.751	.612	.084	Corrected Model	6	1.641	.159	.186
Religious ID	1	.016	.899	< .001	Religious ID	1	2.193	.146	.049
Participation	1	2.287	.137	.045	Participation	1	.931	.340	.021
Orthodoxy	1	.458	.502	.009	Orthodoxy	1	.307	.582	.007
Group Conflict	1	.006	.938	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.500	.483	.011
Jurisdiction	1	.415	.523	.008	Jurisdiction	1	.070	.793	.002
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.046	.832	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.591	.446	.014

Table 14
Effect of Religious Self-Categorization and Article Factors on Perceived Article Credibility

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	12	.488	.920	.032	Corrected Model	12	.607	.834	.041
Religious ID	1	1.474	.226	.008	Religious ID	1	.059	.809	< .001
Religious Affiliation	2	.169	.845	.002	Religious Affiliation	2	.605	.547	.007
Group Conflict	1	.463	.497	.003	Group Conflict	1	.454	.501	.003

Jurisdiction	1	.035	.852	< .001
Relig x Gp Cn	2	.073	.929	.001
Relig x Juris	2	.364	.696	.004
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.874	.351	.005
Relig x GpCn x Juris	2	1.234	.294	.014

Jurisdiction	1	1.630	.203	.009
Relig x Gp Cn	2	1.131	.325	.013
Relig x Juris	2	.344	.710	.004
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.306	.581	.002
Relig x GpCn x Juris	2	.091	.913	.001

Evangelicals - Same-Sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.015	.427	.083
Religious ID	1	3.374	.070	.041
Participation	1	.141	.708	.002
Socialization	1	.757	.387	.009
Orthodoxy	1	.084	.772	.001
Group Conflict	1	.290	.592	.004
Jurisdiction	1	.570	.453	.007
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.493	.484	.006

Evangelicals - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.269	.278	.108
Religious ID	1	.868	.354	.012
Participation	1	1.718	.194	.023
Socialization	1	.880	.351	.012
Orthodoxy	1	1.095	.299	.015
Group Conflict*	1	4.090	.047	.053
Jurisdiction	1	.345	.559	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.023	.880	< .001

Mainlines - Same-Sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	.430	.877	.081
Religious ID	1	1.124	.296	.032
Participation	1	.032	.859	.001
Socialization	1	.003	.954	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	1.375	.249	.039
Group Conflict	1	.001	.973	< .001
Jurisdiction	1	.712	.405	.021
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.177	.676	.005

Mainlines - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	7	2.305	.046	.298
Religious ID*	1	13.726	.001	.265
Participation	1	.006	.941	< .001
Socialization	1	2.340	.134	.058
Orthodoxy	1	1.395	.245	.035
Group Conflict	1	.297	.589	.008
Jurisdiction	1	1.627	.210	.041
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.066	.798	.002

Catholics - Same-Sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	6	.175	.982	.021
Religious ID	1	.045	.833	.001
Participation	1	.003	.957	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	.006	.939	< .001
Group Conflict	1	.135	.715	.003
Jurisdiction	1	.043	.836	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.694	.409	.014

Catholics - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	6	4.173	.002	.368
Religious ID*	1	7.115	.011	.142
Participation	1	1.689	.201	.038
Orthodoxy*	1	4.442	.041	.094
Group Conflict	1	1.121	.296	.025
Jurisdiction	1	1.410	.242	.032
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.083	.775	.002

Self-Categorization Perceptions of Media


H4 predicted that categorization of “the media” collectively as an in-group or out-group would influence HMP. The scale used to measure in-group or out-group categorization of media was reliable for both political ($\alpha = .789$) and religious ($\alpha = .792$) self-categorization. All items and each total scale met normality requirements.

Republicans on average viewed media as a slight out-group ($M = 2.87, SD = .65$), while Democrats had a more neutral perspective ($M = 3.01, SD = .55$). The results of an ANOVA found this difference to be significant, $F(1, 338) = 9.561, p = .002, \eta^2 = .028$.

Dividing the sample by political party, self-categorization of media did not affect perceptions of article credibility for either party. It did, however, predict perceived article support for poverty legislation among Republicans, $\beta = .278, t(1, 113) = 3.080, p = .003, r^2 = .077$, while simultaneously predicting perceived article opposition to poverty legislation among Democrats, $\beta = -.287, t(1, 48) = -2.073, p = .044, r^2 = .082$ (see Figure 11, Table 15). When placed into the model alongside other self-categorization covariates, categorization of media as an out-group continued to be a significant predictor of perceived article support among Republicans, and was the only significant predictor in the ANCOVA. This did not hold true among Democrats, as media categorization lost significance when placed in the model, which was also not significant.

Among the religiously affiliated, Mainlines considered media to be a slight in-group ($M = 3.24, SD = .73$), compared to Evangelicals ($M = 3.03, SD = .73$) and Catholics ($M = 2.98, SD = .67$), who did not categorize media in either direction. The results of an ANOVA were significant, $F(2, 379) = 4.606, p = .011, \eta^2 = .024$, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests highlighting the distinction between Mainlines and the other religious classifications.

Figure 11
Effect of Media Categorization on Perceived Article Support Regarding Poverty



Dividing the sample by religious affiliation, self-categorization of media did not affect perceptions of article support for any groups in either topic condition. It did, however, predict article credibility in the poverty condition among Evangelicals, $\beta = .287$, $t(1, 79) = 2.665$, $p = .009$, $r^2 = .082$. The more media was categorized as an in-group, the more credible the article was reported to be. Placed in the factorial model with other self-categorization measures, media categorization remained significant in predicting article credibility, joined by the existing main effect for group conflict, whereby Evangelicals saw poverty articles as more credible when framed religiously ($EMM = 4.81$, $SE = .13$) than politically ($EMM = 4.44$, $SE = .12$). Media self-categorization did not have an effect on any other HMP models.

The perception of media as an in-group or out-group did not predict HMP in the same-sex marriage topic condition, but did among political groups and Evangelicals in the poverty condition, providing partial support to H4.

Table 15
Effect of Media Categorization on Article Perceptions

Group	<u>Perceived Article Position</u>					
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Republicans	-.109	.151	-.065	-.727	.469	.004
Democrats	.400	.274	.206	1.459	.151	.042
Evangelicals	-.097	.139	-.074	-.701	.485	.005
Mainlines	-.040	.317	-.020	-.127	.900	< .001
Catholics	.231	.229	.134	1.009	.317	.018
Group	<u>Poverty</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
	Republicans*	.360	.117	.278	3.080	.003
Democrats*	-.498	.240	-.287	-2.073	.044	.082
Evangelicals	-.001	.139	-.001	-.007	.994	< .001
Mainlines	-.124	.270	-.062	-.459	.648	.004
Catholics	.013	.193	.010	.068	.946	< .001
Group	<u>Perceived Article Credibility</u>					
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Republicans	-.139	.147	-.086	-.946	.346	.007
Democrats	.250	.277	.131	.903	.371	.017
Evangelicals	.082	.136	.065	.607	.546	.004
Mainlines	.096	.317	.047	.302	.764	.002
Catholics	.044	.226	.026	.197	.845	.001
Group	<u>Poverty</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
	Republicans	-.027	.114	-.022	-.233	.816
Democrats	.294	.204	.204	1.443	.155	.042
Evangelicals*	.341	.128	.287	2.665	.009	.082
Mainlines	-.039	.246	-.022	-.159	.874	< .001
Catholics	.217	.188	.164	1.152	.255	.027

Interaction Between Self-Categorizations

RQ1 asked whether there was a relationship between political and religious self-categorizations. Distribution of each religious affiliation within political parties generally followed the overall distribution of Republicans and Democrats. However, the non-religious were more likely to align politically with Democrats than Republicans. For this reason, a Chi-square test of political and religious affiliation crossovers was significant, $\chi^2(3, n = 297) = 11.601, p = .009$.

A manipulation check item asked participants to self-report the degree to which their political and religious values were important to evaluating each issue. Religion ($M = 3.72, SD = 1.12$) was reported to be more important than politics ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.14$) regarding same-sex marriage, while each were deemed similarly important regarding poverty (Religion $M = 3.49, SD = .94$; Politics $M = 3.59, SD = .83$). No significant differences were observed between self-categorizations.

Table 16
Political Affiliation Within Religious Groups

Party	Religion				Total
	Evangelical	Mainline	Catholic	Not Religious	
Republican	92 (75.4%)	57 (79.2%)	60 (78.9%)	13 (48.1%)	222 (74.7%)
Democrat	30 (24.6%)	15 (20.8%)	16 (21.1%)	14 (51.9%)	75 (25.3%)

$\chi^2(3, n = 297) = 11.601, p = .009$

An ANCOVA using both political and religious group affiliation as fixed factors, and both political and religious group identification strength as covariates, produced significant models predicting personal position for both topics. For same-sex marriage, political group identification strength was the only significant covariate, while religious group affiliation fell beyond the threshold of statistical significance, though it explained the most variance in the

model. Evangelicalism continued to predict sharp opposition to same-sex marriage when compared to other religious and political affiliations, with the greatest opposition coming from Evangelicals who also had strong political self-categorization.

Regarding the poverty legislation, only a main effect was observed for political party affiliation, with the strong support by Democrats compared to the slight opposition of Republicans outweighing other factors.

Perceived article position was not predicted by overall self-categorization for either topic. Models for article credibility also were not significant. However, a main effect of political party affiliation was significant in the same-sex marriage condition, whereby Democrats found the article to be more credible ($EMM = 5.13$, $SE = .20$) than did Republicans ($EMM = 4.57$, $SE = .13$). Complete results are presented in Table 17.

The answer to RQ1 is that, despite self-reports, when one self-categorization emerged to predict perceptions, it was political. However, when concerning personal position for same-sex marriage, Evangelicals fused religion and politics to arrive at their oppositional stance.

Table 17
Effects of Political and Religious Self-Categorizations on Issue and Article Perceptions

	Same-Sex Marriage				<u>Personal Position</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2					
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	32	1.546	.049	.294	Corrected Model*	30	2.265	.001	.388
Political ID*	1	5.510	.021	.044	Political ID	1	.088	.767	.001
Religious ID	1	.069	.793	.001	Religious ID	1	2.997	.086	.027
Party Affil	1	1.271	.262	.011	Party Affil*	1	23.667	< .001	.181
Religious Affil	3	2.584	.057	.061	Religious Affil	3	.768	.515	.021
Group Conflict	1	.098	.754	.001	Group Conflict	1	.011	.916	< .001
Jurisdiction	1	1.172	.281	.010	Jurisdiction	1	.467	.496	.004
Party x Relig	3	1.663	.179	.040	Party x Relig	3	1.336	.267	.036
Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	7	.517	.821	.029	Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	6	1.187	.319	.062
Party x Relig x Jur	7	1.762	.101	.094	Party x Relig x Jur	6	.714	.639	.039
P x R x GpCn x Jur	7	.850	.548	.048	P x R x GpCn x Jur	6	1.212	.306	.064

<u>Perceived Article Position</u>									
<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	32	.518	.983	.122	Corrected Model	30	.963	.529	.213
Political ID	1	.594	.442	.005	Political ID	1	.003	.954	< .001
Religious ID	1	.313	.577	.003	Religious ID	1	.559	.456	.005
Party Affil	1	.575	.450	.005	Party Affil	1	.052	.820	< .001
Religious Affil	3	1.033	.381	.025	Religious Affil	3	1.266	.290	.034
Group Conflict	1	.458	.500	.004	Group Conflict	1	.006	.939	< .001
Jurisdiction	1	.157	.693	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.018	.893	< .001
Party x Relig	3	.372	.774	.009	Party x Relig	3	1.377	.254	.037
Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	7	.542	.801	.031	Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	6	.614	.719	.033
Party x Relig x Jur	7	.461	.861	.026	Party x Relig x Jur	6	1.139	.345	.060
P x R x GpCn x Jur	7	.661	.705	.037	P x R x GpCn x Jur	6	.769	.596	.041

<u>Perceived Article Credibility</u>									
<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	32	.829	.724	.185	Corrected Model	30	.986	.497	.218
Political ID	1	.016	.900	< .001	Political ID	1	1.738	.190	.016
Religious ID	1	.969	.327	.008	Religious ID	1	.107	.744	.001
Party Affil*	1	5.261	.024	.043	Party Affil	1	.762	.385	.007
Religious Affil	3	1.333	.267	.033	Religious Affil	3	.447	.720	.013
Group Conflict	1	.289	.592	.002	Group Conflict	1	3.007	.086	.028
Jurisdiction	1	.009	.923	< .001	Jurisdiction	1	.181	.672	.002
Party x Relig	3	.886	.451	.022	Party x Relig	3	1.060	.369	.029
Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	7	.401	.900	.023	Prty x Rlg x Gp Cn	6	1.849	.096	.095
Party x Relig x Jur	7	.453	.866	.026	Party x Relig x Jur	6	.443	.848	.024
P x R x GpCn x Jur	7	.756	.625	.043	P x R x GpCn x Jur	6	.875	.516	.047

Involvement

Value Involvement

H5 predicted preexisting beliefs to be a positive predictor of value involvement. The Cho and Boster (2005) value involvement scale was reliable ($\alpha = .812$). It also appeared to be valid measure, as value involvement had a positive linear relationship with partisanship strength for supporters and opponents of both issues, $\beta = .266$, $t(1, 518) = 6.286$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .071$. Scale

scores for value involvement did not significantly differ across conditions. Along the seven-point scale, the mean score for the same-sex marriage issue was 4.59 ($SD = 1.10$) and the mean score for the poverty issue was 4.42 ($SD = .94$). Table 18 displays differences between supporters and opponents across the various value involvement measures.

Moreover, the generic value involvement scale, which is meant to capture the effect of deeply-held beliefs on decision-making (Cho & Boster, 2005), corresponded well to prior topic-specific beliefs about same-sex marriage and poverty. The marriage tradition scale was marginally reliable ($\alpha = .693$) and all items had normal distributions. It corresponded with the value involvement scale for opponents of the same-sex marriage ruling, $\beta = .466$, $t(1, 95) = 5.135$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .217$, but not with supporters, $\beta = -.008$, $t(1, 123) = -.089$, $p = .929$, indicating that existing beliefs about traditional marriage predicted value involvement with the stimulus article among those opposing same-sex marriage, but not among those who supported the ruling.

Existing beliefs about the cause of homosexuality predicted value involvement with the same-sex marriage stimulus article among both supporters, $\beta = -.198$, $t(1, 123) = -2.238$, $p = .027$, $r^2 = .039$, and opponents, $\beta = .310$, $t(1, 95) = 3.180$, $p = .002$, $r^2 = .096$, of the judge's ruling. The negative relationship for supporters represents decreasing value involvement the more one believes homosexuality is a choice, while the same attribution belief increased value involvement among opponents.

The poverty attribution scale was reliable ($\alpha = .771$) and all items had normal distributions. One item from the original 15-item scale, asking whether poverty was the result of bad luck, was dropped for low correlation and detrimental effect on scale reliability. Existing beliefs about the cause of poverty significantly predicted value involvement among the

opposition $\beta = .355$, $t(1, 69) = 3.152$, $p = .002$, $r^2 = .126$, but not among supporters, $\beta = -.132$, $t(1, 123) = -1.482$, $p = .141$.

Overall, preexisting beliefs about same-sex marriage and poverty were reliable measures of value involvement. H5 was supported.

H6 examined the relationship between value involvement and HMP, predicting a positive relationship. The marriage tradition scale had a negative linear relationship with personal support for the same-sex marriage ruling in the article, $\beta = -.231$, $t(1, 258) = -3.810$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .053$. Attribution of homosexuality to personal choice as opposed to biological causes also had a negative linear relationship with personal support for same-sex marriage, $\beta = -.305$, $t(1, 261) = -5.173$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .093$. The general value involvement scale did not predict personal issue position in either direction, $\beta = -.092$, $t(1, 262) = -1.502$, $p < .134$. An ANCOVA with personal position and article manipulations as fixed factors and the value involvement scale, marriage traditionalism scale, and homosexuality attribution belief item as covariates determined the effect of value involvement on extremity of personal position on same-sex marriage. The model was significant, $F(10, 209) = 3.454$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .142$. General value involvement and attribution were significant predictors of position extremity.

Table 18
Value Involvement Means by Personal Issue Position

Measure	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>		Measure	<u>Poverty</u>	
	<u>Personal Position</u>			<u>Personal Position</u>	
	Supporters	Opponents		Supporters	Opponents
Value Scale	4.56 (1.07)	4.78 (1.18)	Value Scale	4.43 (.97)	4.60 (.94)
Marriage Values**	3.20 (.67)	3.49 (.82)	Attribution***	3.89 (.712)	4.65 (.68)
Attribution***	2.50 (1.13)	3.14 (1.10)			

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

The poverty attribution scale had a strong negative linear relationship with personal support for poverty legislation, $\beta = -.512$, $t(1, 250) = -9.431$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .262$. In other words, the more one attributed poverty to personal choices, the less likely one was to support the poverty legislation. Once again, general value involvement did not predict direction of personal support, $\beta = -.055$, $t(1, 254) = -.874$, $p = .383$. Items exclusive to same-sex marriage were replaced with the poverty attribution scale and the ANCOVA was run again for the poverty topic. Again, the model was significant, $F(9, 186) = 2.836$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .121$. General value involvement and attribution were each significant predictors of position extremity.


Value involvement had a positive linear relationship with perceived article position among same-sex marriage supporters, $\beta = .178$, $t(1, 127) = 2.038$, $p = .044$, $r^2 = .032$. As opponents of same-sex marriage became more traditional in their views of marriage, they tended to find agreement in the media position, $\beta = .298$, $t(1, 96) = 3.055$, $p = .003$, $r^2 = .089$. Both supporters and opponents found the article to be more agreeable with their position the more intensely they believed homosexuality to be genetic or a choice, respectively. None of the value involvement measures predicted perceived article position for the poverty article.

For same-sex marriage articles, perceived article position was predicted by value involvement (see Figure 12). The overall model was significant, $F(11, 208) = 2.548$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .119$. Main effects endured for both personal position and jurisdiction and both the value involvement scale and marriage traditionalism scale were also significant as covariates, strengthening assimilation of the article to one's personal beliefs. The effect of value involvement on perceived article position relating to the poverty legislation was not significant.

Article credibility was not independently influenced by any of the value involvement measures. Models predicting article credibility were also unaffected by value involvement.

Personal position remained the only significant predictor of credibility for same-sex marriage articles, while the model for poverty article credibility remained non-significant (see Table 19).

Figure 12
Effect of Value Involvement on Personal Position and Perceived Media Position Regarding Same-Sex Marriage



Value involvement had a significant effect on personal issue positions for both topics, as well as on perceived media position in the same-sex marriage condition. However, stronger value involvement consistently caused perceptions of the same-sex marriage article as agreeing with one’s side, not contrasting it. Meanwhile, no effect on article impressions were observed for the poverty article. H6 was not supported.

Table 19
Effect of Value Involvement on Issue and Article Perceptions

	<u>Personal Position Extremity</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>								
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	10	3.454	< .001	.142	Corrected Model*	9	2.836	.004	.121
Value Inv*	1	17.116	< .001	.076	Value Inv*	1	9.365	.003	.048
Marriage Trad	1	.058	.810	< .001	Attribution*	1	10.269	.002	.052
Attribution*	1	6.759	.010	.031	Position	1	2.237	.136	.012
Position	1	1.664	.198	.008	Group Conflict	1	.165	.685	.001

Group Conflict	1	2.158	.143	.010	Jurisdiction	1	.125	.724	.001
Jurisdiction	1	.758	.385	.004	Pos x Gp Cn	1	3.353	.069	.018
Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.004	.317	.005	Pos x Juris	1	.144	.705	.001
Pos x Juris	1	.920	.339	.004	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.759	.186	.009
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.497	.482	.002	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.147	.145	.011
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.623	.431	.003					

Perceived Article Position

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	10	2.578	.006	.110	Corrected Model	9	.967	.469	.045
Value Inv	1	3.503	.063	.016	Value Inv	1	.129	.720	.001
Marriage Trad*	1	3.985	.047	.019	Attribution	1	.722	.396	.004
Attribution	1	.544	.461	.003	Position	1	.535	.465	.003
Position*	1	6.041	.015	.028	Group Conflict	1	1.447	.231	.008
Group Conflict	1	.126	.723	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.046	.831	< .001
Jurisdiction*	1	5.694	.018	.027	Pos x Gp Cn	1	3.612	.059	.019
Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.600	.207	.008	Pos x Juris	1	.116	.734	.001
Pos x Juris	1	1.112	.293	.005	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.919	.339	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.035	.310	.005	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	3.453	.065	.018
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.913	.340	.004					

Perceived Article Credibility

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	10	2.267	.016	.099	Corrected Model	9	1.380	.200	.064
Value Inv	1	1.492	.223	.007	Value Inv	1	1.112	.293	.006
Marriage Trad	1	.241	.624	.001	Attribution	1	.005	.943	< .001
Attribution	1	.352	.554	.002	Position	1	2.441	.120	.013
Position*	1	17.001	.000	.076	Group Conflict	1	.664	.416	.004
Group Conflict	1	.020	.888	< .001	Jurisdiction	1	.396	.530	.002
Jurisdiction	1	.011	.917	< .001	Pos x Gp Cn	1	2.943	.088	.016
Pos x Gp Cn	1	.036	.850	< .001	Pos x Juris	1	1.696	.194	.009
Pos x Juris	1	.012	.913	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.488	.486	.003
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.447	.505	.002	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.637	.426	.003
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.053	.818	< .001					

Outcome Involvement

H7-10 predicted relationships regarding outcome involvement. The Cho and Boster (2005) outcome involvement scale was reliable ($\alpha = .874$). Each item and the scale as a whole met normality requirements. Mean values for the seven-point scale were 3.32 ($SD = 1.17$)

regarding same-sex marriage and 3.55 ($SD = 1.15$) regarding poverty. The difference between supporters ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.07$) and opponents ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.38$) of the same-sex marriage ruling, as well as the difference between supporters ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.05$) and opponents ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.35$) of the poverty legislation, were not significant.

H7 hypothesized that outcome involvement would predict time spent reading the article. However, the results of a linear regression were not significant for either same-sex marriage, $\beta = -.078$, $t(1, 248) = -1.225$, $p = .222$, or poverty topics, $\beta = .056$, $t(1, 243) = .870$, $p = .385$. Thus, H7 was not supported.

H8 hypothesized that personal investment in the topics, or a close bond with someone who has personal investment in the topics, would heighten outcome involvement. Unfortunately, only five of 270 participants in the same-sex marriage topic condition (the only participants who were asked) self-identified as homosexual or bisexual, making tests for personal relevance impossible. However, 60.0% of participants reported having a close friend or family member who is gay. These participants had higher outcome involvement ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 1.24$) than those who did not have a close bond with someone who is gay ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.01$). The results of an ANOVA were significant, $F(1, 256) = 8.508$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .032$.

Personal relevance in the poverty condition was measured by socioeconomic status, assuming that participants describing their circumstances as nearer to lower class would have a greater personal investment in poverty legislation than those considering themselves to be upper class. Further, 67.7% of participants in the poverty topic condition reported having a close friend or family member who is impoverished.

The results of a linear regression indicated that socioeconomic status had a negative linear relationship with outcome involvement, $\beta = -.137$, $t(1, 253) = -2.194$, $p = .029$, $r^2 = .019$.

In other words, as status increased, outcome involvement decreased. However, those who had a close bond with someone struggling with poverty ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.16$) had similar outcome involvement as someone who did not ($M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.12$). The results of an ANOVA were not significant, $F(1, 254) = .787$, $p = .376$.

For both topics, evidence existed for identification with the issue increasing outcome involvement. H8 was supported.

Finally, jurisdiction was hypothesized to be relevant to the concept of outcome involvement. H9 predicted that a story in a local jurisdiction would produce greater outcome involvement than a story in a distant jurisdiction. However, the results of an ANOVA indicated that the relationship between jurisdiction and the outcome involvement scale was not significant for either the same-sex marriage, $F(1, 260) = .149$, $p = .700$, or poverty topics, $F(1, 255) = 1.463$, $p = .228$.

Jurisdiction did not affect outcome involvement even when isolating participants who not only attended college in the local jurisdiction, but also considered it their home state. Of the stimulus conditions taking place in the local jurisdiction, none led to significantly greater outcome involvement among natives to the local jurisdiction than the same story in the distant jurisdiction.

A series of manipulation check items support this finding. Participants were asked if the government action's effect on various populations played a part in their interpretation of the article and debate. They included the government action's effect on self, friends and family, the community, and the country. Linear regressions found that concern about each population positively predicted outcome involvement for each topic. A multiple regression found perception of personal consequence to be most predictive of outcome involvement for same-sex marriage, β

= .246, $t(4, 252) = 3.413$, $p = .001$, $r^2 = .115$, and poverty, $\beta = .217$, $t(4, 249) = 2.254$, $p = .025$, $r^2 = .114$. However, perceptions of personal consequence were not related to where the government action was taking place, as ANOVAs were not significant for same-sex marriage, $F(1, 263) = .016$, $p = .889$, or poverty, $F(1, 259) = 1.208$, $p = .273$. Thus, H9 was not supported.

H10 predicted that outcome involvement would diminish HMP. Entering the continuous outcome involvement scale into the factorial model as a covariate and the categorical identification with homosexuality as a fixed factor, outcome involvement did not predict personal position on same-sex marriage, $F(8, 249) = .922$, $p = .499$. It did, however, predict partisan extremity, $F(16, 204) = 1.959$, $p = .017$, $\eta^2 = .133$, with the outcome involvement scale as a significant covariate.

The effect of outcome involvement on perception of article position was also significant, $F(16, 204) = 1.815$, $p = .031$, $\eta^2 = .125$, with the introduction of a significant interaction between personal position, social identification, and group conflict, whereby those who opposed same-sex marriage and had no close social ties to a friend or family member who was gay perceived the religiously framed article to be much more supportive of same-sex marriage ($EMM = 4.38$, $SE = .24$) than the politically framed article ($EMM = 3.43$, $SE = .239$). Outcome involvement did not alter model significance regarding perceptions of article credibility.

For the poverty condition, both the outcome involvement scale and socioeconomic status were entered into the factorial model as covariates. Outcome involvement had a significant main effect on direction of personal support, $F(1, 253) = 4.268$, $p = .040$, $\eta^2 = .017$, but in an unexpected direction, as higher outcome involvement predicted opposition to poverty legislation. Outcome involvement, however, did not predict the extremity of a personal position. Measures

of outcome involvement also failed to predict perceived article position or article credibility in the poverty condition.

Effects of outcome involvement were particularly evident regarding the same-sex marriage topic, where it predicted partisan strength for both supporters and opponents. While outcome involvement affected personal positions on both issues, it only provided evidence of HMP in one specific three-way interaction in the same-sex marriage topic. Otherwise, it did not play a significant role in shifting perceptions of the media message. H10 was not supported.

Interaction Between Involvement Types

RQ2 considered the relationship between involvement types. Bivariate correlation produced a significant, though weak correlation between the two involvement scales ($r = .212, p = .001$). Both were loaded into a multiple regression model as predictors of each of the HMP outcome variables. Results are displayed in Table 20. Both involvement types had a positive linear relationship with partisan extremity in the same-sex marriage condition. Regarding poverty, value involvement predicted increased partisan extremity, while outcome involvement predicted moderation. Only value involvement was predictive of perceived article position for the same-sex marriage topic, while neither was predictive for poverty. Finally, neither involvement type predicted article credibility ratings.

To examine the interaction between outcome and value involvement in a more complete context, both scales were loaded as covariates into an ANCOVA with the stimulus manipulations and personal position and tested for their effects on the HMP variables. Results are presented in Table 21.

Regarding personal issue position for the same-sex marriage topic, the model was significant, $F(9, 212) = 3.592, p < .001, \eta^2 = .132$. Both involvement types were significant,

though value involvement explained more variance ($\eta^2 = .053$) than did outcome involvement ($\eta^2 = .033$). For the poverty topic, the overall model failed to achieve statistical significance, $F(9, 192) = 1.420, p = .182$. While outcome involvement lost significance as a predictor of personal position, value involvement maintained its effect, $F(1, 201) = 6.562, p = .011, \eta^2 = .033$.

Table 20
Effect of Involvement Types on Issue and Article Perceptions

Invmt	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					Invmt	<u>Poverty</u>				
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>		B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Personal Position</i>						<i>Personal Position</i>					
Value	-.184	.123	-.095	-1.494	.136	Value	-.039	.100	-.025	-.390	.697
Outcome	.107	.117	.058	.912	.363	Outcome	-.154	.082	-.121	-1.868	.063
<i>Position Extremity</i>						<i>Position Extremity</i>					
Value*	.221	.058	.231	3.789	< .001	Value*	.225	.057	.247	3.922	< .001
Outcome*	.133	.055	.147	2.416	.016	Outcome	-.009	.047	-.013	-.199	.843
<i>Perceived Article Position</i>						<i>Perceived Article Position</i>					
Value*	.120	.059	.128	2.024	.044	Value	-.006	.066	-.006	-.088	.930
Outcome	-.025	.056	-.029	-.452	.652	Outcome	.016	.055	.018	.284	.776
<i>Perceived Article Credibility</i>						<i>Perceived Article Credibility</i>					
Value	.097	.060	.103	1.618	.107	Value	.053	.062	.056	.853	.394
Outcome	-.042	.057	-.047	-.741	.459	Outcome	-.094	.051	-.121	-1.851	.065

Regarding perceived article position for the same-sex marriage topic, the model was significant, $F(9, 212) = 2.443, p = .012, \eta^2 = .094$. Value involvement was significant as a covariate, along with a main effect for personal position, indicating that as value involvement rose among supporters, perceived article support also increased. Outcome involvement was not significant in the model. For the poverty topic, neither the overall model, nor an involvement type achieved significance in predicting perceived article position.

Finally, neither involvement scale significantly affected perceptions of article credibility for either topic. Taken together, RQ2 could be answered that both involvement types can

influence one's personal stance on an issue, though value involvement is more influential.

Further, only value involvement was related to shifts in perceived media position.

Table 21
Effect of Involvement Types and Article Factors on Issue and Article Perceptions

	<u>Personal Position</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	5	1.601	.160	.031	Corrected Model	5	1.175	.322	.023
Value Inv	1	2.096	.149	.008	Media Cat	1	.264	.608	.001
Outcome Inv	1	.977	.324	.004	Party Affiliation	1	3.459	.064	.014
Group Conflict	1	1.905	.169	.007	Group Conflict	1	1.493	.223	.006
Jurisdiction	1	1.331	.250	.005	Jurisdiction	1	< .001	.998	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.989	.160	.008	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.099	.753	< .001

	<u>Position Extremity</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	9	3.592	< .001	.132	Corrected Model	9	1.420	.182	.062
Value Inv*	1	11.800	.001	.053	Value Inv*	1	6.562	.011	.033
Outcome Inv*	1	7.271	.008	.033	Outcome Inv	1	.220	.640	.001
Position	1	2.838	.094	.013	Position	1	.216	.643	.001
Group Conflict	1	2.035	.155	.010	Group Conflict	1	.000	.999	.000
Jurisdiction	1	.004	.949	< .001	Jurisdiction	1	.147	.702	.001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	.876	.350	.004	Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.282	.259	.007
Pos x Juris	1	.493	.483	.002	Pos x Juris	1	.221	.638	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.915	.340	.004	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.024	.156	.010
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.226	.635	.001	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.862	.354	.004

	<u>Perceived Media Position</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	9	2.433	.012	.094	Corrected Model		.903	.524	.041
Value Inv*	1	5.679	.018	.026	Value Inv		.152	.697	.001
Outcome Inv	1	.197	.657	.001	Outcome Inv		.426	.515	.002
Position*	1	6.083	.014	.028	Position		.252	.616	.001
Group Conflict	1	.012	.912	< .001	Group Conflict		1.285	.258	.007
Jurisdiction*	1	5.418	.021	.025	Jurisdiction		.000	.982	< .001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	1.548	.215	.007	Pos x Gp Cn		3.185	.076	.016
Pos x Juris	1	1.421	.235	.007	Pos x Juris		.178	.674	.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.535	.217	.007	Gp Cn x Juris		.885	.348	.005

Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.508	.477	.002	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	2.669	.104	.014
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Perceived Article Credibility									
Same-Sex Marriage					Poverty				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	9	2.894	.003	.110	Corrected Model	9	1.271	.255	.057
Value Inv	1	2.543	.112	.012	Value Inv	1	1.340	.249	.007
Outcome Inv	1	1.304	.255	.006	Outcome Inv	1	.242	.623	.001
Position*	1	22.060	< .001	.095	Position	1	3.391	.067	.018
Group Conflict	1	.009	.924	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.408	.524	.002
Jurisdiction	1	.125	.724	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.265	.607	.001
Pos x Gp Cn	1	.061	.805	< .001	Pos x Gp Cn	1	2.676	.104	.014
Pos x Juris	1	.088	.767	< .001	Pos x Juris	1	.916	.340	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.634	.427	.003	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.203	.653	.001
Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.114	.736	.001	Pos x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.659	.418	.003

Interaction Between Self-Categorization and Involvement

RQ3 asked what the relationship was between the two theoretical concepts guiding this study - self-categorization and involvement types. The number of relevant variables to investigate such a question grew quite large, increasing the probability of type II error and practical interpretation of results difficult. Therefore, a core set of predictors were maintained for self-categorization and involvement, while the more novel measures explored within each concept were removed. More specifically, ANCOVAs were conducted on each of the HMP outcome variables, adding value and outcome involvement scales as covariates to represent the effect of involvement types, and adding group affiliation fixed factors and IDPG scales of group identification for self-categorization. Complete results are presented in Table 22.

In determining one's personal position on an issue, the overall model was not significant for the same-sex marriage ruling, and a significant Levene's test indicated the assumption of equal variances was violated, warranting caution in interpreting results. Within the same-sex topic, a significant effect of political group identification was observed. For the poverty topic,

the model was significant and a main effect of political affiliation was the only significant item within the model. Democrats ($EMM = 5.50, SE = .30$) remained far more likely to support poverty legislation than Republicans ($EMM = 3.82, SE = .17$).

Regarding perceived article position, the overall model for each topic was not significant and violated the assumption of equal variances. Article credibility tests met equal variance assumptions, but each overall model was not significant. Within the poverty topic, a main effect maintained for political party affiliation, indicating that Democrats found the article more credible ($EMM = 4.63, SE = .10$) than did Republicans ($EMM = 4.28, SE = .18$).

To answer RQ3, when considering the impact of both self-categorization and involvement types on outcomes related to HMP, political self-categorization carried the most weight within the poverty topic, while clear results did not emerge from the same-sex marriage topic.

Table 22
Effect of Self-Categorization, Involvement, and Article Factors on Issue and Article Perceptions

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>				<u>Personal Position</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	34	1.434	.083	.303	Corrected Model*	32	2.130	.002	.401				
Political ID*	1	6.799	.010	.057	Political ID	1	.029	.866	< .001				
Religious ID	1	.007	.932	< .001	Religious ID	1	2.066	.154	.020				
Value Inv	1	1.441	.232	.013	Value Inv	1	.398	.530	.004				
Outcome Inv	1	.888	.348	.008	Outcome Inv	1	1.199	.276	.012				
Party Affil	1	1.825	.179	.016	Party Affil*	1	21.637	.000	.175				
Religious Affil	3	2.235	.088	.056	Religious Affil	3	.650	.585	.019				
Group Conflict	1	.096	.757	.001	Group Conflict	1	.131	.718	.001				
Jurisdiction	1	1.195	.277	.011	Jurisdiction	1	.785	.378	.008				
Party x Relig	3	1.229	.303	.032	Party x Relig	3	1.351	.262	.038				
Party x Gp Cn	1	.135	.714	.001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.076	.784	.001				
Party x Juris	1	2.069	.153	.018	Party x Juris	1	.003	.959	< .001				
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.012	.998	.000	Relig x Gp Cn	3	1.533	.210	.043				
Relig x Juris	3	2.640	.053	.066	Relig x Juris	3	1.087	.358	.031				
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.013	.910	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.736	.393	.007				

Prty x Rlg x GpCn	3	.439	.726	.012	Prty x Rlg x GpCn	2	2.594	.080	.048
Prty x Rlg x Juris	3	1.897	.134	.048	Prty x Rlg x Juris	2	.003	.997	< .001
Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	.174	.678	.002	Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	.921	.340	.009
Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	.210	.889	.006	Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	.514	.674	.015
P x R x GpCn x Jur	2	.508	.603	.009	P x R x GpCn x Jur	1	.037	.848	< .001

Perceived Article Position

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	35	.520	.986	.141	Corrected Model	33	.913	.606	.230
Position	1	.054	.817	< .001	Position	1	1.574	.213	.015
Political ID	1	.741	.391	.007	Political ID	1	.075	.785	.001
Religious ID	1	.069	.793	.001	Religious ID	1	.545	.462	.005
Value Inv	1	1.522	.220	.014	Value Inv	1	1.462	.229	.014
Outcome Inv	1	.790	.376	.007	Outcome Inv	1	.008	.931	< .001
Party Affil	1	.766	.383	.007	Party Affil	1	.165	.686	.002
Religious Affil	3	.877	.455	.023	Religious Affil	3	1.270	.289	.036
Group Conflict	1	.533	.467	.005	Group Conflict	1	.075	.785	.001
Jurisdiction	1	.250	.618	.002	Jurisdiction	1	.064	.801	.001
Party x Relig	3	.416	.742	.011	Party x Relig	3	1.391	.250	.040
Party x Gp Cn	1	.072	.789	.001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.367	.546	.004
Party x Juris	1	.296	.588	.003	Party x Juris	1	.001	.981	< .001
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.636	.593	.017	Relig x Gp Cn	3	.219	.883	.006
Relig x Juris	3	.217	.884	.006	Relig x Juris	3	2.166	.097	.060
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.021	.886	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.200	.656	.002
Prty x Rlg x GpCn	3	.329	.804	.009	Prty x Rlg x GpCn	2	.808	.449	.016
Prty x Rlg x Juris	3	.099	.960	.003	Prty x Rlg x Juris	2	.884	.416	.017
Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	.160	.690	.001	Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	.954	.331	.009
Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	.632	.596	.017	Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	.732	.535	.021
P x R x GpCn x Jur	2	.321	.726	.006	P x R x GpCn x Jur	1	.056	.814	.001

Perceived Article Credibility

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	35	.845	.710	.213	Corrected Model	33	1.124	.322	.271
Position	1	1.395	.240	.013	Position	1	3.070	.083	.030
Political ID	1	.010	.921	< .001	Political ID	1	1.920	.169	.019
Religious ID	1	.723	.397	.007	Religious ID	1	.793	.375	.008
Value Inv	1	1.198	.276	.011	Value Inv	1	.486	.488	.005
Outcome Inv	1	.767	.383	.007	Outcome Inv	1	.057	.811	.001
Party Affil	1	2.782	.098	.025	Party Affil*	1	5.183	.025	.049
Religious Affil	3	1.415	.242	.037	Religious Affil	3	.263	.852	.008

Group Conflict	1	.028	.866	< .001	Group Conflict	1	3.006	.086	.029
Jurisdiction	1	.144	.705	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.448	.505	.004
Party x Relig	3	.812	.490	.022	Party x Relig	3	1.244	.298	.036
Party x Gp Cn	1	.054	.817	< .001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.767	.383	.008
Party x Juris	1	.366	.547	.003	Party x Juris	1	1.279	.261	.013
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.287	.835	.008	Relig x Gp Cn	3	1.723	.167	.049
Relig x Juris	3	.366	.777	.010	Relig x Juris	3	.503	.681	.015
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.689	.408	.006	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.195	.277	.012
Prty x Rlg x GpCn	3	.409	.747	.011	Prty x Rlg x GpCn	2	.237	.789	.005
Prty x Rlg x Juris	3	.503	.681	.014	Prty x Rlg x Juris	2	.244	.784	.005
Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	.277	.600	.003	Prty x GpCn x Juris	1	1.243	.268	.012
Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	1.033	.381	.028	Relig x GpCn x Jur	3	1.343	.265	.039
P x R x GpCn x Jur	2	2.927	.058	.051	P x R x GpCn x Jur	1	.397	.530	.004

Hostile Media Effects

The final research question asked whether hostile media perceptions could produce hostile media effects (HME). The rarity of HMP in the present study made options for answering such a question difficult. Nevertheless, using behavioral intentions as the outcome variable within models of issue support and self-categorization provided some insights. HME was measured by a seven-item scale measuring intentions to seek out and share information in response to the article. The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .802$) and met normality requirements.

Mean scores on the behavioral intention scale were 2.91 ($SD = .74$) for same-sex marriage articles and 2.77 ($SD = 2.77$) for poverty articles. Article factors and personal issue position were loaded into an ANOVA as predictors of behavioral intentions. Additionally, linear regressions indicated significant independent effects of both value and outcome involvement, as well as perceptions of article credibility, which were included as covariates.

Regarding same-sex marriage, the model was significant, $F(10, 207) = 3.739, p < .001, \eta^2 = .153$. Both value and outcome involvement significantly predicted increased behavioral intentions. There was also a main effect for jurisdiction, whereby articles regarding government

action in the local jurisdiction ($EMM = 3.08, SE = .07$) were more likely to produce a response than articles in the distant jurisdiction ($EMM = 2.77, SE = .07$). Regarding poverty, the model was also significant, $F(10, 184) = 8.228, p < .001, \eta^2 = .309$. Again, both involvement types were significant positive predictors. A main effect of personal support was present. Those who supported the poverty legislation ($EMM = 2.87, SE = .06$) were more likely to respond to the article than those who opposed it ($EMM = 2.51, SE = .08$).


Within the self-categorization paradigm, the media categorization scale provided a way to see if differences in behavioral intentions coincided with the viewing of media as an in-group or out-group. Linear regressions also indicated significant independent effects of both political and religious group identification. ANCOVAs with article manipulations and group affiliation as fixed factors, and media categorization, involvement types, group identification, and article credibility as covariates were used to test effects on article responses.

For political partisans, models were significant for both same-sex marriage and poverty topics (see Table 23). Regarding same-sex marriage, both value and outcome involvements were significant contributors to increased response (see Figure 13). Main effects were observed for party affiliation and jurisdiction. Democrats were more likely to intend a behavioral response to the article ($EMM = 3.06, SE = .10$) than Republicans ($EMM = 2.76, SE = .06$), while all participants were more likely to act on an article in their local jurisdiction ($EMM = 3.07, SE = .08$) than in the distant jurisdiction ($EMM = 2.75, SE = .09$).

Regarding poverty, both value and outcome involvement, as well as party identification strength and perceptions of article credibility were each predictive of increased response. A main effect was observed for party affiliation, whereby Democrats ($EMM = 2.98, SE = .10$) were more likely to have a behavioral response than Republicans ($EMM = 2.68, SE = .06$).

For religious partisans, models were also significant for both topics (see Table 23). Regarding same-sex marriage, value involvement significantly increased response intentions, while religious identification strength significantly decreased those intentions. Significant main effects were found for religious affiliation and jurisdiction. Mainlines had lower behavioral intention scores than other faiths, while local jurisdiction articles continued to produce greater response ($EMM = 3.16, SE = .071$) than those from the distant jurisdiction ($EMM = 2.76, SE = .073$). A significant interaction between group conflict and jurisdiction indicated that most of the jurisdictional variance was explained by the positive effect of the local, religiously framed article ($EMM = 3.24, SE = .10$) compared to the negative effect of the distant, religiously framed article ($EMM = 2.63, SE = .10$).

Figure 13
Effects of Value and Outcome Involvement on Behavioral Intentions



Regarding poverty, both involvement types were significant positive predictors of behavioral intentions. No other variables in the model were significant.

Overall, the findings suggest that groups supportive of the government action described in the article were more likely to respond in some way to that article than were groups opposing the government action. The findings of response apathy matched well with the observance of HMP in religious groups, though they also extended to Republicans, who did not exhibit HMP as operationalized. Thus, RQ4 may be answered that issue opposition and non-proximate outcomes produce muted behavioral article response from participants, and this may be fueled in part by HMP.

Table 23
Effect of Self-Categorization, Involvement, and Perceived Credibility on Behavioral Intentions

	<u>Personal Position</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	10	3.739	< .001	.153	Corrected Model*	10	8.228	< .001	.309
Value Inv*	1	12.633	.000	.058	Value Inv*	1	36.970	.000	.167
Outcome Inv*	1	4.475	.036	.021	Outcome Inv*	1	18.534	.000	.092
Credibility	1	1.702	.194	.008	Credibility	1	.003	.956	< .001
Position	1	1.220	.271	.006	Position*	1	10.983	.001	.056
Group Conflict	1	.576	.449	.003	Group Conflict	1	.058	.809	< .001
Jurisdiction*	1	9.727	.002	.045	Jurisdiction	1	2.381	.125	.013
Position x Gp Cn	1	.524	.470	.003	Position x Gp Cn	1	.181	.671	.001
Position x Juris	1	.099	.753	< .001	Position x Juris	1	.018	.894	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.444	.231	.007	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.902	.344	.005
Pos x GpCn x Jur	1	.020	.888	< .001	Pos x GpCn x Jur	1	.936	.335	.005

	<u>Political Self-Categorization</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	12	2.870	.001	.184	Corrected Model*	12	7.216	< .001	.380
Value Inv*	1	5.211	.024	.033	Value Inv*	1	14.972	< .001	.096
Outcome Inv*	1	6.701	.011	.042	Outcome Inv*	1	12.665	.001	.082
Credibility	1	.205	.651	.001	Credibility*	1	4.820	.030	.033
Political ID	1	.140	.709	.001	Political ID*	1	11.706	.001	.077
Media Cat	1	1.757	.187	.011	Media Cat	1	.326	.569	.002
Party Affil*	1	5.920	.016	.037	Party Affil*	1	6.354	.013	.043
Group Conflict	1	1.646	.201	.011	Group Conflict	1	.346	.557	.002
Jurisdiction*	1	7.383	.007	.046	Jurisdiction	1	3.678	.057	.025

Party x Gp Cn	1	.494	.483	.003	Party x Gp Cn	1	.300	.585	.002
Party x Juris	1	1.979	.162	.013	Party x Juris	1	< .001	.999	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.016	.901	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.116	.734	.001
Prty x GpCn x Jur	1	2.459	.119	.016	Prty x GpCn x Jur	1	.821	.366	.006

Religious Self-Categorization

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	20	3.187	< .001	.253	Corrected Model*	20	4.858	< .001	.352
Value Inv*	1	13.503	< .001	.067	Value Inv*	1	26.543	< .001	.129
Outcome Inv	1	3.062	.082	.016	Outcome Inv*	1	20.356	< .001	.102
Credibility	1	3.070	.081	.016	Credibility	1	.023	.879	.000
Religious ID	1	.028	.868	< .001	Religious ID	1	.930	.336	.005
Media Cat*	1	3.984	.047	.021	Media Cat	1	2.219	.138	.012
Religious Affil*	3	4.728	.003	.070	Religious Affil	3	.604	.613	.010
Group Conflict	1	.217	.642	.001	Group Conflict	1	.459	.499	.003
Jurisdiction*	1	15.630	.000	.077	Jurisdiction	1	.422	.517	.002
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.997	.395	.016	Relig x Gp Cn	3	2.192	.091	.035
Relig x Juris	3	1.155	.328	.018	Relig x Juris	3	.456	.714	.008
Gp Cn x Juris*	1	3.885	.050	.020	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.340	.128	.013
Rlg x GpCn x Jur	3	1.513	.213	.024	Rlg x GpCn x Jur	3	2.102	.102	.034

Table 24
Summary of Findings

Same-Sex Marriage	Effect	Among	Poverty	Effect	Among
<i>Issue Position</i>			<i>Issue Position</i>		
Personal Position	Distinction	Sup/Opp	Personal Support	Distinction	Sup/Opp
Article Position	Assimilation	Sup, Opp	Article Position	Not Significant (N.S.)	
Article Credibility	Assimilation	Supporters	Article Credibility	N.S.	
<i>Political Self-Categorization</i>			<i>Political Self-Categorization</i>		
Personal Position	Distinction	Dem/Rep	Personal Position	Distinction	Dem/Rep
Article Position	Assimilation	Democrats		Extremity	Republicans
Article Credibility	Assimilation	Democrats	Article Position	N.S.	
Categorization of Media	N.S.		Article Credibility	Contrast	Republicans
				Assimilation	Democrats
			Categorization of Media	Contrast	Dem/Rep
<i>Religious Self-Categorization</i>			<i>Religious Self-Categorization</i>		
Personal Position	Distinction	Evangelicals	Personal Position	N.S.	
	Extremity	Evgl, Main	Article Position	Contrast	Main, Cath
Article Position	Contrast	Evgl, Main, Cath	Article Credibility	Contrast	Mainlines
Article Credibility	N.S.		Categorization of Media	Contrast	Evangelicals
Categorization of Media	N.S.				
<i>Self-Categorization Interaction</i>			<i>Self-Categorization Interaction</i>		
Personal Position	Distinction	Political	Personal Position	Distinction	Political
Article Position	N.S.		Article Position	N.S.	
Article Credibility	Assimilation	Political	Article Credibility	N.S.	

Same-Sex Marriage	Effect	Among	Poverty	Effect	Among
<i>Value Involvement</i>			<i>Value Involvement</i>		
Personal Position	Extremity	Sup/Opp	Personal Position	Extremity	Sup/Opp
Article Position	Assimilation	Sup, Opp	Article Position	N.S.	
Article Credibility	N.S.		Article Credibility	N.S.	
<i>Outcome Involvement</i>			<i>Outcome Involvement</i>		
Personal Position	Extremity	Sup, Opp	Personal Position	Position	Opposition
Article Position	Contrast	Opp. w/ no close ties	Article Position	N.S.	
Article Credibility	N.S.		Article Credibility	N.S.	
<i>Involvement Interaction</i>			<i>Involvement Interaction</i>		
Personal Position	Extremity	Value	Personal Position	Extremity	Value
Article Position	Assimilation	Value - Supporters	Article Position	Moderation	Outcome
Article Credibility	N.S.		Article Credibility	N.S.	
<i>Self-Cat. + Involvement Interaction</i>			<i>Self-Cat. + Involvement Interaction</i>		
Personal Position	Extremity	Political	Personal Position	Distinction	Political
Article Position	N.S.		Article Position	N.S.	
Article Credibility	N.S.		Article Credibility	Assimilation	Political - Dem
<i>Behavioral Response Intention</i>			<i>Behavioral Response Intention</i>		
Jurisdiction (local)	Action	All	Value Involvement	Action	All
Value Involvement	Action	All	Outcome Involvement	Action	All
Outcome Involvement	Action	Sup, Opp, Political	Article Credibility	Action	Political
Party Affiliation	Action	Democrats	Personal Position	Action	Supporters
Religious Affiliation	Inaction	Mainlines	Party Identification	Action	Political
Religious Identification	Inaction	Religious			

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

In this study, the functions of self-categorization and involvement types in partisan interactions with media content were explored, with respect to hostile media perception. Through an experimental design using two topics relevant to political and religious self-categorizations, attitudes regarding personal issue positions, perceived media position, and perceived media credibility were predicted by a variety of psychological constructs. Among the key findings, partisan participants demonstrated two different types of biased information processing, HMP and message assimilation, and partisan extremity was usually necessary for either perceptual effect to emerge. Political and religious self-categorization predicted personal positions on the issues, as well as perceptions of relevant media messages. Value involvement increased position extremity and message assimilation. Political self-categorization emerged as the strongest predictor of personal beliefs and media perceptions in the study. Overall, findings suggest particular usefulness of self-categorization in predicting HMP, while raising further questions about how readily HMP occurs, particularly among weaker partisans, and which audience or message factors predict message assimilation or contrast. The findings have both theoretical and practical implications that are highlighted throughout the discussion, as well as methodological implications that are discussed separately. Finally, limitations are recognized, alongside recommendations that invite continued research in the area.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

Contrast and Assimilation

Generally speaking, while both the same-sex marriage ruling and poverty legislation evoked support and opposition, partisans often had similar perceptions of the valence of the stimulus articles, and the credibility therein. The HMP prediction was that extremity in one's personal position would trigger the perception of a disproportionately oppositional media message. The conditions for that to occur, however, were rare in this study.

When HMP did occur, it often had to do with self-categorization, particularly religious self-categorization. This was perhaps best illustrated within the same-sex marriage topic. As Protestant social identities became more intense, adherence to the in-group position of opposition to same-sex marriage grew. At the same time, these same audiences saw the media message as becoming more supportive of same-sex marriage – embracing the hostile position. On the other hand, Catholics were consistently supportive of the same-sex marriage ruling, and while their personal in-group position was not heightened by self-categorization extremity, it did lead to a perception of the media message as being adversarial. Increased self-categorization also caused articles to be seen as antithetical to the in-group support of poverty legislation exhibited by Catholics and Mainlines.

HMP typically has not been limited to only extreme partisans, though few studies have examined dimensions of partisan strength as exhaustively as the present project. The extremity findings were reminiscent of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection proffered by social judgement theory (Sherif et al., 1958; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). As self-categorizations hardened, rejection of the media message, conceptualized as HMP, increased in likelihood.

Meanwhile, the presence of assimilation, and not simply the lack of hostility, harkens back to the Stanford researchers who developed HMP, and their earlier theory of biased assimilation (Lord et al., 1979). Finding assimilation, as opposed to contrast, is not unprecedented in HMP research. It was observed simultaneously in a presidential debate setting, in which political partisans viewed their chosen candidate as the victor, while blaming the moderator (a member of the media) of being biased in favor of the opposition (Richardson, Huddy, & Morgan, 2008). Gunther and colleagues (2009) also found assimilation replaced HMP in high-involvement partisans. However, the involvement scale was original to the experiment and does not readily align with either involvement type identified by Johnson and Eagly (1989).

Still, it is enough to raise questions about the role of involvement – value involvement, in particular – which fell clearly on the side of assimilation in this study. Similar to prior studies (Choi et al., 2009, 2011; Hwang et al., 2008), value involvement was a significant component of issue partisanship, predicting the extremity of one’s personal stance for both the same-sex marriage ruling and the poverty legislation. Unlike those same studies, it was not predictive of HMP. Rather, value involvement was a strong predictor of assimilation in the same-sex marriage topic. Those with greater value involvement perceived the article to be more supportive of their position. This effect of value involvement did not extend to article credibility, where assimilation was also observed in the same-sex marriage condition. The specific questions in the article credibility scale likely prompted greater cognitive attention than the individual article support question, potentially diminishing the role of more affective, ego-protecting value involvement. The only remaining link to explaining assimilation in credibility ratings was self-categorization as a Democrat.

HMP was less prevalent among political self-categorizations. A case could be made that lower perceptions of article credibility among Republicans for both topics is an embodiment of HMP. A more compelling argument presented by the findings is that Democrats assimilated the media message into their preexisting beliefs, as exhibited by both perceptions of increasing article support and credibility as self-categorization strengthened.

This explanation is bolstered by the findings regarding political categorization of media. The strongest evidence of media being perceived as an out-group was observed in the poverty topic condition, where seeing media as a contrasting out-group predicted an adversarial view of the poverty article among both Republicans and Democrats. However, this independent effect was stronger among Republicans, and maintained when placed into the factorial model. Mean impressions of media as out-group were also greater for Republicans. A post-hoc correlational test also observed a significant correlation between media categorization and group identification among Republicans ($r = -.194, p < .001$) that was not present for any other partisan group. The more strongly participants self-categorized as a Republican, the more likely they were to consider media an out-group. Therefore, it might be possible that Democrats felt less threatened by media generally, and that affected how they interpreted the experimental article.

Republicans outnumbered Democrats among political partisans in the sample by a 3:1 ratio. Yet, assimilation in perceived article support and credibility were observed across overall issue support. Given the considerable claims of left-wing media bias originating from conservative circles (e.g., Goldberg, 2014; Groseclose, 2011), it might be more accurate to say that the inherent view of media as a hostile out-group is becoming unique to the staunchest of Republicans. This may be good news for the institution of journalism. Though still struggling to earn the trust of an important political faction, the majority of politically invested audiences, if

presented with a media message, seem willing to at least consider the argument contained within it before reaching a judgment as to its merits.

On the whole, journalists needn't fear automatic dismissal of their work, though biased information processing will still exist among their partisan readership. While it may not damage the credibility of the press like HMP, biased assimilation is perhaps even more dangerous for an informed public and the state of discourse. Simply rejecting new information as hostile effectively stagnates the evolution of ideas. Mistakenly perceiving every new piece of information as agreeable to one's existing position also strengthens the pre-existing belief by adding more erroneous evidence to the support column. Regardless of the type of biased information processing, finding ways to overcome such audience perceptions will remain an important task of researchers seeking to make practical contributions to journalism.

Relationship Between Self-Categorization and Involvement

A primary goal of this study was to explore the effect on HMP of competing involvement types, competing self-categorizations, and, ultimately, competing involvement types *and* self-categorizations. Regarding involvement types, the strongest effect on partisan perceptions was through value involvement. However, as previously discussed, as it intensified partisan positions, it also engendered assimilation of the media message into that partisan position. Outcome involvement, meanwhile, played a lesser role. Its most consistent contribution was to the extremity of personal opposition to government action. As people believed the government action would enact real, personal consequences, they became more stringent opponents. This finding is unexpected, as both government actions should induce the most outcome involvement in the people they would help, rather than those who would not participate in either new initiative. In at least one rather specific instance, opponents to same sex marriage with no close

social ties to homosexuals not only had higher outcome involvement, but that same involvement predicted HMP. However, this contrasting effect of outcome involvement was overpowered by the assimilating effect of value involvement in the interaction test. Though it did not play its hypothesized role in HMP, value involvement validated its position as the greater motivator of both partisan entrenchment and biased information processing.

Political self-categorization was more influential than religious self-categorization. It remained significant in the interaction analysis for reaching personal positions and in determining article credibility. Additionally, political affiliation and identification strength were the only factors to remain significant in the self-categorization and involvement interaction. This finding has significant ramifications for both the findings in the present study, and for theoretical development.

From a practical perspective, it is not surprising that political identity took precedence in this experimental design. According to self-categorization theory, identities become salient by best fitting a situation to facilitate meta-contrast from a salient out-group (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Although stimulus manipulations were present for the purpose of priming religious considerations, news about government actions is inherently political. Therefore, political identity precedence here should be considered contextually and not taken as a general hierarchical order.

The importance of political self-categorization might also explain the lack of HMP findings. Between the two social identities, participants had greater in-group attachment to their religion. It was also in religious self-categorization tests where the majority of positive HMP findings were found. Therefore, while religion was a strongly held self-categorization that led to the rejection of media messages perceived to be hostile, political self-categorization, which was

less strongly held, was made more salient by the context and produced a more prevalent objectivity or assimilation effect.

Political self-categorization findings regarding HMP, then, were quite compatible with value involvement, as each led to biased assimilation of the media message, particularly in the case of same-sex marriage. The starting assumption of self-categorization theory that all identities are social (McDougall, 1920; Rogers, 1959; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) anticipates this relationship. Depersonalization in the self-categorization process lends itself to an adoption of core values consistent with the group (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, one's deeply held beliefs and an in-group's guiding principles are often one and the same. Consistency in the direction of biased information processing between individual value involvement and political self-categorization may similarly indicate an effect of depersonalization on subsequent judgments. However, the same pairing was not observed within religious self-categorizations, in which the self-categorization predicted HMP. Further, value involvement did not significantly affect article perceptions for the poverty topic, which produced HMP among religious partisans. This disconnect is easier to understand, as political guidance regarding poverty has not been made salient by religious opinion leaders (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Addressed in terms of self-categorization theory, the variability of individual value involvement – even individual agency – increased as the specific issue under consideration became a weaker aspect of a self-categorization prototype. This suggests a group-level power structure inherent not only in one's issue positions, but also in one's interaction with new information. Together, the findings both lend credence to a self-categorization explanation for value involvement, as well as the need to keep the two constructs separate in order to measure individual-level deviations from group values, and consider relationships between agency, control and HMP.

The precedence of self-categorization over involvement types in the number of effects observed and the predictive superiority within an interaction model suggests its particular usefulness in predicting partisan information processing broadly, and in HMP specifically. It also situates such research in a distinctly social arena which places a greater emphasis on cues and affect than careful cognition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This has long been suspected of HMP, and has been the general trajectory of inquiry since its more cognitive origins. However, just as Reid (2012) found a limit to consonance motivations in his self-categorization study of HMP, this study also found evidence that participants were doing more than gathering heuristic cues and quickly arriving at an in-group position.

Specifically, group conflict manipulations, while generally unsuccessful at priming specific self-categorizations, did produce instances of heightened rejection. Religious partisans did not follow the in-group position oppositional to same-sex marriage when it was presented in-text. This even applied to Evangelicals, who were easily the group most oppositional to same-sex marriage. Motivations behind this in-group rejection are unclear, and could be a fault of how the argument was presented. What is observable, however, is that religious partisans attended to the arguments made in the story, not just the sources making them.

Further, other variables continued to play an important role in other relationships. A large collection of predictors were significant regarding intended behavioral responses to the article. Value and outcome involvement were each significant motivators of action. Though jurisdiction failed to have its intended effect on outcome involvement, locality did predict action. Self-categorization was once again most important to the theoretical discussion. The most conclusive finding regarding a hostile media effect was that HMP seemed to deter article response, as evidenced by religious partisans in the same-sex marriage topic shying away from behavioral

outcomes. Additionally, Republicans, who rarely exhibited HMP, but also did not exhibit the assimilation patterns of Democrats, were consistently less inclined to engage in activity after reading the article. These findings should be approached with some caution, as measurements have yet to be standardized and validated. It is for the same reason that they are an important contribution to HMP literature, as very few studies extend into behavioral effects. Future studies should extend these efforts.

Fused Identities and Spirals of Silence

The jurisdiction manipulation did not affect HMP, but offers findings that may offer theoretical implications for self-categorization. An unusual interaction was observed whereby Democrats rejected a religiously framed article about poverty when it was in the distant jurisdiction. One interpretation that fits well into the self-categorization framework is that Democrats were also representative of a less religious minority that was dropped from religious self-categorization tests due to low numbers. Those who were religiously unaffiliated were almost twice as likely to align with the Democrats than Christians who made up the testable religious groups. As confessed in the methodology, in anticipation of a larger number of religious participants, the secular source standing against poverty legislation was a straw man position made out of necessity to maintain the true religious position. Thus, in this instance, political Democrats acted as the secular group, rejecting the mischaracterization of the in-group source. Another interpretation follows the finding that the conjunction of religiosity and conservatism has created an opposing identity of secular liberalism (Adkins et al., 2013; Patrikios, 2013). In this case, Democrats could still be reacting within a political self-categorization to an in-group source proclaiming a misaligned position. While self-categorization theory recognizes that people have many different social identities that may be employed in a

particular situation, this notion of combining social identities is not as well developed. Yet, it is worthy of exploration, as fused identities may offer unique contributions to contexts in which multiple self-categorizations are salient.

As to why Democrats did not echo the same sentiment regarding same-sex marriage when the same article appeared in the local jurisdiction, there is room to consider a spiral-of-silence explanation (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). Perhaps there was apprehension about the appearance of speaking against the religious majority in the local jurisdiction that was not salient when considering the distant jurisdiction. A better example of spiral-of-silence might have been in Democrats and Christian groups showing moderate-to-strong support for same-sex marriage in the distant jurisdiction, while nearing neutrality-to-opposition on the issue in their local jurisdiction, where they had greater knowledge of the contentiousness of the debate. Whatever the reason, it is one of many findings that invite future research. Spiral-of-silence has been included in the IPMI paradigm (Gunther & Storey, 2003), and self-categorization has offered robust theoretical explanation to other IPMI phenomena (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Reid & Hogg, 2005; Reid, 2012).

Methodological Contributions

The present study makes numerous methodological contributions to the study of HMP, and of understanding partisanship more broadly. First, regarding HMP, the findings underscore the importance of having partisans from multiple sides of an issue in the sample. The idea that opposing partisans interact with media in equal but opposite ways is a false narrative. Dichotomies were rare between partisan groups, and effects were regularly observed among one political party or religious group but not another. While polarity makes for a parsimonious interpretation, it is not something that should be assumed.

Most importantly, the ability to compare one partisan group's impression of media issue position to another's, or to that of neutral observers, is necessary to determine whether perceptions of media bias are unique to the partisan group, or shared by all observers. The poverty condition in the present study is an excellent example. That Republicans perceived the articles about poverty to be favorable toward the legislation could be an indication of HMP – a media position that was adversarial to their own stance. However, by comparing partisan groups, it became apparent that most of the participants who read an article about poverty legislation felt it to be slightly biased in favor of the government action. Instead of simply requiring media support to be perceived as less than personal support, an accurate test of HMP would mandate the perceived media position to be even more contrasting of one's personal position than what is perceived by other audiences.

This study also highlighted the endogeneity problem with distancing measures of HMP, such as HMP Score. If HMP is operationalized as perceiving media coverage as being less supportive in comparison to one's personal position on an issue, then the strength of one's personal position can independently affect the extremity of HMP. If two partisan groups perceive a media message similarly, or a single group perceives a message as intended by the creator (e.g., perceives an article designed to be unbiased, as unbiased), then a distancing measure that is supposed to measure HMP is actually a result of personal position extremity. Results of studies that have used such measures may warrant scrutiny (e.g., Arpan & Raney, 2003; Choi et al., 2009, 2011).

Multiple measurement techniques allowed for a deeper understanding of self-categorization and involvement types than what is typically found in the HMP literature. Group identification strength, participation, socialization, and adherence to orthodox beliefs of the in-

group each made significant contributions to understanding partisan issue support and interaction with media messages. Psychological group identification and actual participation in behaviors associated with that group were the most common predictors of changes in outcome variables. This suggests that while self-categorization can take place in one's mind regardless of actual group affiliation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and affect behavior (Turner et al., 1987), the resulting tangible engagement may serve to reinforce the original social identity.

Value involvement, as measured by the generic Cho and Boster (2005) scale, was highly correlated with pre-existing attitudes and beliefs about the issues in the articles. Johnson and Eagly's (1989) conceptualization of value involvement places its foundation in core, oftentimes abstract, personal beliefs. While results indicated that abstraction was appropriate for the lofty topics used for this experiment, particularly same-sex marriage, the findings suggest that issue-level beliefs can result in similar involvement, and may serve as an appropriate alternative when an issue does not strongly elicit moral foundations.

The exact cause of outcome involvement was more difficult to identify. It was not associated with elaborated processing of the article, as measured by time spent reading. As predicted, it did increase among those with personal or close social ties to an issue. However, the resulting effect of outcome involvement on issue position was to increase opposition. Further, jurisdiction did not predict outcome involvement, suggesting that participants felt similarly affected by the government action even if it was occurring on the other side of the country. It may be that partisans believe any action, whether proximate or distant, that advances a cause they care about (positively or negatively), creates the perception of personal consequence. The positive relationship between outcome involvement and personal, local, and nationwide perceived effects of government action lends support to this interpretation. Voters can – and

often do – simplify local ballot decisions by looking to national political cues (Elmendorf & Schleicher, 2013). Those cues have become more accessible as political media and party leaders frame local legislation and elections as national indicators (Higgerson, 2013). Add the shrinking of the world through increased mediatization of information and culture (Hepp & Krotz, 2014; Stromback, 2008), and a compelling case can be made for explaining these outcome-related sentiments. Given its history of mixed findings regarding HMP, more investigation is necessary to determine exactly what outcome involvement predicts, as well as exactly what predicts outcome involvement.

The trend toward a more national political perspective may also bear relevance to topic selection. As previously discussed, beyond the basic requirements of a topic to engender issue positions and involvement instead of neutrality and apathy, topics can influence saliency of different social identities, as well as the depersonalizing influence of self-categorizations. One concern might be that the issues, though presented in a statewide context, were part of larger national dialogues, which might lead to perceptions of a lack of personal efficacy in addressing such issues. In other words, debates over same-sex marriage and poverty were each too large for one voice to matter. However, HMP has been observed when dealing with widely discussed, large-scale issues before, including abortion (Matthes, 2013), climate change (Kim, 2011), and war (Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Vallone et al., 1985). Further, partisans in the present study indicated intentions to engage in behavioral responses to the media message, including communicating with other people. The belief that government action had ramifications for the nation as a whole was enough to engage outcome involvement, even when individual- or community-level impacts were not apparent.

Limitations and Directives for Future Research

The present study took place during unique circumstances. The two topics provided different contexts for considering the interplay between politics and religion. At the time of the study's development, both topics were to rely on fictional legislation. However, just as the experiment was to be opened to participants, a judge overturned a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in the state in which the university was located. Data collection was delayed as government officials interpreted the ruling and how to recognize marriage in the state. After the ruling, the fictionalized article prepared for the study was no longer believable. The fictional legislation was replaced with the real judge's ruling, though the remainder of the article was unchanged. Nevertheless, the changes presented some imbalance in the conditions. Most obviously, the premise of the same-sex marriage was real, while the premise of the poverty article was fictional. As such, participants could – and likely did – know additional information about the same-sex marriage ruling that might have colored their perceptions. Additionally, the government actions were no longer equal – one being judicial and the other being legislative.

However, these changes were necessary to maintain the validity of the same-sex marriage condition. Moreover, given the saliency of same-sex marriage at the time of data collection – mere months before the Supreme Court was to rule on its constitutionality – participants were already more likely to carry more retrievable knowledge and attitudes than in the case of poverty, a topic of less public attention at the time. It is also unlikely that participants would perceive much difference in a local judicial action and a local legislative action.

The religious group conflict manipulation was not well recognized, according to the manipulation check. To some extent, this was to be expected, as the stories, regardless of group conflict, each had an inherent political angle. However, the large number of participants

reporting that the sources in the religiously framed story were “everyday people” instead of either religious or political figures was curious, and perhaps calls for more prominent titling of sources. There were other elements, including the headline and lead paragraph, which set the group conflict that were not explicitly measured by the manipulation check, and some circumstances in which expected differences were observed among group conflict conditions.

The stimulus material in this study mimicked the presentation of a mobile newspaper article. The use of multimedia might have drawn greater attention to the stimulus. This comes at the risk of believability. When Turner (2007) attempted to create a televised HMP stimulus, it required building two newsroom graphics packages to mimic those of Fox News and CNN and then having an anchor pretend to be affiliated with each network. Each new production aspect brings the possibility of the manipulated nature of the stimulus becoming apparent to the participant. The overall credibility ratings of the stimuli in this study suggest that they were seen as legitimate news items by the participants, and embedded timing provided at least some safeguard against those who did not bother to read the stimulus.

The present study utilized a convenience sample of college students. Certainly, the sample suffered from generalizability issues beyond non-randomization. It was disproportionately young, female, and White. However, it did offer a fair amount of geographic diversity. Only one-third of the sample resided in the state in which the university was located. In all, participants hailed from 42 states and the District of Columbia. It also provided fairly even partisan distributions on both issues, which provided adequate subsamples for hypothesis testing. The sample did not, however, produce much in the way of religious diversity. While distributions within the three major Christian traditions were sizable, and fairly representative of national distributions (Pew Religion, 2015), no other faith was well represented. Of particular

detriment to the study was the lack of opposition to religion, leading to the necessity of including the non-religious as an out-group to Christians in some tests, a tenuous assumption that lacks many of the characteristics of partisanship. Finally, students studying mass communication accounted for a sizable portion of the sample. While an exact figure cannot be provided because the questionnaire did not ask for a student's major, the majority of recruitment took place in communication courses. These students may have possessed greater media literacy, and/or lesser media criticism than other populations. Future studies should utilize more representative samples to avoid these limitations.

Relationships between the topics and sample are also relevant to interpretation of the results. The state in which the sample attended college was one of the poorest states in the U.S., within the poorest region of the country, as measured by percentage of the population living under the federal government-defined poverty line (Bishaw & Fontenot, 2014), potentially increasing salience of the issue despite participants generally seeing themselves as upper-middle class in terms of socioeconomic status. Meanwhile, the age of the student sample likely contributed to positions on same-sex marriage. While anticipated differences did emerge between political and religious groups, overall sentiment was supportive of same-sex marriage. This finding corresponds with national survey data, which indicates that while the general population is roughly split on the topic, over two-thirds of Millennials (those born in 1981 or later) support same-sex marriage rights (Pew Religion, 2014a). In accordance with the spectrum of biased perception discussed previously and depicted in Figure 1, a dichotomous categorization of a group's position is not as important as the gap between two different groups. Therefore, though strong opposition to same-sex marriage was rare, even slight opposition was a significant deviation from supportive groups, as well as the overall sample.

Future studies involving sexual orientation may also seek different ways of measuring the sensitive personal information. While a majority of participants reported having close social ties to someone who is homosexual, only three participants disclosed a personal homosexual orientation. Despite following established standards for asking about sexual orientation (Williams Institute, 2009), it seems likely that some participants may have still elected not to disclose.

Researchers should continue to investigate the facets of partisan identity. While many of the concepts measured demonstrate a greater in-group adherence, they do not perform as well at capturing perceived out-group contrast (Greene, 2004). More explicit measurement of meta-contrast would be helpful in interpreting self-categorization findings. Among the identity dimensions, socialization was by far the least detailed in terms of measurement, relying on a single item, the wording of which appears to have produced slightly different meanings across self-categorizations. It was surprising to find that political party members reported having a greater number of in-group friends than those in Christian groups. The item asked participants to think about their friends in the same political or religious “group,” which appeared to be interpreted within a political identity as a more abstract party or ideological construct. Meanwhile, within a religious identity, the item might have brought a more specific in-group – fellow members of their congregation. In fact, that is often the wording of such an item in religious scholarship (Gilbert, 1993; Olson et al., 2006). Since there was not a local political parallel of which numerous participants would be members, more generic terminology was adopted for both items. Regardless of the level of abstraction, the socialization dimension still produced significant effects within both identities.

Political party affiliation focused only on the two major parties, while religion included many affiliation options. One might question the exclusion of third-party political groups. However, as the multitude of religious options indicated, participant membership in the minority groups is so low it often necessitates their removal for statistical analyses. In politics, third-party or independent voters often have views that still align more closely with either Republicans or Democrats. In fact, major political surveys often use follow-up questions to force those unaffiliated with one of the two major parties to report which one they lean toward (Robinson et al., 1999).

Along similar lines, this study did not utilize every religious denomination in the RELTRAD classification system. RELTRAD includes almost 150 denominations; this study utilized 35. Even then, 13 had no members and 10 more each accounted for less than 1% of the sample, suggesting that more denominations might have been expendable for the sake of improving the ease of answering the questionnaire item.

Conclusion

This study provided insight as to the social psychological factors that form personal positions on controversial issues and perceptions of media messages related to those issues. It offers theoretical and methodological paths to better understanding biased information processing. The ultimate practical goal of this study was to find ways to overcome HMP, because of the practical harms an immediate rejection of the press afflicts on the state of discourse and the institution of journalism. Article manipulations were not successful in changing perceptions of the message. However, those manipulations never addressed styles of presenting arguments, only sources. Equipped with the social psychological contributions of this study to better understand how partisans arrive at issue support or opposition and interact with

media messages, perhaps those adjustments will become tangible. This study exhibited that dismissal of media as an out-group is not to be assumed. While not thought of as a friend, media was rarely categorized as an enemy. Moreover, the lack of contrast or assimilation in many different tests suggest that a sizeable number of readers who knew which side of an issue they supported were still able to put aside allegiances and perceive an article's content similarly to the rest of the audience. After decades of scholarly inquiry, understanding partisan audiences continues to be a tricky proposition, but a worthy pursuit. The evidence here suggests that HMP is not a foregone conclusion, but is one of many possible outcomes of partisan issue support, self-categorization, and interaction with a relevant media message.

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APPENDIX A
STIMULUS MATERIALS

Prime - Alabama

You are about to read an article from *The Birmingham News*, the largest newspaper in the State of Alabama. Please take a moment to read the article before advancing to the rest of the survey. You will not be able to go back.

Prime - North Dakota

You are about to read an article from *The Bismarck Tribune*, the largest newspaper in the State of North Dakota. Please take a moment to read the article before advancing to the rest of the survey. You will not be able to go back.

The Birmingham News



Political leaders weigh-in on judge's ruling to legalize same-sex marriage in Alabama

By [Mike Cason](#)
State Government Reporter

A federal district court judge has ruled against Alabama's constitutional ban on gay marriage, prompting a political debate between liberals and conservatives.

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The Birmingham News



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By [Kay Campbell](#)
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Political leaders weigh-in on legislation to reduce poverty in Alabama

By **Mike Cason**
State Government Reporter

The Alabama legislature has passed a bill to dramatically increase spending on programs that aid low-income residents, prompting a political debate between liberals and conservatives.

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Supporters of the legislation believe these programs need to grow in Alabama, so that more people struggling with poverty can get the assistance they need.

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The Bismarck Tribune

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APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE

Article Perceptions

Do you support or oppose the legislation described in the article to expand welfare programs for the impoverished?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Neither Support nor Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Do you believe this article is favorable or unfavorable toward the legislation?

Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Somewhat Unfavorable	Neither Favorable nor Unfavorable	Somewhat Favorable	Favorable	Very Favorable
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Are you more likely or less likely to agree with the legislation after reading this article?

Much Less Likely to Agree with Legislation	Less Likely to Agree with Legislation	Somewhat Less Likely to Agree with Legislation	Neither More nor Less Likely to Agree with Legislation	Somewhat More Likely to Agree with Legislation	More Likely to Agree with Legislation	Much More Likely to Agree with Legislation
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Rate the extent to which you believe the article you just read...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Is Fair	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Tells the Whole Story	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Accurate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Understandable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Trustworthy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Biased	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Beneficial to the Community	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Easy to Read	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is Entertaining	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Behavioral Effects

Based upon reading the article, how likely would you be to engage in the following activities regarding the legislation?

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Undecided	Likely	Very Likely
Seek out more information about the legislation	<input type="radio"/>				
Express your opinion with friends	<input type="radio"/>				
Express your opinion on social media	<input type="radio"/>				
Encourage others to seek out more information about the legislation	<input type="radio"/>				
Express your opinion to a journalist for a news story	<input type="radio"/>				
Attempt to rally support for your side	<input type="radio"/>				
Warn others against media bias in reporting on the legislation	<input type="radio"/>				

Outcome Involvement

Note: Though measured and presented here as a two distinct scales, outcome and value involvement questions were presented to participants together in a random order.

Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
The legislation has little impact on my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
All in all, my life will not be affected by the legislation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My life will be changed by the legislation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The legislation has little effect on me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My life will not change much as a result of the legislation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is easy for me to think of ways the legislation will affect my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is difficult for me to think of ways the legislation will impact my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Value Involvement

Note: Though measured and presented here as a two distinct scales, outcome and value involvement questions were presented to participants together in a random order.

Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
The values that are the most important to me are what determine my stand on the legislation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Knowing my position on the legislation is central to understanding the type of person I am.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My position on the legislation has little to do with my beliefs about how life should be lived.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My position on the legislation is based on the values with which I try to conduct my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The arguments for or against the legislation are relevant to the core principles that guide my life.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My beliefs about how I should live my life determine my position on the legislation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My position on the legislation reflects who I am.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Manipulation Check

Where is the government action in the story taking place?

- Alabama
- Mississippi
- North Dakota
- Texas

The people interviewed for the story were...

- Everyday People
- Political Leaders
- Religious Leaders

How important were each of the following in determining your position on the issue in the article?

	Not at all Important	Very Unimportant	Neither Important nor Unimportant	Very Important	Extremely Important
Political Beliefs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moral/Religious Beliefs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How It Might Affect Me	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How It Might Affect My Family/Friends	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How It Might Affect My Community	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How It Might Affect The Country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Demographics

Please provide your gender.

- Male
- Female

How would you describe your ethnicity?

- Hispanic/Latino
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- White
- I prefer not to respond

Thinking about your circumstances locally, and at home (if you still regularly stay with your parents/guardians), which most accurately reflects your state of living?

- Lower Class
- Lower-Middle Class
- Middle Class
- Upper-Middle Class
- Upper Class

What is your academic classification?

- Freshman
- Sophomore
- Junior
- Senior
- Graduate Student

How old are you? Please answer with a numeric value (e.g., "18")

When not at school, what is your home state?

Marriage

Only displayed to participants in the Marriage Topic condition.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Society is better off if people make marriage a priority.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When two people decide to spend the rest of their lives together, it is important that they marry.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is okay for romantic partners to live together without being married.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Homosexuality is a choice.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Homosexuality is the result of natural biological causes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gays and lesbians should be able to legally marry.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gays and lesbians should be able to legally form civil unions, giving them some of the rights of married couples.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If you are currently unmarried, how strongly do you desire to get married at some point in the future? If you are currently married, how strongly did you desire to get married when you were single?

- Very Strongly Avoid
- Strongly Avoid
- Indifferent
- Strongly Prefer
- Very Strongly Prefer

Do you consider yourself to be:

- Gay or Lesbian
- Heterosexual or Straight
- Bisexual

Do you have a close friend or family member who is gay or lesbian?

- Yes
- No

Poverty

Only displayed to participants in the Poverty Topic Condition.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Poverty is caused by the inability to save, spend, and manage money wisely among the poor.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by the low wages that are paid by some businesses and industries.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by sickness and handicaps among the poor.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by loose morals, drunkenness, and drug abuse among the poor.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by the failure of our society to provide good schools.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by bad luck.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by prejudice and discrimination against minorities and poor people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by lack of motivation and laziness among the poor.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by being taken advantage of by the rich.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poverty is caused by lack of intelligence among	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

poor people.							
Poverty is caused by the failure of our society to provide enough good jobs.	<input type="radio"/>						
Poverty is caused by high taxes that take money away from the poor.	<input type="radio"/>						
Poverty is caused by the lack of effort among the poor to improve themselves.	<input type="radio"/>						
Poverty is caused by lack of ability and talent among poor people.	<input type="radio"/>						
Poverty is caused by weak trade unions which don't protect poor people.	<input type="radio"/>						

Which most accurately reflects your state of living when you were growing up?

- Lower Class
- Lower-Middle Class
- Middle Class
- Upper-Middle Class
- Upper Class

Do you have a close friend or family member who is low-income/impoverished?

- Yes
- No

Political Ideology

Which of the following best describe your political ideology?

- Very Conservative
- Conservative
- Moderate
- Liberal
- Very Liberal
- I Don't Care About Politics

Considering the two major political parties, which of the following best describe your party affiliation?

- Strongly Republican
- Republican
- Independent/Other
- Democrat
- Strongly Democrat
- I Don't Care About Politics

Political Identification Strength

Think about the political party to which you most closely identify. Then answer the following questions.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
When someone criticizes my party, it feels like a personal insult.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I talk about my party, I usually say "we" rather than "they."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If a story in the media praised my party, I would feel proud.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My party's successes are my successes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If a story in the media criticized my party, I would be upset.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I act like a member of my party to a great extent.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When someone praises my party, it feels like a personal compliment.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Typically, I feel like the media...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Treats my political party fairly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Treats the other party more favorably than my own	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Treats my party more favorably than our opponents	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Understands my party	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Respects my party	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

How many of your friends belong to your political group?

- None
- Few
- Some
- Most
- All

Political Participation

How likely would you be to engage in the following activities?

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Undecided	Likely	Very Likely
Vote in a presidential election?	<input type="radio"/>				
Vote in a local, non-presidential election?	<input type="radio"/>				
Present facts to contest another person's political statement?	<input type="radio"/>				
Display a poster, bumper sticker, t-shirt, profile picture, etc. with a political message?	<input type="radio"/>				
Sign a petition for a political cause?	<input type="radio"/>				
Campaign or do some other type of work to help a political campaign?	<input type="radio"/>				
Attend a political meeting or rally?	<input type="radio"/>				
Donate money to a political campaign or cause?	<input type="radio"/>				
Join a political group, on campus or otherwise?	<input type="radio"/>				
Attempt to contact an elected official about a political or community issue?	<input type="radio"/>				
Become actively involved in a political effort to solve some community problem?	<input type="radio"/>				

Political Orthodoxy

People who are always trying to reform things are usually...

People who really care about other people	2	3	4	Busybodies who wind up doing more harm than good
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Replacing traditional policies with new ones that seem attractive but have not been tested by experience is...

Often necessary for progress	2	3	4	Usually shortsighted and dangerous
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Trying to make sweeping reforms in a society as complicated as ours is usually...

Worth trying, despite the risks	2	3	4	Much too risky
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If you had to choose, whom would you trust to solve the country's problems?

"Practical" people who know how to run things	2	3	4	"Thinking" people who have lots of ideas
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Can you depend on a person more if s/he owns property than if s/he doesn't?

Yes	2	3	4	No
<input type="radio"/>				

Efforts to make everyone as equal as possible should be...

Increased	2	3	4	Decreased
<input type="radio"/>				

All groups can live in harmony in this country...

Only if big changes are made in the system	2	3	4	Without changing the system very much
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Which of these opinions do you think is more correct?

All people would be about the same if they were treated equally	2	3	4	Some classes of people are naturally better than others
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

In making changes in our society or government, it's usually better to be guided by...

A plan that tries out new ideas	2	3	4	The practical experience of the past
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

The best way to improve our society is...

To follow an overall program or theory	2	3	4	To allow changes to develop naturally by themselves
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Most crime is caused by...

Poverty and social injustice	2	3	4	The bad character of criminals
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Laws and institutions which have existed for a long time...

Usually have much wisdom in them	2	3	4	Are too old-fashioned to be useful
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Public (government) ownership of a large industry would be...

A good idea	2	3	4	A bad idea
<input type="radio"/>				

The way property is used should mainly be decided by...

The individuals who own it	2	3	4	The community
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

When it comes to poverty...

We could easily wipe it out if we really tried	2	3	4	Some people will remain poor no matter what we do for them
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

The capitalist profit system...

Brings out the worst in human nature	2	3	4	Teaches people the value of hard work and success
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

A person's wage should depend on...

The importance of the job	2	3	4	How much the person needs to live decently
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Private ownership of property...

Is as important to a good society as freedom	2	3	4	Has often done more harm than good
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Working people in this country...

Do not get a fair share of what they produce	2	3	4	Usually earn about what they deserve
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Providing medical care for everyone at public expense...

Greatly improves the health of the nation	2	3	4	Reduces the general quality of medical care
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If some people can't afford good housing...

The government should provide it	2	3	4	They should work hard and save until they can afford it
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Money spent by the government to relieve poverty is...

Mostly a waste	2	3	4	A worthwhile investment
<input type="radio"/>				

Spending tax money to provide a college education for those who can't afford it is...

A bad idea	2	3	4	A good idea
<input type="radio"/>				

In the matter of jobs and standards of living, the government should...

See to it that everyone has a job and a decent standard of living	2	3	4	Let each person get ahead on his own
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Who should bear the main responsibility for taking care of our senior citizens?

The elderly themselves and their families	2	3	4	The community
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Which of these comes closer to your own opinion?

No American family should be allowed to live in poverty, even if they don't work	2	3	4	Any person who is able to work should not be allowed to receive welfare
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Religious Affiliation

Which of the following best describes your feelings about religion?

- Strongly Oppose Religion
- Oppose Religion
- Indifferent Toward Religion
- Value Religion
- Strongly Value Religion

Which of the following best describes your religious affiliation?

- Buddhist
- Christian
- Hindu
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Sikh
- Unitarian Universalist
- Other
- Atheist
- Not Religious/Indifferent

Which of the following best describes your religious denomination? (Please read all choices carefully before making a selection)

- Select One
- African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.)
- Assembly of God
- Baptist
- Catholic
- Charismatic
- Christian Scientist
- Church of Christ
- Church of God
- Eastern Orthodox
- Episcopal
- Evangelical
- Fundamentalist
- Greek Orthodox
- Holiness Church
- Independent
- Jehovah's Witnesses
- Latter Day Saints / Mormon
- Lutheran
- Methodist
- Missionary Baptist
- Nazarene
- Non-Denominational
- Pentecostal
- Presbyterian
- Presbyterian USA

- Primitive Baptist
- Reformed
- Sanctification Church
- Seventh Day Adventist
- Southern Baptist
- Tabernacle
- Unitarian
- United Methodist
- Wesleyan
- Zion Union

Religious Identification Strength

Think about the religious group to which you belong. Then answer the following questions.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
When someone criticizes my religion, it feels like a personal insult.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I talk about my religious group, I usually say "we" rather than "they."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If a story in the media praised my religion, I would feel proud.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My religion's successes are my successes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If a story in the media criticized my religion, I would be upset.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I act like a member of my religious group to a great extent.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When someone praises my religion, it feels like a personal compliment.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Typically, I feel like the media...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Treats my religion fairly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Treats other religions more favorably than my own	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Treats my religion more favorably than others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Understands my religion	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Respects my religion	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

How many of your closest friends belong to your religious group?

- None
- Few
- Some
- Most
- All

Religious Participation

How often do you participate in each of the following activities?

	Never	Once or Twice a Year	Once or Twice a Month	Once or Twice a Week	Every Day
Attend informal religious or prayer groups	<input type="radio"/>				
Talk about religion informally with friends	<input type="radio"/>				
Pray before meals	<input type="radio"/>				
Read holy scriptures	<input type="radio"/>				
Read religious literature (non-scripture)	<input type="radio"/>				
Spend time in prayer or meditation	<input type="radio"/>				
Watch or listen to religious media (music, films, podcasts, TV/radio/online sermons)	<input type="radio"/>				

How often do you attend formal worship services?

- Never
- A Few Times a Year
- Once a Month
- Once a Week
- More Than Once a Week

Religious Orthodoxy

Select the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I believe there is a heaven.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe there is a hell.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that there are clear guidelines about good and evil that apply to everyone regardless of their situation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that miracles still occur today as in ancient times.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that angels and demons are active in the world.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that my religion has a duty to convert people of other religious faiths.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that my religion is the only way to be saved from eternal damnation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe that my religion's holy scripture is divinely inspired, and to be taken literally, word-for-word.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

APPENDIX C

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND RELTRAD CLASSIFICATIONS

Table C1
Religious Affiliation

Religion	<i>n</i>	<i>%N</i>
Buddhist	3	0.6%
Christian*	<u>410</u>	<u>79.9%</u>
Black Protestant	13	2.5%
Evangelical Protestant	177	34.5%
Mainline Protestant	101	19.7%
Catholic	111	21.6%
Other Christian	2	0.4%
Hindu	1	0.2%
Jewish	17	3.3%
Muslim	2	0.4%
Unitarian Universalist	4	0.8%
Other	13	2.5%
Atheist	10	1.9%
Not Religious	53	10.0%

* 6 Christians did not provide a denomination for RELTRAD classification.

Table C2
RELTRAD Classifications

	<i>n</i>	%Christians		<i>n</i>	%Christians
Black Protestant	13	2.7%	Mainline Protestant	101	20.9%
African Meth. Episc. (AME)	0		Episcopal	18	
Church of God	7		Lutheran	15	
Holiness Church	2		Methodist	38	
Missionary Baptist	2		Presbyterian	18	
Nazarene	1		Presbyterian-USA	4	
Primitive Baptist	1		Reformed	0	
Sanctification Church	0		United Methodist	8	
Tabernacle	0				
Zion Union	0		Catholic	111	20.9%
			Catholic	110	
Evangelical Protestant	177	36.6%	Eastern Orthodox	0	
Assemblies of God	2		Greek Orthodox	1	
Baptist	60				
Charismatic	0		Other	2	0.4%
Church of Christ	13		Christian Scientist	2	
Evangelical	3		Jehovah's Witnesses	0	
Fundamentalist	0		Latter Day Saints/Mormon	0	
Independent	2		Unitarian	0	
Non-Denominational	75				
Pentecostal	2				
Seventh Day Adventist	0				
Southern Baptist	20				
Wesleyan	0				

APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Table D1
Effect of Political Affiliation and Article Factors on Personal Issue Position

	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	7	1.895	0.73	.074	Corrected Model*	7	8.405	< .001	.270
Party Affiliation*	1	8.768	.004	.050	Party Affiliation*	1	53.488	< .001	.252
Group Conflict	1	.065	.798	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.099	.753	.001
Jurisdiction	1	3.697	.056	.022	Jurisdiction	1	.001	.973	< .001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.031	.860	< .001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.103	.748	.001
Party x Juris	1	3.475	.064	.020	Party x Juris	1	.005	.942	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.049	.824	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.006	.940	< .001
Party x GpCn x Jur	1	1.141	.287	.007	Party x GpCn x Jur	1	3.099	.080	.019

Table D2
Independent Effects of Political Identity Dimensions on Personal Issue Support

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	r^2
<u>Republicans</u>						
Party Identification	-.491	.254	-.172	-1.931	.056	.029
Participation	-.175	.232	-.069	-.757	.451	.005
Socialization	-.214	.216	-.089	-.990	.324	.008
Orthodoxy	-.868	.526	-.151	-1.650	.102	.023
<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification	.402	.421	.137	.955	.344	.019
Participation	.718	.411	.247	1.746	0.87	.061
Socialization	-.270	.385	-.102	-.700	.487	.010
Orthodoxy	-.005	.885	-.001	-.006	.995	< .001
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy	-.410	.651	-.085	-.630	.531	.007

	<u>Poverty</u>					
Republicans	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Party Identification	-.308	.176	-.163	-1.750	.083	.027
Participation	-.222	.167	-.125	-1.330	.186	.016
Socialization*	-.391	.171	-.209	-2.285	.024	.044
Orthodoxy*	-1.417	.287	-.429	-4.929	< .001	.184
<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification	.216	.179	.171	1.206	.234	.029
Participation	.022	.188	.017	.118	.906	< .001
Socialization	-.047	.168	-.040	-.280	.781	.002
Orthodoxy	-.321	.413	-.118	-.776	.442	.014
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy*	-1.307	0.42	-0.351	-3.11	0.003	0.123

Table D3
Effect of Political Affiliation and Article Factors on Perceived Article Position

	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	7	.577	.774	.024	Corrected Model	7	.858	.542	.036
Party Affiliation	1	.146	.703	.001	Party Affiliation	1	.593	.442	.004
Group Conflict	1	.240	.625	.001	Group Conflict	1	.028	.868	< .001
Jurisdiction	1	3.020	.084	.018	Jurisdiction	1	.001	.982	< .001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.172	.679	.001	Party x Gp Cn	1	.695	.406	.004
Party x Juris	1	.980	.324	.006	Party x Juris	1	.023	.881	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.136	.713	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.296	.257	.008
Party x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.001	.979	< .001	Party x Gp Cn x Juris*	1	4.678	.032	.029

Table D4
Independent Effects of Political Identity Dimensions on Perceived Article Position

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
Republicans	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Party Identification	-.142	.135	-.094	-1.051	.295	.009
Participation	-.077	.118	-.059	-.648	.518	.003
Socialization	-.048	.114	-.038	-.422	.674	.001
Orthodoxy	.213	.276	.072	.773	.441	.005

<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification*	.842	.157	.612	5.361	< .001	.374
Participation*	.597	.178	.438	3.344	.002	.192
Socialization	.090	.181	.073	.499	.620	.005
Orthodoxy	.243	.408	.091	.595	.555	.008
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy	.066	.289	.031	.227	.821	.001

	<u>Poverty</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Republicans</u>						
Party Identification	-.026	.109	-.022	-.236	.814	< .001
Participation	-.106	.102	-.097	-1.035	.303	.009
Socialization	.119	.106	.105	1.128	.262	.011
Orthodoxy	.100	.197	.049	.509	.612	.002
<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification	.005	.174	.004	.029	.977	< .001
Participation	-.024	.180	-.019	-.135	.893	< .001
Socialization	.197	.156	.178	1.265	.212	.032
Orthodoxy	-.206	.400	-.078	-.516	.608	.006
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy*	.702	.319	.256	2.201	.031	.066

Table D5
Effect of Political Affiliation and Article Factors on Perceived Article Credibility

	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model*	7	2.127	.043	.083	Corrected Model	7	1.916	.070	.078
Party Affiliation*	1	11.461	.001	.065	Party Affiliation	1	1.396	.239	.009
Group Conflict	1	.091	.763	.001	Group Conflict*	1	4.254	.041	.026
Jurisdiction	1	2.204	.140	.013	Jurisdiction	1	.180	.672	.001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.144	.705	.001	Party x Gp Cn*	1	6.763	.010	.041
Party x Juris	1	.912	.341	.006	Party x Juris	1	.753	.387	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.428	.234	.009	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.254	.264	.008
Party x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.167	.683	.001	Party x Gp Cn x Juris	1	.760	.385	.005

Table D6
Independent Effects of Political Identity Dimensions on Perceived Article Credibility

<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>						
Republicans	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Party Identification	.093	.129	.065	.721	.472	.004
Participation	.173	.115	.137	1.510	.134	.019
Socialization	-.119	.109	-.099	-1.092	.277	.010
Orthodoxy	-.153	.266	-.054	-.575	.566	.003
<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification	-.249	.192	-.186	-1.297	.201	.035
Participation	.026	.195	.020	.133	.895	< .001
Socialization	-.060	.180	-.049	-.333	.740	.002
Orthodoxy	.273	.405	.105	.673	.505	.011
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy*	-.627	.268	-.301	-2.340	.023	.091
<u>Poverty</u>						
Republicans	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Party Identification	-.180	.100	-.169	-1.801	.074	.028
Participation	.055	.095	.055	.577	.565	.003
Socialization	-.109	.097	-.105	-1.120	.265	.011
Orthodoxy	-.081	.189	-.041	-.429	.669	.002
<u>Democrats</u>						
Party Identification	.029	.144	.029	.202	.841	.001
Participation	.036	.150	.035	.243	.809	.001
Socialization	-.027	.131	-.029	-.202	.841	.001
Orthodoxy	.186	.331	.085	.561	.578	.007
<u>Independents</u>						
Orthodoxy	-.509	.374	-.164	-1.363	.177	.027

Table D7
Effect of Religious Affiliation and Article Factors on Personal Issue Support

	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model*	15	1.725	.048	.110	Corrected Model	15	1.221	.258	.084
Religious Affiliation*	3	5.432	.001	.072	Religious Affiliation	3	.680	.565	.010

Group Conflict	1	1.874	.173	.009	Group Conflict	1	.224	.636	.001
Jurisdiction	1	.748	.388	.004	Jurisdiction	1	.027	.869	< .001
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.341	.796	.005	Relig x Gp Cn	3	1.590	.193	.023
Relig x Juris	3	.334	.800	.005	Relig x Juris	3	.341	.796	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.145	.704	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.372	.243	.007
Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	3	.092	.964	.001	Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	3	.594	.620	.009

Table D8
Independent Effects of Religious Identity Dimensions on Personal Issue Position

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Group Identification	-.303	.245	-.130	-1.234	.220	.017
Participation	-.155	.229	-.071	-.676	.501	.005
Socialization	.004	.224	.002	.017	.987	< .001
Orthodoxy*	-.739	.229	-.252	-2.470	.015	.063
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Group Identification	-.345	.424	-.124	-.813	.421	.016
Participation*	-1.095	.314	-.479	-3.491	.001	.229
Socialization	.044	.297	.023	.149	.882	.001
Orthodoxy	-.762	.391	-.288	-1.950	.058	.083
<u>Catholics</u>						
Group Identification	-.535	.353	-.199	-1.516	.135	.039
Participation	-.054	.367	-.020	-.147	.884	< .001
Socialization	-.189	.360	-.069	-.526	.601	.005
Orthodoxy	-.283	.389	-.095	-.729	.469	.009

	<u>Poverty</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Party Identification	-.328	.208	-.172	-1.574	.119	.030
Participation	-.052	.231	-.025	-.226	.822	.001
Socialization	-.086	.174	-.055	-.496	.621	.003
Orthodoxy	-.167	.264	-.070	-.634	.528	.005
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Party Identification	-.347	.250	-.187	-1.387	.171	.035
Participation	-.197	.217	-.128	-.906	.370	.016
Socialization	-.083	.160	-.070	-.521	.605	.005
Orthodoxy	-.367	.251	-.195	-1.461	.150	.038

Catholics							
Group Identification		-.148	.221	-.095	-.669	.506	.009
Participation		-.209	.189	-.158	-1.109	.273	.025
Socialization		-.180	.247	-.104	-.729	.469	.011
Orthodoxy*		-.633	.261	-.331	-2.427	.019	.109

Table D9
Effect of Religious Affiliation and Article Factors on Perceived Article Position

	Same-sex Marriage					Poverty			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	15	.904	.560	.061	Corrected Model	15	1.120	.340	.077
Religious Affiliation	3	.562	.641	.008	Religious Affiliation	3	.541	.655	.008
Group Conflict	1	.009	.926	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.250	.618	.001
Jurisdiction*	1	4.902	.028	.023	Jurisdiction	1	1.831	.178	.009
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.513	.674	.007	Relig x Gp Cn	3	.722	.540	.011
Relig x Juris	3	.770	.512	.011	Relig x Juris	3	2.446	.065	.035
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.105	.746	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.952	.330	.005
Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	3	.957	.414	.014	Relig x Gp Cn x Juris	3	1.335	.264	.020

Table D10
Independent Effects of Religious Identity Dimensions on Perceived Article Position

	Same-Sex Marriage					
	B	<i>SE</i> (B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	r^2
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Group Identification*	.340	.108	.316	3.144	.002	.100
Participation*	.235	.104	.234	2.266	.026	.055
Socialization	.086	.104	.087	.835	.406	.008
Orthodoxy	.044	.140	.033	.313	.755	.001
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Group Identification	-.066	.214	-.047	-.307	.761	.002
Participation	-.080	.178	-.070	-.449	.656	.005
Socialization	.221	.145	.230	1.529	.134	.053
Orthodoxy	-.231	.202	-.174	-1.143	.259	.030
<u>Catholics</u>						
Group Identification	-.182	.186	-.129	-.976	.333	.017
Participation*	-.402	.185	-.278	-2.168	.034	.077
Socialization	.119	.189	.082	.630	.531	.007
Orthodoxy	-.225	.203	-.143	-1.104	.274	.021

	<u>Poverty</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Group Identification	.164	.121	.148	1.350	.181	.022
Participation	.022	.134	.018	.165	.869	< .001
Socialization	.076	.101	.083	.750	.456	.007
Orthodoxy	.090	.153	.065	.585	.560	.004
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Group Identification	-.159	.198	-.109	-.799	.428	.012
Participation	-.200	.176	-.161	-1.141	.259	.026
Socialization	.024	.128	.025	.184	.854	.001
Orthodoxy	.121	.200	.082	.603	.549	.007
<u>Catholics</u>						
Group Identification*	-.327	.133	-.332	-2.461	.017	.110
Participation*	-.288	.119	-.331	-2.432	.019	.110
Socialization	.009	.158	.008	.057	.954	< .001
Orthodoxy	-.209	.179	-.166	-1.164	.250	.027

Table D11
Effect of Religious Affiliation and Article Factors on Perceived Article Credibility

	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>				<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2	
Corrected Model	15	.523	.926	.037	Corrected Model	15	.771	.709	.055
Religious Affiliation	3	.482	.695	.007	Religious Affiliation	3	.567	.637	.009
Group Conflict	1	< .001	.983	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.385	.535	.002
Jurisdiction	1	.850	.358	.004	Jurisdiction	1	1.555	.214	.008
Relig x Gp Cn	3	.316	.814	.005	Relig x Gp Cn	3	1.676	.173	.025
Relig x Juris	3	.577	.631	.008	Relig x Juris	3	.259	.855	.004
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.084	.299	.005	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.035	.852	< .001
Relig x GpCn x Juris	3	.932	.426	.013	Relig x GpCn x Juris	3	.201	.896	.003

Table D12
Independent Effects of Religious Identity Dimensions on Perceived Article Credibility

	<u>Same-Sex Marriage</u>					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Group Identification	-.185	.111	-.175	-1.671	.098	.031
Participation	-.108	.107	-.107	-1.007	.317	.011
Socialization	.024	.104	.025	.234	.815	.001
Orthodoxy	-.175	.141	-.131	-1.246	.216	.017
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Group Identification	.252	.220	.176	1.143	.260	.031
Participation	-.015	.178	-.013	-.083	.934	< .001
Socialization	-.024	.149	-.025	-.160	.874	.001
Orthodoxy	-.099	.203	-.076	-.487	.629	.006
<u>Catholics</u>						
Group Identification	-.105	.183	-.076	-.572	.570	.006
Participation	-.027	.188	-.019	-.143	.887	< .001
Socialization	.023	.185	.016	.123	.902	< .001
Orthodoxy	-.54	.200	.036	-.269	.789	.001
<u>Poverty</u>						
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
<u>Evangelicals</u>						
Group Identification	-.207	.114	-.201	-1.821	.072	.040
Participation	.001	.123	.001	.006	.995	< .001
Socialization	-.082	.096	-.096	-.853	.396	.009
Orthodoxy	-.188	.140	-.149	-1.344	.183	.022
<u>Mainlines</u>						
Group Identification*	-.455	.171	-.349	-2.656	.011	.122
Participation	.123	.168	.106	.734	.467	.011
Socialization	.082	.121	.093	.682	.498	.009
Orthodoxy	.002	.192	.001	.010	.992	< .001
<u>Catholics</u>						
Group Identification*	.519	.117	.534	4.426	< .001	.286
Participation*	.265	.116	.314	2.289	.027	.098
Socialization	.214	.152	.197	1.404	.167	.039
Orthodoxy*	.581	.155	.475	3.744	< .001	.226

Table D13
Effect of Self-categorization and Media Categorization on Perceived Article Position

	<u>Political Identity</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>			
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.503	.853	.024	Corrected Model	8	1.226	.287	.059
Media Cat	1	.007	.935	< .001	Media Cat	1	2.911	.090	.018
Party Affiliation	1	.151	.698	.001	Party Affiliation	1	1.562	.213	.010
Group Conflict	1	.232	.630	.001	Group Conflict	1	.171	.680	.001
Jurisdiction	1	3.007	.085	.018	Jurisdiction	1	.006	.940	< .001
Party x Gp Cn	1	.162	.688	.001	Party x Gp Cn	1	1.299	.256	.008
Party x Juris	1	.970	.326	.006	Party x Juris	1	.060	.806	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.136	.713	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.644	.202	.010
Party x GpCn x Jur	1	.001	.979	< .001	Party x GpCn x Jur*	1	5.757	.018	.036

<u>Republicans - Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Republicans - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.431	.900	.031	Corrected Model	8	1.572	.143	.116
Media Cat	1	1.388	.241	.013	Media Cat*	1	9.910	.002	.094
Party ID	1	< .001	.988	< .001	Party ID	1	< .001	.992	< .001
Participation	1	.761	.385	.007	Participation	1	.045	.833	< .001
Socialization	1	< .001	.988	< .001	Socialization	1	1.379	.243	.014
Orthodoxy	1	.278	.599	.003	Orthodoxy	1	.572	.451	.006
Group Conflict	1	.018	.893	< .001	Group Conflict	1	.639	.426	.007
Jurisdiction	1	.172	.679	.002	Jurisdiction	1	.021	.885	< .001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.216	.643	.002	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.024	.314	.011

<u>Democrats - Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Democrats - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	6	4.810	.001	.407	Corrected Model	6	1.272	.291	.157
Media Cat	1	.401	.530	.009	Media Cat	1	2.959	.093	.067
Party ID*	1	10.538	.002	.201	Party ID	1	.031	.861	.001
Participation	1	1.578	.216	.036	Participation	1	.072	.790	.002
Group Conflict	1	.073	.789	.002	Group Conflict	1	.167	.685	.004
Jurisdiction	1	.249	.620	.006	Jurisdiction	1	.129	.721	.003
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.008	.930	< .001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	3.167	.083	.072

<u>Religious Identity</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	12	.675	.774	.043	Corrected Model	12	.763	.688	.049

Media Cat	1	.032	.859	< .001
Religious Affil	2	.430	.651	.005
Group Conflict	1	.116	.733	.001
Jurisdiction	1	3.010	.084	.016
Relig x Gp Cn	2	.211	.810	.002
Relig x Juris	2	.465	.629	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.181	.671	.001
Relig x GpCn x Jur	2	.941	.392	.010

Media Cat	1	.058	.810	< .001
Religious Affil	2	.411	.664	.005
Group Conflict	1	.728	.395	.004
Jurisdiction	1	.151	.698	.001
Relig x Gp Cn	2	1.095	.337	.012
Relig x Juris	2	1.222	.297	.014
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.105	.746	.001
Relig x GpCn x Jur	2	1.356	.260	.015

Evangelicals - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.493	.174	.134
Religious ID*	1	5.060	.027	.062
Media Cat	1	.485	.488	.006
Participation	1	.414	.522	.005
Socialization	1	.203	.653	.003
Orthodoxy	1	2.064	.155	.026
Group Conflict	1	1.044	.310	.013
Jurisdiction	1	1.730	.192	.022
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.088	.767	.001

Evangelicals - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.699	.692	.070
Religious ID	1	1.346	.250	.018
Media Cat	1	.071	.791	.001
Participation	1	.016	.900	< .001
Socialization	1	.003	.960	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	.130	.720	.002
Group Conflict	1	.590	.445	.008
Jurisdiction	1	3.012	.087	.039
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.059	.809	.001

Mainlines - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.432	.219	.252
Religious ID	1	.224	.639	.007
Media Cat	1	.006	.940	.000
Participation	1	.036	.851	.001
Socialization	1	1.973	.169	.055
Orthodoxy	1	4.785	.036	.123
Group Conflict	1	.353	.556	.010
Jurisdiction	1	2.515	.122	.069
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.595	.446	.017

Mainlines - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.089	.392	.186
Religious ID	1	1.459	.235	.037
Media Cat	1	.102	.752	.003
Participation	1	3.572	.066	.086
Socialization	1	.128	.723	.003
Orthodoxy*	1	4.987	.031	.116
Group Conflict	1	.390	.536	.010
Jurisdiction	1	.150	.701	.004
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.883	.178	.047

Catholics - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	.768	.617	.101
Religious ID	1	.016	.900	< .001
Media Cat	1	.880	.353	.018
Participation	1	1.552	.219	.031
Orthodoxy	1	.515	.477	.011
Group Conflict	1	.037	.849	.001
Jurisdiction	1	.544	.464	.011

Catholics - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	1.300	.275	.182
Religious ID	1	2.043	.160	.047
Media Cat	1	.124	.727	.003
Participation	1	.930	.341	.022
Orthodoxy	1	.328	.570	.008
Group Conflict	1	.484	.490	.012
Jurisdiction	1	.061	.806	.001

Gp Cn x Juris	1	<.001	.998	<.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.573	.453	.014
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Table D14
Effect of Self-categorization and Media Categorization on Perceived Article Credibility

					<u>Political Identity</u>				
<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.866	.069	.084	Corrected Model	8	1.786	.084	.084
Media Cat	1	.120	.729	.001	Media Cat	1	.024	.878	<.001
Party Affiliation*	1	11.517	.001	.066	Party Affiliation	1	.992	.321	.006
Group Conflict	1	.105	.746	.001	Group Conflict*	1	4.881	.029	.031
Jurisdiction	1	2.119	.147	.013	Jurisdiction	1	.354	.553	.002
Party x Gp Cn	1	.168	.682	.001	Party x Gp Cn*	1	7.271	.008	.045
Party x Juris	1	.919	.339	.006	Party x Juris	1	.449	.504	.003
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.400	.238	.009	Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.656	.200	.011
Party x GpCn x Juris	1	.165	.685	.001	Party x GpCn x Juris	1	1.033	.311	.007

<u>Republicans - Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Republicans - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.561	.807	.040	Corrected Model	8	.919	.504	.072
Media Cat	1	.532	.467	.005	Media Cat	1	.222	.638	.002
Party ID	1	.125	.725	.001	Party ID*	1	4.500	.037	.045
Participation	1	1.875	.174	.017	Participation	1	2.098	.151	.022
Socialization	1	.502	.480	.005	Socialization	1	.287	.593	.003
Orthodoxy	1	.864	.355	.008	Orthodoxy	1	.044	.833	<.001
Group Conflict	1	.106	.746	.001	Group Conflict	1	.561	.456	.006
Jurisdiction	1	.057	.811	.001	Jurisdiction	1	.753	.388	.008
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.212	.646	.002	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.111	.740	.001

<u>Democrats - Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Democrats - Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	6	1.741	.136	.203	Corrected Model	6	2.238	.058	.247
Media Cat	1	2.767	.104	.063	Media Cat	1	.368	.547	.009
Party ID*	1	5.654	.022	.121	Party ID	1	.003	.956	<.001
Participation	1	.803	.375	.019	Participation	1	.704	.406	.017
Group Conflict	1	.034	.855	.001	Group Conflict*	1	9.133	.004	.182
Jurisdiction*	1	4.094	.050	.091	Jurisdiction	1	.002	.968	<.001
Gp Cn x Juris	1	1.169	.286	.028	Gp Cn x Juris	1	2.546	.118	.058

Religious Identity

<u>Same-sex Marriage</u>					<u>Poverty</u>				
	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2		<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	12	.675	.774	.043	Corrected Model	12	.763	.688	.049
Media Cat	1	.032	.859	< .001	Media Cat	1	.058	.810	< .001
Religious Affil	2	.430	.651	.005	Religious Affil	2	.411	.664	.005
Group Conflict	1	.116	.733	.001	Group Conflict	1	.728	.395	.004
Jurisdiction	1	3.010	.084	.016	Jurisdiction	1	.151	.698	.001
Relig x Gp Cn	2	.211	.810	.002	Relig x Gp Cn	2	1.095	.337	.012
Relig x Juris	2	.465	.629	.005	Relig x Juris	2	1.222	.297	.014
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.181	.671	.001	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.105	.746	.001
Relig x GpCn x Jur	2	.941	.392	.010	Relig x GpCn x Jur	2	1.356	.260	.015

Evangelicals - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	1.098	.374	.104
Religious ID	1	3.943	.051	.049
Media Cat	1	.226	.636	.003
Participation	1	.284	.595	.004
Socialization	1	1.326	.253	.017
Orthodoxy	1	.018	.893	< .001
Group Conflict	1	.481	.490	.006
Jurisdiction	1	.377	.541	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.681	.412	.009

Evangelicals - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	8	2.174	.040	.195
Religious ID	1	.226	.636	.003
Media Cat*	1	7.692	.007	.097
Participation	1	2.696	.105	.036
Socialization	1	3.006	.087	.040
Orthodoxy	1	.260	.612	.004
Group Conflict*	1	5.543	.021	.071
Jurisdiction	1	.358	.551	.005
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.124	.725	.002

Mainlines - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	8	.368	.930	.082
Religious ID	1	1.100	.302	.032
Media Cat	1	.021	.885	.001
Participation	1	.023	.880	.001
Socialization	1	.005	.944	< .001
Orthodoxy	1	1.252	.271	.037
Group Conflict	1	.004	.948	< .001
Jurisdiction	1	.687	.413	.020
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.115	.737	.003

Mainlines - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	8	2.270	.044	.335
Religious ID*	1	13.384	.001	.271
Media Cat	1	.018	.894	.001
Participation	1	.070	.793	.002
Socialization*	1	4.206	.048	.105
Orthodoxy	1	1.272	.267	.034
Group Conflict	1	.459	.502	.013
Jurisdiction	1	2.634	.113	.068
Gp Cn x Juris	1	< .001	1.000	< .001

Catholics - Same-sex Marriage

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model	7	.168	.990	.024
Religious ID	1	.044	.834	.001
Media Cat	1	.144	.706	.003

Catholics - Poverty

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Corrected Model*	7	3.448	.005	.371
Religious ID*	1	6.669	.013	.140
Media Cat	1	.443	.510	.011

Participation	1	.020	.888	< .001	Participation	1	1.268	.267	.030
Orthodoxy	1	.009	.926	< .001	Orthodoxy	1	4.004	.052	.089
Group Conflict	1	.166	.685	.003	Group Conflict	1	1.044	.313	.025
Jurisdiction	1	.060	.808	.001	Jurisdiction	1	1.340	.254	.032
Gp Cn x Juris	1	.522	.474	.011	Gp Cn x Juris	1	.128	.722	.003

Table D15
Independent Effect of Value Involvement Measures on Issue and Article Perceptions

Value Scale	Same-Sex Marriage					
	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Personal Position	-.179	.119	-.092	-1.502	.134	.009
Position Extremity*	.247	.057	.258	4.325	< .001	.067
Article Position*	.117	.057	.126	2.052	.041	.016
Article Credibility	.082	.058	.087	1.413	.159	.008
<u>Marriage Tradition</u>						
Personal Position*	-.671	.176	-.231	-3.810	< .001	.053
Position Extremity	-.032	.088	-.023	-.363	.717	.001
Article Position	.159	.086	.115	1.852	.065	.013
Article Credibility	-.028	.088	-.020	-.321	.749	< .001
<u>Attribution</u>						
Personal Position*	-.579	.112	-.305	-5.173	< .001	.093
Position Extremity*	-.149	.057	-.159	-2.605	.010	.025
Article Position	-.010	.056	-.011	-.172	.863	< .001
Article Credibility	-.097	.057	-.106	-1.708	.089	.011
<u>Poverty</u>						
Value Scale	B	SE(B)	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Personal Position	-.085	.097	-.055	-.874	.383	.003
Position Extremity*	.223	.055	.244	4.016	< .001	.060
Article Position	< .001	.064	< .001	-.006	.995	< .001
Article Credibility	.025	.060	.026	.419	.676	.001
<u>Attribution</u>						
Personal Position*	-.992	.105	-.512	-9.431	< .001	.262
Position Extremity	-.087	.072	-.076	-1.208	.228	.006
Article Position	.054	.081	.043	.673	.502	.002
Article Credibility	-.043	.076	-.036	-.570	.569	.001

APPENDIX E

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD CERTIFICATION

Office for Research
Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects

THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA
R E S E A R C H

December 19, 2014

Dylan McLemore
Dept. of Journalism
College of Communication and Information Sciences
Box 870172

Re: IRB#: 14-OR-436 "Understanding and Overcoming Partisan Biases Toward Media Messages"

Dear Mr. McLemore:

The University of Alabama Institutional Review Board has granted approval for your proposed research.

Your application has been given expedited approval according to 45 CFR part 46. You have also been granted the requested waiver. Approval has been given under expedited review category 7 as outlined below:

(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies

Your application will expire on December 18, 2015. If your research will continue beyond this date, complete the relevant portions of the IRB Renewal Application. If you wish to modify the application, complete the Modification of an Approved Protocol Form. Changes in this study cannot be initiated without IRB approval, except when necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants. When the study closes, complete the appropriate portions of the IRB Request for Study Closure Form.

Please use reproductions of the IRB approved stamped information sheets to obtain consent from your participants.

Should you need to submit any further correspondence regarding this proposal, please include the above application number.

Good luck with your research.

Sincerely,


Carpantato T. Myles, MSM, CIM, CIP
Director & Research Compliance Officer
Office of Research Compliance



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