

MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ARCHIVES OF
FALLEN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

by

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A THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Library and Information Studies
in the College of Communication and Information Sciences
in the Graduate School of
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2013

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ABSTRACT

This thesis poses the question: What happens to intelligence archives when authoritarian regimes collapse? These files have both personal privacy and national security connotations that separate them from most archival material. As countries make the transition towards democracy, what can be done and are there any lessons learned from historical examples?

Three cases have been examined: the Soviet Union's KGB, East Germany's Stasi, and Apartheid South Africa's NIS. This research examines how the files were handled by the regimes while they were in power, what happened during the transition, and the status of the archives after the transformation of government.

The research finds that while some outcomes are positive or negative, the decisions and the situations are not clear-cut. Not all information can be released as a country becomes a democracy, while information can be obtained from nations that restrict their democratic reforms.

These cases provide examples of the decisions that leaders and archivists could make to open these files to citizens. Although each country is unique in how a government will be run, this work offers additional perspectives on what policies could be in place for other countries in the future.

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the family, friends, and scholars who have assisted me in the completion of my work. It has been a longer journey than anticipated, but I am glad to have made it and look back at it as an experience I do not regret.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS, TERMS, AND DEFINITIONS

Abbreviation and terms	Organization	English translation
Abteilung		Working Group
AFNS	<i>Amt für Nationale Sicherheit</i>	Office of National Security
ANC		African National Congress
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i>	Federal Intelligence service
BOSS		Bureau for State Security
BStU	<i>Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen</i>	Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives
CPSU		Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DDR/ GDR	<i>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</i>	German Democratic Republic
FSB	<i>Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti</i>	Federal Security Service
<i>Glasnost</i>		Openness
GNU		Government of National Unity

GPU		State Political Administration
GRU	<i>Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie</i>	Chief Military Intelligence
HA	<i>Hauptabteilungen</i>	Main Directorates
HVA	<i>Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung</i>	Foreign Espionage
IM	<i>Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter</i>	Unofficial employee/ Informer
K-5	<i>Komtariat 5</i>	
KGB	<i>Komitet Gosdarstvennoi Bezopasnoti</i>	Committee for State Security
MfS	<i>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR</i>	Ministry for State Security
MGB		Ministry for State Security
MVD	<i>Ministerstvo Vnutrenikh Del</i>	Ministry of the Interior
NIA		National Intelligence Agency

NICC		National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NIS		National Intelligence Service
NKVD		People's Commissariat of International Affairs
NSMS		National Security Management System
OGPU		Unified Political Administration
<i>Okhrana</i>	<i>Okhrannoye otделение</i>	Department for Protecting the Public Security and Order (Tsarist Secret Police)
<i>Perestroika</i>		Movement
SAS		State Archive Service
SASS		South Africa Security Service
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i>	Socialist Unity Party of Germany

SSC		State Security Council
StUG	<i>Das Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz</i>	Stasi Records Act
SVR	<i>Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki</i>	Foreign Intelligence Service
TRC		Truth and Reconciliation Commission
VCheKa		Emergency Commission
ZAIG	<i>Zentrale Arbeitsgruppe Auswertung und Information</i>	Central Evaluation and Information Working Group

APPRECIATION

I want to offer my sincere gratitude to Monica Ayhens and Katharine Shepherd for editing my drafts and pushing me to write. Without their assistance I know that this thesis would not have been completed.

I would like to thank my committee members for their assistance in editing and organizing this thesis. Dr. Elizabeth Aversa for her guidance as the committee chair and as an advisor to me on other matters while completing my MLIS. Dr. John Beeler for editing and willingness to be a part of my committee. And Dr. Robert Riter for constantly offering insight into the topic and assisting me in my work late at night.

Thank you to my family and friends for their encouragement and support. Lastly, to Jojo for being the cat who could both distract and soothe me at his discretion.

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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

On November 9, 1989 the East German Foreign Intelligence office, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung (HVA), began the destruction of its records. Markus Wolf, the head of the HVA, followed the order to burn the files the same day that the Berlin Wall opened in response to protests. Since October 1989, organized marches throughout East Germany destabilized and eventually unseated the authoritarian regime. The HVA sought to hide its actions until the protestors stormed the Stasi offices around the country on January 15, 1990 to stop the destruction. However, in February 1990 at a meeting of the Roundtable, the citizen group dominated transitional government; Markus Wolf convinced the leaders that the destruction of the files should continue. He argued that the HVA, as a foreign intelligence service, needed to destroy the files for national security reasons and burned nearly the entire archive.¹

In times of transition, the possibility for government archives to be destroyed, lost, hidden, or stolen increases and the archival information stands a greater chance of never being read.² What are the lessons learned from the example with the HVA and other authoritarian intelligence services? How are intelligence files to be saved for the future? Intelligence files are particularly important because they affect the government, the citizens, and the security agencies that interact with them. They are unique, as they deal with confidential information that can have broad implications on the activities of people and the way a government conducts itself. Democratic governments should secure and manage the files with the goal of ensuring access in the future.

¹ John Koehler, "East Germany: The Stasi and De-Stasification" *Demokratizatsiya*, 12 (Summer 2004): 383.

² Patricia Sleeman, "Cultural Genocide" in *Archives and Archivists*, ed. Ailsa C. Holland and Kate Manning (Portland, Oregon: Four Courts Press, 2006), 188.

At the same time, governments should acknowledge that it is likely that some files will be lost to history.

This research poses the question “What happens to intelligence archives when authoritarian regimes collapse?” To focus this study, five handling questions guide this research: 1) What were the initial decisions by the government for handling the intelligence archives? 2) Who managed the archives? 3) Where were the files located? 4) What is the status of the files now? (Are they available, and if so, to whom?) and 5) How have the files been used?

Three cases are examined: East Germany’s Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi, MfS), apartheid South Africa’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB). As these political transitions occurred over 20 years ago, there has been a significant amount of research written about each case. This thesis discusses information on the authoritarian intelligence services, the successor governments, and the decisions made by the successor governments regarding the agencies’ archives.

For the purpose of this thesis, the terms used to describe subjects of the thesis are those commonly used within the intelligence community and political science. **Intelligence** is knowledge about an adversary or individual gained through observation and understanding; it is security information that can be used, gained, or sought by competing intelligence agencies.³ **Authoritarian governments** are non-democratic and oppressive, restricting the rights of citizens to engage freely in a range of activities. A **transitional/successor government** is the one that follows the authoritarian regime and either strives to be or is a democracy. A **democracy** or a **democratic nation** is one in which the voices of the people are heard and elections take place.

³ Jan Goldman, *Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary* (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 82.

The internal intelligence agencies within these three case studies were a constant presence in the lives of the citizens. Intelligence operatives, secret police members, or informers within each country numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In East Germany, the Stasi had over 100,000 full time agents and nearly the same number of Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs) or unofficial informers. Either bribed or forced to become informers, IMs could not choose non-cooperation or the secret police would turn on them. People lived in fear of being monitored and had reason to think they were under observation. In East Germany the ratio of spies to citizens was 1:120 people in a country with a population of only 13 million. In other Communist nations they were not nearly as pervasive, but still there were significant secret police presences. In Russia, the ratio was 1:600 people, Czechoslovakia 1:780, and Poland 1:1,500.⁴

This engine of intelligence collection created an enormous amount of information. Archives were established as locations for storage as well as for research. When the revolutions brought down the regimes, the intelligence services destroyed or attempted to destroy their own archives to preserve their reputations and prevent any repercussions. It was then the job of the successor governments to rebuild those archives and to consider how best to make them available to citizens.

Whether to open these archives or not is the debate that this research considers. Issues such as privacy vs. openness and stability or national security vs. justice are investigated. This research is descriptive by looking back at the three cases and attempting to draw lessons from the historical record. As each country and revolution was unique with different contexts, there cannot be any proscription on what a country should do. However, there were decisions made

⁴ Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi* (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 11.

along the path from authoritarianism by each country that have had both positive and negative consequences for opening the intelligence archives.

Archival Foundations

To guide this thesis and its relationship to library and archival science, four theories will be used as underpinnings on how best to consider the steps towards opening the intelligence archives. This thesis will draw upon their core concepts and consider how each will bring different perspectives and limitations.

The traditional theory of archives management in the United State is based on T.R. Schellenberg's "Archival Principles of Arrangement". The two basic principles he describes are provenance and original order. Provenance is the principle that archives should be associated with the source that creates them. Original order is the principle that archives are kept in the order created.⁵ This is to retain the archives for evidential use, as he says, "Archives also have an obvious value as evidence of the actions that resulted in their production. ... Every governmental archivist, for that reason, will preserve records containing evidence of the actions of the government he serves."⁶ In addition, the two principles facilitate access to the information contained within the archives through an ordered system. Files located within the archive can be organized based upon their usefulness and validity.

Schellenberg also asks in his book, Modern Archives, why have archives? The reasons he lists are first, they are a way of improving government efficiency when a glut of bureaucratic information is created. Second, archives are a cultural resource; they provide information about the people. Third, records are fundamental to protect old rights as well as securing those now and

⁵ Theodore R. Schellenberg, "Archival Principles of Arrangement" *The American Archivist*, 24 (January 1961): 12.

⁶ Schellenberg, *Archival Principles of Arrangement*, 13.

for the future. Fourth, records are needed for a government to work; they are sources of information as to why activities take or took place. The archives provide a foundation for the structure of a government to operate.⁷ Documentation enables any government to monitor their actions and to better distribute resources or responsibilities.

In relation to intelligence archives, the principles of arrangement that Schellenberg examines are useful for a successor government if they wish to grant access. Retaining the archives as they were enables citizens to follow the logical progression of secret creation and collection. Intelligence archives are a source of information that comes from public administration, diplomatic history, and national history.⁸ Through these records citizens are able to understand the history of the country and consider how to hold others responsible.

Going through security archives after the transition and considering how actors were responsible or to be held accountable is the issue addressed by Antonio Quintana in his research Archives and Human Rights. Quintana specifically looks at what should be done with intelligence archives after the fall of a repressive regime. He believes that archives should be retained and secured for the people, “Without records there can be little to no accountability. The preservation of records is essential to define responsibilities to guarantee reparations and to ensure that the mankind’s collective memory endures.”⁹ He clearly articulates the role of the archives in supporting the democratization process:

Archives in a democratic society serve the people. The preserved record, comprehensive in scope and documenting all of society, equally accessible to all, constitutes the irreplaceable foundation of evidence based governance. Only through an honest

⁷ Theodore R. Schellenberg, *Modern Archives; principles and arrangements* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1956), 8-10.

⁸ Schellenberg, *Modern Archives*, 115.

⁹ Antonio Quintana, *Archival Policies in the Protection of Human Rights* (International Council of Archives, Paris, 2009), 7.

understanding of the societies we have inherited and which we continue to build, their strengths and weaknesses, can we effectively address the challenges of the 21st Century.¹⁰

In this perspective, preserving archives is essential to understanding responsibility for the activities of the secret police. Archives have the capacity to guarantee that the people who supported the regime are properly prosecuted. “The archives contain evidence of violations of human rights. Archives become mirrors to the society that produced them so that people can view what they appeared to be.”¹¹

What should happen within particular countries, Quintana acknowledges, is a complex question. In the original report from 1995, he developed an outline of possible options for the archivists within each country to consider:

Without wishing to offer a set of guidelines which could be applied in every case, as each process of political transition is unique, the group sought to explain to archivists in countries in the process of transition towards democracy the range of problems they would have to face, while at the same time recognizing the actions taken in countries which had been through a similar process, whether complete or in a more or less advanced stage.¹²

In this more expansive report, Quintana offers eighteen recommendations for archivists and successor governments to follow. The recommendations explain his position on preserving all files from the former regime. He argues that the files should be retained, and archivists are the ones most responsible for organizing and maintaining the material. By choosing to follow a code of ethics, archivist’s knowledge of the authoritarian archive is greater than others.

However, Quintana overestimates governments’ and people’s foresight so his concepts are not easy to implement. His recommendations contain many “should be” suggestions. There is

¹⁰ Quintana, 8.

¹¹ Quintana, 23.

¹² Quintana, 17.

little to no discussion of the destruction of archives. He does not fully understand the perspective of repressive regimes that it might be better to destroy and hide information, rather than save it. The lack of documentation may not remove accountability of the actors, but it limits the possibility of prosecution for members of the government and intelligence agencies due to lack of evidence of wrong doing.

Facing the reality that destruction occurs, Patricia Sleeman's work "Cultural Genocide" looks at what happens to archives during wars and conflict. While the three cases did not occur in war zones, the archives were still destroyed. Sleeman's research on the elimination of material provides awareness of what she calls mnemocide, the deliberate destruction of an archive or the destruction of memory.¹³

We must pay attention to and understand the importance of memory, the archive, and the records to a people, especially during a time of war and occupation. The destruction of archives and records is a destruction of the unseen, not of flesh and blood, but that of the soul of a people. ...The obliteration of archives and documentation is hiding the irreplaceable history of people. Archives hold valuable documentation about the accomplishment of a nation and a government's actions as well as of its people's lives. To destroy an archive destroys a people's collective identity. The protection of cultural is an integral part of human rights.¹⁴

Sleeman's research backs up Quintana's recommendations, demonstrates why activism is necessary. The intelligence services shredded or burned vast amounts of information and have done so with the intent of hiding information from historical record. Mnemocide was a part of the overall control of information.

Lastly, it is Antoinette Burton's research on archives as a part of the narrative questions what memory is. In her edited work, Archival Stories, she reiterates the point that archives are as

¹³ Sleeman, 188.

¹⁴ Sleeman, 187-188.

much about finding information as they are about knowing truth. She looks at the case study of South Africa and says:

Debates that engage the challenges of “Truth telling about history” have had very real political and material consequences. In South Africa the TRC actively engaged with the question of archival evidence, deliberately choosing to “wrestle with... notions of truth in relation to factual or forensic truth” and producing in the process a nationwide debate about citizenship after apartheid.¹⁵

Such a project was and is tied to ‘making public memory, publicly’ and as such it often pits conventional forms of knowledge about the past (History) against the claims of groups who have typically been disenfranchised by dominant regimes of truth but who are also seeking political rights - in ways that endanger the status and livelihoods of some, traumatize others, and make visible the extent to which national identities are founded on archival elisions, distortions, and secrets.¹⁶

She argues that having access to information does not settle problems - it may create additional ones. In all three case studies where information was released from the archives, there have been serious ramifications.

Offering an alternative to the traditional Schellenbergian perspective, Burton makes the point that archives are not always kept as evidence nor can they follow the two principles of arrangement. Burton says:

Archives do not appear fully formed. Nor are they innocent of struggles for power in either their creation or their interpretive applications. Though their own origins are often occluded and the exclusions on which they are premised are often dimly understood, all archives come into being in and as history as a result of specific political, cultural, and socioeconomic pressures, pressures leave traces, which render archives themselves artifacts of history.¹⁷

While they can be used as evidence, how they are used is a more significant question.

¹⁵ Antoinette Burton, “Introduction, Archive Fever, Archive Stories” in *Archive Stories: Facts, Fiction and The Writing of History*, ed Antoinette Burton. (Durham, Duke University Press, 2005), 1-2.

¹⁶ Burton, 2.

¹⁷ Burton, 6.

These four theoretical concepts offer differing perspectives on how archives can best be preserved and used. For this thesis while looking at the cases, the theories can be summarized as:

- Schellenberg-archives can be used as evidence and should be retained in the provenance and original order created.
- Quintana-archives should be saved by and for democratic accountability.
- Sleeman- archival destruction is likely to occur in times of transition.
- Burton-Archives are both repositories of documents and memories, and that they can be a source of conflict when comparing the two.

Organization of the thesis

This thesis consists of four additional chapters.

The second chapter will provide context to these cases for the reader. For each case the history of the authoritarian regime and the intelligence service will be described. The structure and other details of the intelligence service will be explained. The archives of the intelligence services will be examined by looking at the structure of the department, how files were kept, and how they were used.

The third chapter will describe the political transition within the three cases, how the intelligence services dealt with the changes and what happened to the archives. In this process answers will be provided for the five handling questions: 1) What were the initial decisions by the government for handling the intelligence archives? 2) Who managed the archives? 3) Where were the files located? 4) What is the status of the files now? (Are they available, and if so, to whom?) 5) How have the archives been used?

The fourth chapter will analyze the positive and negative decisions made in the different cases and the lessons learned. The archival foundations will be considered to compare and contrast the different cases. The validity of the archives will be examined, and alternative examples beyond the three cases will be examined.

Finally, the thesis will conclude by looking at what this research means and how researching this question might affect the future of library science. How can the actions transfer to different cases? As well as future research, opportunities on the subject of intelligence archives will be explored.

CHAPTER 2- HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASES

The Soviet Union

KGB History

The Bolshevik revolution began on October 18, 1917. The revolution brought Vladimir Lenin and the Communist Party into power in Russia. To control the population and prevent counter-revolutionary forces such as those loyal to the tsar, Lenin organized an emergency council called the VCheKa to suppress dissidents. Lenin appointed Felix Dzerzhinsky, a trusted Bolshevik, to run the organization and eradicate any threats to Lenin's authority. He copied the methods of the tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, to propel the policies of Marxist-Leninism.¹⁸ While its targets originally were tsarists, the focus of the VCheKa soon turned on citizens who had engaged in benign behavior as simple as haggling at a market. With Communism established by 1922, the organization was renamed the GPU with Dzerzhinsky still at the head. He was seen as a hero of the Communist Party, after his death in 1926 Lubyanka square was renamed Dzerzhinsky square, where the headquarters of the secret police were located. And as a testament of the influence that he had, until 1990 other Communist secret police agencies called themselves "Chekists" to claim a connection and show respect.¹⁹

When Joseph Stalin rose to power in 1924, his obsession for security increased the power and importance of the secret police. Many Bolsheviks and would be allies were arrested under false charges and quickly executed. This period, called the "Red Terror", was the zenith of the secret police's control over the country. The secret police was renamed several times (see figure

¹⁸ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: the Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), 19-21.

¹⁹ Andrew and Gordievsky, 22.

1 in appendix), but its authority did not decline. It developed many of the tools of espionage and their use of informers that would spread to the rest of the Communist world as a way to collect information on citizens as well as to enforce party propaganda.²⁰

With the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the NKVD, as the secret police was then called, became a tool for Stalin to find and eliminate any individuals who might betray their country. Following the Second World War, these same tactics were used in Soviet occupied Eastern Europe, spreading the climate of fear. The death of Stalin in 1953 reduced some of the security state's influence, but significant aspects of the regime were still in place.²¹

In 1954 the KGB was founded as a way of retaining the Communist authority in the USSR answerable to the Soviet Politburo. Even as an intelligence agency, the KGB was involved in political activities. While Nikita Khrushchev sought to open Soviet society, beginning with his de-Stalinization policies, he used the KGB to arrest his political opponents. Leonid Brezhnev's period in office was harsher on the population due to a return to heightened security state after the 1968 Prague Spring.²² Yuri Andropov, the long lasting KGB chairman, rose to political power with the agency's assistance. He attempted to reform the Soviet system in both economic and political ways, but after a short stint in office. Andropov's unexpected death, as well as that of his successor Konstantin Cherenkov, made way for Mikhail Gorbachev to rise to power and fundamentally alter the KGB and the security state.²³

²⁰ Andrew and Gordievsky, 85-88.

²¹ Andrew and Gordievsky, 279-285.

²² Jeremy Azrael, "The KGB in Kremlin Politics" *RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior* JRS-05 (February 1989): v.

²³ Azrael, vi-vii.

The KGB structure

The KGB structure (see Figure 2 in appendix) was a template for many other intelligence agencies in Central Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Millions of citizens were informers called *stukachi*, or worked for the regime in other ways.²⁴ The organization was divided into different directorates to control different aspects of security. The KGB had an office in every Soviet Republic, but was subordinate only to the centralized hierarchy in Moscow, not republic-level administrators.²⁵

Organizationally the KGB was divided into 16 different departments or directorates, as well as administrative divisions that managed the organization. The numerical division of the KGB departments was based upon technology or task needs. As a new responsibility was identified and developed, a department was created or split from an existing department.²⁶ The Chief Directorates had an additional hierarchical organization as well, dividing tasks or expertise into certain offices. For example the First Chief Directorate, which was responsible for foreign intelligence collection, was organized into specialized skill directorates and departments that focused on specific regions such as the United States or Anglophone Africa.

The other important intelligence agency within the Soviet Union was the military intelligence office, Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU). If the KGB's mission was described as "not to allow the collapse of the Soviet Union from inside", the GRU was described as "not allow an external blow".²⁷ It ensured that no military action or security threat would take

²⁴ Mark Kramer, "Archival Policies and Historical Memory in the Post-Soviet Era" *Demokratizatsiya* 20 (Summer 2012): 204.

²⁵ Amy Knight. "Chapter 19, Internal Security" in *Soviet Union: a country study*, ed. Raymond Zickel (Washington DC: Library of Congress, May 1989), 765-766.

²⁶ Andrew and Gordievsky, Appendix C1.

²⁷ Viktor Suvorov, *Soviet Military Intelligence* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), 45.

place without prior knowledge. The GRU they had an internal archives department that contained millions of files on intelligence officers, recruited foreign agents, and information on political leaders.²⁸

The KGB Archives

There was not one archive of the KGB; it was separated into three sections, within three different directorates. The three archives were: the Central Archives of the KGB, the archives of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), and the archives of the 15th Directorate. The information was scattered making the process of gaining knowledge difficult for enemy agencies, but for internal enemies too. The level of mistrust within the Soviet Union deliberately ensured no division could be a threat to the government.²⁹

The Central archives contained records from 1917 to 1990, encompassing the KGB and all other previous incarnations of the secret police. Their holdings were for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th directorates. The archives contained information from border guards, secretariats, administrative departments, finance departments, personnel departments, and technical support. KGB agents were responsible for organizing the records inside the archives, as civilian archivists were not trusted. In addition, the entire system was paper based, as there was no computerized system to catalog or guide the agents in the KGB Central archive.³⁰

The FCD archives were intentionally kept separate because the contents dealt with foreign operations and intelligence gathering. This was a security measure meant to keep directorates incapable of sharing information. The 15th Directorate was the section responsible

²⁸ Suvorov, 71.

²⁹ Theodore Karasik, *The Post-Soviet Archives: Organization, Access, and Declassification* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 21.

³⁰ Karasik, 23.

for emergencies such as nuclear war, and its archive was kept in a secure location. It contained high-level security information.³¹

Gaining access to the FCD archives was a complex process. First a case officer had to obtain an authorization form detailing their who they were, which department and office they came from, who authorized their access, the date of their authorization, the file name and volume number requested, and then signatures of the person and their section chief. Second, approval was sent to the department/directorate from which the file originated. Third, the requestor had to go to the archive and give the authorization and approval forms, and then fill out two special index cards. On one was the subject of what the file contained, the other was the codename and what type of file it was: working, correspondence, or personnel. The archive official then wrote down the information of the person requesting the file and gave the binder that contained it to the person.³² By the mid-1980's the FCD archive had created a computer system to modernize the indexing system, however delays still occurred.³³

The FCD archivists collected the operational files from their fifteen other departments. An operations officer made the decision as to which files could be discarded if considered expedient, but a notation was made of the removal. Once the decision to retain the file was made, several files were collected as bound volumes and an archivist stamped "ARCH" with a cataloging number on the front cover of the volume.³⁴ These files were originally stored at the headquarters in Dzerzhinsky Square, but in 1972, the FCD moved to Yasenevo, a suburb of Moscow, to house the increasing number of files. Eventually the rate of file creation overwhelmed archives at Yasenevo and the Center and the FCD archives began photographing

³¹ Karasik, 24.

³² Oleg Gordievsky, "The KGB archives," *Intelligence and National Security*, 6 (1991): 7-8.

³³ Gordievsky, 11.

³⁴ Gordievsky, 9-10.

and putting the files on microfiche. This was both a space saving method and a security measure because the files duplicated were placed in secure bunkers.³⁵

East Germany

The Stasi

The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), or Stasi as it was colloquially known, was the secret intelligence agency of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). The agency was organized to be responsible for foreign and domestic espionage against all enemies.

The Stasi was founded on February 8, 1950 under the auspices of the Soviet Occupation, from an earlier organization, Kommissariat 5 (K-5). One of the leaders of K-5, Erich Mielke, was tapped to assist in running the organization, until assuming total power of the MfS in 1955.³⁶ He remained in control of the MfS until October 1989.

The presence of the Stasi was felt throughout the world, but particularly within the GDR. There were 15 branch offices scattered in major cities around East Germany with roughly 100,000 full time employees by 1989. With agents and IMs reporting on the activities and known opinions of many citizens, it held them in fear of being observed. This engine of information gathered 40 million individual cards on East German citizens, and information on 2 million West German citizens, as well as hundreds of thousands of photos, audio and visual recordings, and

³⁵ Gordievesky, 10-11.

³⁶ Wolfgang Krieger, "Foreign Intelligence Services in Germany after 1945" in *Intelligence in the Cold War. Organisation, Role, and international Cooperation*, eds. Lars Christian Jenssen and Olav Riste. (Norway: Norwegian Defence Studies, 2001), 75.

other items such as scent rags. These were used to track any dissident attempting to hide from the authorities.³⁷

Stasi Structure

Structurally, the MfS was divided into 13 main departments and 20 sections. The main departments were involved in covert operations and were called Hauptabteilungen (HA). The organization was divided by specialization, but the numerical division and specificity of the task was not based on any particular reasoning other than need for new departments.³⁸ For example, HA II was for counter espionage, internal control, and monitoring all foreigners traveling within the GDR. Foreign espionage was organized under the HVA, which was under the control of General Markus Wolf and General Wolfgang Schwanz. ³⁹

The sections were placed under the umbrella of the Central Assessment and Information Group (ZAIG), and they played the role of support, planning, and administration for the HA operations. Both fell under Stasi and Erich Mielke's direct authority. These sections performed tasks that were vital to the success of the Stasi because they enabled it to work efficiently. Two of the organizations were the Juristische Hochschule des MfS, which was the site of continuing education for MfS staff and Abteilung XII.

Stasi Archives

Abteilung XII was the official designation of the Stasi archives and records division. It was led by Colonel Heinz Roth, who received his doctorate through the Legal College. Before the collapse of the government, the department had 344 employees and was tasked with

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Mike Dennis, *Stasi, Myth and Reality* (London: Pearson Longman, 2003), 51.

³⁹ Koehler, *East Germany: The Stasi and De-Stasification*, 376.

organizing the personal records to make access retrievable to all departments that requested them.⁴⁰ To gain access to Abteilung XII required written authorization from Mielke himself.⁴¹

The files were organized through index-cards called F16s and F22s. The F16 index cards were cataloged in Ferris wheel like device that spun around until the archivist found the right name. They were organized by name; according to the Stasi's own phonetic alphabet, so for example Mueller, Muller, Möller, and Müller were all filed together. The reasoning behind this was the uncertainty of the proper spelling of some names. The given example would be difficult to spell properly in the midst of a wiretap or conversation. After finding the right name, the F22 index would retrieve the case number that contained additional information.⁴²

This system worked very well for gaining, collecting, and controlling information. There were very few other cases in history where such a large amount of information was gathered for the sake of a government to spy on its own citizens. It is said that an authoritarian regime is one that wants all information about private citizens, but arrests those who attempt to know about the regime. This political structure remained intact to do their work until 1989.

South Africa

Apartheid and National Security

As a nation of white colonizers with a majority black population, laws were passed codifying legal authority called apartheid.⁴³ Historical legislation began in 1856, culminated in the 1953 Separate Amenities Act, and was enforced by the creation of the security branch of the

⁴⁰ "Section Xii of the Ministry of State Security," <http://www.jugendopposition.de/index.php?id=3593> (accessed December 25, 2012).

⁴¹ John Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), 99.

⁴² Timothy Garton Ash, *The File: A Personal Story* (New York: Random House, 1997), 19.

⁴³ Sandy Africa, "The South African Intelligence Service: A historical Perspective", *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa. African Security Sector Network* (June 2009): 64.

South African police in 1947 to detain, prosecute, and imprison any activist opponents of the National Party.⁴⁴

In 1969, the Defense Ministry established the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to organize various intelligence components: military, domestic, and economic intelligence.⁴⁵ The BOSS coordinated the flow of intelligence information between government offices and briefed the State Security Council (SSC), made up of the major heads in the cabinet, for all meetings.⁴⁶ The Soweto Uprising on June 16, 1976 caught the regime by surprise and with the rise of P.W. Botha to the Prime Minister in 1978 the country became more authoritarian.

As Prime Minister, Botha sought two main goals: ensure stability for his government and stop the international boycott against South Africa. The National Security Management System (NSMS) was created with the SSC as the head organization. The BOSS was replaced by the Department of National Security, which was replaced by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1980. To undermine the boycott, these agencies ran extensive networks of informers within the South African populace and internationally to monitor leaders and activists.⁴⁷

The NIS and Botha declared a state of Emergency in 1985 that led to the arrest and torture of thousands of protestors and activists. The state of emergency extended until 1989 and kept police pressure on the activists. It was not until February 1989 when Botha had a stroke and enabled FW de Klerk to rise to power.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Africa, *South African Intelligence Service*, 65

⁴⁵ Joseph Smaldone, "Chapter 5, National Security" in *South Africa: a Country Study*, ed. Rita M. Byrnes (Washington DC: Library of Congress May 1996), 380.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Africa, *South African Intelligence Service*, 67.

⁴⁸ Smaldone, 380.

The Archives

South African archives were generally restricted. The Archives within the government were divided into separate divisions on the basis of confidentiality: Top Secret/Uiter Geheim (Blue files), Secret/Geheim (Pink files), and Confidential files.⁴⁹

From the mid-1950's to the late 1980's certain amounts of information became difficult or even dangerous to acquire. Holding or trying to gain a dissenting opinion from the government's philosophy put one in a suspicious circumstance. To ask about information on topics as broad as: conscientious objections to military service, liberation movements, oil supplies, or any information about the governance of "Bantustans" could put one's career or even life in jeopardy.⁵⁰

The BOSS and the NIS were supposed to save their information in the government archives according to the 1962 Archives Act. The Act was amended several times, but kept within the principle of preserving information. However, the intelligence services claimed an exception to the Archives Act and did not willingly give documents to the State Archive Service, in violation of the Protection of Information Act, which was not normally enforced.⁵¹

International pressure toward South African archivists fed into a cloistered society on all levels. As they were not invited to take part in international conferences as a part of the boycott,

⁴⁹ Sue Onslow, "Republic of South African Archives" *Cold War History* 15 (2005): 370.

⁵⁰ Verne Harris, *Archives and Justice: A South African perspective* (New York: Society of American Archivists, 2007), 270.

⁵¹ Harris, 307-308.

the conservatism within the field affected their ability to learn new archival skills and to adapt to western standards of information sharing.⁵²

⁵² Ailsa Holland, "From Louisbrough to Ladismith: archives in Ireland and South Africa in a century of conflict and change" in *Archives and archivists eds.* Ailsa Holland and Kate Manning (Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2006), 134.

CHAPTER 3- TRANSITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES

USSR into Russia

Collapse and breakup of the Soviet Union

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power on March 11, 1985 after a series of older Soviet leaders died in quick succession.⁵³ He was a protégé of Andropov, who thought that it was imperative for the Soviet Union to reform for its survival. His two main policies were *glasnost*, “openness” and *perestroika*, “movement”. These policies allowed criticism of the government, easier to access to information, and allowed citizens to print materials that were previously controlled by the government.⁵⁴

While *glasnost* was popular with the public, it was not well received within the KGB. Releasing the tight grip of power allowed people demanded more democratic rights and put the central leadership in a difficult position. The KGB thought that by allowing criticism, dissidents would make themselves known thereby assisting the agency in identifying threats. Instead, the open criticism enabled citizens and dissidents to speak up and led to even more criticism of the KGB.⁵⁵

Following the revolutions that began in 1989 and spread through Eastern Europe, unrest within the Soviet Politburo also grew. A group of conservative Communists - led by the KGB chairman Viktor Kryuchkov, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, and Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov- unhappy with the policies that Gorbachev implemented - organized a coup on August 18, 1991. Many of the *glasnost* reforms were rescinded and political opponents arrested. Boris

⁵³ David Marples, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union 1985-1991* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2004), 9.

⁵⁴ Marples, 16-17.

⁵⁵ Azrael, 34-35.

Yeltsin, the President of the Russian state and a supporter of the reforms of Gorbachev , organized protests and popular support pushed the plotters out on August 21, 1991.⁵⁶

Gorbachev, weakened by the putsch, was no longer able to hold the Soviet Union together. Yeltsin used his enhanced reputation to call for Russian separation and took over many of the administrative buildings and the nuclear arsenal of the USSR. On December 26, 1991 the Soviet Parliament voted to dissolve itself.⁵⁷ In the transition, the KGB was split into two different organizations. The Federal Security Service (FSB), a direct descendent of the KGB, and the *Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki* (SVR), which succeeded the FCD. Even though the organizations were renamed and the country became more democratic, individuals like Evgenii Primakov, who was the head of the FCD, retained their titles and continued working for the security services.⁵⁸

The KGB and other Soviet intelligence archives

On August 24, 1991, Yeltsin decreed that the archives of the KGB and the Communist party should be deposited into the care of the Russian Republic. He set up a Parliamentary Commission on the Transfer of CPSU and KGB Archives to State Use to calm fears about the files being lost and to prevent them from being used for political purposes.⁵⁹ However, even democratic allies of Yeltsin seized files from the archives to use as political weapons against their enemies.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Marples, 82-85.

⁵⁷ Marples, 94-97.

⁵⁸ Amy Knight, "Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, 12 (2010): 325.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Karasik, 1

From 1992-1993 the Yeltsin's government in Russia allowed open access to the Soviet archives. Yeltsin set up the Committee for Archival Affairs (Roskomarkhiv) to facilitate the release of government documents from the security agencies and the Communist party. The documents were housed in two locations: the Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) and the Rossiiki Tsentr Khraneniia Iizucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RsKhIDNI), which contained information on the Soviet Union from 1917 until 1952.⁶¹ Yeltsin appointed Rudolf Pikhov, a historian and personal ally, to head the Roskomarkhiv. He expected that many KGB files would be transferred, but that did not happen.⁶²

Although the KGB no longer existed, the FSB and SVR claimed ownership of the files and used the 1993 secrecy law to keep the files classified.⁶³ Soviet policy on declassification stated that any document over thirty years old could be released, but this dictate was almost never followed. The Parliamentary Committee set up by Yeltsin tried to force declassification of documents that dealt with "criminal cases" (i.e. political crimes) be released after fifteen years. The FSB obstructed every effort to release information and many files are still closed.⁶⁴

As the country transitioned out of communism, economic turmoil prevailed. The information within the Soviet archives became sources of wealth for those who had access to it. The leader of the SVR, Evgenii Primakov, used his position to create an arrangement with Crown Publishing to sell access to the KGB archives and information on spies during World War Two.⁶⁵ Pikhov allowed British microform company Chadwyck-Healey to make photographs and copies of the material and make them available to libraries. With a subscription cost of \$3

⁶¹ Knight, *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 326.

⁶² R.W. Davies. *Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era*(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997): 92-95.

⁶³ Davies 110.

⁶⁴ Knight, *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 327.

⁶⁵ Knight *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 328

million, however only organizations such as the Library of Congress and the Hoover Institute can afford to purchase access to these Communist party files.⁶⁶

After the brief open period access to the archives ceased and became accessible only for those who either paid bribes or had privileged political connections. That privileged access became a point of contention, as Russians themselves could not look at their own files. This situation created enormous public pressure during the 1996 Russian presidential election. To secure his nationalist base, Yeltsin significantly reduced access to the archives and re-classified many documents.⁶⁷

Current status

The situation in Russia has not changed much since 1996; there still remains very limited archival access. When Yelstin stepped down from power in 2000 his successor Vladimir Putin kept many of the restrictions in place. Putin was a former FCD officer who did not favor the open climate of information. Since 2000 many more documents have been re-classified and access to archival sources further limited.⁶⁸

As it stands the GRU and KGB archives remain closed for any material collected after 1945, and only a select few are even able to request documents. The only sources of information that are accessible are those documents reproduced during the open period of access, KGB archives within former Soviet states, and the Mitrokhin Archive.⁶⁹

The Mitrokhin Archive is a set of documents collected by Vasili Mitrokhin, the chief archivist of the FCD from 1972 to 1984. As a dissident deep within the KGB, he had special

⁶⁶ Koenker, Diane, Ronald D. Bachman, and Library of Congress, *Revelations from the Russian Archives: Documents in English Translation* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1997), xx-xxi.

⁶⁷ Knight, *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 331

⁶⁸ Kramer, 207-208.

⁶⁹ Natalie Yegirova, "Russian Archives: Prospects for Cold War Studies" *Cold War History*, 6 (November 2006): 546.

access unavailable to any other dissident. He smuggled out copies of documents every day for over ten years, at first a few at a time and eventually reams of paper. The documents were hidden at his home and summer dacha (cabin), making him extremely paranoid of being caught. In 1992, after the Soviet Union ceased to exist, he contacted and eventually defected to the British Secret Service, bringing his family and archive with him.⁷⁰ This significant archive has formed the basis for several books and was a source for many others. The Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Institute has digitized and allowed scholarly access to the entire Mitrokhin archive.⁷¹

While the KGB archives mainly remained within Russia and the files kept restricted, some information was housed in the former republics within the Soviet Union. As the KGB had offices within each of the republics, it contained archives that were useful for those places. The only exception to this was Soviet embassies, where secret files were only kept for a short period of time, and then were destroyed after several weeks.⁷²

Lithuania declared independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, 1990, but did not fully gain it until August of 1991. In the interim the KGB archive was looted by the KGB and protestors. Many files were taken back to Moscow during periods of intense fighting; Government officials did not properly maintain records, and numerous baskets filled with the ashes of burned documents were found at KGB offices.⁷³ In the aftermath, files taken by the government were used to blackmail KGB informers, forged documents were used to impugn the guilt of officials, and some documents were used by conservative political parties as cudgels

⁷⁰ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Sword and the Shield: the Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 1-15.

⁷¹ Mitrokhin Archive, "Mitrokhin Archive" Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/52/mitrokhin-archive> (accessed June 15, 2012).

⁷² Gordievesky, 9.

⁷³ Tomas Skucas, "Lithuania: A problem of Disclosure" *Demokratizatsiya*, 12 (Summer 2004): 416-417.

against liberals for associating with the Communist Party.⁷⁴ By 1994, the files were placed in a secure archive, having saved only a fraction of the files that still existed. The files were then organized into different categories and the work of declassifying and cataloging is still ongoing.

Unification of Germany

Collapse of the GDR

The fall of the East German government was the harbinger of change that enabled Eastern Europe to remove the shackles that the Soviet Union had put on it. To briefly describe the history of autumn 1989 that led to the collapse of the SED and the MfS: East German "vacationers" migrated to Hungary, a tent camp was set up in the West German embassy in Prague, protests erupted and grew in Leipzig, and the Berlin Wall came down on November 9th.

On November 15th, the SED attempted to stall the protests by reconstituting itself as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). The Stasi was renamed as well as the Office for National Security (AfNS). Mielke was removed, and General Wolfgang Schwanz taking charge. Even prior to this transition Schwanz ordered the HVA to begin destroying and burning archival files remove incriminating information.⁷⁵

As protests continued throughout the country, and negotiations to render the GDR more democratic, other Stasi offices throughout the country were destroying many of the personal files. On December 4th, several hundred citizens in Rostock surrounded the Stasi office and negotiated control of the archive. They saw that some files had been destroyed while many were in the process of being removed. They eventually stopped the destruction, but not soon enough to

⁷⁴ Skucas, 418.

⁷⁵ Koehler, *Stasi and De-Stasification*, 383.

save many documents. In mid-December PDS premiere Hans Modrow authorized the destruction of all remaining files in Berlin.⁷⁶ Smoke from the Stasi headquarters on Normanstrasse poured out. Not until January 15, 1990 did protestors in Berlin breach the gates and were able to stop the destruction of the main archive of Abteilung XII.

Controversy and debate of the records during re-unification

With the remaining Stasi files secured, the question became what to do with them. Those files that escaped destruction were significant, an entire warehouse of documentation that could alter the lives of many Germans. The decision on what to do with them divided the people. Those who had benefited from the regime joined with those who feared violence to urge the closure of the archives. For the latter group, they considered privacy to be very important, and the fear of revenge and mistrust at a time of unity was in the minds of citizens. The last, and democratically elected, government of the GDR was against the release of any files. Rainer Eppelmann, the Minister of Defense, said, “new freedoms would be jeopardized by denunciation, revelations, and acts of revenge”. The Minister of the Interior, Peter Diestel, called the files “products of evil”. The West German government opposed opening the archive because it would have threatened their security situation by revealing sources and methods of their intelligence service the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).⁷⁷

The final decision was to open the archives, but the Roundtable made sure to weigh the concerns that opponents had. The view was that the files belonged to the people and they had a right to know what had been written about them and by whom. The Unification Treaty created the right for people to look at their files. And on December 29, 1991 the Stasi Records Act

⁷⁶ Kohler, *Stasi and De-Stasification*, 386.

⁷⁷ Dennis, 236.

(StUG) went into effect creating the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives (BStU).⁷⁸The leader of this Commission was Pastor Joachim Gauck, a leader of the protests in Rustock. The name of this Commission is colloquially known as the Gauck Authority.⁷⁹

What happened to the archives?

With the StUG passed, this law set out to open the available archives to the public, while balancing privacy and national security concerns. The most important functions of this law and the BStU were to analyze, repair, and distribute the files from the Archive to those who requested them.

The BStU is based in Berlin in the former MfS office building. It retained some aspects of the Stasi such as thoroughness in cataloging materials as well as preserving some parts of the building, like Mielke's office, as a museum. The fourteen other storage and access sites throughout Germany are located in Berlin, Chemnitz, Cottbus, Dresden, Erfurt, Frankfurt (Oder), Gera, Hall, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Neubrandenburg, Potsdam, Rostock, Schwerin, and Suhl.⁸⁰

In the twenty years since the establishment of the StUG and BStU: over 6.7 million requests and applications have been submitted, 2.8 million files have been shared with applicants, and there are 10,000 new applications a month to this day.⁸¹ Looking at the files for individuals can also have a greater meaning. For some it can be a point of stress, for others a point of pride. If one was being observed by the Stasi, then one could gain a sense of importance.

⁷⁸ Dennis, 238.

⁷⁹ Ash, 22.

⁸⁰ BStU "About the Archives," BStU www.bstu.bund.de/ (accessed December 20, 2012).

⁸¹ Helen Pidd, "Germans Piece Together Millions of Lives Spied On by Stasi," *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/13/east-germany-stasi-files-zirndorf> (accessed December 20, 2012).

However, if one is being accused of being an IM (both falsely and accurately) then it is a point of great fear. Both of these perspectives have called this experience, “Being Gaucked”.⁸²

The process of obtaining files is a relatively straightforward process. An application is sent and once confirmation of a file exists an archivist works with an applicant to find personal and background records. The only difficulty is with the large number of requests still remaining and the substantial backlog, the process can take up to two years to begin.

The research process within the BStU mirror the methods of the Stasi by using the F16 and F22 index cards and along with a computerized database. The archivist uses the files and writes a report containing the information and copies of the original records. These copies have restrictions, per the StUG, the names of unaffiliated third parties and bystanders who were not involved with a Stasi operation are blacked out. To ensure that their identity is protected, all original files are photocopied, the names of the uninvolved are redacted, and then the copy is again photocopied so that the redaction is opaque.

The Stasi files are an enormous source of information. The detail that the Stasi went into borders on the obscene, such as their use of scent rags. The file that one is given can contain information on who the IMs and Stasi monitoring officers were, notes from observation, transcripts from wiretaps and recorded conversations, and a listing of expenses that the Stasi paid to IMs.⁸³ In addition the files can go into the detailed personal history of the Stasi agents: their biography, family records, employment history, disciplinary records, and even medical records.⁸⁴ The Stasi did not just spy on citizens, but on its own agents as well.

These are the positive and successful actions that the Gauck Authority has done by enabling access, while maintaining privacy controls. However, this is still an incomplete record

⁸² Ash, 86.

⁸³ Ash, 129.

⁸⁴ Bruce, 31.

of the history of the MfS. There still exists a significant amount of material left over from when the Stasi was in power - 122 kilometers of shelf space of written documentation, 360,000 photographs, 600,000 negatives, and 99,600 tape recordings.⁸⁵ Much of it has been gone through and is organized, but it is still just a fraction of the amount of information that the Stasi gathered and archived in Abteilung XII. There are four restrictions that keep a full record from being created of the Stasi archive. They are the 17,000 sacks of torn and shredded paper, the decisions by the last government of the GDR, the lack of an HVA archive, and the question of the files validity.

As per the November 9th 1989 order, many of the files were burnt. This was not an easy process and the Stasi sought to save time by shredding and tearing many of the documents that it had collected. When the citizen committees stormed and occupied the Stasi offices throughout the country they came across sacks of torn paper. The sacks were taken to the Gauck Authority and were given to “puzzlers” to begin putting them back together. This arduous process has yielded few results after so many years. By 1997 only 500 sacks had been sorted. Were a lone individual given the task, it would take an estimate 500 years to complete the process. Technology improvements have allowed the BStU to digitally scan documents then use software to match pages, but it has only gone through 2,000 sacks in a few years with over 14,000 still remaining as of October 2012.⁸⁶

The process of returning the files to the people could have been made much simpler, but that the leaders of the East German protestors made controversial decisions. In the late 1980’s the Stasi began creating an electronic database of its files that were kept in a secured copper

⁸⁵ Jefferson Adams, “Probing the East German State Security Archives” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, 13 (2000): 22.

⁸⁶ Phillip Reeves, “Piecing Together ‘the World’s Largest Jigsaw Puzzle’,” NPR, <http://www.npr.org/2012/10/08/162369606/piecing-together-the-worlds-largest-jigsaw-puzzle> (accessed December 25, 2012).

lined room in the Berlin office. This computer made the process of the F16 indexes work considerably faster. In February 1990, the Roundtable Committee decided to destroy this computer system because the Roundtable feared that the Stasi might re-assert authority and doing so would hinder their work. The computer's destruction instead this made the task of the Gauck Authority much more difficult because they had to rebuild the database, wasting years of potential research.⁸⁷ The person who made this decision as well as several other questionable decisions was the last premiere of the GDR, Lothar de Maizière. There is some debate about his intentions. In the Stasi records there is an IM with the codename "Czerny" who lived at the same address and had a similar background as de Maizière, but he denies having been an IM.

Representative Rule in South Africa

Transition to Democracy

On February 2, 1990, F.W. de Klerk, who rose to the presidency of South Africa as a conservative, conceded to anti-apartheid activists. His announcement on that date released Nelson Mandela from prison and legalized the African National Congress (ANC) as a legitimate political party. With the assistance of the NIS and the ANC's intelligence service, behind the scenes discussions on negotiations took place. The two sides established a framework for a four-year timetable to transition the country from authoritarianism to an elected democracy. Part of the reason was due to political pressure to counter the tide of revolutions that spread over Eastern Europe.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Barbara Miller, *Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany* (London: Routledge Press, 1999), 7.

⁸⁸ Smaldone, 332.

In the four years that the NIS had to transition the country, they used it to burn or shred 44 tons of documents.⁸⁹ Millions of files on individuals and of the organization were intentionally sanitized.⁹⁰ Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Defense and Security, was in charge while the destruction took place, but did not admit to giving the order to that effect. What is known is that in 1993 the SSC ordered the destruction of all files to prevent accountability.⁹¹ This was in violation of the 1962 Archives Act, which required all state records be retained by the State Archive Service (SAS).

The apartheid government did not view the files as archival material. The reasoning can be traced back to a Senate Debate on January 31, 1962 when the Education Minister stated that secret records did not need to be monitored.⁹² The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that “On December 10, 1991 the state President’s office secured a state legal opinion indicating that sensitive documents were in their nature not archives, therefore not subject to the Archives Act.” It was also considered by the President’s office that sound recordings were not written documents therefore not archival material.⁹³ In some cases, “They simply authorized destruction without mentioning the Archives Act at all.”⁹⁴ Even as late as November 1994, the NIS issued guidelines on destroying files without authorization from the director of Archives.⁹⁵ It was not until November 1995 that the ANC announced a moratorium on the destruction of files.⁹⁶

In April 1994 Nelson Mandela was elected as the President of the Government of National Unity (GNU). As part of the government’s reform to challenge the intelligence service

⁸⁹ Sandy Africa, *Well Kept Secrets* (Midrand, South Africa: IGD House, 2009), 68.

⁹⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report. Volume One. October 29, 1998, 201

⁹¹ TRC Report, 202

⁹² TRC Report, 208-210.

⁹³ TRC Report, 210.

⁹⁴ TRC Report, 202.

⁹⁵ TRC Report, 212.

⁹⁶ TRC Report, 213.

the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was established. The TEC looked at the Australian and Canadian models of intelligence for its organizational structure, executive control, and parliamentary oversight features.⁹⁷

Several laws were passed in 1994 to reform the intelligence service: the Intelligence Services Act (No. 38, 1994), National Strategic Intelligence Act (No. 39, 1994), and the Parliamentary Committee Act on Intelligence (No. 40, 1994) that set up the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICC), which organized and briefed meetings for the South African president and parliament, as the SSC had done. The NICC also oversaw the separation of the NIS into four departments including the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS) that focused on foreign intelligence.⁹⁸ To ensure that individuals were not targeted unfairly and that the authoritarian tendency to spy on citizens was checked, the president was required to appoint an inspector general in charge of the NIA and the SASS to ensure that democratic norms were followed.⁹⁹

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

While the archives could not be saved, a debate emerged within South Africa on how best to transition the country away from the authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic society. The TRC was setup through the National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34, 1995), which gave citizens an opportunity to admit guilt to actions that took place under apartheid.¹⁰⁰ It was envisioned as a midway point between the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals and the Truth

⁹⁷ Kenneth R. Dombroski, "Reforming Intelligence: South Africa after Apartheid" *Journal of Democracy*, 17 (July 2006): 46-47.

⁹⁸ Smaldone, 380.

⁹⁹ Smaldone, 381.

¹⁰⁰ Carli Coetzee and Sarah Nuttall. "Introduction" in *Negotiating the past: The making of memory in South Africa*, eds Carli Coetzee and Sarah Nuttall (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4

and Reconciliation Committees of South American dictators.¹⁰¹ Amnesty was given as an incentive for citizens to take part in the process of healing the country. However, there were several restrictions to receiving amnesty: full disclosure had to take place, crimes that were politically motivated happening between January 1962 and December 1993, and actions such as murder would not be forgiven or placed under a statute of limitations.¹⁰²

The TRC existed from 1995-2002, four years longer than anticipated. It was divided into three committees: Human Rights Violations Committee, Amnesty Committee, and Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee. Approximately 21,000 victims spoke at hearings; the commission received 7,112 amnesty applications, amnesty was granted in 849 cases and refused in 5,392 cases.¹⁰³

Current Status

As there is no archive, there is no opportunity for citizens to know about their archives or how to manage it. The TRC allowed some information to come from the testimony of both citizens and high government officials, but it lacked a complete picture of what happened to many citizens in South Africa during apartheid.

The GNU passed laws to prevent intelligence agencies from destroying files and a new law on archives, the National Archives and Records Service of South Africa Act enacted in 1996, then renewed and amended to include cultural memories in 2001.¹⁰⁴ This completely

¹⁰¹ Maryam Kamali, "Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional justice in East Germany and South Africa" *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 40 (2001): 121.

¹⁰² Coetzee and Nuttall, 4.

¹⁰³ United States Institute of Peace, "Truth Commission: South Africa" United States Institute of Peace <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-africa> (accessed February 12, 2013).

¹⁰⁴ Holland, 137.

transformed the archives and information systems within the country. The Archival system has been modernized and enabled the state archival service to function as it was supposed to.

While the BOSS/NIS archive no longer exists, not all relevant information has been destroyed. The archive of documents from the office of the President's and the Foreign Ministry contain important records of the policies that the government made. This archive has survived mostly intact and can be used for scholars looking at operations made by the NIS that the upper echelons of government supported or directed.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Onslow, 370.

CHAPTER 4-ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

Results and Outcomes

Within each of the cases there were positive, negative, and mixed outcomes on archival openness and access. The context within each country is unique and the situations between the three cases are not parallel, but they provide examples of how information can best be saved and preserved. Or as a contrary note how files are more likely to be destroyed or hidden by the intelligence agencies.

The Soviet Union/Russia case was one of initial hope, but failed opportunity resulting in the closing of the archives. The policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* created expectations that the files would be made available. While some were accessible in the open period between 1991-1993, many archives remained closed, and the intelligence archives of the FCD, KGB, and GRU were not accessible without high-level authorization. The people who ran the agencies remained in their positions or were promoted within the Yelstin government, further entrenching the desire for secrecy. Lastly, citizens themselves did not organize to seek out information and instead revolted against the sharing of information to the Western world. They wanted access restricted only to Russians.

In the East Germany case there were many positive, but several negative decisions as well. The citizen groups that took action to protest against the government were well organized and sought to dismantle the regime using levers of power within the system. When groups took over the Stasi offices they did so by negotiation that allowed the intelligence officers their personal security as long as the files were not destroyed. Most importantly, when the government

was democratized and Germany re-unified, it appointed a commission to sort through the files and preserve them. The management of the archive was key because it now allows access to information, gives citizens the rights to look at their files, considers national security concerns, and places a high value on the personal privacy of individuals. However, the German government has imperiled the Gauck Authority multiple times with the threat of closure as well as shielding West German citizens and government officials from accountability.¹⁰⁶

The South Africa case is one that had both negative and positive outcomes. The change of leadership from Botha to de Klerk provided an opportunity for de Klerk to offer negotiations to the ANC and begin the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The context of the time pushed for these needed changes, but both sides had to seek out negotiation. While the political situation changed, the intelligence services hid and destroyed their archives of information under negligent and ulterior supervision. With a need to change both the society and uncover information that had been lost the TRC gave a platform for information to be brought to the public.

Relation to Archival Foundations

To compare and contrast the cases, the archival perspectives are a good standard by which to measure the results of the three cases. In the literature on the cases, there are situations and contexts that explain how and why some information was released, while some was not. In addition, this section will provide more answers to the four handling questions.

The principles of arrangement that Schellenberg advocates were followed only in the case of the former East Germany. Provenance and original order of the files were kept with the

¹⁰⁶ Dennis, 237.

intention of using the archives as evidence of the previous regime's actions.¹⁰⁷ The retrieval format allows a user or archivist to follow the collection process, and the files have been specifically kept connected to the Stasi. Originally, after re-unification, the archives were given to the central *Bundesarchiv* (German central archive), but they were subsequently separated and then placed within the BStU.¹⁰⁸ Schellenberg's principles do not apply in the cases of Russia and South Africa because there is no archive to access. Although the FSB and SVR retain the documents in the original order and provenance, access is denied.

Quintana's philosophy maintains that archives should be saved and used for democratic accountability. When looking at the cases, the results are complex. In Russia, the archive was kept hidden from the people and there was no accountability for any Communist leader for human rights violation. In East Germany and South Africa, as Kamali says:

Entire segments of society in East Germany and South Africa were implicated merely by functioning 'normally' under regimes based on an 'inverse moral order,' such as the repressive orders of communism and apartheid. Whereas South Africa has primarily chosen to pursue justice through collective accountability, East Germany's focus has been on individual accountability.¹⁰⁹

The German people and government managed to save the Stasi archive and made it available to citizens to remember the past. However, there was no governmental accountability against repressive leaders. The West German government attempted to prosecute Mielke, but could not apply West German law because the actions took place under a different jurisdiction. Mielke was only charged for the deaths of two police officers in 1931, and not for any human rights violations while in charge of the Stasi. He only served two years in prison before claiming

¹⁰⁷ Schellenberg, *Archival Principles of Arrangement*, 12.

¹⁰⁸ Geoffrey Giles, *Archivists and historians: The Crucial Partnership* (Washington DC, German Historical Institute, 1996), 17.

¹⁰⁹ Kamali, 91-92.

clemency for health reasons.¹¹⁰ The only people prosecuted for criminal actions were IMs who collaborated and six border guards who shot East Germans attempting to flee the country.¹¹¹

In South Africa, the TRC made an effort to engage in accountability even though the intelligence archives had been mostly destroyed and could not be used. Society desired the transition towards democracy using testimony at the hearings as a platform to speak, "... there has been a tremendous focus on the search for truth about the human rights violations committed by the previous regime, partly because many of the atrocities committed by these authoritarian regimes were conducted in secret."¹¹² The process was as much about recording information to preserve memory and activities as it was as a milestone in South Africa's history. The TRC conducted these hearings with the intention that the apartheid history would not be forgotten and that this could not happen again.

Mnemnocide, as Sleeman defines it, is not just about physical destruction, but also ignoring information or preventing access to records. Mnemnocide is evident in all three cases - significant amounts of information have been lost to history and will never be known.

Following the Soviet *glasnost* reforms, there was a reasonable expectation that the opening of the Soviet Archives would continue under Yeltsin.¹¹³ In 1988, Vladimir Rubanov, the head of the KGB Analysis Directorate, wrote openly about the dangers of "Cult of Secrecy" within the KGB.¹¹⁴ After the attempted coup in 1991, Gorbachev appointed a reformer, Vadim

¹¹⁰ Adrienne M. Quill, "To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Problems Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic." *Indiana International and Comparative Law Review*, 7 (1996):183-184.

¹¹¹ Stephen R. Ratner and Jason R. Abrams. *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001), 172.

¹¹² Kamali, 92.

¹¹³ Knight, *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 326

¹¹⁴ Vladimir Rubanov "From a Cult of Secrecy to an Information Culture" in *Russian Libraries in Transition: An anthology of Glasnost Literature*, ed. Dennis Kimage (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company Inc, 1992), 59-61.

Bakatin, as the new KGB chief.¹¹⁵ After seeing how the Czechs and East Germans had demolished their security states, Bakatin, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin insisted on a more gradual and controlled approach.¹¹⁶ Patricia Grimstead notes that seven years after the transition that there were, and still remain, too many obstacles in place to gain access to the KGB archive.¹¹⁷ As Kramer discussed, Vladimir Putin is retaining the restrictions on access and is re-classifying some material.¹¹⁸

West Germany, before beginning the re-unification process, sought to limit the release of information. The leaders in Bonn thought that the files would be harmful to the stability of the state by preventing any potential East German from attaining political office and the BND thought that a release of documentation would mean that their own intelligence practices would be compromised.¹¹⁹

The negotiation with the BStU ensured that no information about West German citizens or the government could be released, only those of East German citizens. Martin Sabrow observes that in West Germany, when negotiating the re-unification treaty, it stated that records could be released if they contained no personal information, but if personal information was contained then the files must be restricted. The problem of corruption of records retention is

¹¹⁵ J. Michael Waller, "Russia: Death and Resurrection of the KGB" *Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes*, eds. Ilan Berman and J. Michael Waller (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers inc, 2006), 10.

¹¹⁶ Waller, 12.

¹¹⁷ Patricia Grimstead, "Archives of Russia Seven Years After: 'purveyors of Sensations' or 'shadows Cast to the Past'?" *Working Paper #20*, Cold War International History Project, Washington DC (September 1998): 8-14.

¹¹⁸ Kramer, 208.

¹¹⁹ Dennis, 239.

highlighted by the example of Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor of Germany, when he safeguarded his own file from scrutiny despite being a public official.¹²⁰

Balancing the demands of justice versus political stability of the country, Kamali describes how memory within South Africa could be ignored. To encourage individuals to speak at the TRC, the lure of amnesty was offered. “Amnesty can play an important role in the approach a transitional society uses to come to terms with the past. However, amnesty is also a dangerous tool if the new democratic governments use it injudiciously, thereby risking a public amnesia.”¹²¹ This was the TRC’s blind spot; many of those who took part in the Commissions did so with the expectation of amnesty from criminal prosecution. As amnesty could only be given within set boundaries, those who had participated in tactics beyond the parameters chose not to come forward.¹²² Indeed, in TRC testimony, former ministers within the apartheid government, such as Adriaan Vlok, accepted responsibility for crimes only if given amnesty. Files would not be re-opened, and the TRC would be the last word on the subject of apartheid.¹²³

The research relating to intelligence archives rests on the assumption that the information coming from the files is true. Burton describes how archives cannot escape the situation where they are made, and the people who look at them after may see them in a different light. As she says, “the relationship between fact and fiction, truth and lies, is a matter of heated discussion”.¹²⁴ The “truth-telling” process becomes complicated when discerning what is true

¹²⁰ Martin Sabrow, “Quarrel over the Stasi files” in *Institutions of Public Memory: the legacies of German and American politicians*, ed Astrid Eckert (Washington DC, German Historical Institute, 2007), 47.

¹²¹ Kamali, 101-102.

¹²² Anthony Holiday, “Forgiving and Forgetting: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in *Negotiating the Past: Making Memory in South Africa*, eds. Carli Coetzee and Sarah Nuttal (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), 47.

¹²³ TRC Special Hearings, State Security Council Hearings (Johannesburg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, October 14, 1997) <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/security/1securit.htm> (accessed December 10, 2012).

¹²⁴ Burton, 4

goes against perception and how others manipulate perception. Documentation by itself cannot provide an understanding of history.

An example from Russia is the story of Vassiliev's notebooks. Alexander Vassiliev, a journalist and former KGB agent, was allowed access to the FCD archives. Between 1994 and 1996, he worked with an American historian and publishing company to research KGB activities in the West in the 1930s and 1940s.¹²⁵ Vassiliev's notes were summarized and scrutinized by the SVR before being given to the American historian. The project stalled when the SVR put up hurdles to access, and the contract was eventually cancelled.¹²⁶ Vassiliev later smuggled his notebooks into the West where Western scholars verified, transcribed, and translated them thereby becoming the source for several books.*¹²⁷ But historian Amy Knight has denounced Vassiliev's notebooks as a narrow, one-sided perspective on Soviet history from the FCD archives. She calls the notebooks "Soviet style history" because they only contain select information, filtered for an American audience with pre-selected information making them untrustworthy.¹²⁸

In Germany, gaining access to the Stasi files was for many East German citizens an attempt to learn the truth about what happened under observation. Peter Betts in "I Want My File" said reading one's file could either be a second betrayal or a moment of joy depending on whether or not the people you trusted had been informers.¹²⁹ However, Barbara Miller looked at the lives of former Stasi IMs and the way they have been treated. Although most were forced to

*Note: Two books that came from Vassiliev's notes were *The Haunted Woods: Soviet Espionage in America* and *Spies: the Rise and Fall of the KGB in America*.

¹²⁵ G. Edward White, "Alexander Vassiliev & Alger Hiss part I." *Green bag Inc.* (Summer 2009): 459

¹²⁶ White, 466

¹²⁷ John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr "Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks and the Documentation of Soviet Intelligence activities in the United States during the Stalin Era" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11 (Summer 2009): 8.

¹²⁸ Knight, *Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles*, 335.

¹²⁹ Peter Betts, "I Want My File" *History Today*, 59 (October 2009): 35-36.

become IMs under threat, they have faced social ostracism and some have been be fired from jobs when their names were found on the list of IMs. While the victims of the Stasi are able to tell their view of history as it comes from the Stasi archive, the IMs have not been able to tell their perspective. Their stories are only part of the narrative, but how can they be truth tellers in a situation where the truth is difficult to explain?¹³⁰

Burton writes about South Africa and the TRC specifically as they were attempting to discuss what is truth. The mechanics of the process are explained by Berat and Shain - the goals in this process were to punish those who committed crimes and to expose the truth.¹³¹ They explain that there is a divide between seeking information and compelling others to give it, and there had been a “carrot and stick” approach in South Africa. The “truth-telling” aspect is sought, but retribution remains a factor if the members of the former regime refused to come to the TRC. This would also settle most accounts within the country on what is truth. This was because there was an impetus for those involved in the TRC to get their perspective into the written record without and not leave gaps filled out by other people.¹³²

Validity of the documentation

*"If you give a document to an American they think it is real, if you give a document to a Russian they think it is forged" -Malcolm Byrne.*¹³³

A fundamental question is whether the information within an intelligence archive is true or fabricated. The KGB’s Department S within the FCD developed a long running “Active

¹³⁰ Miller, 10-16.

¹³¹Lynn Berat and Yossi Shain, “Retribution or Truth-telling in South Africa? Legacies of the transition phase.” *Law and Social Inquiry*, 20 (Winter 1995): 166.

¹³² Baret and Shain, 187-189.

¹³³ Malcolm Byrne, interview with author, National Security Archive, Washington DC, June 16, 2012.

Measures” campaign to forge documents.¹³⁴ The Stasi, like most intelligence agencies, forged many documents to assist in operations. When the protestors rushed into the Stasi archives, the officers put many such files within reach to misdirect them.¹³⁵

A possible counter to the forgery claim is that within the Soviet Union, there was near total control of communication and government services making it easier to simply withhold information rather than go the extra step in forging information.¹³⁶ Also within the GDR, former MfS colonel Kurt Zeiseweis stated, “the files need to be operationally effective”.¹³⁷ Gauck himself said it best: “In Germany, we have twice experienced the fact that dictators were good bookkeepers.”¹³⁸ Timothy Garton Ash investigated his own Stasi file, tracked down the people named, and discovered that while there were many small inaccuracies and distortions in the file, such as incorrect dates, times, and misspellings, the files were more or less accurate.¹³⁹ In South Africa, the burning of the archives does not allow the validity to be examined.

Alternative examples

The three cases are useful to consider how a country transitions from authoritarianism to a democracy and what happens to their intelligence records. However, there are many variables in a transition making it impossible to predict how a country will take the steps to open their intelligence archives. Each case is unique, “there is a difference between an intelligence agency that spies on people and one that murders people.”¹⁴⁰ In addition, economic and cultural factors

¹³⁴ US Information Agency, *Soviet Active Measures* (College Park, MD: National Archives II, 1984)

¹³⁵ Miller, 6.

¹³⁶ Raymond Hutchings, *Soviet Secrecy and Non-secrecy* (Hong Kong: MacMillan Press, 1987), 8.

¹³⁷ Adams, 29.

¹³⁸ Adams, 28.

¹³⁹ Ash, 30.

¹⁴⁰ Hope Harrison, interview with author, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, August 2, 2012.

play a significant role. These two alternative examples, Iraq and Libya, show how further research must be done and the archival foundations will be tested by different cases.

Iraq

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime in 2003, the Iraqi archival and civil structure collapsed as well. The state archives were looted, files were found in markets, and there was no interest to control or retain the archives. The files were not retained in any arrangement; accountability was through vigilantism, as was the "truth-telling".¹⁴¹ The current government has not made any apparent effort to secure the surviving records.

At the same time there remains a collection of four million Baathist records being held by the US government. They contain records on informers, victims, and military activities. Initially the US government, under pressure from Republicans, put the files on the internet with no redaction. After the New York Times discovered the sensitive knowledge, the files were withdrawn.¹⁴² They now reside at the National Defense University's Conflict Records Resource Center (CRRC). Approval from an Institutional Review Board is required to gain access to most files, while the military and security sensitive records are inaccessible.¹⁴³ This management ensures that the privacy of individuals are retained while ensuring access for scholars and individuals who are seeking their records; however, while the records are secure, they are being retained outside of the country of origin and only meet Schellenberg's perspective on archives.

¹⁴¹ Sleeman, 191.

¹⁴² William Broad "Web Archive is Said to Reveal a Nuclear Primer" *New York Times*, November 3 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/world/middleeast/03cnd-documents.html> (accessed January 30, 2013).

¹⁴³ National Defense University "Conflict Records Research Center" <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm?secID=140&pageID=4&type=section> (accessed January 30, 2013).

Libya

The fall of the Ghaddaffi regime in August 2011 ended forty years of a brutal dictatorship that kept records on the movement and actions of many people inside and outside of Libya. The rebellion started in Benghazi and spread throughout the country, eventually capturing the capital city of Tripoli. Due to the length of the Libyan uprising, the intelligence service had time to burn thousands of documents and scatter many of them around the country. An organization called “Wikileaks Libya” - based on the better known Wikileaks, but both are unaffiliated- has posted documents on an irregular basis. Many of the files are posted without context, there is no redaction, and there is no way to prove that the files are true.¹⁴⁴ The lack of information on who is responsible and the lack of proper accountability does not bode well for archival access. The lessons of South Africa can be applied and in regards to the nature of the archives, Sleeman and Burton are prescient, but the situation is ongoing and cannot be stated just yet. The country has stated an interest in following the model of Spain after the death of Francisco Franco.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Wikileaks Libya, <http://www.facebook.com/Wikileaks.libya?ref=ts&fref=ts> (accessed September 15, 2012).

¹⁴⁵ Mike Elkin, “Libya Looks to Spain as Model for State Building” *New York Times*. April 10, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/world/middleeast/libya-looks-to-spain-as-model-for-state-building.html?pagewanted=all> (Access April 11, 2013)

CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSION

This research has examined three cases and four theoretical foundations to try to answer the question, “What happens to intelligence archives when authoritarian regimes collapse?” This is done to develop an understanding of how archives should be dealt with when there is no government or structure that created them. The laws are changed, the people removed from power, and the social culture changes from closed to open.

The research suggests that while there is a desire for more open and available information by the people, it is not likely for the information from intelligence archives to be released even in the best situations. The intelligence officers have significant control and leverage on what can be released even as their power crumbles and they have the ability to destroy the files if they have the intention. Governments may have an interest in stability and self-preservation of the politicians above the welfare of the people or for justice.

Why try to have the archives opened? Simply, it is because the people have mostly desired it. There is a need to know who spied on whom and who can they trust. They want to know about their own lives, and how they can move forward in a new society. Undeniably there will be social chaos, but in every country that has undergone the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, there has been a desire to know.

This research has looked at the three cases and come to the conclusion that the process to undergo this transition is very complex, errors will happen, and that files will be destroyed, but it is a process that will take place. There are many concerns from national security, privacy, and economics that will affect the transition of the archives. Transitional or successor governments

and archivists should be more proactive in their role as preservers of information, but are well aware of how it cannot be done easily or quickly.

This thesis is not intended as a prediction or be proscriptive of what will happen in other countries, each nation has unique cultural and historical contexts. However, all nations have or will have an intelligence service of some kind for national security interests both foreign and domestic. The three case studies are models of lessons learned and decisions made that other nations can consider.

In the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, there are three main variables in the cases to tell if the archives were opened to the public: First, was there a transition of leadership at the head of the government? Second, was there a significant personnel changes inside the intelligence agencies? Third, how fast did the transition take place?

The Russian case study is an example of a **negative** outcome. There was a change of leadership from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, but Yeltsin was a leader in the Communist party even if he was a reformer. The personnel within the KGB and FCD mostly remained in place and the name of the organization was changed, but not many significant reforms occurred. Lastly, the transition was slow and stopped many times along the way.

The German case study is an example of a **positive** outcome, with some exceptions. The protestors forced the SED to give up power, the Roundtable came in as a transitional body, elections brought in a democratic government, and Germany re-unified. Mielke was removed from power in November 1989. Wolf, after “self-dissoluting”¹⁴⁶ the HVA, was also removed.

¹⁴⁶ Ash, 87

The transition occurred between October 1989 and February 1990, which is fast for most revolutions.

The South Africa case study is a **mixed** example. FW de Klerk willingly began the transition and eventually Nelson Mandela was elected president. As a show of goodwill, Mandela invited de Klerk to be a part of the GNU. The intelligence service took the opportunity to sanitize their history, and in 1995 the personnel amalgamated into the NIA. The NIS had enough time to destroy records during the four years of transition, but considering the impact apartheid had on society, the transition needed time.

In summary, this research is attempting to point out that neither intelligence services nor members of a government should have the responsibility of overseeing their intelligence archive as the country transitions into democracy. The intelligence services should claim primacy and retain materials for the national security concerns, but left to their own devices they will exculpate themselves for human rights violations by destroying or hiding documentation. So it imperative that archivists and members of civil society be proactive, rather than reactive.

Table 1. Summary of Handling Questions

	Soviet Union/Russia	Germany	South Africa
What were the initial decisions by the government for handling the intelligence archives?	Some archives were opened up to the public from 1992-1993, but the KGB archive was not opened.	The archives were saved, a commission was developed, and attempts to dismantle the archive were halted.	The NIS officers and administrators believed that their actions could undergo scrutiny and legal ramifications, so they gave the decision to destroy the archive.
Who managed the archives?	The KGB retained the structure and the archives; the name of the organization was changed to the FSB and SVR.	Initially groups of citizens, then the government appointed Joachim Gauck as the chair of the BStU, which currently runs the archive.	The NIS controlled access to its archive, withholding information from the State Archive Service.
Where were the files located?	The FCD archives were located at Yasenova. Information was released through partnerships with Western organizations, the Mitrokhin archive, or former Soviet satellite states.	The Stasi archives were located around the country, the main archive was located within Berlin. The files have been retained where they were originally located.	They were located in the main offices of the NIS in Johannesburg.
What is the status of the archives now? (Are they available, and if so, to whom?)	Access to the KGB archives is closed or highly restricted.	The BstU maintains the archive with full access to all individuals who request their files, the only restriction is the two year backlog of previous requests.	The files were destroyed in a controlled fashion. The information no longer exists, but the TRC process enabled some citizens to find closure.
How have the archives been used?	Unused within Russia. Within former Soviet satellite states the archives have been used to find information on intelligence officers and informers.	This has been a model for other countries to follow, developing a commission to allow access while preserving privacy.	The archives do not exist, but the TRC process is considered a model for other countries after undergoing authoritarian rule.

Table 2. Summary of Archival Foundations

	Soviet Union/Russia	Germany	South Africa
Schellenberg	There is no official access to the KGB archives by scholars, however, the files are kept in the same provenance and original order	Access to the files is possible, with some restrictions. The files have been re-organized into the same provenance and original order as they were created.	The archives were almost completely destroyed, the files that remain are not organized and there is little access to them.
Quintana	The KGB transformed into the FSB, did not undergo accountability, and the archives were not protected by the government.	Even though the archives and the files were saved, the government did not use them to seek accountability or punish leaders or Stasi officials that violated the human rights of East German citizens	While the information copied into physical format does not exist. The TRC process created space for accountability and to save information for the future
Sleeman	While the archives were not destroyed they remain hidden, the information is inaccessible, and files have been re-classified	Only certain files became completely open, many restrictions were put in place to prevent the release of information on: national security, West German citizens, and government officials	Not only with the destruction of the archives did information become lost, but also within the TRC. The amnesty process compelled some sources to come forward, but for others it preserved the secrecy of some knowledge
Burton	Some information such as Mitrokhin's archives and Vassiliev's notebooks has been released, but that information is only tells a small part of the history, leaving vast gaps in knowledge and understanding of what is the truth in the archives.	The information released created rifts inside the country and some narratives were given support over others, while there has been time to heal the notion of "truth" is still elusive	The "truth-telling" process is complicated. There must be a balance between seeking information and pushing for it at the same time.

Future Research

The research of these three case studies has been both a study of intelligence archives as well as the three countries themselves. I was a scholar of the Middle East with a significant background of knowledge of the region, and my interest in this topic of intelligence archives began with the 2011 Arab Spring transition. I will continue to be looking at the region, but I will focus on the collection of these files. While there still remains little scholarship, in time more will be written about topic. It is my hope to either be an advocate or to be engaged in the process of collecting these files for sharing information to those who were repressed by the previous regimes.

In addition, future research would look at how the policies made within the three cases as well as in the United States, such as the Freedom of Information Act, have had an impact on additional cases.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1. History of the Soviet Intelligence Service





Figure 2. Organization of the KGB¹⁴⁷



¹⁴⁷ Desmond Ball and Robert Windrem, "Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Organization and Management," *Intelligence and National Security* 4(1989): 623.