This dissertation examines the behavioral traits of business executives that lead to financial misconduct. The first essay investigates whether executives act more honestly when ethical considerations are made to stand out in an obvious way. In behavioral experiments, individuals are less likely to cheat when the saliency of dishonesty is increased (Mazar et al. 2008; Gino et al. 2009). We test this hypothesis in a real world setting by treating news about high-profile political scandals as shocks to the salience of unethical/illegal behavior. Analyzing corporate insiders’ stock trading activity, we find evidence of a reduction in inappropriate behavior during these periods. Insiders’ stock sales are less profitable and they are less likely to sell stock ahead of large price declines, suggesting less illegal insider trading. The results are concentrated in months with high levels of local media attention to political scandals, supporting an interpretation that the salience of these events affects insiders’ behavior. The relation is also stronger when an executives’ firm is aligned politically with the accused politician, suggesting that a scandal is more salient to “in-group” executives. However, the behavioral changes appear to be largely transitory and evidence of suspect trading resumes in subsequent years. The second essay examines the effect of envy on executive misbehavior. We provide evidence that envy can lead to executive misbehavior in the form of insider trading. Insiders at underperforming firms headquartered where more other firms are performing well demonstrate greater evidence of informed insider trading. Their stock trades generate higher abnormal returns, and they are more likely to sell stock ahead of a large price decline. We find similar evidence of profitable insider sales when CEOs suffer large pay gaps from their local peers. Envy motivated trading is more apparent in locations where household give less to charities, which may indicate higher levels of greed on average.