

CHILDREN'S EVALUATIONS OF MORAL
AND CONVENTIONAL
RETALIATIONS

by

LAURIE WILLIAMS

JASON SCOFIELD, COMMITTEE CHAIR
TRICIA WITTE
KRISTINA MCDONALD

A THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Science in the Department of
Human Environmental Sciences
in the Graduate School of
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2015

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ABSTRACT

Recent research has found that children are able to effectively interpret and justify situations of moral provocation and retaliation and that their disapproval of provocation increases with age (Astor, 1994; Smetana, Campione-Barr & Yell, 2003). The current study aimed to discover whether children judge moral provocation and retaliation as worse than conventional provocation and retaliation, and if these judgments changed depending on the pattern in which the acts occur. 47 adults and 106 children (aged 4-9) were presented with 8 conditions that combine moral violations and retaliations with conventional violations and retaliations. These conditions were designed to present participants with violations and retaliations that came from within the same domain, and some that came from different domains, (i.e., 'matched' and 'mismatched' domain conditions). It was hypothesized that in all scenarios, children would judge acts of moral transgressions and retaliations as worse and more punishable than conventional. Findings showed that unprovoked transgressions were judged as worse than provoked transgressions, with the most leniency being for provoked transgressions in the conventional domain. Children between ages 4-6 displayed the least leniency for retaliations when compared to older children and adults.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

df	Degrees of freedom: number of values free to vary after certain restrictions have been placed on the data
F	Fisher's F ratio: A ration of two variances
M	Mean: the sum of a set of measurements divided by the number of measurements in the set
p	Probability associated with the occurrence under the null hypothesis of a value as extreme as or more extreme than the observed value
t	Computed value of t test
$<$	Less than
$=$	Equal to

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to have the opportunity to thank my many colleagues, friends and faculty members who have helped me at various stages of this research project. I am most appreciative to the chairman of my thesis, Jason Scofield for sharing his ideas, expertise and passion regarding children's moral development. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank my committee members, Tricia Witte and Kristina McDonald for their continuous support and input over the course of conducting and completing my thesis, and of my journey as a graduate student. I would like to thank Kimberly Linetsky and Shani Kerr for their assistance in collecting data. I owe thanks to The Children's Program at The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa Magnet Elementary School, and University Place Elementary School for providing me with permission to collect data in their facility. I also thank all of the HDFS student volunteers at The University of Alabama.

Completing this thesis would not have been possible without the support of my friends and other graduate students. I am indebted to my family who provided me with eternal support and encouragement, even when being in a different country. Finally, thanks go to the school of Human Environmental Sciences and the department of Human Development and Family Studies for granting me with such a remarkable opportunity to study, learn and grow as an individual.

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The social-cognitive domain perspective of moral and social development, commonly known as *domain theory* (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1994) proposes that children develop a knowledge regarding what constitutes a moral act and what constitutes a conventional act. Moral violations, those that effect others' rights and welfare, are considered universally wrong. Examples include behaviors such as hitting, cheating, stealing and insulting others. Such moral issues are judged independently from rules, authority or cultural practices, and they are based on 'avoiding harm, promoting people's welfare ensuring fairness, and protecting rights' (Turiel, 2008, p.137). In contrast, conventional violations are those specific to appropriate behavior in a particular social context. These conventions *are* reliant with rules and authority; they are agreed upon, communal, uniform rules that are determined by the social system in which they are created (Turiel, 1983). Social-conventional violations include things like interrupting a conversation, cutting in line, littering and men and women using separate restroom facilities, these rules are generally arbitrary as they are commonly applied in order to maintain social order. Leading on from morality and convention as two distinct domains, Turiel (1978) suggested that the development of these two concepts in children originates from different aspects of the child's social interactions.

Within the last few decades there has been a surge of research examining children's conceptions of moral and conventional violations (Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1984). The majority of this research examines children's ability to judge and distinguish breaches of these domains, that are usually unprovoked, the degree to which an act is punish-worthy, the extent to which the act is contingent on the presence of rules or

The majority of the research (Arsenio, 1988; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981) presents children with series of moral violations (hitting, pushing, stealing etc.) and conventional violations (not doing as the teacher says, not putting things away in their right place, breaking school rules by wearing the wrong clothes to class etc.) Children were then asked questions on these transgressions, including questions on how bad the act was, whether the act would be ok in a different setting or is contingent on the presence of a rule and if the transgressor should be punished.

The first research to examine younger children's social concepts was conducted by Nucci and Turiel in 1978, who found that preschool children were able to distinguish between social convention and morality, thus reinforcing that they are two separate domains that are developed independently of each other. Smetana (1981) has provided support for Nucci and Turiel's findings, highlighting that by that age of 2 ½, toddlers can discriminate between domains, although moral events are more consistently distinguished than social-conventional events. For example, in another paper (Smetana, 1984), the conventional violation of a 3-year-old boy wearing a pink girls' bathing suit was responded to strongly by teachers, yet was oblivious to the young boy and his peers. Whilst young children can distinguish between moral and conventional violations, it is thought that development of conventional knowledge occurs slightly later and is longer lasting than that of moral knowledge due to a differentiated use of rules and prohibitions. Findings overall document that moral deviances are judged more seriously than conventional deviances and that children judge moral rule-breakers as worse than conventional rule breakers, showing us that children, like adults, are able to make distinctions between moral and conventional acts and their consequences. Research of this kind describes to us how even young children are able to apply their knowledge of moral criteria to prototypical conditions of moral violations.

However, whilst research on moral and conventional behavior reflects how children learn to distinguish between these two types of behaviors through their knowledge of relevant social domains, there are gaps in social domain theory with regard to more complex social situations such as those of provocation and retaliation. To gain a better understanding of retaliation and provocation it is important to investigate existing work conducted with adults and adolescents, and the ways in which they perceive situations of retaliation. The majority of research on retaliatory attitudes predominately in adults, but also in adolescence, tends to focus more broadly on areas such as whistle-blowing (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005) gender (Schnake et al. 1997), racism (Craig, 1997), and terrorism (Brophy-Baецermann 1994). Retaliation is used in adult contexts as a form of punishment and prevention. Adults will engage in retaliation in response to some form of deviance and will look to punish the perpetrator using some form of “payback” (Jacobs, 2004).

The research conducted on adult retaliatory attitudes reveals various personal factors that can influence one’s stance on retaliation, including gender, aggressive behavior, depression, and past victimization (Copeland-Linder et al., 2007). Furthermore research has revealed that males are more likely to approve of retaliation, yet these judgments are not influenced by cultural stereotypes, rather the domain in which the behavioral act occurred (Pitner et al. 2003). An explanation for these gender differences may be that males frequently score higher in general on measures of aggression than do females, and aggression is linked to approval of retaliation (Douglas & Martinko, 2001). Recent research has also revealed a link between victimization and attitudes towards retaliation (Rich & Grey, 2005) especially amongst young adults who retaliate for reasons such as protecting identity and the pressure of social norms in their environment.

Results such as these begin to explain the avenue of retaliation in the younger population. Jacobs (2004) explains how people are often motivated to retaliate by a desire to

sustain or restore their reputation and identity. This is particularly relevant for adolescences considering that a crucial aspect of progressing through to adulthood is being able to explore and develop one's identity (Erikson, 1968). A study by Copeland-Linder et al. (2007) found that age and SES were related to retaliatory attitudes amongst African American adolescents. They also discovered that youth's perceptions of their parent's attitudes toward physical aggression and fighting were related to their retaliation attitudes. For example, youth who believed that their parents support fighting were more likely to approve of retaliation, thus reflecting the importance of parental attitudes and how they are perceived by children.

Studies have documented the importance of situational effects in the development of judgments about retaliatory aggression. For example Shantz and Pentz (1972) found that older children (10 and 13 year olds) are able to distinguish the appropriateness of certain types of targeted retaliation such as against peers, siblings or parents, whereas younger children (6 year olds) can only make these differentiations after physical provocation. An explanation for this could be that if parents are likely to teach children that physical retaliation is acceptable in response to physical provocation, and younger children are more likely to be physical with one another, then they will only be accustomed to this 'target rule' in instances of physical rather than verbal provocation. Shantz and Pentz continued in concluding that children view retaliatory aggression as much more acceptable than non-retaliatory aggression, thus reflecting a consensus amongst adults and children that certain types of revenge and retaliation are more permissible and morally acceptable than unprovoked aggression.

It is interesting to explore retaliation research on youth and older populations as when children mature their moral reasoning becomes less influenced by rules and voices of authority figures such as parents and teachers, and more influenced by societal expectations and norms, and ideas on respect and justice. Whilst there is a relative amount of research investigating adolescent's and adult's judgments and endorsements of retaliation, again there

is little comparable work in younger children and preschoolers. Perhaps this knowledge on the attitudes of older participants will help to develop a better understanding of the retaliatory judgments made by younger children in this study.

In his book *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932) Piaget describes retaliation amongst children as a form of reciprocity, when they retaliate against a peer they are merely doing so to create a sense of ‘mathematical’ equality. In his research he found that children believe giving revenge back exactly as they had received was fair and this created a balance again. He explained, “one should give back exactly what one has received, but not invent a sort of arbitrary punishment whose content bears no relation to the punishable act (p.300).” This suggests that retaliation is used as a form of punishment to create reciprocity, rather than just aggressive revenge. Retaliators are generally engaging in a form of retributive justice whereby their retaliation is a form of punishment used on the offender. Piaget (1932) found that younger children (<6) will always favor punishment and retributive justice, whereas older children (>10) will consider equality of treatment. Such findings, albeit taken from outdated studies provide information for the hypothesis of this current study, that as children age, they will consider the equality of the retaliation, whereas younger children will be more concerned with any retaliation as a form of punishment.

Within the last couple of decades research has been conducted using conditions of retaliation in which children are exposed to situations whereby they have to apply a more in-depth understanding of social behaviors. In 2003, Smetana investigated children’s judgments of situations involving provocation and retaliation. In this study children were only presented with prototypical moral violations, or provoked moral violations. The results showed that children judged prototypical moral transgressions to be more serious and more deserving of punishment than acts that were provoked, thus suggesting that children are able to apply a more in depth awareness of moral understanding to more complex situations. The results

found by Smetana give support to the current hypothesis that children will display different judgments to acts of retaliation than prototypical acts. In the study, Smetana compared physical violations with verbal violations, and found that children would constantly assess retaliatory acts of hitting as more serious and deserving of punishment than teasing forms of retaliation, but also those children's justifications for these transgressions differ significantly from those given for unprovoked acts (Smetana , Campione-Barr, & Yell, 2003).

A study by Nucci (1984) highlighted how children are able to effectively evaluate teacher's responses to social transgressions using their understanding of the nature of moral and conventional issues. Teacher's responses were either dubbed as domain appropriate for example; using matters of justice and welfare to deal with moral issues and using social order to deal with issues in the conventional domain, or domain inappropriate. Results found that children rated teachers who employ domain appropriate responses higher than teachers who employ domain inappropriate responses to transgressions. Nucci suggested that children use their concepts of moral and conventional issues to make predictions of the form of response they think teachers should use when dealing with transgressions. These findings can be applied to this paper as they highlight how children have an understanding of domain appropriate responses (which can be applied to retaliation) as well as domain appropriate behaviors, which they can use to evaluate others social actions. Nevertheless, the youngest sample in this study was third graders therefore the results might not be reciprocated in a younger sample.

What appears to be missing in the relevant literature however is the comparison between moral retaliations and conventional retaliations. It has not yet been explored as to whether children's evaluations of retaliation would change depending on the type of provoked act, and the type of act retaliated with. For example, if Child A stepped on Child B's toy causing Child B to retaliate by hitting back, would this be seen as worse than if Child B had

stepped on Child A's toy in retaliation? In this example, retaliation using the same act as the original transgression should be viewed as more fair and acceptable than retaliating in a more morally unacceptable way. Therefore the current research aimed to investigate whether young children will be able to conclude that certain moral and conventional retaliations are more acceptable forms of retaliation depending on the circumstances and the original transgression. Karniol and Heiman (1987) found that in early adolescents, teenagers report that situations involving psychological provocation such as bragging make them angrier than physical provocation. Understandings of the social and conventional domains highlight how physical transgressions are moral violations that are viewed more seriously, whereas acts such as bragging and teasing are viewed as social violations that are agreed to not be as severe. However Karniol and Heiman's findings suggest that conventional acts may lead to higher instances of retaliation rather than moral violations.

Although it is common knowledge that older children, adolescents and adults possess a more developed understanding of morality and social convention (Kohlberg, L., & Kramer, R, 1969; Nunner-Winkler, G., & Sodian, B, 1988), little, if not any research has compared kindergarten and elementary children's evaluations of conventional retaliation when compared to moral retaliation. Using findings from existing research (Hewitt, 1975; Shantz, & Voydanoff, 1973; Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Yell, 2003) it can be concluded that not only do children judge moral violations as worse than conventional, but that they also judge prototypical acts as more severe than provoked acts, therefore it can be inferred that when children are presented with a combination of moral and conventional violations and retaliations, they will judge moral violations and retaliations as more justifiably wrong and severe than conventional ones.

Research using provocation and retaliation has documented how beneficial it is to study children's moral and conventional judgments using multiple dimensions (Smetana,

Campione-Barr & Yell, 2003). The primary research question discussed in this paper will explore whether children judge acts of moral retaliation and provocation differently from acts of conventional retaliation and provocation. If children are capable of understanding that certain acts of retaliation are more justifiable and more acceptable depending on the domain of the violation (moral or conventional) then we would expect to see children give different responses regarding severity, punishment and justifiableness, thus reflecting that young children can engage in higher levels of moral thinking.

CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY

This was a repeated measures design involving 8 different conditions. The conditions were as follows: prototypical moral transgression (M_1), prototypical conventional transgression (C_1), moral transgression and a moral retaliation ($M_1 - M_1$), moral transgression and a different moral retaliation ($M_2 - M_1$), moral transgression and a conventional retaliation ($M_1 - C_1$), conventional transgression and a conventional retaliation ($C_1 - C_1$), conventional transgression and a different conventional retaliation ($C_2 - C_1$), and a conventional transgression and moral retaliation ($C_1 - M_1$). These conditions will provide matched and mismatched combinations of transgression and retaliations allowing us to investigate if certain retaliations are more approved of due to their domain appropriateness or inappropriateness.

In order to determine which different transgressions should be used in the $M_2 - M_1$ and the $C_2 - C_1$ conditions, a trial study was ran assessing children's judgements of four different moral transgressions and three different conventional transgressions. In the trial spitting, hitting, stomping on foot and insulting were all compared, similarly talking during quiet time, turning on the light during nap time and cutting in line were compared. Questions were asked to assess the severity of the act. This was carried out in order to ensure that the within domain acts scored similarly on severity and if there were differences in this condition it could not be attributed to one act being significantly more or less severe than the other. Therefore it was decided to choose insulting to be paired with the spitting retaliation, and turning on the light during quiet time to be paired with the talking during quiet time retaliation as these had similar severity ratings.

Participants

Preschool, kindergarten and elementary aged children ($n = 106$) ($M = 6.4$ years; $SD = 0.84$ months; Range = 4 years - 10 years; 59 females and 47 males) and college-aged adults ($n = 47$) ($M = 19.5$ years; $SD = 3.8$ years; Range = 18-44 years; 37 females and 10 males) participated in the study. Participants were recruited from a middle-class area in Southeastern United States. Consent forms were provided to three different educational institutions sourcing children across three key-stages. Participants were then organized into three comparison groups depending on their age. Group one consisted of children between 4-6 ($n = 48$) years of age, group two was children aged between 7-9 ($n = 58$) and group three was participants over the age of 18 ($n = 47$)

Procedure

Testing sessions were always conducted under quiet conditions in an appropriate area. For pre-school children this was a designated research booth and for kindergarten and elementary children this was a quiet space located close to their classroom. The adult participants were interviewed in a lab testing room on the university campus. Interview sessions lasted between 15-30 minutes, typically dependent on the age of the participant and their ability. The sessions consisted of the interviewer/experimenter guiding the participant through all 8 conditions of the research. Each condition featured a cartoon of children performing a particular domain transgression. For two of the conditions, participants were presented with only one prototypical transgression (e.g. spitting, talking during quiet time), for the other 6 conditions the transgression was always followed by a retaliatory act (e.g. saying mean things retaliated with spitting, spitting retaliated with talking during quiet time). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants to create 24 different order possibilities to account for any order effects that may occur in the data collection

process.

The stimuli for the study consisted of colored cartoon images on 9x12 laminated cards depicting the actor, location (school) and act (those described in the preceding paragraph). For the retaliation conditions, participants were first presented with the prototypical transgression and then in sequence, a second card was produced depicting the particular retaliation for that condition. For the prototypical transgressions – those without retaliation – no information was provided about any events that may have provoked the transgression.

Following the traditional process used in assessing domains, participants were asked to make five separate judgments about the act on the card. Participants were provided with a verbal explanation of what is happening in the scene, for example “The boy with the green hair just spit on the girl with the red hair, so the girl with the red hair spit back on the boy”. This was done for all the conditions. For each condition participants were asked similar questions as the ones used in Smetana (2003). Participants were told to answer the questions considering only the retaliators actions and not the actions of the original transgressor. To assess *severity* they were asked; (1) “Is it OK or not OK for the child to ___?” and if not, “Is it a little bit bad or very bad?” The participants were then be asked (2) “Why?” in order to gain *justifications* for their first answers. Questions 3 and 4 were designed to assess *authority independence* and *rule independence*; (3) “If the teacher did not see the child, is it OK or not OK for the child to ___?” and (4) “If the teacher never told the child that he shouldn’t ___, is it OK or not OK for the child to ___?” To assess *generalizability* participants will be asked; (5) “This child ___’d at school, is it OK or not OK for the child to ___ at home?” Then followed assessments of *deserved punishment*: (6) “Should the child [the retaliator] get in trouble?” and if yes, “A little bit or a lot?” Finally, participants were told to point the victim and answer (7) “How do you think this child will feel after s/he is ___?” (e.g. hit or pushed in front of), then they would answer a question regarding the victim but this time after they have

retaliated; (8) “How do you think this child will feel after s/he ____?” These questions are designed to assess the *victim's* and *transgressors (retaliator's) affect*.

This procedure was repeated for all eight conditions. To provide an example, in the M₁ – C₁ condition participants saw an actor perform the moral transgression spitting, which was then retaliated against by talking loudly during quiet time. The judgments were made based solely on the act of the retaliator (the child who talked loudly in quiet time).

For each condition, judgments were scored as either a 0 (i.e., the act was OK, allowed in the absence of an authority figure, allowed in the absence of a rule, and not punish-worthy) or a 1 (i.e., the act was not OK, was not permitted in the absence of authority, not permitted in the absence of rules and was punish-worthy). For judgments assessing severity and punish-worthiness scores were marked out of a total of 2. For example for act evaluation, acts that were judged as OK would score 0, acts that were judged as not OK and a little bit bad would score 1, and acts that were not OK and seen as very bad would score 2. The scoring system is identical for punish-worthiness, assessing whether the character should be punished a lot, or just a little bit.

After being asked the series of questions on the act, the participants were then finally asked how they think the child will feel after they were victimized, and then again after they retaliated. The majority of responses were one or two worded answers. All of the responses were then coded numerically to classify them as either being positive, negative or neutral. Negative responses were coded as 1, neutral 2, and positive 3. Negative responses were commonly “bad”, “sad” or “angry”, neutral responses indicated neither a positive or negative emotion, such as “sleepy” or “confused”, and positive answers were words such a “better”, “happier” and “glad”.

All eight conditions were run in the same manner. When the session was completed

participants had observed 8 different acts: two transgressions without retaliation, and six transgressions followed by the same or different retaliatory act.

CHAPTER 3 - RESULTS

Unprovoked Transgressions

First, analyses were conducted to determine whether the standard domain distinctions found in previous research (Smetana, 1981) would be found in the current sample. A paired samples t-test indicated unprovoked moral transgressions ($M = 1.83$, $SD = .38$) were judged as worse than unprovoked conventional transgressions ($M = 1.49$, $SD = .53$), $t(152)=6.67$, $p<0.05$, $d=.737$. Likewise, a paired samples t-test indicated unprovoked moral transgressions ($M = 1.69$, $SD = .51$) were judged as more punish-worthy than unprovoked conventional transgressions ($M = 1.24$, $SD = .65$); $t(152)=7.61$, $p<0.05$, $d=.787$. See Table 1A for these results. In addition, a McNemar Chi-square indicated unprovoked morals were judged as significantly more wrong than unprovoked conventions when there was no stated rule ($p<.05$) and when performed across different settings ($p<.05$) but not in the absence of an authority figure ($p = .210$). See Table 1B for these results. Consistent with previous research, the current sample distinguished between social domains by judging moral transgressions as more serious, more punish-worthy, more wrong in the absence of a rule, and wrong even across settings.

To investigate any age differences and interactions for the severity of unprovoked transgressions a mixed factorial ANOVA was ran showing a main effect for condition $F(2, 150) = 61.27$, $p<.05$, $\eta_p^2 = .290$, and an age by condition interaction, $F(2, 150) = 28.09$, $p<.05$, $\eta_p^2 = .272$. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that adult participants severity judgments for conventional transgressions ($1.09 \pm .53$, $p<.05$) were significantly lower than the youngest age group ($1.76 \pm .54$, $p<.05$) and the older children ($1.60 \pm .53$, $p<.05$), showing that overall adults judge unprovoked conventional transgressions as less severe than children. See Table

1C. The same analysis was ran for punish-worthiness showing main effects for condition, $F(2, 150) = 75.73, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .336$, and an age by condition interaction, $F(2, 150) = 21.74, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .225$. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that adult participants punish-worthiness judgments for conventional transgressions ($.83 \pm .60, p < .05$) were significantly lower than the youngest age group ($1.57 \pm .58, p < .05$) and the older children ($1.31 \pm .56, p < .05$), showing that overall adults judge unprovoked conventional transgressions as less punish-worthy than children. See Table 1D.

Judgments of Moral Retaliations

Next, analyses were conducted to determine whether judgments of unprovoked moral transgressions differed from judgments of provoked moral transgressions (i.e., those committed in retaliation) and whether judgments of the provoked moral transgressions were influenced by the nature of the provoking act. To analyse judgments of the seriousness of an act, a 3 X 4 mixed factorial ANOVA with age group (4-6 years, 7-9 years, and 18 years and older) as the between subjects factor and condition (unprovoked transgression, provoked transgression – same act, provoked transgression - same domain, different act, and provoked transgression - different domain) as the within subjects factor was conducted. This analysis revealed a main effect for condition, $F(3, 148) = 7.93, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .138$, where the unprovoked transgression ($M = 1.83$) and the provoked transgression - different domain ($M = 1.78$) were judged as worse than the other two provoked transgressions ($M = 1.63, M = 1.68$). There was no main effect for age group ($p = .874$) and the age group by condition interaction was only marginally significant $F(6, 298) = 2.08, p = .056$. See Table 2 for these results. Follow-up inspection of the marginal interaction showed that the judgments of 4- to 6-year-olds did not differ across the 4 conditions, while 7- to 9-year-olds judged the unprovoked act as more serious than the other three, and adults judged the unprovoked act and the provoked transgression - different domain as more serious than the other two transgressions.

To analyse judgments of the punish-worthiness of an act, another 3 by 4 mixed factorial ANOVA with age group (4-6 years, 7-9 years, and 18 years and older) as the between subjects factor and condition (unprovoked transgression, provoked transgression – same act, provoked transgression - same domain, different act, and provoked transgression - different domain) as the within subjects factor was conducted. This analysis revealed a main effect for condition, $F(3, 148) = 20.46, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .293$, where the unprovoked transgression ($M = 1.70$) and the provoked transgression - different domain ($M = 1.68$) were judged as worse than the other two provoked transgressions ($M = 1.40, M = 1.52$). There was no main effect for age group ($p = .58$) and no age group by condition interaction ($p = .64$). See Table 3 for these results.

To explore for differences in judgment of authority, rule and setting contingency across the four moral transgression conditions Cochran's Q tests were conducted. These analyses revealed no differences among the four conditions for authority [$\chi^2(2) = .632, p = .891$], rule [$\chi^2(2) = 3.41, p = .332$], or setting contingencies, [$\chi^2(2) = 4.12, p = .249$].

Judgments of Conventional Retaliations

Attention now turned to examining the differences between conditions when retaliations come from the social conventional domain. The 3 by 4 mixed factorial ANOVA found a main effect for condition, $F(3, 148) = 8.14, p < .05$ showing that the unprovoked condition ($M = 1.49$) was judged as worse than the other 3 retaliations ($M = 1.26, M = 1.30, M = 1.28$), reflecting a leniency towards conditions in which the behavior being judged had been provoked in some way. A main effect for age was also found, $F(2, 150) = 21.63, p < .05$. See Table 3. Post hoc tests revealed that the adult sample judged conventional acts on average as less severe than the younger age groups (ages 4-6 $M = 1.52$, ages 7-9 $M = 1.46$, age 18+ $M = 1.01$). There was no age by condition interaction effect ($p = .36$).

A 3 by 4 ANOVA examining the punish-worthiness of the convention conditions

revealed a main effect for condition, $F(3, 148) = 3.93, p < .05$, revealing that the unprovoked transgression ($M = 1.24$) is judged as more punish-worthy than the retaliation that exactly matched the provocation ($M = 1.05, M = 1.13, M = 1.10$). This finding suggests that when the act is a retaliation it is judged as less punish-worthy because there is a prior provocation to the act making it more permissible overall. Results also found a main effect for age, $F(2, 150) = 13.82, p < .05$, with adult participants ($M = .83$) judging the conventional acts as less punish-worthy than either young children ($M = 1.28$) or older children ($M = 1.27$). Finally, there was also a significant age x condition interaction; when comparing the unprovoked transgression to the various retaliations the youngest participant's judgments differed significantly from the other two age groups. see Table 4. Post hoc tests revealed that younger children judge the unprovoked transgression as a lot more punish-worthy (1.58) than either older children (1.29) or adults (0.83). Their rating for punish-worthiness for the unprovoked transgression was also significantly larger than their ratings for the other conditions and this was again dissimilar to the other age groups. The range in punish-worthy scores for young children was 0.56, compared to 0.138 for older children and 0.085 for adult participants. This finding suggests that committing an unprovoked transgression is almost always regarded as punish-worthy for young children, but older children and adults are more lenient.

Cochran's Q tests were performed to examine differences in authority, rule, and setting contingency in the conventional conditions. For the authority variable, significant differences were found between conditions regarding whether the act is still wrong depending on if authority figures are present [$\chi^2(2) = 8.47, p < .05$]. McNemar tests revealed that these differences occur between the unprovoked transgression and the different domain condition ($p = .026$) and the different domain condition and the same domain different act (C2C) condition ($p = .043$). There was no significant finding for rule contingency across conditions [$\chi^2(2) = 4.83, p = .185$], inferring that judgement of all conditions are the same regardless of whether

rules were present or not. Finally, there was no significant finding for setting generalizability, [$\chi^2(2) = 1.82, p = .610$], highlighting that judgements are the same across two different settings.

Comparisons of Moral Retaliations and Conventional Retaliations

A domain, by condition, by age mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to investigate differences in severity between the two domains. A main effect for domain was found $F(2, 150) = 133.66, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .471$, as well as an age by domain interaction $F(2, 150) = 2.39, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .016$. Post hoc tests revealed that moral retaliations ($M = 1.70$) are judged as more serious than retaliations from the conventional domain ($M = 1.28$), and the adult participants judged conventional retaliations ($M = .99$) as less severe than the youngest children ($M = 1.44$) and older children ($M = 1.41$). Similarly, a mixed factorial ANOVA was ran assessing differences for punish-worthiness between moral and conventional retaliations. Again, a main effect for domain was found $F(2, 150) = 119.48, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .443$, with post hoc revealing that moral retaliations ($M = 1.53$) are judged as significantly more punish-worthy than conventional retaliations ($M = 1.09$).

Children's Perceptions of the Retaliators Emotions

Analysis was conducted to compare the judgments of the emotional state of the victim and then again when they had retaliated and become the retaliator. A paired samples t-test indicated judgments for victims of moral transgressions were more negative ($M = 2.97, SD = .16$) than for when the victim became a retaliator ($M = 1.51, SD = 1.23$), $t(152) = 14.52, p < .005$. See table 6. Likewise, a paired samples t-test indicated victims of conventional transgressions were believed to feel more negative ($M = 2.82, SD = .38$) than after they retaliated back ($M = 1.39, SD = 1.27$), $t(152) = 14.07, p < .005$. See table 7. These results reflect an emotional shift, highlighting that participants think the individual will feel almost always negative when they are the victim, but when they retaliate their emotional state will swing to

almost a neutral status. To see if there were any differences across the ages, a mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. Results showed a main effect for condition, $F(2, 150) = 242.92$, $p < .05$, a main effect for age $F(2, 150) = 20.96$, $p < .05$, and an interaction effect for condition and age $F(2, 150) = 17.14$, $p < .05$. Post hoc tests revealed that the age differences lied in judgments of the retaliator. The youngest group still judged the retaliator relatively negatively ($M = 2.34$) when compared to the older children ($M = 1.14$) and the adult sample ($M = 1.15$), whereas judgments of the victim were more stable.

CHAPTER 4 - DISCUSSION

This study aimed to explore any differences in children's judgments of retaliation when they occurred both in and across domains. A sample of 106 pre-school and elementary aged children, and 47 adults were interviewed about different conditions of provocation and retaliation. It was predicted that overall participants would be more lenient when judging acts of retaliation than prototypical transgressions. It was also hypothesized that there would be a difference between judgments of retaliation when they occurred in different domains. Different age groups were used to investigate whether there are differences in social and moral judgments depending on developmental age.

Due to previous research having shown that both adults and children judge moral transgressions as more severe than conventional transgressions (Smetana, 1981), our first hypothesis followed these findings and predicted similar results. Analysis provided support for this hypothesis and showed that when an act is unprovoked, moral transgressions are judged as more severe and more deserving of punishment than conventional transgressions. As expected, these findings mirror the work of Smetana and provide further support for social domain theory (Smetana, 2003; Turiel, 1983). These results promote the notion that even young children are able to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions.

These domain differences were also expected to be found across rule contingency, authority contingency and setting generalizability. While this was generally the case, it did not hold perfectly true for all the variables. Similar to Smetana's 1981 study unprovoked moral violations were judged as more severe than unprovoked conventional violations when there

was no rule present and also when the act occurred in the home setting rather than the school setting. However unprovoked morals were not judged as more wrong than unprovoked conventions when no figure of authority had witnessed the event; although the raw proportions did change in the expected direction. That is, 7 of 153 participants indicated that a moral transgression would be “OK” in the absence of an authority figure while nearly twice as many (13 of 153) stated that a conventional transgression would be “OK” with no authority figure present. Previous studies show that authority judgments often yield a weaker distinction than some of the other judgments, so the absence of a difference here may simply correspond to normal variance around a weak effect (Astor, 1994).

Following Smetana (2003), the main hypothesis was that children would judge prototypical transgressions as more severe than both conventional and moral retaliations that have been provoked. As predicted, participants viewed prototypical moral and conventional transgressions as more serious and more deserving of punishment than those transgressions that were provoked by a different child. The finding that moral prototypical transgressions are judged as worse than moral retaliations is consistent with Smetana’s (2003) work on moral retaliation and also that of Hewitt (1975) and Astor (1994). Smetana found that children judged hypothetical moral transgressions to be more serious and more punishable than provoked transgressions, and also when the retaliation involved hitting rather than teasing. Our study also found these differences between prototypical and conventional acts, but we also found differences between moral and conventional acts, which Smetana’s study did not investigate. It appears that the retaliators behavior is almost justified because of the provocation that led them to it, and whilst the consensus amongst children is still that retaliating is wrong, there seems to be some leniency in judging the severity of the act when it has been provoked.

What can be concluded from these findings however, that no research has documented

before, is that over retaliating (i.e., retaliating against a conventional transgression with a moral transgression) with a moral transgression is judged as just as bad as when the act is not provoked at all. This is true for participants of all ages, but especially so for the youngest sample and the adult sample. The average judgment rating of these two population samples for the prototypical act and the over-retaliation were identical between the conditions, meaning that they judged morally retaliating to a convention just as severe as committing a moral transgression for no reason. In Smetana's (2003) study, the majority of children always judged retaliatory aggression to be wrong, however there were not such conditions that investigated cross-domain provocations and retaliations. Whilst physical and psychological retaliations were examined, with physical retaliation being judged as more severe than psychological, there were no conditions comparing moral retaliations with conventional retaliations. From the current findings, it is apparent that both adults and children see morally retaliating in response to a conventional transgression to be very severe and sometimes equally as wrong as transgressing without a cause.

Drawing upon the work of Piaget (1932) can help explain the differences between retaliating with the same or similar act, and over retaliating. According to Piaget as children get older they will begin to integrate the principal of reciprocity into their judgments about the severity and appropriateness of retaliation. This implies that when judging an act, children will tend to believe that the retaliation should be equal to the act that was committed against them, so for example if someone spits at you, you should spit back to create a sense of fairness. If this type of behavior were truly reinforced by participants, then they would have expected to show some levels of endorsement for retaliations that matched the provocation. However, this was not the case. Whilst domain matched retaliations were judged less harshly than unprovoked acts and over-retaliations, they were still unanimously judged as wrong, and condemned by all participants.

Rather than accentuate the dissimilarity between Piaget's findings and those of the current study, it may be more useful to explain why matched retaliations are judged as less severe than the other conditions in this study. The unprovoked condition and the over-retaliating act in the moral domain were judged on average as the most severe and most deserving of punishment. It is possible the reasoning behind this is due to the complete lack of fairness in these conditions. It appears that when a retaliation or transgression is more severe than the original act, it cannot be justified – perhaps in the same way than an unprovoked transgression cannot be justified. It is interesting to note that in the conventional domain, the under-retaliation condition was not judged differently compared to the other retaliations in the conventional domain. As Piaget would suggest, the matched retaliation can be justified because it is restoring a sense of justice, the under-retaliation however does not appear to 'even out' the impact of the original transgression. Committing a conventional act in retaliation to a moral is not judged as creating fairness, nor is it judged as unjustified due to severity. Participants appear to draw on their knowledge of social conventions when making judgments about the under-retaliation condition, it can be concluded that it is evaluated as bad because we learn that it is socially wrong to engage in retaliation, and children will have already learnt the consequences of mis-behaving in a multiplicity of situations and settings (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Shantz & Pentz, 1972). However under-retaliating, whilst still condemned is not judged as the most severe because it is essentially not restoring a sense of justice. Such severe judgments of the over-retaliation condition can be attributed perhaps to the excessive nature of the act itself in response to the provocation, and not simply the fact that it comes from an unmatched domain.

Most variation in results was found in the conventional retaliation conditions rather than the moral conditions. Results highlighted more age differences in responses for the relevant conventional conditions when compared to the moral conditions. Adult participants

overall judged conventional acts to be less severe on average than any of the child participants, similar to the findings of Thoma et al. (2014) highlighting the magnitude to which adults and children have when judging conventional transgressions. One explanation for this could be that adults have slightly different concepts of conventions than young children do. Turiel (1978) highlighted how individuals come to learn and understand conventions better over time as a result of social interactions, explaining the different judgments of younger children, older children and adults. Child participants who are still exposed to the school environment will be experiencing frequent reinforcement about the consequences of breaking any conventional transgressions that may disrupt classroom morale. A study by Astor (1994) found that the majority of children will identify unprovoked transgressions as a violation of social rules, and that they reasoned that these social rules exist for moral reasons (i.e., to prevent harm). Therefore it is easy to see perhaps why younger children would judge conventions more harshly than adults, they are drawing upon their current knowledge of social rules and adult constraints, that is different to adults' knowledge. Adult participants also thought conventional transgressions were less punish-worthy than the younger participants, again supporting the work by Turiel (1978) that suggests we develop a better understanding of conventions as we get older, which provides us with more expertise for making these judgments across settings and situations.

An interesting finding is that the youngest children seem to judge the prototypical transgression as far less permissible than any other age group. Not only are their responses much different from the other groups, but they also judge this condition as much more punish-worthy than any other condition. It could be argued that these responses reflect some form of social-desirability regarding provocation and retaliation, for example if they have been taught in the school environment that it is wrong to retaliate against another peer, and that telling the teacher or an adult is the responsible thing to do, then it could be likely that they answer the

questions in such a way that they believe will present them in a positive light to the researcher. However, it seems likely that one's awareness of the severity of retaliation develops and increases with age, Piaget (1932/1977) stated that as children get older they are more likely to use the notion of reciprocity when making evaluations about the appropriateness of retaliating, a strategy that younger children do not yet draw upon. Smetana (2003) also found that older school-age children are less likely than younger children to use undifferentiated justifications when making judgments about prototypical transgressions. She concluded that as children get older, they are more successful in understanding the moral meaning of situations involving provoked and unprovoked acts. Nevertheless, further research will be needed to determine which factors influence both children's and adult's condemnation of provoked and unprovoked events.

There were often no significant findings regarding authority, rule and setting contingency, reflecting that children have an understanding that the act would still be considered wrong even if it was not observed by a teacher; there was no rule present; and it occurred in a different setting. These findings are similar to Smetana's (2003) and reflect knowledge about moral condemnation. Again, where this study does differ however is in the conventional domain condition. There were significant differences for authority contingency in the conventional conditions that occurred between the unprovoked condition and the under-retaliation condition and the under-retaliation condition and the same domain different act condition. It could be suggested that retaliations that are less severe than the original act, are seen as more permissible when no teacher witnessed them because the levels of harm caused by the retaliator do not justify punishment when compared to the original transgression. This is supported by the findings that under-retaliations in general seem to be less severe and deserving of punishment than over retaliating. Smetana's (2003) work shows that for moral retaliations children view them as not ok even when an authority figure did not witness the

act, it is interesting to note however that there is an exception for conventional retaliations against a moral transgression, again documenting these across domain differences. What is difficult to explain however is why these findings have not been replicated for rule and setting contingency, it could be concluded similar to overall act evaluation that people's judgments are less dictated by figures of authority and more by the rules that are present and their knowledge of environment appropriate behaviors.

Investigating children's perceptions of victim and retaliator's emotions revealed differences between their emotional states. Results suggested the retaliator had more positive emotions attributed to them than they did when they were victims. It could be argued that the reason children believe the retaliator feels better after they have retaliated is because they have re-established a sense of equity and have equalled the situation. However those who study the 'happy victimizer' phenomenon would argue that the retaliator now feels good because the outcome has satisfied their desire of revenge (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). The findings in this study could infer that what is driving this recovered emotion is the pleasure of victimizing rather than restorative nature of the retaliator's action. For example, results show that even when a moral transgression is retaliated with a conventional act - which is substantially less severe than the original transgression, children still judge the retaliator as feeling better even though they haven't quite restored justice to the situation. This under-retaliation does just as much for restoring emotion than if they retaliated with the same act they were victimized with. Therefore, regardless of the way in which one retaliates, it can be concluded that it must be the act of victimizing that leads to increases in positive emotions. This current study was not progressed in such a way as to make any definite conclusions about the attribution of emotions to victims and retaliators. However future research could investigate whether retaliating for reasons of restoring justice would give different outcomes than retaliating and feeling better just because someone was victimized. Perhaps a suitable

way to explore this would be to design a study where the initial perpetrator becomes a victim, not by the hand of his or her own victim but by somebody else, and whether this increases positive feelings of the original victim.

Overall, both adults and children show domain distinctions when making judgements about acts of retaliation. The findings extend social domain theory by demonstrating domain distinctions in the judgements of provoked and unprovoked acts when they occur across domains. A strength of the study was that the sample was ethnically diverse, taken from a range of kindergarten and elementary level programs. We also collected data from both boys and girls, across ages ensuring that the findings are largely generalizable. From the main findings it is apparent overall that children's judgments of acts were dependent on the function of the act (unprovoked or provoked), the type of provocation and retaliation, and their age. Previous research has documented children's knowledge of the differences between moral and conventional domains and provoked and unprovoked acts, highlighting how morals are unanimously judged as worse than conventions and unprovoked acts as worse than provoked acts.

This study went one step further however and collected valuable information regarding cross-domain retaliations. The current study expanded the area of interest on children's judgments of provocation and has advanced understandings of social domain theory by demonstrating domain distinctions in situations of retaliation, concluding that there are significant differences in the permissibility of cross-domain retaliations. This study limited the type of provocation to only three different acts, avenues for future research could include looking into which transgressors in particular warrant more or less retaliatory behavior. Research could investigate if there is a hierarchy of moral and conventional behaviours, and which acts deserve to be reciprocated and which do not. It would also be interesting to see if such studies document different findings across cultures, ethnicities and

socio-economic backgrounds, similar to the work of Jagers, Bingham and Hans (1996)
investigating social judgments of inner-city African-American kindergartners.

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Table 1A: Act Evaluation and Punish-worthiness for Unprovoked Acts

<i>Judgment</i>	<i>Moral</i>	<i>Conv</i>	<i>d</i>
Evaluation	1.83	1.48 ^a	.737
Punish-worthiness	1.70	1.24 ^a	.787

^ap<.05; d = Cohen's d statistic

Table 1B: Setting, Rule, and Authority Judgments for Unprovoked Acts

<i>Judgment</i>	<i>Moral</i>		<i>Conv</i>	
	OK	Not OK	OK	Not OK
Generalizability ^a	5	148	25	128
Rule Contingent ^a	5	148	31	122
Authority Contingent	7	146	13	140

^ap<.05

Table 1C: Act Evaluation for Unprovoked Acts: Age Comparisons

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Moral Transgression	1.72	1.88	1.87	1.83 ^a
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression	1.76	1.60	1.09	1.48 ^b
<i>Total</i>	1.74	1.74	1.48 ^c	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 1D: Punish-worthiness for Unprovoked Acts: Age Comparisons

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Moral Transgression	1.66	1.66	1.79	1.69 ^a
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression	1.57	1.30	.83	1.24 ^b
<i>Total</i>	1.62 ^c	1.48	1.31	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 2: Act Evaluations for Moral Retaliations

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Moral Transgression	1.72	1.88	1.87	1.83 ^a
Same Moral Retaliation	1.64	1.66	1.57	1.63 ^b
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Different Moral Retaliation	1.74	1.66	1.64	1.68 ^b
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Moral Retaliation	1.72	1.75	1.87	1.78 ^a
<i>Total</i>	1.71	1.74	1.74	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 3: Punish-worthiness of Moral Retaliations

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Moral Transgression Same Moral Retaliation	1.66	1.66	1.79	1.70 ^a
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Different Moral Retaliation	1.43	1.34	1.43	1.39 ^b
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Moral Retaliation	1.51	1.53	1.51	1.52 ^c
	1.62	1.64	1.79	1.68 ^a
<i>Total</i>	1.55	1.54	1.63	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 4: Act Evaluation Judgments for Conventional Conditions (Means Out of 3)

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Conventional Transgression	1.78	1.59	1.09	1.50 ^a
Same Conventional Retaliation Unprovoked Conventional Transgression	1.38	1.41	0.98	1.27 ^b
Different Conventional Retaliation Unprovoked Moral Transgression	1.46	1.42	1.02	1.31 ^b
Conventional Retaliation	1.46	1.40	0.98	1.29 ^a
<i>Total</i>	1.52	1.45	1.02	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 5: Punish-worthiness of Conventional Retaliations

<i>Condition</i>	<i>4- to 6-yr-olds</i>	<i>7- to 9-yr-olds</i>	<i>Adults</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Conventional Transgression Same Conventional Retaliation	1.57	1.31	0.83	1.24 ^a
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Different Conventional Retaliation	1.02	1.29	0.83	1.07 ^b
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Conventional Retaliation	1.34	1.19	0.87	1.14 ^b
	1.19	1.32	0.79	1.12 ^b
<i>Total</i>	1.28 ¹	1.28 ¹	.83 ²	

Note: Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences, $p < .05$

Table 6: Frequency and Percentage of Negative Judgments for the Moral Victim and Retaliator's Emotional State

	As Victim	As Retaliator
Unprovoked Moral Transgression	148/153 (97%)	
Moral Transgression Same Moral Retaliation	150/153 (98%)	74/153 ^a (48%)
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Different Moral Retaliation	153/153 (100%)	85/153 ^a (56%)
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Moral Retaliation	152/153 (99%)	72/153 ^a (47%)
Total	603/612 (99%)	231/459 ^a (50%)
Total Means	2.97	1.51 ^a

^ap<.05

Table 7: Frequency and Percentage of Negative Judgments for the Conventional Victim and Retaliator's Emotional State

	As Victim	As Retaliator
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression	146/153 (95%)	
Conventional Transgression Same Conventional Retaliation	148/153 (97%)	70/153 ^a (46%)
Unprovoked Conventional Transgression Different Conventional Retaliation	139/153 (91%)	68/153 ^a (44%)
Unprovoked Moral Transgression Conventional Retaliation	151/153 (99%)	74/153 ^a (48%)
Total	584/612 (95%)	212/459 ^a (46%)
Total Means	2.83	1.39

^ap<.05

Figure 1: Sample Condition of Matched Domain Retaliation




Condition	Provocation	Retaliation
MM: Matched domain provocation and retaliation		

Figure 2: Sample Condition of Mismatched Domain Retaliation

Condition	Provocation	Retaliation
CM: Matched domain provocation and retaliation		

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THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA
R E S E A R C H

September 24, 2014

Jason Scofield, Ph.D.
Dept. of Human Development & Family Studies
College of Human Environmental Sciences
Box 870160

Re: IRB # 14-OR-332, "Judging Retaliations in Different Social Domains"

Dear Dr. Scofield:

The University of Alabama Institutional Review Board has granted approval for your proposed research.

Your application has been given expedited approval according to 45 CFR part 46. You have also been granted the requested waiver of informed consent. Approval has been given under expedited review category 7 as outlined below:

(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

Your application will expire on September 22, 2015. If your research will continue beyond this date, please complete the relevant portions of the IRB Renewal Application. If you wish to modify the application, please complete the Modification of an Approved Protocol form. Changes in this study cannot be initiated without IRB approval, except when necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants. When the study closes, please complete the Request for Study Closure form.

Please use reproductions of the IRB approved stamped consent and assent forms.

Should you need to submit any further correspondence regarding this proposal, please include the above application number.

Good luck with your research.

Sincerely,



Carpathia T. Myles, MSM, CIM, CIP
Director & Research Compliance Officer
Office for Research Compliance
The University of Alabama



352 Rose Administration Building
Box 870127
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35687-0127
Tel: (205) 348-4466
Fax: (205) 348-7189
TDD: (205) 348-5066

IRB Project #:

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

I. Identifying Information

	Principal Investigator	Second Investigator	Third Investigator
Names:	Jason Scofield	Laurie Williams	
Department:	JIDFS	JIDFS	
College:	HES	HES	
University:	UA	UA	
Address:			
Telephone:	8-4057	205-886-5170	
FAX:			
E-mail:	scofieldj@ches.ua.edu	lawilliams15@crimson.ua.edu	

Title of Research Project: Interging Relationships in Different Social Domains

Date Submitted: 8-22-14
Funding Source: None

Type of Proposal	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New	<input type="checkbox"/> Revision	<input type="checkbox"/> Renewal Please attach a renewal application	<input type="checkbox"/> Completed	<input type="checkbox"/> Exempt
			Please attach a continuing review of studies form		
Please enter the original IRB # at the top of the page					

UA faculty or staff member signature: _____

II. NOTIFICATION OF IRB ACTION (to be completed by IRB):

Type of Review: _____ Full board Expedited

IRB Action:

Rejected Date: _____
 Tabled Pending Revisions Date: _____
 Approved Pending Revisions Date: _____

Approved-this proposal complies with University and federal regulations for the protection of human subjects.

Approval is effective until the following date: 9-22-15

Items approved: Research protocol (dated 9-23-14)
 Informed consent (dated 9-23-14)
 Recruitment materials (dated _____)
 Other (dated _____)

Approval signature: _____ Date: 9/24/2014

Title: Judging Retaliations in Different Social Domains

Investigator: Dr. Jason Scofield, Associate Professor, HHS, UA

Description: This letter describes a research project being conducted by researchers at the University of Alabama. The purpose of this project is to learn more about how preschool children judge acts of retaliation. Each child will complete a 15-minute interview session. During the session the investigator will show the child a series of animated cartoon characters depicting familiar moral and social behaviors. Children will then be asked questions about the scenes, to gain an insight into their understanding of retaliation.

Risks and Benefits: There are no foreseeable risks due to participation in this project. There are no direct benefits for participating in the project, but participation will contribute to the overall knowledge of child development.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this project is completely voluntary. Participation or non-participation will have no effect on your or your child's relationship with The Children's Program or The University of Alabama.

Confidentiality: All answers will be kept completely confidential and no child will be identified in any published report of this research.

Right to Withdraw: Each child is free to refuse participation or withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice or negative consequence. Parents are also free to withdraw their child from the study at any time without prejudice or negative consequence.

Investigator/Contacts: If you have any questions about this project please contact the PI, Jason Scofield by phone @ 205-348-4057 or e-mail @ scofield@ches.ua.edu. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a participant in this research project, you may contact Ms. Tanya Myles, the Research Compliance Officer at UA, at 205-348-8461 or toll-free at 1-877-820-3066. You may also ask questions, make suggestions, or file complaints and concerns through the IRB Outreach website at http://osp.ua.edu/site/PROO_Welcome.html or email us at particpartoutreach@bama.ua.edu. After you participate, you are encouraged to complete the survey for research participants that is online at the outreach website or you may ask the investigator for a copy of it and mail it to the University Office for Research Compliance, Box 870127, 358 Rose Administration Building, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0127.

Informed Consent: I, _____, have read the description, including the purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, the potential risks and side effects, the confidentiality, as well as the option to withdraw from the study at any time. Each of these items has been explained to me by the investigator. The investigator has answered all of my questions regarding the study, and I believe I understand what is involved. My signature below indicates permission for my child to participate in this study.

Parent/Guardian's Signature

Date

School

Child's Name

Birth Date

Gender

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IRB
CONSENT FORM APPROVED: 9-23-14
EXPIRATION DATE: 9-23-15

Child's Assent

The Experimenter will monitor assent throughout the session. In addition, the following will be read to the preschool children who have parental consent to be in the study.

Hi (child's name). My name is (experimenter's name). We are asking children like you to look at cartoon pictures of people doing different things. Then we want to ask you some questions about the people in the pictures. Would you like to see the pictures with us now?

Child's response: Yes No

Date: _____

Person reading the assent to child: _____

UA IRB Approved Document
Approval date: 9-23-14
Expiration date: 9-22-15

Participant Information Sheet

Title: Judging Retaliations in Different Social Domains

Investigator: Dr. Jason Scofield, Associate Professor, HDFS, UA

Description: This letter describes a research project being conducted by researchers at the University of Alabama. The purpose of this project is to learn more about how adults judge acts of retaliation. Each participant will complete a 15-minute interview session. During the session the investigator will show the participant a series of animated cartoon characters depicting familiar moral and social behaviors. Participants will then be asked questions about the scenes, to gain an insight into their understanding of retaliation.

Risks and Benefits: There are no foreseeable risks due to participation in this project. There are no direct benefits for participating in the project, but participation will contribute to the overall knowledge of moral development.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this project is completely voluntary. Participation or non-participation will have no effect on your or your relationship with The University of Alabama.

Confidentiality: All answers will be kept completely confidential and no participant will be identified in any published report of this research.

Right to Withdraw: Each participant is free to refuse participation or withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice or negative consequence.

Investigator/Contacts: If you have any questions about this project please contact the PI, Jason Scofield by phone @ 205-348-4057 or e-mail @ scofield@hdfs.ua.edu. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a participant in this research project, you may contact Ms. Tanta Myles, the Research Compliance Officer at UA, at 205-348-8461 or toll-free at 1-877-820-3066. You may also ask questions, make suggestions, or file complaints and concerns through the IRB Outreach website at http://osp.ua.edu/site/PRCO_Welcome.html or email us at participantoutreach@bama.ua.edu. After you participate, you are encouraged to complete the survey for research participants that is online at the outreach website or you may ask the investigator for a copy of it and mail it to the University Office for Research Compliance, Box 870127, 358 Rose Administration Building, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0127.

UA IRB Approved Document

Approval date: 9-23-17

Expiration date: 9-22-18